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Chapter III – Durand and Holkar

More important in their results on the general situation were the occurrences taking place about the same time in the States of the native princes in Central India and Rajputana. I have narrated a portion of these under the head of Gwaliar. It is necessary now to invite the attention of the reader to the larger remainder as yet untold.

Colonel Durand

The acting representative of the Governor-General at Indur, the capital of the dominions of Holkar, and the head-quarters of the Central Indian Agency, was Colonel Henry Marion Durand. Colonel Durand was one of the most remarkable of the remarkable men for the production of whom the East India Company was famous. Endowed with a clear head, a comprehensive grasp of affairs, a quick and keen vision, a singularly retentive memory, and an energy that nothing could tire, Durand could not escape distinction. Anywhere, and under any circumstances, he would have attained it. Seldom has there served in India a man who could do all things so well; who could successfully apply to so many diverse subjects his vast talents.

His character

He was equally at home in planning a campaign, in giving, as he did give, the soundest advice to a Commander-in-Chief, after an indecisive action, such as that of Chilianwala, and in devising schemes for the improvement of the complicated revenue system of the North-West Provinces. Nor did his private character belie his conduct as a public officer. Large hearted, full of sympathy for the suffering and the oppressed, he had unsparing scorn and contempt for those only whom he believed to be false, to be treacherous, to be corrupt, to be time-serving. For a man of that class, when once he had found him out, Durand had no pity. But the true man, however poor, however neglected by Fortune he might be, always

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received from Durand support, encouragement, and sympathy. This remark applies alike to Colonel Durand’s relations with natives and with Europeans. It is not true that he had a scorn for Asiatics as Asiatics. He had scorn for corrupt Asiatics, as he had scorn for corrupt Europeans. But in his mind the colour of the skin weighed not at all. With him honesty was honesty, falseness was falseness; and wherever he detected these opposite qualities, he loved or despised the possessor, whether he were Asiatic, or whether lie were European.

His constant struggle with Fortune

It is a remarkable fact that throughout his long career in India – a career extending over forty years – Durand owed nothing to Fortune. On the contrary, his life was a constant struggle against the efforts of the. blind goddess. She made his path hard and difficult. He rose to one of the highest positions in India,--the Lieutenant-Governorship of her most important province – in spite of envy, in spite of calumny, in spite of the thousand and one indirect obstacles which can be and are used to thwart the upward career of an able and honest man, who, connecting himself with no party, dares to have the courage of his opinions. There have been epochs in Indian history when it has been possible for men without brains to rise very high indeed. Servility, complaisance, a cautious reticence, a suppression in fact of one’s inner consciousness, are sometimes found useful and are often rewarded.

His hatred of intrigue

But Durand scorned the backstairs path. He always spoke exactly what he thought, always acted as he believed to be right, regardless of consequences.

His manliness

This manly action made him many enemies, and these enemies thwarted him, as enemies in high places can thwart a man true to his own convictions. That he succeeded in spite of them was due partly to his indomitable strength of will, partly to the fact that, in times of pressure and adversity, Governments find themselves forced to replace the smiling sycophant by the skilled workman.

His earlier career

Colonel Durand belonged to the Engineers. Yet, so great had been his capacity, and so comprehensive his intellectual range, that he, then a Lieutenant of Engineers, had been selected in 1838 for the post of Secretary to the Board of Revenue of the North-West Provinces. He had accepted this post when he was invited to accompany the army which was to march under Sir John Keane

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into Afghanistan. He threw up his civil appointment, joined that force, and was one of the two officers who blew in the gates of Ghazni, thus admitting the storming party. His health requiring a change to England, he had returned to India with Lord Ellenborough in 1841 in the capacity of aide-de-camp. Before landing in Calcutta Lord Ellenborough had promoted the aide-de-camp to be private secretary. Durand held this office during the brilliant Indian career of Lord Ellenborough. On the recall of the latter by the Court of Directors he was appointed Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces. Then came into play those arts which incompetent rulers

Cabal against him

employ to get rid of men, subordinate to them in position, but in every other respect their superiors. Charges, frivolous in themselves, and subsequently proved to be utterly unfounded, were trumped up against Durand. He was removed from his Commissionership.

How he met it

He returned to England with the justificatory pieces in his pocket; convinced the Court of Directors, convinced the Board of Control, and went back to India with an order from the President of that Board that he was to receive an appointment equal to that of which he had been unjustly deprived.

Returns to India

But Lord Dalhousie was then Governor-General of India. Lord Dalhousie did not like Durand. He offered him an appointment in the Panjab so inferior to that he was entitled to expect that Durand unhesitatingly refused it.

Joins the army in the field

He re-entered upon his duties as a military Engineer, joined the army then fighting in the Panjab, was summoned to the councils of war held by Lord Gough after Chilianwala, and aided by his practical advice in ensuring the victory of Gujrat. An account of this campaign from his pen enriched shortly after- wards the pages of the Calcutta Review.

Becomes political agent at Bhopal

After the annexation of the Panjab, Durand accepted from Lord Dalhousie the post of political agent at Bhopal. His labours of years here were most useful. He formed the mind of the Begam; taught her those golden lessons of true and honest dealing as a ruler, from which she profited so much afterwards; and showed her, from the examples of the Muhammadan rulers of India, the material advantage a sovereign reaped from the prevalence of the knowledge that he was to be believed on his own word.

Is forced by ill-health to visit England

Severe illness drove Durand to England in 1854.

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His appointment at Bhopal lapsed to another, and he returned at the end of 1856 to the corps of Engineers. But shortly afterwards, Sir Robert Hamilton, the agent for the Governor-General at Indur, having decided to take furlough to Europe, Lord Canning sent Durand to act for him.

Appointed Governor General’s Agent for Central India

Thus it happened that when the Mutiny broke out in 1857, Colonel Durand was the representative of the Government of India at the court of Holkar, and had political charge of Central India.

Colonel Durand took up his office at Indur on the 5th of April. At that time all was quiet in. Central India. The excitement which had prevailed in Bengal regarding the greased cartridges had not penetrated to Mau58, nor even to Indur.

April 25

Earliest warnings of the mutiny

On the 25th of April, however, a Sipahi of the 30th Native Infantry was apprehended in the act of conveying a treasonable message to the Darbar of Rewa. There is no doubt that he was one of many sent by the several regiments to ascertain the temper and sentiments of the native courts. From this time an uneasy feeling began to prevail throughout Central India – a feeling brought to a climax by the mutiny of the 10th of May at Mirath.

To understand the position of Colonel Durand when the news reached him of the revolt at Mirath it is necessary to define the nature of the territory of which he had political charge, its extent, its resources, and its position with regard to other States, Native as well as British.

Central India

Central India comprised the Native States in subsidiary alliance with the British Government of Holkar, of Sindhia, of Bhopal, of Dhar, of Dewas, and of Jaura.

Its geographical position

The dominion of Sindhia may be roughly stated to comprise the territory bordered by the river Chambal to the north and north-west, severed on the east by the river Sind from Bundelkhand, and, further south, by the Betwa, from the British possessions. Between it and the British territories due south, lies Bhopal, divided from the latter by the river Narbada. To the west of Bhopal is the dominion of Holkar, comprising likewise a portion of the country south of the Narbada, and reaching nearly to the

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Tapti. This dominion is, so to speak, pressed in by its neighbours. Its capital, Indur, lies in a tract of country separated from the remaining part of the dominion by the independent State of Dewas to the north and north-east, and by the independent State of Dhar to the west. On the north it is hemmed in by the south-western limits of the dominion of Sindhia, whilst, separating it again from its northernmost districts, is Jaura, nominally a fief of Holkar, but really independent. To the north of Jaura, again, the dominion of Holkar thrusts its head into Rajputana, by which it is surrounded on three sides.

