ἰδίοις vs. ἑαυτοῦ

[Stephen Hughes]

Stephen (Hughes), If I am understanding you right, are you [basically] saying that the woman gains her 'identity/ἰδίοις' from the husband where the husband's responsibility for his 'own/ἑαυτοῦ' body (where all the instructions for one's physical body apply) include that of his wife? That does seem to give significance to the need for the two terms.

If you are looking for simple / exact answers, then I'd say, I'm as unsure as anyone else - the are both covered by some form of possessive statement in English. If you would like to enter into discussion, then I have some things to say. The identity / responsibility is a conjecture for discussion not an answer in itself.

I'm not sure of the marriage customs of ancient Ephesus (if that is where the work was intended for), but I am sure that what I said about "identity" was not meant to imply that a wife took her husband's family name - in that sense of identity. It is conjecture to say so, but as the church probably consisted of a number of social / ethnic groups "identity" may have been seen in a number of different ways. The suffix bat- + the father's name may have characterised women in the congregation of Jewish background and I've never read anything about that being changed by marriage. The concept of family names that is currently so wide-spread in Western society is a relatively recent phenomenon in many ways. In short, what I've said about "identity" was not intended to be used to support the idea of changing names.

Another point, again for discussion, not a pronouncement of truth, is the nature of the verbs. ὑποτάσσειν is almost a passive verb - conforming to something outside herself, if that is the verb which is implied here, while ἀγαπᾶν is not the passive sort of smitten by love "love your wife" romance (while that type of love is not wrong, bad or unappreciated in itself), but it (ἀγαπᾶν) is probably meant as an active and productive action. If that were the case then the type of action could determine the difference, and that would be almost grammatically determined (or syntactically) if you like.

I'm not going to claim to understand Barry's laconic statement as he understood it when he wrote it, but if I had written what he wrote:

The two are practical synonyms by NT times.

I would have meant two things. First that the stuff in the dictionary about earlier usages stressing "private" etc. is not so relevant for New Testament studies, and should be handled with caution. There are set phrases such as κατ' ἰδίαν which fossilise that earlier meaning, and that survive in literary Greek up until today, but generally the language has moved on to what LSJ describe as

6. in later Gr., almost as a possessive Pron.,= “ἑαυτοῦ, ἑαυτῶν, ἡ ἰ. φιλαγαθία” IG22.1011.71 (ii B.C.), etc.; “χρῶνται ὡς ἰδίοις” UPZ11.14 (ii B.C.); περὶ τῶν ἰ. βιβλίων, title of work by Galen.
b. ἴ. θάνατος one's own, i.e. a natural death, Ramsay Cities and Bishoprics No. 133; “ἰδίοις τελευτῶσι θανάτοις” Ptol.Tetr.199; also ἰδία μοίρῃ Ramsay op.cit. No.187.

. The other thing is that it may not be a distinct meaning difference, but rather a usage pattern difference between them (cf. beautiful / handsome for females / males) drawn up along some lines (which may have been crossed from time to time). But that is what I would have meant, not what Barry did.

Another point for consideration... Why did the Greek speaking readers of the NT think it necessary to correct the more original

Καὶ ἐπορεύοντο πάντες ἀπογράφεσθαι, ἕκαστος εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν.

to the presumably better Greek

Καὶ ἐπορεύοντο πάντες ἀπογράφεσθαι, ἕκαστος εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν πόλιν.

?

[Barry Hofstetter]

Runge's formulation is not "change has meaning" but "change implies meaning," which already builds in the notion that it is not necessarily the case. You've started with the calm is "often" the case and now I'm happy to see it watered down to "not necessarily the case."

I suggest that it is better to focus what meaning--semantic and/or pragmatic--the change could have, rather than to latch on the exception. In my experience, those who propose stylistic or varietal explanations usually attempt to explain the "obscurum per obscurius" and often just beg the question ("it's different to be different"), thereby foreclosing possible productive avenues of investigation.

The fact of the matter is that there is a lot of research showing that synonymy avoidance is an important part of human language and its acquisition. A good heuristic is that, until shown otherwise, different forms mean different things. It is extremely hard to find stable cases of exact synonyms in language. As a result, I tend to be skeptical of most attempts to tolerate apparent synonymy (i.e. the notion that this change does not imply meaning). The major exception is when we have good evidence to think that an author (that of John's Gospel, say) likes playing with synonyms.

Very good observation. A look through the varous attested usages in BDAG is instructive. By saying that it is a practical equivalent of ἑαυτοῦ does not mean that it is a precise synonym or that it shares the same range of usage as the pronoun (itself "in flux" during this period). It does mean that in some contexts it is used where in earlier and even different authors of the same period we might expect the reflexive possessive.

[Thomas Dolhanty]

By saying that it is a practical equivalent of ἑαυτοῦ does not mean that it is a precise synonym or that it shares the same range of usage as the pronoun (itself "in flux" during this period). It does meant that in some contexts it is used where in earlier and even different authors of the same period we might expect the reflexive possessive.

Right. The devil is in the detail. Is a "rock" the same as a "stone"? It depends on the question being asked. I agree that there are few real synonyms, but there are innumerable equivalencies that allow the communicator to use different words to convey the same idea within the context. And skilled communicators take advantage of that fact to add interest and vibrancy to their message by modulating words and constructions.

