Page 65 B. EVENTS FROM JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1941 1. SELECTION OF GENERAL SHORT: General Short was selected for his high post of command by General Marshall. Upon being notified of this selection, he was called to Washington to confer with General Marshall, to receive special written instructions from him and to confer with the sections of the General Staff and particularly the War Plans Division. The purpose of this visit and these conferences was to equip him with the latest and most up-to-date information and instructions as to the responsibilities of his new command. Thereafter, General Short proceeded to Hawaii, arriving there on the fifth day of February, 1941. He assumed command on February 7, 1941. Both Short and Herron concur that the latter fully advised Short of the problems and conditions with which he was confronted. At the time of General Short taking over command, there existed certain basic documents constituting fundamental instructions for his guidance in the conduct of the command, such as the Joint Army and Navy Plan of 1935. This was modified by the subsequent agreements between Short and Kimmel, Bloch and Short, and Bellinger and Martin. Coincident with the assumption of command by General Short on February 7, 1941, a letter was written on that date by General Marshall to General Short comprising a full presentation of the problems confronting General Short in his new command. The letter was based upon a conversation with Admiral Stark, then Chief of Naval Operations, and said in part: "Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns... "What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel throughout the Army and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army. The fullest protection for the fleet is the rather and a major consideration for us, there can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. ... "You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the Army's defenses of the naval overseas installations, but we cannot perform a miracle. ... "... However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet. "My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses will discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority. "Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the naval concentration and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of National defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. ..." (R. 14-17) Thus General Short was provided by his chief with both sound advice and an admirable set of clear-cut signposts to guide him. Such being the measure of his instructions, it is interesting to observe in what particulars he complied with Page 67 them or varied from them and the reasons for his actions. In conformity with the instructions as to the Navy, General Short proceeded to establish cordial and cooperative relationships, the exact nature of which is discussed elsewhere. By the 19th of February he "had made a pretty thorough inspection or survey" (R. 321), and on that date wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff as to things that required immediate attention, which were: "As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes: (1) Cooperation with the Navy. (2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft. (3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense. (4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery. (5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights. (6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails. (7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers. (8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops." The interim from February 19 to December 7 is replete with the efforts of Short to secure approvals and money for improving the defenses of Hawaii. It is also replete with various instances of his being turned down by the War Department, particularly because of lack of money in connection with permanent installations. Undue weight should not be given, however, to the aspects of the equipment, as General Marshall said in his letter of February 7th, "Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army", and the fundamental question to be considered is: What did Short do with what he had to meet the attack? Page 68 As elsewhere stated, he was granted his request for the construction of many types of installation, including the important aircraft warning system. (See the discussion of supply of equipment and construction, and also the delays in construction.) (p. 256) Again on March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General Short as to the air situation in clear, unmistakable language: "I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority." (R. 19) On March 6, General Short wrote General Marshall, with particular reference to Aircraft Warning System and the delays in its construction, and delays in sites due to the Department of Interior delays: "One of the first projects which I investigated in this department was the Aircraft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands. At the present time the maximum distance an approaching airplane can be detected is about five miles. The radio detector equipment of the Aircraft Warning Service increases this distance to one hundred and twenty miles, and in these islands, the use of this equipment is the only way by which the detection distance can be increased. With the present international situation it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here. "The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At present with the fleet in Hawaiian waters, there is no adequate warning service. ... I believe that this matter is sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of War to see if permission can not be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior to construct the Haleakala installation without the necessity of submitting detailed plans for consideration by the National Park Service. "Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is so dependent upon the Page 69 early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was very thoroughly studied by a board of officers in this department who made several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions as to locations, types of stations, and general plans have been approved by the War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be decentralized and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details to expedite its completion." On March 13, General Marshall wrote General Short: "The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department, is most gratifying. ... "The several letters which you have submitted to The Adjutant General requesting personnel, materiel and funds are being processed. To avoid delay in initiating projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including $3,000,000 in the estimates now being prepared." On March 15, General Marshall again wrote General Short as to the Aircraft Warning Service, showing the delays due to the necessity of getting approvals from the Department of Interior regarding matters pertaining to its National Park Service: "The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the aircraft warning service stations I the Hawaiian Department. However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those cases where facilities are to be established on lands pertaining to the Department of the Interior. The National Park Service officials are willing to give us temporary use of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose, but they will not waive the requirements as to the submission of preliminary building plans showing the architecture and general appearance. They are also very definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to