SuthrakAra, says Ramanuja, refutes this by the suthra 'Anandhamayo abhyAsAth.' The self described as blissful is the Brahman because of the repetition. The passage in TaittrEya about the evaluation of the bliss startswith the joy of a man who is blessed with everything and goes on to relate that of celestial beings,devas etc multiplying each by hundred to measure the succesive one ending with the bliss of Brahma, the creator and mentioning that to be a particle of the bliss of the Supreme Being, Brahman. At the end of the chapter is the text, 'yatho vacho nivarthanthe aprApya manasA saha Anandham brahmaNO vidvAn na bibhEthi kuthschana, the enlightened man is not afraid of anything after realising that bliss of Brahman, unable to reach whom, the words turn back along with the mind. This Anandha, can reside only in the Supreme Self who is free from all imperfections and possesses infinite auspicious qualities as it cannot relate to the individual self who is finite and subjected to meagre happiness mixed with unlimited sorrow. The term vijnAnamaya refers to the individual self who has vijnAna and not to the intellect because of the suffix 'mayat' which denotes abundance. The term vijnAna is also used in the figurative sense in texts like 'vijnAnam yajnam thanuthe, the intellect performs sacrifice,' where actually the performer is denoted, as there can be no agency attributed to the intellect. the text of Taittreya however does not ascribe agency to the others like pranamaya and the preceding ones as they are insentient and they mean only the prAna etc. and not the self possessing prAna.Hence that which ie said to be the innerself of vijAnamaya is only the SupremeSelf. The argument based on the text that describes Brahman entering into all beings as its self and the text'that thou art,' to show the identity of the jiva with Brahman is not correct, says Ramanuja because the statementthat it willed to become many and created the fire will not be applicable to the indivisual self.Ramnuja asks, 'kaTHam vA nirastha nikhiladhoshagandhasya anavaDHika athisaya asankhyEya kalyANa guNagaNasya sakalakAraNa bhoothasya brahmaNah nAnAviDHAnantha duhkhAkara karmADHeena chinthithnimishithAdhi sakalpravrtthijivasvarupathvam.' This means that it is impossible for the Supreme Being, who is free from all imperfections and abode of limitless wonderful innumerable auspicious qualities,and the cause of all beings, to be identical with the individual self who is under the influence of karma and experiences infiite misery and engaged in all kinds activities that bind him. It may be argued that the Brahman is perceived as the individual self due to beginningless avidhya, to dispell which the study of vedanta is started. But this is contrary, says Ramanuja to the statement, 'yEna asrutham srutham bhavathi, by which what is not heard becomes heard,' thus promising 'EkavijAnEna sarva vijnAnam, all knowledge by the knowledge of one,' and to the mention of the causality of Brahman by the text 'sadhEva soumya idhamagra Aseeth Ekamva advitheeyam, thadhaikshatha bahu syAm prajAyEya, thatthEjO asrjatha' etc. It would be highly improbable that after showing the Brahman as one of infallible will by the statement 'thdhaaikshatha bahu syAm' if the same Brahman is identified with the individual self who is the experiemcer of infinite misery through the proclamation 'thatthvamasi.' If on the other hand it is claimed that all this (the experience of the world) is unreal then the knowledge of all by knowledge of one will be meaningless as there is nothing real to know. If Brahman alone is real and everything else is unreal, the text 'yatha soumya EkEna mrthpindEna sarvam mrnmayam vijnAtham' will not make sense because it means that when the cause, which is real, clay, is cognised, the effects, which are also real, are understood. The word 'thvam' refers to the jiva in the state of transmigration.The identity between jiva and Brahman has already been refuted by the former suthras. The identity ascertained through discardimg the main meaning of the adjectives and taking only the implied meaning as in the case of 'this is that Devadattha ,' can not be accepted as shown already. the words like 'blue lotus' denotes the blue colour as well as the entity lotus. Ramanuja gives an example to illusrate this point. 