Page 9 Chapter II Background 1. INTRODUCTION: Confusion of Thinking, Organization, Conflict of Opinions and Diversity of Views; Nation Not Geared to War. 2. PUBLIC OPINION: Psychological Conditions and Their Effect; Army Dependent on Public Opinion and State of Public Mind and Its Readiness for War; American Public Reluctant to Consider a War; Japan Ready for War. 3. U.S. POLICY: (1922-1939) Study of Long-Term Treatment of Japan Important; the Mandated Islands and Exclusion of the United States and Fortification of the Islands by Japan; the Navy's Efforts to Get Into the Islands and Its Relationship to the State Department; Diplomatic Status of Consular Agents of Japan in Hawaii and Their Spying Activities; Strong National Policy for the Protection of American Rights Lacking Effect Upon the Army and Navy; the Effect of This Policy on the Japanese Oriental Trading Mind. 4. U.S. POLICY: (1939-1941) Avoidance of a Conflict with Japan 1939-1941 by Avoiding Open Breach; Necessity for Delay to Prepare for War; Negotiations Based Upon Lack of Incidents. 5. MORAL EMBARGOES VERSUS JAPANESE EXPANSION: Moral Embargoes; Economic Sanctions by Direct Embargoes; Coincident Forming of Public Opinion Against Japan; Japanese Making No Concessions and Proceeding with Aggressions; Threatening Hostile Action; Lack of Public Understanding of Importance of Hawaii; War and Navy Departments Making Page 10 Great Effort to Prepare for War with Grave Deficiencies; Diversion of Resources to Assist England and France Retarding Our Own Rearming; Coordination of Action by the Government Through Conference in War Council, Etc.; Lack of Appreciation of Where Japan Would Attack and Miscalculation of Time of Attack; Japanese Full Understanding of Our Dilemma. 6. PUBLIC DEMANDS ACTION AGAINST JAPANESE: National Policy Against War; Attempt to Negotiate and Apply Economic Sanctions Put Government in Difficult Contrary Positions; Conflicting Elements of Policy Communicated to Field Commanders to Both Prepare for War and Not Precipitate an Incident Causing War; Public Opinion in 1941 More Belligerent Than the Preparations for War Justified Complicating Government Position. 7. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST JAPAN: The Economic Effect on Japan of Progressive Sanctions Considered in Detail; the Rising Tempo of Economic Disaster to Japan and the Decreasing Success of Negotiations; Inevitable Showdown Between Japanese Economic Strangulation and Military Action Approaching; the Impasse Reached on November 26, 1941; the State Department Passes Responsibility for the Nation to the War and Navy Departments. 8. THE HAWAIIAN POPULATION PROBLEM: Sabotage Complex; the Japanese Population Conditions Analyzed in Hawaii; the Rising Dominance Economically and Politically of the Japanese Group; Sabotage of War Action Possible by the Hawaiian Japanese Group; the Difficulty of Alerts Without Disturbing the Civilian Japanese Population To An Overt Act; Effect of Japanese Atmosphere in Hawaii and Government Policy Against Overt Acts Upon the Responsible Commanders in Hawaii; the Local Opposition of Commercial Interests to Page 11 Putting Japanese Under Control; Official Reluctance to Put Local Japanese Population under Civilian Surveillance; Free Japanese Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in Hawaii. 9. HAWAIIAN PRESS: Constant Reiteration of Progressively Increasing Difficulties with Japan and Threats of War Accentuated the State of Mind of Local Commanders as to Difficulties with Local Population. 10. SUMMARY: Preparatory Period Immense Effect Upon State of Mind of Public Officials and Commanders; Our Complacency Our Weakness; Our National Pride and Vanity Our Weakness; the Result was Lack of Action, Coordination, Cooperation, Teamwork, and War Spirit; United States Was Unprepared Mentally, Physically, or as an Organization for War. Page 12 1. Introduction: The purpose of this explanation of the background of public and private events as they existed in 1940 and 1941 is this. There existed during this critical period much confusion of thinking and of organization, of conflict of opinion and diversity of views. The nation was not geared to war, either mentally or as an organization. It was a period of conflicting plans and purposes. The winds of public opinion were blowing in all directions; isolationists and nationalists were struggling for predominance; public opinion was both against war and clamoring for reprisal against Japan; we were negotiating for peace with Japan, and simultaneously applying economic sanctions that led only to war; we were arming our forces for war and at the same time giving away much of such armament. The Administration, State, War and Navy Departments in their policies, plans and operations were likewise being pushed here and there by the ebb and flow of war events, public reactions, diplomatic negotiations and newspaper attacks. The War Department by its actions and its organization was still on a peacetime basis; neither its management nor its general staff had perfected its organization for war or for the conduct of a large enterprise. The whole machinery of government was geared to a different purpose and tempo than war. Valiant and brilliant men were struggling to bring order out of chaos, rather as individuals or as small groups, attempting simultaneously both to establish policies and to accomplish practical things. As a result a few men, without organization in the true sense, were attempting to conduct large enterprises, take multiple actions, and give directions that should have been Page 13 the result of carefully directed commands, instead of action taken by conference. We were preparing for a war by the conference method. We were directing such preparations by the conference methods; we were even writing vital messages by the conference method, and arriving at their contents by compromise instead of by command; that was the product of the time and conditions due to the transition from peace to war in a democracy. Such was the confusion of men and events, largely unorganized for appropriate action and helpless before a strong course of events, that ran away with the situation and prematurely plunged us into war. Page 14 2. Public Opinion. The disaster of Pearl Harbor and the responsibilities and courses of action taken by those connected therewith can better be understood when the background of public opinion and the state of the public mind are likewise understood. Psychological conditions has a material effect upon the events that took place. A brief review of the then state of mind of officials and the public; and the facts known to the public and to the government; and our national policy are all necessary in order to view the picture in its proper perspective. Our Army, like other armies of democracies, in its policies and its actions to a degree was dependent upon and was influenced by public opinion and the state of the public mind. Successful war is waged through a state of mind and a state of public readiness for war. A recognition of this fact is necessary to the understanding of the background of public opinion and the state of our desire to make war, which undoubtedly had its influence on the War Department and the responsible commanders in Hawaii. A brief resume of that situation will lead to an understanding of what influenced the taking of certain actions, or the failures to take action, on the part of the Washington departments concerned and the higher commanders in the field. For a long period of time prior to the war the public was reluctant even to consider a war. [1] There was a distinct Footnote: [1] The close vote of Congress on recalling the National Guard from active service and on a proposal to abandon Lend-Lease clearly reflect public opinion of that day and time in 1941. Page 15 lack of a war mind in the United States. Isolationist organizations and propaganda groups against war were powerful and vital factors affecting any war action capable of being taken by our responsible leadership. So influential were these campaigns that they raised grave doubts in minds of such leadership as to whether they would be supported by the people in the necessary actions for our defense by requisite moves against Japan. Public opinion in the early stages had to be allowed to develop; in the later stages it ran ahead of preparation for war. There was little war spirit either amongst the general public or in the armed forces, due to this conflicting public opinion having its influence. [1] The events hereinafter recited must be measured against this important psychological factor. At the same time, Japan was pursuing an opposite policy of preparation. It had been at war for several years in China; both its people and government were psychologically and physically geared to war and were implemented with a polished plan of action and equipment to do the job. It was animated by cunning, hatred and patriotism in a land where life is cheap; and nurtured in an atmosphere of insane nationalism Footnotes: [1] Rear Admiral McMorris testified as to the weak status of our fleet with respect to the strong Japanese task force that attacked Pearl Harbor, and what would have happened if