Subject: Number 111 in the Series--General Dynamics F-111 (1 of 13)

From: [email-masked]
Date: 12 Mar 94 18:31:10 GMT

>From [email-masked]

The General Dynamics F-111 is one of the most controversial aircraft 
that ever flew.  Perhaps no other aircraft before or since has been so 
bitterly criticized in the media.  It suffered a protracted 
development cycle in which numerous serious problems had to be 
identified and repaired, and cost overruns came to be a serious 
concern.  Of the several thousand that had originally been planned, 
only 562 flightworthy examples of seven different variants were 
completed.  The F-111 was the subject of protracted and bitter debates 
within the Congress, with opponents denouncing the aircraft as a 
"flying Edsel" that was more dangerous to the US than it was to any 
potential enemy.  

However, after a prolonged gestation period in which many, many 
problems had to be identified and fixed, the F-111 turned out to be 
one of the most effective all-weather interdiction aircraft in the 
world.  Although vilified by some as being an unsafe and dangerous 
plane, the F-111 series of combat aircraft established the best safety 
record of any of the aircraft in the Century Series of fighters--only 
77 aircraft being lost in a million flying hours.  There is no other 
aircraft in service with the USAF which can carry out the F-111's 
mission of precise air strikes over such long ranges in all-weather 
conditions.  It is still in service with the USAF today, and should 
remain in service at least until the year 2010.  

The history of the F-111 begins back in the late 1950s.  At that time, 
the Tactical Air Command (TAC) of the USAF expressed a future need for 
a replacement for the F-100, F-101, and F-105 fighter-bombers which 
were currently in service.  With this goal in mind, on March 27, 1958, 
the Air Force issued General Operational Requirement (GOR) Number 169, 
calling for Weapon System 649C, which was a Mach 2+, 60,000 foot 
altitude, all-weather fighter capable of vertical and short takeoff 
and landing.  The Air Force wanted this aircraft to be ready for 
operational deployment by 1964.  

This GOR lasted only a year.  GOR 169 was cancelled on March 29, 1959, 
the Air Force recognizing that a V/STOL fighter capable of such 
performance was simply not feasible with the current technology.  On 
February 5, 1960, the Air Force rewrote its requirements and issued 
System Development Requirement (SDR) No.  17, incorporating most of 
the provisions of GOR-169 but eliminating the VTOL requirement.  It 
allowed the subsequent development of specific requirements for a new 
weapon system--WS-324A.  

The general requirements of SDR-17 were brought together into Specific 
Operational Requirement number 183 (SOR-183), issued on June 14, 1960.  
It called for an attack aircraft capable of achieving a Mach 2.5 
performance at high altitude and a low-level dash capability of Mach 
1.2.  It was to have a short and rough airfield performance, and was 
to be capable of operating out of airfields as short as 3000 feet in 
length.  The low-level radius was to be 800 miles, including 400 miles 
right down on the deck at Mach 1.2 speeds.  In addition, it was to 
have an unrefuelled ferry range capable of crossing the Atlantic 
Ocean.  It was to have a 1000-pound internal payload plus a lifting 
payload between 15,000 and 30,000 pounds.  The Air Force considered 
that a variable sweep wing and a turbofan engine would be needed to 
satisfy these requirements.  

At the same time, the Navy had a requirement for a two-seat 
carrier-based fleet air defense (FAD) fighter that would replace the 
McDonnell F-4 Phantom and the Vought F-8 Crusader.  This aircraft was 
to have the ability to loiter on patrol for much longer times with 
substantially larger and more capable air-to-air missiles, and was to 
be able to meet and counter threats to the carrier group at much 
larger ranges.  

Originally, the Navy had planned to meet this FAD requirement with the 
Douglas F6D-1 Missileer.  The F6D-1 was a subsonic aircraft that 
looked a lot like a scaled-up F3D Skyknight.  It was to be powered by 
two 10,000 lb.s.t. Pratt & Whitney TF30-P-2 turbofans, and was to 
carry a three-man crew (pilot, co-pilot, and weapons system operator).  
The Missileer was to be capable of remaining on patrol for up to six 
hours, tracking targets at long range using its powerful Hughes 
pulsed-Doppler track-while-scan radar and attacking threats with its 
six long-range Bendix XAAM-10 Eagle air-to-air missiles.  The Eagle 
was a massive long-range air-to-air missile with a maximum speed of 
Mach 4.  It was equipped with an advanced pulse-Doppler active radar 
homer.  The warhead of the Eagle could be either conventional or 
nuclear.  