be erected at such places as will be open to view and materially alter the natural appearance of the reservation. "I have given these matters my personal attention and have conferred with officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941, outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time. Page 70 On March 15 General Short wrote General Marshall a letter showing full appreciation of the necessity for the dispersion and the protection of aircraft. Among other things he said: "On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th some work has been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but in no case have arrangements been complete for the dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked for money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes must necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited cruising radius." (R. 21-22) In this letter he also discussed at length the question of anti- aircraft defense. On March 28, 1941, General Marshall replied to this letter as follows: "Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted sufficient details to support the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for those purposes will be included in estimates." On April 14, General Short again wrote General Marshall and amongst other things reported progress, as follows: "Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreements made with them: "1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District. Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure. "2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement. "3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement. "I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Page 71 Bloch very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together and with unity of command as the situation requires. "We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the antiaircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details the more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command." (R. 26-27) On May 2, 1941, Short wired General Marshall as to the sums of money needed for the construction of airports and other defense projects totaling over $27,000,000. General Short followed this up with a letter on May 2 to General Marshall in further explanation of his radiogram forwarding supporting data. On May 5, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short acknowledging the receipt of these estimates and supporting data, saying: "The matter of locating strongpoints at various points throughout the Island looks sound to me, and authority to go ahead on the leasing of land parcels was radioed on April 22nd. War Plans and the Air Corps are still looking into the matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect to have an answer for you in a short time. ... "It is most gratifying to have you say that everything is going along extremely well and do not hesitate to write at any time." (R. 28) On May 29, 1941, General Short furnished General Marshall a complete report on current maneuvers, the plans for the organization of the ground and the construction of field fortification, and the plans for repelling a serious attack, and reporting his theory of the defense of Hawaii, saying: Page 72 "My theory of the defense of Hawaii is based upon the following: "1. Complete organization of the ground at all important points. "2. Holding of the most important field fortifications lightly. "3. Holding of large mobile reserves centrally located with sufficient motor transportation to move all reserves at once if necessary. "4. Detailed plans for the employment of reserve with complete reconnaissance and reserves actually rehearsed in carrying out of the plans. "5. All troops to be highly trained in delaying action and counter-attack." On July The Adjutant General sent General Short the following wire: "For your information stop Deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups stop This policy is present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action against the maritime provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduce in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia stop Opinion is that Jap Activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval comma army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out stop The Neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated stop They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first of August stop Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned end." This wire contained notation by the Chief of Staff of July 7, 1941. On July 11, 1941, General Short asked the location of a new airfield on the Island of Oahu. On July 25, 1941, General Short reported to General Page 73 Marshall the Joint Air Arrangements of the Army, Navy, and exchange of facilities such as airfields. On July 25, 1941, a very significant message was sent by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations as a joint dispatch to General Short warning him of the application of economic sanctions against Japan on July 26, particularly saying: "Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japanese through the use of military means, but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measure against any possible eventualities." On August 19, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short as to the establishment of an airfield base for the 15th Pursuit Group and his reasons for so doing. This brings to conclusion the communications between the Chief of Staff and General Short to October 1, 1941. 2. SHORT'S STAFF: Short brought one, Colonel Phillips to Hawaii with the view to making him his Chief of Staff, and to train him for that assignment he placed him successively in various sections of his General Staff. On November 1 Colonel Phillips was made Chief of Staff. Evidence indicates that Phillips failed to measure up to that most responsible and important assignment -- the "alter ego" of the Commanding General; that he was but a weak echo of his Commander and failed to furnish him, as his principal adviser, with vigorous and candid advice of high professional character and with a competent vision and knowledge of what was taking place or might take place. His administration of the staff, as we view it, was weak Page 74 and reflected itself in the work of the several General Staff sections and in the output thereof as a whole. While the various Assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that their testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short. Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far too weak for a position of such importance. [1] Short's selection of Phillips appears to have been a mistake. An examination of Phillips' testimony as to his conception of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of the matter. (R. 1134-1144) In justice to Phillips it should be pointed out that while he was Chief of Staff he never was present at important Navy conferences, (R. 393-394, 534), and that information of important and vital events came to him second- handed. Although Short did not insulate himself from his staff, he had Phillips conduct most of the staff conferences and apparently rarely dealt with his principal staff officers. He delegated to his staff little more than mere routine duties. His direct relationship with his G-2 seemed particularly inadequate in view of the then existing tense situation. (R. 393, 519, 520, 521) Although he frequently visited and consulted with his principal subordinate commanders he held no periodic conferences, and his second Footnotes: [1] R. 265, 1408-1409, 1946, 1977-1978, 2625-2626. Page 75 in command, General Burgin, was not taken into his confidence as to existing conditions nor was his advise sought. (R. 2625) 3. SHORT'S ACTIONS IN BUILDING DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND ADDING EQUIPMENT: There is no question that Short made many demands for equipment, defense construction, and personnel. He was active and diligent in this matter. Except as to aircraft and anti-aircraft, his command appears to have been well supplied. In many instances, long delays were incurred in the approval of defense construction and making funds available therefor and some of the recommended defense construction was disapproved by the War Department. 