

President-centered and Presidency-centered Explanations of Presidential Public Activity



Gregory L. Hager, Terry Sullivan

American Journal of Political Science, Volume 38, Issue 4 (Nov., 1994), 1079-1103.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0092-5853%28199411%2938%3A4%3C1079%3APAPEOP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M>

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

American Journal of Political Science is published by University of Wisconsin Press. Please contact the publisher for further permissions regarding the use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/journals/uwisc.html>.

American Journal of Political Science
©1994 University of Wisconsin Press

JSTOR and the JSTOR logo are trademarks of JSTOR, and are Registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. For more information on JSTOR contact jstor-info@umich.edu.

©2002 JSTOR

*President-centered and Presidency-centered Explanations of Presidential Public Activity**

Gregory L. Hager, *Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky*

Terry Sullivan, *Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina*

This article assesses the president's public activities. It tests hypotheses derived from an explanation that suggests that presidential choice depends upon the nature of presidents—a "president-centered" explanation. It also tests hypotheses derived from the opposing account, that is, that presidential behavior reflects the president's institutional responsibilities and powers—a "presidency-centered" explanation. The latter includes the president's clerkship of official responsibilities, bargaining conditions, and the tenure of presidents. Technological innovations also affect presidential activity. The empirical evaluation of these explanations includes tests for three kinds of president-centered explanations, emphasizing individual presidents, Barber's presidential styles, and the recent interest in Washington outsiders. The empirical evidence suggests an important role for the presidency-centered explanation and the control for technology. The president-centered models, however, provide additional insight into presidential activities.

The relationship between the Congress, the president, and the public has always concerned political scientists. From the founders through Woodrow Wilson to the present day, analysts of constitutional power have worried over the ability of one branch to appeal for public support at the expense of another branch. The founders, of course, thought that in such struggles, the Congress would always win—its close relationship with the public representing one of their constitutional axioms. Wilson's (1908) commentary on presidential power, however, suggested that only the president could embody the national will, thus affording the office a great advantage. Consistent with Wilson's insights, the presidency has undergone a major transformation during the twentieth century, with an "increased presidential visibility" representing one of the four major changes (Greenstein 1988, 347).

*We thank Jon Bond, James Cox, William R. Keech, David Lowery, Stuart MacDonald, Bruce Miroff, George Rabinowitz, Steven Shull, and Steven Smith. The Everett Dirksen Center, Ford Foundation, and University Research Council, University of North Carolina, funded different elements of this research. We also appreciate support from the UNC College of Arts and Sciences and the Lilly Endowment, which supported us as we began this project. As usual, the findings reported here represent our own judgments and not the positions of these colleagues or agencies listed.

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 4, November 1994, Pp. 1079–1103
© 1994 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819

Understanding this increased presidential visibility, and particularly accounting for its apparent increase in the recent past, provides a means for understanding a critically important topic in presidency research: how best to understand presidential decision making. Should we focus attention on the characteristics of individual presidents or groups of presidents? Or should we concentrate on institutional constraints to the decision-making process? As a general question of methodology and theory, political scientists have quarreled over the appropriate form of presidential explanations (Rockman 1986). Hugh Hecló (1977), to name one respected analyst, has forcefully argued that presidential studies should focus more on institutional details, what we call the *presidency-centered* approach. Supporters of the *president-centered* approach suggest that focusing on the institution ignores the basic fact that presidents act as individuals and to ignore presidents misses *the* fundamental fact of the institution.

Analyzing public activity provides an opportunity to compare the president-centered and presidency-centered approaches. The increased level of public activity is one of the principal developments of the modern presidency, and it is, by definition, measurable. But whether presidents make decisions about pursuing public activities based on their own characteristics or institutional constraints is an open question. The president's schedule of public activities does have an inherently personal quality—the president can choose to appear in public, make speeches, or not. Yet arguably there are enormous constraints imposed on public activity by the environment and institutional aspects of the office. In sum, the analysis of presidents' public activities should provide a fair test of two major approaches to presidential studies.

Accounting for Public Activities

Presidents engage in a wide variety of public activities falling into five categories: (1) prime time televised addresses to the nation, called *major speeches*; (2) speeches before more specific forums such as university graduation ceremonies and AFL-CIO conventions, called *minor speeches*; (3) presidential *press conferences*; (4) appearances as the *head of state*; and (5) appearances at *partisan* functions (e.g., campaign appearances supporting other candidates or the president's own ticket). King and Ragsdale (1987) have collected and reported presidential activity data for the period 1949–84. From the data, it appears that major speeches remain relatively stable around a mean of five addresses per year.¹ Presidential press conferences declined steadily over this period

¹The time series is level, without trend or drift. The standard deviation equals 2.2. King and Ragsdale (1987) apparently did miss reporting one major speech in each of 1953,

from an average of 40 per year during the Truman administration to six per year in Reagan's first term, but the remaining categories (minor speeches, head of state, and political appearances) all exhibit something of a monotonic increase.

These trends represent the facts to explain. Because the first two groups (major speeches and press conferences) exhibit no upward trend, we treat them separately. The pattern in the remaining three activities, however, suggests that they represent a single group (call it *political activities*), and we focus on this group. Political activities increased gradually until the late 1970s, when they accelerated in much the way that Kernell (1986) has described. President Truman averaged 45 political activities per year; President Reagan averaged over 130 per year through 1984.

Two Basic Explanations

This section presents two generic or archetypal accounts of presidential activity, one based on individual differences and the other emphasizing institutional constraints and opportunities. Each generic explanation often plays a separate role in the literature's descriptions of presidential decision making, including those determining public activities (e.g., see Page and Petracca 1983). Although some descriptions do not directly address the question of presidential activity, we believe they contribute enough to suggest specific relationships.

We should note that the president- and presidency-centered explanations do not always generate clear-cut distinctions. Since activities necessarily involve choices made by individuals, presidency-centered distinctions might reflect president-centered choices. A particular president, for example, might *choose* to emphasize administrative tasks over speech making in the pursuit of policy goals. On the other hand, some of what passes as individualized choice by presidents might actually reflect systematic presidency-centered pressures. We attempt to avoid this problem by emphasizing as president-centered those characteristics known about presidents before they enter office (their identities, their "character," or their Washington connections). The ideal presidency-centered model, on the other hand, emphasizes context. The latter implicitly assumes that most presidents would behave similarly in similar contexts.

