Page 136 THE ATTACK OF 9-11 JUNE AT 1700 ON 8 JUNE, warning orders were issued by V Corps; the second phase of the beachhead operations was to begin the next day. The delay of two days in reaching the initial objectives gave urgency to the situation. German resistance was weakening, but reinforcements could change the whole picture. The beachhead was still far short of its desired depth, and the landing area could still be reached by enemy artillery fire from the Trevieres positions. V Corps had reckoned with enemy capabilities of attack by three divisions, including armor, by evening of 8 June. So far previsions of counterattack had not been realized, a tribute to the effective work of the Allied air forces on enemy communications. However, V Corps intelligence noted enemy troop movements 70 miles south of the battle front, and the 12th SS Panzer and the SS Hitler Jugend Divisions were believed moving from the east, with possibility of reaching the battle front on 9 June. In the corps zone, Cerisy Forest was suspected of being an area of assembly for enemy forces, including armor. The 30th Mobile Brigade, which had just begun to make an appearance in the fighting, represented the last known local reserves at the enemy's disposal. There was, of course, no assurance that reinforcements coming from a distance would be used against V Corps, for the Germans had a much wider front to consider in committing their available strength (Map No. XVI). To the east, British Second Army was six to eight miles inland on a considerable front, had crossed the Caen-Bayeux highway, and was within two miles of Caen. That city was of vital importance to the enemy, and north of it the Germans were offering strong resistance based on the 21st Panzer Division, with evidence of other armored reinforcement coming up. To the west, VII Corps was still fighting to consolidate the assigned beachhead area, was short of its original objectives, and was opposed by elements of at least three divisions. Carentan was still in enemy hands. Although build-up had been affected by the delay in all landing schedules during the first days, V Corps disposed of considerable increase in strength for attack beyond D-Day objectives. Four battalions of 155-mm howitzers (corps artillery) were getting ashore on 8 June. The 2d Division, originally due by D+2, was estimated far enough along in landing to be operational by the next day. The 9th Infantry had landed the evening of 7 June, and used two battalions on 8 June in clearing out snipers behind the beach between St-Laurent and Vierville. The 38th Infantry had two battalions ashore by evening of the 8th, and the 23d had started landing. Two batteries of divisional artillery were arriving. Behind the 2d Division, the 2d Armored was ready to bring in its first elements on 9 June. In V Corps Field Order No. 2, issued at 2115 on 8 June, General Gerow directed an attack at noon the next day by three divisions abreast (Map No. XIV). The 2d Division, taking over a 5,000-yard front Page 137 north of Trevieres, was to capture the key high ground at Cerisy Forest. The 1st Division was to put its main effort on the right, thus assisting the 2d Division, and to protect the east flank of V Corps along the Drome River. The 1st Division's objectives lay along the high ground west of the Drome River between Cerisy Forest and the Army boundary. On the right wing, covering the drive south to Cerisy Forest, the 29th Division would cross the Aure and reach the edge of the Elle River valley; at the same time, it was to capture Isigny and establish contact with VII Corps toward Carentan. Enemy counterattack was still regarded as highly possible, and each attacking division was ordered to be ready for defense of D-Day positions in its sector with one to three battalions (one in the 2d Division sector), these units to remain in D- Day positions until relieved by Corps order. This attack plan was designed to continue forward movements already under way, with a minimum of delay. In two cases, verbal Page 138 orders of the Corps Commander had anticipated Field Order No. 2; the 29th Division had been ordered to cross the Aure on the night of 8-9 June, and the 1st Division to seize high ground southwest of Tour-en- Bessin as a preliminary to the jump-of on 9 June. There was thus no sharp dividing line, in time, between the completion of the operation toward D-Day objectives and the start of the new phase. Advance to Cerisy Forest After receiving warning orders at 1700 on 8 June, the 1st Division units had a considerable task of preparation in order to attack at noon next day. They were somewhat short of the assigned line of departure: Moulagny-Courtelay-Grivilly-Cussy. On the afternoon of the 8th, the 2d Battalion received orders to occupy high ground a mile southwest of Mosles, in what would be the assembly area for the 18th Infantry. The battalion met determined resistance near Moulagny and dug in for the night a little north of its objective. The other battalions of the 18th had to wait for relief by the 2d Division. This took place on the morning of the 9th, delayed by the fact that the 3d Battalion was engaged in a fire fight at the time of relief; furthermore, both 1st and 3d Battalions then had to cover some distance to reach their assembly area. As for the 26th Infantry, D-Day objectives were just being reached on the morning of 9 June; the 3d Battalion had been in a severe action with the enemy at Ste-Anne early that day, while the 1st Battalion was still slowed by light enemy resistance north of Tour-en-Bessin during the morning. As a result, the jump-off on the 1st Division front was delayed one to two hours. By Field Order No. 36, the 1st Division planned its attack with two regiments abreast. The 18th RCT, with Company C, 745th Tank Battalion, Battery A of the 62d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, and Company B, 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion, attached, and the 32d Field Artillery Battalion in direct support, was to advance on a front of about 4,000 yards, with Vaubadon and la Commune as objectives, on the Bayeux-St-Lo highway The 26th RCT, with equivalent attachments and the 33d Field Artillery Battalion in direct support, was aimed at Dodigny and Agy, on the same highway. Two battalions of the 16th, with the 7th Field Artillery Battalion in direct support, had the mission of clearing enemy resistance up to the Army boundary from Port- en-Bessin to Vaucelles, maintaining contacts with the British on that flank, and organizing defensive positions in the Tour-en-Bessin area. The 2d Battalion of the 16th was held in division reserve. Four battalions of artillery (three of them 155-mm howitzers or guns) were in general support, two of them reinforcing the fires of the 32d and 33d Battalions. Due to make the main effort with Cerisy Forest as its objective, the 2d Division was hampered by lack of weapons and equipment as the hour of jump-off approached. The 9th and 38th Infantry, scheduled to attack abreast in the Trevieres area, had no transportation by the morning of 9 June and most of the battalions lacked heavier automatic weapons, mortars, and communications equipment. Only two battalions (15th and 38th) of the divisional artillery were ready and in position: medical, signal, engineer, and reconnaissance units were only partially ashore. The 23d Infantry, designated as division reserve, had just landed the evening before and was assembling near St-Laurent by noon. Attachments to the 2d Division for the attack included a company each from the 747th Tank Battalion and the 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion. Delayed in starting, the attack made slow progress during the afternoon of 9 June; Page 139 then gathered momentum as it was pressed during the short night (twilight lasted until 2300). The enemy at first offered stubborn resistance from a number of organized positions, but these were widely separated, not held in strength, and given only weak artillery support. Once they were bypassed or overwhelmed, little further opposition was encountered. Enemy weakness was indicated by identification of the replacement battalion of the 915th Regiment, the reserve battalion of the 916th, and the reconnaissance battalion of the 352d Division, as well as remnants of the 517th Mobile Battalion. Evidently, with no fresh troops at hand, the Germans were throwing in their last resources in a fashion that spelled disorganization. Along the front of four regiments, advance was progressively slower from the left to the right flank. By the end of the afternoon, resistance began to fold in front of the 26th Infantry, attacking with the 2d and 3d Battalions abreast. At 2140 the 3d Battalion had reached its objective, Agy; the 2d got to Dodigny at 0150. The 18th Infantry was held up by a strongpoint near the line of departure; this had to be bypassed and cleaned up by the reserve battalion (2d), which took 30 prisoners and counted 20 enemy dead. By 2100 the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 18th were two miles behind the 26th Infantry units on their left, and Corps gave permission for the 16th RCT to move from reserve to a position where it could guard the open flank and help the 18th Infantry if necessary. The 18th, however, made better progress as night fell, and kept on pressing against diminishing opposition. By daylight it was abreast of the 26th. Its objectives on the St-Lo-Bayeux highway were reached at 1000 and 1600 on 10 June. The 3d Battalion, on the edge of Cerisy Forest, met signs of increased resistance near its objectives. In an advance of 6 miles, losses had been slight; the 18th Infantry reported 50 casualties for 9 June. Enemy prisoners stressed the effectiveness of artillery support given the advance; fires had been concentrated on strongpoints, assembly areas, and road movements. The 7th, 32d, and 33d Field Artillery Battalions fired 22 missions on 9 June for a total of 976 rounds. The batteries of the 62d Armored Field Artillery Battalion (self-propelled 105-mm howitzers) had been divided between the 1st Division regiments, to be used for direct fire in close support against enemy strong-points. As a result of the character of the opposition, however, these batteries were not needed. The three artillery battalions used in general