C. CRITICAL PERIOD: OCTOBER 1 TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 1. VITAL MESSAGES: In view of the foregoing, the estimate of the situation showed that an all-out attack by air was the judgment of the best military and naval minds in Hawaii. Under established military doctrine, that called for preparation for this worst eventuality. (R. 436-437) Short so admitted that this was the correct procedure. (R. 436-437) The contrast between the written statements of many of the responsible actors in this matter prior to Pearl Harbor and after Pearl Harbor, as to their estimate of an air attack by Japan on Oahu, is startling. The Secretary of the Navy wrote on January 24, 1941, to the Secretary of War: "The dangers envisage in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: "(1) air bombing attack. "(2) air torpedo attack. "(3) sabotage." (Roberts Record, 1824-1825) However, when Secretary of the Navy arrived in Hawaii a few days after December 7, following the Japanese attack, Admiral Pye testified his (Secretary Knox) first remark was: "No one in Washington expected an attack -- even Kelly Turner." Admiral Kelly Turner was in the War Plans Division of the Navy and was the most aggressive-minded of all. (R. 1070) General Marshall, in a letter to General Short on February 7, 1941, said: "The risk of sabotage and *the risk involved in a surprise raid by air* and submarine constitute the real perils of the situation." (R. 17) Page 106 On October 7, 1944, General Marshall testified before this Board: "We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack upon Hawaii." (R. 9) It will be recalled that Admiral Bellinger and General Martin were responsible for the Joint Estimate, particularly with reference to air, and that this was based upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. In that estimate they put attack by air as the primary threat against Hawaii. Contrast what Admiral Bellinger said on this record: "If anyone knew the attack was coming, why, I assume they would have been in a functioning status." (R. 1626) Contrast what General Martin said: "I didn't see any more danger from attack than General Short did, that is from a surprise attack with the information we had." (R. 1827) Admiral Kimmel said: "We had no reason to believe, from any intelligence we had, that the Japanese were going to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor or even that any attack was going to be made on Pearl Harbor." (R. 1771) The foregoing statement by Kimmel was in 1944 before this Board, whereas the joint agreements he entered into with the Army and the instructions from the Secretary of Navy as well as his own recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy show that an air attack was the principal concern. Likewise, Admiral Bloch, who signed the Joint Air Agreement based on the air estimate of Bellinger and Martin, testified as follows: "General Frank: Was the attack a complete surprise to you" "Admiral Bloch: Yes, sir." (R. 1518) General Short was the signer of the agreements specifying Page 107 the air attack as a primary threat and he had received the Marshall letter of February 7, 1941, and similar letters of General Marshall, and had replied setting forth in letters that the air attack was his primary concern. Witness what General Short says on this record to the contrary: "General Grunert: Was the attack of December 7 a complete surprise to you? "General Short: It was." (R. 536) We must therefore conclude that the responsible authorities, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Staff in Washington, down to the Generals and Admirals in Hawaii, *all expected an air attack before Pearl Harbor*. As a general statement, when testifying after the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it. Apparently the only person who was not surprised was the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who testified: "Well, I was not surprised." (R. 4072) Short's Standard Operating Procedure, which he had formulated with his staff in July and finally put into complete form on November 5, 1941, (R. 333) had been sent to the Chief of Staff. (R. 431) General Marshall wrote General Short on October 10th that it had just come to his attention and that upon an examination of the Standard Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, containing those three alerts, "I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units." (R. 29) He objected to the assignment to the Hawaiian Air Force of the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all Page 108 airfields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks, and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty. He thereby warned General Short that the air force should not be used for antisabotage, for General Marshall further said in his letter: "This (the action of using the air force for antisabotage duty) seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided." (R. 29) General Short replied on October 14, as follows: "The plan was to use them (Air Force personnel) for guarding certain essential utilities. ... However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon." General Marshall again wrote General Short on the 28th of October, and in it he clearly indicated to Short that he should change his alert plan (of which there was no proof that he ever did) and only use the Air Force for guard during the last stage when the Air Force as such had been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. General Marshall further indicated that no potential ground duty should be used as an excuse for not continuing the specific Air Force training, saying: "I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their own specific training requirements. "It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned." (R. 30) Page 109 Here, again, General Marshall cautioned Short to use his Air Force for its normal purposes and not upon antisabotage guard duty and emphasizes that the use of the Air Force must be free and unfettered. On October 16 Short received the following Navy message: "The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the C.N.O. which I have been directed to pass to you. Quote: 'Japanese Cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be anti-American and extremely nationalistic. If the Konoye Cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include reapproachment [sic] with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the United States are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack those two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan'." (R. 279) On October 18, 1941, a radiogram was sent by the War Department to the Commanding General, Hawaii Department, reading as follows: "Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remain strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent." (R. 4258) This message was dated October 18, 1941, according to the Gerow statement, Exhibit 63, but in the copy of communications produced by General Marshall, the same message was dated October 20, 1941, as #266. On October 28, General Marshall wrote General Short as to details of the training of the air corps personnel. On November 24 the Chief of Naval Operations sent the Commander-in- Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message that Short thinks he saw, reading as follows: Page 110 "There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military force is, in our opinion, that a *surprise aggressive movement in any direction*, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam *is a possibility*. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action. ... inform senior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action." (R. 4258) On November 26, 1941, the following secret cablegram was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department: "It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24s on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps, and naval vessels including submarines XXX before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24s are fully supplied with ammunition for guns." (R. 4259) On November 27 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander-in- Chief, Pacific Fleet, a message which was delivered by the liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, to G-3 of General Short, which reads as follows: "Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo." (R. 1775) And on the same day the Chief of Staff sent the following radio to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department: Page 111 No. 472. "Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the U.S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out task assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." (R. 280- 281, 4259-4260) [1] This completes the pattern of the communications and information that was in Short's possession when he made the fatal decision to elect the antisabotage Alert No. 1 and not select either Alert No. 2 or No. 3 which would have constituted the defense against the most serious attack that could be made upon him in view of the previous estimate of the situation and warnings he had received from all quarters of an air raid. [2] On the same day, November 27, 1941, but *after his decision to select Alert No. 1* and sending of a reply to the message, Short received from G-2, War Department, through his G-2, Hawaiian Department, the following message: "Advise only the C.G. and the C. of S. It appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. *Also possibilities that hostilities may begin*. (R. 4260) Footnotes: [1] A full discussion of the message follows. [2] Significant naval messages from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, under dates of December 3, 4, and 6, 1941, relating to the destruction of codes and secret documents by Japanese consulates and instructions regarding destruction of similar means of our own evidently never reached General Short. (R. 424-425) Page 112 Short was asked what were his reasons for his action. The following colloquy is important: "General Frank: I would like to develop this thought for just a minute. This is in consideration generally of military operations. In estimating the situation with which a military commander is confronted, our teachings in the military establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all information that is available, evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct? "General Short. Yes "General Frank: That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our War College teaching and our actual practice in the organization. Now, in coming to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare for enemy action of what character? "General Short: The worst. "General Frank: The worst. Now, can you tell me why that was not done in this instance? "General Short: Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went into Alert N. