From @ubvm.cc.buffalo.edu:owner-china-nt@UGA.CC.UGA.EDU Wed Nov 24 01:56:21 1993 Reply-To: ccf-editor@ifcss.org Sender: China-Net Subject: CCF #9321, Nov 24: "Dialogue on Development of a Country" Comments: To: china-nt@uga.cc.uga.edu To: Multiple recipients of list CHINA-NT ==+==+==+== C h i n e s e C o m m u n i t y F o r u m ==+==+==+=== Wednesday, November 24, 1993 (Issue No. 9321) +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= Chinese Community Forum (CCF) is a journal published on China-Net. CCF is dedicated to the discussion and debate on the issues related to the Chinese community. The opinions expressed here do not necessarily represent the views of the Editorial Board of CCF. Contributions to the discussions and suggestions of new topics are very much appreciated. +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+= Table of Contents Author | # of Lines ============================================================================ 1. Theme of the Issue: Dialogue on Development of a Country Economical vs Political and Social a. Introduction................................................Ning Luo 9 b. Nobel Prize for Economics and "Economy First, Politics Later"....... 75 c. Nobel Peace Prize and "Pure Economical Cause"....................... 30 d. Changes: Economic vs. Politic....................................... 48 e. If You Still Think That Political Reform Could Wait after Economy... 78 2. China Watch a. Does Qiao Shi Have an Edge in Winning Deng's Mantle......James Walsh 129 b. Past Holds Hard Lessons for 'New' China, Don't Expect Boom to End Party's Grip................Lewis M. Simons 103 3. From Readers a. On Anzhi Lai's Article in CCF.9318....................Yi-Xiang Zhang 11 b. On Changqing Yang's Article in CCF.9318................Hao Ming-Hong 19 ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== 1. Dialogue on Development of a Country - Economical vs Political and Social ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1a. Introduction........................................................ 9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- There have been a lot of discussions about the interplays between the economic development of a country and the social and political changes of it. Apparently, China has taken a path different from Russia and most of Eastern European countries. "Which way is better?" will be a controversy lasting for years. Here I have compiled some discussions among some friends of mine on this topic. The names of the participants in the discussions have been concealed since the discussions were not originally intended for publication. It is hoped that this column will attract more readers to participate in the active discussions on interesting topics. (From: Ning Luo Oct-29-93) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1b. Nobel Prize for Economics and "Economy First, Politics Later"....... 75 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Mr D Mr B, does the work of this year's Nobel Prize winners for economics in any way relate to your current research? One of them, Robert Fogel, (commenting on your believe on China's development :-)) said: "My main point, of course, was that markets don't guarantee that evil systems will collapse, because sometimes they're very effective, and only political intervention can bring an immoral system to an end," he said Tuesday. "That was the lesson: Morality is a higher human goal than just efficiency." (today's LA Time) You know he was talking about his research on US slavery. --- --- --- From: Mr B Well, Fogel specializes in economic history and won the prize because of his contribution in that area. His theory of effective slavery is on low-skilled oriented sectors like farming, not on more complex industry sectors. When we compare the productivity per worker in southern slavery states to that in industrialized northern states of USA, the former is much lower than the latter. This is the fundamental reason why the south was defeated by the north. And the cause of USA civil war is also purely economic: The north wanted the south to abandon the slavery practice to get cheaper labor and bigger markets and the south had to segregate to protect their interests. I don't know why Fogel said something like what Mr D cited, because the collapse of slavery in USA is a perfect example that an evil system is destroyed by economic or market forces. Maybe he said that because he wanted to say something politically popular or simply he didn't realize that he made a big mistake. Fogel is indeed a great technician rather than a great thinker. His major contributions are using statistics or econometrics to regress historical data and get some significant or insignificant coefficients and then give his interpretation of those results. Gary Becker and Coase who won the prize last year and two years ago respectively are great thinkers. They gave some very insightful theories rather than just doing statistics. --- --- --- From: Mr D 1. Fogel's finding is that slavery was profitable. From a pure "economic cause" believe, that institution should have lasted and spread to other part of the Union, not the reverse. That's why he believes there were other forces more than a pure economic one --- he is consistent. 