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From: jfb@usgp1.ih.att.com (Joe Baugher)
Subject: New Fighter Series--Grumman F-14 Tomcat (5 of 14)
Message-ID: <D1647I.9q9@ssbunews.ih.att.com>
Summary: Tomcat in Iranian service
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Date: Wed, 21 Dec 1994 15:54:53 GMT
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The F-14A Tomcat was exported to only one foreign customer, the Nirou 
Havai Shahanshahiye Iran, or Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF).  

The government of the Shah of Iran had been granted large amounts of 
military assistance by the United States government in the hope that 
Iran would act as a bulwark against Soviet expansions southward into 
the region of the Persian Gulf.  In addition, Iranian oil revenues 
made it possible for the Shah's government to purchase massive amounts 
of Western-manufactured arms, including advanced warplanes such as the 
Northrop F-5A and E, the McDonnell F-4D and E Phantom, and the 
Lockheed P-3F Orion.  In addition, large numbers of Chieftain and Shir 
main battle tanks were purchased from Britain.  

In May of 1972, President Richard Nixon had visited Iran and the Shah 
had mentioned to him that MiG-25 Foxbat aircraft of the Soviet Air 
Force had regularly been flying unimpeded over Iranian territory.  The 
Shah asked Nixon for equipment which could intercept these high-speed 
intruders, and Nixon told the Shah that he could order either the F-14 
Tomcat or the F-15 Eagle.  

In August of 1973, the Shah selected the F-14 Tomcat, and the sale was 
approved by the US government in November of 1972.  The initial order 
signed in January of 1974 covered 30 Tomcats, but in June 50 more were 
added to the contract.  At the same time, the Iranian government-owned 
Melli Bank agreed to loan Grumman $75 million to partially make up for 
a US government loan of $200 to Grumman which had just been cancelled.  
This loan enabled Grumman to secure a further loan of $125 from a 
consortium of American banks, ensuring at least for the moment that 
the F-14 program would continue.  

The Iranian Tomcat was virtually identical to the US Navy version, 
with only a few classified avionics items being omitted.  The base 
site for Iranian Tomcat operations was at Isfahan.  Imperial Iranian 
Air Force aircrews began to arrive in the USA for training in May of 
1974, and shortly thereafter the first Grumman pilots arrived in Iran.  

The Iranian Tomcats were fairly late on the production line, and were 
therefore delivered with the TF30-P-414 engine, which was much safer 
than the compressor-stall-prone P-412 engine.  The first of 80 Tomcats 
arrived in Iran in January of 1976.  By May of 1977, when Iran 
celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Royal House, 12 had been 
delivered.  At this time, the Soviet Foxbats were still making a 
nuisance of themselves by flying over Iran, and the Shaw ordered live 
firing tests of the Phoenix to be carried out as a warning.  In August 
of 1977, IIAF crews shot down a BQM-34E drone flying at 50,000 feet, 
and the Soviets took the hint and Foxbat overflights promptly ended.  

The IIAF Tomcats bore the US Navy serial numbers of 160299/160378, and 
were assigned the IIAF serial numbers 3-863 to 3-892 and 3-6001 to 
3-6050.  The last of 79 Tomcats were delivered to Iran in 1978.  One 
Iranian Tomcat (BuNo 170378) was retained in the USA for use as a 
testbed.  Iran also ordered 714 Phoenix missiles, but only 284 had 
been delivered at the time of the Revolution.  These Phoenix missiles 
were of slightly-reduced capability as compared with those delivered 
to the US Navy.  

Toward the end of the 1970s, there was increasing chaos in Iran.  On 
January 16, 1979, the Shah fled the country and on April 1, an Islamic 
republic was declared, with the Ayatolla Khomeini as the head of 
state.  The Imperial Iranian Air Force was renamed the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF).  The new government rapidly took 
on an anti-Western stance, denouncing the United States as the "great 
Satan".  Following the Islamic revolution, massive numbers of 
contracts with Western arms suppliers were cancelled by the new 
government, including an order for 400 AIM-54A Phoenix missiles.  
Relations with the USA became increasingly strained, especially by the 
occupation of the US embassy in Teheran by militant students and the 
holding of 52 Americans hostage.  The US responded with a cutoff of 
all political and military ties to Iran and the imposition of a strict 
arms embargo.  

