Subject: WEU Assembly report 1396

From: YVES ROBINS <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 1993 11:45:10 EST

/pub/history/military/a-weu/documents
File: 1396defc.mar

Document 1396                                      9th November 1993

      An operational organisation for WEU:  naval co-operation -
                  Part One:  Adriatic operations
                              -------

                             REPORT (1)

        submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee (2)
               by Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Speed,
                       Joint Rapporteurs

                        TABLE OF CONTENTS
                        =================

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION

    on an operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operation -
    Part One: Adriatic operations

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

    submitted by Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Speed, Joint Rapporteurs

      I.  Introduction

     II.  Previous recommendations

    III.  Sharp Guard

      (a)  History
      (b)  Mission
      (c)  Nations contributing forces
      (d)  Organisation
      (e)  Fighter aircraft
      (f)  Maritime patrol aircraft
      (g)  NATO airborne early warning
      (h)  Rules of engagement
      (i)  Achievements

     IV.  Political purpose and practical reality

      V.  The question

     VI.  Problem areas

    VII.  Provisional conclusion

                              -------

                      Draft Recommendation
                      ====================

  on an operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operation -
                 Part One: Adriatic operations

  The Assembly,

    Considering that the meeting of the WEU Council on
22nd November 1993 and the NATO summit on 10th January 1994
provide excellent opportunities to establish WEU's position as
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance;

    Conscious of the efforts made by WEU and NATO to ensure a
coherent arrangement for naval and maritime air operations in the
Adriatic;

    Welcoming the Atlantic Alliance's willingness to accommodate
a WEU presence in the previously NATO-dedicated headquarters in
Naples;

    Much appreciating NATO's readiness to make its infrastructure
available to WEU, at least on an ad hoc basis;

    Regretting the WEU Council's failure to agree an appropriate
budget for WEU's participation in operation Sharp Guard,

    RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

    Actively prepare and promote WEU's position as the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, and make this explicit at the
forthcoming NATO summit meeting;

    Negotiate a formal agreement with the North Atlantic Council
for WEU's use of NATO infrastructure as appropriate for specific
operations;

    Urgently make available an adequate working budget for the
WEU element on the staff of COMNAVSOUTH in Naples and for the WEU
CONMARFOR at sea in the Adriatic;

    Review its lines of communication with those involved under
the aegis of WEU in the command and control of specific
operations, notably in the Adriatic area and restructure links
between itself and such subsidiary bodies, giving clear mandates
and specific terms of reference to all concerned;

    Ensure that the roles of the Planning Cell, of the WEU
Military Delegates and the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff in
relation to those involved in operations on behalf of the WEU are
clarified, redefining tasks and responsibilities as a matter of
priority;

    Encourage member states to support Adriatic operations in all
ways possible and publicise the achievements of operation Sharp
Guard;
    Pay tribute to the thousands of men and women from WEU and
other alliance nations taking part in operations in the Adriatic
area who, both at sea and ashore, are carrying out an almost
thankless task, often in trying and frustrating conditions and
ensure that such breaches of the embargo as are continuing
elsewhere receive additional attention so that the efforts of the
sailors of the allied nations are rendered worthwhile;

    Explore, with the other member states of the WEU Forum of
Consultation with maritime assets, the possibility of such assets
being made available in support of operations in the Adriatic.

                              -------

                      Explanatory Memorandum
                      ======================

  (submitted by Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Speed, Joint Rapporteurs)

I.  Introduction
----------------

  In the course of their fact finding in preparation for the
presentation of the report on "An operational organisation for
WEU - naval co-operation", your Rapporteurs have discovered such
ramifications to the subject, with many more fundamental
principles at stake than were initially apparent, that they have
decided to present the report in two parts rather than seek to
postpone discussion to a future session.

  Certain aspects of the specific naval operations in the
Adriatic require immediate attention and therefore this first
part deals with the maritime task in hand. Part Two will deal
with the wider issues involved and elaborate further on the
structures and links required for the future conduct by WEU of
naval operations in general.