4. SHORT'S REORGANIZATION OF DIVISIONS: Short converted the square division, known as the Hawaiian Division, into two triangular divisions and equipped them with unusually heavy fire power in both artillery and machine guns as a basis for future expansion in time of war. General Maxwell Murray, commanding the 25th Division, testified: "General Grunert: And in your division you had what artillery? "General Murray: I had the Eighth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Field Artillery, but it is not generally known that we had practically doubled the gun strength of the brigade before the 75-mm. gun batteries; the Eighth and the Thirteenth were 75-mm. gun regiments, and each of those batteries had eight guns to the battery instead of four. The Eleventh was the 155-howitzer regiment, but they were in addition manning two batteries of 155 guns, and some 240-mm. howitzers. The 75 regiments both had 240-mm. howitzers assigned to them, too." (R. 3076-77) Page 76 5. SHORT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NAVY: Turning from Short's efforts to build up the physical installations and equipment of Hawaii and his staff, and the successful conversion of his single square division into two triangular division on which his staff seemed primarily engaged, we come to his actions with the Navy. Acting upon General Marshall's instructions and admonitions of February 7, 1941, which seemed to greatly impress him, Short succeeded in establishing an amiable relationship with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch and Admiral Bellinger. As stated hereinafter, he entered into a series of agreements with the Navy. Suffice it to say that these agreements, while admirable in concept and in many particulars equally admirable in the proposed plan of administration, under the handicap of joint action by cooperation instead of unity of command, were of quite limited effectiveness because neither the Army nor the Navy had sufficient means to properly implement them. The agreements were difficult of execution. To make them effective would have taken skilled professional officers of both services, guided by a well organized composite staff, and practiced in operational tests. The agreements themselves were not to go into effect until either a period of strained relations occurred, or M-Day was declared, or in the actual event of war. Neither the Army nor Navy seemed to appreciate this defect. Short apparently mistook the conduct of "war by contrast" for a conduct of "war by command". Even without the full means of putting these agreements physically into effect, had the equipment and material available been utilized, had there been in existence a Page 77 detailed plan of operation of the staff and lower echelons, and had sound judgment been exercised in the selection of the alert, the disaster of Pearl Harbor undoubtedly would have been materially mitigated, if not wholly avoided. (For a full discussion of the agreements see p. 88 to p. 97.) 6. ABANDONMENT OF HERRON'S FIELD ORDER #1: ADOPTION OF TRIPLE-ALERT SYSTEM: SABOTAGE ISSUE: A further step, and one of great import, taken by Short was the study that he initiated through his staff with a view to abandoning the Field Order No. 1, in vogue under the regime of General Herron, and substituting his temporary Standard Operating Procedure, which was published tentatively on July 14, 1941. The final draft of this vital document came out on November 5, 1941 (R. 283), and provided for three types of alerts, which are defined by Short as follows: "Our Alert No. 1 was a defense against sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities without any threats from the outside. "Alert No. 2 included all these sabotage measure in No. 1, and, in addition, defense against air attacks and surface and submarine attacks. "Alert No. 3 was a defense against an all-out attack where everybody moved to their battle stations and carried out their duties as if there was a possible attempt at landing in sight." (R. 283) Short says that he sent ten copies to the Navy. (R. 395, 400) He says he sent a copy to Washington. (R. 431) Alert No. 1 was purely antisabotage. Its effect when executed was to concentrate the planes in groups, wing-tip to wing-tip, where they were vulnerable from the air but less vulnerable from sabotage on the ground. He said he did this because of Page 78 his deficiency of personnel in protecting his planes against sabotage. If they had been put in dispersed position about the fields within bunkers, they would have been less vulnerable to wholesale destruction from the air. This alert concentrated equipment and personnel and in effect set up almost perfect conditions for a successful enemy air attack. Alerts Number 2 and Number 3, on the contrary, constituted wide dispersion of men and equipment in battle positions, with ammunition at the guns and troops and planes in positions of readiness for action and maximum protection. Under Alert Number 1, the earliest time in which planes were planned to get off the ground was four hours, while under Alerts Number 2 and Number 3 available aircraft is ready and can take to the air in from seven to eight minutes. Likewise, in connection with putting into action the antiaircraft guns and other similar establishments, the contrast between Alert Number 1 and Alert Numbers 2 and 3 was the difference between minutes and hours. As the entire attack upon Pearl Harbor did not extend beyond approximately three hours, it is obvious that the selection of the correct alert was vital. Historically, and by way of precedent, Short had before him the action of General Herron in the preceding year of an all-out alert under Field Order No. 1 of Herron by which complete dispersal of planes and troops and guns was effected, with ammunition at the guns. The record shows (Colonel Capron and other witnesses - r. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2728, 2772-2773, 3096-3097) that there was no disturbance of the civilian population as a result of the action by Herron. This is significant, in view Page 79 of the fact, as will later appear, that General Short gives that explanation as one of his primary reasons for the selection of Alert Number 1, because he might alarm the population. (R. 427-428, 532-533) It should be kept in mind that the civilian population was accustomed to the continued movements of the Army and Navy in their frequent maneuvers and practice operations. Much of the civilian population in this instance was living practically in the midst of one of the greatest military and naval installations anywhere, so that their state of mind would be far different from that of people on the mainland unaccustomed to such sights. Then, too, the newspapers ofttimes contained much more exciting news, threats and disturbing events, than anything that an alert could stir up, either by the Army or Navy or both. The explanations therefore lacks both substance and credibility. At this point the question of sabotage which led to the selection and implementation of Alert No. 1 should be examined. No single instance of sabotage occurred while Short was in command up to December 7. It was true that there were 35,000 aliens of Japanese origin and there was a total