From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941. 
Purple (Extremely urgent)
#1189. (Part 1 of 2)


At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.


HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:


A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."


B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.


(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment fir French Indo-China.


(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.


(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.


(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

Army 25441                                           Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo 
November 26, 1941 
Purple (Extremely urgent) 
#1189. (Part 2 of 2)


(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.


(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.


(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.


(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)


In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

Army: 25442                                          Trans. 11-28-41 (1)