Military occupation of Central India

It will thus be seen that of all the dominions under the Central Indian Agency, that of Holkar was the least compact. Hemmed in on three sides by Native States, its various component portions were isolated from each other, likewise by Native States. Each of these had its own troops. First in order may be named Gwaliar, possessing a force of 8,000 men, disciplined and led by European officers. The main body of this force was at Gwaliar itself, but it had detachments at Sipri; further south still, at Guna; and, on the very borders of Holkar’s territory, at Agar. Thirty miles from Agar was Mehidpur, the headquarters of the Malwa contingent, a small force comprising a regiment of infantry, a battery of artillery, and some cavalry, likewise officered by British officers. Immediately to the north of Mehidpur lies Jaura, and to the north of that again, and on the high road to Dehli, are the stations of Nimach and Nasirabad, garrisoned by troops of the regular army.

The purely native force there

The purely native force in the dominions of Jaura, of Dhar, and of Dewas, was contemptible in point of numbers and efficiency, but to the east of Indur, and about a hundred miles from it, was the Bhopal contingent, a body of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, commanded by British officers, and stationed at Sihor. To the east and northeast of this, again, were native troops of the regular army, in the Sagar and Narbada territories and in Bundelkhand.

Its position with respect to British territory

It will thus be seen that Indur was completely cut off on three sides from the British territory by native troops and native contingents. On the south, indeed, rather more than thirteen miles distant from it, and about five-and-twenty miles north of the Narbada, lay the British station of Mau, garrisoned by

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Garrison of Mau

the 23rd Regiment of Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel Platt, a wing of the 1st Cavalry, under Major Harris, and Captain Hungerford’s battery of Artillery, having European gunners but native drivers. Thus, if India was isolated, Mau was still more so. For while, to the north of it, Indur was occupied by a large native force under the personal direction of Holkar himself, to the south it rested, so to speak, in the air, no British troops intervening between it and the military stations in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies.

Political considerations which affected Central India

It is clear, then, that, in the event of the mutinous contagion spreading to Central India, the maintenance of order in the country north of the Narbada would depend entirely on one of two contingencies. The first of these was, naturally, the early fall of Dehli; the second, the advance of reinforcements from the south. In view of the latter contingency, the paramount importance of maintaining, at all risks, the line of the Narbada will at once be recognised.

The line of the Narbada

Crossing the Narbada below Indur, and running right through the territories under the Central Indian Agency to a point on the Chambal directly north of Gwaliar, ran the direct road from Bombay to Agra. Not only was this road invaluable as a postal and telegraphic line59, but it was absolutely necessary as a military road, constituting, as it did, the direct route by which troops from the South could advance. The importance of maintaining this line, more especially the portion of it south of the Narbada, cannot be over-rated.

Weak points of that line

Its weak points were those where it was commanded by the troops stationed at Mehidpur and at Agra, and where it passed through stations held by troops belonging to the Gwaliar Contingent, such as Sipri and Gwaliar, and where it traversed Dholpur.

The troops at Indur

At Indur, for the protection of the treasury and other public buildings, was a detachment of the Malwa contingent, two hundred strong. These were the only troops stationed there when the news of

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the mutiny of the 10th of May at Mirath reached the Residency.

Policy of Colonel Durand

Colonel Durand received this intelligence on the 14th of May. He comprehended at a glance its importance. He saw that it was but the first act of a very tragic drama. But his duty was clear to him. To maintain his own position at Indur as long as it could be maintained; to sever all intercourse between the native troops of the regular army and the soldiers of the native contingents; to secure the Narbada, and the important road I have described; to re-assure the native princes under his superintendence:– these were his first considerations, and he set himself at once to act upon them.

Summons troops from Sirdarpur and Bhopal

It happened that, in addition to the troops I have mentioned, there was a regiment of Bhils at the station of Sirdarpur, near Mandlesar, about forty miles from Indur. The Bhils are men who have no caste prejudices, and who, reclaimed from a wild life by the British, had always proved good soldiers. Durand sent at once to Sirdarpur for two hundred and seventy of these men. Believing, too, that of all the contingents, those who had been raised at Bhopal were the least likely to waver in their fidelity, he ordered up a strong detachment of cavalry and infantry and two guns from that place. These troops, using every expedition, reached Indur on the 20th of May. As Colonel Durand was precluded by his position as an officer in political employ from exercising military duties, the command of these detachments, and the arranging for the protection of the Residency, devolved upon Colonel Stockley of the Bhil corps.

Mutinous disposition of the troops at Mau

The detachments arrived just in time. The native troops in Mau had not escaped the contagion of the disease by which the entire native army had been infected. Not only were they, at this very time, ripe for revolt, but they had even debated whether it would not be advisable to make at once a dash for the scene where their brethren were fighting, by way of Indur.

Durand accepts a guard of Maharajah Holkar’s troops

Conscious that such a move was possible, that, under certain circumstances, – such, for example, as the presence in the ranks of the native troops of a master mind, – it was certain, Durand had made every preparation to meet the contingency. In consequence

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of his requisition, Maharajah Holkar had supplied him with cavalry60 to form pickets on the roads. From the same source he had received half a battery of guns and three companies of infantry. These had been posted so as to command the approaches to the Residency. A certain number of troopers were kept always in the saddle. Yet, after all, if the attempt had been made, the chances of the English at Indur would have been poor. For the question quis custodiet ipsos custodes? had not then been solved. A few days later it was solved, not exactly to the credit of the custodes.

Colonel Travers arrives and assumes command at Indur

In the middle of June a further detachment of cavalry from Bhopal, under their commandant, Colonel Travers, arrived at Indur. The command of the entire force round the Residency devolved, then, on Colonel Travers, as the senior officer. This onerous duty could not have fallen to a more gallant soldier or to a truer-hearted man. To him was then committed the military care of the Residency, and it is only just to record that not a single precaution was neglected to ensure the safety of its occupants against the effects of a sudden rising.

Gloomy intelligence from the outer world

For some short time prior to the arrival of Colonel Travers affairs had appeared to move more smoothly. From the outer world, however, there came intelligence which more than ever convinced Durand that unless a decisive blow should be struck speedily at the heart of the rebellion, the drain upon his resources would be hard to meet.

Durand is perfectly conscious of the danger of his position

Thus, disquieting rumours from Nasirabad and Nimach; the more than doubtful behaviour of detachments of the Gwaliar contingent; the receipt of a letter from the officer commanding that contingent expressive of his distrust of their loyalty; intelligence that emissaries from the native regiment at Mau had been discovered tampering with the men of the Bhopal contingent:– these reports following in quick succession, were more than sufficient to satisfy Durand that, literally, he and his were standing on a quicksand. It is true that his their feet still rested on the treacherous surface, but every wave of the tide, every effort to move forward, made the position more perilous, the danger mere apparent.

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Possibility that the disastrous news might affect the troops at Mau

This was the case when, on the 1st, Durand received intelligence of the mutiny at Nasirabad; on the 6th, of that at Nimach. The information which reached Durand could not be hidden from the regular troops at Mau. The head-quarter wing of the cavalry regiment there stationed had just mutinied at Nimach. How would the men of the other wing, and the men of the infantry regiment, receive the news? Should they revolt, would the European battery be able to disperse them? Should they make a rush for Indur, would the troops of Holkar oppose them or unite with them? These were questions on the solution of which depended, not only the lives of the Europeans, but the maintenance of British authority in Central India.

