Page 218 CHAPTER IV RESPONSIBILITIES IN WASHINGTON 1. GENERAL 2. WAR COUNCIL: Three groups of conferees. 3. SECRETARY OF STATE: Responsibility for dealing with the Japanese; no authority to commit the United States to War; indecision of the Secretary of State November 25-26; advice to the Secretary of War of the action by the Secretary of State; action by the Secretary of War on the 27th. 4. WAR DEPARTMENT: Policy of War Department to avoid conflict; policy as evidenced in the War Department messages to prevent overt acts; no information to Short of the Secretary of State's counter proposals; confusion resulting from the Navy message of October 16 and 24; confusion from the messages of the 27th and 28th; how the Long message was delivered and what was done about it; failure to act promptly to notify Hawaii. 5. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMY AND NAVY MESSAGES: The Army-Navy messages were conflicting; the Navy messages predominated with warnings of a conflict; Army messages predominant to avoid overt acts. 6. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION: Field of investigation; necessity for a larger scope in the future; intelligence a national problem. 7. WAR PLANS DIVISION: Responsibility for Overseas Departments; responsibility to see the War Plans implemented; no action on Alert No. 1; Gerow's failings; inadequate supervision. 8. NAVY DEPARTMENT: Failure to carry out agreement with the Army for long-distance reconnaissance; failure to advise of enemy submarine sinking; failure to give Short information of Jaluit task force. 9. CHIEF OF STAFF: Responsibility for organization and operation of War Department; failure to delegate authority; responsibility to keep General Short advised of international situation; delay in sending message on December 6 and 7; no action taken on Short's report of measures taken; and lack of knowledge of conditions of readiness in Hawaii November 8 to December 7, 1941. 10 SUMMARY. Page 219 1. GENERAL: The preceding chapter has dealt primarily with Hawaii and the actions of the responsible officers in the Hawaiian Department. It has to some degree and to a lesser extent, by reason of the chronological sequence, dealt with what was done in Washington both with respect to the internal activities in Washington and what Washington sent to Short. This chapter, therefore, will be devoted primarily to the activities in Washington and only secondarily in Hawaii. 2. WAR COUNCIL: The Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, has discussed the activities of the group in the War Department known as the War Council. He also described the group consisting of the Secretary of War. He also described the group consisting of the Secretary of State, Secretary of Navy, Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, who were also called colloquially the "War Council". The third group was that which included the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, usually the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and occasionally Commanding General, Air Force, General Arnold. All three of these bodies were informal and constituted simply a group of men exchanging ideas and attempting to determine policies without regularity of record of what they did, as far as this Board has been able to determine. It was a sort of clearing house for information, a gathering place for discussion of policies, so that each of the independent actors in the scene would know what was going on and would have information to guide him in making his own decisions that were more or less independent, but at the same time also somewhat dependent on the action of other members of the group. Page 220 3. SECRETARY OF STATE: The responsibility apparently assumed by the Secretary of State (and we have no other proof that anyone else assumed the responsibility finally and definitely) was to determine when the United States would reach the impasse with Japan. It was the Secretary of State who was in charge of the negotiations with the Japanese; it was the Secretary of State who had long and numerous conferences with the Japanese. He was the contact man and the responsible negotiator. He was doubtless aware of the fact that no action taken by him should be tantamount to a declaration of war. That responsibility rests with Congress. It is important to observe that the President of the United States had been very careful, according to the testimony of the Secretary of War, to be sure that the United States did nothing that could be considered an overt act or an act of war against the Japanese. For, as Mr. Stimson testified in the phrasing of the message of November 27, he was particularly concerned with so phrasing it so as to carry out the President's directive which was in accordance with our constitutional method of doing business. Mr. Stimson said: "I had had a decision from the President on that subject, and I regarded it as my business to do what I of course normally would do; to see that the message as sent was framed in accordance with the facts." (R. 4057) Mr. Stimson was referring to the status of the negotiations of the previous day on November 26, when the Ten Points were handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese, and to the fact