President-centered Explanations

That *presidents* occupy the presidency is a fundamental characteristic of the office. Their personal preferences and idiosyncrasies could

1960, 1971, 1976, 1978, 1980, and 1981. These differences might result from slightly different coding.

easily affect public activity. Following this approach, to understand how presidents manage public activities, one must understand individual presidents. We assess three types of president-centered characterizations. The first simply identifies each president as a separate individual. The second rests on Barber's (1992) widely recognized characterization of presidents using personality types. The third relies on Polsby's (1978) description of a plebiscite presidency, especially dependent on public support, and Kernell's (1986) elaboration emphasizing the insider-outsider distinction.

Individual presidents. The discipline has long recognized that differences among presidents have major implications for public policy (e.g., George and George 1964). These purely personal differences could greatly affect presidential choices about public activities as well. For example, given their different backgrounds, one might expect that President Reagan felt more comfortable with public appearances than did President Ford. Given their outlooks on the presidency, Carter felt obliged to communicate with the public, while President Nixon did not. These differences suggest a number of individual comparisons in assessing how presidents pursued public activity. In keeping with this emphasis on personal differences, we shall initially test a simple model that distinguishes between presidents as individual variables.

Presidential style. A second distinction uses Barber's (1992) description of presidential styles that, while not specifically intended to explain public activities, seems relevant to that task. Barber distinguishes between four types of character based upon a simple dichotomy. The first describes how presidents feel about themselves (positive or negative). The second dimension describes how they conceptualize the role of president (as active or passive). Presidents with active and positive styles should pursue more contact with the public than those with more passive or more negative styles.

Plebiscitary presidency. Kernell (1986) and others who emphasize the presidency's "plebiscitary" nature propose a third kind of president-centered characterization, one more theoretically developed in terms of specifying its relationship to public activity. These descriptions emphasize the arrival of the "outsider" in the White House. Since they have little Washington background, these outsiders bring to office different motivations. Kernell emphasizes that outsiders depend "upon public opinion for their leadership in Washington to an extent unknown when Dahl and Lindblom in the early 1950s described the President as 'an embodiment of a bargaining society,' or later when Neustadt predicated presidential power on bargaining" (Kernell 1986, 105). The outsider's

dependency on a public mandate requires the administration to take its case to the public, over the heads of the Congress, whenever it needs leverage. Using a simple distinction between presidents based upon political origins, we might expect that outsiders pursue public activity more than do insiders. Presidents Carter and Reagan represent the prototypical outsiders; they came from outside of and ran against Washington.

Presidency-centered Explanations

That presidents pursue political preeminence within an institutional order designed to constrain their efforts is also a fundamental characteristic of the office. Presidents face a myriad of executive responsibilities and demands. Sharing power with Congress and the constitutional and historical practices of the office constrain them. For example, armed hostility represents a clear case of presidential responsibility, constraining the president's choices by bringing to the fore diplomatic and executive management functions. In general, responsibilities pressure presidents for attention, regardless of personal predilections, and constrain their ability to pursue other activities. We identify three general kinds of institutionally derived constraints on presidential activity: the clerkship, the congressional bargaining setting, and the president's tenure.

The president's "clerkship" responsibilities. Of the four changes that Fred Greenstein (1988, 347) has identified as shaping the modern presidency, three involve the president's magisterial responsibilities: unilateral policymaking capacity, national agenda setting, and the presidential bureaucracy. The fourth, of course, involves an improved presidential visibility. The first three developments have a connection with the fourth: *what the president can do depends on what the president must do*. Faced with such demands, presidents must either take on the responsibilities for decision making or shunt those responsibilities. Since responsibilities constrain presidential *choice* by *requiring* presidential attention, increasing demands would generate decreasing options for any president, including public activity. In other words, expectations for the office significantly shape how presidents behave.

The public has come to expect the president's involvement in economic management, and it holds the president (far more than the Congress) responsible for prosperity. Public laws, like the Budget Act of 1921 and the Employment Acts of 1946 and 1978, reinforce this public impression by requiring that each administration assumes an extensive economic policy role. As a result, events within the U.S. economy generate important claims on presidential attention and effort. In any case, a

president may want to pursue more public strategies when the economy seems good than when it seems ailing. Media coverage of presidential speeches during bad times may actually draw attention to poor economic performance.

Second, perusal of any president's daily schedule reveals that administrative responsibilities daily enmesh the president. The management of the national government goes beyond one person. But a president ultimately held responsible for the government's activities must devote some attention to running the government. As the government has grown, so have the difficulties of administrative tasks.

Last, presidents have special responsibilities as chief diplomat. They create and execute foreign policy, from receiving ambassadors to trade policy to making critical military decisions, especially during hostilities. In the latter category, legislation requires that they supervise negotiations, monitor and report on various import triggers, validate most favored nation status or human rights progress, and the like. Thus, the external environment can easily command the president's attention.

The bargaining setting. The impact of the bargaining system on public activity presumes that presidents use public activity to generate presidential support (Neustadt 1980; Sullivan 1987, 1990). Neustadt's analysis suggests the importance of two variables, reputation and prestige, as critical to presidential choices, presumably including those about public activity. As a president's professional reputation for competence and success as leader improves, leadership competition within the governing coalition subsides. A declining reputation, on the other hand, promotes dissent as congressional leaders assert themselves and potential presidential competitors disengage from the administration's program. Faced with declining reputations or with no reputation at all, presidents use their visibility as a lever (Ragsdale 1984).

Kernell (1986) also argues that presidential activity results when the bargaining setting becomes intractable. He argues that the well-organized, typically partisan-led, bargaining regime established in the 1950s and 1960s gave way during the 1970s. Seemingly permanent congressional coalitions dissolved as members became policy free agents. The fading of party at the electoral level compounded the other two effects. Trying to lead and bargain in this new setting presents an unmanageable prospect, resulting in overload and multiplying the president's chance of failure. Caught in this changing regime, modern presidents have resorted to public activity so they could build successful coalitions (Greenstein 1988; Kernell 1986, 24–26; Rose 1991). In addition, Kernell argues that outsiders should be especially sensitive to a deteriorating bar-

gaining setting. Since they have relatively less experience with Washington bargaining and depend relatively more on other talents for leverage, they would find the deterioration even more challenging than insiders.

