Brigadier-General Neill, pressed by the Commander of the Forces, Sir Patrick Grant, to hasten to Kanhpur to join General Havelock as soon as possible, in order that he might be on the spot to take command of the force should Havelock from any cause become unfit for the duty, left Allahabad on the 16th of July, and, proceeding with all possible expedition, reached Kanhpur on the 20th.
On his way he had received a note from General Havelock telling him that he was anxiously awaiting his arrival, as, immediately on that occurring, he intended “to strike a blow that will rebound through India.”
Neill, as I have said, arrived on the 20th. He dined that evening with Havelock, and was informed that he intended to begin the passage of the Ganges on the morrow, leaving Neill in command at Kanhpur with about two hundred men, the majority of whom were sick and wounded. In this arrangement, Neill, anxious that Havelock should take with him every available man, entirely concurred.
Before deciding on making a desperate effort to relieve Lakhnao, General Havelock had traced out a position resting on the river, which it would be easy for a small force to hold against very superior. numbers. The work was being intrenched and some guns were being mounted there at the time of Neill’s arrival. He was to complete and to hold it.
The morning of the 21st set in rainy – the heavy rain of the Indian monsoon – but the preparations had been made the evening before, and, in the presence of Havelock’s determination to push on, nothing. would have stayed them. That day the artillery and a portion
of the 78th Highlanders passed over to the opposite bank. To cross the Ganges in the height of the rainy season is no easy matter. The breadth of the swollen river, the rapidity of the current, alone present formidable obstacles. Fortunately, the General had at his disposal a small steamer. To this steamer he caused to be attached five or six of the boats peculiar to the country, and these she towed across – with difficulty; for it was all she could do to hold her own against the current.
It will easily be understood that, under the circumstances stated, and although the force destined for the expedition numbered little more than fifteen hundred men, and although they took with them no tents of any kind, the operation should be tedious. It occupied just four days. On the afternoon of the 24th, General Havelock crossed likewise, and marched the force about five miles on the Lakhnao road, halting for the night at the little village of Mangalwar.
The force which was now starting on an expedition, which, however desperate it was, seemed at the time to present, under so daring a leader as Havelock, some chance of success, consisted of artillery – ten guns, imperfectly equipped and imperfectly manned; of infantry – the remnants of the 64th, the 84th, the 78th, the Madras Fusiliers, and of Brasyer’s Sikhs; and, of cavalry, some sixty volunteer horse. Small as were their numbers, they were animated by the best spirit, and had unbounded confidence in their General.
On the night of the 24th of July this force bivouacked at Mangalwar. It remained halted at that village four days, to enable the General to complete his dispositions for carriage and supplies. On the 28th these had been completed so far as, in the disorganized state of the country, it was possible to complete them.
At 5 o’clock on the morning of the 29th the force began its onward movement. After marching three miles the advanced pickets of the enemy were discerned. These fell back as our men still pressed on, and disclosed the enemy occupying a very strong position. Their main force rested on the town of Unao, a straggling place, extending about three-quarters of a mile, and which the heavy rains and the nature of the soil
rendered it impossible to turn.
In advance of this town, and between it and the British force, was a succession of walled enclosures, filled with skirmishers. These enclosures joined themselves on to a village united with Unao by a narrow passage, and all the houses in which were loop-holed and occupied.
The narrow passage referred to was also commanded by loop-holed houses on either side of it, whilst the enemy had placed their batteries so as to pour a concentrated fire on troops advancing against the town.
It was impossible to turn such a position; it was murderous work to attack it in front. But if he was to get on at all Havelock had no option. The simple motto of “move straight forward,” embodying a principle which has never failed when tried by British troops against Asiatics, must be adopted. After a steady reconnaissance, then, Havelock gave his orders. Covering his main body with skirmishers, armed with the Enfield rifle, he opened a heavy fire from them and from his guns on the more advanced positions of the enemy. This fire drove them from those positions and forced them to take refuge in the loop-holed houses. At these Havelock then sent the 78th Highlanders and the Madras Fusiliers.
Gallantly did they advance. But to dislodge an enemy from loop-holed houses, singly, one after another, is deadly work. So our men found it. Havelock, therefore, ordered up the 64th. Their advance decided the day. The enemy were either bayoneted in the houses or sought refuge in flight.
But the town of Unao was still in the enemy’s possession, and, what was of more consequence, fresh troops were observed hastening down the Lakhnao road in its direction. Havelock at once made preparations to meet them. Drawing off his force on to a spot of dry ground between the village and the town, he placed his guns in a position to command the high road, by which alone he could be attacked, and waited for the movement of the enemy further to develop itself. In a short time it was manifest he would be attacked. The rebels were marching in dense masses upon him. Havelock’s joy was great. He felt that he had them. Restraining his impatience till they were well within distance, he suddenly opened upon them from both arms a withering fire. It stopped them. They attempted to deploy.
But on either side of them were swamps and marshes. Consequently, their horses and their guns stuck fast, their infantry floundered. All this time they were exposed to a continuous fire. Being what they were, they did not then make the one movement, a straight rush, which might have saved them. Meanwhile, some of our men, wading in the marshes, made their presence perceptible on either flank. That was the final blow. The rebels gave way, and fled precipitately, leaving in our possession fifteen guns.
In one of his letters written during his advance on Kanhpur, I think it was just after the battle which gave him that place, Havelock remarked that, viewing his position, he suddenly recollected. “old Frederick at Leuthen,” and acted accordingly. Probably no man had more completely studied the campaigns of that great master in the art of war, as well as those of his immediate successor in the roll of Fame. If he had learned from Frederick the mode in which to turn to his own advantage a false position occupied by himself, he ever adhered strictly to the Napoleonic maxim of promptly following up a victory. He could not at Unao put into execution this maxim in the manner which would have gladdened his heart – for to carry it out efficiently a general has need of cavalry, and Havelock had but sixty sabres. But he could and he did work it in the only way open to him.
Notwithstanding that he and his men were under the terrible July sun of India, he determined to push on after the enemy as soon as his men should have satisfied the cravings of exhausted nature. He ordered, then, a halt; and while the cooks prepared the food, and the doctors attended the wounded, he caused to be disabled the fifteen guns he had captured, for want of cattle to take them with him!
At the end of three hours the men again fell in, and pushed forwards – always towards Lakhnao. They had marched six miles, when suddenly they came in sight of a walled town, situated in the open, and intersected by the road which they must traverse.
This was the town of Bashiratganj. It looked very formidable. In front of it was a large pond or tank, swollen by the surrounding inundation to the form of a river. On the Lakhnao side of it was another pond or lake, traversed by a narrow causeway. It possessed besides a wet ditch,
and its main gate was defended by an earthwork and four guns, and flanked on both sides by loop-holed turrets. Havelock halted his men, while he rode to reconnoitre. The scheme that his brain then conceived was very daring. It had, too, this great merit that, if successful in every detail, the enemy would be destroyed. He conceived in a word the idea of amusing the rebels with a cannonade, whilst he should send the 64th to cut them off from the causeway.