that the President, as of the 27th of November, 1941, was still desirous that no overt act be committed by Page 221 the United States. With this clear understanding, let us see how these serious responsibilities were discharged. In making this statement we are deeply sympathetic with the state of mind, the irritation, the exasperation, the chicanery, trickery and deception of the Japanese ambassadors with whom the Secretary of State had so long and manfully struggled. What he did was human, but the results are the things with which we are concerned. Undoubtedly the Secretary of State had been frequently advised through the meetings of the War Council of the inadequate status of the defenses of the United States. Our Army and Navy were not ready for war, and undoubtedly the Secretary of State had been fully advised of that fact. So serious was this situation that General Marshall and Admiral Stark drafted a joint memorandum under the date of November 27 on this subject. This memorandum was addressed directly to the President, according to the testimony of General Marshall. It contained two things; first, a statement that the most essential thing then from the United States viewpoint was to gain time and to avoid precipitating military action so long as this could be done consistent with the National Policy because of the fact that the Army and Navy were not ready for war; and second, attention was called to the desirability of counter military action against Japan in event she engaged in specific acts of aggression (described in the memorandum). The memorandum then recommended among other things that "steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the Page 222 issuance of warnings to the Japanese against taking such aggressive action." (R. 9-10-11) The situation was delicate. Now let us turn back to Mr. Stimson's testimony. The War Council met with Mr. Hull on the 25th of November 1941. The *tentative* U.S. proposals to the Japanese were so drastic and harsh that Mr. Stimson testifies that when he read it his diary shows this was his contemporaneous impression of it: "Hull showed me the proposal for a three months' truce which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought, secured it, but I don't think that there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it because it was so drastic." Apparently the Secretary of War, in the light of his long experience with the Japanese, with whom he dealt extensively when he was Secretary of State to this government, was concerned at the situation, for his diary continues: "We were an hour and a half with Hull, and then I went back to the Department, and I got hold of Marshall." Thus the Secretary of War felt the situation that was to be precipitated by the action of the Secretary of State, Hull, necessitated his informing the Chief of Staff immediately of the threatened difficulty. Next, the Secretary of War attended a meeting at the White House. His diary describes it: "Then at 12 o'clock I went to the White House where we were until nearly half past one. At the meeting were Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark, and myself. There the President brought up the relationship with the Japanese. He brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as -- perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. We conferred on the general problem." Apparently, at that time no decision was reached and the Page 223 entire matter was left for further consideration. On the following day, November 26, 1941, the Stimson diary continues: "Hull told me over the telephone this morning that *he* had about made up *his* mind not to make the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day (the 25th) to the Japanese, but to kick the whole thing over and tell them that he had no other proposal at all." Apparently on the 26th in the morning, Mr. Hull had made up his mind not to go through with the proposals shown the day before to the Secretary of War containing the plan for the "Three Months' Truce". Evidently the action "to kick the whole thing over" as accomplished by presenting to the Japanese the counter proposal of the "Ten Points" which they took as an ultimatum. It was the document that touched the button that started the war, as Ambassador Grew so aptly expressed it. Again Mr. Stimson's diary relates "The 26th was the day he (Hull) told me he was in doubt whether he would go on with it." (R. 4051-2-3) Apparently the Secretary of War was not advised by the Secretary of State that he had handed this so-called ultimatum to the Japanese. The diary of the Secretary of War and his actions indicate that to be a fact. Witness what it says as of the morning of the 27th of November 1941: "The first thing in the morning, I called up Hull to find out what his final decision had been with the Japanese -- whether he had handed them the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, 'I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy'." Page 224 His diary continues: "I then called up the President and talked with him about it." He then took prompt action to confer with Secretary Knox, Admiral Stark, and with General Gerow, who appeared to be representing General Marshall in his absence at maneuvers. He was concerned