Tenure. In addition to their current institutional context, administrations have a time-bound quality to them, bound up in such things as the election cycle, the Twenty-second Amendment, and the practice of predecessors. The electoral cycle influences the president's level of public activities, driving it up during a reelection campaign year. The practice of previous years and previous administrations also affects the level of activity. Presidents can innovate in their public activities but only to a certain extent. In several instances, for example, particularly those associated with the Nixon administration, the networks blocked presidential requests for air time, referring to the practice of previous administrations. The behavior of past administrations could also easily stand as a baseline for the current president's activities. Citizens, the media, and Congress come to expect a certain level of public activity, often defined by what the last administration did.

Technological Innovation

The advance of technology plays a special role in presidential activity. The period under study has witnessed a revolution in the technologies that both make administrations more capable and remove the impediments to accomplishing more, regardless of the institutional constraints or the president's preferences. The more recent the president, the easier transportation makes travel, and the broader communications make presidential exposure. Only by accounting for changes in technology are comparisons of the public activity levels of postwar presidents valid. For example, all else equal, President Reagan should pursue more public activities than President Truman simply because Reagan can travel to more places, faster and more comfortably, and receive more widespread media coverage while doing so. Thus, in most analytic frameworks, technology would appropriately represent a control explanatory variable: it affects both individual presidents and the presidency as an institution.

The empirical analysis treats technology in that fashion. Kernell's (1986) analysis, however, suggests that technological innovations played a different role, one primarily governed by the context of president-centered changes. He notes that presidents only slowly incorporated advances in travel and particularly in jet-powered air travel. Insider presidents operate primarily by bargaining with other political leaders so changing technology seems less important. Outsiders, with less bargaining experience and facing a more decentralized power structure, are

more likely to take advantage of technological innovation. Thus, within Kernell's variant on the president-centered explanation, technology interacts with types of presidents. Technology matters when outsiders, possessing the motivation to use it, assume office.

Testing the Explanations

Table 1 summarizes the various explanations, but note three additional points. First, the basic theories under examination rely on different degrees of interaction. The president-centered explanations seem mutually exclusive, but some of the outsider hypotheses draw on other explanations, since Kernell's (1986) theory explicitly includes bargaining considerations. Second, since we know very little about the causes of presidential activity, we begin by analyzing simple, ideal-type models: the three basic president-centered models and a basic presidency-centered model. Following this ideal-type examination, we proceed with examining the two explanations in combined models, allowing for interactions between president-centered and presidency-centered variables wherever specified in the explanations. Third, for methodological reasons, we omit two years from our empirical analyses: 1976 when analyzing political activities and 1966 when analyzing press conferences.² This section fleshes out the empirical examination to follow, including the description of relevant variables. In most situations, we provide more information about our models in an appendix.

Describing presidential public activity. As indicated earlier, presidential activity falls into three general categories: major speeches, press

²The year 1976 represents a major data spike for political activities (e.g., its Studentized residual value equals 7.33 in the presidency model of political activities). Because it comes at the end of the insider regime, because it represents 8% of our cases, and because the data analysis depends on OLS regression, this spike might unduly bias estimation. Diagnostics indicate that models including the 1976 data show heteroscedasticity. Most of the unusual activity in 1976 results from additional burdens placed on the president, as head of state, by the bicentennial celebration, efforts to restore public trust following Watergate, and an unusual reelection campaign involving an "incumbent" running his first national campaign. Given the unique context of 1976, we could treat it in a number of ways. We could ignore its special character and leave it in the analysis. We could transform the dependent variable (e.g., logarithmically) to decrease the magnitude of the outlier, but this reduces ease of interpretation of coefficients. In the end, we decided to drop the year 1976 from the analyses of political activities. We also dropped 1966 from the press conference analysis. For reasons we cannot fathom, President Johnson held significantly more press conferences in 1966 than in any other year. This year stood out as so unusual that it generated heteroscedasticity in some models. Obviously, dropping these cases is less than ideal, since we are trying to explain activities in general, not just for selected years. But given our relatively low number of cases, we deemed such extreme outliers unacceptable.

Table 1. Summary of Empirical Expectations

Variable	Expectation
<i>Technology:</i>	Technological innovation plays an independent role in increasing the president's public activities. As technology improves, presidents employ more public activities.
<i>President-centered:</i>	
Individual presidents	Public activity changes as a result of individual presidential preferences for public appearances.
Presidential style	Public activity depends upon presidential style, the more active and positive presidents pursuing more activity, followed by active negatives, followed by passive positives.
Outsider effect	General effect: All else equal, outsiders pursue public activities more than insiders. Outsiders and the bargaining regime: Outsiders are more sensitive to the bargaining situation. The more the situation deteriorates, the more likely they are to pursue public activities than are insiders. Outsiders and technology: Outsiders are more sensitive to technological developments. The more technology improves, the more likely they are to pursue public activities than are insiders.
<i>Presidency-centered:</i>	
Clerkship responsibility	Economic management: All else equal, a deteriorating economy constrains the president's public activities. Executive management: All else equal, executive responsibilities constrain the president's public activities. Chief diplomat: All else equal, foreign policy responsibilities constrain the president's public activities.
Bargaining setting	Reputation: Improving reputation reduces conflict over leadership. As reputation improves, presidential public activity declines. Prestige: The current level of presidential prestige affects public activity. The higher the president's prestige, the less the administration seeks public activities. Individualized pluralism: The current level of congressional disarray affects public activity. The more disarray, the more the administration develops public activities.
Tenure related	Election cycle: Presidential activity increases in reelection years. Incrementalism: Past levels of public activity affect current strategies. The higher the past levels, the greater the current levels.

conferences, and political activities. The model approximates political activities with a simple additive index: minor speeches, appearances as chief diplomat, and partisan speeches.

Indexing technology. Two technologies plausibly play a major role in affecting the level and intensity of presidential activities: air travel and broadcasting, particularly the dissemination of television. All else equal, a president should pursue more public activities as technology makes such activities easier and/or creates a larger potential audience. Measuring air transport involves two dimensions: the speed of the president's available transportation and the number of usable airports at which the president might land. The operational measure of technology uses these two elements because they clearly play a role in the selection of the president's aircraft. A third technology variable measures the number of television outlets—broadcast stations and cable systems. The more outlets, the more opportunities there are for media coverage. The model then combines these three variables into a technology index by adding standardized scores, lagged one year. The index is intended to measure the increased ease and speed with which incumbent presidents can schedule appearances and the wider audience for such appearances.