But they are apparently not affected by it

For a moment it seemed as though the native troops at Mau were about to prove an exception to their comrades, that amid the faithless they would be faithful. Reports, indeed, to their discredit were rife. It was openly stated that they were in league with the troops of Holkar, and that, strong in that alliance, they intended to master the guns at Mau. and then march on Indur. But they showed no outward sign of or of disaffection. Never were they more respectful; never more fervent in their protestations of loyalty.

Durand is not taken in

Durand was not taken in. He saw through it. As he wrote to Lord Elphinstone, “it was all moonshine.” But to him there was still a glimmering of hope. Though the news of the revolt at Nimach was followed by that of the mutiny of the cavalry of the Malwa contingent – pushed up, contrary to Durand’s orders, into contact with the mutineers – accompanied by the murder of their officers; though reports arrived of the massacre of the Europeans at Jhansi, with its accompanying horrors; and though, last and most fatal of all, intelligence was received of the revolt of the bulk of the Gwaliar contingent at Gwaliar itself, Durand still hoped.

The one hope on which he depends

There was a chance, and apparently a good chance, that he might yet override the storm, that a ray of sunshine might yet harden the treacherous soil.

General Woodburn’s column

This chance lay in the march of a column despatched to Mau from the Bombay Presidency under Major-General Woodburn. It was the approach of this column, consisting of five troops of the 14th Dragoons, a

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battery of artillery, a company of sappers, and a native regiment, that had caused hesitation in the minds of the native garrison at Mau. It was the approach of this column that gave a degree of confidence to Durand. Had it only pushed on, Central India would have been saved from a great calamity.

The column is diverted to Aurangabad

It happened, however, that General Woodburn’s column was suddenly diverted to another point. Disturbances had broken out at Aurangabad. It was believed that on the suppression of those disturbances depended the fidelity to British interests of the troops of the Nizam, and that, therefore, at any sacrifice, they must be suppressed. General Woodburn, then, turned off to Aurangabad. He suppressed the disturbances there, but, having suppressed them, did not move forward. He remained at Aurangabad, halted; I must suppose, in deference to superior orders. To compensate, as far as he could, for the alienation of this force, the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, ever zealous for the public service, was seeking the means of equipping another column for the relief of Central India.

Durand’s one hope is thus disappointed

The hope, then, so promising, apparently so well grounded, was destined to prove delusive. Even before it had utterly flickered away there had come tidings sufficient to daunt the most stout-hearted, but which did not daunt Durand. The northern portion of the great road between Agra and Bombay had, he knew, been lost when the troops at Jhansi, and when, subsequently, the Gwaliar contingent, had mutinied. But now he learned that his communications were still further threatened; that the troops at Jabalpur, at Lalatpur, and at Sagar, were on the verge of mutiny; that throughout Bundelkhand the natives were rising, and that the temper of the troops in Mau was becoming daily more uncertain.

Another hope glimmers on the horizon

But in these desperate circumstances there suddenly appeared in the north-west the reflection of a light sufficient, had it been real, to calm all apprehensions. Just at the time when Durand received information that General Woodburn had crushed the rising at Aurungabad the report reached him that Dehli had fallen. This was the blow at the heart which would have paralysed intending mutineers – this the light which would have diffused

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its cheering ray into every corner of the Empire. It was not Durand alone who heard the report. It had crept into the counting-houses of the native bankers and been whispered in the furthest recesses of the bazaars. The quieter demeanour of the lower classes of the population showed how markedly the confirmation of the rumour would have affected the course of events.

The hope proves delusive

But it proved to be a will o’ the wisp – to be premature – to be untrue. Not to Durand, in the first instance, came the denial of the rumour. Certain information that the intelligence was false reached a banker of the city. He refused to disclose to Durand the nature of the information it was known he had received. But a little later it came to Durand direct.

July 1

Even worse than delusive

On the morning of the 1st of July a letter from Agra, dated the 20th of June, was handed to him.

From this he learned for the first time that the previous report regarding the fall of Dehli was untrue, that, up to the 17th, the British, forced to remain on the defensive, had been repeatedly attacked; that they had with difficulty held their own; and that the General commanding had determined to suspend all offensive movements pending the arrival of reinforcements.

The consequence

The communication from Agra was placed in Colonel Durand’s hands about 8 o’clock on the morning of the 1st of July. About half an hour later he sat down to condense its contents into a letter to be despatched to the Governor of Bombay, when he was startled by the sudden discharge of the three guns in the Residency enclosure61. A second later, and one of his official servants rushed in to report that the whole place was in an uproar. Durand rose and walked hastily to the steps of the Residency. The scene that met his gaze left no doubt upon his mind. The crisis, so long and so skilfully averted, had come upon him. Before I recount the measures taken by the Agent and the commander of the force round the Residency to avert this sudden danger, I propose to describe that place and its environs, and to show how the troops under the orders of Colonel Travers had been posted.

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The Indur Residency

The Indur Residency is a double-storied house built of stone, in an open enclosure, about four hundred yards to the north of the Khan river, flowing in a north-westerly direction towards the city of Indur, from which the Residency is two miles distant. In the same enclosure are bungalows for the assistants to the Agent and other buildings and bazaars. Within its circumference, in fact, was comprised the entire civil station of Indur. It is an open park-like place surrounded by groves and gardens.

Its situation with respect to the city, the bazaars, the river, and the road to Mau

Immediately on its western front runs the road to Mau. This, passing the Residency, crosses the Khan river, about four hundred yards to the west by south-west of that building. To the smith-east of this road are thickly wooded groves and gardens; but immediately to the west of it, and, in some instances, bordering it, were bazaars and a number of native buildings of various sorts. These extended for a considerable distance on either side of the road leading to the city. Not more than a hundred yards intervened between the easternmost of these buildings and the Residency. In and about these were located the native troops, three companies of infantry, and three field guns, sent by Holkar to protect the Residency62.

The location of the troops

To the north of that building, and still nearer to it, was the stable square, in the immediate vicinity of the post-office, the telegraph office, and the treasury. Here was the cavalry picket. Round about it were the camps of the Bhopal cavalry, one hundred and fifty strong, the infantry of the Bhopal and Mehidpur contingents, numbering about four hundred men, and the detachment of Bhils, two hundred and seventy strong. Of all these detachments the cavalry was the most remote from the Residency.

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They are engaged in their ordinary occupations

On the morning of the 1st of July neither were these men nor their officers under the smallest apprehension of a rising. The men were scattered about in undress; some were bathing; some were cooking, their food. The native officers and non-commissioned officers had just come up to transact their morning business at the orderly-room. Colonel Travers himself, in conversation with some of them, was on the point of entering that room.

when they are suddenly attacked

Suddenly they were all startled by the same artillery fire and the same tumult which had drawn Durand to the steps of the Residency. A moment’s glance sufficed to show them that the rebels were upon them. Who were these rebels, and who set them on?

by the troops of Maharajah Holkar

The rebels were the men of the three companies of Holkar’s army, and the gunners of Holkar’s three guns, posted for the protection of the Residency in the buildings between it and the city, and distant from it, at the nearest point, only a hundred yards.

headed by Saadat Khan

To these men, a little after 8 o’clock, a man named Saadat Khan63, an officer in Holkar’s cavalry, followed by eight troopers, coming from the direction of the palace, galloped, shouting: “Get ready, come on to kill the sahibs; it is the order of the Maharajah.” Saadat Khan was followed at a distance by the rabble of the town, eager for blood and for plunder; for the word had gone forth that Durand was about to remove into Mau the treasure64, amounting to £150,000 in silver, which he had guarded in a strong building, erected by the Government for

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the purpose, close to the Residency.