with revising the draft radio of General Marshall, which became radio #472. Also, as he says, "A draft memorandum from General Marshall and Admiral Stark tot he President was examined, and the question of need for further time was discussed." (R. 4054) The advice from the Army and Navy to delay matters and get more time for defense preparations and not precipitate the issue evidently did not reach the President or the Secretary of State in time to be considered before the memorandum of the 26th was delivered to the Japanese. It seems well established that the sending of this "Ten Point" memorandum by the Secretary of State was used by the Japanese as the signal for starting the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese attacking force departed from Tankan Bay on the 27-28 November for its attack on Hawaii. It also appears that the delivery of the 14-point reply of the Japanese to this memorandum was contemporaneous with the attack. 4. WAR DEPARTMENT: The intentions of the War Department not to precipitate war, as far as the War Department was concerned, are clear and unmistakable. The messages sent to the Hawaiian Department show this to be a fact. The Navy apparently had the same idea because many of their messages likewise so indicate the situation and the Hawaiian Department was given the benefit of those messages. Page 225 To be concrete: the Navy message of October 16 concluded with the sentence, "In view of these possibilities you will take due precaution, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose previous intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan."; the message of November 24, from the Navy Department to Hawaii said in conclusion: "Inform senior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation nor precipitate Japanese action."; the message of November 27, #472 from the Chief of Staff to General Short says, "The United States desires that Japan commit the first over act ... these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population nor disclose intent."; the message from G-2 on the same day warns against an incident with the Japanese population by saying, "Axis sabotage and espionage probable". All this had an effect upon Short because his reply to the message of the 27th was "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." In order to prevent an untoward action by Short the message of the 27th as originally drafted started with the opening words, "Negotiations with Japan have been terminated" (R. 4270) were changed by the Secretary of War after consultation with the Secretary of State to the softer caution contained in the Stimson-drafted sentences: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable. Hostile action possible at any moment." Then followed the caution not to commit the first overt act. Page 226 In continuing on beyond November 27th, was the message from G-2 on November 28, #484, sent by General Arnold which was devoted to sabotage and defensive measures. On the same day the War Department sent message #482 to Short with similar tons and tenor. Short replied to #482 on the 28th with a very long message all dealing with sabotage and espionage. This ends the communications with Short by the Army until the final message of December 7, which arrived too late. Short was never informed of the Secretary of State's action in delivering the "Ten Points" counter proposals. He testified he first saw or heard of that document after the White Papers were published. General Short said, "I know nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came out." The message of November 27th did not convey to Short what it was meant to convey by the people who drafted it. While confusing, it contained information and instructions the significance of which should have been appreciated by Short and his staff. The two Navy messages of October 16 and 24, both of which cautioned against precipitation of an incident, could have added to Short's confusion in interpreting the message. The impression that the avoidance of war was paramount was heightened by the message immediately following the one of the 27th. In the first place, Short had no reaction from the War Department to his reply that he was acting only to prevent sabotage and to keep contact with the Navy. He felt confirmed in this action by the message on the 27th, from G-2, saying, "Actions of sabotage and espionage probable". Page 227 Immediately following that the next day were two additional messages dealing with sabotage and espionage. From that time on, November 28, until the message that was received after the attack, Short received no other word by courier, letter, radio, or otherwise. The only claim that he received any additional information was that he was told of messages of December 3, 4, and 6, about the Japanese destroying their codes and the Navy being instructed to destroy some of its codes. Short denies receiving this information. These acts of omission and commission on the part of the War Department undoubtedly played their part in the failure to put the Hawaiian Department in a proper state of defense. The record shows that from informers and other sources the War Department had complete and detailed information of Japanese intentions. Information