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Date: Mon, 24 Sep 90 21:08:25 -0500
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Subject: Sept. 24, 1990, CND-EP Posting
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+  C h i n a   N e w s   D i g e s t  +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

=====================  Europe / Pacific Section (CND-EP)  =====================
                              September 24, 1990

---------------------------- Table of Contents ---------------------------
No. Subject                                                     # of Lines

1. What Can Overseas Chinese Do for Democracy in China ? ..............400
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1. What Can Overseas Chinese Do for Democracy in China ?
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>From: [email-masked]  (Anthony Lee) Mon Sep 17 08:37:01 1990

On Saturday the 8th of September 1990, the Federation for A Democractic China
(Queensland sub-branch of the Australian branch (FDC Queensland)) held
our first seminar titled "What can overseas Chinese do for democracy in
China ?".  Our guest speaker was Dr Gau Chang Fan from Griffith University.
We hoped to use this seminar to kickstart a series a newsletter which will
serve as a basis for discussion on topics related to the political
situation in China.

The following is an extract of Dr Gau's presentation.  If you are interested
in further discussion on issues that Dr Gau has raised or if you want to
contribute articles to our newsletter then please either send them to me
by email or posted to:

Warwick Powell
c/o Division of Asian and International Study
Griffith University
Nathan
Qld 4111
Australia

Dr Gau's presentation:
=======================================================
"What can overseas Chinese do for democracy in China ?"
=======================================================

                   Zenmoban

     My talk is meant to function as an introduction which
consists of two parts. In part one I will touch on the present
situation in the China field so that other speakers can take
up the issue. In part two I will direct my attention to the
Chinese side so that our Chinese scholars present today may
air their views.

Part One: The Left and China

     In the Eighties of this century one phenomenon and one
event more than anything else have had the kind of influence
that will effect us all right into the next century, i.e. the
Gorbachev Phenomenon and the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. Whatever
may happen to Gorbachev himself, the Soviet Union, the Russian
Empire and Eastern Europe will never be the same again thanks
to Gorbachev's almost single-handed efforts. Equally, whatever
may happen to Deng Xiaoping and the Communist Party of China,
the blood of hundreds and perhaps thousands of young students
in Beijing has fertilized some fundamental change that is
bound to take place in China sooner or later. The two together
have changed the political landscape all over the world and
their full effect will not be manifested until many years to come.

     What has happened in both China and Eastern European
block including Russia seems to show that as a different
ideological model and a political alternative to Capital
system what is called Communism has gone bankrupt. As an
indication of this, the Communist Party of Italy dropped their
flag of hammer and sickle after the Beijing Massacre. The
Australian Communist Party changed its name by calling itself
the New Left Party. The trouble with this retreat is the that
the so-called Left themselves find it difficult to keep their
feet on the ground. The Left in the West had had some
difficult times already in the climate of Thatcherism and
Reaganite Cowboyism. But in the Eighties, the Left's defeat
seemed so absolute and complete that they looked like running
away naked. Some left intellectuals tried to pull themselves
together to gain some ground, like the shakeup of the New
Statesman and the New Society in the U.K. and the Writer's
Meeting in London in 1989, but with little success. Some
magazines of left tendency owe their success to marketing
strategy rather than to their intellectual backbone. The New
Internationalist, for instance, does not aim at retaining a
ideological battle ground. Instead, its successful function
has been in highlighting topical issues like the protection of
environment and Third World poverty whereas Marxism Today
marginalises itself so much that in terms of ideological
content what one reads in it can be found in any decent
intellectual journal.

