Subject: New Fighter Series--McDonnell F-4 Phantom (41 of 50)

From: [email-masked]
Date: 5 Jul 94 16:28:02 GMT

>From [email-masked]

Next to the United States, Israel was the largest user of the Phantom.  
Approximately 240 F-4Es were supplied to the Tsvah Haganah le 
Israel/Heyl Ha'Avir (Israel Defense Force/Air Force, or IDF/AF) 
between 1969 and 1976, and these aircraft provided Israel with its 
most potent combat aircraft throughout the 1970s.  Although the     
Lockheed F-16 Fighting Falcon and the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle
have largely supplanted the Phantom in IDF/AF service, substantial 
numbers of Phantoms stil remain in service with the IDF/AF in the 
present day.  

Israel first expressed an interest in the Phantom as far back as 1965, 
but such interest was politely rebuffed at that time.  However, losses 
during the Six-Day War of 1967, the imposition of an arms embargo on 
Israel by France, and the flow of Soviet-bloc weapons to Israel's 
enemies caused the US State Department to change its mind.  On January 
7, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson gave his approval to the sale of 
Phantoms to Israel.  

The delivery of Phantoms to Israel became an issue during the US 
Presidential campaign of 1968.  Robert Kennedy's support of the 
Phantom sale to Israel may have played a role in his assassination.  
Following the election, the departing President Johnson confirmed the 
sale of 44 F-4Es and six RF-4Es to Israel under *Peace Echo I*.  

Crew training began in March of 1969, and the first F-4Es were 
delivered to Israel in September of 1969.  The first IDF/AF Phantoms 
were accepted on September 5, 1969 in a formal ceremony presided over 
by Prime Minister Golda Meier and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan.  

It would not be long before the Israeli Phantoms would be in action.  
This was the undeclared 1969-71 "War of Attrition" between Egypt and 
Israel over antiaircraft missile sites near the Suez canal.  On 
October 22, 1969, IDF/AF Phantoms began attacks against Egyptian SAM 
sites located west of the Suez Canal.  An Israeli F-4E claimed its 
first kill on November 11, an Egyptian MiG-21.  

The missiles operated by the Egyptians were of the SA-2 Guideline 
variety, which had already been encountered by the United States in 
Vietnam.  In the early days of January, 1970, Israel received from the 
United States advanced electronic gear that made it possible for them 
to defeat Egyptian SA-2 missiles.  With this equipment, Israeli 
aircraft would now have warning whenever the SA-2 radar locked onto 
them.  On January 7, 1970, F-4Es hit a SAM training base at Dahashur 
and a commando headquarters at Inchas.  On January 13, warehouses at 
Hannak were attacked.  Ammunition dumps at Hexatat and an armored 
division headquarters at Jabel Hoff were bombed on January 18.  On 
January 23, engineering corps based at Helwan and Cairo were raided.  
On January 28, a camp at Ma'adi and an armored corps headquarters at 
Dahashur were bombed.  

The Israeli successes over the canal led the Egyptians to seek more 
advanced equipment and more direct assistance from the Soviet Union.  
In early February, the Soviets began to introduce SA-3 missiles and 
associated technicians into Egypt.  In the last week of February, 
Soviet aircraft, pilots, and ground crews began to arrive in Egypt.  
By April, there were 5000 Soviet technicians in Egypt.  In early 
April, Soviet pilots began to fly operational missions over Egypt.  

On April 8, eight Soviet-flown MiG-21s were encountered but were 
shaken off.  An Egyptian-piloted MiG-21 shot down a F-4E on April 2, 
and its crew was taken prisoner.  

In March, Egypt began to move its SAM networks gradually toward the 
Suez Canal.  Two Phantoms were lost on June 30 and another one went 
down on July 5.  Two more Phantoms fell to SAMs on July 18.  On July 
30, eight Mirage IIIs and four F-4Es encountered eight Russian-piloted 
MiG-21s and shot down two (some sources say four) of them.  