II.  Previous recommendations
-----------------------------

  During the Assembly's plenary session, in June 1993, the
following recommendations were unanimously adopted:

    "Recommendation 543

    The Assembly,

(i)    Recalling Recommendations 506, 512, 519, 525, 530 and 531
and in particular the recommendations to:

        (a)  Prepare a resolution to be tabled by WEU members of
the United Nations Security Council to reinforce the present
embargo at least to the level of that enforced against Iraq in
1990/91 and in particular to take account of the problem of cargo
in transit and also of the complications of the Danube Convention
and to publish evidence at an early stage of any significant
breach of the embargo;

        (b)  Fulfil its pledge for WEU member states to "offer
expertise, technical assistance and equipment to the governments
of Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river Danube
for the purpose of circumventing or breaking the sanctions
imposed by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 713 and
757" and in particular respond to Romania's request for
assistance;

        (c)  In conjunction with the NATO authorities,
rationalise naval and maritime air operations in the Adriatic
area to form composite and cost-effective forces;

    (ii)    Pleased that WEU has signed memoranda of
understanding with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania on helping
police the Danube and that such operations are already producing
a deterrent effect on possible sanction breakers;

    (iii)    Pleased that WEU and NATO have agreed a composite
force for Adriatic operations (operation Sharp Guard) with a
joint command in Naples;

(iv)    Pleased that all member countries are in one way or
another fully supporting UN-mandated operations in the Adriatic,
on the Danube, or in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia or Slovenia and
considering such action already a symbol of European willingness
to co-operate in the field of security;

(v)    Pleased that the Greek Government has more actively
encouraged the application of UN-mandated sanctions;

(vi)    Considering that the memoranda of understanding signed
with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania are a tangible sign of the
good and practical relations prevailing in the WEU Forum of
Consultation;

(vii)    Welcoming the recent contacts between WEU and both
Russia and the Ukraine over the application of the UN embargo;

(viii)    Convinced that the Council should initiate a specific
exercise programme so that forces now answerable to WEU may train
together on a regular basis at all levels and further suggesting
that the ideal starting point for such a programme would be the
forthcoming Ardente 93 exercise in Italy;

(ix)    Congratulating the Council and the Presidency on their
initiatives,

    RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL

1.    Inform the Assembly of the terms of the memoranda of
understanding signed with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania and in
particular make explicit any security guarantees given to any or
all of these countries;

    2.    Ensure that the longer-term political implications of
WEU's involvement in operations on the Danube and in the Adriatic
are fully studied and appreciated;

3.    Explore with the Greek authorities ways of helping them
ensure complete and visible compliance with all UN sanctions even
to the extent of asking member states to second customs and/or
police officers to help with the task;

4.    Encourage the Russian authorities to give practical
expression to their offer to help ensure that all embargos are
fully respected on the border between Serbia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina;

    5.    Develop the liaison established with the Ukranian
authorities with a view to signing a possible memorandum of
understanding for WEU to provide technical assistance to the
Ukraine so that UN sanctions may be seen to be fully respected;

6.    Urge the UN to implement a compensation scheme to reimburse
at least in part those countries such as Greece, Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania, which have suffered considerable financial
loss as a result of embargo enforcement;

7.    Publish full details of the nationality, identity and
characteristics of all vessels found breaking the embargo in the
Adriatic and on the Danube in defiance of United Nations
resolutions."

  The Council's reply to these recommendations reads as follows:

"1.  The Council will consider the possibilities of informing the
Assembly of the terms of the memoranda of understanding.

The memoranda of understanding contain no security guarantees.
The Council would however reiterate the terms of the last
subparagraph of paragraph 4 of the communique of the meeting of
the WEU Forum of Consultation at Ministerial level, held in Rome
on 20th May 1993: "Moreover, Ministers underlined the importance
of containing the current conflict and agreed that, were any
country to suffer from aggressive action as a consequence of
their support for UN-mandated operations, this would be a matter
of direct concern to the international community".