     On the China front, the defeat of the Left is tragically
shattering. Joseph Needham, the prominent and respectable
scholar in Chinese civilization and technology, had only this
to say after the Beijing Massacre:" History does not seem to
favour the black-haired people". The Society for Anglo-Chinese
Understanding (SACU) has long maintained a friendly and
sympathetic attitudes towards China and the Chinese Government
so much so that at some point SACU was nicknamed as the
Society for Apologizing and Covering Up (for the Chinese
authorities). After the Cultural Revolution, the mouth organ
of SACU, China Now has become more "objective" and detached.
Even so, not long after the Beijing upheaval in 1989, SACU has
to move its headquarters from London to Manchester. Most
Chinese Revolution enthusiasts and admirers of Maoist idealism
were literally fragmented by the brutal suppression of the
students movement. Their long term investment of emotion and
ideas in China were torn to pieces by the tanks on Tiananmen
Square. A tragic example of this is the British linguist David
Cook who has worked in Beijing since the 1949 Revolution.
Despite his hard work and devotion he was jailed for seven
years during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. He
forgave the Chinese authorities for this "misfortune". But he
could not forgive them for the 1989 Massacre. Another example
is William Hinton, the author of Fanshen, amongst others. He is
one of the few prominent figures in the United States who
devoted his life and energy to socialist revolution in China.
Having had the experience of working for a long time in a
Chinese commune he was suspicious and critical of Deng's
reform. But he remained friendly with the Chinese authorities
and was ready to be convinced of the benefits of the reform
until the Massacre which naturally outraged him.

     The Left was disillusioned with the Soviet Union long ago
when Stalin's crimes were revealed. Actually they were more
than disillusioned. For some, their despair was not just
Stalin's Russia, it was the collapse of an alternative
ideology. Orwell's Animal Farm is a good illustration.
However, for some others, China began to cultivate their
idealism. China was gradually perceived not only as a better
alternative to the Soviet Union, but also a model for the
underdeveloped Third World countries. Mao's Cultural Revolution
was considered to be particularly significant because it
appeared to be a a massive grass-root revolution without guns
and bombs. Later when the Chinese themselves completely
denounced the Cultural Revolution and described it as "ten
years of turmoil" and as "fascist dictatorship" the Left found
themselves in an embarrassing situation of having difficulties
in explaining the whole thing even to themselves. Then it was
the beginning of ten years of romance between the Chinese
"Capitalist Roaders" and Western "hamburger" businessmen.
While still trying to make sense of the baffling development
the Left were met with the devastating Beijing Massacre. The
Liberal critics like could now say to the Left who seemed to
have dominated the field for decades:" I told you so long
ago". There seems to be no more ideological battle and the
Left has lost its war at Tiananmen Square. That is the End of
History, claimed Fukuyama.

Part Two: Chinese in Exile and Their Tasks

     For those who are in the West, their mind cannot help but
be engaged in two kind of activities: a) recognizing and
understanding the West and b) analyzing and re-analyzing China.

     Ever since Kang Youwei's Reform in the late 19th Century,
China's development has been tied to her adjustment to the
West. Reformists of all political strands have had to think of
strategies to cope with the West and at the same time have had
to take inspiration from Western sources when considering the
road to be taken for China. The West has become an evil and
yet irresistible woman.

     There has never been much market for those who advocate
to embrace the West thoroughly and whole-heartedly. There was
an attempt to do this during the May Fourth Movement, but only
a passing fancy.

     Those who have dominated political stage for the past one
hundred years or so are those who have made use of some
aspects of Western values. For those people, things Western
are a necessary evil. This beautiful woman, i.e. the West,  is
more or less a captivating prostitute, dirty, decadent and
immoral. But for a desperate man, he has either to take her
into his arms secretly; or, if openly, give her a smack on the
face afterwards to show his moral integrity.

     Slogans like "Zhongzue wei ti xixue wei yong", "Yang wei
zhong yong" basically reflect this kind of mentality. After
the Liberation, slogans like "Fandui zichanjieji de tangyi
paodan", "Dou si pi xiu", "Da gong wu si" and "Fandui
zichanjieji ziyouhua" are essentially aimed at rejecting
Western values.

     In the mind of many Chinese, there is something
categorically and essentially Chinese that is morally superior
to and spiritually more valuable than that of the West. And
that thing, whatever that is, must be upheld or else there
will be "Tian xia da luan", "Bu cheng ti tong", "Wu fa wu
tian",  in a word, the end of the world.

     Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang, on the other hand are
pragmatists who do not claim to hold moral high ground. When
Deng insists on the so-called Four Basic Principles, he does
not mean that these principles are essentially Chinese and
therefore morally superior. What he believes is that in order
to hold China together, the grip of power by the Communist
Party in China cannot be loosen.

