Page 450 Appendix A DIGEST OF OPERATION "OVERLORD" Object. 1. The object of Operation "Overlord" is to mount and carry out an operation, with forces and equipment established in the United Kingdom, and with target date the 1st May, 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed. The lodgement area must contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some twenty-six to thirty divisions, and enable that force to be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of three to five divisions per month. Selection of a Lodgement Area. 2. In order to provide sufficient port facilities to maintain these large forces, it will be necessary to select a lodgement area which includes a group of major ports. We must plan on the assumption that ports, on capture, will be seriously damaged and probably blocked. It will take some time to restore normal facilities. We shall thus be forced to rely on maintenance over beaches for an extended period. 3. A study of the beaches on the Belgian and Channel coasts shows that the beaches with the highest capacity for passing vehicles and stores inland are those in the Pas de Calais, [1] and the Caen-[2] Cotentin [3] area. Of these, the Caen beaches are the most favourable, as they are, unlike the others, sheltered from the prevailing winds. Naval and air considerations point to the area between the Pas de Calais and the Cotentin as the most suitable for the initial landing, air factors of optimum air support and rapid provision of airfields indicating the Pas de Calais as the best choice, with Caen as an acceptable alternative. 4. Thus, taking beach capacity and air and naval considerations together, it appears that either the Pas de Calais area or the Caen-Cotentin area is the most suitable for the initial main landing. 5. As the area for the initial landing the Pas de Calais has many obvious advantages such that good air support and quick turn round for our shipping can be achieved. On the other hand, it is a focal point of the enemy fighters disposed for defense, and maximum enemy air activity can be brought to bear over this area with the minimum movement of his air forces. Moreover, the Pas de Calais is the most strongly defended area on the whole French coast. The defenses would require very heavy and sustained bombardment from sea and air: penetration would be slow, and the result of the bombardment Page 451 of beach exits would severely limit the rate of build-up. Further, this area does not offer good opportunities for expansion. It would be necessary to develop the bridgehead to include either the Belgian ports as far as Antwerp or the Channel ports Westwards to include Havre and Rouen. But both an advance to Antwerp across the numerous water obstacles, and a long flank march of some 120 miles to the Seine ports must be considered unsound operations of war unless the German forces are in a state not far short of final collapse. 6. In the Caen-Cotentin area it would be possible to make our initial landing either partly on the Cotentin Peninsula and partly on the Caen beaches, wholly in the Cotentin or wholly on the Caen beaches. An attack with part of our forces in the Cotentin and part on the Caen beaches, is, however, considered to be unsound. It would entail dividing our limited forces by the low-lying marshy ground and intricate river system at the neck of the Cotentin Peninsula; thus exposing them to defeat in detail. 7. An attack against the Cotentin Peninsula, on the other hand, has a reasonable chance of success, and would ensure the early capture of the port of Cherbourg. Unfortunately, very few airfields exist in the Cotentin, and that area is not suitable for rapid airfield development. Furthermore, the narrow neck of the Peninsula would give the Germans an easy task in preventing us fro-m breaking out and expanding our initial bridgehead. Moreover, during the period of our consolidation in the Cotentin the Germans would have time to reinforce their coastal troops in the Caen area, rendering a subsequent amphibious assault in that area much more difficult. 8. There remains the attack on the Caen beaches. The Caen sector is weakly held; the defenses are relatively light and the beaches are of high capacity and sheltered from the prevailing winds. Inland the terrain is suitable for airfield development and for the consolidation of the initial bridgehead; and much of it is unfavourable for counter-attacks by panzer divisions. Maximum enemy air opposition can only be brought to bear at the expense of the enemy air defense screen covering the approaches to Germany; and the limited number of enemy airfields within range of the Caen area facilitates local neutralization of the German fighter force. The sector suffers from the disadvantage that considerable effort will be required to provide adequate air support to our assault forces and some time must elapse before the capture of a major port. After a landing in the Caen sector it would be necessary to seize either the Seine group of ports or the Brittany group of ports. To seize the Seine ports would entail forcing a crossing of the Seine, which is likely to require greater forces than we can build up through the Caen beaches and the port of Cherbourg. It should, however, be possible to seize the Brittany ports between Cherbourg and Nantes and on them build up sufficient forces for our final advance Eastwards. Provided that the necessary air situation can first be achieved, the chances of a successful attack and of rapid subsequent development are so much greater in this sector than in any other that it is considered that the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages. Page 452 The Lodgement Area Selected. 9. In the light of these factors, it is considered that our initial landing on the Continent should be effected in the Caen area, with a view to the eventual seizure of a lodgement area comprising the Cherbourg-Brittany group of ports (from Cherbourg to Nantes). Opening Phase up to the Capture of Cherbourg. 10. The opening phase in the seizing of this lodgement area would be the effecting of a landing in the Caen sector with a view to the early capture and development of airfield sites in the Caen area, and of the port of Cherbourg. 11. The main limiting factors affecting such an operation are the possibility of attaining the necessary air situation; the number of offensive divisions which the enemy can make available for counter attack in the Caen area; the availability of landing ships and craft and of transport aircraft; and the capacity of the beaches and ports in the sector. 12. Although the strength of the G.A.F. available in 1944 on the Western front cannot be forecast at this stage, we can confidently expect that we shall have a vast numerical superiority in bomber forces. The first-line strength of the German fighter force is, however, showing a steady increase and although it is unlikely to equal the size of the force at our disposal, there is no doubt that our fighters will have a very large commitment entailing dispersal and operations at maximum intensity. Our fighters will also be operating under serious tactical disadvantages in the early stages, which will largely offset their numerical superiority. Before the assault takes place, therefore, it will be necessary to reduce the effectiveness of the G.A.F., particularly that part which can be brought to bear against the Caen area. 13. The necessary air situation to ensure a reasonable chance of success will therefore require that the maximum number of German fighter forces are contained in the Low Countries and North-West Germany, that the effectiveness of the fighter defense in the Caen area is reduced and that air reinforcements are prevented from arriving in the early stages from the Mediterranean. Above all, it will be necessary to reduce the overall strength of the German fighter force between now and the date of the operation by destruction of the sources of supply, by the infliction of casualties by bringing on air battles, and, immediately prior to the assault, by the disorganization of G.A.F. installations and control system in the Caen area. 14. As it is impossible to forecast with any accuracy the number and location of German formations in reserve in 1944, while, on the other hand, the forces available to us have been laid down, an attempt has been made in this paper to determine the wisest employment of our own forces and then to determine the maximum number of German formations which they can reasonably overcome. Apart from the air situation, which is an over-riding factor, the practicability of this plan will depend principally on the number, effectiveness, and availability of German divisions present in France and the Low Countries in relation to our own capabilities. This consideration is discussed below (paragraph 35). Page 453 15. A maximum of thirty and a minimum of twenty-six equivalent divisions are likely to be available in the United Kingdom for cross-Channel operations on the 1st May 1944. Further build-up can be at the rate of three to five divisions per month. 16. Landing ships and craft have been provided to lift the equivalent of three assault divisions and two follow-up divisions, without "overheads," and it has been assumed that the equivalent of an additional two divisions can be afloat in ships. 17. Airborne forces amounting to two airborne divisions and some five or six parachute regiments will be available, but, largely owing to shortage of transport aircraft, it is only possible to lift the equivalent of two-thirds of one airborne division simultaneously, on the basis of present forecasts. 18. Even if additional landing ships and craft could be made available, the beaches in the Caen area would preclude the landing of forces greater than the equivalent of the three assault and two follow-up divisions, for which craft have already been provided. Nevertheless, an all-round increase of at least 10 per cent. in landing ships and craft is highly desirable in order to provide a greater margin for contingencies within the framework of the existing plan. Furthermore, sufficient lift for a further assault division could most usefully be employed in an additional landing on other beaches. 19. There is no port of any capacity within the sector although there are a number of small ports of limited value. Maintenance will, therefore, of necessity be largely over the beaches until it is possible to capture and open up the port of Cherbourg. In view of the possibilities of interruption by bad weather it will be essential to provide early some form of improvised sheltered waters. 