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the requirements of the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action and there was no comment that my action was too little or too much I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it. They had a lot more information than I had." (R. 436-437) ... "General Frank: All right. Now, you have given considerable testimony about how you arrived at your conclusion of the adequateness of Alert No. 1, and in general may we say that you came to this conclusion as a result of your faith in the effectiveness of naval operations and the influence of Naval opinion and to a certain extent of the line of thought as a result of what was contained in messages between the 16th of November and the 27th? "General Short: Yes, sir. And that was later confirmed by, may I add, actions of the War Department in not replying to my message and stating that they wanted more, and in sending planes without ammunition. Page 113 "General Frank: All right. Did you feel that the wording of messages coming here in there to you indicated an effort toward a supervisory control? "General Short: I thought that it indicated very definitely two things: That they wanted me to be extremely careful and not have an incident with the Japanese population that would arouse Japan, and the other thing was not to violate territorial laws in my eagerness to carry out defensive measures. "General Frank: The question has arisen in the minds of the Board as to why, when that air estimate anticipated just exactly what happened, steps were not taken to meet it. I assume that the answer -- "General Short: You mean the estimate of the year -- you mean the year before? "General Frank: No. The Martin-Bellinger estimate. "General Short: Oh. "General Frank: Of 1941. "General Short: Yes. "General Frank: I assume the answer is the answer that you gave to the question asked two or three questions back. "General Short: Yes." (R. 471-472) General Short within an hour after receiving the message from the Chief of Staff of November 27 ordered the No. 1 Alert, which continued up to the attack on December 7. (R. 282) His message in reply to General Marshall was: "Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy. Reuard [sic] four seventy two Nov. 27th." (R. 38, 286) The endorsements so appearing on this reply are as follows: In the handwriting of the Secretary of War there appear the words "Noted HLS", written in pen; "Noted - Chief of Staff", stamped by a rubber stamp on the message without initials; and a rubber stamp "Noted, WPD" (in red ink) followed by pen initials "L.T.G." (R. 38, 4287) Page 114 An examination of the wire received from General MacArthur, in response to a similar message sent to General Short, [1] shows the same endorsements, including "Noted - Chief of Staff", with a rubber stamp but no initials. However, this message has written in General Marshall's handwriting the words "To Secretary of War, GCM", This endorsement does not appear on the following message that came from Short. (See General Marshall's explanation below.) The message from Short to the Chief of Staff indicates that it was the "Action Copy" as noted in pencil at its foot "OCS/18136-120". When questioned about this vital message, the Chief of Staff said: "General Russell: Subsequently General Short sent a reply to that message in which he refers to the November 27 message from you over your signature by number. That message of General Short reporting action merely states: " 'Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD for seven two twenty-seventh.' "The original of General Short's report indicates that it was initialed by Secretary Stimson and has a stamp "Noted - Chief of Staff," and was initialed by General Gerow. "The Board has been interested to know the procedure in your office as it relates to stamping documents which do not bear your signature. Does that indicate that you did or did not see those messages? Footnotes: [1] On November 27th the War Department sent messages similar to one sent to General Short, to MacArthur in the Philippines, Andrews in Panama, and DeWitt on the West Coast, each of which called for a report of measures taken. All replies except that from Short indicated the taking of measures of greater security that those envisaged in the Hawaiian Alert No. 1. Page 115 "General Marshall: Well, I think if you look at the preceding message from the Philippines you will find that same rubber stamp on there, "Noted - Chief of Staff." "General Russell: That is true. "General Marshall: And you will find it at the top of the message. You will find my initials. "General Russell: Yes; I do see them. "General Marshall: But not on the other one. I do not know about that. I do not know what the explanation is. I initial them all; that is my practice. One goes to the particular section that has the responsibility for working on it, which in this case was the War Plans Division, now the Operations Division, and then one comes to me. I initial it and then it goes out to the record. Where I think the Secretary of War ought to see it, and if he is not in the distribution, I check it to him. Where I think there is somebody else that should be notified, I indicate on the face of my copy who else is to be informed of this. As a matter of routine one agency is charged with the execution of the matter pertaining to the message. But in this particular case I do not know. I have no recollection at all. "General Russell: The fact that it reached the Secretary of War's office and was by him initialed -- would that or not indicate that you had sent it up to him or that it might have been sent up to him by someone else? "General Marshall: In this connection I invite your attention to the fact that this was filed behind a message from General MacArthur. I note that I did not initial it. They evidently came in together. "General Russell: If they were together you might or might not have seen them? "General Marshall: I have no recollection at all. The presumption would be that I had seen it." (R. 38-40) No one of these persons, or any of their subordinates, have any record, either internally in the War Department or externally, of any message to Short showing the slightest exception taken to his course of action. It will be noted as to the Chief of Staff, that while he did not initial the Short reply, he did initial the top message from General Page 116 MacArthur on the same subject, and apparently they both went together to the Secretary of War, as they had come at substantially the same time in answer to the same message from the Chief of Staff. The inference from General Marshall's testimony is that possibly he only initialed the top one, but that is speculation, as he said, "I don not know what the explanation is." (R. 39) 2. ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION FROM NOVEMBER 24 TO NOVEMBER 27: The vital message of November 27, #472, heretofore quoted as having been sent by the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, can be understood and its proper place in this narrative determined only when we know the events which led up to its being sent; when we know by whom drafted and by what procedure the drafting was accomplished; and the circumstances under which it was forwarded. Its relationship to surrounding circumstances and other documents must also be understood before we proceed to analyze the message and the meaning of each part of it. [1] Footnotes: [1] The Secretary of War has cleared some ambiguity in this record, and an ambiguity in the White Papers by defining with precision the War Council. There were really three bodies that were loosely referred to from time to time by this title. The true War Council was that established under the National Defense Act of 1920, solely within the War Department. The second body was that created by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox, when they entered into their positions, by which they gathered together at regular intervals with the Secretary of State, and sometimes with General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The third group was that which joined the President at fairly regular intervals, consisting of the President, the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and from time to time General Marshall and Admiral Stark, and occasionally, General Arnold. (R. 4041-4042-4043-4044, 4047-4048, 5-6) Page 117 The War Council met on the 25th of November 1941. Fortunately, we have the advantage of the contemporaneous diary of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, who has pictured in his diary with great clarity and precision the events as they transpired, which were material to this issue. This diary reads: "At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I though, as we read it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic. ... We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall. Then at twelve o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relations with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as -- perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem. (R. 4050-4051) This was the end of the discussions on the 25th of November, 1941 (R. 4050-4051), with the exception that when the Secretary of War returned to his office, he found a G-2 message that a Japanese expedition had started southward, south of Formosa; and he at once called Mr. Hull and sent him copies of the report and a copy to the President. On the following day, November 26, 1941, the diary continues: "Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day (the 25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing ever and to tell them that he had no other proposition at all." (R. 4051-40520 There is some proof that, before General Marshall left Washington for North Carolina on maneuvers on the afternoon of Page 118 the 26th, he had drafted in the rough a proposed message to General Short apprising him of the situation as it was developed. General Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division, testifies that he believes he discussed such a draft with General Marshall. (R. 4244-4246) General Marshall was away on the 27th and returned on the 28th, at which time he saw the complete draft of the message of the 27th together with the report from General Gerow of the events during the 27th which we are now about to relate. (R. 36-37) Before the closing of the story of the 26th, Mr. Stimson defines it as: "The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it." (R. 4051-4052-4053) What the Secretary of State appears to have done was to have his conference with the Japanese Ambassadors and to hand to them the "Ten Points". As Ambassador Grew testifies, the Japanese considered these "Ten Points" to be an ultimatum. (R. 4221) Whether or not the Secretary of State considers now that this is not an ultimatum (see his letter of September 28, 1943), nevertheless, the Japanese did so consider it and acted upon it as such by notifying the task force, as the evidence shows was waiting at Tankan Bay, to start the movement against Hawaii, and it did move out on the 27-28th of November. As well put by Ambassador Grew: "Naturally, they (the Japanese) had all their plans made for years beforehand, in the case of war with America. They were very foresighted in those respects, and they had their plans drawn up probably right down to the last detail; but as for the moment at which the button was touched. I don't myself know exactly how long it would have taken their carriers to get from where they were to the point at which Page 119 they attacked Pearl Harbor; but it has always been my belief that it was *about the time of the receipt of Mr. Hull's memorandum of November 26 that the button was touched*." (R. 4215) On the morning of the 27th of November 1941. Mr. Stimson's diary reads: "The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese -- whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, 'I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy'." Then the Secretary of War states: "I then called up the President and talked with him about it." He (Stimson) then approved the orders presented to him by General Arnold to move two large planes over the Mandated Islands to take pictures. (R. 4053) The Secretary related that General Marshall "is down at the maneuvers today." and "Knox and Admiral Stark came over and conferred with me and General Grew." At this point he says: "A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark to the President was examined, and the question of the need for further time was discussed." (R. 4054) This is the memorandum asking the President not to precipitate an ultimatum with the Japanese and to give the Army and Navy more time within which to prepare; but it was too late, as the die had been cast by the Secretary of State in handing the "Ten Points" counter-proposal to the Japanese on the previous day, which was, as the Secretary of State remarked, "washing his hands of the matter." Page 120 When Ambassador Grew so testified he apparently did not know of the very complete evidence in this record of the movement of the Japanese task force starting on the 27th-28th from Tankan Bay to the attack. Mr. Hull's statement on this subject is of interest: "I communicated on November 26 to the Japanese spokesman -- who were urgently calling for a reply to their proposals of November 20 -- what became the last of this Government's counter-proposal. ... It will thus be seen that the document under reference did not constitute in any sense an ultimatum." (Letter from Secretary of State to the Army Pearl Harbor Board, September 28, 1944.) 