I suggest that it is better to focus what meaning--semantic and/or pragmatic--the change could have, rather than to latch on the exception. In my experience, those who propose stylistic or varietal explanations usually attempt to explain the "obscurum per obscurius" and often just beg the question ("it's different to be different"), thereby foreclosing possible productive avenues of investigation.

Notwithstanding the charged language ("focus" vs. "latch on", " attempt to explain the "obscurum per obscurius", etc.), there is another and opposite error that is often made. It is just as erroneous to find meaning where none was intended as to obscure meaning by appealing to synonymy. Which error rules in frequency I have no idea, but there are ditches on both sides of the path. A saying like "change implies meaning", by itself does not get you very far until you examine the specifics and consider the question being asked. Sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn't for the same words.

[Stephen Carlson]

I suggest that it is better to focus what meaning--semantic and/or pragmatic--the change could have, rather than to latch on the exception. In my experience, those who propose stylistic or varietal explanations usually attempt to explain the "obscurum per obscurius" and often just beg the question ("it's different to be different"), thereby foreclosing possible productive avenues of investigation.

Notwithstanding the charged language ("focus" vs. "latch on", " attempt to explain the "obscurum per obscurius", etc.), there is another and opposite error that is often made. It is just as erroneous to find meaning where none was intended as to obscure meaning by appealing to synonymy. Which error rules in frequency I have no idea, but there are ditches on both sides of the path. A saying like "change implies meaning", by itself does not get you very far until you examine the specifics and consider the question being asked. Sometimes it does and sometimes it doesn't for the same words.

There's a third option, which I mentioned in my original reply: admit one's ignorance and not make stuff up.

[Stephen Carlson]

Very good observation. A look through the varous attested usages in BDAG is instructive. By saying that it is a practical equivalent of ἑαυτοῦ does not mean that it is a precise synonym or that it shares the same range of usage as the pronoun (itself "in flux" during this period). It does meant that in some contexts it is used where in earlier and even different authors of the same period we might expect the reflexive possessive.

Your word "practical" was appreciated.

[Thomas Dolhanty]

There's a third option, which I mentioned in my original reply: admit one's ignorance and not make stuff up.

ὁ ἀγαπῶν παιδείαν ἀγαπᾷ αἴσθησιν ὁ δὲ μισῶν ἐλέγχους ἄφρων Proverbs 12:1

Really, I set out not to make any comment at all, but simply to pass along comments by Hoehner and Larkin on the texts in question. As an afterthought I reacted to the Runge quote, which in retrospect was a bad idea and a distraction from the question being asked. So I accept your reproof. I certainly don't want to be found hiding ignorance or "making stuff up".

[Stephen Carlson]

Really, I set out not to make any comment at all, but simply to pass along comments by Hoehner and Larkin on the texts in question. As an afterthought I reacted to the Runge quote, which in retrospect was a bad idea and a distraction from the question being asked. So I accept your reproof. I certainly don't want to be found hiding ignorance or "making stuff up".

I didn't mean to come across as so harsh. Runge's work opened my eyes to a whole new dimension of meaning in the Greek text, which, in my experience, was too easily ignored as "stylistic" -- as if any meaning that can't captured in English translation (with synonymy = same English translation) isn't worth investigating further. You may be reacting to excesses the other way, but I haven't really seen that in Runge's work.

[Thomas Dolhanty]

I've ordered a copy of Runge' "Discourse Grammar". In light of the excerpts and reviews I've seen, and your comments, I look forward to reading him.

[Tobey]

I've ordered a copy of Runge' "Discourse Grammar". In light of the excerpts and reviews I've seen, and your comments, I look forward to reading him.

Thanks for your insights, Thomas, I certainly understand where you're coming from. Runge's book is definitely an eye-opener as Stephen (Carlson) mentioned.

As additional insight into this matter, I did run across this verse yesterday:

διὰ δὲ τὰς πορνείας ἕκαστος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γυναῖκα ἐχέτω, καὶ ἑκάστη τὸν ἴδιον ἄνδρα ἐχέτω.

Just interesting that when Paul speaks of the woman's relationship to the man, it is ἴδιον yet when he speaks of the man's relationship to the wife, it is ἑαυτοῦ (as in the OP). I agree with you Thomas in the error of trying to discern meaning where none is intended, but again, while it may not be theologically significant, there is a reason Paul used the two terms (so closely together to convey a similar meaning) that the question is begged, "Why?"

To Paul, it may very well simply be that was his style, to refer to husbands possessively and women reflexively (and I mean than in very simple terms). But, it is a very curious thing indeed.

[Stephen Hughes]

There's a third option, which I mentioned in my original reply: admit one's ignorance and not make stuff up.

I'm not so keen to stick my nose in, but perhaps I could share some observations of colleagues and students over the years.

Autodidacts often seem to be making things up. Looked at it a little obliquely progress within a developed field of knowledge is a kind of guided making up knowledge. Without guidance some misunderstandings and misorientations can easily happen. Those type of things straighten themselves out to a large degree given time, exposure to a breadth of material that established the field in the first place or the discipline of structured education. Any one teaching, after the first 2 or 3 autobiographical / egoistic self-discovery tend to come to focus on the material, and the needs of the students require even the autodidact to go beyond their own interaction and discovery - sometimes looking like it's made up - and develop ways to bring others to the subject. It usually follows its own path.

Admission of ignorance requires an appreciation of the limits of ones own knowledge, and when the awareness of ignorance depends on the self-referential body of knowledge that one has oneself, that can be very difficult.