support still found observation a problem and delivered for the most part unobserved fires. Naval fire, using 6 inch guns of the cruisers, was again very helpful, one of the targets being a battery south of the 26th Infantry's objective. According to enemy prisoners, many field pieces of the 352d Division's artillery had been destroyed and all their gun positions had been abandoned. Enemy artillery action on the corps front was limited to occasional fire by single guns. The 2d Division, led by Maj. Gen. Walter M. Robertson, went into its first action of the war under serious handicaps. Its initial objective was Trevieres, a key position if the enemy planned to hold along his present line. While the 38th Infantry attacked from the north and west, the 9th Infantry would outflank Trevieres by seizing Rubercy, to the southeast. The 9th Infantry had relieved the 18th at Engranville and Mandeville that morning and had planned an attack by the 2d and 3d Battalions abreast, 2d to the west. The attack order did not reach the 2d Battalion at Engranville until 1100, and that unit was far short of its line of departure, the Trevieres-Mandeville road. When the battalion Page 140 crossed the Aure, it came under heavy flanking fire of automatic weapons from the strong German defenses east of Trevieres. Supporting tanks, held up by the steep banks of the Aure, were unable to get into position to help, and the 2d Battalion immediately felt the lack of its mortars and machine guns. The right wing of the advance was pinned down for most of the afternoon but managed to disengage and reach the line of departure about dark. Company E had suffered 20 casualties in the fight. When the battalion was ordered to resume the attack at 2200, preliminary artillery fire was misdirected, the first rounds falling into the CP area and inflicting 17 casualties. Recovering from this incident, the battalion pushed on and reached the Rubercy-Trevieres road at midnight. Heavy weapons were now beginning to arrive, but the unit was still without communications and out of contact with the 3d Battalion on its left. Page 141 The 3d Battalion, starting its attack from the area Mandeville-Moulagny, was fortunate in having most of its heavy weapons and equipment. Companies K and L attacked abreast on the Mandeville-Rubercy road, but K lost its direction and side-slipped to the east, forcing the use of I to fill a wide gap in the front. At the village of Haut-Hameau, enemy small-arms fire stopped Company L for several hours. When four tanks came up to deal with the resistance, the Germans put in an unusually heavy concentration of artillery fire, with eight guns reported as firing from the south and southwest. A tank was knocked out; Company L lost 20 men and was disorganized. Contacts with K and I were made and a coordinated attack by Companies I and L was prepared for 1900, preceded by support fires from a 4.2-inch mortar platoon, the Cannon Company, a battery of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion, and several destroyers. When L advanced after this fire, German resistance was slight. Fifteen enemy dead were found, and two machine guns and a few prisoners taken. The battalion was near Rubercy by dark, out of contact with the 1st Division on its left. The 9th Infantry lost 10 killed and 80 wounded for the day's action. To the west of this advance, the 38th Infantry had made slow progress against Trevieres, where the enemy resisted stubbornly from well dug-in positions. The 2d Battalion, attacking from the north, was fighting into the village by nightfall. Two machine guns and some bazookas borrowed from an engineer unit were put to use, and the heavy mortars of Company C, 81st Chemical Weapons Battalion, helped to neutralize enemy strongpoints at the edge of the village. The 3d Battalion crossed the Aure southwest of Trevieres, attempting to outflank the village on that side. During the day, the 15th and 38th Field Artillery Battalions had been called on very heavily for supporting fires, mostly against Trevieres, and had used 3,652 rounds up to midnight. By 10 June the 2d Division had received much of its missing equipment and transportation, and the attack was renewed in greater strength. A prisoner captured on the evening before had stated that the 916th Regiment was withdrawing from the Trevieres area to the Cerisy Forest, and the lack of enemy resistance on 10 June confirmed this statement. The advances east and west of Trevieres had left the enemy there in an untenable salient. After a heavy artillery concentration fired before 0700, the village was cleared out by 0845, and the 2d Division went forward with no opposition except from isolated snipers and an occasional machine gun holding a delaying position. The result was the most extensive advance of the operation. The 9th Infantry got through Cerisy Forest after skirmishes with enemy scout cars, and bivouacked southwest of Balleroy with losses for the day of ix wounded. The 38th Infantry reached he village of Cerisy-la-Foret, and at 2100 he 1st Battalion was pushing on with orders to seize Haute-Litee at the southwest corner of the woods. Only in this area was there any sign of organized enemy opposition, offered by the Engineer Battalion, 352d Division. Prisoners for the day numbered 90, and their reports indicated considerable disintegration of enemy means of resistance: remnants of units were intermingled, supplies were lacking, and some prisoners had no knowledge of the whereabouts of their units and commanders. German artillery delivered no fires on front-line troops and engaged in no counter-battery on 10 June. Only enemy weakness could explain the fact that Cerisy Forest had been practically undefended. Possession of the area by U. S. forces denied the enemy commanding ground from which to mount counterattack against the beach- Page 142 head; furthermore, it lay athwart the best direct route between St-Lo and the German forces defending south of Bayeux. On 11 June, the 1st and 2d Divisions organized the ground won in their rapid advance. On most parts of the front there was no contact with the enemy, and patrols which pushed several miles southward found no opposition in any force. Despite the reports on previous days of the approach of armored units, these were still not in evidence. Enemy artillery fire was almost nonexistent, being reported only twice on the 2d Division front. The only serious fighting of the day took place on the right flank, where the 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry was completing its attempt to secure the crossroads at Haute-Litee. This area was stoutly defended all day by Germans holding prepared positions. When the crossroads were passed at noon, the enemy still resisted in the forest fringes to south and west, holding up further advance by mortar fire. Heavy concentrations by the 38th and 12th Field Artillery Battalions neutralized the mortars and allowed the 1st Battalion to reach objectives west and south of the crossroads. The 38th Page 143 Field Artillery Battalion fired 1,015 rounds during this action. By nightfall, the 23d Infantry had moved up to join the division; its vehicles and equipment were expected to arrive in a matter of hours. On the 1st Division front, preparations were made on the afternoon of 11 June for the corps attack the next day. Balleroy, found held by an enemy patrol in the morning, was occupied in the afternoon without resistance. The division was strengthened by the arrival of the 1st Reconnaissance Troop and the 102d Cavalry Battalion, which were immediately put into use for reconnaissance missions. During the evening, the 18th and 26th Infantry Regiments moved across the Drome to the line Planqueray-la Butte, without encountering opposition. At 2030 some alarm was caused by reports of a German counterattack with armor in the British area, headed west for the left flank and rear of the 1st Division. The report turned out to be unfounded. British advance south and southeast of Bayeux was, however, being slowed by heavy resistance. On 10 June, the main effort, led by the 7 Armoured Division, reached the area Tilly-sur-Seulles-Lingevres and began to encounter enemy armor. On the First Army's flank, elements of the British 231 Brigade reached la Belle-Epine on the 11th and were momentarily checked there by the enemy counterattack which occasioned concern for V Corps' flank. British XXX Corps had been, so far, abreast of V Corps' advance, but there were indications that further progress might be uneven in the two zones. Across the Lower Aure (29th Division) V Corps Field Order No. 2, directing a general attack at noon on 9 June, included as preliminary to the attack certain movements already under way by the 29th Division. One was the capture of Isigny; the other was the crossing of the flooded part of the Aure Valley by the 115th Infantry, to be accomplished during the night of 8-9 ,June. According to advance intelligence, the lowland between Isigny and Trevieres had been inundated to a depth of two to three feet, over a width varying from a half mile to two miles. When the Aure Valley was reached, conditions were found not as bad as had been reported, since the waters had receded. However, large patches of shallow water remained, the mud was deep everywhere, and the close network of drainage ditches between the two main streams (Esque and Aure) would hamper movement, even though the ditches were not wide. The four bridges along the causeway between la Cambe and Douet had been destroyed. Patrols were sent out on the evening of the 8th to reconnoiter for crossings, and heavy artillery and naval fire was laid on the south bank of the flood plain, particularly near Bricqueville, Colombieres, and Calette Wood. This preparatory fire included 150 rounds from destroyers' guns and 208 rounds of the 110th Field Artillery Battalion. 