President-centered—the basic types. We begin with a model that uses dummy variables to represent individual presidents, with Truman as the constant. We then assess presidential styles using three dichotomous variables to represent the four common style types, with passive-negative as the constant. We distinguish between insiders and outsiders by using Presidents Carter and Reagan as the reference (outsider) value.

Presidency-centered—clerkship responsibilities. In assessing the presidential clerkship, the models include three kinds of variables: economic management, executive management, and diplomacy. Following Hibbs's (1977) findings that the two parties have different economic constituencies and thus emphasize different economic indicators, the model uses a composite variable for economic management. For Republican administrations, the variable employs the annual change in the Consumer Price Index (in 1967 dollars), and for Democratic administrations, the variable employs change in unemployment. Since the responsibilities conjecture emphasizes the importance of economic *deterioration* on presidential choice, a positive value represents increasing deterioration in the relevant indicator. The variable measures the rate of change, since changes in economic trends are good indicators of future conditions (Meltzer and Vellrath 1975, 786).³ The second variable operationalizes

³We also used the actual rates of unemployment and inflation to construct a party-relevant variable for economic deterioration with similar results.

executive branch management responsibilities. The size of executive staff proxies for the management stress facing the White House. The model also suggests that the president's diplomatic responsibilities constrain presidential activities. The "chief diplomat" measure is based on variables from the three separate areas mentioned earlier: diplomacy, trade, and defense.

Presidency-centered—bargaining conditions. A second set of variables operationalizes bargaining conditions. In general, these posed some of the most difficult operational problems in the analysis. Since few analysts have focused on the empirical character of bargaining, no standard variables exist. Neustadt (1980), Kernell (1986), and others have suggested, however, that the bargaining regime depends upon three common elements: the president's public standing ("prestige" or public approval), the president's professional reputation, and the conditions within the bargaining structure (what Kernell described as "institutionalized pluralism"). We attempted to operationalize these elements as far as possible. To measure presidential prestige, the model employed the standard Gallup opinion poll information averaged for each year.

The model took "presidential support scores," measuring previous success as a crude representation of presidential reputation. The exact measure (see the appendix for details) compares the current support scores against a president's expected performance. This approach emphasizes that reputation depends not simply upon performance but also on what one might expect from the process. The expectation derives from Bond and Fleisher's (1990, chap. 8) model of presidential success generated by three presidential assets: the president's approval rating, the numbers of the administration's partisans in Congress, and the administration's tenure.

An ideal measure of institutional pluralism would reflect the state of congressional affairs and the general pattern of partisanship in the electorate. No single measure seemed possible as measuring internal congressional conditions has proved difficult.⁴ The analysis employs two separate measures to represent the state of bargaining. The first variable describes whether the administration hails from the same party as the congressional

⁴For example, Smith and Deering (1984, 1985) have proposed a variable (*SUBCOMMITTEE ORIENTATION*) that could represent rising congressional decentralization. Unfortunately, no one reports a long-term time series on such orientations. In addition, the available data that Smith and Deering do report undermine the typical institutional dissolution thesis. They demonstrate a House pattern toward individual pluralism but no such Senate pattern. Kernell (1986) mentions the importance of PACs and congressional caucuses, but time-series data on the former do not predate Federal Election Commission reporting requirements.

majority. Split party control between the White House and at least one congressional house acts as the reference value for divided government. With less support in Congress, the administration should pursue public support more often. A second variable concentrates on electoral conditions. It records the percentage identifying themselves as independents on Gallup polls. As the electorate's share who call itself independent increases, the administration has fewer core supporters, and that ought to pressure the administration to take its problems to the general public more often.

Presidency-centered—tenure. The model examines the empirical impact of two standard tenure effects: the impact of elections and incrementalism. The election cycle variable acts as a dummy with presidential reelection years as the reference value. No standard exists for approximating incrementalism because no one has a clear conception of how current administrations receive guidance from previous administrations. The variable representing incrementalism attempts to operationalize two concepts. It includes a link to the past through the previous administration's average activity level and a measure of the current administration's own style.

Combined models. The examination of any of the proposed explanations ought also to assess them within the context of other variables presumed to affect presidential activities. Thus, after assessing the basic president- and presidency-centered models, we also examine a number of combined models. One type of combined model introduces the various individual presidents; one model adds style; and one investigates the addition of the insider/outsider distinction into the basic presidency-centered model. A second model, based on Kernell (1986), is the most theoretically developed of the combined approaches. The characteristics of outsider presidents lead them to react differently to institutional changes. Specifically, outsiders are more affected by changes in the bargaining regime and should be more inclined than insiders to take advantage of technological improvements that allow more direct contact with the public. We test this interaction through a switching variable allowing changes in technology and the bargaining environment to have separate effects on activity levels when outsiders occupy the presidency. In assessing the impact of the outsider distinction on the bargaining situation, the model focuses on the question of divided government and the numbers of independents in the electorate. In all three interactions, the explanation suggests that outsiders should respond to divided government, deteriorating partisan identification, and to improving technology at a greater level than insiders.

We estimate the following models of the dependent variable Y for activity g :

President-centered:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Individuals: } Y_g = & \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{TECHNOLOGY} + \beta_2 \text{EISENHOWER} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{KENNEDY} + \beta_4 \text{JOHNSON} + \beta_5 \text{NIXON} \\ & + \beta_6 \text{FORD} + \beta_7 \text{CARTER} + \beta_8 \text{REAGAN} + \varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Style: } Y_g = & \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{TECHNOLOGY} + \beta_9 \text{ACTIVE/POSITIVE} \\ & + \beta_{10} \text{ACTIVE/NEGATIVE} + \beta_{11} \text{PASSIVE/POSITIVE} + \varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Outsider: } Y_g = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{TECHNOLOGY} + \beta_{12} \text{OUTSIDER} + \varepsilon.$$

Presidency-centered:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Basic Model: } Y_g = & \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{TECHNOLOGY} + \beta_{13} \text{ECONOMIC} \\ & + \beta_{14} \text{MANAGEMENT} + \beta_{15} \text{DIPLOMACY} \\ & + \beta_{16} \text{REPUTATION} + \beta_{17} \text{APPROVAL} + \beta_{18} \text{DIVIDED?} \\ & + \beta_{19} \% \text{INDEPENDENTS} + \beta_{20} \text{INCREMENTALISM} \\ & + \beta_{21} \text{REELECTION YEAR?} + \varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