3. THE DRAFTING OF THE MESSAGE #472 OF THE 27TH: We now turn to the drafting of the message of the 27th as related by the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, General Bryden and General Gerow. (R. 4239-4240) A second meeting between Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark and General Gerow was held later in the day. (R. 4240) As the diary of Mr. Stimson says: "But the main question at this meeting was over the message that we shall send to MacArthur. We have already sent him a quasi-alert or the first signal for an alert; and now, on talking with the President this morning over the telephone, I suggested and he approved the idea that we should send the final alert, namely that he should be on the *qui vive* for any attack, and telling him how the situation was." (R. 4055) To continue with the diary: "So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him (Mr. Stimson here verbally testified -- 'We were sending the message to four people, not only MacArthur, but Hawaii, Panama, and Alaska'). So Gerow and Stark and I went over the proposed message to him from Marshall very carefully, finally got it into shape, and with the help of a telephone talk I had with Hull I got the exact statement from him of what the situation was." (R. 4056) Page 121 The Secretary of War then stated: "The thing that I was anxious to do was to be sure that we represented with correctness and accuracy what the situation was between the two governments, and this part I got from Hull, as I said, by telephone, to be sure I was right." (R. 4056) The two sentences which the Secretary of War apparently wrote in the message of the 27th were these: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purpose with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment." [1] The Secretary continues his testimony: "That was what I was interested in getting out at the time, because that had been a decision which I had heard from the President, as I have just read, and I had gotten the exact details of the situation between the State Department and the envoys from Mr. Hull; and, as I pointed out here, the purpose in my mind, as I quote my talk with the President, was to send a final alert, namely, that the man should be on the *qui vive* for any attack, and telling him how the situation was here." (R. 4056) The task that the Secretary of War was engaged upon was normally that of the Chief of Staff. As Mr. Stimson said: "That was why I was in this matter. Marshall was away. I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do what I of course normally do; to see that the message as sent was framed in accordance with the facts." (R. 4057) The message to Hawaii now under consideration of the 27th has endorsed upon it, "Shown to the Secretary of War". (R. 4057) Footnotes: [1] However, General Gerow (R. 4247) testified that he believed that the sentence "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment" was inserted by him or Colonel Bundy. Page 122 The Secretary testified: "I went over very carefully the whole message. ... And I saw it after it was finally drawn, as was shown by the memorandum there." (R. 4058) With reference to the other messages that took place on the 27th in the drafting of this message, #472, General Gerow's testimony is that at the meeting with the Secretary of War the first two sentences, reported by the Secretary of War as being drafted by him, were sentences which were softened by instructions or information furnished by the Secretary of State in a conversation over the telephone with the Secretary of War the morning of the 27th. (R. 4247) General Gerow testifies that the sentences so softened originally read "Negations with Japan have been terminated." (R. 4270) The sentence, "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment" was put in by General Gerow or Colonel Bundy. (R. 4247) The sentence, "If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act," was thus phrased because as Gerow said he testified before the Roberts Commission: "We pointed out in the message the possible danger of attack and directed reconnaissance and other necessary measures without fully carrying into effect the provisions of this plan, which would have required hostile action against Japan, and the President had definitely stated that he wanted Japan to commit the first overt act." (R. 4251- 4252) The next sentence: "This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense" was inserted by General Gerow or by Colonel Bundy. The Page 123 purpose of this language was to insure freedom of action to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. (R. 4252) General Gerow said that there had been no discussion of the ambiguity of the message or its apparent conflicting instructions as a "Do-or-Don't" message. (R. 4252) He said that nothing in the message told General Short about the relations between the American Government and the Japanese Empire. (R> 4256) The sole information passed on to General Short by the War Department from October 20th to November 27th about what the soldier calls "enemy information" was in this particular message. (R. 4263) The only previous message that Short had had of the international situation from the War Department was on October 20, which read, [1] [2] Footnotes: [1] However, General Gerow testified (R. 4258) that there was a Navy Department message of November 24th which contained information of the Japanese aggressive action and which directed the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet to inform General Short of its contents. [2] Information gleaned by the Board indicates that G-2, War Department, on November 3, 1941, sent a letter to G-2, Hawaiian Department, in which was set forth the prophecy of war between Japan and the United States in December 1941 or February 1942, as made by a prominent Japanese. Page 124 "Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent." (R. 4264) The sentence: "This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense" was put in by the War Plans Division. (R. 4271) With reference to the phrase, "You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary" apparently at that time no investigation was made by the War Department to ascertain just what means General Short had of conducting the reconnaissance; but aside from this fault, the fact is that General Short did have some planes plus radar to conduct a degree of reconnaissance. This the record shows he did not fully and gainfully employ these means for this purpose. General Short was recalled at substantially the end of all the testimony and questioned on this point. Short's position on this message was that the direction to him to conduct reconnaissance was a futile directive and that it indicated to him that the man who wrote the message was entirely unfamiliar with the fact, "that the Navy was responsible for long distance reconnaissance". He said this was "in spite of the fact that the Chief of Staff had approved that plan that provided for that, whoever wrote the message was not familiar with it, or it had slipped his mind that it was the Navy and not the Army that was responsible." (R. 4436-4437) He said when questioned as to why he did not call attention to this matter in his reply to the War Department: "I think if the War Department had intended to abrogate that agreement, they would have told me so." Page 125 He said he based everything on the responsibility of the Navy for long distance reconnaissance, because it had been approved by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. (R. 4438) He could not explain why he failed to use his own reconnaissance aircraft even though the agreement was not actually in effect at that time or the War Department had overlooked the agreement because he says, as elsewhere admitted, that the Army and Navy agreement was not to go into effect until hostilities, or their equivalent, had occurred. His reconnaissance planes were still under his control and could have been used by him to carry out this direct order in this message. For instance, the following colloquy occurred: "62. General Grunert: You might clear up two additional points. First, we will take up the point that you have brought out, there, that the War Department had evidently overlooked the agreement that your command had with the Navy, as to distant reconnaissance. Did you call the War Department's attention to the fact, when you were ordered to make reconnaissance, about that agreement? "General Short: I did not, but I reported to them exactly what I was doing. "63. General Grunert: Then you considered your report the answer to that? "General Short: They called on me for a report. If they had not called on me for a report, I think the situation would have been quite different; but they definitely told me to 'report action taken' which I did; and I heard nothing further from them. "64. General Grunert: We have had testimony before the Board, from a member of the Navy, calling the Board's attention to the fact that this Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was not operative until an emergency arose, and apparently the emergency, or the imminency of Page 126 such an emergency, was not agreed to, locally, to make the provisions operative. With that understanding, was it the Navy's business to conduct long-distance reconnaissance, prior to such an emergency? "General Short: If the emergency existed, it was their business; if it did not exist, there was no necessity. "65. General Grunert: Then, when do you judge the emergency came about? "General Short: It very definitely cam about, at 7:55 on the morning of the 7th." (R. 4438-4439) This is sufficient in itself to clearly demonstrate that Short was not taking the action which he could and should have taken of either more fully carrying out the order, or of specifically and definitely reporting the complete circumstances of his inability to do so. He did not call the attention of the War Department to what was an apparent misunderstanding on its part. He was relying upon the Navy reconnaissance without any reasonable energetic inquiry to ascertain the correctness of his assumption that the Navy was conducting long distance reconnaissance. He has no adequate explanation for not using the radar 24 hours a day (which was in full operation Sunday prior to