2d Lt. Kermit C. Miller took a combat patrol of platoon strength from Company E, 115th Infantry, crossed the valley south of Canchy after dark, and went into Colombieres. Already hit hard by artillery concentrations, the enemy force there was disorganized; the patrol took it completely by surprise, ambushed enemy reinforcements, and inflicted more than 40 casualties before withdrawing with 11 prisoners. The 3d Battalion also sent out small reconnaissance patrols of two or three men, who reported getting across at several points but were dubious about being able to guide the battalion. About first light on 9 June, the 3d Battalion started out over the flats south from Page 144 Canchy, with the Cannon Company of the 115th as near as possible to the valley for close support. Visibility was good, and enemy opposition in any strength could easily have made the advance very costly. Halfway across, the battalion reached a stream too deep to ford, and stopped while Company A of the 121st Engineer Combat Battalion rigged 10 improvised foot bridges, using assault-raft equipment, pneumatic floats, and bridge timbers. “Weasels” (M-29) [23] were used to get the materials forward. These bridges got the troops over the deeper streams and ditches, but the smaller ones still caused plenty of delay, two hours being required to put the battalion across the exposed flats. Fortunately, the area was practically undefended. No artillery fire was encountered and only scattered rifle fire. The 2d Battalion followed the 3d, and both were over by 1100. Further east, the 1st Battalion tried to find a passage across the narrower part of the Aure Valley, south of Ecrammeville, but the enemy holding the Trevieres area repulsed this effort with machine-gun and rifle fire. The 1st Battalion then marched to Canchy and followed the route taken by the rest of the regiment. Along the causeway, four short treadway bridges were started by the 254th Engineer Combat Battalion and were ready for vehicles that night. By Field Order No. 4 of the 29th Division, initial objectives assigned to the 115th were Bricqueville, Colombieres, and the Calette Wood; these were supposed to be occupied by noon as bases for the next phase of the attack. The 1st Battalion marched to Bricqueville, repulsed a weak enemy attack with the aid of close-support fire by the regimental cannon company, and organized defensive positions. The 3d Battalion arrived at Colombieres by 1020, encountering no opposition. The battalion did not move out on the attack until 1700 and reached its next objective, la Folie, at 2300. Its position that night was to be somewhat exposed, since the enemy still held Trevieres, and on the right the 2d Battalion had met disaster. That battalion had a hard day's work. After crossing the Aure Valley, it turned west toward Calette Wood, from which enemy harassing fire was holding up the bridging work at the causeway. En route, the battalion met considerable opposition near Vouilly, from riflemen and bicycle troops armed with machine pistols. Only scattered resistance was met at Calette Wood which had received two concentrations of fire from the division artillery. The battalion spent three hours in beating the thick brush for snipers, and cleared out the woods enough so that the bridges could be completed. About 1900 the 2d Battalion returned to Vouilly, where enemy snipers were still active, and started south for its next objective, le Carrefour, six miles south. A wrong turn took the unit off the route and added three miles to the march. It was 0230 before the exhausted troops reached their objective and began to move off the road for a brief rest. The night was overcast and very dark, making it difficult to reconnoiter the ground for temporary defensive positions. The two leading companies were ordered to take positions to the east and west sides of a large orchard, and it was planned for Company E and Headquarters Company to complete a perimeter defense. These units were still halted on the road, waiting to move into the held, when officers standing near the rear of the column (where two quarter-ton trucks had just brought up some rations from Bricqueville) heard a slight noise of traffic about 40 yards north. They believed it was the 3d Battalion coming up. Almost immediately a column of enemy infantry, [23] A full-track, light cargo carrier with 1,200 pound capacity. Page 145 with some type of armored vehicles in it, appeared around a bend in the road and a machine-pistol was fired. When U. S. troops fired a few shots in return, they heard an uproar of voices and the sound of many vehicles shifting gears. The enemy immediately swept the road with machine-gun fire and then sent armored vehicles down it, firing 88-mm guns into the hedgerows and adjacent fields. Company E scattered off the road into the fields; the companies already in the orchard were caught completely by surprise and had no chance to organize for effective defense. Most of the men had thrown themselves on the ground and had gone to sleep as they dropped; wakened by artillery and machine-gun fire at point-blank range, they were confused and stupefied. First efforts at resistance only gave away their positions to the German guns, and some groups were caught in wild rifle fire from friendly units. Heavy weapons were not in position to be used. The battalion commander was killed, control was never established, and men began to drift out of the orchard in all directions. In a short time the battalion was dispersed into scattered groups, making their way back north and west through the night. Losses were 11 officers and 139 enlisted men. It was afterwards estimated that the 2d Battalion had been hit by a German column retreating from the Aure Valley and bent on escape to the south. By all evidence, the encounter was a surprise for the Germans as well, but circumstances favored the enemy. In march formation, with armored vehicles leading (probably about eight self-propelled 88-mm guns), they were able to use the heavy and demoralizing fire of these guns in the first, decisive minutes. The Germans suffered casualties, and two armored vehicles were knocked out by bazookas. Fortunately, the enemy had no resources on this front to take advantage of his local success. On 10 June, the 2d Battalion was reorganized, received 110 replacements, and moved back into line in the afternoon. No enemy resistance was met, and the 115th Infantry reached its final objectives during the afternoon: the 2d Battalion near Ste-Marguerite- d'Elle; the 3d east of it along the river; and the 1st at Epinay-Tesson. That night, the 2d Battalion outposts were attacked by small German forces which crossed the Elle River, and skirmishing lasted all night. To the west of the 115th, the 175th Infantry Regiment had secured the corps' flank along the Vire River. After Isigny was taken on the morning of 9 June, the regiment turned south toward the objective area, Lison-la Fotelaie, moving in column of battalions, with the 747th Tank Battalion attached. Resistance was met south of la Herennerie, where elements of the 352d Divisional Artillery, acting as infantry, were swept aside with an estimated loss of 125 killed. Forward elements of the armored units reached Lison at noon but were temporarily checked by artillery fire. Although Lison was then bombed and strafed by Allied planes, an enemy force of about company strength delayed the advance for a few hours. Both Lison and la Fotelaie were occupied by nightfall. West of Isigny, Company K had been sent toward the bridge over the Vire River at Auville-sur-le-Vey, with orders to seize the crossing as a means for contact with VII Corps. The bridge had been burned, and the enemy held machine-gun emplacements on the other bank. On the morning of 10 June intense mortar and machine-gun fire stopped the first effort to cross the stream. Company K was reinforced by a platoon of tanks, a platoon of Company E, and the 29th Reconnaissance Squadron. At 1800, under covering fire Gf the mortars and automatic weapons of the 29th Reconnaissance Page 146 Squadron, the reinforced company forded the 40-foot stream at low tide and advanced into Auville-sur-le-Vey, which it held that night to cover bridging operations by Company C of the 254th Engineer Combat Battalion. Company K suffered about a dozen casualties in the crossing. Despite vigorous German resistance 500 yards to the west, a patrol of the 29th Reconnaissance Squadron made first contact with patrols of the 101st Airborne Division that afternoon (1500) near Catz. The 101st was still fighting toward Carentan from the north but had put small forces across the Douve Estuary east of Carentan. On 11 June, the situation on this flank was strengthened by the arrival of a battalion of armored infantry from Combat Command A of the 2d Armored Division, which took over the bridgehead west of the Vire. The 116th Infantry, with the Ranger Force attached, engaged in mopping- up operations between Grandcamp and Isigny on 9 June, overcoming final enemy opposition at Maisy and Gefosse-Fontenay; thereafter, it went into division reserve, moving south of the Aure on the afternoon of 11 June. As on the rest of the corps front, enemy resistance in the 29th Division's one had shown less and less strength as the attack progressed. Evidences of disorganization mounted, particularly with respect to intermingling of units. Elements of the 915th Infantry were identified west of the Vire as well as on the 1st Division front; according to prisoners, the 915th and 916th Infantry Page 147 were being merged. Enemy artillery was little in evidence. Except for harassing night raids against Allied shipping off the beachheads, German planes were still unable to intervene effectively in the battle one. All air activity was restricted by weather on 9 June. On 10-11 June, Allied air forces resumed their work of bombing airfields, cutting communications, and carrying out tactical missions against supply dumps, road junctions, and assembly areas close to the front. By 11 June, bombers o the Royal Air Force had set a new record for weight of bombs dropped in a week: 17,268 tons, of which only 1,444 tons had been directed against targets in Germany. The best testimony on the effectiveness of the Allied air action, and the major results it was beginning to achieve, comes from the complaints of high German commanders in Normandy on their situation in respect to supply, transportation, and reinforcements. The Enemy Side These three days, 9-11 June, marked a period of disillusionment for the German command. On 8 June, they had still been looking forward to the imminent counteroffensive which was to destroy the Allied beachheads, beginning at Caen. In the succeeding days, these hopes had to be given up, and Seventh Army concentrated on