This arms embargo against Iran imposed by the West caused a severe 
spare parts and maintenance problem.  Even the best-equipped units 
were often poorly trained and could not operate without Western 
contractor support.  The political upheavals and purges caused by the 
fundamentalist revolution made the situation much worse, with many 
pilots and maintenance personnel following the Shah into exile.  As a 
result, by 1980 the IRIAF was only a shadow of its former self.  

This embargo was to have a especially severe long-term effect on the 
Tomcat fleet, since the embargo prevented the delivery of any spares.  
In addition, by August of 1979, all 79 of the F-14A Tomcats had 
supposedly been sabotaged so that they could no longer fire their 
Phoenix missiles.  According to various accounts, this was done either 
by departing Grumman technicians, by Iranian Air Force personnel 
friendly to the US shortly after the fall of the Shah, or even by 
Iranian revolutionaries in an attempt to prevent operations by an Air 
Force perceived to be too pro-Western.  

The Iran-Iraq war began on September 22, 1980 with an Iraqi air attack 
on six Iranian air bases and four Iranian army bases.  It was followed 
by an Iraqi land attack at four points along a 700-kilometer front.  
Before the war ended in 1988, somewhere between 500,000 and a million 
people were dead, between 1 and 2 million people were injured, and 
there were two to three million refugees.  Although little-covered in 
the Western media, the war was a human tragedy on a massive scale.  

Air power did not play a dominant role in the Iran-Iraq war, because 
both sides were unable to use their air forces very effectively.  
Fighter-vs-fighter combat was rather rare throughout the entire course 
of the Iran-Iraq war.  During the first phase of the war, Iranian 
aircraft had the fuel and the endurance to win most of these aerial 
encounters, either by killing with their first shot of an AIM-9 or 
else by forcing Iraqi fighters to withdraw.  However, at this stage in 
the war the infrared homing missiles used by the fighters of both 
sides were generally ineffective in anything other than tail-chase 
firings at medium to high altitudes.  Initially, Iranian pilots had 
the edge in training and experience, but as the war dragged on, this 
edge was gradually lost because of the repeated purges within the 
ranks of the Iranian military which removed experienced officers and 
pilots who were suspected of disloyalty to the Islamic fundamentalist 
regime or those with close ties or sympathies with the West.  As 
Iranian capabilities declined, Iraqi capabilities gradually improved.  
After 1982, Iraq managed to improve its training and was able to 
acquire newer and better arms from French manufacturers, especially 
the Dassault Breguet Super Etendard and the Mirage F-1.  The Mirage 
F-1 was capable of firing the Matra R-550 Magic air-to-air missile, 
which had a 140-degree attack hemisphere, a head-on attack capability, 
high-g launch and maneuver capability, and a 0.23 to 10-km range.  The 
Magic could also be launched from the MiG-21, and proved to be far 
superior than the standard Soviet-supplied infrared homer, the Atoll.  
Mirage F-1s were reported to have shot down several Iranian aircraft 
with Magic missiles and as having scored kills even at low altitudes.  
After 1982, Iraq generally had the edge in most air-to-air encounters 
that took place, with Iran losing most of the few air-to-air 
encounters that took place after 1983 unless it used carefully-planned 
ambushes against Iraqi planes that were flying predictable routes.  
The Iranians could not generate more than 30-60 sorties per day, 
whereas the number of sorties that Iraq could mount steadily increased 
year after year, reaching a peak as high as 600 in 1986-88.  

The Tomcat never proved very effective in IRIAF service, since only a 
relatively small number could be kept airworthy at any one time.  Very 
often, they served in a mini-AWACS role by virtue of their powerful 
radars and were deliberately not risked in combat.  Several Iranian 
Tomcats were reported lost in action, most of the reported losses 
being kill claims by Iraqi sources.  Iraq first claimed to have shot 
down an Iranian F-14Aa on November 21, 1982, the kill reportedly being 
made by a Mirage F1EQ.  In March 1982, a downed Iranian pilot is 
reported to have told his captors that he was really surprised to see 
an Iraqi MiG-21 shoot down such an advanced aircraft as an F-14.  On 
September 11, 1983, two Iranian Tomcats attempting to intercept Iraqi 
aircraft attacking Iranian positions were claimed to have been shot 
down.  One Tomcat was lost in a dogfight with Iraqi aircraft on 
October 4, 1883, another in an air battle over Bahragan on November 
21, 1983 and single examples were lost on February 24, and July 1, 
1984.  Iraq claims to have shot down three F-14As in a single day on 
August 11, 1984.  It is impossible to judge the reliability of these 
claims, but there is probably nothing intrinsically implausible about 
them.  Iranian F-14As are known to have shot down at least three Iraqi 
fighters, including two Mirage F1s and one MiG-21.  An Iranian Tomcat 
achieved a kill against an Iraqi Mirage F1 as late as the spring of 
1988, indicating that the IRIAF was able to keep at least one Tomcat 
operational.  