December 7) after getting the message of the 27th, and which was used continuously after December 7. (R. 4441-4444) For some time after December 7th the situation as to the dearth of spare parts was the same as before December 7th. The Secretary of War did not know the authorship of the part, "Report measures taken ... Limit dissemination ... to minimum essential officers". (R. 4071) He said he knew it was there and he understood it. There were two conferences with the Secretary of War, one Page 127 at 9:30 the morning of the 27th, and one later in the day. At the first conference, the Secretary of War, General Bryden, Deputy Chief of Staff, and General Gerow were there. At that time General Gerow received instructions with reference to the preparation of the message. He then consulted Admiral Stark. (R. 4239-4240) The second conference took place later with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and Mr. Stimson. (R. 4240) General Bryden has testified that although he was Deputy Chief of Staff, and Acting Chief of Staff in General Marshall's absence, he does not remember the message nor the conference thereon. (R. 900) While the Chief of Staff reviewed the message of the 27th on the 28th, it is unfortunate that during this critical period he was off on maneuvers in North Carolina and missed the drafting of the message which was the composite work of a number of people, which may account for its confusing and conflicting tenor. Possibly had he been present, the Marshall-Stark memorandum might have reached the President in time to have influenced the momentous decisions of November 26th. It is equally obvious that the November 27th message was the only message that attempted to translate the long and tempestuous course of events terminating in the counter-proposal on the 26th of November to Japan. No other picture of the situation was given to Short, except in this message. It is apparent that the message of November 27 was entirely inadequate to properly and adequately translate to Short's mind the background of events that had been taking place. While this does not excuse Short, it does necessitate an assessment for the responsibility on others. Page 128 The three principal Major Generals who were commanders under Short have testified that they received substantially nothing by way of information as the international situation except what they read in the newspapers. The fact that the newspapers were urgent and belligerent in their tone was discounted by them, because they were not receiving any confirmatory information from the War Department through Short. Information that was of tremendous value both as to content and substance, which the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and other high staff officers of the War Department had, was not transmitted to short. The only summary of this information was the brief and conflicting tone of the message of November 27, which was but a faint echo of what had actually occurred. It is significant that the Japanese upon the termination of negotiations by the counter-proposals of the 26th, considered by them as an ultimatum, were thereby in full possession of all the information, which our ultra-secrecy policy did not permit of full transmission to field commanders. The Japanese knew everything. The War and Navy Departments transmitted to Short and Kimmel only so much of what they knew as they judged necessary. [1] It is also significant that the Secretary of War had to go and call Mr. Hull to get the information on what amounted to the practical cessation of negotiations, which was the most vital thing that had occurred in 1941. If it had not been for Footnotes: [1] Both General Marshall and Admiral Stark expressed themselves as of the opinion that the warnings transmitted to Short and Kimmel were sufficient to properly alert their respective commands. Page 129 Mr. Stimson's initiative in calling the Secretary of State, it is uncertain as to when he would have been advised of this most important event. As it turned out, the delay of from ten to twelve hours in getting the information was not material, since the Japanese delayed striking until December 7th. The effect of the counter-proposals of November 26th on the resulting responsibilities of the Army and Navy is indicated in Mr. Stimson's quotation of Mr. Hull's comment to him, as follows: "Now it is up the Army and Navy to take care of the matter. I have washed my hands of the Japanese." 4. ANALYSIS OF THE NOVEMBER 27, 1941, MESSAGE: The message of November 27, 1941, from the Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, consists of the following component parts: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practicable purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government may come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment." Comment: This statement on Japanese information is inadequate. It did not convey to Short the full import of the information concerning the American-Japanese relations which was in the hands of the War Department. It was misleading in that it stated that there was a bare possibility of the resumption of negotiations, which carried with it the implication that such resumption would influence the Japanese-American relations, i.e., that war might not come. The War Department was convinced then that war would come. The statement that "Japanese future action unpredictable" Page 130 was in conflict with the Navy message which the War Department had directed to be shown to Short, to the effect that the attack would be in the Kra Peninsula and elsewhere in the Far East. It did not convey to Short the fixed opinion of the War Department General Staff as to the probable plan of Japanese operations. A warning that "hostile action possible at any moment" indicated the necessity of taking adequate measures to meet that situation. This is particularly true in view of the Navy message of 16 October, 1941, which said that there was a possibility that Japan might attack. There was also received from the Navy on November 27 a message containing these words, "Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days." The next statement in the Chief of Staff's message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department: "If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoid comma the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense." Comment: This instruction embodied our well known national policy against initiating war. The responsibility for beginning the war must be Japan's. It give Short the right to defense, notwithstanding the restriction, but creates an atmosphere of caution which he must exercise in preparing for such defense. The third portion of the message is this: "Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma alarm Page 131 the civilian population or disclose intent. Report measures taken." Comment: This was an order. Short could take such measures, including reconnaissance, as he deemed necessary. What was available to Short for reconnaissance and defensive action and the measures taken by him are fully discussed elsewhere. Here again we find the limitation that he must act cautiously. However, the weight of evidence indicates that a higher form of alert than that taken would not have alarmed the public. Short did report within an hour the measures taken. (R. 286) Short's answer to General Marshall's radio said: "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. Reuard four seven two twenty seventh." This in itself was sufficient to show that such steps were inadequate, but as he did not say he was taking any other steps, the War Department erroneously assumed that its responsible commander was alert to sabotage and to liaison with the Navy and was taking the necessary responsible other steps mentioned in the radio because he had been warned in this radio of the 27th by General Marshall. Having asked for a report of what he was doing, the War Department placed itself in the position of sharing the responsibility if it did not direct Short to take such measures as they considered adequate to meet this serious threat. This is particularly true in view of the fact that much material information relating to Japanese-American relations was in the War Department, which had not been made available to Short. Page 132 The next and last portion of the message: "should hostilities occur, you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Number 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." Comment: (a) This was a clear recognition, and advice to Short, that his basic war plan and all joint Army and Navy plans based upon it was to be used and was a clear indication to him to adopt adequate preparatory measures to insure the execution of Rainbow Number 5. (b) As to the directive to "Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers: The War Department was security-conscious. The construction which Short appears to have placed upon this language may have unduly limited the information which reached responsible subordinate commanders. This part of the message left broad discretion in Short as to the dissemination of the information contained in the message, and had the personnel operating the Air Warning Service on the morning of December 7th known of the absolute imminence of war they doubtless would have interpreted the information obtained from the radar station much differently. It is of a piece with the other provisions of the instructions -- not to alarm the public, not to disclose intent, and to avoid commission of the first overt act. *Comment on the message as a whole*: General Short, ass the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, was charged with the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and as such had a fundamental duty to properly employ all available means at his disposal for that purpose in the face of any threat, with or without notification of impending hostilities. Page 133 Notwithstanding receipt of conflicting and qualifying information, which undoubtedly had its effect on Short's mental conception of the situation, the responsibility rested on him to take measures to meet the worst situation with which he might be confronted, and such action on his part, as Commander on the spot, was mandatory despite the fact that he was not kept fully advised by the War Department of the critical situation and of the positive, immediate imminence of war. The same day G-2 of the War Department wired to G-2 Hawaiian Department, which clearly indicated that *both* sabotage and hostilities might and be concurrent. This message said: "Advise only the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Actions of sabotage and espionage probable. *Also* probable that *hostilities* may begin." This G-2 message nullifies all Short's explanation that his mind was put on sabotage because of the War Department's emphasis on this subject. The message shows that hostilities were just as possible as sabotage. His decision to adopt Alert Number 1 came on the 27th, before receipt of any message having reference to sabotage. He had two threats: he only took measures as to one. The third message, upon which he particularly relies as to sabotage, which came on November 28 from the War Department (G-2), came *after* he had made his decision to go to Alert Number 1. This last message again mentions the critical situation as to sabotage activities. It does not in any way change previous messages. Short should have known, as a trained soldier, that a G-2 message is informative and is of Page 134 lesser authority than a command message from the Chief of Staff. When General Short