The F6D aircraft was considered by the Navy to be too costly and too 
specialized, and was thought to be too slow to be capable of defending 
itself once its missiles had been launched.  Consequently, the F6D and 
its Eagle missiles were both cancelled in December of 1960 in the last 
waning days of the Eisenhower administration.  This still left the FAD 
requirement unfulfilled.  

The Air Force and Navy requirements were at first sight completely 
different.  However, on February 16, 1961 the new Secretary of 
Defense, Robert McNamara, directed that the Services study the 
development of a single aircraft that would satisfy both the 
requirements of the Air Force's SOR 183 mission and the requirements 
of the Navy's FAD mission.  In addition, McNamara wanted the aircraft 
to be capable of being used by the Army and the Marine Corps as a 
close-support aircraft.  It was hoped that this strategy would reduce 
procurement costs substantially.  The project came to be known as the 
Tactical Fighter Experimental, or TFX for short.  

It did not take long for the services to convince Secretary McNamara 
that the close air support mission requirement could not be satisfied 
by the TFX, and the Marine Corps and the Army were dropped from the 
program at an early stage.  However, Secretary McNamara stuck doggedly 
to his idea of maximum commonality between USAF and Navy versions of 
the TFX, and in June 1961, he instructed the Air Force and the Navy to 
work closely together to combine their requirements before issuing a 
joint RFP.  Although both the USAF and the Navy thought that this idea 
was completely unrealistic, Secretary McNamara was the boss and they 
reluctantly followed orders.  

Both the USAF and the Navy agreed that the use of variable-geometry 
wings would be a good idea.  However, on just almost everything else, 
they differed substantially.  The Navy favored side-by-side seating 
for its FAD fighter, whereas the Air Force preferred tandem seating.  
The Navy wanted an aircraft equipped with a long-range search and 
intercept radar having a dish 48 inches in diameter, whereas the Air 
Force needed an aircraft equipped with a terrain-following radar 
optimized for low-altitude operations.  The Navy wanted an aircraft 
that was optimized for long loiter times at medium to high altitudes 
at subsonic speeds, whereas the Air Force insisted on an aircraft 
capable of low-altitude operations and supersonic dash performance.  
Undaunted, Secretary McNamara pressed forward with the project and 
directed that the Air Force would be the lead service for the 
development of a common TFX aircraft.  

By August of 1961, the Secretary of the Navy reported to Secretary 
McNamara that the compromise TFX design could not meet the Navy 
requirements.  The Air Force wanted an aircraft weighing 75,000 pounds 
gross, while the Navy wanted the gross weight to be kept below 50,000 
pounds.  In addition, carrier operational requirements necessitated 
that the overall length be kept below 56 feet so that it could fit 
aboard existing carrier elevators.  McNamara ordered the Navy to 
accept a design sized to accommodate a 36 inch radar rather than the 
48 inch radar it really wanted and to accept a gross takeoff weight of 
55,000 pounds.  

On September 29, 1961, a new Request For Proposals was issued to 
Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed, Northrop, Grumman, McDonnell, 
Douglas, North American, and Republic.  The Air Force's version of the 
TFX was to be designated F-111A, with the Navy's version being 
designated F-111B.  In the spirit of commonality, the Air Force and 
Navy versions did not carry separate designation schemes.  

Nine responses were received in early December of 1961.  Only Northrop 
turned down the invitation to submit.  In their first evaluation of 
the proposals on January 19, 1962, the Air Force Selection Board and a 
Navy representative endorsed the Boeing proposal, but the Air Force 
Council rejected the Boeing bid as requiring much more work.  In late 
January of 1962, both the Air Force and Navy agreed that none of the 
proposals were really acceptable, but that two of them--the Boeing and 
General Dynamics proposals--warranted further study.  A letter 
contract was issued to each company requesting more design data.  