our fleet had gone out into deep blue water to fight: "a fight would have occurred in which our losses might have been even greater than actually occurred, *** our own losses would have been extremely heavy and might well have included the loss of both our carriers." (R. 2878) Page 16 and oriental intrigue. Japan was a nation united for the single purpose of world conquest based on more than a thousand years of conflict. As Ambassador Grew testified, from the time of his arrival in Japan in 1932, he constantly developed the theme of the grave necessity for adequate preparation militantly to implement our diplomatic policy, because of Japan's readiness for war. As he said to Mr. Stimson, then Secretary of State, in the latter part of 1932: "The Japanese Army has been built for war, it feels prepared for war, and it wants war." And he continued: "At that time I said it would be criminally 'short-sighted', I think not to recognize this fact and be prepared for anything that might develop in the Far East. Those warnings were, as I say, continued in my telegrams and dispatches throughout the ten years of my service there, right up to the end." (R. 4201) Page 17 3. U.S. Policy, (1922-1939). The events leading up to the Pearl Harbor disaster can only be understood when we examine our national policy as administered by the State Department. That policy must be examined back a number of years to see the long-term treatment of Japan which had its bearing on the Pearl Harbor disaster. An early step in a direction considered adverse to the interests of the United States was our failure to have a showdown with Japan on its fortifications of the mandated islands. The Mandate for the German possessions in the Pacific Ocean lying north of the Equator under date of December 17, 1902, the Convention for the Control of Trade and Arms and Ammunition between the Allied Powers under date of September 10, 1919, and the Mandates between the United States and Japan regarding the former German Islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the Equator and particularly the island of Yap under date of February 11, 1922, have the following in common: a. "Full power of administration and legislation over the Mandated territory, including control of public works and services, the importation of arms, etc. In short it was 'government in trust'." b. "No military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory." c. "The Mandatory...allow all missionaries, nationals of any state member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the Page 18 territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling." d. "Any dispute between Japan and the other nations signing the Mandates, whether it be the first two Mandates mentioned, or the one direct with the United States, are to be settled by a negotiation of 'The Permanent Court of International Justice'." e. "Vested property rights in the Mandated Islands shall be respected and in no way impaired." f. "The existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be applicable to the Mandated Islands." g. "The United States and its nationals shall have free access to the island of Yap on a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other nations and their respective nationals and all that relates to the landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable, or over any cable which may be hereafter laid or operated by the United States or its nationals connecting with the island of Yap." h. There are many other provisions of the same effect of entire freedom of action with respect Page 19 to Yap. [1] Had the United States successfully insisted upon Japan living up to those treaty stipulations, the entire naval and military structure in the key Pacific Islands erected by the Japanese might have been impossible. Japan, without authority of international law and in violation of the treaties and mandates above referred to, for nearly twenty years successfully and completely excluded other nationals from the mandated territories, and during this time built up army, navy and air installations of tremendous strategical value. Footnotes: [1] The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, advised this Board: "Japan was given under a League of Nations mandate full power to administer the Mandated Islands as an integral part of Japan and to apply Japanese laws in the islands. The United States had expressly agreed in a treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, to administration by Japan of the islands pursuant to the League mandate. Among the Japanese laws the operation of which was extended to include the Mandated Islands was that which stipulated that all ports and harbors shall be closed to foreign vessels except those that were specifically open to foreign trade. The opened ports in the Mandated Islands were Saipan, Palau, Angaur, Truk, Ponape, and Jaluit. "Article II (3) of the Treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated Islands provided that: 'Existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be applicable to the mandated islands.' Article IV of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded between the United States and Japan on February 21, 1991, contained the following provisions: 'The citizens or subjects of each of the Contracting Parties, equally with the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, shall have liberty freely to come with their ships and cargoes to all places, ports and rivers in the territories of the other which are or may be opened to foreign commerce, subject always to the laws of the country to which they thus come.' "By an exchange of notes which took place concurrently with the signing of the treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated Islands, Japan assured the United States that 'the usual comity will be extended to nationals and vessels of the United States in visiting the harbors and waters of those islands'. The term 'usual comity' in its application to visits by the nationals and vessels of other countries means the courtesy which is normally accorded by a country to the nationals and vessels of other countries." Page 20 As a consequence of the foregoing, Japan gained the enormous advantage of a string of naval and air and army bases across our lifeline to the Philippines and rendered futile and impotent any fortification of our own islands, such as Guam, Midway, Christmas, Palmyra, etc. It also placed the dagger's point at the heart of the Hawaiian Islands because such a base as Jaluit in the mandated islands was a thousand miles closer to Hawaii than to the homeland of Japan. Our policy through the successive years appears to have been based upon a combination of fear of the Japanese and of an obsession not to give offense to the Japanese; a policy which because of their temperamental characteristics, proved to be one of weakness rather than of strength; it was also a policy of endeavoring to treat the Japanese on the basis that they were civilized and that their word could be trusted and at the same time one which treated them as if they were uncivilized and could not be trusted, and consequently we excluded them from the United States. We entered the year of 1941 with two purposes in mind: first, to avoid war and settle our troubles by negotiation, treaties, and contracts; and, while negotiating, we applied exactly the opposite remedy of economic sanctions. Efforts to visit the Mandate Islands, presumably to glean information, were said to have been made and were unsuccessful. (R. Miles, 101-107; Pye 1064-1065; Bloch, 1503, 1527-1529; DeLaney 1702-1703; Kimmel, 1807- 1808; Layton, 3054-3055). The State Department explanation concerning these efforts is set forth below. The net result was, however, that we did not get into these Islands; the Japanese fortified the Islands and in Page 21 consequence the United States suffered. The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, presented his Department's views as fellows: "The matter of visits to the Mandated Islands by American nationals or private American vessels, just as visits in general by American nationals and American private vessels to ports and places elsewhere in the world, did not call for a procedure involving requests through diplomatic channels by this Government to the Japanese Government and would not therefore have come within the cognizance of the Department of State, except in cases where, because of a refusal of the Japanese Government to permit such visits, this Government had taken diplomatic action at the instance of the American parties at interest. No record has been found in the Department's files of any application having been made by the Department to the Japanese Government for permission for American nationals or American private vessels to visit the Mandated Islands during the year 1940-1941, the year concerning which you made inquiry. According to the information made available to the Department in 1940, an officer attached to the office of the Naval Attache in Tokyo inquired in August 1939 at the ticket office of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha Steamship company with regard to possibilities of making reservations for passages