20. Assuming optimum weather conditions, it should be possible to build up the force over the beaches to a total by D plus 6 of the equivalent of some eleven divisions and five tank brigades and thereafter to land one division a day until about D plus 24. Proposed Plan. Preliminary Phase. 21. During the preliminary phase, which must start forthwith, all possible means including air and sea action, propaganda, political and economic pressure, and sabotage, must be integrated into a combined offensive aimed at softening the German resistance. In particular, air action should be directed towards the reduction of the German air forces on the Western front, the progressive destruction of the German economic system and the undermining of German morale. 22. In order to contain the maximum German forces away from the Caen area diversionary operations should be staged against other areas such as the Pas de Calais and the Mediterranean Coast of Preparatory Phase. 23. During this phase air action will be intensified against the G.A.F., particularly in North-West France, with a view to reducing the effectiveness of the G.A.F. in that area, and will be extended to include attacks against communications more directly associated with move- Page 454 ment of German reserves which might affect the Caen area. Three naval assault forces will be assembled with the naval escorts and loaded at ports along the South Coast of England. Two naval assault forces carrying the follow-up forces will also be assembled and loaded, one in the Thames Estuary and one on the West Coast. The Assault. 24. After a very short air bombardment of the beach defenses three assault divisions will be landed simultaneously on the Caen beaches, followed up on D Day by the equivalent of two tank brigades (United States regiments) and a brigade group (United States regimental combat team). At the same time, airborne forces will be used to seize the town of Caen; and subsidiary operations by commandos and possibly by airborne forces will be undertaken to neutralize certain coast defenses and seize certain important river crossings. The object of the assault forces will be to seize the general line Grandcamp-Bayeux-Caen. Follow-up and Build-up Phase. 25. Subsequent action will take the form of a strong thrust Southwards and South-Westwards with a view to destroying enemy forces, acquiring sites for airfields, and gaining depth for a turning movement into the Cotentin Peninsula directed on Cherbourg. When sufficient depth has been gained a force will advance into the Cotentin and seize Cherbourg. At the same time a thrust will be made to deepen the bridgehead South-Eastwards in order to cover the construction and operation of additional airfields in the area South-East of Caen. 26. It is considered that, within fourteen days of the initial assault, Cherbourg should be captured and the bridgehead extended to include the general line Trouville-Alencon-Mont St. Michel. By this date, moreover, it should have been possible to land some eighteen divisions and to have in operation about fourteen airfields from which twenty-eight to thirty-three fighter-type squadrons should be operating. Further Developments after Capture of Cherbourg. 27. After the capture of Cherbourg the Supreme Allied Commander will have to decide whether to initiate operations to seize the Seine ports or whether he must content himself with first occupying the Brittany ports. In this decision he will have to be guided largely by the situation of the enemy forces. If the German resistance is sufficiently weak, an immediate advance could be made to seize Havre and Rouen. On the other hand, the more probable situation is that the Germans will have retired with the bulk of their forces to hold Paris and the line of the Seine, where they can best be covered by their air forces from North-East France and where they may possibly be reinforced by formations from Russia. Elsewhere they may move a few divisions from Southern France to hold the crossings of the Loire and will leave the existing defensive divisions in Brittany. It will therefore most probably be necessary for us to seize the Brittany ports Page 455 first, in order to build up sufficient forces with which we can eventually force the passage of the Seine. 28. Under these circumstances, the most suitable plan would appear to be to secure first the left flank and to gain sufficient airfields for subsequent operations. This would be done by extending the bridgehead to the line of the River Eure from Dreux to Rouen and thence along the line of the Seine to the sea, seizing at the same time Chartres, Orleans and Tours. 29. Under cover of these operations a force would be employed in capturing the Brittany ports; the first step being a thrust Southwards to seize Nantes and St. Nazaire, followed by subsidiary operations to capture Brest and the various small ports of the Brittany Peninsula. 30. This action would complete the occupation of our initial lodgement area and would secure sufficient major ports for the maintenance of at least thirty divisions. As soon as the organization of the L. of C. in this lodgement area allowed, and sufficient air forces had been established, operations would then be begun to force the line of the Seine, and to capture Paris and the Seine ports. As opportunity offered, subsidiary action would also be taken to clear the Germans from the Biscay ports to facilitate the entry of additional American troops and the feeding of the French population Command and Control. 31. In carrying out Operation "Overlord" administrative control would be greatly simplified if the principle were adopted that the United States forces were normally on the right of the line and the British and Canadian forces on the left. Major Conditions Affecting Success of the Operation. 32. It will be seen that the plan for the initial landing is based on two main principles-concentration of force and tactical surprise. Concentration of the assault forces is considered essential if we are to ensure adequate air support and if our limited assault forces are to avoid defeat in detail. An attempt has been made to obtain tactical surprise by landing in a lightly defended area-presumably lightly defended as, due to its distance from a major port, the Germans consider a landing there unlikely to be successful. This action, of course, presupposes that we can offset the absence of a port in the initial stages by the provision of improvised sheltered waters. It is believed that this can be accomplished. 33. The operation calls for a much higher standard of performance on the part of the naval assault forces than any previous operation. This will depend upon their being formed in sufficient time to permit of adequate training. 34. Above all, it is essential that there should be an over-all reduction in the German fighter force between now and the time of the surface assault. From now onwards every practical method of achieving this end must be employed. This condition, above all others, will dictate the date by which the amphibious assault can be launched. 35. The next condition is that the number of German offensive divisions in Page 456 reserve must not exceed a certain figure on the target date if the operation is to have a reasonable chance of success. The German reserves in France and the Low Countries as a whole, excluding divisions holding the coast, G.A.F. divisions and training divisions, should not exceed on the day of the assault twelve full-strength first-quality divisions. In addition, the Germans should not be able to transfer more than fifteen first- quality divisions from Russia during the first two months. Moreover, on the target date the divisions in reserve should be so located that the number of first-quality divisions which the Germans could deploy in the Caen area to support the divisions holding the coast should not exceed three divisions on D Day, five divisions on D plus 2, or nine divisions by D plus 8. During the preliminary period, therefore, every effort must be made to dissipate and divert German formations, lower their fighting efficiency and disrupt communications. 36. Finally, there is the question of maintenance. Maintenance will have to be carried out over beaches for a period of some three months for a number of formations, varying from a maximum of eighteen divisions in the first month to twelve divisions in the second month, rapidly diminishing to nil in the third month. Unless adequate measures are taken to provide sheltered waters by artificial means, the operation will be at the mercy of the weather. Moreover, special facilities and equipment will be required to prevent undue damage to craft during this extended period. Immediate action for the provision of the necessary requirements is essential. 37. Given these conditions-a reduced G.A.F., a limitation in the number or effectiveness of German offensive formations in France, and adequate arrangements to provide improvised sheltered waters- it is considered that Operation "Overlord" has a reasonable prospect of success. To ensure these conditions being attained by the 1st May, 1944, action must start now and every possible effort made by all means in our power to soften German resistance and to speed up our own preparations. Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W.1, 30th July, 1943 [1] "Pas de Calais area" has been assumed as the area between Gravelines and the River Somme. [2] "Caen area" is taken as that between the River Orne and the base of the Cotentin Peninsula. [3] The "Cotentin" Peninsula is the peninsula in which Cherbourg is situated. ***************************************************************** Page 457 Appendix B DIRECTIVE TO SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operations for liberation of Europe from Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force. 2. Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. 3. Notwithstanding the target date above you will be prepared at any time to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the enemy on your front, to effect a reentry into the Continent with such forces as you have available at the time; a general plan for this operation when approved will be furnished for your assistance. 4. Command. You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will exercise command generally in accordance with the diagram at Appendix. Direct communication with the United States and British Chiefs of Staff is authorized in the interest of facilitating your operations and for arranging necessary logistic support. 