was asked if he had known that negotiations with Japan had practically ended when he received the message of November 27th, he said: "I think it would have made me more conscious that war was practically unavoidable......If I knew it was immediately imminent......but if I had known it was immediately imminent, then I should think I would have gone into Alert Number 3......It would have looked to me definite that the war was almost upon us." (R. 450) "General Russell: General Short, did you know that on the 26th of November the State Department handed to the Japanese representatives a memorandum which G-2 of the War Department at least considered as an ultimatum to the Japanese government? "General Short: I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever the State Department paper came out. "General Russell: Did you know on the 27th of November when you received that message that the Secretary of State had in a meeting that the Secretary of State had in a meeting on the 25th of November told the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and probably the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Admiral Stark, that the State Department had gone as far as it could in its negotiations with the Japanese and that the security of the nation was then in the hands of the armed forces? "General Short: I did not. "General Russell: Did you know that in January of 1941 Ambassador Grew made a report to the State Department or to the Secretary of State in which he stated that there were rumors in Japan that in event of trouble with America the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor? "General Short: At that time I was not in command; but I have known of that later, I think probably a year or so later. I do not think I knew anything about it at that time." (R. 451) This concludes the status of affairs to the 27th. There still remained the period from the 27th to the 6th of December, inclusive, during which time messages and even letters could have been sent outlining and completely delineating the entire Page 135 situation to Short. Even a courier could have reached Honolulu in 36 hours from Washington. The War Department, although it had additional information of a most positive character, left Short with this fragment of information regarding the U.S.-Japanese negotiations contained in the two sentences inserted in the message of the 27th by the Secretary of War, and took no action either to investigate Short's reply to the message of November 27 to determine the steps being taken for defense, or to assure that adequate defensive measures were being taken. 5. MESSAGES 28TH NOVEMBER TO 6TH DECEMBER, INCLUSIVE: On November 28th the War Department sent message No. 482 to Short, reading as follows: [1] "Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department (See paragraph 3 MID SC thirty dash forty-five) stop. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop. This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized. stop. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat no affect your responsibility under existing instructions." Footnotes: [1] A similar message, No. 484, was sent on the same day to the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by General Arnold. Page 136 Short sent a reply to wire 482 of November 28th on the same day which outlined at length the sabotage precautions he was taking. The War Department copy of this wire, which is addressed to the A.G.O., shows that a copy was sent to the Secretary of the General Staff, but no other endorsements are on it showing it was read or considered by anyone else. This wire reads: "Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eight, full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Dept paren paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five and paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants, telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this Hqrs by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by Section sixty seven of the organic act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the Commanders of Military and Naval Forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this Hqrs to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and structures I the territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations. In this connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Dept. to close, or restrict the use of and travel upon, any highway within the city and county of Honolulu, whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters. Short." It is to be noted that the official file does not show a copy of radio #482, sent to Short by the War Department on Page 137 November 28th. On December 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operation sent the following wire to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet: "On 3d December we have, 'Op Nav informs' -- this is a paraphrase, you understand, sir. . . --'informs C in C Asiatic, CincPac, Combat 14-16 that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents'." (Admiral Bloch, Vol. 13, Page 1513, APHB) [1] The story as to whether Short ever saw or received this message is as follows: Admiral Kimmel visited Short December 2 and December 3, 1941. (R. 1513) Short says: "I never saw that message" (R. 424), referring to the 3 December message. He also denied seeing the message from the Navy of December 4th and 6th hereinafter quoted. (R. 424-425) However, Short was advised by the F.B.I. that it had tapped the telephone line of the Japanese Consul's cook and had found the Consul was burning his papers. (R. 3204) All other lines were tapped by the Navy. (R. 3204) Phillips testified Short was "informed of it," but nothing was done about it. (R. 1243) Short denies such G-2 information, saying: "I am sure he didn't inform me." (R. 525) Colonel Fielder says the matter was discussed by Colonel Phillips at a staff conference, but nothing was done about it. Colonel Bicknell, G-2, Hawaiian Department, confirmed Fielder. (R. 1413-1414) Footnote" [1] This message also paraphrased by General Grunert, Vol. 4, Page 424. This same message also paraphrased in Roberts Testimony, Vol. 5, Page 583, and Vol. 17, Page S-85 Page 138 This record does not provide either a true copy or a paraphrase copy of the message of December 4, 1941, or December 6, 1941. The information we have is no better than that contained in the Roberts Report, which reads as follows: "the second of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential communication, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only); and the third of December 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the naval commands on the outlying Pacific islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those essential to continued operation should be retained until the last moment." (Roberts Report, page 8) These messages were received because Admiral Bloch testified that he remembered them. (R. 1513-1514) Irrespective of any testimony on the subject the record shows that on December 3, 1941, Short and Kimmel had a conference about a cablegram relative to the relief of marines on Wake and Midway. (R. 302, 394) There is a serious question raised why the War Department did not give instructions to Short direct which would have put him on his guard as to the tenseness of the situation. On December 6 there was reported to the Chief of Staff, Phillips, the message about the Japanese burning their papers, and he reported it at a staff meeting on December 6. (R. 1414) 6. DECEMBER 7, 1941 MESSAGE: This brings us to the final message from Washington. It was filed by the Chief of Staff at 12:18 p.m. Washington time, December 7th, which was 6:48 a.m. Honolulu time. "Japanese are presenting at 1 p.m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum. Page 139 Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop. Inform naval authorities of this communication." The story of the sending of this message, which, if it could have been sent so as to have reached Short a few hours prior to the attack might at least have greatly lessened the results of the attack, will be set forth at length. It was sent by commercial radio, the R.C.A. This is a commercial line. Early in the morning in Honolulu the Hawaiian Department radio had had great difficulty in keeping in communication with the War Department radio. It is significant that the Hawaiian Department only had a small 10 k.g. set. It was not a powerful set, like that of the Navy or the R.C.A. The Message Center of the War Department, which is charged with the expeditious handling of messages, decided to send this vital message by commercial R.C.A. instead of War Department radio, because it could not get through on its own net. Why this message was not sent by the Navy radio, by F.B.I. radio, or by telephone, and why these means of possibly more rapid communication were not investigated, is not satisfactorily explained. The explanation that "secrecy" was paramount does not appear to apply to these means. Shivers of the F.B.I. testified: "We had our own radio station...I would say within -- depending on the length of the message: a 20-word message could be probably gotten to Washington by -- could have gotten to the receiving station in Washington within a period of twenty minutes...our channels were not jammed...we used a frequency that was assigned to us by the F.C.C...All of the stuff that went out from here to -- that went out over that radio, was coded." (R. 3221) Page 140 "General Grunert: Then any message that Washington wanted to get to you during that morning or just prior to the attack on that morning you think could have gotten to you within the leeway of an hour? "Mr. Shivers: The message could have been sent out within an hour, yes. Yes, sir." (R. 3221) It is to be noted in this connection that no only was the F.B.I. radio working between Washington and Honolulu on December 6-7, but that testimony shows numerous telephone conversations were conducted just after the attack, over the telephone between Washington and Honolulu. The story of the sending of this message in the War Department is as follows: Page 141 This message arrived in Honolulu at 7:33 a.m., Honolulu time, December 7th. The attack struck 22 minutes later. The message was not actually delivered to the signal office of the Hawaiian Department until 11:45 a.m., the attack having taken place at 7:55 a.m. The message was decoded and delivered to The Adjutant General at 2:58 p.m., 7 hours and 3 minutes after the attack. The status of communications between Washington and Hawaii on the morning of December 7th and for 24 hours previous to that time was as follows: The Hawaiian Department had a scrambler telephone connection direct with Washington by which you could ordinarily get a message through from Washington to Hawaii in ten or fifteen minutes. After the attack on December 7, Colonel Fielder (G-2) himself talked to Washington twice on this phone and received a call from Washington on the same phone: it took no more than an hour as a maximum to get the call through despite the heavy traffic to Hawaii by reason of the attack. (R. 2999) Furthermore, a war message could have demanded priority. It is important to observe that only one means of communication was selected by Washington. That decision violated all rules requiring the use of multiple means of communication in an emergency. In addition to the War Department telephone there also existed the F.B.I. radio, which was assigned a special frequency between Washington and Hawaii and over which it only took twenty minutes to send a coded