X-NEWS: muvms6 soc.history: 304 Relay-Version: VMS News - V6.0-3 14/03/90 VAX/VMS V5.5; site muvms6.wvnet.edu Path: marshall.wvnet.edu!wvnvms.wvnet.edu!darwin.sura.net!haven.umd.edu!purdue!mentor.cc.purdue.edu!mace.cc.purdue.edu!jewell Newsgroups: soc.history,alt.war Subject: Japanese Econ & Mil. Preps, 1931-1941 Message-ID: From: jewell@mace.cc.purdue.edu (Larry Jewell) Date: Wed, 19 May 1993 13:07:03 GMT Sender: news@mentor.cc.purdue.edu (USENET News) Followup-To: soc.history,alt.war Organization: Purdue University Keywords: World War II Lines: 277 Xref: muvms6 soc.history:304 alt.war:44 FROM: UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, The War in the Pacific, STRATEGY AND COMMAND: THE FIRST TWO YEARS, Lous Morton, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D.C., 1962, Ch. II Japanese Policy and Strategy, 1931-July 1941, pp54-58. Transcribed and edited by: Larry W. Jewell jewell@mace.cc.purdue.edu ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PREPARATIONS In the decade 1930-40, industrial production in Japan increased at a phenomenal rate. In the opening years of the decade, Japanese industrial output was valued at six billion yen and the emphasis was on the light industries; by 1941 production had increased fivefold and heavy industry constituted 72.7 percent of the total.[13] The military significance of this sensational rise in industrial production can be found in the emphasis on heavy industries, the basis of any modern military machine, and a measure of its importance lies in the increase in annual steel production from 1.8 to 6.8 million tons. In 1930 japan had produced only 500 vehicles and 400 aircraft. Ten years later the annual production of vehicles was 48,000 units, and the Japanese aircraft industry was manufacturing over 5,000 planes annually. Shipbuilding in Japan showed a similar increase during these years. Deliveries under the naval construction program in this period totaled 476,000 tons, and construction of merchant ships rose from 92,093 tons in 1931 to 405,195 tons in 1937.[14] Much of this increase in industrial production, especially in the heavy industries, was due to government expenditures for military purposes which rose sharply after 1936 as a result of the February 1936 incident and the Army's ascendancy. ( Table 1 [Appended to end of this posting, LWJ]) Military expenditures after 1936 reflected military domination of political life. The entire economy of the nation was rigidly controlled and oriented toward war; the armament industries were expanded, and every effort was made to stockpile strategic raw materials.[15] The production of armaments after 1936 increased rapidly to meet the demands of the China war. This increase was accomplished under a 5- year plan developed by the Army in 1937 and officially adopted by the Cabinet two years later. Separate programs were established for Japan, Manchuria, and northern China, and certain industries considered essential for war were selected for rapid expansion.[16] Some success was achieved in Manchuria under the 5-year plan but the program for Japan had to be modified several times. The aviation and munitions industries made rapid progress, the steel industry achieved a remarkable success, and the production of machine tools surpassed the goals established. But other basic industries, such as the production of synthetic oil and hydroelectric power, were limited by the shortage of raw materials, and, despite the most strenuous efforts, failed to reach the goals set by the Army.[17] During these years the Japanese armed forces also began building up stockpiles of essential supplies, Reserves of weapons, ammunition, and other important military equipment were adequate, but those of certain strategic materials were not. The quantity of bauxite on hand in 1941 totaled 254,740 tons, which represented a 9-month supply. Also, since 1938, Japan had been forced to draw upon its stockpile of iron ore for the war in China, and at the end of 1941 had only a few months' reserve.[18] The shortage of petroleum production was the key to Japan's military situation. It was the main problem for those preparing for war and, at the same time, the reason that the nation was moving toward war. For the Navy, the shortage of oil was critical; for the Army it was always a limitation. To secure reserves of this precious commodity, Japan imported heavily during the decade of the 1930's, the amount reaching 37,160,000 barrels in 1940. During that year Japan produced only 3,153,000 barrels, less than 12 percent of the nation's peacetime requirements. To increase the amount available for military use, civilian consumption of oil was curtailed sharply after 1937, and practically all civilian motor traffic was abolished or required to use wood and charcoal burners. Despite these measures, Japan had only 43,000,000 barrels of oil reserves in 1941, an amount sufficient at most for two years of war under the most favorable conditions, if supplemented by resources within the empire.[19] The growth of Japan's military forces matched its industrial growth during these critical years. Between 1936 and 1941, the number of men conscripted for the Army doubled. At the end of 1937 Japan had 24 divisions, 16 of which were stationed in China; three years later the total had risen to 50: 27 in China, 12 in Manchuria, and the remainder in Korea and the home islands. The Army Air Forces showed the greatest proportionate growth, increasing from 54 squadrons in 1937 to 15o in 1941. Pilots were well trained and about half of them had actual combat experience in China or in border fighting with Soviet Russia.[20] (Table 2 [Appended to this posting, LWJ]) Japan's naval forces, which had been limited first by the Washington Naval Conference (1921) and then by the London Naval Conference (1930), grew rapidly after 1936 when Japan withdrew from the naval conference of that year. In 1937, twenty new vessels with a tonnage of 55,360 tons were completed; the next year this amount increased to 63,589 tons, and by 1941 had reached the prewar peak of 225,159 tons. This tonnage represented one battleship of the YAMATO class, 10 carriers of unspecified tonnages, 7 cruisers, and 37 destroyers.