In the spring of 1962, Boeing and General Dynamics submitted second 
proposals.  In May of 1962, both the Air Force and Navy Secretaries 
rejected the two contractor's second proposals for lack of sufficient 
data.  A third submission took place in late June.  At this time, the 
Air Force endorsed the Boeing proposal, but the Navy was unhappy with 
their version and refused to commit themselves.  A frustrated 
Secretary McNamara ordered a final competition for later that year on 
the basis of a point system for categories based on performance, cost, 
and commonality.  

Boeing and General Dynamics resubmitted their final proposals in 
September of 1962.  The Air Force Council, the Air Force Logistics 
Command, and the Bureau of Naval Weapons (the Navy organization which 
had replaced the Bureau of Aeronautics in 1959) all indicated that 
they preferred the Boeing design, but on November 24, 1962 the Defense 
Department announced that the General Dynamics design had been 
selected.  The reason given for the selection of the General Dynamics 
proposal was its promised greater degree of commonality and its more 
realistic approach to the cost problem.  

A political storm broke out, with Senator Henry Jackson leading the 
fray in Congress in loudly denouncing the choice in no uncertain 
terms.  The Boeing company was located in Jackson's home state of 
Washington and would lose a lot of business if the decision were 
allowed to stand.  A series of congressional investigations was 
initiated, and the TFX stayed in the headlines for many months.  
Nevertheless, the decision of the Secretary stood, and the contract 
remained with General Dynamics.  

The F-111A and B aircraft shared the same primary structure, the same 
fuel system, the same pair of Pratt & Whitney TF30-P-1 turbofans, and 
the same two-seat cockpit in which the two crew members sat 
side-by-side.  The side-by-side seating was a concession to Navy 
demands.  The Navy also insisted that the cockpit be capable of 
doubling as an escape capsule for the crew which could blown free from 
the aircraft in the case of an emergency to parachute to the ground.  
The F-111B's nose was 8 feet 6 inches shorter than the F-111A's 
because of the need of the aircraft to fit on existing carrier 
elevator decks, and had 3 feet 6 inch extended wingtips in order to 
increase the wing area so that the on-station endurance time would be 
improved.  The Navy version would carry a Hughes AN/AWG-9 
pulse-Doppler radar and an armament of six Hughes Phoenix missiles, 
which had both evolved from the F6D program.  The Air Force version 
would carry the General Electric AN/APQ-113 attack radar and the Texas 
Instruments AN/APQ-110 terrain- following radar and an armament of 
air-to-ground stores.  

On December 21, 1962, the Air Force amended the Letter Contract that 
had initially covered General Dynamics' second competitive proposal 
and initiated procurement of 18 F-111As (serial numbers 63-9766/9782) 
and 5 F-111Bs (BuNos 151970/151924).  These were to be exclusively 
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&A) aircraft.  

Plans originally envisaged using titanium for almost all the airframe 
in order to save weight, but this proved to be too costly and more 
conventional materials had to be used.  

Since General Dynamics lacked any experience with carrier-based 
fighters, it teamed with Grumman for the integration of the naval 
electronics package and Grumman was to assemble and test the entire 
F-111B aircraft.  In addition, Grumman would build the aft fuselage 
and the landing gear of the F-111A aircraft.  

The F-111A mockup was inspected in September of 1963.  

By the spring of 1964, AiResearch, AVCO, Bendix, Collins Radio, Dalmo 
Victor, General Electric, Hamilton Standard, Litton Systems, 
McDonnell, Texas Instruments and seven other major subcontractors had 
become involved with the F-111 project.  An associate prime contract 
for the F-111B's Phoenix missiles had been awarded to Hughes.  These 
major subcontractors were doing business with no less than 6703 
suppliers located in 44 states.  The TFX project became a close 
approximation to the ideal weapons project--one with at least one 
contractor located in each Congressional district.  :-) 

The first test F-111A (serial number 63-9766) rolled out of the 
General Dynamics Fort Worth, Texas plant on October 15, 1964, 37 
months after the OSD go-ahead decision, 22 months after the program's 
actual beginning, and two weeks ahead of schedule.  It was powered by 
YTF30-P-1 turbofans.  Pending the availability of the escape capsule, 
it was fitted with a pair of conventional ejector seats.  

63-9766 took off on its maiden flight from Carswell AFB, Texas on 
December 21, 1964.  Dick Johnson and Val Prahl were at the controls.  
Although the flight was shortened to 22 minutes because of a flap 
malfunction, the results were generally satisfactory.  On its second 
flight, on January 6, 1965, the wings were swept form the minimum 16 
degrees to the full aft 72.5-degree position.  During early flight 
testing, the F-111A achieved Mach 1.3.  A second F-111A took off on 
its maiden flight on February 25, 1965.  