2.  The Council is fully aware of the need to study and
appreciate the "longer-term political implications of WEU's
involvement in operations on the Danube and in the Adriatic".

3.  The Council reiterates that the embargo is the responsibility
of the United Nations Security Council. WEU's assistance to the
Danube riparian states was sought by those countries. In this
context, the Council is not planning "to explore with the Greek
authorities ways of helping them ensure complete and visible
compliance with all UN sanctions even to the extent of asking
member states to second customs and/or police officers to help
with the task".

4.  The Council takes due note of the Assembly's proposal. Member
states' governments have been unstinting in their encouragement,
both within the UN Security Council and in their bilateral
relations with the Government of the Russian Federation.

5.  The Council attaches the utmost importance to compliance with
United Nations sanctions. The main aim of the contacts
established with Ukraine was to consider supplying equipment to
help the Ukrainian authorities implement the embargo. There were
no plans, however, to ask WEU to coordinate a technical
assistance operation to this end.

6.  This problem comes under the sole responsibility of the
member states as members of the UN.

7.  The Council notes the Assembly's wish that "full details of
the nationality, identity and characteristics of all vessels
found breaking the embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube in
defiance of United Nations' resolutions" be published. The
embargo was imposed by the United Nations and it is they who are
co-ordinating the economic sanctions imposed on 30th May and 16th
November 1992. The Sanctions Committee holds all the information
on violations. The Council possesses no more than fragmentary
information regarding the embargo in the Adriatic.

The Council is studying the possibilities of declassifying the
data in its possession regarding the embargo in the Adriatic and
on the Danube. In this event, such declassified data will be
communicated to the Assembly."

  While the previous recommendations as such of course
encompassed WEU initiatives both on the Danube and in the
Adriatic and the present report deals in particular only with the
Adriatic (the Danube operations being currently the subject of
other fact-finding missions) your Rapporteurs wish to bring
various particular aspects of the Council's reply to the notice
of members.

  In general terms the Assembly may congratulate itself on
continuing a tradition of providing political impulse to the WEU
Council and there are signs in the Council's reply to
Recommendation 543 (and, also encouragingly, in its reply to
Recommendation 542 on United Nations operations - interaction
with WEU) of the beginnings of a true dialogue. In particular
your Rapporteurs hope that the Council will make up its mind
before too long on "the possibilities of informing the Assembly
of the terms of the memoranda of understanding" and on "the
possibilities of declassifying the data in its possession
regarding the embargo in the Adriatic".

  In passing it is worth mentioning that excellent progress is
being made in terms of co-operation between WEU nations for a new
generation of exercises, pioneered by the French-sponsored
exercise Farfadet in June 1992. Ardente '94 sponsored by Italy
(with major participation from France and Spain and, to a lesser
degree, from Greece, the Netherlands, Turkey and the United
Kingdom) was held during the week of 25th October in Tuscany.
Like Farfadet, Ardente took as its theme the evacuation of
nationals from a war-torn area, including the creation of a
corridor for humanitarian relief - highly topical in another
context also.

  Such exercises, held increasingly in the WEU context, are the
shape of the future and your Rapporteurs are pleased that similar
exercises are planned for 1994 (Transmontana under Spanish
auspices and a command post exercise Purple Nova in the United
Kingdom with full participation by the WEU Planning Cell) and in
1995 (in France). The naval aspects of these exercises will be
emphasised in Part Two of the present report.

III.  Sharp Guard
-----------------

  Meanwhile naval operations continue in the Adriatic under the
name of Sharp Guard and stemming from a WEU initiative taken in
the wings of the 1992 Helsinki CSCE meeting.