of 160,000 or about 37% of the population of Japanese origin affiliations (R. 289), but in no case was there any instance of misbehavior, despite a very exhaustive investigation being made constantly by the F.B.I. and by G-2, as well as by Naval Intelligence. We have investigated the state of mind and the information as to the actions of the Japanese population in an endeavor to understand why it was that General Short adopted his antisabotage alert on November 27 in the face of the Page 80 increasing international tension, and of his own estimate and that of the Navy that an air attack was the most dangerous for of attack likely to be encountered. We therefore resorted to the testimony of a great variety of witnesses in all walks of life in Honolulu, resident there during 1941, and inquired of their feelings and views and the whole situation as to the Japanese population. We could find no substantial evidence of any fear by these witnesses, including some of the best-informed leaders in the civil life of the Islands, that the Japanese would commit acts of sabotage. Their knowledge was based upon long residence in the Islands and experience with the Japanese. Governor Poindexter, newspaper editors like Raymond S. Coll, of the Honolulu Advertiser, United States District Attorney Angus Taylor, Shiver, head of the F.B.I., General Wells, executive vice- president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, and Walter Francis Dillingham, president of the Oahu Railway and Land Company and owner or director of many other enterprises in the Islands, concurred with many other witnesses such as ranch owners, government officials, leaders in business, that the risk of sabotage, so long as the Army and Navy were in a predominant position, before an actual landing and show of success by the Japanese, was a relatively minor matter. However, the Army was sabotage-minded. There appeared to be no substantial basis for this fear other than speculation as to what a large body of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry might do in case of stress. Page 81 7. NAVY LONG-DISTANCE RECONNAISSANCE: He assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance, and in this he was joined by a large group of ranking subordinates, but an inquiry by him, if it had been made, would have soon revealed the fact that his assumption that the task forces went out for conducting reconnaissance at long distance was not true. Such reconnaissance as they were conducting was only incident to the maneuvers of the task forces of the fleet, who were operating for training purposes and were looking for Japanese submarines so as not to interfere with their training operations. The Navy was submarine- and training-minded. (R. 1527, 1600, 1725, 1773, 1802) It should have been apparent upon examination of the facts by him that any such operations of the task forces were not only intermittent and limited in scope but they could not possibly cover the entire 360 degrees around the Island. A further understanding by him of the actual facts would have disclosed very promptly, as it did to his air force subordinates, that the Navy did not have any means for such long- distance reconnaissance, even though under the agreements the Army on call was to supply a substantial portion of the long-range aircraft for this purpose. In fact, the Army had at the time of Pearl Harbor available for this purpose only six planes capable of this work. The Navy acceptance of responsibility for long-distance reconnaissance is set forth in paragraph 18(I) of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which provides: Page 82 "18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for: ... "i. Distant reconnaissance." (R. 1745) The purpose of long-distance reconnaissance, which the Navy assumed in its agreements with the Army, was to discover hostile naval forces and particularly carriers before they could launch an attack. The area of search extended two to six hundred miles from the shore. It was assumed by Short that the presence of task forces of the Navy at sea insured such reconnaissance being conducted. Long-distance reconnaissance was obviously the very heart of the defense of Oahu because upon its results would depend not only the opportunity to destroy the carriers and carrier-borne planes of the Japanese but also put the forces on Oahu on the alert for an effective reception of the attack if it got through. But, as elsewhere stated, this long-distance reconnaissance was not being conducted by the Navy and such air reconnaissance as was being conducted was for the purpose of clearing the area of submarines where the fleet was in training. The inshore reconnaissance by the Army, up to twenty miles from shore, was substantially for the same purpose. The record showed it was the well-considered estimate of the Army and Navy commanders and their staffs that carriers and their supporting craft would attempt to approach Pearl Harbor, arriving in position at dark preceding the dawn of the day on which the attack was to be made. (R. 106) Under the protection of darkness 300 additional miles could be covered so that at dawn the attack could be launched within Page 83 approximately 300 miles from shore. This is apparently substantially what actually did happen. (Roberts Record 556-F) The conception and estimate of the situation was correct; steps taken to meet it were either absent completely or so defective as to amount to little. The Navy had available for long-distance reconnaissance, from November 27 to December 7, 1941, 50 PBY's and the Army had six heavy bombers while at least 270 planes would have been required as a minimum for conducting such a reconnaissance if a 360- degree area around Oahu was to be covered. (R. 1762, 1766) It is significant that in the joint Army-Navy plan of 1935 distant reconnaissance was made a mission of the Army but Short and Bloch agreed early in 1941, in the joint plan for the defense of the Hawaiian frontier and for the employment of the Army-navy Air Forces, to place the responsibility for distant reconnaissance on the Navy, leaving to the Army reconnaissance only about 20 miles from shore. This is due to the fact that almost all of the planes suitable for distant reconnaissance were naval. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was O.K.'d by Kimmel and approved by the War Department. The result was that the critical band of sea around Hawaii (the 600- to 900-mile area) was not patrolled. Observations therein was infrequent and incidental. Admiral Kimmel reached a decision that the few planes available would be wholly ineffective for this purpose and employed them otherwise. (R. 1763) Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were conversant with these conditions. (R. 375, 1763, 4438-4439) It was obvious, Page 84 therefore, that a Japanese task force with carriers could launch an attack upon Oahu with a reasonable certainty of success since its discovery prior to such launching would have been purely accidental and its chances of discovery remote. An early alert by the Navy to the Army would have permitted of a dispersion of its planes with the result that they could have been aloft, ready to intercept the attack, and the damage done would have been greatly lessened. The remaining factor for reconnaissance and detection was in the Aircraft Warning System, which was a responsibility of the Army. [1] The Army had put into operation in the fall of 1941, on a training basis, which was operating for all practical purposes, a number of mobile radar sets and an aircraft information center. That it was in operating condition, even with the state of training of the personnel that then existed in late November and early December 1941 was amply proven by the successful operation of the system during previous tests and