In 1965, a cost rise from an estimated 4.5 to 6.3 million dollars per 
aircraft caused the Defense Department to cut the F-111 program 
sharply.  A contract for 431 production aircraft was placed on April 
12, 1965.  This was more than 50 percent less than than the amount 
originally planned.  Eleven production F-111As were added to the 
extensive test and engineering program.  

The ninth aircraft (63-9775) crashed on approach to Edwards AFB on 
January 19, 1967 because of an incorrect wing setting.  

The escape capsule was first fitted to F-111A number 11 (63-9777) 

The Pratt & Whitney TF30-P-1 turbofan was first flown on an F-111A on 
July 20, 1965.  The first 30 F-111As were equipped with this engine, 
but they experienced numerous engine compressor stalls, particularly 
at high speeds and at high angles of attack.  These necessitated a 
change to the 18,500 lb.s.t. TF30-P-3 and to new "Triple Plow I" 
variable-geometry inlet ducts with larger areas.  This engine was 
later retrofitted in several of the first 30 F-111As.  These changes 
did not entirely cure the stall problems, but the did help somewhat.  
Many fixes and many years of hard work were necessary before the 
appropriate air intake geometry was finally found.  

Movable underwing pylons were introduced from the fourth production 
aircraft onward, and from the eleventh production aircraft onward a 
20mm M61A1 Vulcan cannon was installed in the internal weapons bay in 
place of two 750 lb. bombs.  However, this cannon was rarely carried 
by actual operational aircraft, the space in the weapons bay being 
used for bombs, fuel, or electronics.  

In the spring of 1967, a series of tests known as *Combat Bullseye I* 
were carried out with test F-111As.  They confirmed the superior 
bombing accuracy of the aircraft's radar.  

A total of 141 production F-111As were delivered from July 17, 1967.  
The electronics package was known as the Mk I avionics system.  It 
included a Litton AJQ-20 inertial navigation and attack system, a 
General Electric AN/APQ-112 attack radar, a Honeywell APN-167 
pulsed-type radar, a Texas Instruments AN/APQ-110 terrain-following 
radar, and Collins ARC-109 UHF and ARC-112 HF radio transceivers.  

The underside of the central fuselage of the F-111A is occupied by a 
giant airbrake which is forced open by a large hydraulic jack.  
Together with the main landing gear, the presence of this airbrake 
precludes carrying any bombs or fuel tanks underneath the fuselage.  
The massive main landing gear has two huge low-pressure tires which, 
together with the long-stroke legs that are pivoted near the aircraft 
centerline, enable no-flare landings to be made at high weights.  The 
large airbrake helps cover the retraction bay, and is partially 
extended when the main gear is down.  The nose landing gear has twin 
wheels and is hydraulically steerable.  

The Triple Plow I air intakes for the TF30 turbofans are mounted 
underneath the leading edge of the fixed wing glove.  A 
triangular-shaped wedge is fitted to the upper, inner corner of each 
intake, and a large planar wedge is mounted ahead of each intake 
parallel to the sides of the fuselage .  The entire intake cowls could 
be moved forwards or backwards as needed to optimize the air flow into 
the engines for the given speed or angle of attack.  A set of vortex 
generators is fitted inside the intake ducts to provide a homogeneous 
flow of air to the engine.  The low-mounted air intakes have a 
disadvantage in that they tend to suck up a lot of runway debris, 
dictating that the F-111A use only prepared runway surfaces that are 
kept thoroughly swept at all times.  

The fixed inner wing has a set of pivoted surfaces that normally lie 
flush to the surface but at high angles of attack or in high-lift 
situations they can be extended to improve air flow over the 
glove-wing junction.  

The variable-geometry wing outer panels are pivoted to the fixed inner 
wing gloves and can be driven symmetrically to any sweep angle from 16 
degrees to 72.5 degrees.  The upper surface of the wing has a set of 
spoilers which are used for roll control, no ailerons being provided.  
The main wing has a set of double-slotted flaps which occupy the 
entire trailing edge of the wing.  The flaps are disconnected when the 
wing is at maximum sweep so that they cannot be operated in such a 
configuration.  A set of slats occupy the entire width of the wing 
leading edge.  These slats can be extended by a rack and pinion system 
when the aircraft is flying at low speeds or at high angles of attack 
to increase lift and to prevent the aircraft from stalling.  