of the evident Japanese intention to go to war in the very near future was well known to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations. It was not a question of fact; it was only a question of time. The next few days would see the end of peace and the beginning of war. If it be assumed that for any reason the information could not have been given to the Hawaiian Department, then it was a responsibility of the War Department to give orders to Short what to do, and to tell him to go on an all-out alert instead of a sabotage alert. As elsewhere related in detail, when vital information of December 6th reached G-2 of the War Department, not later than nine o'clock the evening of December 6, it was placed in Page 228 the locked pouch and delivered to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen. Smith, with a warning from Colonel Bratton, Chief of Far Eastern Section of G-2, that it contained a vitally important message. In fact the message implied war and soon. Whatever was the reason of Colonel Bedell Smith for not conveying this message to General Marshall on the night of December 6th, it was an unfortunate one. And further, with the top War Department officials fully aware of the critical nature of this situation, standing operating procedure should have required delivery of this vital information to General Marshall at once. He, himself, was responsible for the organization and operation of his own immediate office. This information could have been sent to Short on the afternoon (Honolulu time) of December 6. Additionally, this same information was given to General Gerow's Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division, and there is no evidence of action taken by that Division. The responsibility of War Department is clearly defined and plain. Action by it would have been sufficient further to have alerted the Hawaiian Department. It was in possession of the information which was the last clear chance to use the means available to meet an attack. It had the background of the full development of the Japanese preparation for war and its probable date. Again, the equally important and vital information of December 7th, the day of the attack, was in the possession of the War Department at 0900 on the morning of December 7. Colonel Bratton made an immediate effort to get the Chief of Page 229 Staff at that hour. It was not until nearly three hours later that any action was taken by the War Department, when time was of the greatest importance. Under the circumstances of the clear and explicit revelation of Japanese intentions, arrangements should have been made for immediate action to further warn Hawaii and not leave the situation to be acted upon when the Chief of Staff could not immediately be reached. The responsibility is the Chief of Staff's for not providing an arrangement by which another could act in so critical a situation when he could not readily be reached. Strange as it may appear, the War Department did not know the actual state of readiness of Short's command from November 27th to December 7th, 1941, though this information was contained in Short's report of action taken on November 27th. 5. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE ARMY AND NAVY MESSAGES: The practice of having General Short secure through the Navy in Hawaii copies of the naval messages tended toward confusion. We have taken occasion to compare the messages of the Navy and the messages of the Army delivered to General Short from October 16 to December 7. We find: *a*. That they were conflicting *b*. That the Navy messages were predominant with warnings of a conflict and the Army messages predominant with the idea of avoiding a conflict and taking precautions against sabotage and espionage. Short naturally took his choice between the two types of Page 230 messages and followed that of the War Department. Examination of the Navy messages of October 16, 24, November 27, December 3, 4, and 6, will show that their tenor was predominantly war. One Army message of November 27 and two of November 28 predominate in antisabotage warnings. Furthermore, the Navy message of November 27 and the Army message of November 27 from the Chief of Staff were conflicting: the Navy message flatly stated, "This is a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended." Now, contrast the opening sentences of the Army message which indicates that negotiations may still continue, where it says: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes. Only barest possibility that Japanese government might come back and offer to continue." The Navy message contained no warning to Hawaii to take precautions against sabotage or over acts, and no precautions as to the civilian population. To the contrary, the Army message gave explicit directions on this subject. This was followed on the same day by a G-2 message, which said, "It appears that the conference of the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable." The Navy war warning was further diluted in its effect upon Short by the Arnold-AG sabotage message on the 28th of November; and the additional G-2 message on sabotage on the 28th. These November 28 sabotage messages undoubtedly influenced Short to continue on his sabotage alert. Thereafter Short had only silence from Washington. Short was given no further clarification of this conflict amongst the messages. Page 231 There is no explanation why Short was not told of the so-called ultimatum. It was known to the Japanese because it was handed to them. 6. