----------------------------------------------------------------- NAVY & MARINE CORPS WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE COMMITTEE A service of Navy Chief of Information Office (703)695-3161/DSN 225-3161 ----------------------------------------------------------------- The Battle of the Atlantic By Jack Gallant WWII Committee The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest campaign of World War II, and one of the most costly. Action began Sept. 3, 1939, when the British ocean liner Athenia was sunk off the coast of Ireland by the submarine U-30. It ended with the German surrender on May 7, 1945. Germany mounted a powerful naval and air campaign against England in an attempt to prevent munitions and materials from reaching the British Isles. The submarine was the principal weapon, with heavy surface units and Luftwaffe aircraft also attacking shipping. Despite adoption of the convoy system, British losses continued to mount. Antisubmarine tactics were still being developed, and heavy Royal Navy surface units were retained in home waters to meet any threats from German naval units acting as commerce raiders. Taking advantage of the situation, U-boats began operating in "wolf packs," at times numbering more than two dozen submarines. They shadowed the convoys during the day, attacked on the surface at night, then submerged safely before the escorts could attack. For the Germans, July through October 1940 was known as the "happy time." They sank 217 ships with a loss of only two U-boats. When the Royal Air Force won the Battle of Britain, more convoy escorts became available. Additionally, the British response was more coordinated with the establishment of Western Approaches Command at Liverpool and the Newfoundland Escort Force at St. John. The threat of long-range German air attacks was reduced by the development of Catapult Aircraft Merchant ships, or CAM ships, which carried and launched one or two planes for air cover. Later, escort carriers gave the convoys their own air forces for trans-Atlantic operations, and the Royal Air Force Coastal Command concentrated attacks against U-boats off the western coast of Europe. In September 1941, the U.S. Navy, while technically neutral, began escorting convoys from Canada and the East Coast to an open ocean hand-off point 400 miles west of Iceland. USS Kearny, one of five U.S. destroyers reinforcing a 50-ship convoy south of Iceland, was the target of a three-torpedo spread fired by U-568 on Oct. 15. Kearny, nearly cut in two, survived, but 11 of her crew died. They were the first American naval casualties of the war. The freighter Lehigh, clearly identified as American, was sent to the bottom off the West African coast by U-126 in daylight four days later. On Oct. 31, 1941, the U.S. destroyer Reuben James was torpedoed by U-55 and sunk while escorting a convoy east from Halifax; 115 men died. British technology and techniques for protecting convoys and locating and sinking submarines improved significantly. Long-range aircraft using radar and improved underwater detection aboard ships were particularly effective. Frustrated, Grand Admiral of the German Navy Karl Doenitz shifted his U-boat efforts to the coast of West Africa. But after war was declared against the United States in December 1941, he concentrated submarine operations along the Atlantic seaboard, the Caribbean, and into the Gulf of Mexico. The U-boat war reached America on Jan. 12, 1942, when U-123 sank the British steamer Cyclops off Cape Cod, Massachusetts, with the loss of 87. A second "happy time" for the U-boats began with the sinking of 65 ships in February, 86 in March, 69 in April and 111 in May. The toll of lost ships and men increased. U.S. antisubmarine efforts against the Germans were at first disorganized, uncoordinated and ineffective. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard protected convoys with limited success because they lacked sufficient escort ships. The Army Air Corps could only provide short-range air cover for shipping as it sailed to England. The tide of battle against the U-boats did not turn until May 1943 when the concentrated efforts of the antisubmarine campaign forced Doenitz to again withdraw his forces from the convoy routes. SOURCE: Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Navy & Marine Corps World War II Commemorative Committee Navy Office of Information (CHINFO) The Pentagon, Room 2E352 Washington, DC 20350-1200 -----------------------------------------------------------------