A ceasefire ended the War of Attrition on August 7, 1970.  However, by 
that time the Egyptians had a total of 16 operational missile 
complexes in place.  Within a month, 45 new sites were put in place, 
several of which were very close to the canal, placing Israeli 
aircraft flying over the eastern bank of the canal at risk.  

24 ex-USAF F-4Es were delivered to Israel during 1971 under *Peace 
Echo II and III*.  

The IDF/AF ordered six RF-4E unarmed photographic reconnaissance 
aircraft.  Pending delivery of these planes, the USAF loaned two 
RF-4Cs to Israel under *Operation Night Light*.  They were operated by 
the IDF/AF from August 1970 to March 1971.  They were returned when 
the six RF-4Es were delivered under *Operation Peace Echo I*.  

12 ex-USAF F-4Es were delivered to Israel during early 1971 during 
*Operation Peace Patch*.  

On September 9, 1972, two Syrian Su-7s were shot down over the Golan 
Heights.  Four Syrian MiG-21s were downed on January 8, 1973.  On 
February 21, 1973, a pair of F-4Es shot down a Libyan Arab Airlines 
Boeing 727 which had strayed over the Sinai and had refused to land.  
Another Syrian MiG-21 was shot down on September 13, 1973.  

24 ex-USAF and 28 new-build F-4es were delivered to Israel between 
April 1972 and October 1973 under *Operation Peace Echo IV*.  This 
brought the grand total to 122 F-4Es and 6 RF-4Es that had been 
delivered to Israel.  

By the time of the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, slightly over 100 
Phantoms were in service with the IDF/AF.  By that time, Israel had 
lost at least eight Phantoms in various battles with Egyptian and 
Syrian forces, one and probably two of them having been downed by 
MiG-21s.  In exchange, Israeli Phantoms had destroyed 11 enemy 
aircraft.  

The Yom Kippur War began on Saturday, October 6, 1973, with an attack 
by Syrian MiG-17s on Israeli positions on the Golan Heights, followed 
by an assault by 700 Syrian tanks.  Simultaneously, Egyptian forces 
launched an assault across the Suez Canal.  Total surprise was 
achieved, and Israel was suddenly faced with the greatest threat to 
its existence since the War of Independence of 1948.  

In the opening Egyptian attack on October 6, 1973, a pair of Phantoms 
were able to scramble and shoot down seven enemy aircraft.  On the 
same day, Phantoms intercepted Mil Mi-8 helicopters attempting to land 
commandos in Sinai, and destroyed five of them.  

On October 7, Phantoms launched an attack against Syrian SAM sites, 
but the Syrian forces were now equipped with the new Soviet-built SA-6 
Gainful mobile surface-to-air missile.  Syrian forces were also 
equipped with ZSU-23 mobile radar-controlled anti-aircraft artillery.  
The SAM-6/ZSU-23 combination proved deadly.  No less than six Phantoms 
and thirty A-4 Skyhawks were lost in this single day.  Very few of 
their pilots manage to escape by parachute.  At one time, the Israelis 
were losing three out of every five aircraft they were sending over 
Golan.  These losses were clearly unsupportable, and Chief of Staff 
Elazer was forced to temporarily abandon air strikes over Golan in 
mid-afternoon.  

The SA-6 was an unpleasant surprise to the Israelis.  Israeli 
electronic countermeasures had been designed to counter the earlier 
SA-2 and SA-3 radar-guided missiles that had been encountered by the 
Americans in Vietnam, but these techniques were useless against the 
SA-6.  Earlier Soviet SAMs had used command guidance throughout the
entire flight of the missile, but the SA-6 homed in on CW energy
reflected from the illuminated aircraft for the final approach to the
target.  The *Straight Flush* radar that guided the SA-6 operated
over a much wider bandwidth than did the earlier Soviet radars,
and used D-band for illumination and G, H, and I/J-bands for
initial acquisition and initial launch guidance.  The *Straight Flush*
codename is an apparent reference to the five frequencies used by
the system.  In the semi-active homing mode, the SA-6's homing head
and rearward-facing reference antenna receive CW command signals in
the I-band.  Beacon signals from the missile are in G and H band. 
The SA-6 apparently also had an alternative infrared-homing system,
but I am not sure if it was actually used.