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION. Within the scope of its activities, this division performed well. It gathered much valuable and vital data. Through Colonel Bratton it insisted on the dissemination of this information to Field Commanders. There was a broad field for investigation, however, which was not touched by it or any intelligence agency of the American Government, either military or civil. In this field were the mandated islands, the home land and the home waters of the Japanese empire, and the areas in which the Japanese Navy and Army were operating. In these fields, reliance was place upon sources of information which were inadequate. The Japanese Navy was lost to us for considerable periods in those months prior to the outbreak of war. The task force which made the attack on 7 December 1941, left home ports, assembled at Tankan Bay, and notwithstanding that it was a relatively large convoy, sailed for thousands of miles without being discovered. Part of its aircraft was in flight for the targets at Pearl Harbor and on Oahu before we knew of its existence. Its detection was primarily a naval job, but obviously the army was intensely interested. Elsewhere in this report, the mass of detailed information which the Japanese had assembled relating to American activities has been discussed and is not repeated here. Discussing this subject before the Board, General Miles, G-2 in 1941, testified as follows: Page 232 "But to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. That was beyond our terms of efficiency." (R. 107) The disadvantages accruing from this situation could have been calamitous. The Japanese armed forces knew everything about us. We knew little about them. This should not come to pass again. Our intelligence service must be brought in line with the part which we are to play in world affairs. We must know as much about other major world powers as they know about us. This is an absolute condition precedent to intelligent planning by those charged with formulating our international policies and providing for our security. Out intelligence service should be second to none in its efficiency. It must not be inferred that this is the exclusive function of the M.I.D. It is a national problem. In the past our intelligence service has suffered from lack of funds, lack of interest, and legal obstacles and regulations. Steps should be taken to correct all of these. 7. WAR PLANS DIVISION: The War Plans Division, the supervising agency for the War Department for Overseas Departments, was charged with directing the preparation of and coordinating the war plans for Hawaii. It had the responsibility and duty to insure the implementing of such plans. Aside from the letters and telegrams sent throughout 1941 to General Short (and there were no letters from General Marshall to General Short after the first of November 1941,) no action after November 1, 1941, appears to have been taken by way of communication or inspections, or full report of Page 233 any sort, to reveal whether General Short was doing anything, whether he was doing it correctly, what his problems were, and what help could have been given him. The War Plans Division took no action when Short put the Alert Number 1 into operation and so reported. It took no steps to stop the use of the Hawaiian Department as a training station and put it on a combat basis, such as an outpost should have been, with threatened war. It took no steps to find out if the Hawaiian defenses were being implemented and built according to schedule and the right priorities. It took no steps to put the control of the building of its defenses on the Department Commander so that he could coordinate the building of defenses with his other defense preparations. General Gerow's own testimony clearly pictures the lack of organization and management of the War Plans Division of the Overseas Departments, such as the Hawaiian Department. The War Plans Division was responsible for the Overseas Department, said General Gerow. (R. 4334-4335) The War Plans Division was familiar with the equipment situation in Hawaii, such as lack of parts for radar. (R. 3425) It was their duty to do all they could to correct the deficiencies but there is no proof that any action was taken. (R. 4325-4326) The War Plans Division was responsible for drafting the operational messages to the Hawaiian Department. Gerow was responsible for drafting the message of the 27th and managed the drafting and final sending of that message. He admitted that he failed to follow up to see if the message of the 27th was being carried out and that was the War Plans Division's responsibility. Page 234 He said: "Admiral Standley: Then who would have been interested in following up that message to see whether those instructions were obeyed or not? "General Gerow: The War Plans Division, sir, should have been -- "Admiral Standley: War Plans Division. "General Gerow: Should have been responsible for following it