were filled for a period of three months. His subsequent efforts to obtain passage were frustrated by dilatory tactics on the part of the Japanese. No request for diplomatic assistance was made in that instance. *** "The procedure followed by this Government in asking permission from the Japanese Government for visits by public vessels to Japanese ports or ports in Japanese mandated areas was in accord with the procedure followed by this Government in requesting permission for visits by its public vessels to the port of other countries. "No record has been found of any requests in 1904 and 1941 by the War or Navy Department to this Department that there be taken up with the Japanese Government proposals for visits to the Mandated Islands or of this Government's having approached the Japanese Government during those years in regard to visits to the Mandated Islands. In previous years the Navy Department at various times asked this Department to obtain permission for certain United States naval vessels to visit certain specified opened and unopened ports in the Mandated Islands. The Department of State promptly made representations to the Japanese Government requesting the necessary permission. With regard to applications made prior to 1936 the Japanese Government indicated its readiness Page 22 to permit American public vessels to visit the opened ports but not the unopened ports named in the lists submitted by the Navy Department. The Navy Department, however, canceled the proposed visits to the opened ports for which permission to visit had been granted. In the approaches made by this Government in 1936 and 1937, the Japanese Government, on grounds of inconvenience, withheld its permission for United States public vessels to visit the opened ports as well as the unopened ports of the Mandated Islands. "In view of the fact that the Japanese Government in 1936 refused in actual practice to permit visits to the opened ports as well as to the unopened ports in the Mandated Islands and in view also of the fact that with the termination in 1936 of the Treaty Limiting Naval Armament, signed in Washington in 1922, this Government became free to fortify the Aleutian Islands, this Government decided to adopt a more restrictive policy with regard to the admission of Japanese war or other public vessels to the Aleutians and to Alaska. After 1936 visits by Japanese public vessels were permitted only to Dutch Harbor, also known as Unalaska, and, on two occasions, to the Pribiloff Islands which the Japanese were permitted to visit because of special circumstances arising out of the Convention of 1911 for the Preservation and Protection of Fur Seals. Subsequent to 1936 permission was withheld for all visits by Japanese public vessels to the territorial waters of the western Aleutian Islands." The Japanese consulate and its consular agents in Hawaii enjoyed diplomatic immunity. This gave them a free rein in their spying activities and unrestricted communication by radio and cable with the mainland of Japan in reporting upon the movement of our fleet and the status of our armed defenses in Hawaii. [1] Neither the Army, the Navy, nor the F.B.I. had Footnotes: [1] Admiral McMorris, head of the War Plans Division of Staff of Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, 1941, said: "I never entertained any doubt, any time during 1941, that the Japanese were fully informed of all military activities in this area." (R. 2882) Page 23 authority to tap these lines and find out what was going on because of our own legal restriction, the Communication Act of 1934. [1] No better example of the failure to control consular agents and the results thereof can be found than the case of the consul general in Honolulu. This man had about 200 consular agents in the Islands. He used the telephone and telegraph for reporting on our defenses and fleet movements with impunity. When he was arrested with his agents on December 7th, a large number of his messages were found in the wastepaper basket, torn up and partially burned. As a result of eight months' work in piecing a portion of these together, Colonel Fielder, G- 2 under General Short and since that time G-2 in Hawaii, produced a number of these reconstructed messages which clearly revealed that military information was being gathered and transmitted to Japan. The day before this event took place a radiophone message, that was monitored, between a Japanese doctor's house Footnotes: [1] Memorandum of September 29, 1944, from James Lawrence Fly, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission: "The United States was at peace with Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the Communications Act of 1934, under which the Federal Communications Commission was organized and from which it derives its powers, prohibited the tapping of wires or other interception of messages transmitted between points in the United States, including its territories, and a foreign country (Section 605). Since that prohibition upon the Commission had not been in any way superseded, the Commission did not intercept any messages over the radio-telegraph, cable telegraph or radiotelephone circuits between the United States (including Hawaii) and Japan prior to December 7, 1941." Page 24 in Honolulu and a newspaper in Japan was heard and reported, late on December 6, and was given extensive consideration by General Short and Colonel Fielder, G-2; but its exact meaning could not be made out. This message is referred to as the Mori message. (R. 2961) The next morning the Japanese struck. The evident trend of this message was to report upon the state of the naval defenses and the presence of the fleet as well as the Army defenses. This Board believes that Japan's spying activities could have been determined, the intentions of the Japanese revealed and much important information gathered, which would probably have prevented in large measure the Pearl Harbor disaster, had the Army and Navy been permitted, with the F.B.I., to tap these lines and find out what was going on. If the consular agents were conducting commercial business no harm would have been done; if they were not limiting their activities to consular business, we than had a right to know it and to take action accordingly, either by an open breach or by preparing ourselves to meet what they were doing. Ambassador Grew has well stated that there are three lines of defense for a nation such as ours: the diplomatic line of defense, the Navy, and the Army. However, the diplomatic line -- held by the State Department -- ofttimes handicaps and influences the preparation for the Army and Navy defense lines. As an illustration, the policy of compromise between economic Page 25 sanctions and negotiations [1] in turn influenced War Department action, in that Short was told by the War Department, which in turn reflected the State Department's warnings, to take defensive measures but in doing so he was told not to alarm the population nor to disclose intent. [2] There appears to be no evidence of a strong policy of standing up for American rights and boldly stepping out and making the Japanese behave themselves; and this in the face of the fact that it was well known that people of the character of the Japanese and their national attitude of mind respect only force and strength and do not respect a policy of good intentions nor demands of conduct without means to enforce same. The Board is impressed with the necessity for a closer, more aggressive relationship between the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the War and Navy Departments, in using all of their facilities as a coordinated team for the defense of the United States. [3] Footnotes: [1] The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said: "With regard to the lines along which this Government's foreign policy with respect to Japan was directed in 1941, a detailed record is given in Chapter XIV of *Peace and War* (a publication issued by the Department in 1943), and on pages 325-386 of Volume II of *Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan*, 1931-1941." [2] The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said: "With regard to your request for an expression of the Department's views touching upon the influence of foreign policy upon military directives, it was not the policy of this Government to take provocative action against any country or to cause Japan to commit an act of war against the United States." [3] The State Department counter proposals of the 26th of November, which Japan considered as an ultimatum, the day before the Army and Navy, Marshall-Stark memorandum could be delivered asking no ultimatum, is a case in point. Mr. Hull said after delivering his ultimatum that he washed his hands of the matter and left it to the Army and Navy. (R. Stimson, 4051-4053, 4078-4079). Page 26 The Japanese policy was typical of the oriental mind, which is predominantly a bargaining mind, asking twice as much as they expect to get and then settling on a compromise. Any show of weakness merely strengthens the hand of the bargainer, and any crack in the bargainer's front causes him to lose face and bargaining power. Therefore the action of the