It is extremely difficult to get any reliable estimates of just how 
many Iranian F-14As were in service at any one time during the war.  
Western intelligence estimates tended to put the number of serviceable 
Tomcats flying with the IRIAF at a very low level, often less than 
ten, with planes having been deliberately cannibalized to keep at 
least a few flying.  In the summer of 1984, the Pentagon estimated 
that Iran could field only 15-20 Tomcats, maintaining them largely by 
cannibalization.  Iranian sources tended to discount these Western 
estimates as "imperialist propaganda", and placed the number of 
in-service Tomcats at a much higher value.  

An indication that Western intelligence may have consistently 
underestimated Iranian capabilities in this area may have taken place 
on February 11, 1985, when no less than 25 Iranian F-14A Tomcats took 
place in a mass flypast over Teheran.  In spite of the Western arms 
embargo, Iran seems to have been able to maintain a more-or-less 
steady supply of spare parts for its fleet of Tomcats, Phantoms, and 
F-5Es.  Some of these parts seem to have been smuggled into Iran by 
collusion with Israel.  Some may have come in as a result of the 
"arms-for-hostages" deal in which the US government supplied arms to 
Iran in exchange for its assistance in getting hostages held in 
Lebanon released.  

The Phoenix missiles and/or their guidance avionics were reportedly 
rendered inoperative by sabotage before the war began and have not 
been operational since.  There are no reports of any Phoenix missiles 
being fired during the Iran-Iraq war.  However, the AN/AWG-9 radar did 
remain operational, and the Iranian Tomcats could still fire AIM-7 and 
AIM-9 missiles.  Most IRIAF Tomcats flew with a missile load of four 
Sparows and two Sidewinders.  

The accidental shootdown of Iran Air Flight 655 by missiles launched 
from the USS *Vincennes* on July 3, 1988 with the loss of 290 lives 
may have been caused by the accidental misidentification of the Airbus 
A300 as an IRIAF F-14A by the ship's radar system operators.  Rumors 
had been going about that Iranian F-14As had been fitted with the 
capability to launch air-to-surface anti-ship missiles.  

Despite the Iranian regime's official anti-Communist stance (the 
Communist Party is officially banned in Iran), there are persistent 
rumors that one or perhaps several IRIAF F-14A were delivered to the 
Soviet Union in exchange for other arms assistance.  At least one 
Iranian F-14A crew has reportedly defected to the Soviet Union.  There 
is every reason to believe that the F-14A, its AWG-9 fire control 
system, and its Phoenix missiles were completely compromised at this 
time.  An examination of the Phoenix supposedly helped the Soviets to 
build the Vympel R-33 (known in the West as AA-9 *Amos*) long-range 
missiles which arm the MiG-31 Foxhound.  However, Gennadiy Sokolovskiy 
of the Vympel Design Bureau denies that the R-33 was based on the 
AIM-54 Phoenix, maintaining that he has never actually seen a live 
Phoenix.  

I believe that some F-14As are still flying in Iran, but I am not sure 
of the number.  

Sources:

   Grumman Aircraft Since 1919, Rene J. Francillon, Naval Institute
   Press, 1989.

   Grumman F-14 Tomcat, Doug Richardson, Osprey, 1987.

   F-14 Tomcat: Fleet Defender, Robert F. Dorr, World Airpower
   Journal, Vol 7, 1991.
 
   Grumman F-14 Tomcat Variant Briefing, World Airpower Journal,
   Vol. 19, 1994.

   From ALKALI to AAM-L, Part 2, Piotr Butowski, Air International,
   November 1994.

   The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Aircraft Armament, Bill Gunston
   Orion, 1988.

   The American Fighter, Enzo Angelucci and Peter Bowers, 
   Orion, 1987.

   Encyclopedia of World Military Aircraft, Volume 1, David Donald
   and Jon Lake, AirTime, 1994.

   The World's Great Interceptor Aircraft, Gallery Books, 1989. 

   The Lessons of Modern War, Molume II: The Iran-Iraq War, Anthony
   H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, Westview Press, 1990.

   Air-to-Air Missile Directory, Doug Richardson and Piotr Butowski,
   Air International, October 1993, p 197.


Joe Baugher			  **************************************
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