The early part of the SA-6's flight was guided by radar, but the  
Straight Flush radar operated over a much wider bandwidth than that
of the earlier Soviet missiles.  The radar ranged over three 
separate frequencies during search, acquisition, tracking, and 
guidance.  Before the war began, not enough was known about these 
frequencies or about the ability of the missile to switch between 
frequencies while in flight to throw off jamming transmissions.  
The ALR-36 radar warning receiver was of little use in picking up
these radar signals, since these emissions were outside the band in 
which the ALR-36 was designed to operate.  Consequently, Israeli 
aircraft found it very difficult to detect a SA-6 launch, and even
more difficult to jam the missile while in flight.

One technique that was occasionally effective against SA-6 missile 
sites was to use dive-bombing attacks against them.  When launched, 
the SA-6 took off at a relatively shallow angle which steepened as it 
climbed and accelerated.  In order to take advantage of this weakness, 
the attacking plane would approach the site from a high altitude and 
then dive down on the battery as steeply as possible.  

The fix for the SA-6 problem proved to be in figuring out a way
to detect the launch.  Hurried modifications of Israeli radar 
warning receivers were made in the field, assisted by a lot of
people in the United States burning the midnight oil in trying to
come up with a solution.  By the third day of the war, equipment
was in the field which could produce a reliable squeal in a pilot's
earphone whenever a SA-6 launch occurred in his direction.
If the SA-6 launch could be detected, violent evasive maneuvers were 
often effective in throwing it off the target.  These maneuvers 
turned the side of the aircraft toward the incoming missile 
and sharpened the missile's turning angle.  This would sometimes 
cause the SA-6 to lose its lock.  Another tactic which sometimes 
worked was for two planes to carry out a "split-S" maneuver, with the 
lead plane diving sharply into and across the missile's approach while 
the following plane dove across the first plane's vapor trail.  
After the third day of the war, these techniques began to work and
SA-6 losses began to drop sharply.

By mid-October, 37 Phantoms had been lost, most of them to SAMs 

On October 8, Phantoms attacked Syrian airfields and attempted to bomb 
the Egyptian pontoon bridges that had been thrown up across the Suez 
Canal.  Four MiG-17s were shot down.  

By the end of the day on October 9, Israeli Skyhawks had destroyed 
more than half of the SA-6 batteries on Golan.  Israeli Phantoms and 
Mirages flying top cover had shot down 27 MiGs in one day over Golan.  

On October 9, Phantoms launched an attack against the Syrian army 
headquarters in Damascus.  This was (in part) an attempt to get the 
Syrians to divert some of their deadly SA-6s away from Golan.  One 
aircraft was lost, and another was damaged but managed to get home.  
Another F-4E was lost during attacks on airfields and power stations 
in Egypt.  

On October 10, Phantoms attacked various Egyptian and Syrian air 
bases, suffering no losses.  

On October 11, two F-4Es were shot down by Egyptian MiG-21s.  On 
October 13, an F-4 was badly damaged by AAA during an attack on a 
Syrian airfield near Damascus.  The plane was flown out over the sea 
and the crew ejected.  

The attacks on Syrian airfields ended on October 14, but attacks on 
Egypt continued.  On October 15, F-4s shot down a MiG-21, but one 
Phantom was lost and another suffered severe damage.  Three Phantoms 
were lost and a fourth was damaged during attacks on SAM positions 
over the next three days.  On October 18, four Syrian MiG-17s were 
shot down by IDF/AF Phantoms, at least one by using the new Shafrir 
air-to-air missile.  On October 20, two more Phantoms fell to Egyptian 
SAMs.  

By mid October, 37 Phantoms had been lost, most of them to SAMs and 
AAA.  An additional six Phantoms had been so badly damaged that they 
had to be written off.  To make good the losses, President Nixon 
approved an emergency transfer to Israel of 36 USAF F-4Es under 
*Operation Nickel Grass*.  These planes came mainly from the 4th and 
401st TFWs.  