In an emergency, the cockpit can be used as an escape capsule which 
separates completely from the aircraft and is blown free from the 
aircraft by a rocket motor.  The pilot and systems officer sit side-by 
side in a shirt-sleeve environment, eg, wearing no pressure suits or 
oxygen masks.  If they decide to eject, first a bunch of explosive 
guillotines sever all the hydraulic lines and cables.  Then, a quite 
hefty rocket charge separates the entire cockpit from the plane.  The 
ejection capsule takes with it a small portion of the fuselage above 
and to the rear of the cockpit which acts as a stabilizing airfoil.  
After the chutes are opened, anti-radar chaff is dispersed, and a 
cushion/flotation bag is inflated.  All of this can be accomplished 
from zero/zero airspeed/altitude (eg; from an F-111A parked at rest on 
a runway).  In the case of an over-water ejection, the capsule is 
supposed to be completely submersible and is capable of floating for a 
considerable amount of time.  While the capsule is floating in the 
water, the joy stick can double as a bilge pump by moving a pin in its 
base.  

The escape capsule was used with success on several occasions.  
However, there was a problem with excessively hard landings which were 
so jolting that they injured the crew members.  However, I suppose 
it's better to be injured than to end up as a smoking hole in the 
ground :-).  

The horizontal tailplane is of the all-flying variety with no separate 
elevator.  

At the rear of the tailcone, between the two engine exhausts, is a 
fuel vent for the dumping of fuel.  This device is sometimes used for 
a rather spectacular airshow demonstration, in which the pilot vents 
fuel while in afterburner, producing a spectacular torch behind the 
aircraft.  

There are six underwing pylons for carrying bombs, rockets, or fuel 
tanks.  The two outboard underwing pylons on each wing are fixed and 
do not pivot.  Consequently, they can only be used between 16 and 26 
degrees of wing sweep.  However the four inboard pylons do pivot and 
remain parallel to the aircraft centerline throughout the entire sweep 
range.  There is a small internal weapons bay which can accommodate a 
pair of 750-pound bombs.  Alternatively, the bombs in the internal 
weapons bay can be replaced by a 20-mm M61A1 rotary cannon with 2000 
rounds of ammunition.  

In an extreme situation, the F-111A could carry as many as 50 
750-pound conventional bombs (two of them being carried internally, 
the rest on the six underwing hardpoints), or 26 1000-pound bombs.  
However, such loads could only be carried if the wing is swept no more 
than 26 degrees and would therefore be unlikely to be carried in 
actual combat.  If the wing needs to be swept back at an angle of 54 
degrees, the bomb load is limited to 26 750-pound bombs.  In standard 
USAF form, the F-111A's useful payload varies from 8000 pounds to 
20,000 pounds, according to range.  For example, for a mission range 
of 1725 miles, the payload is of the order of 16,000 pounds.  

The APQ-113 forward-looking attack radar is a large liquid-cooled set 
that operates in the J-band (16-16.4 GHz).  It is used by the 
navigator sitting in the right hand seat for navigation, air/ground 
ranging and weapons delivery.  It can also be used in the air-to-air 
mode in conjunction with the 20-mm M61A1 cannon or Sidewinder 
missiles, although the air-to-air role is not the primary mission of 
the F-111A.  

The F-111A is equipped for midair refueling.  A receptacle for a 
refuelling boom is fitted on the top of the fuselage behind the 
cockpit.  The F-111A has no provision for refuelling by the 
probe/drogue method.  

The first F-111A deliveries took place on July 18, 1967 to the 428th, 
492th and 430th Tactical Fighter Squadrons of the 474th Tactical 
Fighter Wing based at Cannon AFB in New Mexico.  In early 1968, this 
outfit moved to Nellis AFB.  

Based on the results of the *Combat Bullseye I* tests of the spring of 
1967, the Air Force decided to rush a small detachment of F-111As to 
Southeast Asia under a program known as *Combat Lancer*.  This program 
was preceded by the *Harvest Reaper* program of June 1967 which was 
intended to identify known F-111A shortcomings and to prepare the 
aircraft for combat.  It was anticipated that the *Harvest Reaper* 
modifications would enter the F-111A production lines if they were 
successfully proven in combat.  