exercises and of the station that discovered the attacking Japanese force 132 miles from the Island and the correct interpretation by the two enlisted men operating the station, who duly reported the presence of a strange force but were told by an inexperienced and only partially trained Air Force lieutenant to "forget it". This was at 0702 on December 7, 1941. If this information had been transmitted to the Air Force and to the Navy the latter would have had the anti-aircraft weapons on its ships in action, since only three to five minutes were required for that purpose, the Army anti-aircraft Footnote: [1] See p. 147 for complete study of construction difficulties of an aircraft warning system, signal difficulties, and how the enemy fleet was discovered. Page 85 system could have been alerted and many of the Army planes dispersed and some could have gotten off the ground. The only other reconnaissance instrumentality available was that being operated by the Navy. It was functioning officially in the latter part of 1941 and was constantly supplying information of the greatest value to important naval commanders, a part of which information was communicated to General Short by Admiral Kimmel. (R. 1771-1772) The one notable and tragic exception was the failure to advise General Short that on or about November 25 a Japanese task force was discovered in the Marshall Islands, in which force there were reported as present two or three carriers, 15 to 20 submarines, and possibly other vessels. (R. 361) About the first of December radio contact was lost with this force as it apparently went into radio silence, which was known to be by the Navy the third and last and most dangerous phase of the movement of the enemy fleet. (R. 1654-1655, 1662) The loss of such contact of a threatening fleet in the year preceding was the occasion for a directive from Washington for an all-out alert by which all troops went into the field with live ammunition and remained there for six weeks. So here again, as in the case of the Army radar system, there was a failure of transmission of the information by the Navy to the Army as the Army had failed to transmit its radar information on the morning of December 7th to the Navy. Such a Japanese task force in the Marshall Islands was 72 hours away from Pearl Harbor and nearly a thousand miles closer to Pearl Harbor than the Japanese fleet resident in Japan, from whence Page 86 the main attack was expected if it ever did arrive. (R. 106-107) After extensive testimony had been given before this Board on the Jaluit task force and the fact that there was long belief that it was from Jaluit that the attacking force had moved against Pearl Harbor, there was produced in Hawaii the more certain proof that this force had assembled at Tankan Bay in northern Japan and had moved from that point eastward and then southward for the attack, leaving Tankan Bay on the 27th-28th of November 1941. If this proof be accepted of the later naval witnesses as against the testimony of the earlier naval witnesses, who seemed equally well informed, it does not change the situation. The Navy failed to give the Army a very vital and important piece of information. In conclusion, the last elements in the tragic situation was the failure of the subordinate officers of the Navy to report to the Army the presence in the outer harbor, on the early morning of December 7, at about 0630, of a Japanese submarine which was sunk by naval action (the destroyer "U.S.S. Ward" and a naval patrol plane) about 0633 to 0645 hours, which would have indicated that something was on the move and the whole naval and military establishment should have been correspondingly alerted. The "Ward" reported this action to the Naval Chief of Staff. The Army was not notified. (R. 536-537; Roberts Record 1725) The situation as to this reconnaissance is best set forth in excerpts in testimony from senior commanders. The Page 87 long-distance patrol of the Navy consisted of only two or three PBY's and it was "nothing to amount to much." (R. 1820) General Martin said: "I complained to Admiral Bellinger about the lack of patrolling that was being done. 'Well', he said, 'this is all that I have. This is all I can put up'." (R. 1822) "General Frank: But so far as there having been a reconnaissance for the actual protection of Oahu, such continuous reconnaissance had not been done?" "Admiral Bloch: That is correct; and that was a matter subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. I think that might as well be cleared. He would be the man to order that, in my opinion." (R. 1527) As to Army reconnaissance, General Mollison testified that such reconnaissance as was being conducted from Bellows Field did not operate on Sundays, saying, "I'm sure it did not. It may have on this Sunday, but I doubt very much if it did." (R. 812) So far as inshore patrol is concerned, he said that the Army Air Forces did so little that it would amount to "a token payment only". (R. 824) "General Rudolph: On that particular Sunday morning I understood they didn't have a boat out -- an airplane, seaplane." (R. 1232) "General Frank: But you understand that they were not out on that morning?" "General Rudolph: So I was informed." (R. 1233) "General Grunert: Then, according to the instructions under which you were functioning you had no responsibility for distant air reconnaissance? "Admiral Bloch: There was no distant air reconnaissance ordered in that order. That is the only order that I know which was operative. Page 88 "General Grunert: But actually was there some distant air reconnaissance being made from time to time or continuously? "Admiral Bloch: I do not know. I do not know whether there was or not. That would not be under me." (R. 1484) With reference to distant reconnaissance, means of performing it under the joint air agreement, Admiral Bloch testified: "So I had no implements to perform distant reconnaissance in the 14th Naval District force." (R. 1484) "General Grunert: Do you know on the morning of the 7th of December whether any such planes were in the air on any reconnaissance mission? "Admiral Bloch: I hear planes taking off. I do not know exactly what missions they were on, but there were planes in the air." (R. 1494) So now let us turn to the agreements upon which Short placed such reliance for protection by Naval long-distant reconnaissance and joint air action with the Navy. 8. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY: The basic document governing the relationship of the Army and Navy in the formulation of defense plans for the Hawaiian Islands is contained in the document entitled "War Plans, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935". This was prepared in pursuance of the directive of the Rainbow War Plan. It covers the over- all policies of the functions and agreements between the Army and Navy as to their relative responsibilities in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. The category of defense in this document which applied to Hawaii was Category D. This category was defined as "Coastal Frontiers That May Be Subject to Major Attack." Under this Page 89 category the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will generally find application. ... In addition, antiaircraft defense of important area outside of harbor defenses should be organized; ... Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided. ... (Page 39) And the purpose of coastal frontier defense was stated to be "Protecting our Military and Civil Installations and Facilities; ... Insuring the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which are vital to military, industrial and commercial operations." It was also provided that there be furnished "a communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service among the elements of the land defense with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy." This was a responsibility of the Army. Pursuant to the foregoing plan, an agreement was entered into entitled "Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan." (Prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th Naval District.) This agreement was signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short and provided the fundamental plan for the defense of Hawaii. The third agreement was that entitled "Joint Air Agreement", signed March 28, 1941. This document was prepared by Major General Martin, U.S. Army Air Force, and Admiral Bellinger, as Base Defense Air Force Commander, and signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short. It provided for the combined air action as follows: Page 90 "Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army Bombardment strength to participate in each mission, etc." "Defensive air operation over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practical. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status, until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control." (Roberts Record 555) This Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941, signed by Bloch and Short, was implemented by certain additional documents signed by Bellinger and Martin as operating plans. The date of these operating plans was April 9, 1941. (Roberts Record 556a-0 vol. 5) Under this agreement Admiral Bloch, not an air officer, was acting on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief in signing the document, and there operated under him Admiral Bellinger, who had the command of the planes, so far as the Navy could implement the Agreement, as Commander of the Air Base Force. Bellinger, however, was under the command of Admiral Kimmel, and Bloch, who was charged with the responsibility for the operation orders and plans of operation for the base defense air force, had no air force with which to implement the Agreement. Bellinger had the job to do and such means as existed to do it with was Fleet aviation. Bloch had supervisory control over Bellinger, but the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kimmel, had to approve the Agreement. (R. 1522) Page 91 Bloch was called upon to designate the condition of readiness of the aircraft, but did not have control of the aircraft, the readiness of which he was to determine. The confusion inherent from the Navy's organization is best expressed in the following question: "General Grunert: Who would the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet hold responsible in case something went wrong? Would he hold you or Bellinger? "Admiral Bloch: I do not know." (R. 1522) This agreement was the result of a report of a Joint Army and Navy board dated October 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian Islands. This report was signed by Major General Martin and Admiral Bellinger. (R. 1581) Under such circumstances the Army had a difficult time in determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility. Plans which must wait to be put into practice and only become operative when war strikes under all the unexpected and changing conditions of an attack inevitably prove unsound in practice. The basic difficulty of the Short-Bloch-Kimmel agreements was inherent in all such agreements, as they constituted a vain paper attempt to predict war procedure without having properly tested out the proposed arrangements in training and by joint staff action to see if they were practical measures. The proof of the soundness of the plans is whether they work, and the Short-Bloch-Kimmel agreements were never tested out far enough to find out if their plans were sound in practice. There was inadequate practice of them to enable Page 92 the respective organizations to acquire that automatic facility in their execution so that the plans would be carried out effectively despite all the stresses, strains and unexpected developments to personnel and equipment that were incident of a conflict. We desire to emphasize this synthetic structure of agreements and plans based upon them. The following analysis of these agreements shows that: There were two joint agreements. The first was known as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. It was based on the war plan and the "Joint Action of the Army and Navy" of 1935. The second agreement was the Joint Air Force Agreement signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short and based upon it as Appendix #7 was an operating plan worked out by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger. As Admiral Bloch said: "Ordinarily it would no be operative." (R. 1478) He also testified: "The plan was never operative as a plan because the War and Navy Departments never ordered it to become operative, either in part or in whole. The local commanders never mutually agreed to have it become operative in part." (R. 1474) And again he testified: "General Russell: So that respecting missions of the Army and Navy, according to your construction of the Agreement, reconnaissance missions were not effective until December 7, 1941? "Admiral Bloch: Under the circumstances that obtained, that is the way it happened. I will say that I accepted the responsibility I that agreement for distant reconnaissance for the Navy, and I did my utmost to implement my responsibility by demanding patrol planes for that purpose, but I never had any; I never had one." (R. 1487) The agreements entered into between the Navy and the Army Page 93 had two basic defects. First, they did not become operative until an emergency arose. The agreements said (paragraph 15(c), 2): "Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders." (R. 1584) The local commanders as testified to by Admiral Bellinger were understood to be General Short and Admiral Bloch. These commanders apparently took no action to "mutually agree" to implement parts of the plan and, evidently were going to let the agreements go until an emergency arose, when they became operative automatically. As Admiral Bellinger testified: "That could have been done at anytime by the commandant of the 14th Naval District, who was Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, if it was approved by and agreed upon by General Short." (R. 1591) But it was not done. The selection of M-Day to initiate the putting of the joint plan and agreements thereunder into effect according to the terms of the agreement just quoted was a function of the War and Navy Departments. They took no action to put it into effect although a copy of this agreement was forwarded to the War Department and presumably to the Navy Department. (R. 1474) The consequence was that not until the morning of December 7th did the agreement become operative, when it was too late to have gotten the benefit of the cooperative action that it implied, and the training which would result from this close teamwork by the Army and Navy. As Admiral Bellinger testified: "The Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, did not have the authority to place that organization in the functioning status, except in case of an actual emergency." (R. 1582) Page 94 This brings us to the second defect: unit of command. If that had been put into effect as provided in paragraph 9(b) of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan this air agreement would have become effective by reason of such unity of command. As Admiral Bellinger against testified: "I was not satisfied with the setup under the estimate and directives concerning the Naval Base Defense Air Force. I thought that it was necessary to have a unity of command to make such an operation a success. "General Frank: You mean a unity of command before something happened? "Admiral Bellinger: Yes "General Frank: Rather than when