Israel has persistently been rumored to have had nuclear weapons since 
the 1960s.  The investigative journalist Seymour Hersh claims that 
things were so bad at one stage during the Yom Kippur War that a 
squadron of F-4Es armed with nuclear bombs was put on alert for 
possible use.  The Israeli government has not confirmed this claim.  

After the end of the Yom Kippur War, 24 ex-USAF and 24 new-build F-4Es 
were transferred to Israel, plus two batches of six RF-4E unarmed 
reconnaissance aircraft.  This program was known as *Operation Peace 
Echo V*.  The last Phantom was delivered to Israel in November of 
1976.  

Following the end of the Yom Kippur war, IDF/AF Phantoms were in 
constant use against guerilla targets in Lebanon in the sporadic 
fighting that led up to the Israeli involvement in the Lebanon civil 
war.  

Following the introduction of the F-15 and F-16 into IDF/AF service, 
the Phantom has been largely operated in the air-to-ground role.  

The Israeli incursion into Lebanon began on June 9, 1982 with an 
attack on the Syrian air defense network in the Bekka Valley in 
Lebanon.  Phantoms armed with Mavericks, Shrikes, and Standards attacked 
Syrian SAM sites while F-15s and F-16s flew top cover.  The attack was 
a devastating success, and the Syrian air force was forced to launch 
more than 100 aircraft in a vain attempt to defend the sites.  Scores 
of Syrian aircraft were shot down by the F-15s and F-16s of the IDF/AF 
that were flying top cover, with no losses being incurred by the 
Israelis.  

Since the Lebanon War, IDF/AF Phantoms have continued to carry out 
attacks on guerilla targets in Lebanon.  Losses have continued to take 
place, with Phantoms falling on July 24, 1982 and October 16, 1986.  
The latter loss was caused by a bomb accidentally exploding upon 
release.  The pilot was rescued by helicopter, but the weapons system 
operator was taken prisoner by guerillas and has been held ever since.  

Iraq has claimed to have shot down an IDF/AF RF-4E while it was 
photographing their ballistic missile research center near Mosul in 
1986.  However, this loss has never been confirmed by the Israelis.  

Throughout the years, IDF/AF F-4Es have been modified in the field to 
fit local needs.  These modifications included the fitting of a 
non-retractable midair refuelling probe connected to the dorsal fuel 
receptacle, the provision for carrying domestically-produced Shafrir 
and Python air-to-air missiles and Gabriel air-to-surface missiles, 
and the replacement of the 20-mm M61A1 rotary cannon by a pair of 
30-mm DEFA cannon.  

At one time, Israel had considered an ambitious Phantom upgrade 
program, under which the J79 turbojets would be replaced by PW1120 
turbofans, canard aerodynamic surfaces would be mounted, and newer 
electronic systems and equipment would be fitted.  However, cost 
considerations led the Israeli government to scale back its plans 
considerably and to introduce a much more modest program, termed 
Kurnass 2000.  IDF/AF Phantoms subjected to this upgrade were fitted 
with a new Kaiser wide-angle heads-up display, a mission computer, a 
display computer controlling new multifunction displays, a heads-up 
display video camera, new radios, and major improvements to the 
electronics.  Various parts of the aircraft structure were 
strengthened and fuel tank leaks were fixed.  The converted aircraft 
were fitted with fixed inflight refuelling probes that were plumbed 
externally into the boom refuelling receptacle on the upper fuselage 
behind the second crewman 

The first Kurnass 2000 conversion was carried out at the IDF/AF's 
Central Maintenance Unit.  The first example took to the air on its 
maiden flight on July 15, 1987, and was formally accepted by the 
IDF/AF on August 11, 1987.  Further upgrades were carried out by the 
Bedek Aviation Division of Israel Aircraft Industries, with planes 
being converted as they come in for their D-level maintenance 
overhauls.  Conversions began in April of 1989.  The Kurnass 2000 
upgraded Phantom was first used in action in February of 1991, when a 
number of aircraft used laser-guided bombs against a target in 
Lebanon.  