5. Logistics. In the United Kingdom the responsibility for logistics organization, concentration, movement and supply of forces to meet the requirements of your plan will rest with British Service Ministries so far as British Forces are concerned. So far as United States Forces are concerned, this responsibility will rest with the United States War and Navy Departments. You will be responsible for the coordination of logistical arrangements on the continent. You will also be responsible for coordinating the requirements of British and United States forces under your command. 6. Coordination of operations of other Forces and Agencies. In preparation for your assault on enemy occupied Europe, Sea and Air Forces agencies of sabotage, subversion and propaganda, acting under a variety of authorities are now in action. You may recommend any variation in these activities which may seem to you desirable. 7. Relationship to United Nations Forces in other areas. Responsibility will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating to operations of the Forces of the U. S. S. R. for your guidance in timing your operations. It is understood that the Soviet Forces will launch an offensive at about the Page 458 same time as OVERLORD with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western front. The Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, will conduct operations designed to assist your operation, including the launching of an attack against the south of France at about the same time as OVERLORD. The scope and timing of his operations will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will establish contact with him and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your views and recommendations regarding operations from the Mediterranean in support of your attack from the United Kingdom. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will place under your command the forces operating in Southern France as soon as you are in a position to assume such command. You will submit timely recommendations compatible with this regard. 8. Relationship with Allied Governments-the re-establishment of Civil Governments and Liberated Allied Territories and the administration of enemy territories. Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date. ***************************************************************** Page 459 Appendix C Top Secret The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces 24 Copies Copy No.____ OKW/WFSt/Op.Nr.: 001031/42 g.Kdos. Directive No. 40 Fuehrer Headquarters 23 March 1942 Subj: Command Organization on the Coasts I.) General Situation: In the days to come the coasts of Europe will be seriously exposed to the danger of enemy landings. The enemy's choice of time and place for landing operations will not be based solely on strategic considerations. Reverses in other theaters of operations, obligations toward his allies, and political motives may prompt the enemy to arrive at decisions that would be unlikely to result from purely military deliberations. Even enemy landing operations with limited objectives will- insofar as the enemy does establish himself on the coast at all- seriously affect our own plans in any case. They will disrupt our coastwise shipping and tie down strong Army and Luftwaffe forces which thereby would become unavailable for commitment at critical points. Particularly grave dangers will arise if the enemy succeeds in taking our airfields, or in establishing airbases in the territory that he has captured. Moreover, our military installations and war industries that are in many instances located along or close to the coast, and which in part have valuable equipment, invite local raids by the enemy. Special attention must be paid to British preparations for landings on the open coast, for which numerous armored landing craft suitable for the transportation of combat vehicles and heavy weapons are available. Large-scale parachute and glider operations are likewise to be expected. II.) General Tactical Instructions for Coastal Defense: 1.) Coastal defense is a task for the Armed Forces, and requires particularly close and complete co-operation of all the services. 2.) Timely recognition of the preparations, assembly, and approach of the enemy for a landing operation must be the goal of the intelligence service as well as that of continual reconnaissance by Navy and Luftwaffe. Embarkation operations or transport fleets at sea must subsequently be the target for the concentration of all suitable air and naval forces, with the object of destroying the enemy as far off our coast as possible. PAGE 460 However, because the enemy may employ skillful deception and take advantage of poor visibility, thereby catching us completely by surprise, all troops that might be exposed to such surprise operations must always be fully prepared for defensive action. Counteracting the well-known tendency of the troops to relax their alertness as time goes on will be one of the most important command functions. 3.) Recent battle experiences have taught us that in fighting for the beaches-which include coastal waters within the range of medium coastal artillery-responsibility for the preparation and execution of defensive operations must unequivocally and unreservedly be concentrated in the hands of one man. All available forces and equipment of the several services, the organizations and formations outside of the armed forces, as well as the German civil agencies in the zone of operations will be committed by the responsible commander for the destruction of enemy transport facilities and invasion forces. That commitment must lead to the collapse of the enemy attack before, if possible, but at the latest upon the actual landing. An immediate counterattack must annihilate landed enemy forces, or throw them back into the sea, All instruments of warfare- regardless of the service, or the formation outside of the armed forces to which they might belong-are to be jointly committed toward that end. Nevertheless, shore-based Navy supply establishments must not be hampered in their essential functions, nor Luftwaffe ground organizations and Flak protection of airfields impaired in their efficiency, unless they have become directly affected by ground combat operations. No headquarters and no unit may initiate a retrograde movement in such a situation. Wherever Germans are committed on or near the coast, they must be armed and trained for active combat. The enemy must be kept from establishing himself on any island which in enemy hands would constitute a threat to the mainland or coastwise shipping. 4.) Disposition of forces and improvement of fortifications are to be so made that the main defensive effort lies in those coastal sectors that are the most probable sites for enemy landings (fortified areas). Those remaining coastal sectors that are vulnerable to coups de main of even small units must be protected by means of a strongpoint type of defense, utilizing, if possible, the support of shore batteries. All installations of military and military- economic importance will be included in that strongpoint defense system. The same rules apply to offshore islands. Coastal sectors that are less endangered will be patrolled. 5.) The several services will establish a uniform definition of coastal sectors, if necessary on the basis of a final decision on the part of the responsible commander named in III.) 1.) below. 6.) By means of proportionate allocation of forces, improvement of positions (perimeter defense), and stockpiling of supplies, the fortified areas and Page 461 strongpoints must be enabled to hold out even against superior enemy forces for extended periods of time. Fortified areas and strongpoints are to be held to the last. They must never be forced to surrender because of a shortage of ammunition, rations, or water. 7.) The commander responsible according to III.) 1.) below, issues orders for coastal security, and assures a speedy evaluation, collation, and dissemination to authorized headquarters and civil agencies of intelligence procured by all the services. Upon the first indication of an imminent enemy operation, that commander is authorized to issue the necessary orders for unified and complementary reconnaissance by sea and air. 8.) All elements stationed in the vicinity of the coast, whether headquarters or units of the Armed Forces, or organizations or formations outside of the Armed Forces, will forego the niceties of peacetime protocol. Their quarters, security measures, equipment, state of alert, and utilization of local resources will be governed solely by the necessity of countering every enemy raid with the utmost speed and force. Wherever the military situation demands, the civilian population will be evacuated at once. III.) Command: 1.) The following authorities are responsible for the preparation and conduct of defense on coasts under German control: a) in the Eastern Theater of Operations (excluding Finland), the army commanders designated by OKH; b) in the coastal sector under the control of Army Lapland, the Commanding General of Army Lapland; c) in Norway, the Armed Forces Commander, Norway; d) in Denmark, the Commander of German Troops in Denmark; e) in the occupied West (including the Netherlands), the Commander in Chief West; In matters pertaining to coastal defense, the commanders mentioned in categories d) and e) above are under the direct control of OKW. f) in the Balkans (including the occupied islands), the Armed Forces Commander Southeast; g) in the Baltic and the Ukraine, the Armed Forces Commanders Baltic and Ukraine; h) in the Zone of Interior, the commanding admirals. 2.) Within the framework of coastal defense missions, the commanders designated in III.) 1.) above, will have command authority over tactical headquarters of the services, the German civil authorities as well as units and organizations outside of the armed forces that are located within their respective areas. In exercising that authority, the commanders will issue tactical, organizational, and supply orders necessary for coastal defense, and insure their execution. They will influence Page 462 training to whatever extent is necessary for preparing their forces for ground operations. The required data will be put at their disposal. 