Murder of the Christians not in the Residency

Others of the same class mingling with Durbar soldiers had rushed to seek out the Christian population who had remained in their own homes or in their offices, unprepared for and not expecting the sudden murderous onslaught which was to lay them low65.

The Durbar troops thus appealed to by Saadat Khan, turned out at once. They were not taken by surprise. Their commandant, Bans Gopal, admitted subsequently that his men had been demoralised.

The troops sent to guard the Residency join in the revolt

Certainly neither he nor any other officer made the smallest attempt to check the outbreak. On the other hand, no men could have shown themselves more ready and eager for mischief. They at once began to shout vociferously as they formed up, whilst the gunners placed their three guns in position, and opened fire on the picket of cavalry.

Such was the sight and such were the sounds that met Durand and Travers about half-past 8 o’clock that morning. Sudden as was the outbreak, it found the two men cool and collected.

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Colonel Travers

Travers, who, I have said, was at the moment talking to his native officers, hastened to the picket in the stable square, ordered the troops to turn out and the guns to be placed in a position to open fire on the rebels. The men, surprised, half-stupefied by the suddenness of the attack, showed at first no hesitation.

Turns out the men

While they were turning out, Travers caused the men of the picket to mount, and rapidly conducted them to a point whence they could most advantageously charge the enemy’s battery. He then attempted to form them up to charge. But here, likewise, treason had done its work.

Traitors in his ranks attempt to baulk him

The native officer of the picket had been “got at.” And though the picket was three times formed for attack, three times did this man break the formation from, the rear. This action threw the men into confusion. Two opposite feelings seemed to contend in them for mastery. But to stand still was fatal.

Notwithstanding, he leads a gallant charge on enemy’s guns, which he captures

Travers felt this, and feeling it strongly, he gave, notwithstanding that success seemed hopeless, the order to charge. Gallantly leading, he reached the guns, and though followed by but five of his men, drove away the gunners, wounded the inciter of the mutiny, Saadat Khan, and for a few moments had the guns in his possession. Had he only been properly supported this charge would have been decisive.

He is not supported

But not only was he not supported, but he and his five men were exposed to the fire

of the enemy’s infantry, now drawn up in order. For a moment, indeed, that infantry seemed inclined to waver; but when they recognised the small number of the men who had followed Travers, they opened a musketry fire against the Residency.

His charge, however, is opportune and useful

The gallant charge of Travers had not, however, been useless. It had given time to Durand to make hasty preparations for the defence of the Residency, to the gunners to place the guns in position, to the officers to turn out and form up their men.

Durand writes to Mau for Hungerford’s battery

Durand, too, had utilised the few minutes at his disposal to write a letter to Colonel Platt, commanding at Mau, telling him that he had been attacked, and requesting him to send Captain Hungerford’s battery to his aid.

Durand had just come out with this note in his hand when he met Travers returning from his charge. He gave

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Travers the note, with a request to forward it at once. Travers entrusted the important missive to a trooper on whom he believed he could depend. But he felt even then that absolute confidence was to be placed in no native soldier, and he more than doubted whether the letter would be delivered.

The enemy recover from the charge of Travers

Meanwhile the enemy, recovering from the effect of the spirited charge of Travers, moved their guns round the left flank of the barracks into the open ground, with the intention of taking up a position for a front attack on the Residency. To meet this, Travers pushed forward his two guns two hundred yards to the right front of the Residency, and directed the gunners to open a concentrated fire on the enemy’s supports.

He, however, again forces them back

The guns, well served by two serjeants, Orr and Murphy, and by fourteen native gunners, who had remained faithful, at once opened with effect, disabling one of the rebels’ pieces, and forcing their infantry to retire. Again was a splendid chance offered to the garrison. A charge in force now would have decided the day. The head was there to see the opportunity, the hands were there that might have seized it, but the hearts that should have animated those hands were cold and lifeless.

A golden opportunity of deciding the day

In a word, the cavalry, who could have gained the victory, would not. They came up in excellent formation, but despite the efforts of their officers and of Durand they melted away. Twenty-five or thirty of them galloped off at once to Sihor, filling the air with cries that the Europeans were being massacred. The greater number remained helpless, panic-stricken, afraid of each other.

Frustrated by the refusal of the native troops to act

The Hindus and Sikhs amongst them suspected the Muhammadans, and the Muhammadans suspected the Hindus and Sikhs. Divided into parties they scattered themselves over the enclosure, seeking the best available shelter from the enemy’s fire, passive spectators of an assault which with union and heartiness they might have prevented.

Travers renews his attempt to charge, but in vain

Still conscious of the possibilities before him, and maddened by the refusal of the Bhopal men to seize them, Travers ordered Captain Magniac to ride after the men and to do his utmost to bring up a dozen or even half a dozen to attack the battery still lying defenceless in the open. But again he was disappointed. The men would not respond to his call.

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The infantry also refuse to fight

Baulked by the behaviour of the cavalry, Travers turned to the infantry, feeling, like Eyre at Arah, that a bayonet-charge would yet save the day. But here again he was disappointed. The two hundred men of the Mehidpur contingent absolutely refused to fight. Of the two hundred and seventy men of the Bhopal contingent only about twelve showed signs of obedience. The rest levelled their muskets at their officers, and drove them off. They declined even to lift a finger on behalf of the British. The Bhils allowed themselves to be formed up but would not act.

Even the Bhils refuse to discharge their pieces

Still the defence was not abandoned. It was determined to bring the Bhils – the only troops not in open mutiny – under cover. They were accordingly brought inside the Residency in the hope that they might be prevailed upon to discharge their pieces at the enemy when sheltered by stone walls. But. meanwhile, the rebels, finding that no advantage had been taken of their first check, and rightly conjecturing that the trained Sipahis had refused to fight them, had completed their artillery movement, and were pouring in many directions a fire of round shot and grape. Under the influence of this fire the Bhils were completely cowed, refused even to discharge their pieces, and abandoning their posts at the outer windows, crowded into the centre rooms. The rebel infantry was forming up, evidently with the intention of taking advantage of the effect of the fire of their guns.

The number of defenders is reduced to a handful

To defend the Residency there now remained, besides the fourteen faithful native gunners, eight combatant officers, two doctors, two sergeants, and five Europeans66 of the telegraph department. Under their charge were eight ladies and three children.

Too few to continue the contest

The forces were too disproportionate for the contest to continue longer, unless succour should arrive. The enemy’s officers were calling on their men to assault, and their ranks were rapidly filling. The position seemed desperate.

At this crisis, the few cavalry who had remained huddled up, passive and inactive, behind the Residency, sent a message through their officer, Captain Magniac, that they were about

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The “loyal” cavalry determine to retire

to consult their own safety, further defence being hopeless; that if they did not then move, their retreat would be cut off, and they begged that this last chance might be taken of saving the women and children.