United States in demilitarizing Guam by removing its guns and other equipment and thus attempting to show Japan the peaceful intentions of the United States, was undoubtedly considered by Oriental Japan as an evidence of weakness and merely served to put our interests backward instead of forward. (R. 3062) Page 27 4. U.S. Policy (1939-1941). We had been following the policy immediately before the war which broke out between Germany, England, and France, of veering away from anything that would precipitate a conflict with the Japanese. In view of the tense international situation, particularly after the outbreak of the European War in August 1939, it became apparent that it would be necessary for us to redouble our efforts to avoid any open friction with the Japanese, both because we wished to devote what resources were available to the assistance of England and France, with whom we were in deep sympathy; and also, for the further purpose, that we were inadequately prepared to meet any attack from Japan in the Pacific. [1] Footnotes: [1] Captain Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, gave this very significant testimony, when asked if the American Navy, with two of its carriers, had discovered the task force that attacked Hawaii and had attacked this force at sea, what would have been the outcome: " Captain Layton: I think the American forces here would have taken the licking of their life, first, because the American people were not psychologically prepared for war. "General Russell: How would the psychology of the American people influence a naval engagement off of Oahu? "Captain Layton: I am referring to the American Navy as a part of the American people, and I use this example: During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a portion of a squadron of American carrier planes were than flying in from a carrier to Ford Island. They were attacked by Japanese fighters, and it is to be observed that these planes were armed with machine gun ammunition and machine guns ready to fire, and I can find no record of any of these carrier planes firing one single shot at any Japanese plane." (R. 3047) Page 28 As events became more critical in 1940 and 1941, the necessity of following a policy for delay and apparent appeasement of Japan increased to one of great national urgency. We were faced with a dual load of unpreparedness for any war and the necessity of sending England and France what equipment and supplies that were available. It was, therefore, natural with this factual situation to bow to the necessity of avoiding war by trying to appease Japan. We found it expedient to lean over backwards to avoid an appearance in Hawaii of a war-like or belligerent attitude, particularly, in view of and towards the large Japanese population of the islands. [1] Our general national policy and, particularly the War Department policy, very naturally conveyed itself to the commanders in residence in Hawaii. Their acts were colored and their dispositions tempered by the repeated cautions in this direction as we sought for time to prevent an untoward incident from precipitating war with Japan before we were ready to meet it. The fact that they were not more fully advised of the progress towards a critical international situation in the Pacific must be taken into account. This policy of avoiding any act to offend the Japanese was offset to some degree by one at right angles to it, of the application of commercial restrictions which tended to strangle her economic life and her preparation for war. For instance, the refusal to sell scrap to Japan, the abrogation Footnotes: [1] 160,000 Japanese were in the Islands, composing about one-third of the population. (R. 2947) Page 29 of Japanese commercial rights under treaty and the failure to renew that treaty with Japan, the oil embargo and similar incidents were at variance with this general policy. The net result was a national policy towards which reflected itself I the "Do-Don't" type of instructions that characterized the message from the War Department to Hawaiian Commanders up until December 7, 1941. The policy of our government as practiced by our public officials in their attitude toward Japan was not one of appeasement openly, but it was that in effect. Every effort was being exerted to prevent a rupture of relations with Japan, while presenting a show of face by economic sanctions to restrain Japanese aggression. Every effort was made to maintain the *status quo* until we were ready. Time was our most precious commodity in 1941. Page 30 5. Moral Embargoes Versus Japanese Expansion. No competent understanding can be gained of the relationship with Japan unless we break down the problem into its essential aspects. Japanese industry had received a succession of serious blows by reason of our successive steps of not renewing the commercial treaty with Japan, the cutting off of scrap to Japan, the cessation of our trade in silk with Japan, the oil embargo, the freezing of credits and assets, and numerous other incidents. On the diplomatic front, strong efforts were being made to maintain the *status quo* leading up to the final visit of Japanese special Ambassadors to the United States terminating with Pearl Harbor. This situation generally trended, however, towards placating and appeasing Japan with such firmness as was necessary to keep the negotiations going. During all of this period the government was not supported by a public that was war-minded; just the contrary. Public irritation was increasing, but it was still hoping to avoid war. On the contrary, Japan's attitude toward the United States was one of increasing hostility. Its policy was to conduct its aggressions starting in 1935 against China, as rapidly and as effectively as its resources would permit, while maintaining a diplomatic screen and pretense of considering the views of the United States. Being unable to agree with them, it had no intention of doing so whatever. During this period Japan made no concessions. It was quite apparent that she would continue her course until the patience of the United States was exhausted; and the United States was forced into a position of an open breach -- the time of that breach was stipulated clearly to the President Page 31 November 27 by General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The delivery of the counter proposals to Japan on November 26 anticipated that time -- war came before we were fully prepared. It was well known that Japan's entry into all wars of the past had been characterized by the first overt act of war coming simultaneously with the declaration. The services, both Army and Navy, were well aware of this Japanese characteristic. It was, therefore, to be expected that an unexpected attack would be made by Japan as the first indication of a breach of relations. This is well expressed by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified: "General Russell: Then you were not surprised at the air attack on the 7th of December: "Mr. Stimson: Well, I was not surprised, in one sense, in any attack that would be made; but I was watching, with considerably more care, because I knew more about it, the attack that was framing up in the southwestern Pacific. And I knew also that there was a concentration in the mandated islands -- I know now, because I was shown by General Arnold the letter about the telegram, and an order; so that that was an additional threat, and that might fall on either Hawaii or Panama." (R. 4072) Indeed, Ambassador Grew on January 27, 1941, sent the State Department the following message: Tokyo, January 27, 1941 -- 6 p.m. (Received January 27 -- 6:38 a.m.) "A member of the Embassy was told by my...colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese Military forces, in case of 'trouble' between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of *all* the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic." Grew Page 32 Japan, well knowing the policy of the United States had been to avoid war to the limit of its endurance, took advantage of our situation. It was, therefore, obvious that the United States would have to avoid friction with Japanese nationals as that would be a ready excuse for Japan to precipitate the issue prematurely. On the other hand, sabotage was to be expected from these Japanese nationals. A large body of them, as in Hawaii, was a potential source of great danger, not only as to what they might do, but as the basis of precipitation of an international incident with Japan. The public generally did not understand the importance of Hawaii. It had no appreciation of the danger except as the press became increasingly insistent in pointing out the progress of the advance towards war and the likelihood that this outpost would be involved in the conflict as one of the first line elements of our western defense. [1] The War Department was urging officially and privately that every effort be made to delay the declaration of war by Japan because of our serious state of unpreparedness and because much of our available military resources were being utilized to assist the United Nations. The battle of the Atlantic was the predominant factor in the public mind and dominated the