3.) Orders and measures implementing this directive will give priority to the following: a) inclusion within fortified areas or strongpoints of all installations important militarily or to the war economy, particularly those of the Navy (submarine bases) and the Luftwaffe; b) unified direction of coastal surveillance; c) infantry defenses of fortified areas and strongpoints; d) infantry defenses of isolated installations outside of fortified areas and strongpoints, such as coastal patrol and aircraft warning stations; e) artillery defenses against ground targets (in installing new shore batteries and displacing those in position, the requirements of naval warfare will receive priority); f) defense preparedness of fortified establishments, their structural improvement, and the stockpiling of reserve supplies, as well as defensive preparedness and stockpiling of supplies in isolated installations outside of those establishments (including supply with all weapons necessary for defense, mines, hand grenades, flame throwers, obstacle material, and similar items); g) signal communications; h) tests of the state of alert as well as infantry and artillery training within the framework of the defensive missions. 4.) Similar authority will be vested in the commanders of local headquarters down to sector commands, insofar as they have been made responsible for the defense of coastal sectors. The commanders enumerated in III.) 1.) above, will generally confer such responsibilities on commanding generals of army divisions that are committed for coastal defense, and in Crete, on the Fortress Commander Crete. In individual sectors and subsectors, and particularly in establishments that have definitely been designated as air or naval bases, the local Luftwaffe or Navy commanders are to be put in charge of the entire defense, insofar as their other missions permit them to assume those responsibilities. 5.) Naval and strategic air forces are subject to the control of the Navy or Luftwaffe, respectively. However, in case of enemy attacks on the coast they are-within the framework of their tactical capabilities-bound to comply with requests from the commanders responsible for defensive operations. For that reason they must be included in the exchange of military intelligence, in preparation for their future employment. Close contact must be maintained with their respective higher headquarters. IV.) Special missions of the several services within the framework of coastal defense: 1.) Navy: a) organization and protection of coastwise shipping; Page 463 b) training and commitment of the entire coastal artillery against sea targets; c) commitment of naval forces. 2.) Luftwaffe: a) air defense in the coastal areas. This mission does not affect the right of local defense commanders to direct the assembly of Flak artillery suited and available for commitment against enemy invasion forces. b) improvement of the Luftwaffe ground organization and its protection against air and surprise ground attacks on airfields that have not been sufficiently protected by their inclusion in the coastal defense system. c) commitment of strategic air forces. Instances of overlapping control resulting from those special missions must be accepted as unavoidable. V.) As of 1 April 1942, all instructions and orders not in agreement with the present directive are rescinded. New combat directives issued by the responsible commander pursuant to my directive will be submitted to me through OKW. signed: Adolf Hitler ***************************************************************** Page 464 Appendix D Fuehrer Headquarters 3 November 1943 Top Secret The Fuehrer OKW/WFSt/Op.No. 662656/43 g.K. Chefs 27 Copies Copy No.____ Directive No. 51 For the last two and one-half years the bitter and costly struggle against Bolshevism has made the utmost demands upon the bulk of our military resources and energies. This commitment was in keeping with the seriousness of the danger, and the over-all situation. The situation has since changed. The threat from the East remains, but an even greater danger looms in the West: the Anglo-American landing! In the East, the vastness of the space will, as a last resort, permit a loss of territory even on a major scale, without suffering a mortal blow to Germany's chance for survival. Not so in the West! If the enemy here succeeds in penetrating our defenses on a wide front, consequences of staggering proportions will follow within a short time. All signs point to an offensive against the Western Front of Europe no later than spring, and perhaps earlier. For that reason, I can no longer justify the further weakening of the West in favor of other theaters of war. I have therefore decided to strengthen the defenses in the West, particularly at places from which we shall launch our long-range war against England. For those are the very points at which the enemy must and will attack; there-unless all indications are misleading-will be fought the decisive invasion battle. Holding attacks and diversions on other fronts are to be expected. Not even the possibility of a large-scale offensive against Denmark may be excluded. It would pose greater nautical problems and could be less effectively supported from the air, but would nevertheless produce the greatest political and strategic impact if it were to succeed. During the opening phase of the battle, the entire striking power of the enemy will of necessity be directed against our forces manning the coast. Only an all-out effort in the construction of fortifications, an unsurpassed effort that will enlist all available manpower and physical resources of Germany and the occupied areas, will be able to strengthen our defenses along the coasts within the short time that still appears to be left to us. Stationary weapons (heavy AT guns, immobile tanks to be dug-in, coast artillery, shore-defense guns, mines, etc.) arriving in Denmark and the occupied Page 465 West within the near future will be heavily concentrated in points of main defensive effort at the most vulnerable coastal sectors. At the same time, we must take the calculated risk that for the present we may be unable to improve our defenses in less threatened sectors. Should the enemy nevertheless force a landing by concentrating his armed might, he must be hit by the full fury of our counterattack. For this mission ample and speedy reinforcements of men and materiel, as well as intensive training must transform available larger units into first-rate, fully mobile general reserves suitable for offensive operations. The counterattack of these units will prevent the enlargement of the beachhead, and throw the enemy back into the sea. In addition, well-planned emergency measures, prepared down to the last detail, must enable us instantly to throw against the invader every fit man and machine from coastal sectors not under attack and from the home front. The anticipated strong attacks by air and sea must be relentlessly countered by Air Force and Navy with all their available resources. I therefore order the following: A) Army: 1.) The Chief of the Army General Staff and the Inspector General of Panzer Troops will submit to me as soon as possible a schedule covering arms, tanks, assault guns, motor vehicles, and ammunition to be allocated to the Western Front and Denmark within the next three months. That schedule will conform to the new situation. The following considerations will be basic: a) Sufficient mobility for all panzer and panzer grenadier divisions in the West, and equipment of each of those units by December 1943 with 93 Mark IV tanks or assault guns, as well as large numbers of antitank weapons. Accelerated reorganization of the 20 Luftwaffe Field Divisions into an effective mobile reserve force by the end of 1943. This reorganization is to include the issue of assault guns. Accelerated issue of all authorized weapons to the SS Panzer Grenadier Division Hitler Jugend, [1] the 21st Panzer Division, and the infantry and reserve divisions stationed in Jutland. b) Additional shipments of Mark IV tanks, assault guns, and heavy AT guns to the reserve panzer divisions stationed in the West and in Denmark, as well as to the Assault Gun Training Battalion in Denmark. c) In November and December, monthly allotments of 100 heavy AT guns models 40 and 43 (half of these to be mobile) in addition to those required for newly activated units in the West and in Denmark. d) Allotment of large numbers of weapons (including about 1,000 machine guns) for augmenting the armament of those static divisions that are committed for coastal defense in the West and in Denmark, and for standardizing the equipment of elements that are to be withdrawn from sectors not under attack. Page 466 e) Ample supply of close-combat AT weapons to units in vulnerable sectors. f) Improvement of artillery and AT defenses in units stationed in Denmark, as well as those committed for coastal protection in the occupied West. Strengthening of GHQ artillery. 2.) The units and elements stationed in the West or in Denmark, as well as panzer, assault gun, and AT units to be activated in the West, must not be transferred to other fronts without my permission. The Chief of the Army General Staff, or the Inspector General of Panzer Troops will submit to me a report through the Armed Forces Operations Staff as soon as the issue of equipment to the panzer and assault gun battalions, as well as to the AT battalions and companies, has been completed. 3.) Beyond similar measures taken in the past, the Commander in Chief West will establish timetables for, and conduct maneuvers and command post exercises on, the procedure for bringing up units from sectors not under attack. These units will be made capable of performing offensive missions, however limited. In that connection I demand that sectors not threatened by the enemy be ruthlessly stripped of all forces except small guard detachments. For sectors from which reserves are withdrawn, security and guard detachments must be set aside from security and alarm units. Labor forces drawn largely from the native population must likewise be organized in those sectors, in order to keep open whatever roads might be destroyed by the enemy air force. 4.) The Commander of German Troops in Denmark will take measures in the area under his control in compliance with paragraph 3 above. 