Summary of the situation

I pause for a moment to ask the reader to take a glance at the position. Let him imagine a large stone house, occupied by seventeen Englishmen and fourteen faithful natives, with two guns for its defence, attacked by about six hundred trained Sipahis, swelled by the constantly augmenting rabble of the city67:– the besieged embarrassed, moreover, by having eleven women and children to protect, and encumbered and threatened by having nearly five hundred mutinous troops within the range of their defence – troops who, if they acted at all, would act against them. But this is not all. The assailants occupied the buildings and roads all about the Residency. But there was besides a body of native cavalry, willing to protect the Europeans from actual assault if they would abandon the Residency and retreat, but unwilling to stir hand or foot in defence of that building. But now this body of cavalry was being outflanked. It was threatening to ride off. Should it go, its place would inevitably be occupied by the enemy, and the Residency would be attacked on four sides.

Courses which might be open to Durand and Travers

This was the position. How was Durand to act? Could he cut his way through the enemy? He and the other men might possibly have done so; but they would have exposed to certain death the women and the children. As a body, the civil portion of the Europeans were unarmed. They had escaped to the Residency with their bare lives. No valid assistance then was to be looked for from these. To remain was impossible. Could the attack be resisted there were no supplies – even water would have failed the garrison, Could Durand wait for Captain Hungerford’s battery from Mau? He had written for it at a quarter to 9 o’clock. It was then half-past 10, and there was no sign of its approach. In any case it was impossible it could arrive before half-past 12, – and then the enemy would be concentrated to receive it, whilst the last hope of saving the women and children

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would have been lost.

Of these only one really feasible

Under these circumstances there was really but one course to pursue. On this all were agreed, Durand as well as Travers; all the other officers as well as Durand and Travers.

They evacuate the Residency

Maharajah Holkar

They collected then the little garrison, and placing the ladies on gun-wagons, moved out of the Residency, covering their rear with the cavalry, ready to follow the Europeans though not to fight for them. It was then half-past 10 o’clock68.

But where, all this time, it may be asked, was Maharajah Holkar? Where was Captain Hungerford’s battery? These are the questions I now propose to answer.

Was he loyal or disloyal?

Few matters have been more debated than the conduct of Holkar at this critical period. There are those who believed then that he was disloyal, who believe still that he was a watcher of the atmosphere. There are those, on the other hand, who consider that his loyalty was unimpeachable, and that the doubts cast upon that loyalty, culminating as they have in the denial to him, maintained to the close of his life, of a practical expression of the complete satisfaction of the paramount power similar to that bestowed upon his compeers, were insulting to his family and to his name.

Considerations not germane to the question

In writing history, sentiment is, or ought to be, excluded. The historian has to deal only with facts. It is not very germane to the point at issue to inquire whether Durand disliked Holkar, or Holkar disliked Durand.

It may even be admitted that Durand did not admire the character of Holkar; and that Holkar, regarding Durand as

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a locum tenens only, as one who would shortly make way for the man whom he really cared for, took no special pains to conciliate Durand. But there is unquestionable evidence to prove that up to the 1st of July Durand did believe in the loyalty of Holkar. I have been assured by a distinguished officer69, present with him throughout this critical time, and who enjoyed his confidence, that up to the time of the outbreak Durand constantly insisted that Holkar must know the strength of England too well to be other than loyal. That there was cordiality between the Agent and the Prince may well be doubted; but Durand gave a positive proof70 that he trusted Holkar when he accepted from him, for the protection of the Residency, three companies of his troops and three of his field-guns. That he should withdraw that confidence pending explanation, when those troops and those guns turned against him, without any apparent prohibition on the part of Holkar, was, to say the least, a very natural proceeding.

To return to the region of facts. What was Holkar’s conduct on the eventful let of July?

It is only due to the Maharajah to state the explanation which he himself gave.

The explanation given by the Maharajah himself

For some time past Maharajah Holkar had felt the control of his troops slipping out of his hands. Only the day before the 1st of July some of his men had assumed so mutinous an attitude that he provided them with carriage and supplies in order to rid Indur of their presence. It is not at all surprising that this should have been so. Under the trying circumstances of that trying period the most popular sovereigns could not command the obedience of their followers when they called upon these to act against their strong inner convictions. The loyalty of Maharajah Sindhia, in 1857–58, has never been questioned. Yet his own clansmen turned against him rather than fight for the British. There can be no question but that the troops of the native princes did sympathise deeply with the mutinous Sipahis, and did regard their cause as their own. At Indur, moreover, in 1857,

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there was a strong Muhammadan faction, scarcely less hostile to Holkar than to the British. Holkar, himself, prior to the 1st of July, had shown that he was well aware of the disorder fomenting around him.

Makes it clear that his troops acted in spite of him

He had candidly told Durand that he mistrusted his own troops. Taking the above facts into consideration, the circumstances that the day prior to the mutiny he had sent away from Indur his most uncontrollable troops, that the leader of the assault on the Residency was a prominent member of the Muhammadan faction, I think it sufficiently established that on the 1st of July his mutinous soldiers took the bit into their mouths, and acted without his knowledge and in spite of him.

Why did not Holkar come to the Residency?

But the part of Holkar’s conduct, which, up to the present time, has seemed the most to require explanation, is that which relates to his action whilst the attack on the Residency was proceeding. In the explanation which he offered at the time the Maharajah stated that the confusion had been too great to allow of any communication being made to the Residency; that on learning what had happened, he was preparing to set out for that place, when he was stopped by the intelligence that all was over. Nov, the first discharge of grape into the Residency took place between 8 and 9 o’clock, the garrison evacuated the Residency at half-past 10. What was Holkar doing during those two hours? There is no doubt but that he was aware of the nature of the events which were taking place. Before 9 o’clock, Saadat Khan, blood-stained and wounded, had ridden into his presence to report that he had attacked the Residency, and wounded a sahib. What, then, was he doing?

The supposition that he was watching the turn of events

Here again we are met with opposite opinions. On the one side it is hinted, if not asserted, that he was watching the turn of events, not caring to interfere on behalf of the British, until it was certain that their sun had not set.

Is combated by his supporters

On the other, it is declared that in acting as he did, he was unswerving in his loyalty to British interests; that had he mounted his horse and ridden to the scene of action, his presence would have sanctioned the mutiny, and given stability of action to the revolted soldiery; that in any case he would have been powerless to control them71.

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Successfully

I cannot but consider that there is force in this argument. Having regard to the fact that his army had slipped from his control, it is certainly possible, I think, that Holkar’s presence on the scene might have been misinterpreted by the soldiery, and might have inspired them with the moral force of which actually they were in want. It is certainly true that Durand sent a letter to Holkar. But it is not less an ascertained fact that Holkar did not receive it. The messenger who carried it, alarmed, made for his own house, taking the letter with him. The passive attitude of Holkar, then, proves nothing against him. It is perfectly reconcilable with absolute want of sympathy with the mutineers. To gauge what were his real wishes, it is necessary to inquire into his conduct subsequent to the evacuation of the Residency.

His conduct subsequent to the evacuation

On this point I find a general agreement as to the facts, combined with a marked difference with respect to the conclusions. It is not denied that Saadat Khan rode up, wounded, to Holkar’s palace whilst the conflict was going on, and told Holkar that he had wounded a sahib and had attacked the Residency.

Suspicious elements in that conduct

It is not denied that, though Holkar managed at the time to place that rebel leader in confinement, Saadat Khan was free a few hours later, and actually entered with his family into occupation of the Residency. It is asserted on the one side, and I cannot find it denied on the other, that Holkar remained in his palace till the third day in constant communication with the mutineers; that he then visited the Residency, and conversed with Saadat Khan, with Bans Gopal – the commandant of the infantry which had led the attack – and with the Subahdar of the 23rd Native Infantry, whose hand was red with the blood of his commanding officer.

