CHAPTER VI Page 294 CONCLUSIONS INDEX I. EXPLANATIONS: 1. Scope 2. Estimate upon which action was based. 3. Relationship of Commander in Hawaii. II. GROUPING OF CONCLUSIONS: 1. Pearl Harbor Attack. a. Attack a surprise. b. Two primary causes. c. Responsibilities. 1. Secretary of State. 2. Chief of Staff. 3. War Plans division. 4. Hawaiian Department. Page 295 CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS I. EXPLANATIONS As prelude to the citation of conclusions the following is pertinent: 1. SCOPE: Attention is called to the fact that the record developed by the investigation of this Board contains a great amount of evidence, both oral and documentary, relating to incidents and issues about which no conclusions are drawn. Evidence was introduced on these so that anything which might have had a bearing on the Pearl Harbor disaster would be fully explored. The Board considered that its mission implied the revealing of all pertinent facts to the end that charges of concealment would be fully met. In formulating its conclusions the Board has selected for treatment only those things which it considers material for a clear understanding of the events which collectively caused the Pearl Harbor disaster. The full report of the Board discusses and analyses the testimony in its entirety and must be read for a clear understanding of the history of the Pearl Harbor attack. 2. ESTIMATES UPON WHICH ACTION WAS BASED: The responsible officers in the War Department and in the Hawaiian Department, without exception, so far as this Board has been able to determine, estimated by facts which then seemed to impel the conclusion that initially the impending was would be confined to the land and seas lying south of the Japanese homeland, as forces of the Japanese Army and Navy were concentrating and Page 296 moving in that direction. British and Dutch forces were being organized and made ready to move in opposition. The Philippine Islands which were in this theater constituted a threat to the flank of the Japanese force if the United States should enter the war. Supplies and reinforcements were being rushed to the Philippines. There was complete ignorance of the existence of the task force which attacked Pearl Harbor. Intelligent officers in high places made the estimate and reached the conclusions in the light of these known facts. They followed a sane line of reasoning. These statements are in explanation, not justification. The estimate was in error. The procedure in arriving at it was faulty, because it emphasized Japanese probabilities to the exclusion of their capabilities. Nevertheless, the thinking of these officers was colored and dominated by this estimate and their acts were similarly influenced. 3. RELATIONSHIP OF COMMANDERS IN HAWAII: The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, the commanders of the Army and Navy forces in Hawaii, were very cordial. They were making earnest and honest efforts to implement the plans which would result in the two services operating as a unit in an emergency. These highly desirable ends had not been accomplished at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. 4. INTERCHANGE OF INFORMATION -- STATE AND WAR DEPARTMENT: The Board was impressed with the apparent complete interchange of information between the State Department and the War Department. As a result the War Department was kept in close touch with international developments and the State Department knew of the Army's progress and its preparations for war. Page 297 II. GROUPING OF CONCLUSIONS The conclusions group themselves logically in two divisions: the Pearl Harbor attack, and operations of the Engineers in Hawaii. We shall consider these in the order stated. 1. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK: a. The attack on the Territory of Hawaii was a surprise to all concerned: the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian Department. It was daring, well-conceived and well-executed, and it caught the defending forces practically unprepared to meet it or to minimize its destructiveness. b. The extent of the Pearl Harbor disaster was due primarily to two causes: 1. The failure of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department adequately to alert his command for war, and 2. The failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the type of alert taken by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to direct him to take an adequate alert, and the failure to keep him adequately informed as the developments of the United States-Japanese negotiations, which in turn might have caused him to change from the inadequate alert to an adequate one. c. We turn now to responsibilities: 1. The Secretary of State -- the Honorable Cordell Hull. The action of the Secretary of State in delivering the counter-proposals of November 26, 1941, was used by the Japanese as the signal to begin the war by the attack Page 298 on Pearl Harbor. To the extent that it hastened such attack it was in conflict with the efforts of the War and Navy Department to gain time for preparations for war. However, war with Japan was inevitable and imminent because of irreconcilable disagreements between the Japanese Empire and the American Government. 2. The Chief of Staff of the Army. General George C. Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars: (a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little. (b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war. (c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this. Page 299 (d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending threat of war. 3. Chief of the War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, Major General Leonard T. Gerow, failed in his duties in the following particulars: (a) To keep the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, adequately informed on the impending war situation by making available to him the substance of the data being delivered to the War Plans Division by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. (b) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive; on the contrary he approved the message of November 27, 1941, (472) which contained confusing statements. (c) To realize that the state of readiness reported in Short's reply to the November 27th message was not a state of readiness for war, and he failed to take corrective action. (d) To take the required steps to implement the existing joint plans and agreements between the Army and Navy to insure the functioning of the two services in the manner contemplated. Page 300 4. Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, failed in his duties in the following particulars: (a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch. (b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible commanders. (c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy. (d) To replace inefficient staff officers. Page 304 (Pages 301-303 not provided) CHAPTER VII RECOMMENDATIONS Recommendations: NONE George Grunert Lieut. General, U.S. Army. President Henry D. Russell Major General, U.S. Army. Member Walter H. Frank Major General, U.S. Army. Member. Friday, 20 October 1944.