5.) Pursuant to separate orders, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army will form Kampfgruppen in regimental strength, security battalions, and engineer construction battalions from training cadres, trainees, schools, and instruction and convalescent units in the Zone of the Interior. These troops must be ready for shipment on 48 hours' notice. Furthermore, other available personnel are to be organized into battalions of replacements and equipped with the available weapons, so that the anticipated heavy losses can quickly be replaced. B) Luftwaffe: The offensive and defensive effectiveness of Luftwaffe units in the West and in Denmark will be increased to meet the changed situation. To that end, preparations will be made for the release of units suited for commitment in the anti-invasion effort, that is, all flying units and mobile Flak artillery that can be spared from the air defenses of the home front, and from schools and training units in the Zone of the Interior. All those units are to be earmarked for the West and possibly Denmark. The Luftwaffe ground organization in southern Norway, Denmark, northwestern Germany, and the West will be expanded and supplied in a way that will-by the most far-reaching decentralization of own forces-deny targets to the enemy bombers, and split the enemy's offensive effort in case of large-scale opera- Page 467 tions. Particularly important in that connection will be our fighter forces. Possibilities for their commitment must be increased by the establishment of numerous advance landing fields. Special emphasis is to be placed on good camouflage. I expect also that the Luftwaffe will unstintingly furnish all available forces, by stripping them from less threatened areas. C) Navy: The Navy will prepare the strongest possible forces suitable for attacking the enemy landing fleets. Coastal defense installations in the process of construction will be completed with the utmost speed. The emplacing of additional coastal batteries and the possibility of laying further flanking mine fields should be investigated. All school, training, and other shore-based personnel fit for ground combat must be prepared for commitment so that, without undue delay, they can at least be employed as security forces within the zone of the enemy landing operations. While preparing the reinforcement of the defenses in the West, the Navy must keep in mind that it might be called upon to repulse simultaneous enemy landings in Norway and Denmark. In that connection, I attach particular importance to the assembly of numerous U-boats in the northern area. A temporary weakening of U-boat forces in the Atlantic must be risked. D) SS: The Reichsfuehrer-SS will determine what Waffen-SS and police forces he can release for combat, security, and guard duty. He is to prepare to organize effective combat and security forces from training, replacement, and convalescent units, as well as schools and other home-front establishments. E) The commanders in chief of the services, the Reichsfuehrer-SS, the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Commander in Chief West, the Chief of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement Army, the Inspector General of Panzer Troops, as well as the Commander of German Troops in Denmark will report to me by 15 November all measures taken or planned. I expect that all agencies will make a supreme effort toward utilizing every moment of the remaining time in preparing for the decisive battle in the West. All authorities will guard against wasting time and energy in useless jurisdictional squabbles, and will direct all their efforts toward strengthening our defensive and offensive power. signed: Adolf Hitler [1] In this month (November 1943) this division was converted to a Panzer division (12th SS). ***************************************************************** Page 468 Appencix E CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN PLANNING PAPERS FROM 1 JANUARY 1944 Date Hq Paper 31 Jan FUSA Planning Directive for OVERLORD 1 Feb Joint Commanders NEPTUNE, Initial Joint Plan 4 Feb Second Army (Br) Outline Plan 10 Feb TF 122, FUSA Joint Agreement for Amphibious Operations 12 Feb V Corps Preliminary 'OVERLORD' Plan 25 Feb FUSA Operations Plan NEPTUNE 28 Feb V Corps Planning Guide, Operation "OVERLORD" 28 Feb ANCXF Operation "NEPTUNE"-Naval Plan [1] 7 Mar 21 AGp Directive to FUSAG 10 Mar SHAEF Directive to 21 A Gp, AEAF, ANCXF 20 Mar Second Army, 83Joint Plan Group (2d TAF) 26 Mar V Corps NEPTUNE Plan 27 Mar VII Corps Plan of Operation, NEPTUNE 8 Apr 21 A Gp, ANCXF NEPTUNE Joint Fire Plan 10 Apr ANCXF Operation NEPTUNE-Naval Orders (ON) 15 Apr AEAF Operation NEPTUNE-Overall Air Plan 16 Apr 1st Div Field Order No. 35 21 Apr WNTF Operation Plan No. 24 (ONWEST 2) [2] 24 Apr War Office Movement Plan 28 Apr 21 AGp Amended Directive to FUSAG 1 May ANCXF Amendment No. 1 to ON 2 May Ninth AF IX Tactical Air Command Plan for Operation NEPTUNE 6 May 82d Abn Div Field Order No. 6 8 May FUSAG, 9th AF, WNTF Joint Operations Plan, U.S. Forces for Operation OVERLORD (Revised) 9 May VII Corps Field Order No. 1 12 May 4th Div Field Order No. 1 15 May Assault Force U Operation Order No. 34 [3] (ON-WEST/U-3) [1] Superseded by Operation NEPTUNE-Naval Orders (ON) . All copies ordered destroyed. [2] Changes of 4,10, and 22 May and addenda of 29-31 May. [3] Changes of 30 May and 1 June. **************************************************************** Page 471 Appendix G DIVISIONS AVAILABLE TO GERMANY ON 6 JUNE 1944 (BASED ON GERMAN SITUATION MAPS) Theater Inf type Pz Type Misc Denmark 2 1 + 2 Brig 3 Norway 11 Finland 10 Eastern Front 122 25 + 17 + 1 Brig 1 Brig OB SUEDOST (Balkans) 20 2 3 OB SUEDWEST (Italy) 17 + 7 1 1 Brig OB WEST (France and Low Countries) 41 + 11 9 1 Rgt Zone of Interior 3 + 1 + 4 + 1 Brig 2 Brig 2 Brig TOTAL GERMAN DIVISIONS 226 + 47 + 37 + 2 Brig 5 Brig 3 Brig 1 Rgt AXIS SATELLITES Finnish, East. Front and Finland 14 + 1 1 Brig 8 Brig Romanian, East. Front and Romania 17 + 1 2 Hungarian, East. Front and Hungary 9 + 2 5 3 Brig Bulgarian, Occ. Duty in 11 Balkans and Bulgaria Italian, In Zone of Interior 4 TOTAL AXIS SATELLITE DIVISIONS 55 + 4 7 + 16 Brig 4 1 Brig ***************************************************************** Page 472 Appendix H Table of Equivalent Ranks U.S. Army German Army and Air Force German Wafen-SS None Reichsmarschall None General of the Army Generalfeldmarschall Reichsfuehrer- SS General Generaloberst Oberstgruppen- fuehrer Lieutenant General General der Infanterie Obergruppen- Artillerie fuehrer Gebirgstruppen Kavallerie Nachrichtentruppen Panzertruppen Pioniere Luftwaffe Flieger Fallschirmtruppen Flakartillerie Luftnachrichtentruppen Major General Generalleutnant Gruppenfuehrer Brigadier General Generalmajor Brigadefuehrer None None Oberfuehrer Colonel Oberst Standarten- fuehrer Lieutenant Colonel Oberstleutnant Obersturmbann- fuehrer Major Major Sturmbann- fuehrer Captain Hauptmann Hauptsturm- fuehrer Captain (Cavalry) Rittmeister First Lieutenant Oberleutnant Obersturm- fuehrer Second Lieutenant Leutnant Untersturm- fuehrer ***************************************************************** Page 473 Appendix I Recipients of the Distinguished Service Cross All pertinent Army records have been scrutinized in the endeavor to include in the following list the name of every soldier that received the DSC for his part in the operations recounted in this volume. Inasmuch as no complete listing of DSC awards is maintained in any single Army file, it is possible that some names may inadvertently have been omitted. (P) indicates a posthumous award. Alexander, S/Sgt. Paul E. (P) Amerman, 2d Lt. Walter G. Anderson, 2d Lt. William A. Anker, 2d Lt. Leonard A. Appleby, T/4 Stanley P. Armellino, Capt. John R. Armstrong, T/Sgt. L. M. Arnold, Capt. Edgar L. Atchley, Pvt. John E. Atwell, T/4 Daniel E. Bailey, Maj. Woodrow W. Baker, Pvt. Odell Barba, Cpl. James N. Barber, Pfc. Alexander W. Barcellona, 2d Lt. Gaetano R. Beavers, 1st Lt. Harold R. Beitler, Capt. Kenneth E. Belcher, Sgt. Julius W. Benn, T/Sgt. William R., Jr. Bennet, Lt. Col. Donald V. Benton, S/Sgt. John L. Berkowitz Pfc. Henry Bingham, Maj. Sidney V. Bleau, 2d Lt. Kenneth (P) Bolderson Pfc. John D. Bowen, Pfc. George H. Briggs, Capt. Victor H. Brooks 1st Lt. Elton E. Burgin Pfc. James F. Buschlen, Sgt. Arthur B. (P) Canham, Col. Charles D. W. Cassidy, Sgt. O'Dell K Cassidy, Lt. Col. Patrick F. Cavalierre, Pvt. Peter Chase, S/Sgt. Donald L. Chesnut,1st Lt. Webb W. Clark, S/Sgt. Philip C. Clarke, Pvt. James A. Clayman, Lt. Col. Donald C. Coffman, S/Sgt. Ralph S. Colson, Sgt. Clarence Colwell, S/Sgt. Curtis Cordes, Pvt. Herman J. (P) Cota, Brig. Gen. Norman D. Cotter, Capt. John J. Courtney, Sgt. William J. Curtis, T/Sgt. Earl R. Cutler, 1st Lt. Robert R. Danforth, Cpl. Vergial E. Dawson, 1st Lt. Francis W. Dawson, Capt. Joseph T. Deery, T/5 John F. Dickinson, Pfc. Byron B. Dillon, 1st Lt. William T. Ditullio, Pfc. Dominick Dock, T/4 Lowell L. Dove, Pvt. Vinton W. Dowdy, Lt. Col. John (P) Dreher, Pfc. William E., Jr. Dulin, Lt. Col. Thaddeus R. (P) Earl, Sgt. Thomas R. Eberle, 1st Lt. George M. Eddy, Maj. Gen. Manton S. Elder, Pfc. Leonard P. Elder, Capt. Ned S. Ellis, T/Sgt. Calvin L. Ernest, Capt. Charles A., III Evans, 2d Lt. William M. (P) Fair, 1st Lt. DeWitt C., Sr. Ferguson, 2d Lt. Forest K. Page 474 Fitzsimmons, 1st Sgt. Lawrence Fleishman, Pfc. Ward D. (P) Fournier, Pfc. Edgar L. Fryer, Pvt. Gibson Gallagher, Pfc. Richard J. Ganabrant, Capt. John R. (P) Gandara, Pvt. Joe Gavin, Brig. Gen. James M. Gearing, 1st Lt. Edward N. George, Capt. Malcolm L. (P) Gettman, T/5 John Gibbs, Lt. Col. George W. Giles, 1st Lt. Carl K. Glider, 2d Lt. Joseph Goranson, Capt. Ralph E. Gowdy, 1st Lt. George H. Graff, 1st Lt. Elmer W. Griffin, Pfc. Harry E. Griffin, Pfc. John V. Habib, Sgt. George A. Haley, Capt. James W. Hall, Pfc. Henry H. (P) Hannum, 1st Lt. Craig B. (P) Harbauga, Pvt. Francis L. Hargrove, 1st Lt. Robert C. Harris, 1st Lt. Ernest O. (P) Harrison, Sgt. Bailey Harrison, Maj. Willard E. Hartman, T/5 Harry Heenan, Pfc. John R. Heim, Pvt. Marcus Henderson, T/Sgt. Gerald M. (P) Henshan, 1st Lt. Robert E. Hicks, Lt. Col. Herbert C. Horan, 2d Lt. Roger J. Houston, Sgt. Robert J. Isley, Lt. Col. Carl J. Jackson, Lt. Col. Charles L. Jenkins, S/Sgt. Floyd M. Jewett, Maj. Milton A. ohnson, Sgt. Denziel O. Johnson, Col. Howard R. (P) Jones, Pfc. Aaron B. Jones, 1st Lt. Charles H. (P) Jones, 1st Lt. Henry W. Katsoulakos, Pvt. William (P) Kehaly, 1st Lt. William J. Kelly, Cpl. John D. (P) Kerchner, 2d Lt. George F. Kidwell, Pvt. Kenneth P. Kirby, T/5 Varsel (P) Kolodziek, Pfc. Frank S. (P) Krause, Lt. Col. Edward C Kulp, Capt. Johh A. Lacy, 1st Lt. Joseph R. Langen, T/4 Robert F. Lanterman, 1st Lt. Raymond E. Larson, T/Sgt. Donald W. Lee, Capt. Gail B. Leino, Pvt. Loyd J. Lillyman, Capt. Frank Lockwood, Pvt. John A. Lomell, 1st Sgt. Leonard G. Lovell, Sgt. Warden F. Lutz, Pvt. Frederick P. Mabry, Capt. George L., Jr. MacConchie, 1st Lt. Howard P. MacNeely, Lt. Col. Carlton O. Mager, 2d Lt. Irvin A. (P) Maloney, Lt. Col. Arthur A. Maloney, Capt. John S. Mansfield, S/Sgt. Paul F. Marez, Pvt. Joe M. Masny, Capt. Otto Mayor, Pvt. Arthur C. McElyea, 2d Lt. Atwood M. McKissick, T/5 Howard D. McLaren, Pvt. Donald B. Meredith, S/Sgt. Iral (P) Merendino, Capt. Thomas N. Millener, Lt. Col. Raymond D. Miller 1st Lt. Jesse R. Miller Pfc. Milan