message from Hawaii to Washington or vice versa. Shivers of F.B.I. so testified. (R. 3222) Short testified: "General Marshall stated that the reason he did not telephone was that it took more time, that he had called the Philippines before he called Hawaii, and there was a Page 142 possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department. In other words, I think there was a feeling still at that time that secrecy was more important than the time element in getting the information to us as rapidly as possible. Whatever the reason was, we got that information seven hours after the attack." (R. 310) Apparently, the War Department at that time did not envisage an immediate attack, rather they though more of a breaking of diplomatic relations, and if the idea of an attack at 1:00 p.m. E.S.T. did enter their minds they thought of it as probably taking place in the Far East and not in Hawaii. Hence secrecy was still of paramount interest to them. We find no justification for a failure to send this message by multiple secret means either through the Navy radio or F.B.I. radio or the scrambler telephone or all three. The result was the message did not get through in time due to failure of the War Department to use the telephone as the Chief of Staff used it to the Philippines (Short R. 310) or take steps to insure that the message got through by multiple channels (by code over naval or F.B.I. radio to Hawaii), if the War Department radio was not working. He left Short without this additional most important information. Short testified as follows: "If they had used the scrambled phone and gotten it through in ten or fifteen minutes we would probably have gotten more of the import and a clearer idea of danger from that message and we would have had time to warm up the planes and get them in the air to meet any attack." (R. 310) Colonel French, in charge of Traffic Operations Branch, Chief Signal Office, in the War Department testified that on December 7, 1941, Colonel Bratton brought the message to the code room in the handwriting of the Chief of Staff which "I had typed for clarity" in a few minutes. Colonel Bratton read and authenticated it. The message was given to the code clerk and transmission facilities checked. It was decided to send Page 143 the message by commercial means, choosing Western Union, as the fastest. He stated that he personally took the message from the code room to the teletype operator and advised Colonel Bratton it would take 30 to 45 minutes to transmit the message to destination. It left at 12:01 (Eastern Standard Time, 6:31 a.m. Honolulu time). The transmission to Western Union was finished 12:17 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, or 7:33 a.m. Honolulu time. It took 45 minutes in transmission. The message was actually delivered at 11:45 p.m. Honolulu time. The messenger was diverted from his course during the bombing. (R. 189-202) Colonel French had no knowledge of the type of communication the F.B.I. used to Hawaii; he never used the scrambler telephone and sometimes he used the Navy to send messages, but did not inquire on the morning of December 7, although the Navy has a more powerful radio. (R. 203-204) 7. FAILURE OF NAVY TO ADVISE SHORT OF ENEMY SUBMARINE IN PEARL HARBOR ON MORNING OF DECEMBER 7, 1941. The second failure was the Navy Department, upon whom Short so trustingly relied. A two-man submarine entered Pearl Harbor area at 6:30 a.m. Between 6:33 and *6*:45 a.m. it was sunk by the Navy. This was reported at 7:12 a.m. by naval base officers to the Chief of Staff but the Navy made no such report to Short. (R. 310-311; See Roberts Report p. 15) As Short said: "That would, under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was danger. The Navy did not visualize it anything by a submarine attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of Page 144 it and just failed to notify me; that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the information to me had not -- at any rate, I did not get the information until after the attack." (R. 311) 8. FAILURE OF AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE TO ADVISE OF APPROACHING PLANES, DECEMBER 7, 1941. The third event that might have saved the day was the following: The aircraft warning service had established mobile aircraft warning stations on the Island of Oahu, as elsewhere related in detail, and had set up an Information Center to utilize the aircraft warning information, plot the course of any incoming planes and to advise the responsible authorities. The organization was set up and operating and was being utilized from 4 a.m. to 7 o'clock on the morning of December 7th as a training method and had been so used for some time past. The Navy was supposed to have detailed officers in the Information Center to be trained as liaison officers, but had not yet gotten around to it. In the Information Center that morning was a Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, a pursuit officer of the Air Corps, whose tour of duty thereat was until 8 o'clock. It was Tyler's second tour of duty at the Center and he was there for training and observation, but there were no others on duty after 7 o'clock except the enlisted telephone operator. He was the sole officer there between 7 and 8 o'clock that morning, the rest of the personnel that had made the Center operative from 4:00 to 7:00 had departed. At one of the remote aircraft warning stations there were two privates who had been on duty from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. One of them was Private Lockard, who was skilled in operating the radar aircraft detector, and a Private George E. Elliott, who was Page 145 the plotting man to plot the information picked up on the radar. This plotter was anxious to learn how to operate the radar, and Private Lockard agreed to show him after the station was supposed to close at 7 o'clock and while they were waiting for the truck to take them to breakfast. He kept the radar open for further operation to instruct his partner, Private Elliott. While Lockard was adjusting the machine to begin the instruction of Private Elliott, he observed on the radar screen an unusual formation he had never seen in the machine. He thought there was something wrong with it, as the indicator showed such a large number of planes coming in that he was sure that there was nothing like it in the air and there must be a machine error. He continued to check, however, and finally concluded that the machine was operating correctly and that there was a considerable number of planes 132 miles away from the island approaching from a direction 3 degrees east of north. The time was 7:02 a.m., December 7, 1941. In this record Private Elliott, now Sergeant Elliott, testified that he plotted these planes and suggested to Lockard that they call up the Information Center. After some debate between them, Lockard did call the Information Center and reported to the switchboard operator. The switchboard operator, an enlisted man who testified, was unable to do anything about it, so he put Lieutenant Tyler on the phone. Tyler's answer proved to be a disastrous one. He said, in substance, "Forget it." Tyler's position is indefensible in his action, for he says that he was merely there for training and had no knowledge upon which to base any action, yet he assumed to give directions instead of seeking someone competent to make a decision. If that be a fact, and it seems to be true, then he should Page 146 not have assumed to tell these two men, Private Lockard and Private Elliott, to "forget it", because he did not have the knowledge upon which to premise any judgment. (R. 1102) He should, in accordance with customary practice, have then used initiative to take this matter up with somebody who did know about it, in view of the fact that he said he was there merely for training and had no competent knowledge upon which to either tell the men to forget it or to take action upon it. By his assumption of authority, he took responsibility and the consequences of his action should be imposed upon him. If Tyler had communicated this information, the losses might have been very greatly lessened. As General Short testified: "IF he had alerted the Interceptor Command there would have been time, if the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would not have been time to get them in the air...It would have made a great difference in the loss...It would have been a question of split seconds instead of minutes in getting into action." (R. 312-313) The attack actually took place at 7:55 a.m. When the information that showed up on the oscilloscope was communicated, apparently Lieutenant Tyler had in his mind that a flight of B-17s was coming from the mainland and he thought that they might represent what was seen on the screen of the radar machine. As a matter of fact, that probably had something to do with it, as they did come in about this period and were attacked by the Japanese, some of them being destroyed. 9. NAVY FAILURE TO ADVISE SHORT OF SUSPECTED NAVAL CONCENTRATION IN THE JALUITS. About November 25, the Navy through its intelligence sources in the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor and in Washington had reports showing the presence in Jaluit in the Page 147 Marshall Islands of the Japanese fleet composed of aircraft carriers, submarines, and probably other vessels. Information of this fleet ceased about December 1, 1941. As Jaluit was 1,500 miles closer to Oahu than the mainland of Japan, the presence of such a strong force capable of attacking Hawaii was an important element of naval information. This information was delivered to G-2 of the War Department as testified to by General Miles. No information of this threat to Hawaii was given to General Short by either the War or Navy Departments in Washington nor the Navy in Hawaii. Short and his senior commanders testified that such information would have materially alerted their point of view and their actions. Such information should have been delivered by the War Department or the Navy for what it was worth to permit Short to evaluate it; this was not done. The fact that the actual forces which attacked Hawaii has now been identified does not change the necessity for the foregoing action. 