When he should consider that movement sufficiently pronounced he would storm the town with the 78th, and the Madras Fusiliers, and catch the enemy between two fires. He succeeded in all, except in the most decisive, of his combinations. He poured a tremendous fire on the town, whilst the 64th made a flank movement to his right; then, when he deemed the moment to have arrived, he sent on his remaining infantry at the main gate.
But – one of the chains in his scheme had snapped. The 64th had not reached the causeway – and the main body of the enemy escaped across it.
Still the loss of the rebels that day had been severe. It was computed that not less than four hundred of them had been killed or wounded. On the British side eighty-eight had been placed hors de combat – but two battles had been gained!
But the thoughts of the General that night were not consoling. It was not alone, or even mainly, that his losses in the fight had been heavy. Sickness also had done its work. On the morrow of the two battles he could not, deducting the necessary guards, place in line more than eight hundred and fifty infantry. He knew that in front of him were places to be traversed or stormed, the means of defence of which exceeded those of the places he had already conquered. Then, too, he had no means of carrying his sick. He could not leave them. He could not spare a sufficient force to guard them.
But perhaps his strongest difficulty lay in the fact that every step forwards would take him further from his base, and he had information that that base was threatened. Nana Sahib, in fact, had no sooner heard of the onward move of the British, than he sent a considerable body of cavalry across the river to cut off their communications with Kanhpur.
Such arguments as these were sufficient to make even Havelock
hesitate. But with them came the other consideration, – the possibility, notwithstanding all these obstacles, of success.
But he could not help putting to himself this pertinent question:– What sort of success would it be? If, on the morrow of his first march he could bring only eight hundred and fifty infantry into line, how many would he be able to muster on the morrow of the fourth? This question was answered by the General’s own Quartermaster-General in a telegram sent to the Commander-in-Chief. “We could not hope to reach Lakhnao,” telegraphed Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser Tytler, on the 31st, “with six hundred effective Europeans; we had then to pass the canal, and force one and a half mile of streets” – and this in face of some thousands of trained and disciplined soldiers, and an armed and countless rabble!
I do not think the soldier lives who would fail to justify the resolution at which Havelock arrived the following morning, to fall back on Mangalwar, and to ask for reinforcements. From Mangalwar it would be possible to send the sick and wounded to Kanhpur without permanently weakening his force. He effected this movement the following day without haste, and in the most perfect order. He did not march before 2 P.M., and then retired only to Unao. The following morning (31st) he fell back on Mangalwar. Thence he despatched his sick and wounded into Kanhpur, and a letter to General Neill, stating that he had been forced to fall back, and that to enable him to reach Lakhnao it was necessary that he should receive a reinforcement of a thousand men and another battery of guns.
Neill received this letter the same day. He had assumed command at Kanhpur on the 24th, and in a few hours the troops there had felt the effect of his vigorous and decided character. Neill was a very remarkable man. By the “law of desert” he stands in the very front rank of those to whom the Indian mutiny gave an opportunity of distinction. It would be difficult to put any one above him Not only did he succeed in everything he undertook, but he succeeded when the cases were all but desperate.
He succeeded because he dared; because he threw into all he attempted the energy of one of the most determined characters ever bestowed on man. Such a man could not fail, and live. His whole soul was in
his profession. He had made his regiment, the Madras Fusiliers, equal to any regiment in the world. At Calcutta, he had inaugurated, by his dealings with the railway officials, the principle of prompt obedience to military requirements. At Banaras he had, by his vigour and decision, crushed an outbreak, which, had it been successful, would have raised all the country to the north-west and to within a hundred miles of the capital. The same qualities displayed at Allahabad had saved that important fortress. In the moment of success, when men had begun to stake all their hopes on his advance to Kanhpur, he was suddenly superseded by Havelock. And now, second to that general, he was at Kanhpur commanding there a few invalids, with the commission to finish the fortified work on the river, to erect têtes de pont – so that on the subsiding of the waters a bridge of boats might be established – and to send on to his senior officer all the reinforcements in men and material he might receive.
Neill, I have said, assumed command on the 24th of July. He had been but ill-satisfied with the state of affairs, as he found them, at Kanhpur. The location of the troops appeared to him faulty; the
camp pitched without method or arrangement; no effectual steps taken to put a stop to the plundering in the city – a plundering carried on by our European and Sikh soldiers173. But on the 24th he was master, and could remedy these evils.
His first act on the 25th was to appoint a superintendent of police; to re-establish authority and order in the city and bazaars; to put a stop to plundering. He announced his assumption of command, and notified the carrying out of the measures above stated in a telegram the same day to the Commander of the Forces, Sir Patrick Grant. The spirit of the man showed itself in the last sentence of this telegram:– “All well here. I will hold my own against any odds.”
He was a bold man who would thus write under existing circumstances. Not only was Neill aware that Nana Sahib, distant from him but twenty-four miles, was threatening to cross the river and to attack him, but he had received information that the mutinous 42nd Native Infantry were within eight miles of the station,
and that other native regiments were gradually collecting on the right bank of the Jamnah with the avowed intention of making a dash on Kanhpur. But Neill was not disturbed. “If the 42nd are within reach,” he recorded in his journal on the 30th, “I will deal them a blow that will astound them.”
With the levies of Nana Sahib he did deal. On the 31st he despatched a party of fifty Fusiliers and twenty-five Sikhs, with two 6-pounders and a 5½ -inch. mortar, manned by six gunners, under the command of his aide-de-camp, Captain John Gordon, of the 6th Regiment N.I., in the steamer to Jajamao174, to seize the boats in which it was reported Nina Sahib intended to cross the river. The party destroyed several boats, carried off six or eight, and returned to Kanhpur the next day.
Neill meanwhile had been receiving small reinforcements. He was daily expecting half a battery (Olpherts’s), with which to reinforce Havelock; but unfortunately there was a deficiency of gunpowder – and no gunpowder could be expected for a week.
Under these circumstances, and in view of the one fact, that on the 30th he received from General Wilson, commanding before Dehli, a letter intimating that it might be necessary for him to retire on Karnal, and of the other, that his own position was threatened from the west, it became more than ever necessary to show a bold front, and even, whenever feasible, to strike a blow. The one thing necessary for the success of Neill’s views in this respect was that Havelock should continue to move successfully on to Lakhnao.
This being the case, and the character of the man being considered, some idea may be conceived of the fury which seized him when he received, on the night of the 31st, a letter from General Havelock, informing him of his retrograde movement, and that he could not advance until he should receive a reinforcement of a thousand European infantry and another battery of guns. A second letter merely asked for all the infantry that could be spared and half a battery. With the demand for guns came, too, the information that of the fifteen pieces taken from the enemy every one had been destroyed.
