[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
5 December 1941
(Purple)
#1261 (In 2 parts, complete)
On
the 5th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on Secretary Hull, and,
putting the matter contained in your instructions in writing, submitted it to
him.
Hull:
"You explain the matter as if the Chinese have concentrated troops near
the border and that there is a fear that they would take aggressive
action."
We:
"Whether or not they would attack and where from if they do attack,
depends entirely on such things as the military strengths of each and on other
considerations. We who do not have a clear picture of the exact conditions on
the scene, cannot make any explanations other than those contained in the
instructions we receive.
"However,
the fact remains that there is a possibility that the Chinese would take the
offensive. We have been in receipt of advices for some time past that the
Chinese have been concentrating large forces in the Kwangsi area."
Hull
said that he would relay the explanations to the President.
While
we were there, we continued along the following line:
"Fundamentally
speaking, it was because we wanted to avoid just exactly what happened as a
result—namely, the misinterpretations and the consequent belligerent argumentations—of
the President's most recent inquiries, that we wished to bring about a speedy
settlement through our 20 November proposal.
"You
keep bringing up the subject of our occupation of French Indo-China. Basically
this is merely a phase of 'power politics'. Your country herself, has stated
that the 'best defense is an offense'. Your military men in particular have
taken this adage literally, and as proof thereof, have been making every effort
to strengthen the army and the fleet of the ABCD. With this situation being
flaunted before their eyes, our army and navy cannot remain unconcerned."
So
saying, we repeated the gist of the contents of your message #878**.
(Part 2)
Hull:
"Since these conversations were started this spring until 24 July when
Japan occupied the southern part of French Indo-China the United States
continued to permit the exporting of oil to Japan During that time, I was the
target of terrific criticism for allowing this, from Senators and from many
other sources. Even in those times, the opposition to allowing this was of
blistering intensity. Public opinion would absolutely prohibit the resumption
of exporting of petroleum to Japan today."
We:
"If the relationship between Japan and the United States underwent some
improvement and if peaceful cooperation between our two countries is
established, in accordance with that which is our Excellency's custom to
advocate, the concern you express now would automatically be dissolved.
We
are convinced that the correct starting point leading to the above described ideal situation, is to
settle our major differences individually, rather than attempt to reach a
blanket agreement, along the lines proposed by us on 20 November."
Hull
then pointed out that the general tone of our press and other publications were
making it difficult for the United States and Japan to reach an agreement. We
therefore said that the same can be said of a portion of the U. S. press and
went on to relate to him the contents of paragraph 1 of your message #878**.
(Translator's
note: Last 5 lines of text unreadable).
25842
JD-1: 7139 (D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)
**JD-1: 7049 (S.I.S. #25720).
*JD-1: 7105.
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)