efforts to bring enough strength into Normandy to prevent further loss of vital ground. The delays in arrival of German reinforcements were a cause of increasing difficulty and anxiety (Map No. XV On the morning of 9 June the sector south of Omaha Beach loomed into prominence for the first time at Seventh Army Headquarters. At 1035 General Marcks reported from LXXXIV Corps. Isigny had been taken by a surprise attack; tanks were reported on the Lison-St-Lo road, so that the commanding general of Seventh Army was advised not to make a trip to St-Lo as planned; Allied intentions were probably to cross the Vire and link up with the western bridgehead, and LXXXIV Corps had no available force to stop them, the 352d Division having been reduced to “small groups” and the 726th Infantry having practically disappeared. General Marcks wanted to withdraw behind the Vire and assemble II Paratroop Corps for later counter-attack, with one of its divisions (77th Infantry) to go to the Valognes area. He also asked that LXXXIV Corps be freed of responsibility for action east of the Cotentin, suggesting that II Paratroop Corps be put under I SS Panzer Corps and take over the sector east of Carentan. Army disagreed with all these proposals except that of using the 77th Division to meet the growing pressure of Allied attack toward Montebourg. Army was aware that the “hole between Isigny and Bayeux had now been widened,” but still planned to assemble II Paratroop Corps at Balleroy for a counteroffensive toward Bayeux. It was beginning to doubt, however, whether this would be practicable, since the corps was so strung out on the road that its units would not arrive in fashion to permit concentration of offensive effort. At 1730, General Marcks reported again. This time he was more reassured about the Carentan area, for the Allies showed no tendency to push beyond Isigny. The 352d Division believed it might be able to hold the attack in progress at Trevieres, but an Allied breakthrough threatened at Montebourg. This was the background for an appearance of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel at Seventh Army Headquarters. Briefed on the situation, the Army Group Commander stressed two points. The Allies must not be allowed to get Cherbourg; and every effort must be made to prevent their linking up bridgeheads west of the Vire. He agreed with the Seventh Army viewpoint that counterattack by II Paratroop Corps had better be postponed until the corps was fully assembled and its action could be coordinated with that of Page 148 I SS Panzer Corps. Rommel expressed his conviction that this counteroffensive, when staged, would be successful. Von Rundstedt, he reported, believed the Allies were about to make a major assault on the Pas-de-Calais coast. Following this conference, Army ordered II Paratroop Corps to change its direction of advance from Balleroy toward the Isigny area, while the 77th Division was to go to Valognes. Rommel emphasized that the problem at the moment was to prevent linking of the bridgeheads, however serious the situation at Montebourg. That evening, nevertheless, saw II Paratroop Corps still far from the threatened area, despite urgent orders to make all possible speed. The 77th Division was near Avranches; one regiment of the 3d Paratroop Division was nearing St-Lo, but the rest of the division was still in Brittany. Advance elements of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division were approaching Balleroy, with main units near Avranches and Laval and location of its halftracks and heavy equipment (coming by rail) unknown. All these movements were hampered by shortage of fuel, as well as air attacks and sabotage along the line of march. In the Caen area, I SS Panzer Corps was still unable to start its attack, and the 21st Panzer and part of the 12th SS Panzer lost some ground north and west of Caen in defensive fighting. The 346th Division had been ordered (8 June) to move to the assistance of the 711th Division east of the Orne River, with the aim of freeing elements of 21st Panzer in that sector. General Marcks had expressed the conviction that 10 June would be the day of crisis in the battle on the approaches to Cherbourg. Rommel on that morning expressed a change of view with regard to the mission of the oncoming II Paratroop Corps; his main concern now was not so much to prevent linking of the bridgeheads as to forestall any Allied effort to cut off the Cotentin peninsula by pushing westward. Army ordered the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division to move to a position just southwest of Carentan, while the 3d Paratroop Division assembled on St-Lo. At the end of the day, Seventh Army felt that things had not gone as badly as had been feared. The German units had managed to hold on at Montebourg in heavy fighting; the Allies had crossed the Vire near Isigny but were not pressing in that area. I SS Panzer Corps' attack in the Caen area still failed to materialize; Allied pressure in that sector kept the German troops on the defensive and indicated preparations for a major attack on Caen. Reinforcements were now in sight of the threatened areas. Advance elements of the 77th Division were nearing Valognes, though the rest was strung out all the way to Avranches; 3d Paratroop Division had some units at Berigny and the main body had cleared the Avranches corner, coming out of Brittany; elements of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division were between Balleroy and Coutances In addition, the 2d Panzer Division (from northern France) had been ordered to Seventh Army [when the order had been issued is not stated], and its half-track elements were at Alencon. Army Command West was making further efforts to reinforce the Normandy battle. The XXXXVII Panzer Corps Headquarters had been ordered to the Seventh Army, and the 353d Division was now ordered from Brittany to join II Paratroop Corps. A number of artillery and antiaircraft units were also on their way. With this strength coming up, Army's appreciation of the situation showed moderate confidence. the armored divisions, once ready, would be able to wipe out the Allied lodgement in the Caen-Bayeux area; the forces in the Cotentin, though not strong enough for counterattack, would suffice to hold Cherbourg. Army indicated to Army Group its need for mobile artillery, anti-tank weapons, and antiaircraft. The overwhelming importance of having more fuel, both for operation of armored units and for faster movement of reinforcements, is stressed several times during the day's communications from Seventh Army to higher headquarters. One of the difficulties underlined by Seventh Army is that reinforcements were having so many delays that Page 149 units arrived in driblets and had to be committed piecemeal. On 10 June, the advance elements of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division bogged down at St-Lo for lack of fuel, and an engineer battalion had to be rushed to the Carentan area. The 352d Infantry Division on this day (10 June) advised Army that it was “not probable that much resistance was still being offered in the coastal defenses.” The Allied progress on 10 June in the Cerisy Forest-Balleroy area was not known to Seventh Army until the morning of the 11th. Then LXXXIV Corps reported (0530-0630) that the situation on its right flank was serious. The fighting value of the 352d Division was now very slight, and the hole between it and its right-hand neighbor (I SS Panzer Corps) was larger. The reaction at Seventh Army was that reinforcements on the way would take care of this hole in time, although Allied armored reconnaissance activity indicated their intention to exploit the gap. At the end of 11 June, Army reported that Allied forces were regrouping and that they had made no significant gains during the day, though Carentan was threatened. Army's intention was to hold the Vire-Elle line and Carentan. LXXXIV Corps had the mission of blocking the road to Cherbourg and, with II Paratroop Corps under its command, of preventing any drive to sever the Cotentin peninsula. Its right wing was to push toward Balleroy and seek contact by reconnaissance elements with I SS Panzer Corps southeast of Bayeux. By the close of the day, main elements of the 3d Paratroop Division were northeast of St-Lo; the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division was reaching assembly areas southwest of Carentan, ready to attack to east or north; and battle groups of the 265th and 275th Divisions were arriving westward of St-Lo. The 266th Division (battle group) was released for ultimate commitment in the St-Lo area. In the Caen area, the plan of early attack against the Allied bridgehead was finally abandoned, Army deciding that the Allied strength in that area was too great. The Panzer Lehr Division had arrived in the Tilly- sur-Seulles area, but Army's intention for the time being was to assume the defensive in this sector. Mobile elements, particularly tanks, were to be withdrawn as soon as possible from the battle and assembled in preparation for a later counteroffensive . The Seventh Army War Diary for 11 June devotes much space to a lengthy review of the effects of enemy air attacks, particularly on lines of communication. By 9 June rail transport anywhere near the battle .one had been rendered impossible. Elements of the 265th and 275th Divisions coming from Brittany had been forced to unload from trains after getting only a quarter of the way to the front. The 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division had also been forced to unload before it reached Seventh Army's rear boundary. The result put a heavy strain on motor transport, and this strain was increased by. Allied air attacks which took heavy toll of vehicles. The results showed in delays and in loss of supplies, including fuel, which in turn seriously crippled the lighting ability of the armored units as they arrived. All time schedules for arrival of reinforcements had been thrown off; movement by motor transport was possible only at night, and even marches conducted at night could be hindered by bombing of communications centers. Allied air observation also precluded movement by day near the battle front and led to attack on assembly areas, sometimes from the air. Army concluded this review with