“Our prestige here is gone,” records Neill in his journal. The letter from General Wilson was bad enough, – but that was only a possibility – it might not happen. But this retirement, the death-blow to all his hopes, had actually occurred. Who, he asked himself, was to blame for it? He did not take long to answer. He had no love for Havelock. He had felt deeply the slight, as he considered it, that he, the second in command, had not been invited to assist at the councils of war which had been held; that, although asked to communicate unreservedly with Havelock, he had been told to address his Adjutant-General. These things had chafed him. And now this retreat had come to upset all his calculations. He could not restrain himself. He had been asked to communicate “unreservedly” with Havelock through his staff. He determined to write “unreservedly” direct. He did so175. Havelock replied in the indignant tone
which might have been expected. By this time the first burst of Neill’s anger was over, and the rejoinder he sent to Havelock’s reply was pronounced by the high authority to which it was referred – the acting Commander-in-Chief, to be “perfectly unexceptionable.” The matter was then allowed to drop, but the correspondence had produced between the two generals a coolness which, whilst it did not interfere with co-operation for the good of the State, could yet never be forgotten.
On the 3rd of August Havelock was reinforced by Olpherts’s half-battery and a company of the 84th. Hopes had been held out to him that the 5th Fusiliers and the 90th Light Infantry would reach Kanhpur early in August. Had the Government of India only taken the precaution to disarm the native regiments at Danapur early in June, this might have been possible. But the fatal trust in men known to be untrustworthy had kept the 5th Fusiliers in Bihar and had stopped the onward progress of the 90th176. This culpable weakness made itself felt in Lakhnao as well as in Bihar. But the disappointment only roused Havelock to renewed exertion.
On the 4th of August, having then about fourteen hundred effective men under his command, two heavy guns (24-pounders), two 24-pounder howitzers, and a battery and a half of guns, he started a second time in the direction of the besieged Residency.
Having heard that the town of Bashiratganj had been re-occupied in force, he bivouacked that night at Unao. Leaving that place early the following morning, he found the enemy occupying a position very similar to that from which he had dislodged them on the 29th of July. This time he determined there should be no mistake; that, if the enemy would only wait the completion of his turning
movement, they should not escape.
Havelock then ordered the advance by the road of the heavy guns, supported by the 1st Madras Fusiliers and the 84th Foot; whilst the 78th Highlanders, the Sikhs, and Maude’s battery should turn the village on its left. The heavy guns, commanded by Lieutenant Crump of the Madras Artillery, a very able and gallant officer, speedily dislodged the enemy from the outer defences. As they retreated our infantry advanced. Meanwhile the turning movement greatly disquieted them. They saw that if carried out it would entrap them.
Bewildered by the progress it was making, and much embarrassed by the firing in front of them, they were stricken by panic and fled across the causeway.
This flight saved them from certain and entire destruction. The turning movement had not been completed. Still it had progressed so far that in their flight across the causeway the rebels came under the fire of the guns of Maude’s battery and were mown down in numbers.
The heavy guns continued all this time their destructive fire, silencing the guns of the enemy and forcing them back. The rebels did indeed for some time longer hold villages to the right and left of the town, but in the end they were forced out of these. Still, though the enemy was beaten, “the whole transaction,” to use the language employed by Lieutenant-Colonel Tytler to Sir Patrick Grant, “was most unsatisfactory, only two small iron guns, formerly captured by us, and destroyed, in our ideas177, being taken.”
The loss of our force had not been large. Two had been killed and twenty-three wounded. The loss of the rebels was estimated at three hundred. But there were weighty considerations to stay further advance. Cholera had broken out in the camp. This disease and fever had placed seventy-five men on the sick list. In the action at Bashiratganj one-fourth of the gun ammunition had been expended. Between that town and Lakhnao, was a deep river, the Sai, and three strong places, guarded, it was believed, by 30,000 men. The zamindars, too, had risen on every side in bodies of five hundred or six hundred, independently
of the regular troops. “All the men killed yesterday,” wrote Colonel Tytler, “were zamindars.” But even were the force able to reach Lakhnao what could it effect, enfeebled and worn out, against the myriads who would oppose it in the streets? On the morrow of the fight at Bashiratganj it was impossible to parade nine hundred infantry. To what extent would this number be reduced in fighting its way to the Residency?
These were potent reasons against an advance, but there were others still stronger. Intelligence reached Havelock on the 5th that the men of the Gwaliar contingent had successfully mutinied against their own Maharajah, and were threatening to move on Kalpi. Kalpi was a position which would threaten Kanhpur, and menace the communication with Allahabad. It is true that, had it been possible to strike a decisive blow at Lakhnao, the striking of it would have been the best reply to any demonstration on Kalpi. Not less true that a defeat involving a heavy loss to the force in an attempt on Lakhnao would precipitate any such demonstration. The intelligence regarding the Gwaliar force then brought home to Havelock for immediate decision the question of advance or retreat. The advance could scarcely be successful, and yet failure in it involved, in Havelock’s opinion178, the destruction of his force, and with it, possibly a disaster at Kanhpur. Retreat only risked Lakhnao. But did not an unsuccessful advance subject Lakhnao to a risk even greater?
No sensible man will deny that, under the circumstances of the case, Havelock exercised a wise judgment in deciding to retire and wait for reinforcements.
He fell back on Mangalwar. He lay there for four days recruiting his men. On the 11th he purposed to recross into Kanhpur. But, learning that the rebels had established themselves in considerable force at Bashiratganj, with advanced parties at Unao, prepared to disturb him while crossing, he resolved to anticipate them. For the third time, then, he advanced along the Lakhnao road, pushed the advanced
parties of the enemy out of Unao, and bivouacked near that town for the night.
At dawn the following day, the 12th, he set out and found the enemy strongly intrenched behind earthworks in a village in advance of Bashiratganj. Covered by his artillery and skirmishers, Havelock advanced in echelon of battalions from his right. The swampy nature of the ground delayed the advance of the heavy guns, and the British troops suffered somewhat meanwhile from the enemy’s fire. When the British guns were in position, they opened on the earthworks; but, as might have been expected, the fire made little impression. Havelock, therefore, determined to try the effect of an infantry charge. Under his orders the 78th Highlanders precipitated themselves, without firing a shot, on the earthworks in front, while the Madras Fusiliers, to whom the turning movement had been intrusted, took them in flank.
The result was decisive. Two of the enemy’s guns were captured and turned on them. They fled in disorder, leaving about two hundred. killed and wounded. Our loss amounted to thirty-five.
Having thus scared away the enemy, Havelock leisurely fell back on the 13th, and by 2 o’clock of that day had recrossed into Kanhpur without a casualty. His troops were taken over in the steamer and in country boats towed by the steamer, the current being still too strong to permit the putting together of the bridge of boats, materials for which had been prepared.
