When there is a contradiction,virodha, between perception and sruthi
the latter is claimed to be stronger. But here there is no virodha
and hence there is no need to prove that one is stronger than the
other, says the advaitin. Even through in perception only
attributeless Brahman is perceived, according to Advaita it is only
the unity through the existence,satthA, that is perceived and not
difference.
But how can the perception that 'this is a pot, this is a cloth
etc.,' be shown as sanmAthragrAhi, that of the existence alone? Only
when the knowledge is continously of one object , like that of a pot
alone, this can be true. Advaitn says, 'Yes it is true and we wish to
prove only that here ,namely the perception of all objects is that
of one only.
If the difference is perceived it cannot be simultaneous with the
object at hand. That is, when we see a pot its difference from a
cloth is not seen because the knowledge of the cloth is in the
memory. Probably what is meant here is that even if we see the pot
and the cloth at the same place when we look at the pot we do not see
the cloth. In the perception that the pot exists the 'isness' of the
pot does not give the knowledge of its difference from the cloth
because the knowledge of difference belongs to a different time other
than that of perception, which belongs to that moment only.
So as in the case of seeing nacre as silver, sukthirajatham, what is
perceived is only the attributeless Brahman which appears as a
different object because of bhrAnthi, illusion due to anAdhi avidhya.
Moreover the difference,bhedhah, cannot be defined, says the
Advaitin. The difference is not of the nature of the object in which
case only the difference will be perceived.That when we see the pot
we would also see its difference from the cloth which is not the
case.This sounds a bit confusing but it is not so. If ghata, pot and
its bhedha, difference from other objects, say, pata,cloth, is its
svsrupa then the two tems ghata and bhedha will be synonymous like
hastha and kara, both of which mean hand. So the object and its
difference are not the same.
On the other hand if it is said that the difference is the attribute
of the object, it must be assumed to be different from the object.
That is, the difference will be different from the essential nature
of the thing. Then the difference of the difference will be its
attribute and the same argument follows leading to anavasThA. Also
this difference of the object from others will be observed only when
the object belonging to the particular class as distinct from others
is observed. But the distinctness to be perceived requires the
knowledge of its difference from the others. So there is the defect
of anyonya AsrayaNam., mutual dependence and hence becomes
untenable.Therefore advaitn concludes that since the difference
cannot be proved the perception is of sanmmAthra, existence only.
Even in the perception of 'the pot exists, the cloth exists' etc
what persists is the existence alone and not the forms which are
perceived to disaappear after a while. In the perception this is pot
etc. the 'this' element persists in all and the forms change.So the
exitence signified by 'this' alone is paramArTHa, real, and the
others are unreal like rajjusarpa, snake in the rope. In the illusion
of the rope as snake, crack in the ground, stream of water etc., the
rope is the substratum of the illusion and hence is real whereas the
other illusory objects are unreal being separate, vyAvrtthi, from the
rope. So too the existence, 'sat,' alone is the substratum and is
therefore real.
But the reality of the rope is not due to persistence but due to the
fact that it is not sublated by any other knowledge as in the case of
snake etc. which again not unreal due to their being separate from
the rope but because they are sublated by the subsequent knowledge.
To this advaitin answers that in the perception that this is a pot
there is sublation of the perception of other objects like cloth and
vice versa. So there is sublation as a result of
distinctness ,vyAvrtthi. Thus everything else than satthA, existence
is apparmArTha , unreal. Advaitin clinches the argument by a
syllogism- sath paramArThah, anuvarthmAnatyhvAth,rajjusarpAdhou
rajjvAdhivath; ghatAdhayah aparamArThAh, vyAvarthamANathvAth,
rajjvAdgyaDHishthAna sarpAdhivath. The existence is real because it
persists (in all perceptions) like the rope in the illusion of snake
in a rope and the objects like pot etc. are unreal because they are
separate, vyAvartha, like the snake in the substratum of the rope.
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