policy of the War Department, as evidenced by the transfer of a considerable part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic. Therefore, the entire consciousness of the War Footnotes: [1] *Fortune* magazine polled the public in late 1939 and made a report in January which showed that 55% of those questioned were in favor of defending Hawaii; 25%, not defend, and the balance did not know what they wanted. Page 33 Department was directed towards avoiding any incident that might precipitate war with Japan while, at the same time, exerting its efforts to prepare for such a war. The War Department was confronted with a grave lack of planes, anti-aircraft guns, and other implements of war with which to equip Hawaii with an adequate defense mechanism. The previous delay in implementing our defense had left us, two year after war had started in Europe, gravely lacking in our preparations. The strong anti-war group in the Unites States made it unwise for the United States to take a stronger action against Japan. These general policies apparently were the subject of discussion of the War Council. [1] Its policies were reflected Footnotes: [1] There is some apparent confusion of that testimony in the use of this term, and the two bodies to which it refers. The situation was clarified by the testimony of Mr. Stimson, who said: "The first subject that was listed here is that of the 'War Council'. By the 'War Councils' we meant the meetings that were held by the Secretary of State, possibly the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, from time to time, to discuss the relations between the Japanese Empire and the American Government. *** "The name 'War Council' is the name of a statutory body which was created in, I think, the National Defense Law of about 1920; but it was purely a War Department board. It did not have any members from the Navy or from any other department in it. *** "The War Council was in effect and used to meet, usually on Wednesdays, in the times that we are taking over, but it consisted solely of myself, my assistants, civil assistants, and the Chief of Staff and such other officers as I invited in; and it had nothing to do with the Navy or matters outside of this Department. But we did have two sets of meetings -- they can hardly be dignified by the 'organization' -- but early, very soon after Mr. Knox and I came into the Government in 1940, we decided that we ought to meet regularly, and we ought to meet with the Secretary of State; we were approaching important matters; and so we went to the Secretary of State and asked him if he had any objection to meeting with us once a week. He agreed cordially, and accordingly we began meeting on Tuesday mornings at 9:30 every week, whenever we were present in Washington, or able to come, and those series of Page 34 Footnote [1] - Continued from preceding page. meetings went on until Mr. Know died; they lasted right through. "They were perfectly informal and unofficial meetings, but they were very regular, and we met once a week regularly; and during the time at which you are about to inquire, just before Pearl Harbor, we had extra meetings. In fact, we were in such a meeting on the Sunday morning that the Japanese attacked. The meetings took place in the State Department, Mr. Hull's office, and during that time the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Navy, and myself were in constant contact. "The other set of meetings were meetings called by the President, which he usually called with great regularity -- the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff -- that was, of course, General Marshall -- the Chief of Naval Operations, who was at that time Admiral Stark; and sometimes, General Arnold. Well, that was also improvised, so to speak; it had no custom before it. It was created in the light of the approaching emergency, and among ourselves, as a nickname we called it the 'War Cabinet,' or the 'War Council,' or something like that; and evidently Mr. Hull, from what you say, used that expression in his White Paper. "There was no regular day set for the meetings of that body. They met on the call of the President, at his office; and during this time about which you particularly ask, the autumn of 1941, they were meeting very frequently, also; and, fortunately, I have records. I have kept records during the time that I am here, in which I have set down very briefly, and without much reference to good English sometimes, what was taking place, including everything that was important, that I deemed to be important; in regard to the crisis that was coming along; and including these meetings; so that I am in a position where I can give you dates of these meetings pretty fully." (R. 4041-4043) (General Marshall, R. 5-6) Page 35 in actions of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, as to measures taken for defense in the Pacific. It is necessary to keep these factors in mind in reading the messages from the War Department to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. The handling of Japan had been a mixture of diverse policies; and this reflected itself in War Department messages to Hawaii, which both told Short to prepare for defense and at the same time to do nothing in preparing it that might precipitate trouble with the local Japanese population or excite the local public. As evidence of this was the fact that Short responded to the situation by selecting an anti-sabotage alert and the War Department took no exception to it. These two conflicting courses of action were reflected in the messages and in the policies of the War Department; they account in part for the attitude of mind in Short and others in the Hawaiian Department. Whether justified or not, we consider later. Then, too, official War Department thought on the subject of Pacific defense was almost wholly concentrated as to what might happen to the Philippines, the intermediate islands, and Panama. It was there that the main attack, in the first phase, was expected from Japan. No early attack was expected on Hawaii. As the Chief of Staff testified, it was a surprise to him. (R. 9) All efforts were being made towards strengthening these outposts. Such modern bombing aircraft as could be made available was being flown to the Philippine theater. Likewise, efforts were being made to strengthen the defenses of Midway, Guam, Wake, and other localities judged to become the first Page 36 involved. The Hawaiian defense was clearly secondary at that time, although prior thereto it was considered as our strongest outpost, and had first priority on equipment and maintenance. (R. 14,184) Planes flown from the mainland as late as December 7, 1941, to Hawaii en route to the Philippines were not supplied with ammunition until they were ready to depart from Hawaii. General Arnold explains this was because of the necessity of carrying sufficient gas to insure a safe arrival. (R. 168) This too led to a state of mind, both officially and personally, in the responsible officers of the Hawaiian Department, that, even if war with Japan was about to start, Japan would not initially attack Hawaii. It was felt that Hawaii was quite well down on the list of objectives of Japan, as those parts of American territory closer to Japan would be the first to feel the blow and that the implementing of other defenses must give way in priority to those though to become the first involved. (R. 2872) Japan shrewdly calculate and estimated correctly this state of mind. It arrived at this conclusion and acted accordingly, temporarily by-passing the Philippines and the intermediate American islands, for a direct attack on Hawaii December 7, 1941, just as Ambassador Grew had clearly warned in his message of January 27, 1941. So clearly did Japan understand our national psychology that it selected Sunday morning, early, as the time for attack, well knowing this to be the best time to achieve surprise. Japan took, as the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force estimated, a 50 to 1 shot. Later, it will appear how well that venture was Page 37 prepared and executed, and how well timed as an answer to our counter proposals of November 26, which the Japanese considered an ultimatum; because it was on and after the delivery of that document against which General Marshall and Admiral Stark warned too late, that the task force of Japan that attacked Hawaii moved out of its rendezvous at Tankan Bay o the 27th or 28th of November to launch the attack against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. [1] Footnotes: [1] The best attainable evidence supports this statement. (R. 3033) Page 38 6. Public Demands Action Against Japanese. Our national policy has been to avoid war. The difficulty with our policy appears to have been its conflicting nature, in that in the case of Japan we desired to avoid war, to continue in business with Japan, and at the same time to prevent Japanese aggression by both negotiation and simultaneously to apply economic sanctions against Japan. As our nation was not prepared for war, it left the administration, particularly the State Department, without the full support of the public so it could proceed with a firm policy