[21] By 1941, Japanese combat tonnage had risen to 1,059,000 tons, more than twice that of 1922, and Japan's fleet was more powerful than the combined United States-British fleets in the Pacific. Despite these preparations for war, the Japanese Army and Navy had no military or naval plans to guide them. There were in the files of the supreme command statements dealing with national defense policy and with the employment of troops, but these dated from 1930 and were expressed in general principles rather than in terms of specific operations. Moreover, they provided only for a defensive war against either the United States or the Soviet Union, and emphasized that in no case should Japan fight more than one of these countries at the same time. There was no mention in these statements of a possible war with Great Britain or the Netherlands, or of war against a combination of these powers. They were, in the words of one Japanese officer, "outdated writings" and "utterly nonsensical from the standpoint of authority and contents." [22] The lack of a concrete strategical plan was partially overcome by the Army and Navy's annual operations plans. Each year the two services worked out their own plans for operations against the two named enemies separately and then submitted them for Imperial approval. These plans made no provision for total war, and so long as the government refused to decide which was the most likely enemy or to admit the possibility of war with more than one nation, it was impossible to establish priorities, for a war against Russia would require strengthening the Army and a war against the United States would call for larger naval appropriations. The Navy's 1940 plan for a war with the United States, therefore, simply declared that the Imperial Navy, in co-operation with the Army, would destroy American strength in the Far East and maintain command of Far Eastern waters "by intercepting and crushing American fleets." [23] How America was to be defeated was never even considered. The Army's annual plan for 1940 emphasized defensive operations against the Soviet' Union from Manchuria. Operations to the south were "secondary and supplementary in importance."[24] In case of war with the United States, the planners expected that Japanese forces would take the Philippines and Guam, but made no concrete plans for their seizure or for countering American reaction. The main objective of the Army, they believed, was to prepare against attack, not to fight a war against the United States. The 1940 plan was equally vague about Great Britain and the Netherlands. In case of war the plan provided for the seizure of Hong Kong and Singapore, but not for the Netherlands Indies, Burma, India, or Australia. Japan, said the Army's Chief of Operations, "had no capacity to meet the need of a crisis ... with drastic measures on a grand scale." [25] Thus, throughout the decade of the 1930's, the Japanese leaders had no military strategy for a war against a coalition such as they later faced, and their policy was based almost entirely on political considerations and on what one officer called their "exceedingly conceptual and common sense understanding of war strategy." Deliberations of the Cabinet and of the Liaison and Imperial Conferences,[26] though attended by Army and Navy officers, were not limited by precise studies and plans outlining the course of military and naval action to be taken in every conceivable situation. They were guided, rather, by political strategy " pushed without any consideration of a definite war strategy plan." [27] [13] Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), p. 1; United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy (Washington, 1946) p. 12. [14] Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruc- tion, pp. 2-3; USSBS, Japanese Naval Shipbuilding (Washington, 1946), p. 1; USSBS, Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding (Washington, 1947), pp. 4-5. [15] IMTFE, Judgment, pt. B, pp. 114ff. [16] Ibid., p. 353. [17] History of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, 1941-1945, Japanese Studies in World War II, 72, p. 5; Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, ch. I. [18] Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, p. 48. [19] USSBS, Oil in Japan's War (Washington, 1946), p. 1. [20] Hist of Army Sec, Imperial GHQ, Japanese Studies in World War 11, 72, pp. 2-3; USSBS, Japanese Air Power (Washington, 1946), pp. 4-5. [21] USSBS, Japanese Naval Shipbuilding, app. A. [22] Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt. IV, Japanese Studies in World War II, 150, pp. 1-2. [23] Ibid., p. 2. [24] Deposition of former Lt. Gen. Shinichi Tanaka, Chief of Operations, Japanese General Staff, IMTFE, exhibit 3027. [25] Ibid. [26] The Liaison Conference was an informal body consisting of the service chiefs, the principal civilian ministers, and other high government officials, and served as a link between Imperial General Headquarters and the Cabinet. The same body when it met with the Emperor on more important occasions and under more formal circumstances was known as the Imperial Conference. [27] Political Strategy Prior to Outbreak of War, pt. IV, Japanese Studies in World War II, 150, p. 3. Table 1 JAPANESE MILITARY BUDGET, 1931-1940 (in millions of yen) Military Budget as Percent of Year Military Budget Total Expenditures ---------------------------------------------------------- 1931 434 29.4 1932 733 37.6 1933 873 39.2 1934 955 44.2 1935 1,032 46.8 1936 1,105 48.4 1937 3,953 71.6 1938 6,097 75.4 1939 6,417 71.7 1940 7,266 65.9 Source: Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction, p.5 JAPANESE ARMY GROUND AND AIR FORCES AND NAVY AIR FORCES 1937-1941 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941(8 Dec) __________________________________________________________________ Army Ground Forces Divisions 24 + 34 41 50 51 6 Reserve ------------------------------------------------------------------ Army Air Forces (First-Line Aircraft) .................................................................. Bombers 210 330 450 500 660 .................................................................. Fighters 210 240 280 360 550 .................................................................. Recon. 120 130 180 200 290 ------------------------------------------------------------------ Navy Air Forces .................................................................. Carrier Based 216 269 201 167 684 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Land based ................................................................... Bombers 204 228 288 264 443 ................................................................... Fighters 132 132 132 132 252 ................................................................... Torpedo 108 132 156 180 92 ................................................................... Others 178 200 228 306 198 ................................................................... Source: Japanese Opns in SWPA, GHQ Hist Series, II, p. 54. -- #L.W. Jewell Moderator at the Veterans Information Site (veteran@cc.purdue.edu)# #& WWII-L Listowner: "Sunday's horoscope is note worthy because of its strange,# #sudden and wholly unpredictable and inexplicable occurrences, affecting all # #phases of life." "Your Horoscope" L.A. Evening Herald Express, Sat, 12/06/41 #