10. THE NAVY ACCOUNT OF THE JAPANESE TASK FORCE THAT ATTACKED PEARL HARBOR; SOURCES OF INFORMATION TO JAPANESE. The following account is based upon the testimony of Captain Layton, who has been Fleet Combat Intelligence Officer, and was at the time of December 7th and shortly before Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet. He said that the task force which had been identified by the Navy through numerous captured documents, orders, maps, and from interviewing prisoners who were in a position to know personally the orders and preparations for the attack, had the following history, according to the Navy view of the correct Page 148 story: [1] Japan started training its task force in either July or August, 1941, for the attack on Pearl Harbor. They were evidently trained with great care and precision as disclosed by the maps which were found in the planes which were shot down in the attack on Pearl Harbor and in the two-man submarines. These papers and orders show meticulous care in planning and timing, which would take very considerable practice. The initial movement from Japan to the rendezvous at Tankan Bay was about November 22nd, and they awaited word to act before the force moved out on the 27th-28th of November, 1941. [2] The elements of the fleet for this task force consisted of six carriers, two battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and a destroyer division. This is one of the *most powerful task forces ever assembled and after the date of* Footnotes: [1] The Japanese striking force assembled in home waters during November and departed from the Bungou Channel area in Japan about 22 November, proceeding to Tankan Bay (sometimes called Hittokapu Bay). This assembly had started between the 7th and 2nd of November. Tankan Bay is located at Ktorofu Island in North Japan. It does not appear on the ordinary maps or charts, but is shown in a map of the Japanese Empire in a Japanese encyclopedia under the title "Hittokapu Bay." The task force arrived in this bay approximately November 25th. The entire force departed on the 27th-28th of November (see footnote 2), taking a northerly route south of the Aleutians directly to the east(to avoid being sighted by shipping) and then headed for a position to the north of Oahu, arriving there on the early morning of the 8th of December (Japanese time) or the 7th of December (Hawaiian time). The date of departure of November 27th-28th, according to numerous documents and prisoners interviewed who had intimate knowledge of this matter and who independently picked the same date, is confirmed beyond doubt according to Admiral McMorris and Captain Layton. This force consisted of six aircraft carriers, two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and some destroyers as well as submarines. [2] Japanese time and date must be taken into consideration because our December 7th at Honolulu is Japanese December 8th. The time difference between Tokyo and Hawaii is 4 1/2 hours, the time difference between Washington and Tokyo is 10 hours. Page 149 the attack upon Pearl Harbor, it took part in a number of similarly successful and very disastrous attacks in the Pacific southwest. The elements of this task force left individually from the Japanese mainland and assembled at Tankan Bay in an uninhabited spot where they would be unobserved. The assembly was completed and the task force departed on November 27th-28th Eastern Longitude Time, which was apparently after the date that the counter-proposal (considered by the Japanese as an ultimatum) were delivered by the President of the United States to Japan through Secretary Hull on November 26, 1941. It is significant that the attack of the Japanese task force aircraft upon the Army and Navy planes parked together wing-to-wing as protection against sabotage (Alert #1) must have been as a result of knowledge of that fact, in view of their carefully rehearsed and scheduled attack formations in which they ran down the aprons, setting the planes on fire with incendiary ammunition: it is equally significant that it was well known in the island that Alert #1 was put into effect November 27th and therefore can be assumed to have been communicated to Japan, and that advantage of such information was apparently taken by reason of the nature of the attack and the way it was conducted. It is also significant, a map having been found upon the pilot of a shot-down Japanese attacking plane, and another map having been found upon one of the crew in a two-man submarine, that there had been entered on these map, which were old Geodetic Survey maps of the Pearl Harbor area, the location of the hangars that had been built on Hickam Field and of those that were yet to be built. Five of these hangars had been built. Earlier 1936 maps issued by the Hawaiian Department Page 150 or by the Air Force, showing Hickam Field, showed five of these hangars in full lines and three in dotted lines as being hangars yet to be built. The Japanese are well known as precise copyists. It is apparent that when they made the maps found on the aviator and the submarine crew members they had knowledge later than 1936 of construction either that had been or was to be constructed, because the entered on such maps the additional three hangars in full lines. The task force proceeded in radio silence due east to a point substantially due north of Oahu and thence proceeded southward under forced draft to a point between 300 and 250 miles from Oahu, from which the flight took off. The two-man submarines were carried on top of the mother submarines and released adjacent to the harbor. Captain Layton further testified that the orders that were captured and those that they had knowledge of did exist, as reported by captured prisoners, show that the attacking forces were to destroy without a trace any third power's vessels including Japanese and Russian within 600 miles of the destination of the task force; to capture and maintain in radio silence any such vessels including Japanese and Russian within 600 miles of the destination of the task force, but if such vessels had sent any radio communications to destroy them. (R. 3043) This is a good evidence of Japanese character, being unwilling to trust their own people and to sink them without mercy because they happened to be operating by accident in this vacant sea where no vessels normally operate. This task force was very powerful in the air, having a total of approximately 424 planes; (R. 3048) of this number about 300 actually attacked Pearl Harbor. (R. 3053) The pilots Page 151 were of the highest quality and training that have ever been encountered in this war with the Japanese, with the exception of the Battle of Midway where four of these same carriers were engaged and sunk. (R. 3046) The maximum total number of airplanes on carriers that the United States could muster on December 7th, on the carriers "Lexington" and "Enterprise", was approximately 180 planes. (R. 3049) Captain Layton testified that our Navy in Pearl Harbor would have been unable to have brought the Japanese task force under gunfire because our battleships were too slow and the remainder of our forces would probably have suffered severe superiority in the air before our superior gunfire could have been brought to bear. The only possible hope of overcoming such a Japanese force would be in weather that prevented flight of their planes so that the United States force would have superiority of gunfire, irrespective of Japanese superiority of air power. He stated that no word of this task force was received in any way, from any source, by the Navy. The attack was wholly unexpected, and if it had been expected the probability of the United States' winning in any engagement of this task force was not a bright one. He stated that this task force represented a substantial per cent of the entire Japanese Navy. It provided alone on the Jap carriers 424 aircraft against a possible 180 which we might have mustered if we had our own two carriers available to operate against them. (R. 3048-3049) The information upon which the story of the attack is based has been revealed so far as coming from several sources. Page 152 First, the Otto Kuehn trial revealed his complete disclosure of the fleet dispositions and locations in Pearl Harbor in the period December 1 to December 6, and a code delivered with the information, so that communication of the information to Japanese offshore submarine adjacent to Oahu could be used. The same information was delivered to the Japanese Consul direct to the homeland. Otto Kuehn and his co-conspirators, Japanese of the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu, had conspired to send information as to the units of the fleet in Pearl Harbor and their exact positions in the harbor. This information the Japanese Consulate communicated principally by commercial lines to Japan. Additionally Kuehn provided a code indicating what units were in the harbor and what were out and means of signaling consisting of symbols on the sails of his sailboat, radio signals over a short-wave transmitter, lights in his house, and fires in his yard, all in order to signal to Japanese submarines offshore. The period during which the signals were to be given was December 1 to 6. If such information had been available to our armed forces it would have clearly indicated the attack. The messages taken from the Japanese Consulate on the subject show clearly what was done and the intention of the Japanese. If authority had existed to tap these lines, this information would have been available to both the Army and Navy. Kuehn was tried by a military commission after signed confessions of his actions and sentenced to death. This was later commuted to imprisonment for fifty years. If is significant the Kuehn was a German agent and had for a long time been living on funds forwarded to him from Japan and had conducted his espionage with impunity until after Pearl Harbor, right Page 153 under the nose of the Army, the F.B.I., and Naval Intelligence. As Shivers, head of the F.B.I. in the islands, said: "If we had been able to get the messages that were sent to Japan by the Japanese Consul, we would have known, or we could have reasonably assumed, that the attack would come, somewhere, on December 7; because, if you recall, this system of signals that was devised by Otto Kuehn for the Japanese Consul general simply included the period from December 1 to December 6." (R. 3218) Shivers testified that the reason why the information being sent over the commercial lines to Japan, other than telephone, was not secured was that while he had the approval of the Attorney General to tap the telephone wires and intercept telephone conversations, yet they could not get the information out of the cable offices. He testified: "Colonel Toulmin: I would like to ask him one question. What other means of communication did the Japanese Consul have with the homeland other than a telephone connection? "Mr. Shivers: He had commercial communication system. "Colonel Toulmin: Did you have any opportunity of tapping the commercial lines or of securing any information off the commercial lines? "Mr. Shivers: Off the lines themselves? "Colonel Toulmin: Yes. "Mr. Shivers: No, sir. "Colonel Toulmin: So that he did have a free, undisturbed communication over those lines? "Mr. Shivers: Yes, sir." (R. 3223) It was later discovered, when the torn messages of the Japanese Consul were reconstructed after they had been taken on December 7th, that many vital messages were being sent by the Japanese Consul, who was keeping Japan advised of the entire military and naval situation and every move we made in Hawaii. Another example of this Japanese activity is the telephone Page 154 message on December 5th from the house of Dr. Mori by a woman newspaper reporter, ostensibly to her newspaper in Japan, an apparently meaningless and therefore highly suspicious message. It was this message that was tapped from the telephone by the F.B.I., translated, and delivered to Military Intelligence and submitted by it to General Short at six o'clock on December 6th. (R. 1417-1419, 2993) As Short was unable to decipher the meaning, he did nothing about it and went on to a party. (R. 1420) The attack followed in the morning. In the same connection, the story of the spying activities of the German, von Osten, is in point. (R. 2442-2443, 3003) The telephone lines of the Japanese Consulate were tapped by the Navy with the exception of one telephone line to the cook's quarters, which was overlooked, and this was tapped by the F.B.I. (R. 3204) The last and one of the most significant actions of the Japanese was the apparent actual entry of their submarines into Pearl Harbor a few days prior to December 7th, their circulation in the harbor, by which they secured and presumably transmitted complete information as to our fleet movements and dispositions. The story of the bold Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor prior to the attack on December 7th is