M. (P) Mitman, T/Sgt. Erwin F. Montilio, Cpl. George Moody, 1st Lt. William D. (P) Moody, Sgt. Willie W. Morse, 1st Lt. Verne V. Mullins, Lt. Col. Thornton L. (P) Murrin, S/Sgt. Richard C. Nash, Pfc. Freeman J. Nicoli, Sgt. Raymond E. Nothel, Sgt. Henry V. O'Brien, Capt. Thomas F. Odom, 1st Sgt. Hubert O'Donnell, Sgt. Francis C. Ogden, 1st Lt. Carlos C. O'Neill, Lt. Col. John T. Orndorff, Sgt. Douglas Ostberg, Lt. Col. Edwin J. Panas, 1st Lt. James P. Paolini, Pfc. Camillus J. Page 475 Parke, Pvt. Joseph P. Parker, 1st Lt. Charles H. Patch, Capt. Lloyd E. Patterson, S/Sgt. Lyman K. Pellarine, 2d Lt. John J. (P) Pence, Capt. James L Perehinec, S/Sgt. Joseph P. (P) Perry, Capt. Edwin R. Peterson, S/Sgt. Gerard B. Peterson, Sgt. Kenneth F. Peterson, Pfc. Lenold C. Peterson, Pfc. Victor E. (P) Philips, Capt. Vodra C. Porter, Pvt. Benton L. Pressley, 1st Sgt. William M. Profit, T/Sgt. Carl D. Pryne, Pfc. Gordon Purvis, S/Sgt. Darvin D. Radford, S/Sgt. David N. Rae, Capt. Robert D. Ralston, Capt. Emerald M. Rebarchek, 1st Lt. John C. Reckford, Capt. John G. (P) Reed, 2d Lt. Richard N. Reeder, Col. Russell P., Jr. Richards, Maj. William A. (P) Richmond, Capt. Kimball R. Ridgway, Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Riggs, Pfc. William C. Ritter, T/Sgt. Ozias C. Roach, T/Sgt. John A. Roberts, Cpl. Ernest T. Roberts, 2d Lt. Eskoll F. Robinson, T/4 Earl A. Robinson, 1st Lt. James L. (P) Rogers, T/Sgt. Howard W. Rogers, Pfc. Lee. N. Rosemond, Capt. St. Julien P. Rosen, Pfc. Sanford Ross, 1st Lt. Robert P. Ruby, 2d Lt. Clarence T. Rudd, T/5 Jack L. Rudder, Lt. Col. James E. Samuels, Maj. Joseph T. Santarsiero 2d Lt. Charles J. Savino, T/5 Felice J. Schneider S/Sgt. George Schneider, Lt. Col. Max F. Scoroposki, 1st Sgt. Felix Sefchick S/Sgt. Joseph F. Settineri, Capt. John Shaffer, T/5 Edward Shelby, 1st Lt. John D. Shindle, T/4 Elmer G. Shoemaker, Pvt. William J. Shorter, S/Sgt. Paul R. Skaggs, Lt. Col. Robert N. Smith, Pvt. Gerald E. (P) Smulik, T/4 Bolick Soliz, S/Sgt. Marcelo M. Songer, 1st Lt. Francis E. Sosnack, Pvt. Andrew Spaulding, 2nd Lt. John M. Sprecher, 1st Sgt. Kenneth N. Sproul, Capt. Archibald Steiner, Lt. Col. Fred A. (P) Stephens, Pfc. Otto K. Stockwell, S/Sgt. Leeward W Streczyk, Sgt. Phillip Strojny, S/Sgt. Raymond F. Sullivan, Maj. Richard P. Summers, S/Sgt. Harrison C. Sweeney, Pfc. Lawrence G. Synowsky, 1st Lt. John Talley, Col. Benjamin B. Taylor, Col. George A. Taylor, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Teague, Lt. Col. Arthur S. T. Tegtmeyer, Maj. Charles E. Thompson, Col. Paul W. Townsend, 2d Lt. John N. Tubbs, 1st Sgt. Herbert A. Tucker, Pvt. Albert J. Turner, Lt. Col. William L. (P) Upham Lt. Col. John S., Jr. Urish Sgt Joseph .W Vandervoort, Lt. Col. Benjamin H. Van De Voort, 1st Lt. Leo D. Van Valkenburg, Pvt. John J. Wade, S/Sgt. John E. (P) Washington, Maj. William R. Weathers, Capt. Omery C. (P) Welborn, Lt. Col. John C. Wells, S/Sgt. James A. Werner, 1st Lt. Carlton G. (P) Wetherholt, Pfc. Lee, Jr. White, T/Sgt. John W. Whittington, Capt. George P. Wilk, Pfc. Theodore T. Page 476 Williams, 1st Lt. Alfred H., Jr. Winters, 1st Lt. Richard D. Woelfel, Pfc. Earl L. Woodward, Capt. Robert W. Woodward, Pfc. Russell H. Wozenski, Capt. Edward F. Wray, 1st Lt. Waverley W. Wyman, Brig. Gen. Willard G. Zahn, Sgt. Donald E. Zantow, Capt. Forrest Zeigler, Ist Lt. Harvey J. Zwingman, Pvt. Otto K. ***************************************************************** Page 477 Appendix J Basic Military Map Symbols (This and page 478 will be scanned as a tiff file to preserve the symbols used in this Appendix.) ***************************************************************** Page 479 Glossary A-2 Intelligence section of air staff AAF Army Air Forces AAR After action report ABDA area American-British-Dutch-Australian theater of war covering area from Bay of Bengal to Australasia Abn Airborne AC Air Corps ACofAS Assistant Chief of Air Staff Admiral Kanalkueste Admiral commanding Channel coast naval district AF Air Force AEAF Allied Expeditionary Air Force AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters AGWAR Adjutant General, War Department A Gp Army group AKA Cargo Ship, Attack Amph Amphibious ANCXF Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force ANFA Hotel at Casablanca at which plenary meetings were held in January 1943 Anlage Appendix or annex APA Transport Ship, Attack l'Armee Secrete Secret army formed by officers and men of the French Regular Army ASW Assistant Secretary of War BAR Browning Automatic Rifle Bazooka Rocket launcher, hand-carried BCRA Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action (Central Intelligence and Operations Bureau) Belgian Gate Barricade-like gates used as underwater obstacles Bn Battalion bodenstaendig Static (division) British; branch Br Bull Bulletin CC Combined Commanders CCA Combat Command A CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff CG Commanding General CinC Commander in Chief Page 480 CO Commanding Officer COA Committee of Operations Analysis CofS Chief of Staff COHQ Combined Operaions Headquarters Comdr Commander Commandos Specially trained British assualt troops Concertina wire Cylindrical portable barbed wire entanglements le Conseil National de National Council of Resistance la Resistance Corncobs Blockships COS British Chiefs of Staff Cosintrep Combined situation and intelligence report COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate) CPS Combined Planning Staff DBST Double British Summer Time DD Duplex Drive amphibious tank D Day The first day of any military operation, specifically the day OVERLORD was launched DSC Distinguished Service Cross DSO Distinguished Service Order DUKW 2 1/2-ton, 6x6 amphibious truck E-boat Small German torpedo boat (German S-Boot) Ersatzheer German Replacement Army ETO European Theater of Operations ETOUSA European Theater of Operations, United States Army FA Field Artillery FFI Forces Francaises de l'lnterieur (French Forces of the Interior) Flak Antiaircraft FO Field Order Francs Tireurs et French communist resistance group Partisans Freiwillige Volunteers Fuesilier battalion Separate infantry and reconnaissance bat- talion in the German 1944-type division FUSA First United States Army FUSAG First United States Army Group G-l Personnel section of divisional or higher staff G-2 Intelligence section G-3 Operations section G-4 Supply section Geschwader Luftwaffe wing GHQ General headquarters Gkdo. Generalkommando (German corps-type headquarters) GO General Order Grossadmiral Grand-Admiral Hedgehog Portable obstacle, made of three crossed angle irons Hilfswillige Volunteer Auxiliaries (non-German) Hornets 88-mm. self-propelled antitank guns Int sum Intelligence summary Jaeger (division or Light infantry (division or other unit) other unit) JB Joint Board JCS Joint Chiefs of Staf f Jedburgh teams Three-man inter-Allied teams, parachuted into French territory to act as liaison between the maquis groups and SHAEF JIC Joint Intelligence Committee JPS Joint Planning Staff JSM Joint Staff Mission JSSC Joint Strategic Survey Committee JWPC Joint War Plans Committee Kampffuehrung Conduct of operations Kampfgruppe A term loosely assigned to improvised combat units of various sizes, named usually after their commanders KMA German coastal mine KTB Kriegstagebuch (war diary) Landesschuetzen Home Guard battalion sometimes employed battalion outside Germany Landfront Landward fortifications of Cherbourg Landwirt submarines Submarines of "Group Landwirt," a special anti-invasion force of thirty-six small U-boats LCA Landing Craft, Assault LCG Landing Craft, Gun LCI Landing Craft, Infantry LCM Landing Craft, Mechanized LCT Landing Craft, Tank LCT(R) Landing Craft, Tank (Rocket) LCVP Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel LSH Landing Ship, Headquarters LST Landing Ship, Tank Luftflotte Reich German Home Air Command Luftgaukommando Headquarters of the Luftwaffe administra- Westfrankreich tive and supply organization in western France Luftwaffe German Air Force Maquisards Men of the maquis Page 482 Mark III, IV German medium tanks Mark V German medium tank with heavy armor and high-velocity gun Merhbuch Notebook Militaerbefehlshaber Military governor MLR Main Line of Resistance MRU Machine Records Unit MS-Flotilla German mine sweepers Nebelwerfer Rocket projector or chemical mortar OB SUED Oberbefehlshaber Sued, German theater headquarters in Italy OB WEST Oberbefehlshaber West, Highest German ground headquarters of the Western Front OKH Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command) OKL Oberkommando der Luftwafe (Luftwaffe High command) OKM Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (Navy High Command) OKW Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High Command) ONI Office of Naval Intelligence OPD Operations Division, War Department General Staff Opns Operations Org. Abt. Organisations Abteilung (Staff subdivision in charge of organization) Organization Todt Paramilitary construction organization of the Nazi party, auxiliary to the Wehrmacht. Named after its founder, Dr. Todt. OSS Office of Strategic Services 0st East Osttruppen Non-German volunteer troops from east-European countries Panther German Mark V tank Per Rpt Periodic report Plan Tortue Resistance plan to block road traffic Plan Vert Resistance plan to cut railroads POD Plans and Operations Division RF Royal Air Force Rangers Specially trained American assault troops Rhino ferry Barge constructed of ponton units RN Royal Navy S-1 Personnel section of regimental or lower staff SAC Supreme Allied Commander SAS Special Air Service Page 483 S-Boot E-boat SCAEF Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force SF Special Force SFHQ Special Force Headquarters SGS Secretary General Staff SHAEF Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expedition- ary Force SIS Special Intelligence Service Sitrep Situation report SNCF Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer (National French railroad system) SO Special Operations SOE Special Operations Executive SPOBS Special Observers SS Schutstaffel (EliteGuard) Stuetzpunkt Strong point Teller mines German antitank mines Tetrahedra Pyramid-shaped steel antitank obstacles TF Task Force Tiger German Mark VI tank Tk Bn Tank Battalion TM Technical Manual T/O Table of Organization UK United Kingdom USA United States Army USAFBI United States Army Forces in the British Isles USN United States Navy USSAFE United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe USSTAF United States Strategic Air Forces Vergeltung Vengeance Verteidigungsbereich Defensive areas Volksdeutsche Citizens of a country other than Germany who were considered Germans racially Volkswagen German jeep Waffen-SS Combat arm of the SS, in effect a partial duplication of the German Army WD War Department WDCSA War Department Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Armed Forces Commander Netherlands Niederlande Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab Armed Forces Operations Staff Werfer Mortars; rocket launchers WFSt Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab (Armed Forces Operations Staff) Widerstandsnest Resistance nest WP War Plans Page 484 XAP Merchant cargo ship Y Day Target date for any military operation, specifically target date for OVERLORD Zweite Stellung German secondary defense position ***************************************************************** Page 485 Code Names ABC-1 Agreements reached at Washington Conference, January-March 1941 ANVIL The planned 1944 Allied invasion of Southern France in the Toulon-Marseille area ARCADIA U.S.