(a)  History

  In July 1992, forces operating under WEU and NATO, working in
strict co-ordination, began monitoring in the Adriatic sea the
compliance of resolutions of the United Nations Security Council
against the former Yugoslavia (operations Maritime Monitor and
Sharp Vigilance). On 22nd November 1992 both operations were
amplified in scope to include the enforcement of relevant UN
resolutions (operations Maritime Guard and Sharp Fence).

  On 8th June 1993 the Councils of WEU and NATO, at a joint
session, reviewed the embargo operations and approved a combined
concept of operations for the implementation of UN Resolution
820, which strengthened the existing embargoes against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This
concept included a single command and control arrangement for the
combined operation Sharp Guard under the authority of the
Councils of both organisations.

  The operation began on 15th June 1993.

(b)  Mission

  To conduct operations to monitor and enforce compliance with UN
sanctions in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions
(UNSCR) 713, 757, 787 and 820. Combined Task Force 440, in
particular, prevents all unauthorised shipping from entering the
territorial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro).

(c)  Nations contributing forces

  Nations contributing forces at present are: Canada, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. Nineteen vessels are
participating and some 12 000 sailors are at sea or on shore in
the area.

(d)  Organisation

  The overall operational control is delegated to Admiral Carlo
Alberto Vandini, Italian Navy, as Commander, Combined Task Force
440 (CCTF 440). He is assisted by Rear Admiral Gianfranco
Coviello, Italian Navy, as Deputy CCTF 440. Admiral Vandini is
the Commander of Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe. As CCTF
440, his staff has been complemented by a WEU staff element.
  Surface ships operate under two operational combined task
groups (CTG) at sea to conduct operations in the Adriatic sea. A
third task group has responsibility for ships conducting training
or port visits. Operational responsibilities rotate among the
task group commanders on approximately a monthly basis. At the
time of writing, the two operational CTG commanders are a British
Commodore and an Italian Captain. The third task group is
commanded by a Canadian Commodore.

  Maritime patrol aircraft operate under operational command of
CCTF 440 through the Commander of Combined Task Force 431, a US
Rear Admiral.

(e)  Fighter aircraft

  Eight Italian Air Force Tornado aircraft are available to
support operation Sharp Guard from their home base at Gioia del
Colle. These aircraft can contribute to the defence of ships from
attacks from surface ships. Other aircraft from allied forces
operating in the area also contribute to this support.

(f)  Maritime patrol aircraft

  Continuous maritime air patrol support to the naval forces of
CTF 440 is provided with assets from nine NATO nations: Canada
(CP-140 "Aurora"), France (Atlantique), Germany (Atlantic), Italy
(Atlantic), the Netherlands (P-3C), Portugal (P-3P), Spain (P-
3B), United Kingdom (Nimrod), United States (P-3C).

  The above aircraft operate from the airbases at Sigonella
(Sicily) and Elmas (Sardinia), in Italy.

(g)  NATO airborne early warning

  Four E-3A and three E-3D from NATO's airborne early warning
Force (NAEWF) are supporting operation Sharp Guard, as well as
NATO operation Deny Flight, from their home base at
Geilenkirchen, Germany, and forward operating bases at Aviano and
Trapani, Italy, and Preveza, Greece. The E-3A aircraft are flown
by multi-national crews provided by eleven NATO nations (Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Turkey and the United States). The NAEWF E-3D
Component, comprised of aircraft from the United Kingdom's Number
8 Squadron are also participating in the mission. These aircraft
operate from their home base at Royal Air Force Station
Waddington, United Kingdom, as well as Aviano and Trapani, Italy.
French E-3F aircraft operating from the French air base in Avord
and Italian air base at Trapani under the auspices of the WEU are
also participating.

  Worthy of note in this context is the readiness of both Austria
and Hungary to give effective support to such operations.

(h)  Rules of engagement

  In their previous report, your Rapporteurs drew attention to
the dangers of inadequate or varying rules of engagement.
However, in spite of the fact that two participating nations have
not adopted exactly the common WEU/NATO rules of engagement, the
situation now appears satisfactory to the extent that ships of
the nations concerned are unlikely to be deployed into sensitive
areas.