     Looking from this perspective and considering the fact
that there was already a developing power struggle within the
Party and that students' demonstrations had already had great
impact all over China in those weeks, one might be able to
make some sense of the Beijing Massacre.

     The students were romantic, idealistic and even naive
sometimes. They were idealistic about China's reform, about
the Communist Party, about their own image and power and above
all about Western democracy. They were intoxicated, for
instance, by the so-called people's power winning in the
Philippines as projected on the TV screen without releasing
what really happened in that country.

     This is not to say that what the students did was wrong
or bad. On the contrary, there can never be anything wrong
about a student's movement. Indeed there can never be anything
wrong about being romantic and idealistic. That is part of
human nature, an important part of human nature that makes us
vital, interesting, and above all humane. That is why the
brutal suppression should be condemned as inhumane.

     The students of the May Fourth Movement were not romantic
and idealistic. Furthermore, the starting point of the May
Fourth was the struggle against Western Powers (Japan-"Dong
yang guizi"-was already perceived as part of the West) That is
why they succeeded to certain extent and in some ways both
immediately and afterwards for a long time to come whereas
this time last year a tragedy of enormous scale occurred.

     This is not to say that the students movement last year
is insignificant. On the contrary, it's significance is no
less, if not more, than that of its predecessor 70 years ago.
The tragedy is that hundreds and perhaps thousands died. But
it is the death not only of these heroic youth, it is the
death of an ideology, the death of a nation. China could never
be the same again. She has changed overnight.
     There are some apprehensions about Chinese scholars not
going back to China. Some would argue that there is a moral
responsibility for Chinese scholars, especially those
sponsored by the Government, to go back and work in China.
This is a complex issue. First of all, many Chinese scholars
are ready to go back and they do not intend to settle down in
the West for good. Therefore to say that they are not
returning is at least not accurate. Secondly, it is very
difficult to make a moral judgment here. You could argue that
by refusing to go back and therefore refusing to support a
government that is corrupt and repressive one is maintaining
a moral ground. Thirdly, by staying in the West, the Chinese
scholars, because of better environment, cam make a greater
contribution to human knowledge than if they go back to China.
There is, finally, another point. China is full of talented
people and what the Government does is suppress them. The
amount of money wasted, e.g. bad management and spent e.g.
eaten at banquets, by the corrupt officials is beyond our
imagination. To save money for a government that does not know
and that does not care what it is doing is of no help of the people.

     What we have to realize is that the exile environment
provides the best opportunity for us to discuss deeply and
thoroughly some theoretical issues that are important for
China's future.  We have the responsibility to do that. In
order to take up this responsibility, we have to be daring. On
the one hand, we have to let our imagination run loose. On the
other hand, we have to be disciplined and do some patient
work. The Chinese mind has long been trained to listen, to
obey and to tread on a narrow path. This is the result of both
cultural tradition and political suppression. What we need now
is to get rid of all these constrains. At the same time we
must work hard. It is no use shouting slogans and talking
cliches. Let us admit that China lags behind the West not only
in science and technology, but also in social science and
humanity studies in terms of sophistication. Let us admit that
we are naive about the West as well as about ourselves. Let us
admit the remarks made by prominent people like Fang Lizi are
really common sense and truism. These things need to be said
and it is good that Fang had the courage to say them. But it is
far from enough. Let us admit that in China it is not only
that we cannot say what we want to say, but also that we do
not really have much to say! We have to be much more
sophisticated than we are now to be qualified for talking
about China's future.

     Suppose that China changes in few years' time. Change can
be manifested in different forms, e.g. gradual reform, Zhao
comes to power, palace coup, civil war. Suppose that by then
we can all go back to do something for China, like the
students returned from Japan and other countries in the West
at the turn of the century, what programmes can we put over to
the Chinese people? What advices can we give to those in power
who are willing to seek our advice? What can we do if we come
to power ourselves? Since the exile environment provides with
a kind of freedom that does not exist in China, the Chinese
scholars should make the best use of this intellectual space.