the demand that the German air forces intervene, by both day and night, to break this “unbearable” superiority of Allied air. In the meantime, Army was undertaking drastic measures to reorganize control of roads and transport in its rear areas and was trying to get Army Group to take over responsibility for a larger area in bringing up supply, so that Seventh Army's overtaxed transportation could be used only for the immediate needs of the battle zone. The fuel shortage was stressed, and Army stated the “outcome of the battle for the coast” depended on speedy supply of fuel to give arriving armored units the mobility necessary for an offensive. Page 150 THE ATTACK OF 12-13 JUNE BY 11 JUNE, V Corps had won the ground essential for security of its beachhead. The advance had carried over 12 miles inland and had conquered the dominating terrain at Cerisy Forest, while the right wing rested securely on the Vire-Elle river line and was ready to link up with VII Corps. But the attack was to continue without pause; on 11 June preparations for a new effort were under way, directed by Field Order No. 3 issued at 1700 (Map No. XV). The principal objective in this next phase was the Caumont area, assigned to the 1st Division with, in addition to previous attachments, the 102d Cavalry Squadron and three battalions of tanks. To the right of the main effort, the 2d and 29th Divisions were ordered to take objectives south of Cerisy Forest and the Elle River. In general effect, the advance would be echeloned from east to west, with Caumont at the apex of a salient. The 2d Armored Division, as corps reserve, would be held in readiness to use if necessary as a counterattacking force. V Corps' attack was closely related to plans of the British XXX Corps for 12 June. In hard fighting on the 11th, the British had been unable to dislodge the Panzer Lehr Division from positions between Lingevres and Tilly-sur-Seulles. This effort was to be renewed on the 12th, with the aim of flanking the whole German defense of the Caen area. V Corps' advance in the adjoining zone would materially aid XXX Corps by threatening the enemy flank southwest of Tilly-sur-Seulles. Furthermore, the attack of 12 June was designed to assist in the development of VII Corps' offensive toward Cherbourg. Enemy attention and reinforcement might be diverted from that area if V Corps exploited the enemy weakness now apparent in its one. The remnants of the 352d Division, showing signs of increased disorganization every day, were still the only important German force on a front of more than 25 miles. They were short of ammunition, and they had almost no artillery support. What small reinforcement they had received, mainly the three battalions of the 30th Mobile Brigade, had been wholly insufficient to remedy the situation. Enemy morale, according to evidence of prisoners, was steadily declining. According to the same source, to a certain extent supported by reports of troop movement south of the battle front, enemy armored units were on their way toward this front. They were believed to be the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division; some prisoners had been taken from its reconnaissance battalion in Cerisy Forest. Apart from the wider considerations governing this attack, the objectives of V Corps represented valuable tactical goals. A road junction of some importance, Caumont lies on a hill mass more than 750 feet above sea level, overlooking the Cerisy Forest and controlling the upper Drome Valley. Its capture would make V Corps hold on the beachhead doubly secure; as a base for further offensive operations into Page 151 the hilly country to the south, possession of Caumont would threaten the enemy's main lateral communications from Caen to the St-Lo-Vire- Avranches region. In the ones of the 2d and 29th Divisions the most important objective was Hill 192. This dominating height afforded observation over the whole area between the Elle and Vire Rivers, and was key terrain or any offensive operations aimed at St-Lo. Advance to Caumont By Field Order No. 37, issued at 2400 on 11 June, General Huebner planned the 1st Division's attack in essentially the same formation used before: the 18th and 26th RCT's abreast on fronts of about 3,000 yards, with the 16th RCT in reserve, ready to assist either attacking regiment and to protect the flanks. The left flank was to be guarded by the 1st Reconnaissance Troop, and two troops of the 102d Cavalry Squadron were to patrol in advance of the attacking units. Each regimental combat team included a tank battalion; the 18th and 26th had each a company of tank destroyers from the 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion. Six battalions of artillery were in direct or general support. Movement toward the line of departure (le Planqueray-la Butte) had begun during the evening of 11 June, but the 26th Infantry experienced road difficulties which caused a two-hour delay in the jump-off, scheduled for 0600. On the right, the 18th Infantry had a comparatively easy advance, led by the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast. No prepared enemy defenses were encountered, and opposition was offered only by light mobile screening forces, operating in patrols supported by armored cars and an occasional tank. This opposition was handled in well-organized fashion, pulling back on what appeared to be a prearranged schedule. The 745th Tank Battalion, attached to the 18th Infantry, reported a minimum of contact with enemy during the day. By evening, the 18th had made a four-mile advance to the Caumont-St-Lo highway and was ordered to stop there and patrol, particularly on the right flank. Here, the 18th was two miles farther south than the objectives assigned to the 2d Division. Troop B of the 102d Cavalry Squadron established a screen to protect this flank along the Drome River and made contact with the 2d Division. On the left, the 26th Infantry met much the same type of light, delaying resistance, built around reconnaissance cars and a few tanks. By dusk the 2d Battalion was on the edge of Caumont. Patrols, probing into the village, found it held by the enemy in small force. During the night the battalion endeavored to capture the village but was held off by determined resistance estimated at two companies, supported by five or six tanks or self-propelled guns. Company F penetrated into Caumont but was then forced back. With elements of the 743d Tank Battalion leading, the infantry cleaned out the village by 0900, in house-to-house fighting. The enemy lost several vehicles and an 88-mm gun in attempts to stop the tanks. Artillery observers, entering Caumont with the advance, reported that they had excellent observation into enemy positions for the first time since D Day. The 18th and 26th Infantry spent 13 June in organizing their positions for all-around defense and in patrolling forward and to the flanks of the salient created by their advance. By afternoon, strong enemy patrols were taking offensive action all along the 1st Division front, probing vigorously to find its positions and in some cases infiltrating well beyond the outposts. Patrol activity was so lively as to give the impression of counterattacks, and supporting artillery was called on much more frequently than during Page 152 the previous day. The 33d Field Artillery Battalion, attached to the 26th Infantry, fired 895 rounds as against 39 on 12 June, most of it about 1500 when a “counter-attack” was signaled. Enemy artillery showed signs of revival, putting some accurate fire into Caumont. Although no real counterattack developed, it was clear that the enemy was sensitive to the advance into Caumont and that a new quality of resistance was beginning to show. Elements believed to be from the 3d and 4th Companies of the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion, 2d Panzer Division, were identified. In fact, the bulk of that division was moving across the 1st Division front during the day, from west to east, and was being committed just east of Caumont in an action that was critical for the whole Allied front. The British, on 12 June, had begun a maneuver closely related to the 1st Division's attack on Caumont. Finding the Panzer Lehr Division holding strongly on the line Tilly-sur-Seulles-la Senaudiere, XXX Corps planned to slip the 7 Armoured Division south along the Army boundary, with Villers-Bocage as objective. This move would put them on the Avranches- Caen highway and threaten to outflank not merely the Tilly positions but the enemy lines as far as Caen. Protected on the west flank by the 1st Division's progress to Caumont, this maneuver began on the afternoon of 12 June, aided by arrangements for using one road Page 153 that lay in First Army's zone. By dark, leading elements of the 7 Armoured Division were two miles northeast of Caumont, and prospects seemed good for a decisive envelopment. These hopes were dashed on 13 June. The 50 Division, renewing the attack from the north, made no progress at Tilly-sur-Seulles. The 2d Panzer Division, arriving at the last minute on the highway from the southwest, was thrown at Villers-Bocage just after the advance elements of 7 Armoured Division reached the village. The enemy attack was repelled in heavy fighting, but the British could not both hold this position and continue their thrust to envelope the Panzer Lehr Division at Tilly-sur- Seulles. The 7 Armoured Division was withdrawn and occupied defensive positions two miles northeast of Caumont. The timely arrival of the 2d Panzer enabled the enemy to retain an area which they evidently regarded as having major importance. Both Tilly-sur-Seulles and Villers-Bocage remained, until the great Allied offensive in late July, as the western bastions for German defense of the Caen-Orne Valley sector. On the 2d Division front, the 9th Infantry attacked south on an axis parallel to the Caumont thrust. The 9th's objective was the Littcau ridge, which was close to the Cerisy Forest and detached from the hills to the south and east. Nearly 500 feet above sea level, its position made the ridge important both for observation and for protecting the flank of the Caumont salient. