Page 55 CHAPTER III THE STORY OF PEARL HARBOR A. GENERAL 1. INTRODUCTION: SCOPE OF THE CHAPTER AND ITS PURPOSE: This is a running story of the principal events, documents, and actions taken leading up to Pearl Harbor. We accompany this story with a discussion of the pro's and con's of each situation in order that all arguments for and against every explanation and the circumstances surrounding every set of facts may be clearly understood and evaluated. Against such a background, all claims, arguments, facts and explanations can be considered. We believe this chronological history of the entire transaction will make our succeeding conclusions clearly stand forth. After setting forth some general considerations in this chapter, we direct attention to the two primary periods, from January through September and from October through December. As will be noted elsewhere this is a logical chronological division. In the latter part of the year 1941 there seemed to be change of understanding, appreciation, and apprehension of forthcoming events on the part of those in Hawaii. In reading this chronological history this should be observed because it is an important factor in what was done or not done in Hawaii. 2. GEOGRAPHICAL: The Territory of Hawaii comprises an island group of which the Island of Oahu is the primary element. Oahu contains Pearl Harbor, located on its southern rim. Pearl Harbor is the base for the Pacific Fleet, and was also the headquarters during 1941 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Page 56 Pacific Fleet and Headquarters of the 14th Naval District, which had naval jurisdiction over the Hawaiian Islands and our other island possessions in the Pacific including Midway and Wake but not the Philippines. Oahu was also the location of one of the largest troop concentrations in the national defense system of the United States while other national defense elements are located on the adjacent islands. It is important to emphasize that Hawaii was an *outpost* in the American Defense system. In view of that fact, certain fundamental requirements of action resulted which were incumbent upon the commander of the Hawaiian Department to follow. Hawaii is both an outpost for defense and offense, and is one of the primary bastions of our national defense system. In priority of importance it is rated on a par with the Panama Canal. The primary mission of the Army was the defense of Hawaii and particularly of Pearl Harbor and the fleet there, when in residence; and the fleet sea and air bases at all times. Aside from the necessity of preventing these islands from falling into the hands of other nations as a springboard for an attack upon the United States, the foregoing primary mission was that incumbent upon General Short at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The whole reason for having this outpost was that it should be on alert to repel attack and to furnish the springboard from which attacks could be launched upon our enemies. For this reason this outpost was implemented with the major portion of the fleet and very substantial Army installations in order that the mainland might rest securely Page 57 and be protected. There is no other fundamental reason for the great concentration of naval and military power on the Island of Oahu and associate islands. The very location of the Hawaiian Islands, approximately 2,000 miles from our Pacific Coast, makes it an admirable location for naval, air and ground forces for it gives, by reason of its position, a scope and flexibility of attack and defense, sufficiently remote from the Pacific Coast to insure the maximum latitude of action against our enemies and the maximum protection of the mainland of the United States. 3. MISSION OF ARMY IN HAWAII: The Army in Hawaii had a mission and a duty to perform. As stated in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan this was: "a. JOINT TASK. To hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base, and to control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone. "b. ARMY TASK. To hold OAHU against attacks by sea, land, and air force, and against hostile sympathizers, to support the Naval forces. "c. NAVY TASK. To patrol the Coastal Zone and to control and protect shipping therein, to support the Army Forces. The Army's mission was primarily that of protecting Hawaii, because it was the sea and air base for the fleet; and, when the fleet was in the harbor, it was there to render such protection as it could to the fleet. The protection of the Islands, other than for these purposes, was secondary and only necessary to the extent of making it possible for the Army to execute its primary mission. It should be observed that the very fact of the fleet being in the harbor increased the responsibilities of the Army, because of the dual facts Page 58 that the fleet when in the harbor was not in a position to support the Army forces either by reconnaissance or by the protection incident to its being at sea in waters adjacent to the islands, and when in the harbor itself needed protection for its ships that were temporarily immobilized and particularly vulnerable to air attack. 4. CONDITION OF THE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AT THE TIME OF SHORT'S ASSUMPTION OF COMMAND AND JUST PRIOR THERETO: With above mission in mind, the condition of the Hawaiian Department just prior to the assumption of command by General Short and Admiral Kimmel is a matter of interest. Admiral Richardson was the senior naval officer in command of the fleet, and General Herron the senior Army officer in command of the Hawaiian Department. These officers jointly reviewed the situation as to the Army. As a result Admiral Richardson addressed a letter on the 25th of January, 1941, as to the status of the Army's deficiencies for the defense of Hawaii, which was sent to the Secretary of the Navy. (R. 1802) The Secretary of the Navy, in turn, wrote to the Secretary of War, and called his attention to the serious conditions existing. [1] Admiral Kimmel summed up the situation in his testimony: *He was "astounded at the then existing weakness" of the Pearl Harbor defenses,* [2] and collaborated with his Footnotes: [1] See p. 99 in this chapter for a discussion of this correspondence. [2] Underscoring by the Board. Page 59 predecessor in the preparation of a letter dated 25 January 1941 to the Chief of Naval Operations. This letter pointed out: "(a) The critical inadequacy of A.A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of Ship's A.A. guns while in port. "(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land base aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols. "(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, etc. "(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore." (Roberts Rec. 544) He communicated this information to General Short. (R. 1768) It is therefore apparent from the considered investigations by Richardson and Herron, which conditions were concurred in by Short, that the lack of adequate defense equipment and what was needed to bring it up to a satisfactory status, were clearly known to both the Army and the Navy in Hawaii and to the War and Navy Departments. Short, therefore, came to the command on the 5th day of February, 1941, with a clear and unmistakable recognition by all concerned of the condition of the Department of which he had assumed command. General Herron, who preceded General Short, had been directed on June 7, *1940*, by Washington, to institute an alert. (R. 213) This alert lasted six weeks. (R. 214-215) After it was suspended at the end of six weeks it was reinstated for a period. The alert was an all-out alert, with complete dispersion of