2. The North hathe west, and blacks were a small portion of the whole population (compared with women, for example, another rights-deprived group). More labor and market could not be a very significant (or sole) cause for slaves liberation. 3. It is hard to doubt that many great "thinkers", like Thomas Jefferson, believing that slavery was a crime against all people, were actually hypocritical morally. 4. Movements to free the slaves were organized by both whites and blacks before the civil war. I don't think those "underground railroad" secret groups were formed by properties owners who just wanted more labors. 5. Pretty soon, no great thinkers can be produced without statistical or quantitative methods/data. Psychology was dominanted by those thinkers one hundred years ago. Today, one can't say a word without understanding advanced statistics first. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1c. Nobel Peace Prize and "Pure Economical Cause"....................... 30 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Mr D There comes the announcement of this year's Nobel peace prize winners. Mr B may want to tell us how the ending of S. Africa's apartheid was the result of some pure economical forces. :-) --- --- --- From: Mr B All social development or events is pushed by interests, most of which are about economic concerns. The result of S. Africa is not an exception. The change is because such a tiny nation cannot take any longer after decades of economic sanction, not because the white government suddenly fell in love with democracy and racial equality. I love to see naturally grown democracy but feel uneasy about instant ones like Russia or forced ones like what is coming in S. Africa, because those instant or forced democracy are not sustainable and will cause those countries further troubles and from being sustainable and well-functioning democracies. Go back to S. Africa, the development there so far brought about a lot of violence, higher inflation and lower GNP. Capital is fleeing and human capitals (most of them are Whites or Asians) are planning to flee. And all these are just beginning. Blacks in S.Africa will get higher social status and democracy, but they will also see their living standard lower in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, isn't it an irony that the best way to win a Noble peace prize is to fight each other desperately for decades and then sign a peace treaty between them? :-) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1d. Changes: Economic vs. Politic....................................... 48 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: Mr N In my view, the theory of North (one of the most successful schools originated from Coase's idea) is more relevant to our current topic. His theory claims that the system (institution), rather than those people usually call "production forces" (including sciences and technologies), is the determining factor in economic development. Could Mr B also give some comment on that? It is not a simple matter to separate "economic" from "politic". Different people have different definitions. Many economists use principles in economics to study all human behaviors, including political ones. Before it is clearly defined "what is and what is not 'of economy'", the discussions could be very confusing and misleading. Of course, the definitions could be non-unique, but it should be specified in each specific discussion. It is true that certain political or social structures could not function properly without certain "economic base" (which itself could have many meanings: wealth, production output, leisure time, etc..), just like that certain economy would not work without certain technological base, but the politic level" (mainly quantitative rather than qualitative meaning here) is NOT unique. The choice of which one to take will affect the future development of economy. I might be wrong, but I have an impression that what Mr B advocate is a kind of deterministic social development pattern with stochastic perturbations --- there are variations, to be sure, but they will fail eventually, only the ones who outgrow "naturally" out of economic development would prevail in the end. At least it gives me the picture of a convergent trend. Am I right, Mr B? --- --- --- From: Mr B I share Coase's view on institutions. Indeed I think institutions is the most decisive factor in social development. A right system will attract capitals and technology and so as to foster growth. A bad one will get the opposite. A right system is very difficult to get because too many interests are involved in any change of the system, especially in a democracy. From this aspect, a dictator is at a better position to achieve a right system of institutions if such a system is desirable to the whole society. About the role of system in historical development, it's difficult to prove the determinant effects of institutions by testing historical data because too many variables cannot be controlled. The experimental economic researches fully support the claim that institutions make a huge difference. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1e. If You Still Think That Political Reform Could Wait after Economy... 78 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- [Note: This series of discussions were triggered by a story on CND about local officials in China abusing their power. --- Ning Luo.] From: Mr B Talking about the local authority's corruption after the decentralization of power in China, I cannot see how democracy can make it better, if not worse. Democracy means FURTHER decentralization of power. Now the cases of local emperors are still few because most are afraid of central authority. Democracy will make local emperors everywhere like what have been happening in India for decades. :-) The best way to solve this problem is using economic growth to increase the mobility of people, which is a fast current trend. If you are a local emperor and want to exploit me? No way! I just move to any place to begin my new life and let you enjoy your empire without 'citizens'. ;-) --- --- --- From: Mr D To save me time on arguing with Mr B on the topic of "corruption & democracy", someone wrote an editorial titled "Democracy system is the UNIQUE way to fight against corruption. Please refer to page 3 of Oct.17 issue of China Time Weekly... --- --- --- From: Mr N Not much new in that Editorial. Basically, it says that without a pluralistic polity (duo1 yuan2 zheng4 zhi4), there will be no checks and balances, then the monopoly on the power goes un-checked. However, there are two points to argue: (1) The Editorial does mention another factor: The cost of the corrupting official for being corrupted. It also mentioned the example of Hong Kong. In my view, it is this second factor that is the main guarantee for HK's relatively clean political and business environment. Being an economist, Mr B could elaborate further on here :-). (2) Monopoly in power does not necessarily leads to corruption, if the monopoly is indeed effective and efficient in carrying out the power. There are numerous examples that corruptions are "cured" by dictatorship, in the name of either a person or "the people". The point is, the corruption in China now is eroding the monopoly of power of CCP itself. Aside from a few scholars who try to rationalize the phenomenon for CCP, most people, inside or outside of CCP, agree with this conclusion. Therefore, the rampant corruption now in China can only be viewed as the incompetence of the monopoly power of CCP. Of course, the question still exists: To return to the old days, or to trying to establish another mechanism to put a brake on the frenzy, and WHAT should be the mechanism. --- --- --- From: Mr B The cost issue if very essential in explaining all social phenomena. In developed democracies, the cost of corrupt is high and the benefit is relatively low. But in all developing democracies like India or Mexico, the cost is low and the benefit is relatively high, so corruption is rampant in all developing democracies. Therefore it is ridiculous to announce democracy is the UNIQUE way to get ride of corruption as the editorial claims. Democracy cannot bring about economic growth, but economic growth will definitely and eventually bring about democracy. Only the democracy built on high living standard has the hope to cure the disease of corruption. One reason for developing countries like China lacking Western standard of due process is that the due process involves high cost which a poor country can hardly bear. And the Western deemed 'proper' or 'humane' treatment of criminals may provide great incentives for the poor to commit crime if they find out that they will have better or almost the same living condition in prisons than working in countryside. Think about China still has 10 million plus whose annual income is lower than 70 yuan ($10). Besides, the due process makes it possible for criminals get away with it like the Denny beating case, which also provide extra incentives to commit a crime. (From: Ning Luo Nov-9-93) ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== 2. China Watch ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2a. Does Qiao Shi Have an Edge in Winning Deng's Mantle......James Walsh 129 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- As a rule, Chinese take a backseat to no one in abhorring public shame, especially under an international spotlight. Beijing's loss of the 2000 Olympics, then, was ominous: it seemed to have all the potential of turning the People's Republic into a regime of socialism with a surly face. Yet the threat passed; by last week Beijing was again bending somewhat to accommodate Western concerns about its human-rights record. As it resumed a formal dialogue on the issue with Washington, even a China deeply chagrined over the Olympics debacle may have come around to recognizing where its vital interests lie: in sustaining an economic boom that has been fueled to a large degree by trade with the U.S. Whether the leadership's internal succession struggle manages to keep that interest in focus remains questionable. In recent months the regime has oscillated unaccountably between the velvet glove and the horsewhip amid presumed jockeying for position to succeed Deng Xiaoping. Yet one man who has kept his head and voice above the fray