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 9th Infantry advanced two miles to their objective by 0940, 12 June. Enemy opposition had been very light, but by afternoon vigorous offensive patrolling was initiated by elements identified as belonging to the 3d Paratroop Division. This activity continued through 13 June, especially against Company C, which had moved to an advance position on dominating ground at Montrabot Hill. Supporting the 9th Infantry, the 15th Field Artillery Battalion fired 828 rounds on the 12th and 1,320 the next day. Enemy artillery action was light; no counterbattery fire was reported. Crossing the Elle River As it worked out, the attack of V Corps on 12-13 June shows marked contrast between developments on the right and left wings. The main effort toward Caumont, involving the 1st Division and the 9th Infantry of the 2d Division, reached its objectives with only slight difficulty. To the west, the 29th Division and the 38th Infantry of the 2d Division met a type of enemy resistance which spelled the end of the rapid advances made since 7 June. The Germans defended the approaches to Hill 192 with a vigor proving the importance they attached to St-Lo, committing in this area the first considerable reinforcements to be used against V Corps. Although the Elle River was a small, fordable stream, its crossing involved a number of bitterly contested actions. On the 2d Division's right, the 23d Infantry had the mission of passing through the positions of the 38th, attacking across the Elle, and occupying the Berigny-Hill 192 area. As planned, the attack was to be made in rather separated thrusts by two battalions of the 23d: the 1st would cross the Elle southwest of Cerisy-la-Foret and move south toward the hill; nearly three miles away, on the far side of Cerisy Forest, the 2d Battalion was to strike west across the Elle on the St-Lo highway, through Berigny. The attack jumped off at 0600 after a 20-minute artillery preparation by the 37th and 38th Field Artillery Battalions. The 1st Battalion got across the small stream but was not far past the line of departure Page 154 when it began to meet effective resistance. Helped by patches of woodland which concealed their movements, enemy infantry counterattacked the 1st Battalion on its western flank and threatened its rear. The battalion fell back a mile, staying south of the river. The 2d Battalion, coming out of Cerisy Forest on the Berigny highway, was stopped practically at the line of departure by heavy machine-gun and mortar fire from the west bank of the Elle. The 3d Battalion was then moved through Cerisy Forest to attack between the other two; its advance got as far as the Elle by early afternoon and was stopped there on the east bank. The enemy was benefiting greatly by observation from Hill 192, and an air mission of fighter-bombers was directed against that height before dark. Supporting artillery was very active during the day, the 37th and 38th Field Artillery Battalions firing over 2,600 rounds. The artillery effort was increased late in the day as a result of requests for fire to stop local enemy counterattacks, which amounted to aggressive thrusts by small units. The enemy kept the initiative through the night, alarming the 2d Battalion at 0151 with a heavy burst of small-arms fire, and probing at other points along the line. Enemy artillery, though light, showed increased activity. Identifications of prisoners revealed that elements of the 352d Division were north of Hill 19, but that units of the 8th Paratroop Regiment, 3d Paratroop Division, were in the Berigny area. This division was regarded as a first-class unit of very high fighting quality. General Robertson planned to resume the attack on 13 June, with two battalions of the 38th Infantry moving on Hill 192 from the north. Starting at 0800, these units passed through the 1st Battalion of the 23d Infantry and made good progress for two miles south of the Elle. They were hitting stronger opposition when the attack was stopped in the afternoon by division order; the 38th and 23d Infantry Regiments were to prepare their present positions for defense against possible enemy attack. Artillery support of this action had been heavy and effective; the 12th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm howitzers) fired 1,445 rounds, the 37th Field Artillery Battalion 4,400 rounds, and the 38th Field Artillery Battalion 841 rounds. The 2d Division had made some progress on 13 June, but was still two miles north of Hill 192 and had not succeeded in getting possession of the Berigny-St-Georges-d'Elle area. Losses reflected the heavier fighting on these two days, the 23d Infantry reporting 211 casualties and the 2d Division totals being 540. In the same period the 1st Division lost 92 men. To the northwest of Berigny, the 29th Division encountered similar difficulties in crossing the Elle River. In the attack plan for 12 June, the division's main effort was to be made by the 115th Infantry, with the 175th in defensive positions on the west flank of V Corps and the 116th in reserve. The 747th Tank Battalion was held in division reserve to be in readiness for counter-attack. Three (plus) battalions of division artillery were to render close support for the 115th Infantry. That unit was ordered to attack across the Elle at 0500, its objectives St-Clair-sur-Elle and Couvains, in an operation which would protect the right flank of the 2d Division as it advanced on Hill 192. Because of the opposition offered by the Germans, the Elle River crossing was to be more difficult than those of the Aure and Vire, much larger streams. The Elle itself was only 10 feet wide, but the very steep and wooded southern bank gave good ground for well-concealed emplacements. During the night, 29th Division artillery placed interdictory fire once an hour on St-Clair-sur-Elle, St-Jean-de-Savigny, and Couvains. Page 155 The 115th Infantry attacked with 2 battalions abreast, after 20 minutes of heavy preparatory fires by 4 artillery battalions. Company K, leading the 3d Battalion, was disorganized and suffered 32 casualties from shells which it believed to be “shorts” from friendly guns; this belief was later disproved, but by timing their own fire with the U. S. artillery preparation the Germans had affected the morale of the assault force. Despite these difficulties, Company I and a platoon of Company K got across the stream east of the north-south road to St-Jean-de-Savigny; the rest of the battalion followed and by 0830 was 1,200 yards south of the crossing. However, to the right the 1st Battalion was stopped at the stream by heavy and accurate small-arms fire, with some support from mortars and antitank guns. This situation left the 3d Battalion advancing with open flanks south of St-Jean-de-Savigny, where it was stopped by machine-gun fire from hedgerow positions that could not be located. An enemy column, including some armored vehicles, came north on the road from Couvains and deployed in the hedgerows to east and west. By the end of the morning the 3d Battalion was fighting on the defensive to avoid being cut off from the rest of the division, was short of ammunition, and was suffering from accurate mortar fire and close-up shelling from antitank or self-propelled guns. In the early afternoon, K and I Companies withdrew to the starting positions; other elements failed to receive the withdrawal orders and came back two hours later in some disorder. The battalion's losses had been severe. Division had begun by noon to take measures for rebuilding the attack. Two platoons of the 747th Tank Battalion were sent forward; attempting to spearhead the 1st Battalion of the 115th, the tanks were stopped by skillful use of antitank guns, three vehicles being knocked out, with nine casualties. Alerted at 1630, the 116th Infantry took over the attack in the evening. At 2200 it had two battalions across the Elle, and the 3d Battalion of the 115th (now attached to the 116th) had recrossed the river. By daylight of 13 June the attack had neared its objectives. That morning, coordinating its efforts with the 2d Division's attack just to the east, the 116th managed to fight into St- Clair-sur-Elle and Couvains. Division artillery continued to deliver heavy fires in support of the attack; its 6 (plus) battalions (of which one was supporting the 175th Infantry) fired 125 missions during the 2 days, and rounds expended after 1000, 12 June, included 2,736 high explosive and 400 white phosphorus. Of the units involved, the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion fired 1,952 rounds on 12 June, and the 110th Field Artillery Battalion 1,053 rounds in the same period. No fresh enemy forces had appeared in this area despite continued reports on 12-13 June indicating the approach of armor, believed to be the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division. Elements of several units of the 352d Division and of the 30th Mobile Brigade had rallied after their earlier reverses and were putting up determined resistance. North of St- Clair-sur-Elle, the Germans had made maximum use of prepared positions, with well-placed fields for automatic fire. In the St-Jean-de-Savigny area, the enemy had employed mobile tactics, involving infiltration and counterattack by small units on the flanks of advancing U. S. forces. German artillery support was still weak, with some self-propelled guns in use. It was clear that the enemy was prepared to hold Hill 192 with every means at his disposal. The engagement at the Elle on 12-13 June was, in fact, a foretaste of the bitter fighting to come in this sector. Most of the 29th Division's 547 casualties for the 2 days were Page 156 (Map No. 9) Page 157 suffered in their first battle for the approaches to St-Lo. Five miles from that town on 13 June, the 29th Division entered it on 18 July, while Hill 192 was captured by the 2d Division on 11 July only after costly fighting for every hedgerow on its slopes. Action West of the Vire The Allied invasion began with three separate beachheads; these had to be welded into one before the first phase of operations could be considered accomplished. V Corps and the British Second Army had met at their boundary on 8 June in the Port-en-Bessin area, but four days later, solid junction with VII Corps was still to be achieved. The main obstacle was enemy resistance at Carentan, defended by the 6th Paratroop Regiment. From 10 to 12 June, the 101st Airborne Division was