forces into combat positions and with full equipment and ammunition. Page 60 General Herron testified that there was no disturbance of the civilian population by the use of this all-out alert which was instituted under conditions similar to those which later prevailed for General Short's alert. When asked as to the Alerts 1, 2, and 3 of Short, he disposed of these alerts with the following language: "General Herron: That was a refinement that the training men put over on General Short when he came out there. I told him I would not do any such thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was a total alert, and then I would do it in accordance with the situation. But the training men like refinements, and they recommended three kinds because the Navy had three kinds. But they did not get to the real point of the thing. The Navy has three kinds, but the all-out alert is number one, always. Now they ease up into two and three; but these young men did not know that, and when Short came out they put over the three and go them reversed, so that Short went into the Number 1, which was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change, I don't suppose, and it turned out to be vital. It was too much of a refinement." (R. 226-227) In this connection, General Herron made a significant observation on the responsibility of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. "General Grunert: I have one more question on alerts. The fact that you received a directive from the War Department to alert the command: Did that leave the impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the future the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it up to your judgment? "General Herron: I always felt that I was entirely responsible out there and I had better protect the island." (R. 228) 5. ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY AT PEARL HARBOR: Before proceeding to a consideration of the Army's problems and the action taken by the Army in preparing the defenses of Hawaii, it is necessary to understand the organization of the Navy with whom General Short was to deal extensively and with which he was to Page 61 enter into various agreements and understandings, which have a material bearing upon which was done or was not done. To an Army man the organization of the Navy at Hawaii appeared to be quite complex. Admiral Kimmel was Commander-in-Chief of the Unites States Fleet and Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Block was the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. Admiral Bloch's duties consisted of the following: a. Commandant of the 14th Naval District, reporting directly to the Navy Department; the 14th Naval District was a decentralized Navy Department for local affairs, dealing with administrative matters such as plans, buildings, work of the navy Yard, repairing ships and the like, and providing for the Fleet oil, docks, water protection and such services as minesweeping, antisubmarine patrol, and the like. b. An officer of the Fleet, reporting to Admiral Kimmel, and acting as a subordinate of Admiral Kimmel; his duties related to the preparations for the offensive and defensive actions in time of war and to purely military matters. c. Administrative control over Admiral Bellinger, Commander of the Base Defense Air Force. d. Commander of Task Force No. 4 in control of the naval installations at the outlying island bases, such as Midway, Wake, Guam, etc. It will be noted from the foregoing that Admiral Bloch dealt directly with the Navy Department on certain phases of Page 62 his work. He was primarily charged as the Naval Defense Commander of the naval intelligence on shore. He was also a Task Commander under Admiral Kimmel. He was the responsible commander over the shore-based naval air forces, which were charges with the mission of naval long- distance reconnaissance. Additionally, Bloch, in his capacity as a Defense Commander, had administrative control over Admiral Bellinger, the Naval Air Officer, who was responsible for cooperation in the air with the Army, but he had no power of disciplinary control over Admiral Bellinger, who was under Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Bellinger's duties, in turn, were as follows: a. Commander, Hawaiian Base Patrol Wings, and Commander, Patrol Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2. b. Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1 and 2, plus other units as assigned by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for conduct of Pacific operations. c. Commander, Fleet Air Detachment Pearl Harbor. The responsibilities of this function included administrative authority in local matters over all Fleet aircraft actually based ashore. d. Liaison with Commandant, 14th Naval District, for aviation development within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands. e. Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. In connection with the above five major duties, Admiral Bellinger operated under the following senior officers: Page 63 (1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who as Fleet Commander for patrol wings was based at San Diego. (2) Commander, Scouting Force, the 4th Command of which Patrol Wings 1 and 2 were a part. (3) Directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in his capacity as Commander, Task Force 9. (4) Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. (5) Commander of Fleet Task Force 1, 2, and 3 of patrol planes assigned to those forces for specific operations. To summarize, Admiral Bellinger indicated that he held six positions in Honolulu on December 7, 1941, namely, (1) Commander, Base Patrol Wing (2) Commander, Patrol Wing 2 (3) Commander, Task Force 9 (4) Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor (5) Liaison Commander with the 14th Naval District (6) Commander of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. In these various capacities he was responsible to the (1) Commander, Aircraft Scouting Forces (2) Commander, Scouting Force 1 and 2 (3) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for his duties in connection with Task Force 9 Page 64 (4) Commander of the 14th Naval District, for his duties in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force. (5) Commander-in-Chief, the Pacific Fleet, for his duties with respect to Patrol Wings 1, 2, and 3. In Admiral Bloch's testimony he testified that he (Bloch) wore three hats. He was in command of the 14th Naval District, in which capacity he reported direct to the Navy Department. In another capacity, as an officer of the Fleet, he was directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in another capacity, with respect to the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, as Naval Defense Commander. As may be realized, in this organization in which there were two governing heads, Admiral Kimmel and Bloch, with whom General Short had to do business, and their respective staffs with whom Short's staff had to deal, as well as the many-titled Admiral Bellinger with whom General Martin dealt, the problem of cooperation was made somewhat difficult. By way of contrast, the Navy only had to deal with General Short as the sole responsible commander over all activities, both ground and air. General Martin was in command of the Army Air Forces and presented a single air commander with whom the Navy had to deal; and Martin was under the direct command of Short. When the agreements and methods of operation arrived at between the Army and Navy was examined hereinafter, these relationships will become important in understanding what was done and what was not done and some of the reasons for the failure of the competent defense of Hawaii.