toward Japan; and it left the War and Navy Departments without sufficient means to implement a more aggressive policy towards Japan. The result of this conflicting situation made it extremely difficult for the State Department to handle negotiations with japan, which well know our national policy. It was difficult both to negotiate for a peaceful solution of differences with a nation such as Japan, and at the same time impede negotiations by applying economic sanctions such as the freezing of assets and credits, the cutting off of the supply of oil and scrap, and the termination of a commercial treaty with Japan. This conflicting element of policy reflected itself in the actions directed by the War Department to its field commanders, who were required to both take all the necessary precautions to meet war and at the same time to take no steps either to excite the civil population or to precipitate war by overt acts. Such a policy was particularly difficult to carry out in Hawaii, where there was a very large proportion, some thirty percent, of the population of the nationality or Page 39 Japan. The danger, therefore, was great in carrying out the War Department policy, that in our preparations for war we would precipitate an issue with Japanese nationals in the Hawaiian Islands which would be an excuse by Japan to open hostilities. This state of public minds was further inflamed to demand action by the Government against Japan, because of the latter's open aggressions in 1941; but effective action was impossible of fulfillment because of the long public policy of only maintaining a very modest army and navy. Public opinion can change far faster than a nation can make ready for war. The time element of making preparations for war is so long that it always lags behind a sudden change of public views, as in our case with Japan. Our public opinion had changed against Japan faster than preparations for war could be made. This left the Department of State with the most difficult task of negotiation without means of enforcing its views by force of arms. It likewise left the War and Navy Departments unable to fully support the State Department in its negotiations. This led to a compromise solution, due to this public opinion as expressed by the press, in the form of a resort to economic sanctions. But the difficulty with economic sanctions was that, while it indicated a firm policy on the part of the United States, it also so aggravated the situation in that it made negotiation difficult of either progress or consummation. At most, our national policy was one of defensive character while waiting for the preparations for war to catch up with the new state of the public mind that Japan should be made to Page 40 behave herself and that our government should do something about it. 7. Economic Sanctions Against Japan. In 1938 and 1939 a series of "moral embargoes" or commercial sanctions were applied to Japan by the United States. During those two years there had been brought about a cessation of the United States' export to Japan of airplanes, aeronautical equipment, and certain other materials. There also resulted a state of decline of export to Japan of strategic materials, and as of July 1904, under the Export Control Act, the President had curtailed or prohibited the export of basic war materials.. Licenses were refused for the export of Japan of aviation gasoline and most types of machine tools as of September 1940. The testimony of Ambassador Grew throws light upon the effect and result of embargoes. He said: "During the period up to, I think it was, the autumn of 1940, I took the position that economic embargoes against Japan -- and embargoes are in the nature of sanctions and therefore are always interpreted as international insults -- I took the position that we should not put embargoes on Japan, until we were prepared to go all the way through with whatever might result from those embargoes. I pointed out that when we put embargoes against Japan in effect, our relations with that country were bound to go steadily down-hill and it might, and probably would, end in war; and that until we were prepared to go to war with Japan. I felt it would be very short-sighted to get into a situation where we might be obliged at a later date to withdraw those embargoes. There is nothing so conducive to a lowering of national prestige, reputation, and authority as to make threats and then have to recall those threats or modify those threats. We saw that working out in the relations between Great Britain and Italy at the time of the Abysinnian campaign. Page 41 "But, in the autumn of 1940, I telegraphed the Secretary of State that I felt that time had then come, since Japan was threatening not only our national interests, but, I would say, our vital national interests; I felt that the time had come to consider, not whether we must call a halt to Japan's expansion, but when. It seemed to me at that time, whether we were fully prepared for war or not, that we must in our own interests put those embargoes in effect; and, shortly thereafter, those embargoes were put into effect. "Our relations than started directly on a down-hill course, and they ended in war; but at least we were more prepared for war at that time than we had been two years earlier." It was in the fall of 1940 that we cast the die and adopted economic sanctions. And we find it significant that about June 1940 General Herron as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department upon Washington orders went into an all-out alert into battle positions with live ammunition for six weeks. (R. 212). In September the export of iron and steel scrap was prohibited. The effect of the United States policy was to cut off from Japan by the winter of 1940-1941 the shipment of many strategic commodities, including arms, ammunition, and implements of war, aviation gasoline and many other petroleum products, machine tools, scrap iron, pig iron and steel manufactures, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, and a variety of other commodities important to a war effort. Further parallel to this course of action by the United States was the decision in August 1941 between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression, that the United States could continue its conversation with the Page 42 Japanese government and offer her a reasonable and just alternatives to the course upon which that country was embarked. [1] As was stated in the White Papers [2] as to economic sanctions, he (Grew) said that "considering the temper of the people of Japan it was dangerously uncertain to base United States policy on a view that the imposition of progressive and rigorous economic measure would probably avert war; that it was the view of the Embassy that war would not be averted by such a course. Finally he warned of the possibility of Japan's adopting measures with dramatic and dangerous suddenness which might make inevitable a war with the United States." As Ambassador Grew testified in summary: "However, I can say, in brief compass, that the trend of our relations during the period you mention; that is, the year 1940 and 1941; was almost steadily down-hill; we, of course, in our embassy in Tokyo, leaving nothing undone to arrest that trend; and I think everything was done that could possibly have arrested it, in our work in Tokyo. But, we were up against what I would call a 'tidal wave' of military extremism in Japan; and I think the results as culminating in Pearl Harbor proved that fact." The testimony of Ambassador Grew as to his actions as reflected in the State Department's White Papers and in extracts from his diary indicates that he too was acting under what Footnotes: [1] "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941," Department of State, Washington, p. 129. [2] "*Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941* Vol. I and Vol. II; and *Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931- 1941*, Department of State, Washington D.C." Page 43 apparently was a conflicting policy but with a full recognition of the inevitable date of a final trial of strength with Japan. A review of Grew's communications to the State Department in the year 1941 is an excellent perspective of the course of the fatal events that led to Pearl Harbor. On January 27, 1941, he communicated by wire with the State Department indicating that an attack on Pearl Harbor by all means available to the military and naval forces of Japan was being discussed, and he felt that it was so serious that it should be reported, even though it was fantastic to consider it; on February 1 he said the outlook was never darker for peace; on July 25 the United States froze Japanese assets, causing bitter Japanese resentment; on August 18 he reported the Japanese protest on U.S. economic pressure; on August 29 the United States applied the oil embargo, decided to send oil tankers to Russia and a military mission to China; on September 6 Grew reported the statement of the Japanese Premier that if the United States continued its economic sanctions it would prevent any settlement for six months to a year after they terminated, and on September 29 Grew sent an important message