In his absence Neill had not been idle. The night of the 5th of August intelligence had reached him that a party of the mutinous 42nd Native Infantry, aided by some disaffected villagers, had plundered part of Bithur, and had sacked the house, and carried off the two daughters of Subahdar Narain Rao, a relative of Nana Sahib, but who, throughout the mutiny, had been staunch in his allegiance to the British, and had suffered much persecution in consequence.
Neill at once ordered a party, commanded by Captain J. Gordon, and accompanied by the Subahdar referred to, to set out at daybreak to clear the river. the following morning in the steamer for Bithur.
Gordon started at 4 o’clock on the morning of the 6th, having under him forty men of the Madras Fusiliers, twenty-five Sikhs, and six gunners, in charge of two six-pounders and a 5½-inch mortar. Passing Bithur, Gordon noticed that the roof of one of Nana Sahib’s houses was crowded with
men. He promptly opened fire upon and dispersed these. He then sent a party on shore to endeavour to recover the daughters and property of the Subahdar – the latter accompanying it. In both attempts success attended its efforts. The steamer, whose guns had meanwhile effected considerable damage on the houses and shipping of the rebels – sixteen boats having been sunk – picked up the Subahdar179, his daughters, and property, and reached Kanhpur at six o’clock that same evening.
A third steamer expedition under the same officer, Captain Gordon, was organised for the 8th. The object this time was to intercept the troops of Nana Sahib, who had begun the previous evening to cross the Ganges three miles above Bithur. The steamer, having on board the same number of troops as on the 6th, set out again at 4 A.m. As she steamed by Bithur a shot was directed at her from the shore. This was followed by a heavy musketry fire, and it soon became evident that the place was occupied by a strong body of the mutinous 42nd. The steamer returned the fire from guns and Enfields as she slowly steamed on, the Sipahis following her, taking advantage of every scrap of cover for three miles. At this point the current was so strong that the steamer could proceed no further. The Sipahis then took possession of a house on the bank and opened a heavy fire; but they were speedily shelled out of it. Captain Gordon, unable to make further way against the current, ascertained by other means that no troops were crossing, and then turned the head of the steamer down stream. But, after passing Bithur, she struck heavily on a sand-bank. Fortunately this sand-bank was beyond musketry range. There the steamer remained all night. The following morning the enemy brought some guns to bear upon her, but the great strength of the current had enabled her to cut her way through the sand-bank during the night, and at daybreak she dropped down to Kanhpur.
Captain Gordon had ascertained that the number of mutineers, regular troops, at Bithur, amounted to about two
thousand. He made his report accordingly to Brigadier Neill.
With a soldier’s true instinct, Neill, the next morning, marched about two hundred men and four guns about three miles on the Bithur road, passing the city on the way. This movement had the best effect. It gave confidence to our well-wishers, and discouraged the rebels and their friends. The movement was repeated the following day and the day after.
I have already stated that General Havelock re-crossed on the 13th. He at once assumed command. The meeting between the two generals was outwardly friendly; but it was impossible, after the correspondence I have alluded to, that there should be any real cordiality between them. At an interview on the following day Neill expressed to Havelock his opinion that his men were not then in a fit state to march on Lakhnao; that they required rest, and should not be unnecessarily exposed; that it was indispensable that the rebels at Bithur should be dealt with first. The private journal of Neill shows that ho still held to his previous opinion, that in retiring after his first victory, on the 29th of July, Havelock had committed an error which could not be redeemed until he had received largo reinforcements. I cannot concur in this view.
Subsequent events prove, I think, that it was not well founded. Indeed, considering the immense temptation to Havelock to advance, the pain which the issue of the order to retreat caused to him, I cannot but regard his resistance to that temptation as the most heroin act oven of his heroic career.
Havelock allowed his troops to rest on the 14th and 15th. At 4 o’clock on the morning of the 16th, leaving only a hundred men under Neill in the intrenched camp, he marched against Bithur. The rebels at that place, now augmented to nearly four thousand, were composed of Sipahis from the 17th, 28th, 31st, 34th, and 42nd Native Infantry; of the 2nd Regular and 3rd Irregular Cavalry; of Nana Sahib’s retainers and two guns. Havelock found them drawn up in advance of the castellated palace of Bithur. Their position was strong, being defended by intrenched mud quadrangles filled with Sipahis, and sheltered by plantations of sugar-cane rising high above the head. Two villages, one on either flank, and connected by earth-works, formed the supports
of this position.
The villages were strongly occupied. The enemy looked so formidable that Havelock resolved to avail himself of his great superiority at Bithur in guns. He made his men lie down, whilst for twenty minutes he poured on the enemy a heavy fire from the artillery and Enfield rifles. The guns made, however, little impression on the quadrangles, and Havelock saw he must effect his purpose with the bayonet.
Covering his infantry with the Madras Fusiliers, he gave the order for an advance. The quadrangles were rapidly approached, but when our men were within twenty yards of them, the men of the 42nd Native Infantry, dressed in their red coats, started up, and met them. Bayonets were actually crossed, and it was not till sixty of the 42nd had fallen that they retired on their supports between the two villages. Havelock cannonaded this position for a time, but the enemy’s guns were so well served that he again sent on the infantry. Another desperate contest ensued.
The enemy defended their guns with great spirit, and were only driven from their position by hard fighting. Meanwhile a body of their cavalry, some two hundred strong, had made a raid on our rear, killed twenty or thirty camp followers, and carried off the mess property of the volunteers. This raid did not, however, affect the action. That was decided in front of Bithur by the defeat of the enemy, the capture of his position, and the loss of his two guns.
Still, victory as it was, it was in every sense of the word a victory most exhausting to the victors. In the 84th Regiment seven men died from sunstroke alone. The Madras Fusiliers lost five from the same cause. In killed and wounded the British lost between fifty and sixty. The men were much knocked up from fatigue. They could not pursue the enemy, but bivouacked where they had fought. The next morning they returned to Kanhpur.
This was on the 17th. General Havelock found waiting him on his return a copy of the Calcutta Gazette, dated the 5th of August, containing the nomination of Major-General Sir James Outram to the military command of the country in which he was operating. He learned, in fact, that he was superseded. He received this information from the Gazette alone.
It was accompanied by no communication to break the news. He had the harsh and bald announcement only.
This, then, was the result of his splendid daring, of his victories against Nana Sahib, of his strenuous efforts to reach Lakhnao! Supersession! A hard word to a victorious soldier! For though Havelock had failed to reach Lakhnao he had ever been victorious. Supersession! The first thought of a feeble Government when their hopes have not been entirely fulfilled! With what confidence could any man serve a Government which acted in this manner towards one who had shown, by his daring, his self-negation, his devotion, by his success wherever success was possible, that he had never despaired of the safety of his country. It was not in this way that Rome treated her generals. Terentius Varro carried rashness to its extreme when he fought Hannibal; yet, recognising the patriotism of his motives, Rome received Varro with applause. She thanked him for not having despaired of the fortunes of the republic.