Combined models:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Basic Model: } Y_g = & \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{TECHNOLOGY} + \beta_{13} \text{ECONOMIC} \\ & + \beta_{14} \text{MANAGEMENT} + \beta_{15} \text{DIPLOMACY} \\ & + \beta_{16} \text{REPUTATION} + \beta_{17} \text{APPROVAL} + \beta_{18} \text{DIVIDED?} \\ & + \beta_{19} \% \text{INDEPENDENTS} + \beta_{20} \text{INCREMENTALISM} \\ & + \beta_{21} \text{REELECTION YEAR?} + \dots \end{aligned}$$

. . . combined with *INDIVIDUALS*:

$$\begin{aligned} & + \beta_2 \text{EISENHOWER} + \beta_3 \text{KENNEDY} + \beta_4 \text{JOHNSON} \\ & + \beta_5 \text{NIXON} + \beta_6 \text{FORD} + \beta_7 \text{CARTER} \\ & + \beta_8 \text{REAGAN} + \varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

. . . combined with *STYLE*:

$$\begin{aligned} & + \beta_9 \text{ACTIVE/POSITIVE} + \beta_{10} \text{ACTIVE/NEGATIVE} \\ & + \beta_{11} \text{PASSIVE/POSITIVE} + \varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

. . . combined with *OUTSIDERS*:

$$+ \beta_{12} \text{OUTSIDER} + \varepsilon.$$

. . . combined with *OUTSIDERS*, interactively:

$$\begin{aligned} & + \gamma_i \text{switch}[\beta_1 \text{TECHNOLOGY} + \beta_{18} \text{DIVIDED?} \\ & + \beta_{19} \% \text{INDEPENDENTS}] + \varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

Findings

The analysis initially employs OLS regression to estimate annual activity level Y_g , where g indicates one of three types of activity: major

speeches, press conferences, and political activity. In estimating each model, we began with an assessment of autocorrelation, especially when examining models containing the incrementalism variables, which are based on past values of the dependent variables. Where autocorrelation is indicated, we calculate the values of the coefficients, estimates of their statistical significance, and R^2 s taking the autoregressive parameters into account.⁵

Table 2 summarizes how the empirical models performed in describing two of the three activities: press conferences and political activities. We present R^2 to compare explained variance across the models, the standard error of the estimate (SEE) to compare prediction error across models, and to the AIC statistic to assess the quality of the models. We also present the Box-Ljung Q statistic for six lags to indicate the lack of autocorrelation in the residuals for each model (Greene 1990). No empirical approach developed here accounts for presidential major addresses. No approach produced an R^2 greater than 0.10, and hence we excluded reporting those results in the table. Given the little variation in major addresses across the years, it is unsurprising that the models perform so poorly. Table 2 illustrates two main results, however, in describing the other activities. First, the models do a reasonable job of accounting for both press conference activities (adjusted R^2 ranging from .71 to .91) and the president's political activities (adjusted R^2 rising to more than 80% of the variance). Second, these summary statistics can suggest how well the two basic approaches do.⁶ If we could ascertain overwhelming evidence that the basic ideal-type, president-centered models performed well while the presidency-centered model did not, then we could conclude that presidential behavior appears idiosyncratic, or at least unexplainable by the included variables. Evidence of superior performance by the ideal-type presidency-centered model would suggest the opposite:

⁵We tested for autocorrelation by examining Durbin-Watson d tests for those models not containing an incrementalism variable. Since incrementalism is based on lagged values of the dependent variable, we used the Durbin m for those models containing incrementalism (Ostrom 1990). We calculated Box-Ljung Q s for each model to assess autocorrelation. No models exhibited evidence of first-order autocorrelation, but test statistics and autocorrelation plots indicated combinations of second- through sixth-order autocorrelation, especially for press conferences. Where autocorrelation was indicated, the presented results derive from maximum likelihood estimation using SAS Autoreg. The Q statistics presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4 indicate a lack of autocorrelation in the residuals after making the necessary corrections.

⁶Since the incrementalism variable depends in part on lagged values of the dependent variables, the presidency-centered model might have an advantage in comparisons with president-centered models. We retested the president-centered models with incrementalism and found no substantial improvement in adjusted R^2 or SEE.

Table 2. Summary Results of Basic and Combined Models of Public Activities

Statistics ^a	President-centered Model			Presidency-centered Model	Combined		
	Individual	Style	Outside		Individual	Style	Out
<i>Press conference:</i>							
Adjusted R^2	.82	.71	.72	.79	.82	.81	.80
SEE	4.67	5.96	5.60	4.75	4.22	4.51	4.59
AIC	215	229	220	221	216	218	220
Autoregression	—	—	AR2, AR4	AR5	AR5	AR5	AR5
Q (to lag 6)	9.43	2.37	4.67	7.73	6.81	7.99	8.76
Number of cases	35 (Years 1949–1965, 1967–1984)						
<i>Political activity:</i>							
Adjusted R^2	.60	.27	.28	.72	.75	.77	.84
SEE	39.90	40.02	40.00	29.11	27.40	26.23	22.36
AIC	367	364	363	344	341	337	327
Autoregression	AR3	AR4	AR4	—	—	—	—
Q (to lag 6)	4.74	5.99	6.35	5.90	2.83	4.19	3.69
Number of cases	35 (Years 1949–1975, 1977–1984)						

Note: ^aModels are estimated using OLS, except where autocorrelation is indicated. For autoregressive models, SEE and AIC statistics are calculated with autoregressive parameters included.

Source: Compiled by authors using data sets described in the appendix.

behavior as institutionally driven. Interestingly, the presidency-centered model performed about as well as the individuals model in predicting the number of press conferences. In other words, we can explain press conference activity just as well by not including individual presidents. The presidency-centered model did a better job of explaining political activities than the president-centered models. While not clear-cut, these results support the more systematic presidency-centered approach.