is Qiao Shi, a senior Politburo member and new chairman of the National People's Congress, or legislature. If this oft described ``mystery man'' near the hierarchy's pinnacle had his choice, it seems, the obligation to maintain a more civil society would be made of durable stuff. At face value, Qiao Shi would seem to have little in common with Deng, the great reformer and ailing patriarch. Qiao, 68, is best known as China's former supercop and keeper of officialdom's darkest secrets: a kind of J. Edgar Hoover without benefit of fedora -- or Bill of Rights. Even so, this Communist stalwart, who happens to be married to the niece of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's chief of staff, has shown he can almost effortlessly bestride his party's ideological camps. Though his owlish gaze and tight smile bespeak a man who expects obedience, Qiao has actually encouraged a more broadly based, if not quite democratic, brand of politics. Beyond that, as No. 3 in the leadership, he has an inside track toward winning Deng's mantle of modernization. The danger of the prosperity drive's going off the rails became clearer last week during a visit to Beijing by John Shattuck, Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Human Rights. Last May, President Bill Clinton renewed China's most-favored-nation trading privileges with America for another year, but with the proviso that Beijing demonstrate ``overall significant progress'' in easing domestic oppressions. Shattuck emphasized that as things stand, the most-favored-nation status is in peril. At a news conference in Hong Kong, he said that if it were up to Clinton to renew MFN status today, ``he would not be able to do so.'' In Washington, Secretary of State Warren Christopher told American business leaders much the same thing and added a condition on China's overseas peddling of arms. Whether Christopher specified weapons proliferation inadvertently was unclear: Clinton expressly exempted this dispute from the trade provisos when he extended most-favored-nation status. In any case, the double-barreled warnings from Shattuck and his boss suggested a deliberate effort to impress on Beijing the seriousness of their expectations. The loss of MFN status could inflict severe damage to the successes Dengist reforms have achieved to date, which include a 1992 trade surplus of $18 billion with the U.S. In such an event, all the political uncertainties hanging over the issue of who succeeds Deng would be almost academic. Even die-hard Marxists at the top acknowledge today that economic liberalizations have saved the regime from the fat recognition perhaps explains Beijing's consent to reopen talks with Washington about human rights. The government even allowed Shattuck to visit Tibet and speak, under strict supervision, to an imprisoned dissident. If the visit opened the door a crack to smoother relations, however, the kind of reforms championed by Qiao point to another way out of China's persistent quarrels with major trading partners. With his history of overseeing the security and intelligence apparatus, Qiao may seem an unlikely figure to promote constitutional liberties. He reportedly visited Tibet after a 1988 uprising there and told local authorities to show no mercy to separatists. Outsiders who had put the label ``China's Gorbachev'' on economic czar Zhu Rongji have been inclined to tag Qiao ``China's Andropov'': a man who, like Moscow's former KGB chief Yuri Andropov, could be the tough dark horse to win an unsettled regime's leadership sweepstakes. The analogy may be valid in terms of raw power politics: unlike technocratic Executive Vice Premier Zhu, Qiao probably commands important loyalties among generals, the police and party conservatives. But he has also deferred to reformers, having openly advocated the rule of law rather than of men. A Politburo member since 1985, Qiao in recent months has shed his formal connections to the security establishment and the Central Party School, which he used to head. More significant, he has called for giving the legislature greater real authority -- which would also enhance his new power base -- and for the institution of a legal system immune to the vagaries of political wars and whims. Whether such departures from the Leninist line are based on expediency more than conviction remains unknown: Qiao has the kind of quicksilver image that can adapt to almost any contours. ``You don't know", complains a midlevel official. A Chinese journalist remarks, ``In general, people don't like him because of his links to the secret police. He's as sly as a fox and always seems to know which side of the fence he should be on.'' Officially, of course, Deng's designated successor remains party chief Jiang Zemin, who is also State President and chairman of the Central Military Commission. Qiao and Jiang are comrades from way back -- they were both underground student organizers in Shanghai in the 1940s -- and Qiao has made a point of disclaiming any ambitions to eclipse his comrade. During a well-publicized tour of Southeast Asian capitals in July, Qiao laughingly dismissed suggestions to the contrary. Still, as Philippine Senator Blas Ople judged, ``it sounded like the demurral