attempting to capture Carentan and reach the neck of land between the Douve and Vire rivers. On 10 June the 327th Glider Infantry had crossed the Douve between Carentan and the sea, contacting V Corps' bridgehead at the Vire, but this link was slender (Map No. XIV). On the next two days the 327th was putting its main effort west toward the town, and V Corps units were called on for some assistance in protecting its flank. The small bridgehead at Auville-sur-le-Vey, established by the 175th Infantry on 10 June, was strengthened at 1700 the next day by arrival of the 3d Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry (2d Armored Division). On 11 June, the 29th Division was ordered to send a rifle company over the Vire south of the railway crossing, with missions of reconnoitering the area near Montmartin-en-Graignes and capturing two highway bridges southwest of it on the canal connecting the Vire and Taute Rivers (Map No. 9). By holding these two bridges, First Army would be more secure against the threat of an armored attack from St-Lo into the thin area of link-up between V Corps and VII Corps. This small operation, ordered to be carried out on 12 June, turned out to be much more than a routine reconnaissance in force. The area of Montmartin had not been adequately patrolled, so the 175th Infantry decided to send a task force of two companies, E and C, each reinforced by a section of heavy mortars and one of heavy machine guns; Company C of the 121st Engineer Combat Battalion was to provide the equipment for crossing the stream at two selected sites. As a result of various delays in assembling and getting started, the units did not reach the river in time to make the crossing under cover of darkness, as planned. Engineer trucks, carrying assault boats, got to the Vire about 0700. This tidal stream, about 150 yards wide in the area, flows between 10-foot dikes bordering flat expanses s)f marshland on both sides. With four assault boats to a company, each carrying about ten riflemen, the crossing had to be effected in a series of waves. Not until the first started was there any sign of the enemy, who then opened up with ineffective machine-gun fire at long range. The enemy evidently had outposts along the edges of the marsh flats some 500 yards to the west, but their few machine guns could not reach the level of the river below the dikes. Company E, accompanied by General Cota and by Col. Paul R. Goode, commanding the 175th Infantry, got across without losses. Enemy rifle fire began to build up as the attacking troops started across the marshes, making short zigzag dashes and using cover afforded by the many drainage ditches. The German machine guns were not sited for grazing fire on the flat, and casualties were only six or seven men. The enemy fire died out as the company reached the edge of the higher ground. A quarter mile to the south, Company C crossed against similar resistance, but Page 158 radio communications were not working between the units as they advanced to make a prearranged junction in Montmartin. General Cota decided to continue with Company E. Company E got near Montmartin about 0800 and started to work around it to the north. Enemy fire reopened from the west, at about 300 yards range, and again stopped as Company E pushed against it. It was decided not to wait for Company C, but to go after the objective at the canal bridge. In approach-march formation, Company E started south down a road banked with deep hedgerows, planning to turn west just beyond the village. Before they had gone a hundred yards, heavy enemy fire from machine-pistols and rifles came out of the hedges on both sides of the sunken road. Caught in an ambush of a type easily set in hedgerow country, Company E was cut up and badly scattered. It withdrew to reorganize, north of Montmartin, but some of the troops went all the way back to the river and recrossed. The remnants of Company E were joined at 1040 by a part of Company C, which had experienced somewhat similar opposition as it neared the village. At 1100 the group started south to try to get past Montmartin on the river side. About 400 yards southeast of the village they were brought under machine-gun fire from prepared emplacements, ahead and to the west. Several concentrations by the 224th Field Artillery Battalion were called for, but failed to neutralize the enemy positions. The terrain lacked cover affording an approach to the enemy position, so the task force decided to withdraw and try once again to pass the village on the north. At 1600 they were back where the morning fight had taken place; once again enemy machine guns and rifles stalled advance westward. A brisk fire fight was heard to the north, and word reached the task force that units of the 327th Glider Infantry were fighting south from the railroad. But no contact was made other than by patrols, and toward nightfall the 175th's task force was reduced to about 150 men and was running short of ammunition, water, and food. General Cota ordered them into the village. Light enemy resistance, of a type which had often managed to impose considerable delay, was quickly disposed of by combining movement with the fire of every available small-arms weapon. Later in the evening General Cota decided the village was undesirable for purposes of a night defense and moved to a slight rise, covered by an orchard, just southeast of Montmartin. Considerable anxiety concerning the Vire-Taute area was felt at higher headquarters that night. Carentan had been entered from the north, but German troops were reported counterattacking into the town. There were indications of a possible. enemy counterattack by armor from south of Carentan, and even reports of enemy patrols infiltrating into the Isigny area. At midnight of the 12th, First Army telephoned General Gerow of the possibility that the enemy might launch a strong counterattack between Carentan and Isigny next morning, and directed him to send a battalion of tanks and one of armored infantry to that area from the 2d Armored Division. Their mission was to assist the 327th Glider Infantry and the 175th Infantry in defense of the thinly held corridor connecting V and VII Corps. This order was carried out by Combat Command A, 2d Armored Division, which sent the 2d Battalion of the 66th Armored Regiment to join the armored infantry already west of Isigny; by 0630 this force was ready to move south to meet the presumed German armor. Before Combat Command A could launch an attack planned to strike south from Auville, its mission was changed by orders from First Army. Joined by a second battalion of Page 159 tanks, the combat command went to assist the 101st Airborne Division in securing Carentan. The 327th Glider Infantry, after nearly reaching Montmartin on 12 June, withdrew next day to its former line protecting the highway. Meantime the 175th Infantry had made an attempt to relieve the remnants of the task force near Montmartin-en-Graignes. Colonel Goode himself took Company G, reinforced with heavy weapons, across the river at midnight on the 12th. The company moved south close to the river and past General Cota's night position. About a mile south of Montmartin they ran into a German bivouac and inflicted many casualties in a surprise encounter. Rallying, the Germans came back and surrounded Company G, which fought on until its ammunition ran low. Scattered groups made their way back in the morning; Colonel Goode was taken prisoner. These developments left General Cota's group in dangerous isolation, nearly surrounded and still short of ammunition and food. Division ordered it to withdraw and had supplies dropped from planes. Fighting their way back to the Vire, 110 men rejoined the 175th Regiment at midnight of 13 June. In the action at Montmartin, the reconnaissance force had been engaged with elements of a mobile unit (estimated at a company) which had operated according to prearranged defensive plans. These involved a thin screen of outposts along the river, to observe and delay a crossing. Main defensive forces, using bicycles, were then rushed up from rear posts to the threatened area and used for counterattack. Armed with a high proportion of machine pistols and machine guns, the German units made maximum use of the defensive possibilities offered by hedgerows, supplemented by prepared emplacements, echeloned in depth, at points offering good fields of fire along the roads. While part of the defenders used these positions for delaying action, other groups would make probing attacks on the flank and rear of an advancing column, attempting to surround and cut it of. Depending on aggressive maneuver by very small units, these tactics were particularly effective against a force like the reconnaissance groups of the 175th Infantry, which lacked the numerical strength and fire power to “bull through” and disorganize the enemy screen. The check at Montmartin was not important in the perspective of the main action on 13 June. While the 175th Infantry's task force was fighting for survival at Montmartin, Combat Command A and the 101st Airborne Division had settled the main issue: possession of Carentan. Their coordinated attack had carried two miles southwest of the town and insured its capture. No enemy counterattack from the south had developed to split the link between the corps, and Army now had resources sufficient to enlarge the corridor of communication between Isigny and Carentan. That mission was assigned on 13 June to XIX Corps, which became operational at noon the next day. The Enemy Side At the opening of the period, Seventh Army learned that Carentan had fallen on 11 June and that there were clear indications of Allied preparation for attack in the Caen-Bayeux sector (Map No. XV). During the morning of 12 June, Army received word that weak Allied reconnaissance elements had pushed close to Caumont. General Marcks, commanding LXXXIV Corps, was killed in a strong attack. Army informed his successor that the 2d Panzer Division was on the way to 11 the hole between the 352d and Panzer Lehr, with reconnaissance elements already near Caumont. According to Army's views at the mo- Page 160 ment, the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division was not likely to be used in a counterattack to retake Carentan; instead, it must be held in