Findings on Press Conference Activity

Table 3 expands on the press conference summary by focusing on the combined model that adds individual presidents to the basic presidency model. Given that we can explain the trend in press conferences fairly well with presidency-centered variables and technology, do individual presidents still stand out? The results from a reduced model (eliminating insignificant variables and accounting for collinear effects) suggest that press conferences seem less idiosyncratic than one might imagine.⁷ When controlling for other contextual factors, only Eisenhower and Kennedy have significant coefficients. Each held significantly fewer press conferences than his predecessor. Nixon and Reagan, often anecdotally cited as radically different on holding press conferences, also have negative coefficients, but these are not significant. Their behavior reflects more the standard trend generated by contextual forces (e.g., technology, reputation, divided government, and incrementalism).

Given these results, the long-term decline in press conferences, though lamented by some, should not seem surprising. Compared with the alternatives, press conferences offer few attractive opportunities for presenting the president's position. Despite the potential controls (e.g., prespecified formats, formal statements, and planted questions), every president must face reporters whose agenda differs from the administration's. Manheim (1979) found that although few face more than a handful of hostile questions, no administration ever focused more than 15% of the questions on those issues raised by the president's opening statement.⁸ So while an administration rarely faces an openly hostile press, it also may not get its message across. Given this background, improving technology makes attractive other possibilities that offer better potential for information control. As suggested by the negative coefficient, technological inno-

⁷The coefficients for the presidents included are negative, since the dummy variable for President Truman is omitted to be captured by the intercept. Truman had substantially more press conferences than his followers, so coefficients are negative in comparison to him.

⁸These results conflict with those analyses suggesting that the president controls press conferences (e.g., Edwards and Wayne 1990).

Table 3. President/Presidency Combined Model of Press Conference Activity

Variable	Reduced Model ^a	
	<i>b</i>	SE
Constant	58.01	11.45***
<i>Technology:</i>		
State of technology _{<i>t</i>-1}	-7.20	4.00*
<i>President-centered (individuals model):</i>		
Eisenhower	-21.80	5.93***
Kennedy	-30.33	10.72**
Johnson	-14.62	14.25
Nixon	-19.57	16.84
Ford	-13.37	18.48
Carter	-11.78	21.56
Reagan	-13.56	23.67
<i>Presidency-centered:</i>		
<i>Clerkship:</i>		
Economic deterioration	-0.82	.59
<i>Bargaining:</i>		
Reputation _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.38	.17**
Gallup approval of president	0.18	.11
Divided government?	-9.53	4.11**
<i>Tenure:</i>		
Incrementalism	-0.83	.28***
Reelection year?	-1.33	2.40
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²		.91
Number of cases		35
SEE		3.69
AIC		202
Autoregression		AR6
<i>Q</i> (to lag 6)		9.42

Note: ^aModel is reduced by eliminating presidency-centered variables for management stress, chief diplomat, and national percentage of independents.

*significant < .1; **significant < .05; ***significant < .01.

Source: Compiled by authors from data sources in the appendix.

vations in travel and broadcasting improve the president's access to these other possibilities, and administrations take advantage of these opportunities by deemphasizing press conferences. Partisan competition between institutions increases the potential for competing perspectives on policy,

increasing the number of potentially hostile questioners. When they can avoid such questioners, administrations do. The relatively small negative coefficient for incrementalism suggests that presidents have fewer press conferences than their immediate predecessors but not substantially so.

Findings on Political Activities

Table 4 describes political activities. The left column presents the presidency-centered model. The right column presents a model combining the presidency model with an interactive distinction between insider and outsider presidents. We modeled the outsider variable interactively with variables representing technology and the bargaining situation. Since they depend more on external support, outsiders should respond more positively to technological advances and to a deteriorating bargaining situation by pursuing more public activities than would insiders.

Clearly, technology acts as a major determinant of presidential activity. As the index measuring efficiency of travel and size of the potential audience increases, so does the activity level. Presidents use technological progress to help them do more, given their work load demands and time constraints.

These tests suggest some interesting results for the presidency-centered explanation. Perhaps not surprising given the relatively low number of cases, most coefficients are insignificant. Of the three significant variables, two perform as expected. As foreign policy duties increase, presidents pursue fewer political activities, and presidents significantly increase their activities during reelection years. Divided governments, interestingly enough, seem to decrease political activities.

Combining the standard presidency-centered model with the outsider interactions produces a much stronger view of political activities, both in terms of improved R^2 , tighter SEE, and more variables with significant coefficients. Now, not only does diplomacy constrain political activities, but the other clerkship variables (economic and executive management) also affect activity. As additional duties call on their attention, presidents pursue fewer political activities. Elements of the bargaining situation also affect activity. As hypothesized, increasing political popular standing reduces demands for political activity. The increase in the number of independents seems to constrain presidential activity.

The three outsider interactions present some interesting results as well. As hypothesized, outsider presidents react strongly to changes in technology and the bargaining environment. They have a stronger response to technological advances than do insiders. But they do not increase activity in response to a deteriorating bargaining environment. Instead, outsiders withdraw more from political activity than do insid-

**Table 4. Models of Political Activities
(Minor Speeches, Head of State, and Political Speeches)**

Variable	Presidency		Combined Interactive	
	<i>b</i>	SE	<i>b</i>	SE
Constant	234.36	106.92**	333.89	103.77**
<i>Technology:</i>				
State of technology _{<i>t</i>-1}	24.82	5.32***	36.20	6.37***
<i>President-centered:</i>				
Out × divided government?			-140.42	43.50**
Out × % independents			-16.47	5.06**
Out × state of technology _{<i>t</i>-1}			131.70	45.43**
<i>Presidency-centered:</i>				
<i>Clerkship:</i>				
Economic deterioration	-3.43	3.89	-11.46	3.52**
Management stress	-0.01	.00	-0.018	.00**
Chief diplomat	-7.59	4.31*	-6.89	3.77*
<i>Bargaining:</i>				
Reputation	-0.16	1.09	-0.59	.86
Gallup approval	-0.91	.66	-1.31	.62**
Divided government?	-28.30	13.2**	-11.50	11.45
% independents	-3.77	3.4	-6.33	3.10*
<i>Tenure:</i>				
Incrementalism	-0.19	.15	-0.03	.17
Reelection year?	79.18	17.03***	63.26	16.00***
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²		.72		.84
Number of cases		35		35
SEE		29.11		22.36
AIC		344		327
<i>Q</i> (to lag 6)		5.90		3.69

*significant < .1; **significant < .05; ***significant < .01.