of a strong contender.'' Qiao's past is rather murky. Born to Jiang Zhitong or Chiang Chaomin in late 1924, he comes from a family in coastal Zhejiang province, near Shanghai, with reputed distant blood ties to Generalissimo Chiang, Nationalist China's leader. In any case, Qiao, who apparently changed his name as a cover after joining the Communist Party in 1940, went on to marry Weng Yuwen, the niece of Chiang's chief of staff, Chen Bu-lei. Rumor has it that Chen once tried to recruit Qiao to the Nationalists' cause without knowing that the Shanghai teenager had already secretly joined the Communists. After 1949, Qiao was a cadre in the Communist Youth League, an organization with which he maintained ties over the years. Through it he became a protege of Hu Yaobang, who later rose to party chief under Deng -- only to be dumped unceremoniously in early 1987 as a ``bourgeois liberalizer.'' Qiao not only managed to avoid any taint attached to his patron but also refused to join the bandwagon in denouncing Hu. In 1989 he even succeeded in emerging from the public security at the time, he reportedly did not go along with the decision to send in guns and tanks. According to a Chinese journalist, Qiao, as a one time student agitator himself, ``didn't feel it was necessary to use force'' in putting down the demonstrations. Like Deng, moreover, he knows what it is like to be on the business end of official disfavor. He was purged as a Kuomintang ``spy'' during the Cultural Revolution, surfacing only in 1977 to resume his career in the party's semi-clandestine International Liaison Department, an important agency that used to be in charge of aiding guerrilla movements overseas. What kind of No. 1 leader he might be in practice, if Jiang should self- destruct, is anyone's guess. Given the human-rights disputes that continue to roil Beijing's ties to the West, however, the mystery man at least offers China the possibility of a more predictable road to riches. (From: CND ) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2b. Past Holds Hard Lessons for 'New' China, Don't Expect Boom to End Party's Grip................Lewis M. Simons 103 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- WHILE the world marvels at breezy news accounts of a billion Chinese growing richer by the day, the key to the Middle Kingdom's future lies in a tightly guarded bedroom in Beijing where a tiny, feeble old man approaches death. No one knows what actions and reactions the imminent passing of 89-year-old "paramount leader" Deng Xiaoping will set in motion: Will the economic boom Deng engineered roll smoothly onward? Or will the power struggle to succeed him among Communist Party chiefs erupt in chaos, pitting reformers against hard-liners? Optimists, and these include some of America's leading industrialists and investors, say that with the genie of rising expectations out of the bottle, China is irreversibly on the road to wealth. And once a car-driving, home- owning middle class is firmly entrenched, they reason, communism must quietly succumb to democracy. Slavering over the prospect of a China that would be the world's largest market, U.S. investors are pumping $5 billion into the overheated economy this year, up sharply from $3.1 billion in 1992 and roughly $500 million four years ago. I think they're closing their eyes to the repeated lessons of history. The same pie-in-the-sky fantasizing that has them dreamily counting laptop- computer sales in the millions also sent their 19th-century ancestors scurrying to China to peddle oil lamps - only to miserably fail to penetrate the hermetically sealed nation. HAVING LIVED through the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square, I've seen China's doctrinaire communists force the genie back into the bottle when they feared ,they were losing control. With succession to Deng a mystery, the only basis for speculating on the future is the past. And history suggests that the hard-eyed men of Beijing won't let go this time any more than they did four years ago. Control is the name of the game in China. To the intense consternation of those hovering around the fragile Deng behind the high walls of Beijing's Zhongnanhai, the party leadership's secretive compound, their once-steely grasp already is slipping. In the coastal cities where the boom is in bloom, entrepreneurs armed with cellular phones and women decked out in the height of imported fashion hardly give communism a second thought. IN THE landlocked hinterland, impoverished peasants are turning bitter toward the local communist cadre as they recognize the party's failure to deliver egalitarianism at a level above the most basic food, housing and clothing. The likeliest result of this convulsive, expanding gap in wealth must be social unrest. It's already happening. Unseen in the photos of construction cranes clustered like bamboo groves and happy bicyclists toting home color TVs are a lot of Chinese who are very upset about rampant corruption and inflation in the 15 to 30 percent range. Those same problems, precisely, underlay the 1989 uprising. The students who marched off their campuses to seize the very heart of China's communist establishment were furious because they