up, sir. "Admiral Standley: That was not done then? "General Gerow: No, sir, it was not. ... "Admiral Standley: Then those instructions went by the board; nobody followed them up, then? "General Gerow: That is correct, sir; that is, between the 27th and the 7th." (Roberts Report 1857-1858) And he again admitted that he made an error in not realizing that the reply of Short, which referred to Message No. 472 by number, referred to that message. He thought it referred to a G-2 message. (Roberts Record 1857-1858) He also testified as follows: "General Grunert: Without such coordination, there was liable to be confusion and misunderstanding as to the intent of each one of the messages. Was that the War Plans Division? Was it the Chief of Staff? "General Gerow: It was done, usually, General, I believe by a matter of getting concurrence between the various divisions of the General Staff, on something that was going to be sent out." (R. 4336) ... "General Gerow: The coordination of concurrences, and then most of these important messages, I believe, went through the Secretary of the General Staff. "General Grunert: Then it appears to be the Secretary of the General Staff? "General Gerow: No. Page 235 "General Grunert: It appears you do not know just who does it, do you? "General Gerow: Well, no, sir." (R. 4337) He testified that it was not his particular duty in 1941 to coordinate all messages of the War Department that went to our overseas possessions. (R. 4338) Therefore the War Plans Division under General Gerow failed as follows: a. General Gerow failed to take action on Short's reply showing that he was taking precautions against sabotage only. He again failed to take action in that he assumed liaison with the Navy meant Short was taking the correct steps. The documents in the War Plans Division show that the Navy's responsibilities did not start until war was imminent or had taken place and that some formal action by Washington or the Hawaiian Department putting the agreements into effect was necessary. b. He was responsible for drafting the confusing message of November 27. c. He took no steps to deliver to Short additional available information. As Gerow testified as to Short's reactions to the message of the 27th: "No one knows what he would have done had he been in the position and *not having perhaps all information we had here*." (R. 1851) d. He did not check on the Hawaiian Department's activities to determine its state of readiness from November 28 through December 7. (R. 4306) Page 236 e. He relied upon the message of November 27 to give Short all the information he needed for full preparation for war, but did not check out if that was a fact. (R. 4256) f. The joint air estimate of General Martin and Admiral Bellinger under the joint agreement of General Short and Admiral Bloch as approved by Admiral Kimmel, stated that air attack was the prime threat against Hawaii; and when General Gerow was advised in a conference with the Secretary of War and the report to the Secretary of War from the Secretary of State, in addition to the intelligence information with which he was provided as to the status of the international situation, it was incumbent upon him to do two things which he failed to do: (1) To correct Short's mistake in going to Alert Number 1 instead of to Alert Number 2 or 3; and (2) To direct immediately the activation of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Defense Plan to put the Army, in conjunction with the Navy, on a complete war footing, ready for any eventuality. 8. NAVY DEPARTMENT: The Navy Department undertook by a signed agreement to provide long-distance reconnaissance in Hawaii. It assumed this responsibility admittedly without means of carrying it out in Hawaii. The Navy in Hawaii failed to advise Short of the sinking of enemy submarines in the outer harbor between six and seven Page 237 a.m. the morning of December 7. The Navy failed to advise Short of the Jaluit task force so that he could evaluate the information for himself. 9. CHIEF OF STAFF: The responsibility for the conditions in the military component of the War Department as depicted in this chapter rests with the Chief of Staff. At about this time, November 25-December 7, 1941, there seemed to have been in the War Department a firm conviction that war was imminent but also there seems to have been the conviction that it would start in the Southwest Pacific and evidently nobody had any belief that Hawaii was immediately in danger. There was the belief both in Hawaii and in Washington that war was on our doorstep but not on Hawaii's doorstep. This resulted in the main consideration being given to General MacArthur and the Philippines Islands and the resulting second consideration during this critical time to Hawaii. The unfortunate thing was that the Japanese "crossed us up" with a daring surprise attack. When the famous November 27 message was being prepared, consideration first was given to send it only to MacArthur and then it was decided to include Panama, Hawaii and the Western Defense Command. This shows the trend. As a result of the message of November 27 Short ordered only a sabotage alert and so reported to the War Department as of the same day. The import of Short's reply was little noticed in