Source: Compiled by authors from data sources reported in the appendix.

ers. Though perhaps surprising to some, these unexpected results about president-centered effects present an interesting interpretation if taken from the presidency-centered perspective. For the moment, assume that increasing numbers of independents and the advent of divided government (the main variables involved in the two significant, negative interactive effects) actually present any administration with a tough managerial problem (e.g., as party leader). A declining electoral commitment to party and concerns about congressional cohesion generate organizational stress

with which the president must grapple, which would in turn constrain presidential activity. The increasingly uncontrollable decision process would victimize everyone, of course. Insiders pursue fewer activities while trying to manage, but these difficulties prove especially challenging for outsiders trying to govern. After all, they have less experience with the Washington process, even under the best of circumstances.

Given these empirical effects, the oft-cited image of President Reagan going over congressional heads seems far less important than the ubiquitous image of the president's staff sitting in closed-door negotiations with the congressional leadership, endlessly trying to hammer out some compromise package: a tax increase, social security reforms, the budget, deficit reduction plans, and so on.⁹ Indeed, some have argued that the Reagan tendency to go public damaged the president's bargaining position (Burke 1985). Thus, the evidence about outsiders suggests that administrations have not abandoned bargaining despite its increasing difficulty. Going public may be complementary to bargaining activities, but it has not replaced them.

Conclusion

Analyzing presidents' public activities opens a window on understanding *how* best to understand presidential decision making. Should we focus on president-centered explanations emphasizing the distinctions between individual or groups of presidents? Or should we emphasize presidency-centered explanations that are concerned with institutional forces affecting many presidents? The latter approach provides the best opportunity for systematic study of the presidency. But we should not ignore the characteristics and preferences each occupant brings to the White House.

For the most part, our results represent a strong affirmation of the presidency-centered explanation. Overall, the presidency-centered variables played a very strong role in defining presidential activity. For press conferences, the presidency model explained variation as well as the individual presidents model. The presidency model of political activities performed better than any of the president-centered alternatives. Changes in the technology variable were also consistently important. As improved travel and communications made other public activities more feasible, they were emphasized at the expense of press conferences. In short, we can explain a lot about presidential public activities through an

⁹Indeed, Bodnick (1990, 15) argues that Reagan's 1981 tax and budget cuts, taken as prime examples of "going public," resulted from more traditional bargaining strategies with public involvement as "a secondary tool, used principally to reinforce preexisting coalitions."

approach that emphasizes measurable variables available over a long period of time.

Fortunately, we are not limited to one approach and looking at presidents individually or in groups can also contribute to an understanding of the office. But we would argue that a president-centered approach should also explicitly consider contextual factors whenever possible. At the very least, contextual variables provide a baseline for meaningful comparisons among presidents. Our combined model of press conferences contains presidency-centered variables, technology, and variables representing individual presidents. The results suggest that presidents who were anecdotally thought to be outliers are not. Just observing the number of press conferences that a president has is not enough. To understand individual presidents, we must place them in context. For example, the question is not whether Presidents Nixon or Reagan had relatively fewer press conferences due to personality traits, distrust of the media, and so on. The initial question should be whether their activity levels are distinctive given the context in which they governed.

The ultimate value of combining approaches is that it allows for better theory, testing, and explanation. For example, we found that the best model of political activities, both theoretically and empirically, was adding the interactive outsider effects to the basic presidency model. Outsider presidents are not just modeled as "different," they should react differently to changes in the institutional context and technology. One particularly interesting result described the outsider vulnerability to deteriorating bargaining conditions. The deteriorating situation seems to preoccupy the outsider, to the exclusion of public strategies, and much more so than it does the insiders, contrary to the typical president-centered explanation. Apparently, the deterioration presents outsiders with a management problem in which they become mired, while insiders, presumably with more experience dealing with the institutional setting, appear less affected. Thus, the empirical results from the president-centered variables emphasize a *presidency-centered* interpretation.

We do not argue that who occupies the Oval Office does not matter or that public appearances are the most important presidential activity. We do suggest that we should not underestimate the degree to which the institution or expectations about it affect presidential behavior. Individual presidents exist within an environment that we should make every effort to measure and consider. Only by doing so can we produce better theories and explanations of presidential behavior in general.

Manuscript submitted 6 July 1993

Final manuscript received 10 March 1994

APPENDIX
Data Sources and Operationalizations

Dependent Variables

The analysis employs a number of standard data sources. The annual data for the dependent variables cover the years 1949 to 1984 as reported in King and Ragsdale (1987), with two exceptions. First, in separate empirical analyses, we excluded two years as described earlier. Second, the Nixon-Ford transition presented a problem for annualizing data. President Nixon held office for seven months during 1974, and Ford, for the remaining five months. While several methods presented themselves for estimating 1974 and 1975 activity levels, our approach developed 12-month estimates for 1974 (for Nixon) and 1975 (for Ford) based on each president's performance in 1974 and the relevant contiguous year:

$$g'_{1974} = 12 \text{ months} \left(\frac{g_{1973} + g_{1974(\text{Nixon})}}{20 \text{ months}} \right)$$

and

$$g'_{1975} = 12 \text{ months} \left(\frac{g_{1974(\text{Ford})} + g_{1975}}{17 \text{ months}} \right).$$

This approach deflated Ford's 1975 performance by taking into account his 1974 activities and inflated Nixon's 1974 performance by considering 1973 activities.

Presidential Style

For "style," the administrations in this data base fall into the following categories: *ACTIVE/POSITIVE* (Truman, Kennedy, Ford, Carter); *PASSIVE/POSITIVE* (Reagan); *ACTIVE/NEGATIVE* (Johnson, Nixon); and *PASSIVE/NEGATIVE* (Eisenhower). These classifications are based on Barber (1992) and *US News* (1980).

Technology

The technology variable uses three major components: the number of "lighted runways" (an FAA distinction) to approximate the dispersion of usable airports, the speed of Air Force 1 to approximate mobility, and the numbers of television outlets in the country to approximate the dispersion of media markets. The data on Air Force 1 comes from terHorst and Abertazzie (1979); *Jane's Aircraft* (various years); direct communications, 1776th Air Base Wing, Andrews Air Force Base; and the Commerce Department's *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (various years). The statistics on runways and TV outlets come from the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (various years).

Economic Deterioration

The measure for unemployment and inflation derives from Bureau of Labor Statistics regular reports and the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (various years).