     As an indication for the kind of problems that I have in
mind let me put the following theoretical issues to you:

1. What is it that is so special so that it is called
   Chinese? If there is such a thing why should we
   insist on keeping it? Why are we so paranoid about
   this Chineseness? Why do we all think that we are
   Chinese?

2. Before we ask whether Marxism is out of date or not we
might
   as well ask: what is it in China's present political system
   that it is really Marxist?

3. What is "socialism"? Is China a socialist country? If public
   ownership of the means of production is the only or major
   criterion, what difference is there between Taiping Tianguo,
   Sun Zhongshan's ideas and the present system?

4. What does democracy mean to China and the Chinese? Does
   democracy necessarily lead to economic success? If not, why
   do we advocate it? What are its intrinsic merits, if any?

5. What do the so-called Four Dragon countries have in common?
   What is or are the keys to their economic success? Can China
   copy them?

6. What exactly does Neo-Authoritarianism mean? What does it mean
   in China's contexts?

7. What is to be done with the issue of ownership of
   the means of production? Privatization? If so, how
   and to what extent? If not, why? Do we not believe that
   it is better for the wealth to be held in the hands of
   the state than in the hands of the individuals? Why?

8. How to institutionalize the Chinese army in such
   a way that it is not a political army which holds
   the key to internal stability?

9. What should be the best long term policy in the countryside
   with respect to ownership of the land, education,
   mechanization, population control and the abolition of
   poverty?

10.During the process of China's further industrialization,
   what precaution can we take by learning lessons from
   the West as well as developing countries with respect
   to issues like internal migration, the protection of
   environment and quality of life?

11.Is there a moral crisis in the Western societies? How and
   where? Is the West in decline?

12.Do we need some moral authority like God or Confucianism
   to held China together? Why? What will happen to China if
   there is no, say, Confucianism? Indeed what held China
   together for the past 40 years? Do we need an ideology? Why?

13.Should China give freedom to mass media? Why is it that the
   Chinese are so sensitive about the freedom of thinking and
   freedom of spirit anyway?

14.What makes China different from any other country, for
   instance, either the Soviet Union, or Brazil (I do not know
   about Albania and Cuba) is that there is no middle class in
   China. Do we need to cultivate a middle class? In other words,
   do we have to let professional people like doctors, lawyers,
   academies, artists and managers to have some privilege? If
   yes, why? If not why? Is the traditional mentality "Bu fan
   gua, er fan bu jun" a hindrance to competition? Or don't we
   need to encourage competition?

15.What should be the proper channel to produce civil servants?
   That is to say, how to solve the "jiebanren wenti"? How to
   reduce the power of politicians? How to institutionalize the
   salary system so that corruption unique to Chinese practice
   can be at least be limited?

16.What should be the acceptable Tibetan policy, i.e. acceptable
   for both the Tibetan and the Chinese, and above all the
   Tibetans?

And I can think of many more.

     There are many China experts in Australia. We have to learn
from them and make use of their knowledge and research. However,
we must also be aware that their emphasis and interest are
different. Because of their historical and cultural contexts they
look at China from different perspective. Because of their
national and personal interest they have different research
market. For example, they may stress on explaining China and on
predicting China's development whereas we Chinese students in
exile, at least some of us, would like to make things happen in
China in a way that we think will benefit the Chinese people. But
as I mentioned earlier, the complexity does not stop here. At the
moment, it seems that the liberal critics of China have got the
upper hand. Therefore the Chinese scholars in exile have to face
two problems. Problem one: How to research and work in an
environment that is dominantly Western-centered. Their method,
their approach and attitudes are all a part of the Western
intellectual Establishment. For instance, if you cite a Chinese
source or reference your Australian colleague may not know or
simply not be interested. Problem two: How to deal with the
different factions of the academics. My impression of the liberal
critics of China is that they seem to love everything traditional
and old about China. But they hate modern China and China's
recent 40 years' of history. They think that the present Chinese
system is a monster imposed by somebody. But by whom? The
Russians? It seems absurd. China is China now and then. You
cannot separate then and there from now and here.

     Precisely because the above mentioned difference we can
complement each other. That is why the establishment of a
newsletter that we have been thinking of is important. That is
another agenda item in our seminar.
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