even more astounding as to the complete freedom with which Japan operated in getting intelligence out of Hawaii. Shivers of the F.B.I. produced maps 1 and 2, which were copies of maps captured from Japanese two-man submarines that came into Pearl Harbor on December 7th. The F.B.I., in endeavoring to reconstruct the Page 155 intelligence operations of any agent who may have been operating in Hawaii prior to the attack, secured these maps from Naval Intelligence. (R. 3210) Maps 1 and 2 have a legend translating all of the Japanese characters and writing appearing on the maps. Shivers said: "An examination of the map indicated to me rather definitely that there had been Japanese submarine in Pearl Harbor immediately before the attack." (R. 3210) "Now, on this map is various information relating to the installations at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and areas adjacent to both places." (R. 3211) There appeared on the map a code in Japanese which was translate by the F.B.I. and shows that it was intended for use by the submarine commanders in communicating with the Japanese task force enroute to Hawaii. It contains such messages as "indication strong that enemy fleet will put out to sea," or "enemy fleet put out to sea from or through;" in other words, describing the presence, size, composition, and movement of the fleet. (R. 3212) As this map shows the complete timed movement in and out of the harbor of the submarine and this information had been prepared partly written in Japanese, it is obvious that the Japanese must have been in the harbor a few days before the attack and evidently were moving in and out of the harbor at will. The data on the chart shows the submarine was so well advised that it went in at about 0410 when the submarine net was open to permit the garbage scow to leave the harbor, and stayed in the harbor until about 0600 and then left by the same route. The map shows the location of our battleships and other naval vessels observed by the submarine. (R. 3212-3213) As the ships actually in the harbor on December 7th were somewhat different from those shown on the map, it is conclusive proof Page 156 that this submarine was in the harbor and probably advising the fleet of Japan as to our dispositions prior to December 7th. (R. 3210-3213) The real action that should have been feared from the Japanese was not open sabotage, but espionage. It is obvious that the reason why the Japanese aliens did not commit sabotage was that they did not want to stimulate American activity to stop their espionage and intern them. That was the last thing they intended to do; and Short appears to have completely misapprehended the situation, the psychology and intentions of the enemy, by putting into effect his sabotage alert. Undoubtedly the information of the alert, the placing of planes wing-to- wing, etc., as well as the disposition of the fleet was reported by Kuehn through the Japanese Consul, were all known to the Japanese task force proceeding toward Hawaii. That will explain why they were able to conduct such precise bombing and machine-gunning. The bomb pattern on Hickam Field and the machine-gunning of that field, as well as other fields, show that the attack was concentrated on the hangars, marked on the Japanese maps, and upon the ramps where the planes were parked wing to wing. There was no attack of any consequence upon the landing strips. From the foregoing it appears that there were a large number of events taking place bearing on the attack; and that a clue to such events and the Japanese actions was in part available to Short and in part not available to him. Both the War Department and the Navy failed to inform him of many vital matters, and our governmental restrictions as to intercepting the communications of the Japanese Consul prevented him from getting still additional information. Page 157 If General Short had any doubt on the subject of his authority, he had ample opportunity from November 27th to December 6th to inquire of higher authority and make his position and his actions certain of support and approval. This he did not do. 11. INFORMATION NOT GIVEN SHORT. In judging the actions of General Short and whether he carried out his responsibilities, there must be taken into account information that he was not told either by the War Department or by the Navy. Briefly summarized, the fundamental pieces of information were following: 1. The presence of the task force in the Marshall Islands at Jaluit from November 27th to November 30th and the disappearance of that force. Neither the War Department nor the Navy Department saw fit to advise Short of this important piece of information. 2. The fact that the Chief of Staff with the Chief of Naval Operations had jointly asked (on November 27th) the President not to force the issue with the Japanese at this time. (R. 9) 3. The delivery on the 26th of November to the Japanese Ambassadors by the Secretary of State of the counter-proposals; and the immediate reaction of the Japanese rejecting in effect these counter-proposals which they considered an ultimatum and indicating that it was the end of negotiations. 4. Short not kept advised of the communications from Grew reporting the progressive deterioration of the relationship with the Japanese. Page 158 5. No reaction from the War Department to Short as to whether his report of November 27th as to "measures taken", i.e., a sabotage alert and liaison with the Navy, were satisfactory or inadequate in view of the information possessed by the War Department. 6. The following information not furnished also existed in the War Department: Information from informers, agents and other sources as the activities of our potential enemy and its intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete knowledge of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know their potential moves against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions and proposals. This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war. The messages actually sent to Hawaii by the Army and Navy gave only a small fraction of this information. It would have been possible to have sent safely, information ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives for an all-out alert. Under the circumstances, where information has a vital Page 159 bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and cannot be disclosed to them, it would appear incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directives to such commanders. Short got neither form of assistance after November 28th from the War Department, his immediate supervising agency. It is believed that the disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been lessened to the extent that its defenses were available and used on December 7 if properly alerted in time. The failure to alert these defenses in time by directive from the War Department, based upon all information available to it, is one for which it is responsible. The War Department had a abundance of vital information that indicated an immediate break with Japan. All it had to do was either get it to Short or give him a directive based upon it. Short was not fully sensitive to the real seriousness of the situation, although the War Department thought he was. It is believed that knowledge of the information available in the War Department would have made him so. General discussion of the information herein referred to follows: The records show almost daily information on the plans of the Japanese Government. In addition to that cited above and in conjunction therewith the War Department was in possession of information late in November and early in December from which it made deductions that Japan would shortly commence an aggressive war in the South Pacific; that every effort would be made to reach an agreement with the United States Government which would result in eliminating the American people as a contestant in the war to come; and that failing to reach the agreement the Page 160 Japanese Government would attack both Britain and the United States. This information enabled the War Department to fix the probable time of war with Japan with a degree of certainty. In the first days of December this information grew more critical and indicative of the approaching war. Officers in relatively minor positions who were charged with responsibility of receiving and evaluating such information were so deeply impressed with its significance and the growing tenseness of our relations with Japan, which pointed only to war and was almost immediately, that such officers approached the Chief of the War Plans Division (General Gerow) and the Secretary of the General Staff (Colonel Smith) for the express purpose of having sent to the department commanders a true picture of the war atmosphere which, at that time, pervaded the War Department and which was uppermost in the thinking of these officers in close contact with it. The efforts of these subordinate officers to have such information sent to the field were unsuccessful. They were told that field commanders had been sufficiently informed. The Secretary to the General Staff declined to discuss the matter when told of the decisions of the War Plans Division. Two officers then on duty in the War Department are mentioned for their interest and aggressiveness in attempting to have something done. They are Colonel R. S. Bratton and Colonel Otis K. Stadler. The following handling of information reaching the War Department in the evening of December 6 and early Sunday morning December 7 is cited as illustrative of the apparent lack of appreciation by those in high places in the War Department of the seriousness of this information which was so Page 161 clearly outlining the trends that were hastening us into war with Japan. At approximately 10:00 o'clock p.m. on December 6, 1941, and more than 15 hours before the attack at Pearl Harbor, G-2 delivered to the office of the War Plans Division and to the office of the Chief of Staff of the Army information which indicated very emphatically that war with Japan was a certainty and that the beginning of such was in the immediate future. The officers to whom this information was delivered were told of its importance and impressed with the necessity of getting it into the hands of those who could act, the Chief of Staff of the Army and Chief of the War Plans Division. On the following morning December 7 at about 8:30 a.m. other information reached the office of G-2, vital in its nature and indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan. Colonel Bratton, Chief, Far Eastern Section, G-2, attempted to reach the Chief of Staff of the Army in order that he might be informed of the receipt of this message. He discovered that the General was horseback riding. Finally and at approximately 11:25 a.m. the Chief of Staff reached his office and received this information. General Miles, then G-2 of War Department, appeared at about the same time. A conference was held between these two officers and General Gerow of the War Plans Division who himself had come to the Office of the Chief of Staff. Those hours when Bratton was attempting to reach someone who could take action in matters of this importance and the passing without effective action having been taken prevented this critical information from reaching General Short in time to be of value to him. Page 162 About noon a message was hastily dispatched to overseas department commanders including Short in the Hawaiian Department. This message which had been discussed elsewhere in this report, came into Short's possession after the attack had been completed.