Management Stress

Several analysts criticize past measures of staffing. For example, Hart (1987) argues that given the numbers of agency detailees and changes in accounting practices and administration reports, few measures accurately estimate the size of subunits within the Executive Office, but the most appropriate and consistent approach would use numbers drawn from

the OPM Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics series. The measure used adopted this approach using data from Stanley and Niemi (1992).

Chief Diplomat

The chief diplomat variable uses an additive index of three measures, based on standardized scores. The first enumerates the year's executive agreements as an approximation of diplomatic responsibilities, lagged one year. The second measures the merchandise trade balance change described so that the positive values represent a deteriorating balance. This measure taps the size of the administration's trade responsibilities. The third summarizes whether the nation was at war or not, with war as the reference value, suggesting the magnitude of the administration's defense responsibilities. Executive orders data come from King and Ragsdale (1987). Data on the trade balance come from Stanley and Niemi (1992).

Reputation

The measure of reputation (**R**) equals:

$$R_j = S_{j-1} - [\xi(\text{INITIAL APPROVAL}_{j-1}, \text{MINIMUM \% PARTISANS}_{j-1}, \text{TENURE}_{j-1})],$$

where the subscript j indexes the current year; S measures the administration's success as reported by *Congressional Quarterly* (various years); and ξ represents a linear function mapping the president's endowments into success scores. *INITIAL APPROVAL* represents the average administration approval rating over the year's first four months, derived from Gallup. *MINIMUM \% PARTISANS* describes the smallest percentage of House or Senate partisans. This approach presumes that the administration could expect only as much as the support common to both the House and Senate. *TENURE* represents the administration's years in service. One difficulty arose with this reputation index. *Congressional Quarterly* began publishing support scores in 1953. In order to approximate the necessary pre-1953 data, we used the *CQ* presidential boxscore to identify bills on which the administration would likely have taken a stand. Reading the *CQ* story on each bill helped identify votes, administration positions, and congressional dispositions.

Presidential Approval

Approval ratings come from communications with the Gallup opinion organization and the *Gallup Opinion Index* averaged for the year.

Party Independents

These data are from yearly averages of the Gallup poll questions on party identification. We obtained these data through private communications with the Gallup organization.

Incrementalism

For a particular kind of activity g , we define *INCREMENTALISM* (**I**) as

$$I g_{jc} = \frac{\left(\sum_{i=1}^{j-1} g_{ic} \right) + \bar{g}_p}{j},$$

where the subscript j indexes the current year of an administration's tenure; c indexes the current administration; and p indexes the previous administration. Thus, in the administration's third year, the incrementalism value ($I g_{3c}$) sums the administration's first two years' experience ($g_{1c} + g_{2c}$) with the average for the previous administration's tenure (\bar{g}_p), all

divided by three (i.e., the current value of j). Given this approach, I_g values for early years weight heavily the previous administration's efforts. Over time, though, those efforts become less important as the current administration develops its own pattern.

REFERENCES

- Barber, James David. 1992. *The Presidential Character*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Bodnick, Marc A. 1990. "'Going Public' Reconsidered: Reagan's 1981 Tax and Budget Cuts, and Revisionist Theories of Presidential Power." *Congress and the Presidency* 17:13–28.
- Bond, Jon, and Richard Fleisher. 1990. *The President in the Legislative Arena*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Burke, John P. 1985. "Presidential Influence and the Budget Process." In *The Presidency and Public Policy Making*, ed. George Edwards, Steven Shull, and Norman Thomas. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Edwards, George, III, and Stephen J. Wayne. 1990. *Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making*. 2d ed. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- George, Alexander, and Juliette George. 1964. *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House*. New York: Dover.
- Greene, William H. 1990. *Econometric Analysis*. New York: Macmillan.
- Greenstein, Fred I. 1988. "Nine Presidents in Search of a Modern Presidency." In *Leadership in the Modern Presidency*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hart, John C. 1987. *The Presidential Branch*. New York: Pergamon Press.
- Hecl, Hugh. 1977. *Studying the Presidency*. New York: Ford Foundation.
- Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy." *American Political Science Review* 71:1467–87.
- Kernell, Samuel. 1986. *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- King, Gary, and Lyn Ragsdale. 1987. *The Elusive Executive: Discovering Statistical Patterns in the Presidency*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Manheim, Jarol B. 1979. "The Honeymoon's Over: The News Conference and the Development of Presidential Style." *Journal of Politics* 41:55–74.
- Meltzer, Allan, and Mark Vellrath. 1975. "The Effects of Economic Policies on Votes for the Presidency." *Journal of Law and Economics* 18:781–98.
- Neustadt, Richard. 1980. *Presidential Power*. New York: Wiley.
- Ostrom, Charles W., Jr. 1990. *Time Series Analysis: Regression Techniques*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Page, Benjamin, and Mark Petracca. 1983. *The American Presidency*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Polsby, Nelson. 1978. "Interest Groups and the Presidency: Trends in Political Intermediation in America." In *American Politics and Public Policy*, ed. Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Ragsdale, Lyn. 1984. "The Politics of Presidential Speechmaking, 1949–1980." *American Political Science Review* 78:971–84.
- Rockman, Bert A. 1986. "Presidential and Executive Studies: The One, the Few, and the Many." In *Political Science: The Science of Politics*, ed. Herbert Weisberg. New York: Agathon Press.

- Rose, Richard. 1991. *The Postmodern President: The White House Meets the World*. 2d ed. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
- Smith, Steven, and Christopher Deering. 1984. *Committees in Congress*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- . 1985. "Subcommittees in Congress." In *Congress Reconsidered*, 3d ed., ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Stanley, Harold W., and Richard G. Niemi. 1992. *Vital Statistics on American Politics*. 3d ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Sullivan, Terry. 1987. "Headcounts, Expectations, and Presidential Coalitions in Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 32:567–89.
- . 1990. "Bargaining with the President: A Simple Game and New Evidence." *American Political Science Review* 84:1167–96.
- terHorst, J. F., and Ralph Abertazzie. 1979. *The Flying White House: The Story of Air Force One*. New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan.
- US News and World Report*. 1980. "Carter and Reagan: Clues to Their Character," 27 October.
- Wilson, Woodrow. 1908. *Constitutional Government in the United States*. New York: Columbia University Press.