Havelock was opposed to no Hannibal, but he had fought against an enemy exceeding him in numbers, occupying chosen and well-fortified positions, and animated by the energy of despair. Circumstances had forced him to emulate even Varro in rashness. He had been compelled to risk much, to put aside the prudent part of the regulations of the military science, to dare and to dare greatly. He had won all his battles. And, if in the ultimate aim he had not entirely succeeded, it was to a great extent because the fatuous action of the Government of India with respect to the Sipahis at Danapur had hindered the onward progress of the reinforcements by whose aid alone complete success would have been possible!
And he was superseded – without a word – by a simple announcement in the Gazette. Again was it apparent that success was the sole standard by which, in those troublous times, the Government judged their servants. Mark their action in this respect. At Danapur they threw on Major-General Lloyd the responsibility of disarming or of not disarming the Sipahis. That officer took thereupon certain measures which were not successful. In consequence, the Government supersede him, and announce their intention to bring him to a court-martial. At Agra, Brigadier Polwhele
fought a battle with the enemy, and, though one result of that battle was the retirement of the enemy from Agra, yet in the actual conflict he was beaten. The Government of India promptly remove him from his command. Mr. William Tayler saved the province of Bihar. Then, in the dire extremity to which that province is again brought by the action of the Government, he issues an order which in its operation might, under certain circumstances, expose the Government to the chance of losing a few thousand pounds. Fortune brings on the spot a heaven-born soldier to avert that chance. Yet, because it had been incurred, Mr. Tayler is removed from his post, and professionally ruined. Neill starts from Calcutta, achieves great things at Banaras and at Allahabad. The Government of India are impatient for him to march on Kanhpur. But the mutiny has caused confusion in every department. Supplies have to be stored; carts to be collected; elephants, camels, and bullocks to be brought in – and this when the whole civil organisation of the country is out of gear. Neill, aided nobly by the civil authorities, completes all his arrangements. At last he is on the point of moving. But there has been some delay – necessary delay – yet delay. The very day he telegraphs he is about to move on he learns that he has been superseded by Havelock. He, labouring, perspiring, taking no rest night or day, displaying an energy that acts as inspiration to all around him, has not yet been sufficiently expeditious for the occupiers of the gilded saloons of Calcutta. Again, the test of results is applied. Neill makes way for Havelock. And now, under the influence of the same test, Havelock gives way to Outram.
It is one of the glories of our countrymen that, however acutely they may feel a disappointment of this nature, it never affects their public conduct. It, is this recognition of, and this devotion to, duty, that stamp the Englishman. He subordinates to it all private feelings. He may be keenly sensible of the injustice perpetrated towards himself, but above himself is always his country.
He may have his own views as to how that country may best be served; but, when the Government which represents it has other and different views, he feels bound to devote all his energies to make possible of success the orders of the Government. Thus acted Neill. And, now, thus also acted Havelock. Superseded, as he
regarded himself to be, he was as active, as daring, as devoted, as when he ruled, the unfettered commander of an independent force. Never indeed was the exercise of the great qualities of resolution and energy more necessary than after his return from the expedition against Bithur. Out of seventeen hundred English troops whom he had had altogether under his order from the time of his quitting Allahabad, but six hundred and eighty-five remained effective.
Not only was he now compelled to abandon for the moment all idea of re-crossing into Oudh, but the action of the. Gwaliar contingent threatening Kalpi rendered it doubtful whether he could even hold Kanhpur. Were Kalpi to be occupied by this force, consisting of five thousand disciplined men, with thirty guns, his communications with Allahabad might at any moment be cut off. To the north, the Nawab of Farrukhabad was ready with thirty thousand men – some Sipahis, some raw levies – to take advantage of any difficulty which might threaten Kanhpur. It was, too, in the power of the rebels in Oudh to cross the Ganges at any point below Kanhpur, and acting singly, or co-operating possibly with the Gwaliar troops, to endanger his communications. Of all these dangers Havelock had the fullest cognizance. Yet his judgment was never clouded. To remain at Kanhpur was undoubtedly a risk, but to fall back on Allahabad would have been a calamity.
Not only would he have lost by such a movement the prestige and the material advantages his victories had gained, but such a movement would have had the effect of uniting against him the now divided enemies, and of placing them, with more means at their disposal, in a position stronger than that from which he had dislodged Nana Sahib. His central position, faulty as it was in a military sense, gave him an immense moral power. He resolved, then, to hold it as long as possible. He announced, accordingly, to the newly-arrived Commander-in-Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, that, if hopes of reinforcements were held out to him, he would, in spite of the very threatening aspect of affairs, continue to hold Kanhpur; that otherwise he should be forced to retire on Allahabad.
The reply of Sir Colin on this head was reassuring. Reinforcements were on their way. Havelock resolved to await. them at Kanhpur. The month that intervened between the battle of Bithur and
the arrival of Sir James Outram was rich in events, which, if not showy, were important.
On the 20th of August the indefatigable Captain Gordon had again been sent on an expedition in the steamer. This time he was to proceed down the river and destroy some sixty-two boats belonging to the Oudh rebels, said to have been collected opposite Rajghat, in the Fathpur district. The operation was one most necessary to be carried out, for it was by these boats that the Oudh rebels might hope to cross the river and operate on our communications with Allahabad. Gordon, taking with him one hundred men of the Madras Fusiliers, twelve artillerymen, twelve Sikhs, and three pieces, started on the 19th. On the way down the river, hundreds of horse and foot were noticed collected on the Oudh side, opposite the intrenched camp of the British. The steamer was fired at from more than one fort on the way down. The expedition, notwithstanding, was to a great degree successful, for the party on board the steamer managed in four days to destroy thirty-five boats of various sizes.
Arrangements meanwhile were made and carried out for sending all the sick and wounded who could bear the journey to Allahabad. Reinforcements gradually arrived in small parties; the troops were allowed to rest after their fatigues; the regulations for the maintenance of public order were rigorously enforced; the works at the intrenchment were pushed on. In all these works the co-operation of the civil authorities, at the head of whom was Mr. Sherer, was of inestimable value. Our countrymen had the gratification also of welcoming fugitives from various parts of the country. On the 1st of September, Mr. and Mrs. Probyn and family, Mr. Edwards, and Mr. Jones, came in from Oudh. “They looked so joyous and happy after their sufferings180.” On the 4th eleven more (Eurasians) came in from Kalpi, their release having been negotiated some time before by General Neill with the Rajah of that place. To keep the men in spirits, games and races were instituted every evening; there were occasional theatrical performances, and a band constantly played.