(i)  Achievements

  During operation Sharp Guard, 6 157 merchant vessels have been
challenged. Of them, 728 have been halted and inspected, or
diverted to a port for inspection.

  As a result of the co-ordinated efforts of the forces which
have operated under WEU and NATO, 1 032 merchant vessels were
halted and boarded - or diverted to a port for inspection - from
22nd November 1992 to 15th June 1993, when operation Sharp Guard
began. During the same period 12 367 merchant vessels were
challenged. Therefore, an overall total of 18 524 ships have been
challenged so far, with 1 760 inspected or diverted.

  Since the UN Security Council strengthened the embargo against
Serbia and Montenegro with Resolution 820, in April 1993, no ship
has been able to break the embargo.

IV.  Political purpose and practical reality
--------------------------------------------

  It might be surmised from the above that the composite
arrangements described represent the achievement of a political
aim, namely the bringing together of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO)
and its European pillar (WEU), thus giving substance to
intergovernmental declarations at Maastricht and on the
Petersberg (3) .

  While such co-operation is certainly apparent between NATO and
WEU, there are nevertheless various grey areas which must be
elucidated and problems which must be resolved as a matter of
urgency. In political terms the greatest imperative for such
action is of course the forthcoming NATO summit scheduled for
10th January in Brussels. Even if this summit achieves little by
way of the much-heralded "enlargement" of NATO it should at least
lead to the consacration of WEU as the European pillar of NATO
and lay the formal foundation for a new (and lasting)
relationship between the two organisations. Such a development is
necessary for two main reasons:

  (a)  to outline the ground rules for co-operation so that those
working within the organisations know what is expected of them
and;

  (b)  to present a united front in spite of the inevitable
carping and often derogatory comments of those who find it
difficult to accept NATO/WEU accommodation. For accommodation
there has been, especially as the result of a very understanding
approach by the senior commanders involved on the spot.

  Your Rapporteurs have been struck by the rearguard action of
some of those in authority but obviously remote from the area:
"we cannot possibly allow WEU ships to operate close to the
Montenegrin coast because of the missile danger" (when, in fact,
all ships are fully integrated into one or other of the key areas
depending on an individual ship's capability rather than on
whether it is "WEU CONMARFOR", "STANAVFORMED" or "STANAVFORLANT"
and also on when the task group commanders rotate from area to
area on a five week cycle - when the President of the Assembly
visited the Adriatic in October he embarked in the STANAVFORMED
ship which was the flagship for the WEU Commander) or "Admiral X
is very competent to conduct the operation - not so certain about
Admiral Y" (when the only difference between the two Admirals was
that one had a NATO hat and the other did not - they even share
the same nationality!). Fortunately, as time goes on, such
comments are dying out in the face of the obvious complementarity
and sheer professionalism of all concerned, in practical terms.

  Your Rapporteurs wish to pay special tribute to the individual
efforts of the particular officers concerned with command of
operations in zone, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern
Europe (CINCSOUTH) and Commander-in-Chief Allied Naval Forces
Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH). Their patient pragmatism in
working out command and control arrangments is admirable.

  In practical terms COMNAVSOUTH's staff has been reinforced by
an Italian 2-star flag officer, a Spanish 1-star flag officer,
two Captains, one French and one German, and an Italian Commander
- the WEU "naval element". The senior Italian Captain at sea as
one of the three Task Group Commanders (wearing a "WEU hat") has
French and Spanish officers as planners on board his flag ship.

  The Italian navy has made available significant logistic
support (both people and material) which has been greatly
appreciated.

  In practical terms the WEU naval element has been absorbed into
the COMNAVSOUTH process for decision making, planning, etc.,
etc., and there can be no quarrel with the result: an efficient,
well-conducted embargo operation which to date has dealt with
nearly 19 000 merchant marine vessels.