were forced to live in dark, stinking dormitories and were fed inadequate rations, while their political masters grew fat and rich. Today, China's political and economic outlook is more unstable than at any time since the Tiananmen crackdown. As the handful of wealthy grow richer and the masses of poor descend into deeper poverty, the possibility of the huge nation fracturing into decentralized provincial governments, with wealthier regions splitting off from the rest of the country, becomes ever more serious. THE PARTY hard-liners, military as well as civilian, are haunted by the Soviet example of fragmentation and instability. For years, China's leaders insisted that by converting the planned economy to a free market, they'd make the masses happy and retain political control. Now they're finding freedom can't be so neatly compartmentalized. Instability, more than anything, is what the communists fear. At the height of the Tiananmen bloodletting, when it looked for a moment as though violent dissent would flood out of Beijing and inundate all of China, the rulers warned ominously of "white terror." They meant that unless their dictates were followed without question, China would plunge into a chaotic free fall, a time of insanity, starvation, murder, brutal retribution. It worked. As much as the ruthless assault on the square, the warning of impending madness frightened people into compliance. For China has known "white terror" many times before: Mao's Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, the internecine warlordism of the 1920s and '30s, and back, back, back to the era of the Warring States, 400 years before the time of Christ. Of those thought to be at the top of the short list of Deng's potential successors, neither the passive President Jiang Zemin (who's to meet President Clinton at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Seattle this month) nor Prime Minister Li Peng (suffering the aftereffects of a heart attack) has what it takes to cool today's seething economic pot. VICE PREMIER Zhu Rongji, whom the Chinese press calls the Great Rectifier, has tried but failed to make headway in spreading the economic boom evenly, though he's the best bet at the moment. Yet to imagine that Deng's successor, whoever he turns out to be, win simply roll over for a decentralized China, watching benignly as the country follows in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, is nonsense. The Chinese Communist Party may go down in time, all right, but it won't go down without a fight. (Forwarded by: ) (Source: San Jose Mercury News, Nov-7-93) ===========***==========***==========**==========***==========***=========== 3. From Readers (2 items) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3a. On Anzhi Lai's Article in CCF.9318....................Yi-Xiang Zhang 11 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Anzhi Lai wrote: It is my dream that, some day, the Vice President of China is sitting in front of the camera of the CCTV side by side with someone who opposes the government, debating on an national issue, just like Gore vs Perot on the NAFTA. Yi-Xiang Zhang on 17 Nov 1993 commented: I just want to point out that Perot is NOT opposing the government. He is opposing Clinton Administration, if you will. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3b. On Changqing Yang's Article in CCF.9318................Hao Ming-Hong 19 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dear Changqing Yang: I just read your commentary on CCF.9318 about economic development and democracy in China. I cannot hold to express my fully-hearted support to what you said. Overviewing the oversea CSS community, it is not difficult to observe three groups of people on the basis of their attitudes towards the People's Republic: those of understanding, supportive and optimism, those of over-idealistic on both good and bad sides of the motherland, and those of radical or even hostile to the poor country which born them and brought them up. Unfortunately, it appears that the third group of people dominate the media of the CSS community here in the US. It is probably not an accident that the opinions like the one of yours are shown on CCF long after its submission dated 8-OCT-93, while those of critical and/or radical opinions are broadcasted more timely (maybe I am wrong about the date of your article which is caused by mistake, but I do have the same feeling without respect to this particular article). Congratulation on your thoughtful and constructive commentary. Wish you could put forward more thoughts to share with other CSS members. (From: Hao Ming-Hong 18-Nov-93) (Forwarded by: YANG Chang-Qing" ) +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=++ + Executive Editor: Shusheng Luan Executive Moderator: Tong Shen + +--------------------------------------------------------------------------+ + For subscription: mail "SUB CHINA-NT Your-First-Name Your-Last-Name" + + to LISTSERV@UGA (bitnet) or listserv@uga.cc.uga.edu (internet) + + For back issues of CCF: + + anonymous ftp to cnd.org[132.249.229.100]:pub/community/CCF + + For contribution and inquiry: mail to ccf-editor@ifcss.org + +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=++