Of these three facts, the only one apparently incriminating Holkar is the last. And his conduct here has been explained. It is but fair to the Maharajah to state that explanation in the very words of his advocate72.

Have been satisfactorily explained

“On the 4th of July, mounted, and spear in hand, he (Holkar) confronted the mutineers boldly at the Residency. They received the Maharajah at first respectfully, but afterwards reminded him of the martial character of his ancestor, Jeswant Rao, and reviled him as a degenerate Holkar. He absolutely refused

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his countenance, and rejected all their demands.” The visit of Holkar to the Residency is, therefore, entirely consistent with the theory that he had lost control over his troops, and that they acted without his orders and in spite of him

It is clear that he protected European fugitives

It is, too, in my opinion, clearly made out that the Maharajah, on the day following the assault, refused the threatening demands of the mutineers from Mau to deliver up the Europeans and other Christians who had fugitives. taken refuge in his palace73.

At the risk of his life

He states himself that he offered to them his own person rather than the heads of those under his protection. It may be said that this proves only that Holkar had not fully decided to go against the British, that he was aware that the European battery held Mau. But, in judging his conduct as a person accused of complicity with the mutineers, this action is a strong point in his favour.

His further conduct on the day of the mutiny

Another point, not less strong, perhaps even stronger, is the fact, that on the 1st of July, the very day of the Holkar sent in to Mau, by the hands of Ganpat Rao, his agent at the Residency, a letter addressed to Colonel Platt, to inform him of the mutiny, and stating that his own troops had refused to act against the mutineers. On the same day he wrote also to the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, telling him of what had occurred. He wrote also that evening to Durand, protesting his innocence, and begging that the march of General Woodburn’s force might be hastened as much as possible.

The members of his Durbar are free from complicity

It deserves further to be stated, that none of the influential members of the Durbar, none of the Maharajah’s kinsmen or associates, joined in the attack on the Residency.

The decision must be a favourable to Holkar

Looking at the question as a whole, I am of opinion that Holkar was free from complicity with the mutineers; that his soldiers had slipped out of his hands; that his presence amongst them on the 1st of July would have been misinterpreted; and that subsequently he did his best to serve the British interests. But it must be admitted that, at the time his conduct bore a very suspicious appearance. It must not be forgotten

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that, although Durand sent him a letter by the hands of a messenger, that messenger never appeared at the Palace; that his own troops, led by his own officer, Maas Gopal, attacked the Residency; that Durand had reason to believe that his retreat on Mandlesar was prevented by the occupation by Holkar’s troops of the Simrol pass. These circumstances could not but seem most suspicious to the Agent on the spot, thus attacked and thwarted.

Though the facts justified the conduct of Durand at the time

Whilst, then, Holkar must be acquitted of complicity with the rebels, the conduct of Durand in refusing to hold confidential intercourse with him until the Government of India should clear him from the suspicions attaching to his conduct must be upheld and justified.

Mau

It is time now to turn to Mau. Colonel Durand’s letter to Colonel Platt, the commandant of the 23rd Native Infantry and of the station, despatched from Indur at a quarter to 9, reached Colonel Platt about 10 o’clock.

Captain Hungerford’s battery

Colonel Platt instantly gave orders to Captain Hungerford, commanding the battery, to set out for the relief of the Residency at Indur. The battery, – why, has not been explained, – was not ready to leave Mau before noon.

Leaves at noon

It then advanced on the Indur road at a trot. It had reached the village of Rao, half-way between the two stations74, when Captain Hungerford learned that Colonel Durand and the British residents had left Indur, and had not taken the road to Mau.

Hungerford hears of the evacuation and returns

Hungerford at once turned about, and galloped or cantered back to Mau, arriving there at, 3 o’clock in the afternoon75.

Futility of its proceeding further

It is clear from this statement that Captain Hungerford’s battery could not have reached Indur, if it had continued the journey at the rate at which it was going, before 3 P.M. – equally clear from the narrative I have given of the events at Indur, that Colonel Durand and the garrison could not have held out for the four and a half hours which would have elapsed between his departure and the arrival of Captain Hungerford. Further, it is tolerably certain that Captain Hungerford’s battery, arriving at any hour after the

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complete investment of the Residency, driven by native drivers; unsupported by cavalry or infantry, would have been unable to hold its own against the large force of all arms, which it would have found at Indur. However, Captain Hungerford returned to Mau. The same evening, he took his battery within the fort

The troops in Mau mutiny

That night, the regular troops in Mau, in conformity at with the arrangement made with their brethren in the service of Holkar, broke out into revolt. They began, as usual, by firing the mess-house. They then shot dead their colonel, Colonel Platt, and their adjutant, Captain Fagan, who had gone down to the lines to reason with them. The cavalry troopers, likewise, killed their commandant, Major Harris. The other officers escaped with their lives.

Hungerford drives the mutineers from Mau

On the first sound of the mutiny, Colonel Platt had called upon Captain Hungerford to turn out with his battery. Captain Hungerford proceeded to respond to the call, but by the time he arrived on the parade-ground the mischief had been done and no enemy was to be seen. Nothing fell upon his vision but the blazing bungalows till then occupied by the officers. In this perplexity Hungerford directed fire to be opened on the lines. Then poured forth the Sipahis, liberated from restraint. They pushed on to Indur, effected a junction with the mutineers at that place, and subsequently made their way to Dehli.

Assumes charge of the Central Indian Agency

Hungerford then held the chief authority at the station. Occupying the fort which commands the military road from Bombay and the low country to the highlands of Central India, he was in a position to render excellent service. During the absence of Durand, he assumed the post of representative of the Government of India at the court of Holkar. The real authority however, still remained with Durand, whose course I now propose to follow.

The evacuation of the Residency

We left Durand with the garrison, the women, and children, evacuating the Residency at half-past 10, on the memorable 1st of July. Travers made a last effort to induce the infantry of the two Contingents to make but one charge. These men, however, had by this time become so infused with the mutinous spirit, that Travers at once recognised that the attempt was useless, and if persevered in, might be dangerous. He managed, however, to collect the greater portion of the Bhopal cavalry, and though these refused

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to charge, they assumed an attitude sufficiently threatening to prevent pursuit. The next point to be considered was the direction in which they were to retire.

Considerations regarding the line of retreat

The natural line of retreat was on Mau. By that road alone was it likely that assistance could come. A letter had been dispatched for that assistance at a quarter to 9. That letter could scarcely have reached Colonel Platt before 10. It was just possible that Hungerford might be starting76. But it was equally possible, and more probable, that the letter might not have reached Mau. At a time when the native cavalry all over India were falling away by hundreds, it would have been hazardous to carry out a military manoeuvre, the safe execution of which depended on the fidelity of one solitary trooper.

Still, in war something must be risked, and Durand and Travers were alike prepared to accept the chance that Hungerford had started to meet them.

Insurmountable difficulties in the way of a retreat on Mau

But there was an insurmountable difficulty to the retreat on Mau. In my description of the Residency, I have shown that the road to Mau passed near that building on its western front, and at a distance of about four hundred yards from it crossed the Khan river. I have shown, likewise, that it passed by the cluster of buildings occupied by Holkar’s troops. When the Residency was evacuated, not only was the entire length of that road in their possession, but their right rested upon it, a few yards in front of the bridge and completely covering it. Had the men of our Contingents made one charge the enemy’s right might have been forced back and the bridge secured. But – as has been already stated – the cavalry refused to act; the infantry, when appealed to by Travers, threatened his life. The timely devotion of a Sipahi alone saved him.