it happened? "Admiral Bellinger: Yes." (R. 1589) Under the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the unity of command and could be put into effect either by the President of the United States or by joint agreements of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy or when the commanders of the Army and Navy forces agreed that the situation required unity of command who was to exercise it. No one of these agencies took steps to effectuate what all of the witnesses have concurred in stating was the principal cause of difficulties on December 7, 1941, and the events leading up to and causing those difficulties, that is, unity of command. (R. 1587-1588) It is interesting to observe the reason why this air agreement was not put into effect, in addition to lack of equipment to make it effective. As Admiral Bellinger testified: "The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into a functioning status Page 95 would have necessitated the substantial cessation of training activities in order to concentrate on defense." (R. 1582) Likewise General Short testified: "General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we should do nothing that would interfere with the training or ferrying group. The responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us to get the ships there and get them there without loss; and we could not do it if we started them out with untrained crews. "That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1 rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3." (R. 286) "As I say, none of these fixed stations was in operation. We had gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we got them we started using them right away; and when this message of the 27th came along, I prescribed that the Aircraft Warning Service would function those hours (4:00 to 7:00 A.M.). In addition to that, they had their normal training. They trained then from 7 to 11, and they had maintenance work, work of the kind, from 12 to 4." (R. 298) "By making it 4 hours (time for aircraft to get into the air) it gave the possibility to the men going ahead with recreation and athletics without being worried about getting that alert. They could go right ahead with their normal functions. They might have been out on a problem where it would take them an hour to get back in." (R. 460) "Alert No. 2 would have practically stopped the training of the Air Corps and the Antiaircraft Corps. It would not have interfered seriously with the training of the infantry divisions." (R. 528) The reason for not so doing is shown in Kimmel's words: "We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had received no orders to mobilize." (R. 1811) Admiral Kimmel observed that while the responsibility was on the Commandant, 14th Naval District and himself, on behalf of the Navy, for putting this plan into effect, yet it would have been necessary to refer to Washington for a decision. When asked why this would be so, he said: Page 96 "It would have alarmed the population. It might have been considered by Japan an overt act. It would have tended to upset the Japanese-American relations, which we had been enjoined to maintain in status quo; and it would have required, so far as the Navy is concerned, certain movements of the fleet and certain action which should not have been taken without reference to the Department." (R. 1756) Therefore it is apparent that the local commanders waited for Washington and Washington took no action under the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, relying upon Hawaii to do so; and that in turn meant that the Martin-Bellinger Air Plan of Cooperation, which depended upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, did not go into operation. The second reason why the air plan was ineffective was that Admiral Bloch, Commandant of the 14th Naval District, as testified by Admiral Kimmel, "had no planes assigned to him at that time." (R. 1751), so that he could do nothing to carry it out. As to the Army, Admiral Kimmel pointed out: "There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going to be any." (R. 1753) When asked why the Navy accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance without any effective means of carrying it out, Admiral Kimmel testified "he accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance, because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible." (R. 1753) Admiral Bellinger confirms Admiral Kimmel's statement of long- distance reconnaissance means not being available. (R. 1595, 1606) Therefore, paragraph 18 in the air agreement providing the Navy will furnish distant reconnaissance was without effect. (R. 1605-1606) Bloch had no planes and such planes as Bellinger had were under command of Kimmel and were Page 97 being used for other purposes in connection with reconnaissance with the fleet for protecting maneuver areas against submarines. For the dual reason that the instrumentalities were not available and to the extent that any planes were available the use of them would have interfered with training, and for the further reason that the agreements were not to go into effect until an emergency, the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and the Martin-Bellinger Air Agreement signed by Short and Bloch were ineffectual. The Army and Navy agreed that when and if the time came that they had to put the plan into effect, the documents could only show what the working scheme would be. The inherent weakness in making such plans was the fact of their not being operative in time to meet the attack. Neither the local commanders nor Washington took steps to make them operative as they could have done. (R. 1606-1607, 1609) However, unity of command in Washington would have been a condition precedent to unity of command in Hawaii. 9. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The best indication of what the Army and Navy recognized as the primary danger to the defense of Hawaii is found in the estimate of the situation in the implementing, operating plans signed by Bellinger and Martin on April 9, 1941, in execution of the Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941. This estimate was prophetic in its accuracy and called for vigorous implementation to meet the worst the enemy could do, as estimated in this document. The document says: "b. In the past Orange (Japan) has never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war. "c. A successful, sudden raid against our Page 98 ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective defensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period. "d. It appears possibly that Orange (Japan) submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence Service. ... II(s) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines, and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. ... III(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack of Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside of 300 miles. ... (o?) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start. ..." (Roberts Record 556-D- F) It is also significant that in this estimate of the situation it was stated: "Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force, probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier." (Roberts Record 556-F) It will be recalled that a submarine appeared off the entrance to Pearl Harbor and was sunk at about 6:45 a.m. on December 7th, but was not reported by the Navy to the Army. Such a report would have been a sure warning of an hour before the attack of what was coming as recognized by paragraph 3(d) of the Estimate of the Situation, forming a part of the Martin-Bellinger Plan. In reviewing the situation as Short knew it in order to judge of the information that he had upon which to premise a successful course of action, it is necessary both to take into consideration the background in the first chapter and of the official communications of those estimates Page 99 of the situation at the time. It will be recalled that Ambassador Grew had warned that State Department on January 27th by wire of the possibility of an air attack upon Pearl Harbor. This possibility had already been apparently thoroughly considered by the War and Navy Departments, and it had been concluded that that was the strongest danger to Hawaii. In early January, Admiral Richardson, with the concurrence of Admiral Kimmel and General Herron, had written at length to the Navy Department on this subject, with particular reference to the weaknesses of the Army defenses against air attack. This letter and the resulting correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War must be read in light of the Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan of 1935, which places upon the Army the following mission: "b. Army - Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air forces and against hostile sympathizers." General Marshall testified, however, as follows: "We anticipated, beyond a doubt, Japanese movement in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack." (R. 9) As a result, Secretary of Navy Knox wrote to Secretary of War Stimson on January 24, 1941, in part as follows: "My Dear Mr. Secretary: "The security of the U.S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports Page 100 from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo-plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack on the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor. "In my opinion, the inherent possibility of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above. "The dangers envisioned in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack (2) Air torpedo-plane attack (3) Sabotage (4) Submarine attack (5) Mining (6) Bombardment by gunfire "Defense for all but the first two appears to have been provided for satisfactorily." It will be noted that an anxiety of Secretary Knox was as to air attack and that he was satisfied that precautions as to sabotage were sufficient by the Army. It will be recalled that Admiral Richardson's letter stimulating this letter of Secretary Knox was based on Richardson's personal inspection and knowledge of the Army situation. Secretary Knox concludes his letter with the following recommendations to the Army: "Assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii...that the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor." "(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty exists." So this letter clearly outlined the considered judgment Page 101 then existing that the most serious threat was an air attack and that all means should be taken to implement against it. On February 7, 1941, the Secretary of War replied to this letter of the Secretary of the Navy under the subject "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," and said: "In reply to your letter of January 24, 1941, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the fleet or naval base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and of the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort..." "(6) With respect to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and of this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective." On the same day another communication was addressed to General Short, and this time by General Marshall: "Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Navy materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and antiaircraft guns." "The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid and by submarine, constitute the real peril of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands, as long as we have air superiority." And not satisfied with this first letter, General Marshall on March 5, 1941, again addressed General Short, saying: "I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a *matter of first priority*." And to that General Short replied on March 15, 1941, at length with reference to the vulnerability of Hawaii to air attack and the measures being taken to meet this situation. Page 102 He points out that antisabotage measures and suppression of local disorders could be handled by battalions of National Guard, which come from the Islands. The rest of the letter dealt with defenses against air attacks. His estimate of the situation was: "The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack." Short realized the necessity for the dispersion of planes, the use of emergency fields on the outlying islands and the preparation of bunkers to protect the dispersed planes, as he discusses such a problem at length and its solution. (R. 21-25) On April 14, 1941, Short wrote the Chief of Staff sending him the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and 14th Naval District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measures; Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement, and Field Orders No. 1-NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the Joint Agreement. (R. 26-27) He also stated that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and himself felt all steps had been taken "which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Force to act together with the unity of command as the situation requires." (R. 27) [1] This statement was in error at the time it was made, as the agreements could not be implemented for lack of means to do so in any material way and there was no unity of command, none Footnote: [1] Excerpts from letter dated April 14, 1941 (R. 27) Page 103 proposed and none was ever put into effect under these agreements. Open hostilities were necessary to make the agreement operative. This communication was acknowledged by General Marshall on May 5th. This brings us to the estimate of the air situation thus transmitted to the Chief of Staff on April 14th as indicating the best judgment in estimating the situation by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger and approved by General Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch. It is a familiar premise of military procedure in estimating a situation *to select the most dangerous and disastrous type of attack the enemy may make and devote your primary efforts to meeting this most serious of the attacks*. (R. 1121, 2662) In the present instance, it was clearly recognized, not only in the foregoing correspondence, but in this formal joint estimate by the Army and Navy of the situation, *that the most serious attack to be met by the Army and Navy was an air attack by Japan*. Herewith is the following statement from that estimate signed by the Army and Navy through General Martin and Admiral Bellinger and approved by Kimmel, Short and Bloch. This estimate is prophetic in its accuracy and uncanny in its analysis of the enemy's intention. "2. Assumptions: ... c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or attack on Oahu. e?. Our most likely enemy, Orange, can probably employ a maximum of six carriers against Oahu. ... c. ... The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy. "2. a. The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the *action upon which we should base our plans of operation*, is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule: (1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before attack. (3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the attack. ... "4. ... The sole purpose of the existence of the military establishment on Oahu, ground, and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an outlying naval base. ..." "It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore, withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive action."