V.  The question
----------------

  Your Rapporteurs have tried to put these operations into
perspective. Do the ends justify the means? Not so much in terms
of whether or not the embargo operation continues or is the best
possible way to try and bring pressure on Serbia as rather, in
parochial terms, whether or not WEU really needs to be present to
help apply the said sanctions.

  Quite apart from the Assembly's own stance on the matter
(calling for the application of stringent sanctions from the very
beginning (4) ) we must examine the performance of the WEU
Council which in its collective and consensual wisdom decided to
take action in this way. And here lies the nub of this present
report and its set of recommendations, for in your Rapporteurs'
opinion, not enough has been done to give practical substance to
the Council's political decisions.

VI.  Problem areas
------------------

  While WEU is now in a totally different operational mode today
compared with five or six years ago, we need to ensure that
arrangements are both efficient and cost-effective. We must be
certain that terms of reference are clear, for example, and a
whole range of problem areas tackled as a matter of urgency.

  For instance:

  (a)  all WEU member countries should be seen to be contributing
both in practical and material terms to helping run operations
which have been decided unanimously - although such is not
presently the case in the Adriatic it may be that "Country X" is
present on the Danube - greater publicity is necessary to bring
such facts to the attention of the public at large;

  (b)  costs must be shared on a more equitable footing. The
present principle that those contributing the largest contingents
should be expected also to make the largest financial
contribution is simplistic in the extreme;

  (c)  a formal agreement with NATO must be drawn up to deal with
such matters as the use of infrastructures. NATO has made a large
number of friendly gestures to WEU in current circumstances, but
on a purely ad hoc basis. It must be made clear exactly who pays
for what, for example, and the WEU element should be given its
own budget to deal with daily necessities. But a fundamental
matter of principal is at stake here, for if WEU so much as buys
one item of kit to help ensure that current operations are
effective is that not one step on the slippery slope towards
duplication? The matter must be resolved sooner rather than
later;

  (d)  formal links have to be established between the WEU
element in Naples, the WEU Council in Brussels, the Planning
Cell, the Satellite Centre, but especially with the Chiefs of
Defence Staff Committee and the WEU Military Delegates Committee.
There is a pressing need to define relationships within the
organisation as well as without;

  (e)  practical as well as formal links are also vital: a travel
budget obviously has to be decided to allow WEU personnel in
Naples to visit the various relevant authorities concerned by
Adriatic operations: communication equipment is also urgently
required, as is a computer-assisted planning system. None of
these items in themselves are expensive and indeed the whole cost
has been estimated at less than that incurred by firing one "shot
across the bows" at sea!

VII.  Provisional conclusion
----------------------------

  This report will be considered by colleagues in committee at
the beginning of November and, if accepted, debated in the
Assembly's plenary session scheduled for the end of the month.
Between these two rendezvous the WEU Ministerial Council will
meet on 22nd November in Luxembourg. Your Rapporteurs trust that
appropriate decisions on these practical matters will then be
forthcoming and thus allow revised recommendations to be
presented, as necessary, at the plenary session. WEU would then
be in some strength in presenting a common European position for
the NATO summit on 10th January 1994.

(1) 1.   Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 0 with 1 abstention.

(2) 2.  Members of the committee: Mr. Baumel (Chairman); MM. De
Decker, de Puig (Vice-Chairmen);
Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman, MM. Borderas, Briane,
Brito, Chevalier, Cox, De Carolis, Dees, Dumont, Fernandes
Marques, Ferrarini, Hardy, Irmer, Jacquat, Kelchtermans, Leccisi,
Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Mannino, Marten, Lord
Newall, MM. Pecchioli, Reis Leite, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir
Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Lopez Valdivielso, Vazquez (Alternate:
Cuco), Zierer.

(3) 1.  10th December 1991 and 19th June 1992.

(4) 2.  Recommendation 512 adopted by the Assembly on
4th December 1991.

                              -------

A French version of this report may be obtained upon request.

 For information, please contact:   Yves ROBINS, Press Counsellor

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