Six 428th TFS F-111As were allocated to the *Combat Lancer* program, 
and departed Nellis AFB for Thailand on March 15, 1968.  By the end of 
that month, 55 night missions had been flown against targets in North 
Vietnam, but two aircraft had been lost.  Replacement aircraft had 
left Nellis, but the loss of a third F-111A on April 22 halted F-111A 
combat operations.  However, the aircraft remained poised for combat, 
but they saw little action before their return to the USA in November.  
It turned out that the three F-111A losses were not due to enemy 
action but were caused by wing and tail structural defects.  One of 
the *Combat Lancer* crashes had been traced to a malfunction of the 
aircraft's tail servo actuator.  The USAF later discovered (as a later 
returning prisoner of war would confirm) that a tailplane problem 
could cause a sudden and uncontrollable pitch-up and roll.  This 
failure in the flying controls system caused the aircraft to break up 
in flight.  The other two crashes in Vietnam were traced to poor 
mounting of the M61A1 cannon and to pilot error.  

These losses caused a storm of controversy in the USA--Senator William 
Proxmire denouncing the F-111A as an unsafe and defective plane.  The 
aircraft became known as "McNamara's Flying Edsel", and was accused of 
being a potential "technological gold mine for the Reds".  

However, the Air Force and General Dynamics remained hard at work 
trying to fix the problems with the F-111A.  The 428th TFS of the 
474th TFW reached an initial operational capability in the spring of 
1968.  *Harvest Reaper* modifications validated by the *Combat Lancer* 
operations followed shortly thereafter.  The *Harvest Reaper* 
modification took a lot longer than expected, and the Wing was not 
fully operational until July of 1971.  

F-111 testing and training incidents (including two crashes in early 
1968) had dictated a detailed and involved investigation.  On August 
27, 1969, a wing-carry-through-box failed during a ground fatigue 
test.  This failure was traced to the manufacturers of the box, the 
Selb Manufacturing Corp, which had been paying off inspectors for 
approving unauthorized weldings.  Extensive retrofits were required 
because most F-111As had already cleared the production lines.  

The last of 158 F-111As was delivered on August 39, 1969.  This total 
included 17 of the 18 RDT&E F-111As initially ordered in December 
1962.  The 18th test F-111A was used as a test prototype for the 
FB-111A bomber program.  

The Air Force lost its 15th F-111A on December 22, 1969, due to 
failure of the forged wing pivot fitting.  All F-111As were grounded 
the next day.  The grounding was lifted on July 31, 1970.  This 
accident cast doubt on the structural integrity of the aircraft and 
compounded the aircraft's modernization.  Each F-111A had to be 
carefully checked and fixed as necessary.  

The F-111A returned to Southeast Asia in September of 1972.  They 
entered combat not long after yet another crash and yet another 
grounding.  Two F-111A squadrons (the 429th and 430th) left Nellis AFB 
for Thailand.  They participated in the *Linebacker II* aerial 
offensive against North Vietnam.  They flew bombing missions against 
targets in North Vietnam and Laos in the midst of the monsoon season.  
They flew without electronic countermeasures escort aircraft or KC-135 
tankers.  On November 8, 1972, they flew 20 strikes over North Vietnam 
in weather that grounded other aircraft.  

Four F-111As could deliver the bomb loads of 20 F-4s.  Shortly after 
returning to SEA, an F-111A experienced double engine rollback after 
encountering heavy rain.  There were continual problems with the 
terrain-following radar and the attack radar.  Malfunctions of the 
internal navigation and weapons release system also cropped up on a 
regular basis.  Nevertheless, the 429th and 430th TFS flew some 4000 
combat missions with excellent success rates in hitting targets even 
when visibility was near zero.  Only six aircraft were lost in action.  

In 1977, surviving F-111As were transferred to the 366th TFW based at 
Mountain Home, Idaho, where they equipped the 389th and 391st 
Squadrons.  

42 F-111As were converted into EF-111A Raven electronic warfare 
aircraft.  

In 1982, four F-111As were transferred to the Royal Australian Air 
Force to cover attrition in their F-111C fleet.  