to Washington that the Japanese could only be brought to a halt by a show of force. He pointed out that any agreement would be a mere breathing spell for Japan, that war was likely in any event, and unless results were shown in the negotiations, more than had been demonstrated to date, the Japanese would conclude the United States was only playing for time and would act accordingly. On September 30 Grew protested at the secrecy of our conversations with Japan as practiced by the United States without advising with the public, Page 44 whereas it was common knowledge in Japan. On October 9 he significantly reported that the frozen-credit policy of the United States was driving Japan into national bankruptcy and she would be forced to act. His prediction was correct, because Tojo, the only Japanese Premier to stay on the active Army list in that position, was made Premier on October 16. There was an indication of trouble when the Premier of Japan was a dominant military figure on the active Army list, and on October 25 he reported that the Emperor ordered the Privy Council before him and asked them if they intended war. When they refused to answer, he instructed them that there should be no war with the United States. This was the final effort by conservative Japanese to avoid war. The next step would probably be war itself. Grew warned on October 30 that the situation was fraught with the greatest danger. On November 3 he said that war was not only possible but probable and that Japan was preparing for hostilities "with dangerous and dramatic suddenness." It was on that date that Kurusu left for Washington, refusing to take a *later* clipper for "technical reasons", the significance of which was apparent. On November 7 Secretary Hull informed the Cabinet "that relations between Japan and the United States were 'extremely critical' and that there was 'imminent possibility' that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force." (White Papers, p. 136) This was followed by warnings of the impending seriousness of the situation in speeches made by Secretary of the Navy Knox and Under Secretary of State Welles, November 11, 1941. Page 45 The White Papers continue: "On November 17 Ambassador Grew cabled from Tokyo that we could expect a 'sudden Japanese Naval or military attack in regions not then involved'." Secretary Hull on November 25 and November 28 at meetings of high officials of this government. "stated there was practically no possibility of agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for the purpose thereof." (White Papers, p. 144) It does not appear that such a statement was sent by the Army and Navy to their field forces. On November 26 the Secretary of State handed the President's Ten Points of Settlement to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. These proposals were verbally rejected by the Japanese Ambassadors at once, but they inquired as to any other basis of negotiation or a *modus vivendi*. The following day, at the request of the Japanese Ambassadors, the President received them and Secretary of State Hull, at which time the President reaffirmed with finality the "Ten Points" were based. On the same day, General Marshall and Admiral Stark wrote a memorandum to the President requesting that no ultimatum be delivered to the Japanese as the Army and Navy were not ready to precipitate an issue with Japan, and notified him of the agreement reached with the British and the Page 46 Dutch for reciprocal action in the case either one of them was attacked. The proof indicates that the Marshall-Stark memorandum of the 27th to the President did not reach him until after the meeting with the Japanese Ambassador on the 27th or possibly on the 28th of November. Whether or not the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, now disclaims that this document of the 26th was an ultimatum, Ambassador Grew testifies that the Japanese so regarded it. (R. 4208, 4215, 4221, 4222) They so acted upon it and Mr. Hull likewise so acted because he so informed the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, on the morning of November 27. The latter testified, based on his diary of contemporaneous events, thus: "The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese --- whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, 'I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy.' "General Russell: Mr. Secretary, I don't like to disturb you, but I have become a little confused on dates, about this telephone call. Was that on the 26th of -- "Mr. Stimson: This was the 27th. "General Russell: 27th. "Mr. Stimson: The day after the 26th. "General Russell: Yes, sir. "Mr. Stimson: The 26th was the day he told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it. "General Russell: Yes. "Mr. Stimson: Or whether he would break it off; and on the morning of the 27th, by telephone, he told me that he decided to break it off. "I then called up the President and talked with him about it." (R. 4052-4053) On November 29 Secretary Hull said to the British Ambassador, "The matter will now go to the officials of the Page 47 Army and Navy." He warned that the Japanese action would probably be "a desperate gamble and require the utmost boldness and risk." His predictions were uncanny. (White Papers, pp. 144-145) On November 29, Ambassador Grew relates that there had just reached Japan news that the President had made a proposition to settle Japanese grievances by giving her substantially most of what she wanted, [1] and on December 1 Grew reported Japan cold to the proposals, a fact Secretary Hull had found on the 26th when he handed the President's Ten Points to the Ambassador. On the same day, December 1, his diary shows that he had a conversation with a Japanese friend apparently high in that government, Grew saying "everything was over and that I would soon be leaving Japan." On December 6 an address of Tojo was read for the Diet different from all others heretofore delivered by him, the tone of which clearly indicated Japanese intentions. The following day, on Sunday morning, the Pearl Harbor attack occurred. Footnotes: [1] "Ten Years in Japan" by Ambassador Grew. Page 48 8. The Hawaiian Population Problem: Sabotage Complex. The conditions in Hawaii and the state of the public mind in Hawaii were considered apparently by the War Department to be primary factors to be taken into consideration in the carrying out of the military mission of the defense of the islands and defense of the fleet. As elsewhere indicated in War Department communications, this was a fact; and the responsible commanders in Hawaii in the Army also gave great weight to the state of the Hawaiian situation on the civil side. It is significant that it had been the national policy of the United States to exclude Japanese national from the United States and its territories, both for self-protection and to protect American labor against cheap foreign labor of the yellow races. Yet in Hawaii, our fleet base and one of our most important defense outposts, we permitted the introduction into the population of the islands of Japanese, to the extent of 30% of the total population or 160,000. [1] Footnotes: [1] There are three classes of Japanese population: (a) old aliens known as Issei, about 37,500; (b) Hawaiian-born Japanese who are sent back to the mainland of Japan for education known as Kibei, about 2,599; and (c) Hawaiian-born Japanese and Hawaiian-educated known as Nisei, composing the balance of 160,000. 95% of the Japanese children attend the Japanese language schools. Under Japanese Law no Japanese is released from Japanese citizenship until he goes through a formal procedure securing his release from that citizenship. Most Japanese in the Islands have not secured such a release and they therefore have dual citizenship in the United States and Japan. Approximately 50,000 Japanese attended the Shinto temples of which there were 55. Around these temples were centered the teachings of Japanese culture, patriotism, and family fealty. (R. 3919-3920) See also Chapter I, "Gentlemen of Japan" by B. S. Haven, Ziff-Davis Publishing Co.; "Feudal Hawaii; Paradise, Ltd." by Stanley High, *Readers Digest*, June 1943, pp. 19-23; and "Are the Japs Hopeless?" by George Horne, *Saturday Evening Post*, September 9, 1944. Page 49 Many were Japanese of dual citizenship who, although born in the United States, had not yet taken the steps made available by Japan to become released from their Japanese citizenship. These Japanese laborers and artisans were comparatively economical in terms of performance, useful both in agricultural pursuits and as artisans, were highly prized by the great commercial interests in sugar cane, pineapples, shipping, and other interests of the Islands; and it was the urgent desire of these commercial interests apparently both to enjoy the protection and profit from the basing of the fleet in Hawaii and also to have no disturbance of such labor or to be led into any situation that would disturb these profitable labor relations. This policy of encouraging the Japanese and permitting them to become dominant in the affairs of the Islands has even gone so far as to permit the Japanese to become important