'YaTHA neelmuthpalam Anaya ithyukthe neelimaadhi visishtamEva AneeyathE, yaThA cha vinDHyAtavyAm madhamudhithO mAthangajasThishTathi ithi padhadhvaya avagatha viseshaNa visishta Eva arTha pratheeyathe'. That is, when someone is asked to bring the blue lotus he brings only the lotus having the attribute of blueness and not white or red one. Similarly on hearing the words there is a mad elephant standing in the vindhya forest we understand the meaning only with all the qualifications such as the place, the entity and its state (madness) etc. According to the principle of SamANadhikaraNya,coordination, 'bhinnapravrtthi nimitthAnAm sabdhAnam Eaksmin arTHE vrtthih sAmana DHikaraNyam,' when different words having different application are coordinated to denote the same entity.Secondary meaning is to be resorted to only when any one of the words fail to express the entity it qualifies through its primary meaning as in the cases of 'gourvAhikah, this vahika man is an ox, where the words man and ox cannot denote the same entity by their pimaray meaning and hence one of the words, namely, ox, is taken in the secondary sense. But here in the example 'blue lotus' there is no such need to resort to secondary meaning as the term blue denotes only the lotus in its primary sense of colour silmilar to the expressions 'dhandee or kundalee,' one with a stick or one wearing earrings.Even in the sentence 'so ayam devadatthah, this is that Devadattah,' there is no contradiction between the person seen at present and the same seen in the past because of the difference in the time and place. (The identity between Brahman and the jiva is established in advaita by citing this example as seen previously.) Ramanuja cites another example 'aruNayA EkahAyinyApingkshyA sOmam kreeNaAthi,' which means, he buys soma by a cow one year old, of tawny hue and yellow eyes.. He refutes the view of the opponent who says that the attributes mentioned may not refer to one entity, by saying, the same entity ,namely the cow is denoted as having the attributes, one year old, tawny colour and yellow eyes, which is justified by the principle of sAmanadhikaraNya. This is the similar one to the expression 'the cloth is red.' Several words put in the same case ending, nominative , may stand in coordination denoting the same entity such as ' devadatthah syamo yuvA dhandee kundalee thishTathi,' Devadattha, dark, young, carrying a staff and wearing earrings is standing. Ramanuja shows another instance where the words not with the same case ending also illustrate the principle of sAmAnAdhikaraNya. In the sentence 'kAshTaih sTHAlyAm Odhanam pacheth' meaning, 'he will cook rice in a vessel with firewood' denote a single purport using words with different case endings, kAshTaih in instrumental and sTHAlyam in the locative case. Ramanuja even cites a more complex sentence as an example of this.'khAdhiraih sushkaih kAshTaih samparimAnE bhANdE pAyasam salyodhanam samarTHah pAchakah pacEth.' This means, a proficient cook (samarThah pAchakah-nominative), cooks in a vessel of even dimension (samaparimANE bhAnde-locative) rice pAyasam( accusative) with sticks of dry khadhira wood (indstrumental). In this sentence the adjectives are put in different cases according to the words they qualify and yet denote the purport of the sentence by coordination. Ramanuja takes up another objection, ( of mimAmsaka) that the word denoting a quality of a thing already mentioned in the context refers to the quality only and not the entity. Ramanuja says that it is not so because neither in the scriptures nor in the worldly usage the words denoting qualities which are in coordination with the an entity are seen to connote only the attribute. 'lOkavEdhayOh dravyavAchipadhasamAnADHikaraNasya gunavAchinah kvachidhapi kevalaguNAbhiDHAna adarsanATH.' For example in the sentence 'the cloth is white, patah shukalah' the word white denotes the cloth which is white whereas in the expression 'the whiteness of the cloth,patasya shuklah' it has an independent meaning, not because the word 'patah' is mentioned first but it is due to the two words being in different case terminations. On the other hand when it is said 'patasya shuklah bhAgah' the white part of the cloth, the same case termination denotes the part of the cloth which is white. In the vedic usage also, points out Ramanuja, in the sentence like 'aruNayA EkahAyinya pingAkshyA sOmam kreeNAthi', he buys soma with tawny-coloured, one year old and yellow-eyed (cow), the words tawny, one year old and yelow-eyed have connection only with the entity cow whom they qualify and do not denote the attribute only. This is in answer to mimaamsakas view that all words are meaningful only when they are connected with action. Hence they explain the above sentence to mean that one buys soma with one year old, with tawnycoloured and with yellow-eyed in which each word is connected with the verb kreeNAthi, buys, independently. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Oppiliappan/ <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: Oppiliappan-unsubscribe@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
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