The feeling entertained by Neill towards Havelock had, I
have said, never been very cordial.
The two men were not formed to act together. Neill had chafed much under the inaction to which, since Havelock’s arrival, he had been subjected, and he had greatly feared that, in the advance which was to take place, he would again be left behind. His gratification, then, may be imagined when, on the eve of Outram’s arrival, Havelock informed him that the command of the right wing of the relieving force had been conferred upon him.
Sir James Outram arrived at Kanhpur on the 15th of September. If there were anything in the world which could reconcile a successful soldier to supersession,. it would be to be superseded by such a man as Outram. Sir James Outram bore the highest character. He was a paladin of the days of chivalry and romance. To a fearlessness which never recognised danger, to a nerve that never trembled, to a coolness that never varied, he added a generosity without stint, a forgetfulness of self rarely paralleled, a love of the soul’s nobility for its own sake alone. Not idly had he been called the Bayard of the Indian army. He was without fear and without reproach. Engaged in many contests, he never fought for himself – he fought always the cause of those whom he believed to have been wronged. When a man so acts – when he gives himself, as it were, to others – the thought of self always flies. So it was with Sir James Outram. He gave all his energies to his clients. On their behalf he staked his prospects, his position, his future. He was appalled neither by the power, the talent, the interest, of the side to which he was opposed. He had emphatically the courage of his opinions, and, convinced of their soundness, he fought for them to the end.
In an earlier part of this volume181 I have stated that Sir James Outram had arrived in Calcutta on the 1st of August. Four days later he was reappointed Chief Commissioner of Oudh, and nominated to the joint command of the Danapur and Kanhpur divisions – a command including practically the entire country between Calcutta and Agra. General
Outram left Calcutta at once by river steamer and, after a tedious voyage up the Ganges, reached Allahabad on the 2nd of September. He devoted three days to the necessary preparations. These made, he sent
off, on the morning of the 5th, the 5th Fusiliers, some detachments of the 64th and the 1st Madras Fusiliers, and Major Eyre’s battery of artillery – the same which, with a detachment of the 5th, had relieved Arah – following himself the same evening with the 90th Light Infantry.
For the first three days the progress of the troops was uneventful. But on the fourth day, on arriving at the camping-ground of Kaligaon, definite information reached Outram that a party of insurgents from Oudh, in number from three to four hundred, with four guns, had crossed the Ganges, near the village of Kundapati, on the trunk road between Fathpur and Allahabad. The object of this party was evident. It was to sever the communications between Outram and Allahabad.
Outram at once sent orders to the advanced guard of his force to halt where it was. On joining it, he directed Major Eyre to march against the enemy. For this purpose, he placed at that officer’s disposal one hundred men of the 5th Fusiliers, sixty of the 64th, all mounted on elephants, and two guns. Forty men of the 12th Irregulars were directed to join this detachment on its march.
Eyre set out on the 10th. On reaching, that same evening, the village of Hatgaon, he was joined by Captain Johnson and his forty horsemen (the 12th Irregulars). As these men had made a forced march of twenty-four miles to join him, Eyre prudently resolved to halt for a few hours. By so doing he would refresh his men, and still be able to reach his destination by daybreak. He set out again at half-past one in the morning, and came in sight of Kundapati at early dawn. The villagers whom he met reported the rebels to be close at hand, if not actually within the walls of the village, and that their boats were moored about a mile off. Eyre at once ordered his cavalry to gallop at once to the gates of the town, – to guard them should the rebels still be there, – to pursue and hold them in check should they have evacuated it. Mean while he pressed on the infantry.
The prudence of these dispositions was quickly justified. The rebels, learning almost at the same time of Eyre’s approach, had already commenced a hasty retreat towards the river, and had just entered their boats when
the cavalry came upon them. The latter, just in time to prevent the unmooring of the boats, kept the rebels fully occupied till the other arms should arrive. Then, when these came up, Eyre gave orders to board. The enemy, crowded though they were, made for some time an obstinate resistance. At last, seeing that the day was going against them, they made a desperate attempt to blow up the boats and all therein. In one boat only was the attempt partially successful. Recognising the general failure of their scheme, and resolved not to ask for quarter, they then threw their guns overboard, and precipitated themselves into the river. Eyre at once drew back his men, and opened upon the rebels a grape and musketry fire, the effect of which was decisive. Not a man surrendered:– but only three escaped.
The effect of this decisive movement completely paralysed the plans of the mutineers. It was felt all over the Duab. Another, and it was estimated, a larger party, had landed some four miles higher up with the intention of co-operating with the men against whom Eyre had marched. But so great was the terror caused by his victory that they re-embarked and recrossed into Oudh before the cavalry could intercept them. The movement, so skilfully planned and so vigorously carried out, had, in fact, relieved Sir James Outram from the danger, no light one, of having his communications cut off during the contemplated operations in Oudh182.
Thus secure regarding his communications, Outram continued his march, and reached Kanhpur on the 16th of September. His very first act was of a nature so noble, so generous, so disinterested, that had it been the solitary glorious act of his glorious life, it would have sufficed to surround his name for ever with a halo of veneration and respect – an act so rare, so striking in
its self-abnegation, that lesser and ignoble natures, unable to comprehend it, endeavour to seek for it a motive congenial to the temper of their own minds, – but yet an act essentially genuine – pertaining to the nature of the man – consistent with every previous act of his life.
Sir James Outram had been sent to Kanhpur to command the force which was to relieve Lakhnao. In accepting that command he superseded the man whose daring efforts with an inferior force to effect that relief had won for him the applause and admiration of his countrymen. To the generous nature of Outram it seemed revolting that he should reap where another had sown; that he should obtain the glory where another had endured the trials and the dangers. He could not do it. He was determined that it should not be done.
Availing himself, then, of the circumstance that whilst, in a military point of view, he was commander of the forces about to march into Oudh, he would also enter that country in a civil capacity, as its Chief Commissioner, he published, the day of his arrival at Kanhpur, the following order:–
“The important duty of relieving the garrison of Lakhnao had been first entrusted to Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., and Major-General Outram feels that it is due to that distinguished officer, and to the strenuous and noble exertions which he has already made to effect that object, that to him should accrue the honour of the achievement.
“Major-General Outram is confident that this great end for which Brigadier-General Havelock and his brave troops have so long and gloriously fought will now, under the blessing of Providence, be accomplished
“The Major-General, therefore, in gratitude for, and admiration of, the brilliant deed of arms achieved by Brigadier-General Havelock, and his gallant troops, will cheerfully waive his rank in favour of that officer on this occasion, and will accompany the force to Lakhnao in his civil capacity, as Chief Commissioner of Oudh, tendering his military services to Brigadier-General Havelock as a volunteer.
“On the relief of Lakhnao, the Major-General will resume his position at the head of the forces.”