the War Department by either General Marshall or General Gerow. Just as General Short failed to interpret the full seriousness of the November 27 message, likewise the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the War Plans Division failed to Page 238 interpret the limited defense that Short's reply indicated in the face of known impending war. There was failure of understanding at both ends of the line. The Washington officials had full knowledge of impending events, which full knowledge was not available to Short. A cardinal principle in good management is the necessity to "follow up" on directions. The War Department had nine days in which to check up on the state of defense in Hawaii, which it did not do. Repeatedly, since General Short took command in Hawaii in February 1941, General Marshall during this peacetime had written to him at length, advising him on details of operation and here, late in November, with war expected almost daily, he communicated none of those personal messages containing needed inside information. The evidence indicates that the manner in which authority to act was delegated or not delegated had its influence on this situation. The Chief of Staff had three deputies, Generals Bryden, Arnold, and Moore. None of these three was given the secret information concerning the known Jap intentions. When General Marshall went away on November 27 he had, prior to departure, prepared a first draft of the November 27 message. It was the Secretary of War who initially followed through on it on November 27. Then it was given to Gerow to complete. Complete authority to act in General Marshall's absence does not seem to have been given to any one subordinate. Had there been an officer either with authority or with courage to act on the information that was in the War Department on the evening of December 6, and had he sent a message to Short, Page 239 Hawaii should have been fully alerted. As has been repeated so many times, there was positive evidence in the War Department that it was only a matter of days before war would ensure and the War Department had notice that Hawaii was on only a sabotage alert, inadequate for full warfare. Had a full war message, unadulterated, been dispatched or had direct orders for a full, all-out alert been sent, Hawaii could have been ready to have met the attack with what it had. What resulted was failure at both ends of the line. Responsibility laid both in Washington and in Hawaii. Hawaiian responsibility has been treated in Chapter III. To summarize: insofar as the Chief of Staff is related to these events there are specific things which appear in the record with which he was personally concerned. The following are of this nature: a. Failure to advise his Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Bryden, Arnold, and Moore, of the critical situation in the Pacific so that they might act intelligently for him in his absence. b. Failure to keep General Short fully informed as to the international situation and the probable outbreak of war at any time. c. The delay in getting General Short the important information reaching Washington on the evening of December 6 and the morning of December 7. d. Noting without taking action the sabotage message of Short which presumptively was on his desk on the morning of November 28, 1941. e. His admitted lack of knowledge of the condition of readiness of the Hawaiian Command during the period Page 240 of November 8 to December 7, 1941. The Board is impressed with the absolute necessity of considering the conduct of all responsible officers in the light of the situation as it existed in November and early December, 1941. It was a case of intelligent men arriving at the best decision possible with all the facts that were before them. This is the basis for successful procedure in either military or civil affairs. In both these fields occasional mistakes are made notwithstanding that such principles are followed. Such was the case at Pearl Harbor. This recital is in explanation, not justification. The thinking in the War Department and the Hawaiian Department was faulty in that it emphasized probabilities to the exclusion of capabilities. 10. SUMMARY: In summarizing the "Responsibilities in Washington" it appears that the issue between the United State and Japan was precipitated before the Army and Navy could prepare themselves to follow through on the consequences thereof and that coordination and cooperation between the State, War and Navy Departments lacked effectiveness, at least in this respect. As to the War Department's responsibilities there was: a. A lack of organization for war. b. A lack of adequate procedure under which to advise the Hawaiian Department and to control its action. c. A lack of instructions to the Hawaiian Department based upon full knowledge of its actions and full knowledge of the international situation. d. Failure on November 26-27, November 28, during the period from November 28 to December 7, and on December 6 and 7, to take adequate and prompt action on vital information then at hand. These responsibilities in no way mitigate those of General Short as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. However, they do add others to the list of those responsible.