readiness to keep open the corridor north of la Haye-du-Puits in the western Cotentin. Army was apprehensive of a new ,Allied landing operation in the Cherbourg area, in which air landings might be combined with assault from sea west of the port. Higher headquarters, on the other hand, showed more concern over the Allied advance in the Caumont area, and Army Group sent orders that all possible measures be taken to plug the gap on the right of the 352d Division. Amy informed von Rundstedt that reconnaissance elements of the Panzer Lehr and 2d Panzer Divisions had been put into that area, as well as some elements of the 3d Paratroop Division. Half-track elements of 2d Panzer were expected to arrive by 14 June, and first elements of the 2d SS Panzer on the 15th; the latter unit was on its way from the mountains of central France, where it had been dealing with French Resistance groups. In Army's view, there was now no reason for alarm with regard to the gap. The principal fighting of 12 June took place between the Elle and Tilly- sur-Seulles. As Seventh Army viewed it, the Allies were making a main effort to exploit the gap. They had Page 161 managed to reach Caumont, and the flank of Panzer Lehr was exposed. In the Elle sector, local attacks were regarded as checked, although LXXXIV Corps warned that the Allies evidently planned a drive to seize St-Lo. Orders from Hitler came that evening to Seventh Army: the Allied bridgehead between the Orne and Vire Rivers must be attacked and destroyed piecemeal, beginning with the area east of Caen. Hitler also stressed that in future any German unit cut off or surrounded must be prepared to fight where they stood, to the last man and the last bullet. No orders for withdrawal would be tolerated. Seventh Army’s intentions for 13 June were: attack east of the Orne by the 21st Panzer Division; preparations for an attack by 2d Panzer Division in the Caumont area; and use of parts of the 17th Panzer Division for recapture of Carentan. From Seventh Army’s viewpoint, 13 June was characterized by a defensive success which ended its worries over the gap in the Caumont-Villers- Bocage area. Elements of the 2d Panzer Division had arrived to fill the hole; admittedly just in time. With the 2d SS Panzer Division coming up to the same area and expected shortly, Army now envisaged an attack northward toward Balleroy to shorten the line. In the Elle sector, some penetrations had been made by Allied units in what is described as bitter fighting, but the 3d Paratroop Division was in position to defend that area. The German attempt to retake Carentan had failed. Allied gains had been made west and north of Ste-Mere-Eglise, and this area was now Seventh Army’s main concern. A curious report from LXXXIV Corps informed Army that the U.S. 1st Division was “newly identified” in the fighting northeast of St-Lo, and that the U.S. 29th Division, exhausted, was reported to have left the line. On 13 June, the enemy forces in the sector between the Vire and the Taute comprised a battlegroup (“Heintz”) made up of elements of both the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division and the 352d Division, attached to the 17th SS for operations but under the 352d for administration. The battle group included two infantry battalions (one newly arrived), elements of two engineer battalions, and some remnants of the 352d Divisional Artillery (4th Battalion). Their mission was to hold the ground from Montmartin-en-Graignes to the western end of the Vire-Taute Canal, against “continuous” Allied attacks “in battalion strength,” supported by tanks. The status of the reinforcing columns at the end of 13 June was as follows: wheeled vehicles of the 2d SS Panzer were at Tours; wheeled vehicles of the 2d Panzer were at Caumont, but tracked vehicles still at Paris, where they had detrained for march by road; the battle group of the 265th Division had reached Coutances; that of the 266th was still in the Brittany area; the 353d Division was near Rennes. All small mobile units of the divisions and corps still in Brittany were to be organized into battalions and made ready for departure to the Normandy battle. On 14 June, Corps reported that the 352d Division was completely used up and should be taken out of line. On account of delays in reaching the battle area, the 2d Panzer Division was still lacking its heavier antitank guns, armored artillery, and heavy tanks. So far, it had been operating with its armored infantry units, which had taken heavy losses. In Army’s opinion, the effectiveness of the other elements of the division was likely to be reduced by the fact that they were being forced to make a long overland march to reach the battle area; in particular, it was noted that the average life of the motor in Panther tanks was estimated at 500 miles. Allied air attacks were still causing major complications, including command problems. Not only had General Marcks (LXXXIV Corps) been killed by strafing planes, but bombing of a Panzer Corps headquarters (British zone) had forced a transfer of command to a new headquarters. As for German air, Army was informed that it could not intervene in the battle because of the distance from its (usable) bases. Page 162 (Unit Patches) Page 163 CONCLUSION AT 0125 ON 13 JUNE, V Corps received instructions from First Army, immediately communicated to subordinate units, which had the effect of marking the end of the Omaha beachhead operation (Map No. XVI). For the time being V Corps was to hold in its present positions, employing aggressive action by strong patrols to keep the enemy uncertain of our intentions. The First Army’s offensive effort was concentrated on the right flank, where VII Corps continued its drive toward Cherbourg. XIX Corps was to become operational at noon, 14 June; consisting of the 30th and 29th Divisions, its missions was to secure and enlarge the Carentan- Isigny corridor. First Army’s instructions were confirmed by V Corps Field Order No. 5, published at 2100 on 13 June. The operations already under way on 13 June, in the Caumont and Hill 192 sectors, had been allowed to proceed during the day; the effect of Field Order No. 5 was to stop the effort toward Hill 192 at the positions reached that evening. Starting from the smallest of footholds on D Day, V Corps had in one week driven inland 15 to 20 miles on a broad front. Junction had been firmly established with Allied forces on both flanks. The crisis of the whole operation had come at the very start, when unexpected enemy strength was met at the beach and the American troops had been called on for their utmost effort. Thereafter, the task of V Corps became progressively easier; the German 352d Division was pushed south at increasing speed and given no time to organize a defense. V Corps’ advance had halted by decision of the higher command in view of overall tactical considerations. Its mission of capturing an adequate beachhead had been achieved. In the course of a week’s fighting casualties had mounted to 5,846 of which 1,225 were killed in action; more than half of these casualties came in the first day. Heaviest losses had fallen to the 29th Division, with 2,440 for the period; the 1st Division had 1,744 casualties, and the 2d Division 855. Enemy prisoners amounted to about 2,500, and casualties of the 352d Division had reduced that offensive unit to a shadow of its former strength. Weeks of hard fighting were ahead, but the foundation for the final success of the Allied campaign in France had been firmly set. Scene of one of the hardest assault landings in military history, Omaha Beach was now part of a solid base for offensive operations which three months later reached the borders of Germany. Page 164 ANNEX NO. 1 Omaha Beachhead Unit Citations (Published in War Department General Orders up to 15 September 1945) 1st Engineer Combat Battalion 1st Platoon, 30th Chemical Decontamination Company 1st Platoon, Company A, 203d Quartermaster Gas Supply Battalion 2d Ranger Infantry Battalion 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion 16th Infantry Regiment 18th Infantry Regiment 20th Engineer Combat Battalion 37th Engineer Combat Battalion 81st Chemical Battalion, Motorized 112th Engineer Combat Battalion 115th Infantry Regiment 116th Infantry Regiment 146th Engineer Combat Battalion 147th Engineer Combat Battalion 149th Engineer Combat Battalion 1st Battalion Team, 293d Joint Assault Signal Company 1st Platoon, 31st Chemical Decontamination Company 2d Platoon, 634th Medical Clearing Company 2d Squad, 1st Medical Depot Company 3d Battalion Team, 293d Joint Assault Signal Company 3d Platoon, 607th Quartermaster Graves Registration Company 27th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad 88th Quartermaster Railhead Company 214th Military Police Company 293d Joint Assault Signal Company (3 Battalion Teams) 461st Amphibious Truck Company 500th Medical Collecting Company 618th Ordnance Ammunition Company 967th Quartermaster Service Company 3205th Quartermaster Service Company 3704th Quartermaster Service Company 3820th Quartermaster Gas Supply Company Company B, 7th Naval Beach Battalion Company C, 7th Naval Beach Battalion Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 6th Engineer Special Brigade Headquarters & Headquarters Detachment, 95th Quartermaster Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon, 356th Ordnance MAM Company Page 165 Surgical Teams, 3d Auxiliary Surgical Group 299th Engineer Combat Battalion 397th Antiaircraft Artillery Provisional Machine Gun Battalion of the 4th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade 741st Tank Battalion 743d Tank Battalion, Medium 834th Engineer Aviation Battalion ANNEX NO. 2 Abbreviations A.E.A.F Allied Expeditionary Air Force LCA Landing Craft, Assault LCI Landing Craft, Infantry LCI (L) Landing Craft, Infantry (Large) LCG (L) Landing Craft, Gun (Large) LCM Landing Craft, Mechanized LCM (3) Landing Craft, Mechanized (Mark 3) LCT Landing Craft, Tank LCT (A) Landing Craft, Tank (Armoured)* LCT (HE) Landing Craft, Tank (Modified)* LCT (5) Landing Craft, Tank (Mark 5) LCT (R) Landing Craft, Tank (Rocket) LCVP Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel LSI Landing Ship, Infantry LST Landing Ship, Tank NSFCP Naval Shore Fire Control Party RCT Regimental Combat Team BLT Battalion Landing Team