A total of 116 air-to-air victories were claimed by Israeli Phantoms 
between the beginning of the War of Attrition in 1969 and the Bekka 
Valley battles of 1982.  Israel has admitted to the loss of at least 
55 Phantoms in combat, most of these to SAMs and AAA.  

Today, Israel still operates some 112 F-4E/Kurnass 2000s, plus two 
F-4E(S) and 14 RF-4Es, with an unknown number being held in storage.  

The following is a list of known USAF serial numbers of Phantoms
that have been turned over to Israel.  This includes both direct
purchases under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) where USAF serial
numbers were assigned for administrative purposes, as well as
those aircraft which were transferred to Israel from USAF stocks.
This list may be incomplete, and I would appreciate being informed
of any errors or omissions in this list.

66-0298/0338 		McDonnell F-4E-32-MC Phantom
				0313 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				0327 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
66-0339/0382 		McDonnell F-4E-33-MC Phantom
				0352 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
					w/o before 1981
67-0283/0341		McDonnell F-4E-35-MC Phantom
				0326 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				0340 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
67-0342/0398		McDonnell F-4E-36-MC Phantom
				0346 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				0362 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				0368 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				0383 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
68-0303/0365		McDonnell F-4E-37-MC Phantom
				0331 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				0333 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
68-0366/0395		McDonnell F-4E-38-MC Phantom
				0380 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
68-0396/0399		McDonnell F-4E-38-MC Phantom  (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS, 1969, Peace Echo I)
68-0414/0417		McDonnell F-4E-39-MC Phantom  (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS, 1969, Peace Echo I)
68-0418/0433		McDonnell F-4E-39-MC Phantom
				0430/0433 to Israel in 1969 under FMS, Peace 
					Echo I
68-0434/0437		McDonnell F-4E-39-MC Phantom  (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS, not sure which program)
68-0454/0457		McDonnell F-4E-40-MC Phantom  (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS, Peace Echo I)
68-0469/0472		McDonnell F-4E-40-MC Phantom  (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS, 1969, Peace Echo I)
68-0484/0487		McDonnell F-4E-40-MC Phantom  (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS, 1969, Peace Echo I)
68-0499/0502		McDonnell F-4E-41-MC Phantom  (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS, 1969, Peace Echo I)
68-0519/0525		McDonnell F-4E-41-MC Phantom  (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS, 1969, Peace Echo I)
68-0539/0547		McDonnell F-4E-41-MC Phantom  (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS, 1969, Peace Echo I)
69-0236/0303		McDonnell F-4E-42-MC Phantom
				0294/0296 for Israel in 1970, Peace Echo II
				0299/0301 for Israel in 1970, Peace Echo II
69-7201/7260		McDonnell F-4E-43-MC Phantom
				7224/7227 for Israel in 1970, Peace Echo III
				7229 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				7237/7250 for Israel in 1970, Peace Echo III
				7255 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
69-7546/7578		McDonnell F-4E-44-MC Phantom
				7547/7549 for Israel in 1971, Peace Patch
				7553 for Israel in 1971, Peace Patch
				7554 for Israel in 1971, Peace Patch
				7567/7570 for Israel in 1971, Peace Patch
				7575/7578 for Israel in 1971, Peace Patch
69-7590/7595		McDonnell RF-4E-45-MC Phantom (new builds for Israel 
				under FMS in 1969, Peace Echo I)
71-0224/0247		McDonnell F-4E-48-MC Phantom
				0224/0236 to Israel in 1972-73, Peace Echo IV
				0246 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
71-1070/1093		McDonnell F-4E-49-MC Phantom
				1071 to Israel in 1972-73, Peach Echo IV
				1074 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				1078 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				1080 to Israel in 1972-73, Peach Echo IV
				1082 to Israel in 1972-73, Peach Echo IV, 
							(w/o before 1981)
				1090 to Israel in 1972-73, Peach Echo IV
				1093 to Israel in 1972-73, Peach Echo IV
71-1391/1402		McDonnell F-4E-50-MC Phantom
				1393 to Israel in 1972-73, Peace Echo IV
				1394 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				1395 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				1396 to Israel in 1972-73, Peace Echo IV
				1398 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				1399/1402 to Israel in 1972-73, Peace Echo IV
71-1779/1786		McDonnell F-4E-51-MC Phantom  (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS in 1972-73, Peace Echo IV)
71-1787/1793		McDonnell F-4E-52-MC Phantom  (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS in 1972-73, Peace Echo IV)
71-1794/1796		McDonnell F-4E-53-MC Phantom   (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS in 1972-73, Peace Echo IV)
72-0121/0138		McDonnell F-4E-50-MC Phantom
				0121 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				0123 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				0127 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				0129 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				0130/0133 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
				0137/0138 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
72-0157/0159		McDonnell F-4E-51-MC Phantom
				0157/0158 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
72-0160/0165		McDonnell F-4E-52-MC Phantom
				0163/0164 to Israel in 1973, Nickel Grass
72-1476/1489		McDonnell F-4E-54-MC Phantom
				1480/1481 to Israel in 1974-76, Peace Echo V
				1487/1488 to Israel in 1974-76, Peace Echo V
72-1490/1497		McDonnell F-4E-55-MC Phantom
				1491/1492 to Israel in 1974-76, Peace Echo V
				1495/1499 to Israel in 1974-76, Peace Echo V
73-1157/1164		McDonnell F-4E-57-MC Phantom
				1157/1159 to Israel in 1974-76, Peace Echo V
				1161/1162 to Israel in 1974-76, Peace Echo V
73-1165/1184		McDonnell F-4E-58-MC Phantom
				1169/1170 to Israel in 1974-76, Peace Echo V
				1178/1179 to Israel in 1974-76, Peace Echo V
73-1185/1204		McDonnell F-4E-59-MC Phantom
				1190/1191 to Israel in 1974-76, Peace Echo V
				1201/1202 to Israel in 1974-76, Peace Echo V
74-1014/1015		McDonnell F-4E-60-MC Phantom  (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS in 1974-76, Peace Echo V)
74-1016/1021		McDonnell F-4E-61-MC Phantom  (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS in 1974-76, Peace Echo V)
74-1022/1037		McDonnell F-4E-62-MC Phantom  (new builds 
				for Israel under FMS in 1974-76, Peace Echo V)
75-0418/0423		McDonnell RF-4E-63-MC Phantom (new builds for 
				Israel under FMS in 1974-76, Peace Echo V)