political factors with membership in both the Senate and the House of Hawaii, and to dominate, by way of majority, the Island governing councils in some of the islands of the Hawaiian Group. (R. 2941) Sabotage was a critical consideration by the local Army authorities. But up to December 7 there had been not a single instance of sabotage. On December 7 a number of illegal radio stations interfered with the radio operations of the Army. No other specific instance of sabotage or alien enemy action had been reported either by the War Department of Hawaii or by G-2 or the F.B.I. in Hawaii. Additionally, the placing of the Army upon alert by War Department order to General Herron, by which his troops moved Page 50 into the field in battle positions with live ammunition in June 1940, had no effect upon the civilian population or their anxieties. Subsequent frequent alerts and maneuvers which were constantly going on, including Short's Alert Number 1 as to sabotage, had had no effect upon the civil population. All activities of the Army in disturbing the local populace paled by comparison with the contents of the local newspapers and their reports of the war news and the progressively increasing threats of Japanese action. Indeed, approximately a week before the attack at Pearl Harbor, a local newspaper in Hawaii carried a complete prediction of this attack on the following Sunday. (Exhibits 19-19a.) The foregoing statement of fact as to background should be considered in connection with the communication of the War Department warnings as to sabotage, the action of General Short in placing the Department under the Number 1 Alert against sabotage on November 27, and the claimed reasons for not taking other defensive measures, because of the reluctance to disturb both the civilian population and the alien population of Hawaii. The effect of such an atmosphere upon the policies and actions of the responsible commanders and their resulting state of mind is an important factor for consideration. As part of this state of mind, it was generally considered that Japan would never dare attack; and certainly, in the early stages of a war, she would not dare risk the major portion of her carriers for the launching of such an attack. The probabilities were strongly against such a bold and possibly suicidal move by Japan. Page 51 The state of mind engendered by the sabotage issue and the presence of the large Japanese population built up a sabotage consciousness in the responsible authorities as a more likely course of Japanese action than what was regarded as the more remote military operation of a direct air attack. This background is important to consider in evaluating the decisions arrived at by the Army commander and the actions taken by his associates. The existence of this state of public opinion had its effect upon the evaluation by the Army of the Japanese capabilities. Likewise, it was supplemented by the American attitude that Japan would not dare attack the United States in what was regarded as its home territory in the Islands, in the presence of the fleet, which was considered an asset and not, in reality, a liability. Senator Hill of the Hawaiian Senate testified (R. 2939-2940) as to the protests of local commercial interests to General Emmons when he proposed to take action in removing the dangerous Japanese from the sugar plantations after the Pearl Harbor attack. He said the political pressure brought to bear by these interests was sufficient to bring about a cancellation of this effort of General Emmons. It was significant of the propaganda pressure on the subject of doing nothing to offend the Japanese in the Islands and to let them alone so they could work for these Island industries and agriculture, which must have been imposed heavily on General Short. The constant application of such pressure for a period of nearly a year upon General Short doubtless had a material effect upon his mind and upon his anxiety about the Japanese population, Page 52 about which he could do nothing. This was particularly reflected in his refusal to have legal action taken against those who failed to register as aliens. (R. 3255-3256) It was well known in Honolulu to both the F.B.I. and G-2 of the Army that there were certain Japanese activities that were inimical to the best interests of the United States in the Hawaiian Islands. A Japanese combines in his Shinto religion, centering about the Shinto temples, three things: patriotism, religion, and family fealty. Those three things compose his entire emotional, political, and family life. The Shinto priests and the large number, 55, of Shinto temples in the Islands were the focal point of Japanese propaganda, patriotism, and disloyalty to the United States. This was all well known and could have been cured promptly by closing the temples and arresting the priests, as was done after December 7. Then there were the Shinto societies, and particularly the Black Dragon society. The Japanese are well known as great organizers and they had countless organizations, many of which were potential subversive character. The Japanese ran their own Japanese-language newspapers which promoted the same national spirit. They had Japanese-language schools in which they taught Japanese customs, family fealty, religion, and patriotism to Japanese children one hour each day after their regular education in the American schools. Here again our national policy, due to freedom of the press and freedom of religion and of education, permitted these people to jeopardize the defense of Hawaii. After December 7 the Japanese newspapers were put under strict control and used by the United States for propaganda agencies to control the Page 53 Japanese population, and the Shinto temples were closed. 9. Hawaiian Press. The state of mind and the state of information in the Hawaiian Islands leading up to Pearl Harbor, and particularly before it, is not better illustrated than the articles appearing in the *Honolulu Advertiser* and the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*. A mere recitation of these headlines would seem to have been sufficient to have warned General Short and his subordinate officers of the critical international situation. The newspaper headlines in question read as follows: "U.S. Waits Japan Reply" (29 Nov 41 -- *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Japanese May Strike Over Weekend"; "Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready For Battle" (30 Nov 41 -- *Honolulu Advertiser*); "Hull, Kurusu In Crucial Meeting Today" (1 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Advertiser*); "U.S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows"; "Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension"; "War Fears Grow in Philippines" (1 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace with U.S."; "Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations" (2 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Advertiser*); "Huge Pincer Attack on U.S. by Japan, France Predicted" (3 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Japan Spurns U.S. Program" (4 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Advertiser*); "Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U.S. Today" (4 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Singapore on War Footing"; "New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo"; "Civilians Urged to Leave Manila" (6 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Japanese Navy Moving South"; "Detailed Plans Completed for M-Day Setup" (6 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Advertiser*); "F.D.R. Will Send Message Page 54 to Emperor on War Crisis" (7 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Advertiser*). [1] [2] 10. Summary. We have learned a great deal about psychological warfare since this nation went to war. Looking backwards, it is possible to se that the psychological phases of the preparatory period for war leading up to the conflict with Japan had an immense effect upon the state of mind of our own public, officials and commanders; and upon what they did or did not do, prior to December 7. The deception of Japan and its actions based upon that deception in combination with our own failures to take precautions against the attack played no small part in the disaster of December 7th. Our complacent nation appeared to be sure, in view of its wealth and industrial strength and its prestige and leadership, that no one would presume to attack it. This national pride and vanity and sense of false security, so prevalent on the mainland, undoubtedly had its influence in Hawaii. With the foregoing background it is possible to understand more accurately and judge the following story of Pearl Harbor from early January 1941 until the attack and shortly thereafter. Footnotes: [1] Complete excerpts from the newspapers during this period will be found in Exhibits 19 and 19a. [2] The editors of both papers were called and examined as witnesses. They testified that these headlines resulted from deductions based on current trends in international relations gleaned from news dispatches. No other factual data was available to them. (R. 3107-3108, 3169-3170)