-British staff conference at Washington, December 1941-January 1942 BOLERO The build-up of troops and supplies in the United Kingdom in preparation for a cross-Channel attack BUCCANEER Operation planned against the Andaman Islands, Bay of Bengal, 21 June-15 November 1943 COCKADE Diversionary operations in 1943 to pin down German forces in the west CROSSBOW The anticipated enemy pilotless aircraft offensive against England in 1944 DRAGOON Allied invasion of southern coast of France, 15 August 1944, planned under the code name ANVIL ECLIPSE Plan for the initial phase of military occupation of Germany EUREKA The Tehran Conference, 26 November-2 December 1943 FABIUS Amphibious landing exercises of all assault forces except Force U, early May 1944 FORTITUDE Threat operation in 1944 directed against the Pas-de-Calais area GYMNAST 1941 plan for invasion of North Africa HARLEQUlN Loading exercise in connection with operation COCKADE, September 1943 JUPITER Plan to attack Norway MAGNET 1942 build-up of U.S. forces in Northern Ireland Artificial harbors for OVERLORD MULBERRIES Artificial harbors for OVERLORD. NEPTUNE Actual 1944 operations within OVERLORD. This code name was used for security reasons after September 1943 on all OVERLORD planning papers which referred to the target area and date. OMAHA Beach assaulted by troops of U.S. V Corps, 6 June 1944 OVERLORD Plan for the invasion of northwest Europe, spring 1944 PIRATE 1943 exercise by Force J (British and Canadian) POINTBLANK The Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom against Germany QUADRANT The first Quebec Conference, August 1943 Page 486 RANKIN Plan for return to the Continent in the event of German deterioration RATTLE Conference held by the Combined Operations Headquarters in 1943 to discuss amphibious tactics and techniques ROUNDHAMMER Code name used at the Washington Conference in May 1943 to designate a modified ROUNDUP invasion ROUNDUP Various 1941-43 plans for a cross-Channel attack in the final phases of the war SEELOEWE (SEALION) The German planned invasion of England in 1940-41 SEXTANT The Cairo Conference, 22-26 November 1943 SKYSCRAPER A cross-Channel attack plan drawn by the Combined Commanders in spring of 1943 SLEDGEHAMMER Plan for limited-objective attack across the Channel in 1942 designed either to take advantage of a crack in German morale or as "sacrifice" operation to aid Russians STARKEY Threat directed in 1943 against the Pas- de-Calais TIGER Invasion exercise of Force U (II Corps) TINDALL Threat directed against Norway in 1943 TORCH Allied invasion of North and Northwest Africa, 1942 TRIDENT Washington Conference, May 1943 UTAH Beach assaulted by troops of U.S. II Corps, 6 June WADHAM Threat directed against the Cotentin in 1943 ZITADELLE German offensive in Russia, spring 1943 ***************************************************************** Page 487 Bibliographical Note Cross-Channel Attack is based almost entirely on documents now in the custody of the Department of the Army. These range from the official records of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the operational journals of combat battalions; they include all the records of the German Army which have not been destroyed or sent to the USSR. Quantitatively the archives containing material relevant to this book are measured literally in scores of tons. Evidently no one researcher could have examined the whole record. In the past five years, however, the combined researches of Department of the Army historians have sifted through the bulk of it. While the author cannot claim a definitive exploitation of all the sources, he can at least reasonably hope that the available documents of major interest have not escaped his attention. Free access was had to all relevant material regardless of classification. Primary Sources I The formal record of the wartime proceedings of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff consists of minutes of their meetings together with papers embodying all the proposals which they formally considered. This record includes minutes of the plenary conferences presided over by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill Rounding out the Joint and Combined record are the thousands of cables between Roosevelt and Churchill, between the War Department and the theater, between the British Chiefs of Staff and their military mission in Washington, and between various commanders and planners. Light is thrown on many of the official ambiguities by the personal letters and cables between General Marshall and General Eisenhower. The heart of the material for the present volume is the very large collection of SHAEF documents. Again cables, letters, memoranda, and minutes of both routine and special staff meetings recording the day-to-day work of the headquarters comprise the bulk of the collection. Besides these, however, SHAEF collected extracts from memoranda by the British Chiefs of Staff and their affiliated planning bodies as well as minutes of those British Chiefs of Staff meetings at which OVERLORD matters were discussed. Finally SHAEF inherited most of the records of its predecessors, COSSAC and the Combined Commanders. In supplementing the written record a series of interviews conducted by Forrest C. Pogue of the ETO Section of the Historical Division in 1946 with British commanders and planners proved very useful particularly in filling in background to important decisions. The author has interviewed and corresponded with a number of American commanders. The bulk of the narrative of operations is based on preliminary studies by War Department historians (see below), but these were checked and supplemented by reference to the primary sources. The latter consist of unit journals, after action reports, and interviews conducted by historical officers with participants in most Page 488 cases immediately after the battle. The unit journals contain most of the contemporaneous incoming and outgoing messages of the headquarters involved together with overlays of troop dispositions, reports, intelligence estimates, and other supporting documents. These constitute the principal primary sources for the history of operations during June 1944 except for the action of the two airborne divisions. No contemporary record of any value for the historian was kept by the airborne units. This lack was fortunately remedied in good part by the extensive interviews conducted by Colonel S. L. A. Marshall with airborne officers and men during June and July 1944. The much abbreviated accounts of British operations are largely based on information supplied by the British Cabinet Office Historical Section. Information on German preparations and combat comes from original records of the German Army and from manuscript histories prepared after the war by more than two hundred German general and general staff officers working under direction of Col. Harold E. Potter, USA Original documents include army headquarters war diaries (KTB's) and their supporting papers, special orders, reports, telegrams, and conference minutes. Although a large number of documents were destroyed by German order or by Allied looters, and a considerable number were sent to the Soviet Union, the collection remaining available to the Western historian is still relatively rich for the pre-D-Day story of the German Army in France. In contrast, few original records of German operations in Normandy survived the annihilation of von Schlieben s force in the Cotentin and the later August collapse of the Seventh Army. The principal extant source is the Seventh Army KTB. This is supplemented by the postwar accounts of various unit commanders and staff officers. The War Diary of Army Group B has been lost and only a few of the supporting documents remain. The OB WEST diary has been preserved only from 1 July 1944. Some use was made of German naval and air force records. The U.S. Navy Department has duplicates and microfilms of original German Navy documents held by the British Admiralty. Especially useful for the present work were the war diaries of Admiral Doenitz and of Admiral Krancke, Naval Commander in the West. Luftwaffe records are particularly spotty. Most useful were those preserved by the Luftwaffe Historical Section in the Von Rohden Collection, now at the Air University, Maxwell Field (microfilms in the Library of Congress). III Following is a guide to some of the principal documents and document collections. AAF files. Army Air Force files containing operational records of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces. Now at the Air University, Maxwell Field, Montgomery, Alabama. Adm. file. Administrative file; contains miscellaneous papers mostly from non-operational headquarters in the period before D Day. Like the Pre-Invasion file (q.v.) it includes chiefly documents which were rescued from destruction or dispersion by historians in the European theaters. Page 489 Barker papers. Personal papers, chiefly correspondence, of Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker (ret.) specially made available by him to War Department historians. CC. Combined Commanders' papers led in SHAEF SGS files (q.v.). A duplicate collection is in the Pre-Invasion file q.v.). CCS. Combined Chiefs of Staff papers and minutes of meetings. These are all maintained in the OPD files (q.v.). CCS papers are memoranda, reports, reprints cables, etc., prepared by the U.S. or British Chiefs of Staff or by their subordinate agencies and submitted for combined discussion. Minutes of the meetings are not stenographic. Notes were kept by U.S. and British secretaries. The minutes in final form were specifically d individually approved by each of the Combined