Two of the pre-production F-111As (serial numbers 63-9771 and 63-9777) 
were used for tests by NASA at the Dryden Flight Research Facility 
between the years 1967 and 1971.  Another pre-production F-111A 
(63-9778) became the Transonic Aircraft Technology demonstrator for 
NASA.  It was fitted with a supercritical wing with a shorter span and 
blunt wingtips and reduced aspect ratio.  It flew for the first time 
at Edwards AFB on November 1, 1974.  During mid-1980, it was flown 
with laminar flow glove-sections on the wing then rebuilt with a 
Boeing variable-camber "mission adaptive" wing for Advanced Fighter 
Technology Integration tests.  The F-111/AFTI continued further flight 
testing until early 1989 when it was retired to the USAF Museum at 
Wright Patterson AFB in Ohio.  However, I don't remember seeing it 
there when I visited the museum in 1992 

The F-111A never had an official Air Force popular name.  However, 
because of its long, pointed nose, the F-111A came to be known 
unofficially as the "Aardvark", or just 'Vark for short.  

F-111A serial number 67-0067 is currently on display at the USAF 
Museum at Wright Patterson AFB in Ohio.  An escape pod that was 
successfully used to eject from F-111A 63-9780 is also on display.  

Serials of F-111A: 

63-9766/9782 	General Dynamics F-111A 
			9776 converted to RF-111A recon aircraft 
65-5701/5710 	General Dynamics F-111A 
66-0011/0058 	General Dynamics F-111A 
66-9277 	General Dynamics F-111A 
67-0032/0114 	General Dynamics F-111A 

Specifications of the F-111A: 

Two Pratt & Whitney TF30-P-3 turbofans, 12,000 lb.s.t. dry and 18,500 
lb.s.t. with afterburning.  Weights: 46,172 pounds empty, 63,051 
pounds combat, 82,819 pounds gross, 98,850 pounds maximum takeoff.  
Maximum speed 1453 mph at 53,450 feet, 914 mph at sea level.  Initial 
climb rate 25,550 feet per minute (clean).  Service ceiling 58,000 
feet, combat ceiling 56,650 feet, absolute ceiling 66,000 feet.  
Combat radius was 1330 miles, with ferry range being 3165 miles with 
maximum external fuel being carried.  Internal fuel capacity was 5043 
US gallons.  With underwing fuel tanks, a maximum of 7443 US gallons 
of fuel could be carried.  Dimensions: wingspan 63 feet 0 inches 
(maximum) and 31 feet 11 1/2 inches (minimum), length 73 feet 5 1/2 
inches, height 17 feet 6 inches, wing area 525 square feet.  Armed 
with one 20-mm M61A1 rotary cannon with 2000 rounds, which was only 
rarely actually fitted.  Up to 30,000 pounds of bombs, missiles, or 
fuel tanks could be carried on six underwing hardpoints and in the 
internal weapons bay.  

Sources:

  Grumman Aircraft Since 1929, Rene J. Francillon, Naval Institute
  Press, 1989.

  United States Military Aircraft Since 1909, Gordon Swanborough and
  Peter M. Bowers, Smithsonian, 1989.

  The Fury of Desert Storm--The Air Campaign, Bret Kinzey, McGraw-
  Hill, 1991.

  General Dynamics Aircraft and their Predecessors, John Wegg, 
  Naval Institute Press, 1990.

  Post-World War II Fighters: 1945-1973, Marcelle Size Knaac,
  Office of Air Force History, 1986.

  The American Fighter, Enzo Angelucci and Peter Bowers,
  Orion, 1987.

  The World Guide to Combat Planes, William Green, Macdonald, 1966. 

  Modern Air Combat, Bill Gunston and Mike Spick, Crescent Books, 1983.

  The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Aircraft Armament, Bill Gunston,
  Orion, 1988. 

  Flying the Frontiers--NACA and NASA Experimental Aircraft, Arthur
  Pearcy, Naval Institute Press, 1993.

  F-111 Aardvark--USAF's Ultimate Strike Aircraft, Tony Thornborough,
  Osprey Aerospace, 1993.

  F-111 Aardvark, Hans Halberstadt, Specialty Press, 1992.

Joe Baugher		AT&T Bell Laboratories   	
2000 North Naperville Road      Naperville, Illinois 60566-7033