Rare and noble act of generosity! Only a soldier can appreciate the full extent of abnegation of self which it involved.
Well might the illustrious warrior who then commanded in chief in India – well might Sir Colin Campbell, when announcing to the army this deed of real glory, write these glowing words: “Seldom, perhaps never, has it occurred to a Commander-in-Chief to publish and confirm such an order as the following one, proceeding from Major-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B.
“With such a reputation as Major-General Sir James Outram has won for himself, he can well afford to share glory and honour with others. But that does not lessen the value of the sacrifice he has made with such disinterested generosity in favour of Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., commanding the field force in Oudh.
“Concurring, as the Commander-in-Chief does, in everything sated in the just eulogy of the latter by Sir James Outram, His Excellency takes this opportunity of publicly testifying to the army his admiration for an act of self-sacrifice and generosity, on a point which, of all others, is dear to a real soldier.”
I cannot believe that there will be one amongst my readers who will grudge the time and the space I have devoted to the complete elucidation of this “act of on self-sacrifice and generosity.” The incidents of war often harrow the imagination. They bring to the surface many of the darker and the baser emotions of human nature. They show men to the world with their passions excited often beyond control, their worst feelings rampant and raging. This was especially the case during the war with the mutinous Sipahis, and with the rebellious population generally. It is a relief to turn from the contemplation of such incidents to a noble deed – a noble deed of a noble man – unsurpassed and unsurpassable of its kind – and which will have its record eternal as the language in which it has been chronicled.
General Havelock then remained commander of the force that was to relieve Lakhnao. He issued the same day an order acknowledging “the kind and generous determination of Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., to leave to him the task of relieving Lakhnao, and rescuing its gallant and enduring garrison,” and expressing “his hope that the troops will strive, by their exemplary and gallant conduct in the field, to justify the confidence thus reposed in them.”
The force now at Havelock’s disposal consisted of three
thousand one hundred and seventy-nine men of all arms183.
He divided it into three brigades:– two of infantry, the third of artillery. The first brigade consisted of the 5th Fusiliers; the 84th Regiment, and, attached to it, two companies of the 64th; and the Madras Fusiliers. It was commanded by the gallant Neill.
The 2nd Brigade, composed of the 78th Highlanders; the 90th Light Infantry; and the Sikh regiment of Firuzpur, was commanded by Brigadier Hamilton, 78th Highlanders.
The 3rd Brigade comprehended Captain Maude’s battery, Captain Olpherts’ battery, Major Eyre’s battery of heavy 18-pounders, the whole commanded by Major Cooper.
Besides these, there were a hundred and nine volunteers, and some fifty-nine of the 12th Irregulars, believed to be faithful, under the command of Captain L. Barrow. Major-General Outram was one of these volunteers. To defend Kanhpur during the advance on Lakhnao, there remained the Head-Quarters of the 64th Regiment, under the command of Colonel Wilson.
The whole of the reinforcements had reached Kanhpur by the morning of the 16th of September. It was decided, however, not to attempt the passage of the river till the bridge of boats should be completed.
The rebels, meanwhile, were on the alert. On the afternoon of the 17th, a party of their cavalry and infantry, with three guns, came down to the opposite bank to reconnoitre. Their appearance was the signal for the withdrawal to the right bank of a party of Sikhs who had been sent across to cover the formation of the bridge. Emboldened by this retreat, a detachment of the rebel infantry crossed to an island, and, under cover of the long grass found there, opened a fire on the men working at the bridge. But a few round and shrapnell shot from our heavy pieces soon drove them away.
The bridge-head on the opposite side was covered by a detachment from the British force during the night, and on the 18th the bridge had so nearly approached completion, that it was resolved to make arrangements at once to effect a successful passage. On the 18th no enemy was to be seen on the opposite bank. That morning four guns of Maude’s battery were crossed over to the island above referred to, and the 78th Highlanders and the 90th Light Infantry were marched to a position on the river-bank, to be ready to take immediate advantage of the completion of the bridge. Subsequently, part of the 90th and three guns of Maude’s battery crossed the river. At eleven o’clock the enemy brought down their heavy guns, and opened fire on the British. The British guns answered. The cannonade lasted three hours, when the rebels ceased it almost as suddenly as they had begun it.
On the 19th the bridge was ready. The English force crossed in the following order. The 78th Highlanders led. They were followed by the Sikhs of the regiment of Firuzpur, by the remainder of the 90th Light Infantry, by Olpherts’ battery, by the Madras Fusiliers, then Her Majesty’s 84th and two companies of the 64th, the Volunteer Cavalry and Irregulars, then half of Maude’s battery – in the order named.
As soon as they had crossed the troops were formed into contiguous columns at quarter distance, and the 84th were ordered to lie down, as they were in the line of the enemy’s fire. Skirmishers from the 78th Highlanders were sent out at once to cover the line. General Neill’s brigade was then ordered to take up a position on the right of the line, and to drive the enemy from some sand-hills occupied by them about six hundred yards in advance. Neill immediately moved forward his brigade and attacked the enemy. They made a firm resistance, but were driven from their position. Whilst the infantry fight was going on William Olpherts184 brought up a half-battery in splendid style, and silenced the enemy’s guns. The enemy
slowly retired, and, the cavalry having followed them up to observe, the force piled arms and laid themselves out for breakfast, pending the arrival of the camp equipage. This did not reach the ground till past three o’clock.
The next day was devoted to the crossing of Eyre’s heavy guns. They were brought into camp by noon. The arrangements for the advance were then. complete.
At half-past five o’clock on the morning of the 21st the force started on its arduous task. The second brigade, having Olpherts’s battery attached to it, and with the volunteer cavalry on its reverse flank, led; the first brigade, with Maude’s battery, followed; then came Eyre’s heavy battery, escorted by the 5th Fusiliers, one wing leading, the other covering the rear; last of all, the 12th Irregulars under Captain Johnson. The pickets of the previous night formed the baggage and rear guards.
On approaching the village of Mangalwar it became evident that the enemy were massed there in great strength. Havelock upon this took ground to the left, and deployed into line, having the volunteer cavalry on the extreme left. This manoeuvre had scarcely been accomplished before the enemy’s guns, five in number, opened fire. They had playing on the road one heavy gun defended by a breastwork. The three English batteries at once replied, whilst the infantry marched through the swamp to the hard ground from which they could act on the rear of the rebels. Just at this moment the rain came down in torrents. This did not affect the assailants, but before they could reach the road behind the village the enemy had evacuated it. A rapid pursuit ensued. It was most successful. The volunteer cavalry captured two guns, a set of colours, and an elephant, and killed about a hundred and twenty men. It was said in camp that five men had fallen to the sword of the General’s son and aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Havelock. Olpherts’s battery, though newly horsed with but half-trained horses, pushed on splendidly, doing great execution. As the infantry advanced they found the road strewed with shoes which the rebels had cast off to facilitate their flight. But, fast as they ran, the English followed to within musket-shot. This close pursuit drove the enemy helter-skelter through the village of Unao, without their making even an effort to defend it.