Israel has been quite secretive about its IDF/AF serial numbers.
A few IDF/AF serials are known, but the relationship between them and
these USAF serials is unknown.

Sources:

  McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Since 1920: Volume II, Rene J.
  Francillon, Naval Institute Press, 1990.

  McDonnell F-4 Phantom: Spirit in the Skies.  Airtime Publishing, 1992.

  Modern Air Combat, Bill Gunston and Mike Spick, Crescent, 1983.

  The American Fighter, Enzo Angelucci and Peter Bowers, Orion, 1987.

  United States Military Aircraft Since 1909, Gordon Swanborough and
  Peter M. Bowers, Smithsonian, 1989.

  Post-World War II Fighters: 1945-1973, Marcelle Size Knaac,
  Office of Air Force History, 1986.

  The World's Great Attack Aircraft, Gallery, 1988.

  Israeli Air Power into the 1990s, Tim Ripley, Air International, Vol 45,
  No. 3, 1993. 

  The Yom Kippur War, Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, Doubleday,
  1974.
 
  electronic mail from Frank Lemmon

Joe Baugher			**************************************
AT&T Bell Laboratories		*  "Round up the usual suspects."    *
1000 E. Warrenville Road	**************************************
P. O. Box 3013
Naperville, Illinois 60566-7013		
(708) 713 4548				
uscbu!jfb                     Who, me?  Speak for AT&T?  Surely you jest!	
[email-masked]