By the regular road

To move artillery without supports, close to and in face of an enemy flanking the moving body is, in war, impossible. For four hundred yards the retreating party would have been exposed to the fire of an enemy elated by victory. The attempt to cross that bridge would then have been fatal to the entire party. Nor was it possible to cross the river itself above the bridge – for it had steep banks and was not fordable. I may add, with confidence, that even had the bridge been forced, the difficulties of the retreating

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party, harassed by a formidable enemy, would not have been lessened.

The other road equally out of the question

But there was another bridge across the Khan, higher up, and beyond the Residency garden. This might certainly have been crossed. But having crossed it where would the party have been? To gain the Mau road they would have had to move for about six hundred yards by the road on the left bank of the Khan – the only other traversable road. To the point where that road meets the Mau road the rebels were nearer by three parts of the whole distance to be traversed than were the ladies and the garrison. That is to say, the rebels, crossing by the lower bridge, were about a quarter of a mile distant from that point, whilst the garrison, leaving the Residency, would have to traverse more than a mile to reach it. Surely to attempt that road by the upper bridge would have been to draw rather too large an order on the blindness of an enemy reeking in slaughter and flushed with victory

Disinclination of the native troops to go to Mau

Another reason for not attempting the Mau road was based on the disinclination of the remaining cavalry to follow it. Their hearts were in their homes and with their families. Their homes and their families were at Sihor – and Sihor was the goal of their hopes.

Durand and Travers renounce the idea of Mau

Durand and Travers were forced then, most unwillingly, to renounce the idea of a retreat on Mau. The impossibility of reaching that station being clear to them, it devolved on Durand to decide the direction in which to retire. In connection with this point a plain duty, he conceived, lay before him.

Reasons which actuated Durand in his choice of a line of retreat

I have already alluded to the Bombay column halted at Aurangabad. Under the circumstances of the case, attacked by Holkar’s troops, with, as he undoubtedly believed at the time, the sanction and concurrence of Holkar; driven out of Indur; cut off from Mau; it seemed to Durand to be his plain duty, at any and every sacrifice, to make his way to that column and urge its immediate advance. He believed that Central India was in the utmost peril; that the only mode of saving, or of promptly recovering it, lay in the immediate advance of Woodburn’s column. He resolved then to push on towards that column by way of Mandlesar.

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Attempts to move on Mandlesar

The party started then on the Mandlesar road. But, after proceeding some distance, Travers found it might be within the range of possibility to communicate with Hungerford. It had occurred alike to Durand and himself that it was just possible that Hungerford’s battery had started; that it would push on to Indur, and that Hungerford, embarrassed by native drivers, might find himself in difficulties. To relieve Hungerford, then, Travers wrote to him two notes, stating that Durand had evacuated Indur, and was endeavouring to effect a retreat by the Simrol pass. The notes were despatched, each by the hand of a trooper, in the hope that, finding his way across country, one at least would reach Hungerford.

The Simrol pass is reported occupied by Holkar’s troops

The troopers had not long started when reports from many quarters reached Durand that the Simrol pass was occupied by the cavalry and artillery of Holkar. These were, he was told, the very cavalry and artillery whom Holkar, to be rid of, had furnished with carriage and supplies. Durand, nothing daunted, resolved to force this pass. But again he was baffled by his following.

The Bhopal cavalry refuse to attempt to force it

The Bhopal cavalry were willing enough to follow the English residents to their own homes at Sihor, and to protect them from assault on the road; but they were not prepared to run any risk to escort them anywhere else. They positively refused to attempt the Simrol pass. They declared that they would go only to Sihor, in the first instance – thence to any station that might be named.

Durand compelled to retire on Sihor

No resource was left, then, to Durand but to retire upon Sihor. It was a bitter alternative, for it removed him from the line by which General senor. Woodburn would have to advance. The distance, too, was long and wearisome for the ladies and children. More than that, it appeared to be surrounded by danger. The reception of the fugitive party at Sihor was by no means assured. Durand could not be certain that the Begam of Bhopal would be able to withstand the severe pressure that he well knew was put upon her, or that she would be able to restrain her excited Muhammadan subjects77. But there was no help for it. Could

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he have seen his way to the Bombay column, via Mau, it is obvious he would have taken it. He could then have left his wife, then suffering, and the other ladies, in safety at Mau, whilst he should proceed on his journey to the south. But the evidence is overwhelming that such a movement was impossible.

Which he reaches the 4th of July

Forced, then, to take the road to Sihor, he proceeded by rapid marches to that place, and arrived there on the 4th of July with the guns and the Europeans who had left the Indur Residency on the morning of the 1st of July.

Reason why the story of Indur has occupied so much space

I have occupied many pages in treating this interesting episode in the great Indian mutiny, but the widely diverse views disseminated, since his decease, regarding the conduct of the principal actor, have imposed upon me the necessity of making my narrative of the events which happened at Indur as clear and as precise as possible. It has been more than insinuated that Durand needlessly abandoned his position; that he might have retired on Mau; that he was quite unequal to the occasion. Such charges, if made anonymously, might have been left to be disposed of by the judgment of those who knew Durand in India. But they have assumed

the garb and the title of History.

Will be generally accepted as sufficient

It was necessary, therefore, that their baselessness should be made clear by History. And no one will assert that, for such a purpose, the narrative of the events at Indur in these pages is too long.

Summary of Durand’s conduct

What, in fact, in a few words, was the conduct so carped at, but, in reality, so noble and meritorious, of Colonel Durand, in those dark days which intervened between the 14th of May and the 4th of July 1857? That conduct has been clearly, fairly, and briefly summed up in a manner which cannot be improved upon. “Without the aid of any European force,” summarises the writer of Central India in 1857, “he had succeeded in maintaining himself at Indur for six weeks after the outbreak at Dehli, by isolating the contingent troops, and playing them off against the regulars. When, contrary to his wishes, the two were allowed to come into contact, the fidelity of the Contingents gave way, and,

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gradually, the circle of insurrection closed upon Indur. At last, driven out of the Residency by a combination of treachery and cowardice, he made a good, soldierly retreat, in the face of overwhelming masses, veiling his weakness by a show of force, and marched into Sihor without the loss of gun, standard, or trophy.”

He proceeds to Hoshangabad

Such was the conduct of this noble representative of the English race up to the 4th of July. His subsequent action neither belied his reputation, nor conduced less to the security of British interests in Central India. Arriving at Sihor, Durand stayed there but one day, and then started off for Hoshangabad, on the southern bank of the Narbada’ in the hope of being able to communicate with General Woodburn. At Hoshangabad he heard of the mutiny of the regular troops at Mau, and of their departure from that station, held, thenceforward, in security by Hungerford’s battery. Secure, then, of Mau, Durand was anxious that Woodburn’s force should make safe the line of the Narbada, and thus interpose a barrier “between the blazing north and the smouldering south.” But here he met with an unexpected difficulty.