Chiefs. COS. British Chiefs of Staff papers and minutes of meetings. Selections of memoranda and excerpts of minutes relating to patters of interest to SHAEF are bound d separately filed with the SHAEF SGS collection (q.v.). The few COS papers reserved in other special SHAEF files e so cited in the footnotes. COSSAC. Designates papers officially sued by General Morgan's headquarters and the minutes of COSSAC staff meetings. All such documents are to be found separately bound in the SHAEF S files (q.v.). C/Sfile. Contains documents filed during the war in the Office of the Chief of Staff. Now held as a separate collection by Historical Records Section, Department Record Branch, AGO. Dep C/S file. A small collection of documents which during the war were filed the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff. Now held in a separate collection by Historical Record Section, AGO. Diary of CinC. MS diary of the Office of the Commander in Chief, kept for General Eisenhower by his naval aide, Capt. Harry C. Butcher. It was begun in July 1942 just before Eisenhower became commander in chief of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. Edited excerpts have been printed by Butcher in My Three Years with Eisenhower (New York, 1946). Eisenhower Personal Files. Contains communications between General Eisenhower and General Marshall including both personal letters and cables which had limited distribution and were not sent to regular operational files. E TO file. Files of the European theater headquarters now held by the Organization Records Branch, Records Administration Center, AGO. FUSA file. Administrative and pre-D-Day planning papers of First U.S. Army now held by the Organization Records Branch, AGO. Hist Div files. A miscellaneous collection of documents chiefly comprising material prepared or collected by War Department historians. It includes interviews, responses to special questionnaires, manuscript histories, and certain British documents not found in U.S. operational files. JCS. Joint (U.S.) Chiefs of Staff papers and minutes of meetings. Copies of all JCS documents cited can be found in OPD files (q.v.). The JCS papers include memoranda by the Joint Chiefs as a body, by individual members, and by subordinate agencies. Minutes of the meetings were not stenographic. Cf. note under CCS. Page 490 JIC. Joint Intelligence Committee (British) estimates found, unless otherwise noted, in SHAEF SGS files (q.v.) in Separately bound collection of JIC papers. JPS. Joint Planning Staff (U.S.) papers and minutes of meetings. Copies of JPS documents are in OPD ABC files, which include in most cases not only the final planners' memoranda, but OPD drafts, discussions, and working notes. JWPC. Joint War Planning Committee (U.S.) papers, many of which were reissued as JPS or JCS documents. All cited are in OPD files. Cf. note under JPS. Navy Dept files. The manuscript studies of U.S. operations and the occasional documents cited are in the Office of Naval Record. German documents are in the so-called Tambach collection which contains carbon duplicates and microfilms of German originals held by the British Admiralty office. OPD files. Collection of the Operations Division of the War Department. They include the central files bearing the OPD decimal classification, and two separate collections: one kept by the Strategy and Policy Group within OPD which is identified by the initials ABC, and one kept by the Executive Group identified as the Exec file. Pre-Inv file. The Pre-Invasion files contain miscellaneous papers on planning and strategy originating with or collected by various headquarters in the European theater before the invasion. The documents were turned over to War Department historians in the theater during 1944, and are now held by the Historical Records Section, AGO. SHAEF files. Files of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. This is a very large collection of all CROSS-CHANNEL ATTACK the working papers of the staff sections of General Eisenhower's headquarters together with records of COSSAC, the Combined Commanders, and the British Chiefs of Staff. Files of each of the five general staff sections and of the Secretary of the General Staff (SGS) and the Adjutant General (AG) are separate, each containing the papers of chief concern to the respective section. -For the present work the richest files are those of SGS G-3, and AG. The SGS section actually contains the bulk of the important cables, memos, minutes, and planning papers with which SHAEF was concerned. Files are held by the historical Records Section, AGO. 12th A Gp le. Operational files of the 12th Army Group with certain planning papers from the preinvasion period when the headquarters was designated 1st Army Group. Files now separately held by the Historical Records Section, AGO. USSTAF file. Comprises documents specially collected by the chief USSTAF historian. Formerly in the Air Force Historical Section office, some of these papers have been transferred to the Spaatz file in the Library of Congress. Others can be found in AAF files at the Air University, Maxwell Field, Montgomery, Alabama. WD Cable log. The large collection of cables which cleared through the War Department Message Center, filed by date in incoming and outgoing books. Secondary Sources Unpublished preliminary historical studies by Army, Navy, and Air Force historians greatly facilitated the task of research into subjects peripheral to the Page 491 main narrative Especially useful was the series, The Administrative and Logistical history of the European Theater of Operations. The eleven volumes of special studies on such matters as training, manpower, planning, and supply were written by Army historians in the European Theater of Operations under the direction of Maj. Roland G. Ruppenthal, assistant theater historian, USFET. The Administrative History, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, on file in the Historical Division, contains material on naval organization for the assault. Other manuscript studies of naval administrative history, on file in the Navy Department, were consulted chiefly for aspects of the submarine war and landing craft procurement. Of some help were two manuscript histories of the Ninth Air Force, one by Lt. Col. Robert H. George and one by Col. William B. Reed, both in Air Force files. The 1500-page history of the French Forces of the Interior, prepared by Capt. Lucien Galimand, Capt. Marcel Vigneras, and Maj. R. A. Bourne-Paterson, is an important compilation of information on the French Resistance, drafted in 1945 from documents that have since been widely scattered. From interview material, Col. S. L. A. Marshall made a series of small-unit studies of airborne operations in Normandy. These manuscripts in Historical Division files are often brilliantly illuminating as to the nature of the fighting in the Cotentin. Published sources include official reports and dispatches of commanders, special studies generally for limited distribution, official histories, unofficial histories, and memoirs. Of the dispatches and reports, most of which are not very useful for historical purposes, special mention need be made only of "Despatch of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory," Fourth Supplement to the London Gazette No. 37838, 31 December 1946; and Report by Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force on Operation NEPTUNE (London, 1944), 3 vols. Both of these reports are exceptionally full. A pertinent special study particularly valuable for the OVERLORD story is George E. Mowry, Landing Craft and the WPB (Civilian Production Administration, Historical Reports on War Administration: WPB Special Study No. 11) (Washington, 1946). The Historical Division of the Department of the Army has published in the AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION series, two preliminary narratives of U.S. operations in Normandy in June 1944 which cover most of the fighting described in Cross-Channel Attack. These narratives are [Charles H. Taylor] Omaha Beachhead (Washington, 1945) and [R. G. Ruppenthal] Utah Beach to Cherbourg (Washington, 1947). Fully documented manuscripts of both studies are on file in the Historical Division. This documentation has not been repeated in the present volume. Official histories of the U.S. Navy and Air Forces are just beginning to appear and for the most part those so far published do not cover the period with which this volume is chiefly concerned. However, some use has been made of the first two volumes of Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate (eds.), he Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago, 1947 and 1948). In addition, portions of that work still in manuscript have Page 492 been made available to the author by the Air Force Historical Section. The published volumes of the semiofficial naval history, Samuel E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic (Boston, 1948), and idem, Operations in North African Waters (Boston, 1947), bear only indirectly on the subjects of this volume. Col. C. P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945 (An Official Historical Summary) (Ottawa, 1948), a preliminary work, is the only official account of British or Dominion forces to appear so far. Semiofficial histories exist for most U.S. combat units but few go beyond the bare outlines of after action reports colored by accounts of individual exploits. A noteworthy exception is the history of the 101st Airborne Division: Leonard Rapport and Arthur Norwood, Jr., Rendezvous With Destiny (Washington, 1948). Of the unofficial histories touching OVERLORD far the best now in print is Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, 1948) A revised edition with supplementary material was published in 1950. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948) is a fine volume of memoirs and a valuable contribution to the strategy story at the highest level. Some use has been made of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York, 1948) and Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Morgan, Overture to Overlord (New York, 1950), although these books deal with subjects abundantly covered by the primary sources consulted Captain Harry C. Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower (New York, 1948) is not the "personal diary" of Captain Butcher as advertised but a collection of excerpts from the personal and official diary of General Eisenhower kept for him by Captain Butcher. Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance(New York, 1950) touches only on the very beginnings of the OVERLORD story.