Urges the advance on Mau of Woodburn’s column

Mr. Plowden, the Commissioner of the Central Provinces, under the impression that the rising at Mau had been fatal to all the Europeans stationed there, was urging General Woodburn to throw up the line of the Narbada, and to march on Nagpur. Durand strongly protested against the adoption of a course of action which would have roused Central India against us. He wrote to the Government of India; he wrote to Mr. Plowden; he wrote to General Woodburn. He even authorised the officers commanding military posts to disregard any orders they might receive to abandon their positions on the Narbada. But he did more. Keenly sensible of the necessity for prompt action, of the delays entailed by correspondence, and of the value of enforcing his arguments by his personal presence, Durand started for Aurangabad, where he believed Woodburn’s column still to be. On his way, the gratifying intelligence reached him that his urgent requisitions for the advance of the column had been successful; that General Woodburn had returned to Puna in bad health; that Brigadier Stuart had succeeded him, with orders to push on at once, and that the column was on its way to Mau via Asirgarh.

Joins that column at Asirgarh

To Asirgarh, at then, Durand hurried. His presence there, was a

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tower of strength. He impressed his own energy on every one present with the force. There were no further delays.

Accompanies it to Mau

Pressing onwards, the column traversed the pass of Simrol on the 1st of August, and entered Mau on the following day, just in time to escape the difficulties which the rainy season would have entailed upon them. The line of the Narbada was saved.

In this rescued position, for the present, I must leave Central India, to glance at the condition of affairs in the bordering States of Rajputana, and then to record how the action in the Native States affected Mr. Colvin and Agra.

Footnotes

58. Mau is the British military station between thirteen and fourteen mile& by the then existing road, south-west of Indur.

59. There was, in 1857, no direct telegraphic line between Madras and Calcutta, and the only circle by which telegraphic communication with the Madras and Bombay presidencies could be effected was that by Agra and Indur, – Central India in 1857.

60. The cavalry furnished by Holkar were never considered trustworthy. When, therefore, Colonel Travers arrived at Indur, the Maharajah was requested to remove them, and to send them on distant duty. This was done.

61. In his letter to Holkar, dated the 3rd of August, Durand stated that the attack began at twenty minutes to nine.

62. Major Evans Bell (Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor) implies that the Residency was not made defensible. But the following description of that building will show how impossible it was to make it proof against cannon shot. Not only was the Residency built of stone, but in the lower storey it is entered by from twenty-four to thirty glass and Venetian doors, incapable of resisting even a kick. The chief entrance to the upper storey is from outside, by a handsome flight of stone steps. The glass and Venetian doors on this storey are as numerous as those below, but are larger.

It was impossible to throw up earthworks in front of the Residency, for the simple reason that there was no earth wherewith to make the works. The Residency stands upon ground not having an inch of soil in depth. Even for the small flower-beds in front of the building _earth had to be brought from a considerable distance.

63. In a work recently published, Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor (Major Evans Bell), Saadat Khan is described as “a sort of half-pay officer, with no men under his command.” Again, “a man of good family, considering himself to have some claim to be hereditary Bakhshi of Holkar’s army, but out of employ and in disgrace.” But the Governor-General’s Agent – who then was Sir Robert Hamilton – describes him in 1858, in his official letter to Government as a” Durbar officer of cavalry.” Major-General Sir Henry Daly, subsequently the Governor-General’s Agent at Indur, thus described him officially in 1874: “Saadat Khan was a man of weight in Indur in 1857; his father was commandant of Cavalry, in which he was known as Risaldar. The Customs Department was also under his control.” The fact is that Saadat Khan, although influential with the Muhammadans, did not occupy a position of authority, nor was he in favour with the Durbar.

64. Major Evans Bell states, as I understand him (Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor, page 89), that Durand had given orders for the removal of the treasure of Mau on the 1st of July. But there are the most convincing reasons for believing that no such order was issued. The Treasury Guard was under the orders of Colonel Travers. On Colonel Travers it would have devolved to furnish the escort for the treasure. Now Colonel Travers received no order whatever on the subject. Not a cart, not even a camel had been obtained. The Treasury was closed. Had Durand intended to remove the treasure, the fact could not have been kept secret from the officers, nor could he have overlooked communication with Colonel Travers.

65. Lieut.-General Travers, V.C., C.B., states (The Evacuation of Indore), that the number of the English population, men, women, and children, murdered by these ruffians amounted to thirty-nine. In a work recently published, Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor (Major Evans Bell), it is stated that this statement is erroneous, that the murdered were only twenty-five in number, and that of these only two were Europeans. But the Agent to the Governor-General in 1874, Major-General Sir Henry Daly, K.C.S.L, writing officially to the Government in that year (10th of September). reports as follows (para. 5): “It was recorded in the Durbar Diary of July, 1857, that Saadat Khan, after the attack on the Residency on the 1st of July, which resulted in the slaughter of British subjects, European and native, women and children, in all, 39,” &c. It would thus appear that the only mistake made by Lieut.-General Travers is in the use of the adjective “English in the sense of English-born.” That thirty-nine persons were massacred by the rebels is clear. Not less so, that these thirty-nine persons were British subjects. It is no exculpation of the brutality of the assassins to state that of the total number only two were full-blooded Europeans and the remainder half-breeds, or Eurasians. The numbers given by General Travers are those attested to by the Durbar records, and quoted as indisputable by the highest British authority on the spot.

66. One of them was Post-master. All, however, were unable, either from alarm or from being unnerved by the slaughter which they had escaped, to use their arms. They did not fire a single shot.

67. The six hundred trained Sipahis were composed of about two hundred of all ranks of Holkar’s men, and the contingent infantry who, just about this time, fairly went over to the rebels.

68. Major Evans Bell (Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor, page 99), has laid some stress on the fact that no one was killed during the withdrawal from the Residency. I have communicated on this subject with Lieutenant-General Travers, V.C., C.B., and I append his reply. “The Residency,” writes General Travers.” stands upon the shoulder of slightly rising ground which falls away towards the enemy’s position and the river, and, rounding the shoulder, slopes in the other direction for some distance. The ground is open and smooth, and by keeping the building as long as possible between the fugitives and the enemy’s artillery, a considerable advantage was gained. Indeed, by holding the cavalry as an additional screen, the enemy’s attention was withdrawn, and he was delayed in bringing his guns into action. What damage was done by his fire I cannot say. We could not possibly know what natives composed our mixed party. I myself can only speak to one man, an European or Eurasian – a clerk, I believe – whose head was taken off by a round shot. He fell in a little jungle, and might not have been discovered had not his horse stood by the corpse.”

69. * Lieutenant-General Travers, V.C., C.B.

70. I may mention another proof. A very few days before the mutiny, Holkar represented to Durand that his magazine was almost empty of artillery ammunition. Without inquiry or question Durand had him supplied from the Mau magazine at once.

71. Last Counsels of ten Unknown Counsellor, Major Evans Bell.

72. Last Counsels of an Unknown Counsellor, Major Evans Bell.

73. This protection was acknowledged by three Europeans, seven Eurasians, and some native Christians.

74. Major Evans Bell speaks of the distance between the Residency and Mau as being ten miles. It is so now by the new road. But by the road which existed in 1857, it was more nearly fourteen than thirteen miles.

75. Colonel Durand to Lord Canning’s Private Secretary.

76. In point of fact he did not leave Mu till noon.

77. General Travers, V.C., thus writes:– “When we reached Ashta” (in Bhopal territory), “on the 3rd of July the guard drawn up on the banks of the Parbati, and across our road, and the crowd with it, made many think their last hour had come. The women and children were dismounted from the limbers, and the guns got ready for action, when a messenger arrived to announce it was the Guard of Honour! It was a relief.”

This collection transcribed by Chris Gage
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