Our men halted for breath and a mouthful of food at Unao. They stayed there but half an hour Then, pushing on, they reached Bashiratganj – likewise abandoned by the enemy in their flight – and put up for the night in the sarai, or travellers’ resting-place – a very large building, capable of accommodating nearly the whole of the force.
There was not a man not wet to the skin, for the rain had been of the pelting nature peculiar to the breaking up of the rainy season.. The baggage was some distance behind, but it came up two hours later, and afforded then to the tired combatants the luxury of dry clothes and a dinner.
The force had thus reached with but a skirmish the furthest point of Havelock’s three brilliant inroads into Oudh. This time there was no talk of retreat.
Yet, excited with victory, proud of their day’s work as they were, the men were not unconscious that their greatest difficulties lay before them. But, had those difficulties been ten times greater, they were in the mood to overcome them. The end to be attained was the relief of their beleaguered countrymen – of those countrymen who for more than eighty days had held out against the hosts of the enemy. It was that enemy who now barred their onward progress. The pent-up determination of every heart found vent that night in the expressions of firm resolve that, be the resistance of the enemy what it might, it should bar the way no longer.
The rain fell heavily next morning as Havelock’s force left its night quarters, at half-past seven, the first brigade leading. Every one was in the highest spirits, and, in spite of the pelting downpour, wetting to the skin, all stepped out gaily. No enemy was seen in front – a few cavalry only, at a safe distance, on the flanks. After a march of sixteen miles they reached the village of Banni. Banni was a strong and defensible position. To reach it a force coming from Kanhpur had to cross the river Sal, here spanned by a long bridge built of masonry. After passing the bridge the road takes a turn to the right. The river was not fordable.
Strong as was the position, the enemy neither used the advantages it offered to them, nor opposed to our troops the smallest opposition. They even neglected to break down the bridge. Nor, although they had constructed
two half-moon batteries on the Lakhnao side of it, had they the spirit to use them. In a word, panic-stricken by Havelock’s rapid advance, they abandoned the best chance they had of stopping him, and evacuated their strongest position before even it had been attacked. Banni was but sixteen miles from Lakhnao.
Havelock, then, in the hope of giving information of his approach to the garrison of the Residency, fired that evening a Royal salute. His men lay there for the night, their indignation aroused and their slumbers troubled by the constant sound of the booming of the cannon fired against their beleaguered countrymen.
The events of the following day, the 23rd, were certain to be crucial. Breakfast, then, was served out to the men before they started. But by half-past eight o’clock they were on their way, marching in column of subdivisions right in front. The rain had cleared off, but it was very close and steamy, without a breath of wind.
Since six o’clock that morning the booming of the cannon discharged against the Residency had ceased. This silence seemed to indicate that the enemy were massing their big guns to oppose the relieving force. The men of the relieving force, however, unawed by the silence, pressed on with determined step. For some time no enemy was visible. But as they approached the Alambagh infantry began to show themselves on their flanks, and it soon became apparent that the enemy were prepared to receive them at that walled garden. A party of cavalry was sent on to reconnoitre. They returned to report the enemy had six guns in position; that their left rested on the Alambagh, and their centre and right were drawn up behind a chain of hillocks.
Havelock then halted his force, changed the order of the column from right to left in front, and brought up the 78th Highlanders and Eyre’s heavy guns. These changes having been effected, the British attack force moved on. No sooner, however, were they within range than the enemy’s guns opened with round and grape shot. They must have studied the distance very carefully, for their first shot knocked over three officers of the 90th, all of whom subsequently died. The casualties amongst the men and camp followers were likewise considerable. .But these losses did not check the advance. Whilst the 78th,
the 90th, and the remainder of the 2nd Brigade pushed quickly on to gain the open ground on which it could deploy, Neill, with the 1st Brigade, took ground to the left, passing through deep ditches, through swamps, and over heavy ground. On reaching the open he deployed his men in a position causing them to overlap the enemy’s right. Meanwhile Eyre’s battery on the road, and Olpherts’s on the right, had opened out on the enemy. Maude’s quickly followed. This fire had the effect of dispersing the rebel cavalry, and cleared the way for the advance of our men. By this time the two brigades had reached open ground, had deployed, and were advancing, the 2nd on the front, the 1st enveloping the enemy’s right.
Neill led his men over very heavy ground, and drove the enemy from several villages in succession. The key of the enemy’s position, however, was the Alambagh, and the upper-storied buildings adjacent to it. These the rebels defended with great resolution; but they could not withstand the assault made by the 5th Fusiliers. Advancing with the bayonet, the men of this splendid regiment cleared the houses and stormed the position. The rebels then fell back to resume the contest on the morrow. Of the guns they had brought into action five were captured by the Volunteer Cavalry. One of these, however, in the darkness and confusion of the night, they recovered.
Having driven the enemy from the Alambagh, the force advanced to within sight of the domes, the minarets, and the gardens of Lakhnao. But the day’s work had been hard – much still remained to be effected, and the General prudently determined to halt for the night. Accordingly he took up a position, placing the 1st brigade on the right, the 2nd on the left, of the road, Eyre’s heavy battery on the road itself.
Our men, however, had scarcely taken up the ground assigned to them and had halted, when the rebels, who, up to that time, had been fleeing in desperate haste, suddenly stopped, brought up fresh guns, and opened a heavy fire on the regiments as they stood or lay in line. They occupied also in considerable strength a two-storied house, subsequently known as the Yellow House, and from it began a fusillade on our line. Just at this time the rain came down in torrents, and our men were soon wetted to the skin. Havelock met this action of the enemy by drawing back his line out of fire, throwing
his right on the Alambagh, and refusing his left. The movement was a difficult one, as darkness had set in, and the road was jammed with horses, elephants, bullocks, guns, and men. However, it was carried out.
The 5th Fusiliers occupied the Alambagh. The other regiments were more or less provided for, some occupying hamlets, some lying in the open. The Madras Fusiliers bivouacked for the night in mud ankle deep; but they and the rest of the force “were as merry and jolly as possible185.” The rain had ceased. The men had been greatly cheered by the news that reached them that day that Dehli had been captured, and were in a humour to bear up against evils far greater than those they were encountering.
They had shown their enthusiasm by loudly cheering Olpherts’s battery as, led by that most daring officer, it had passed in front of the infantry line at a gallop to charge the enemy.
The force halted throughout the day of the 24th to prepare for the desperate deed of the morrow. During the day the position was further changed so as to remove the men entirely from the range of the enemy’s guns, which nevertheless continued their cannonade. The enemy’s cavalry, likewise, creeping round to the rear, made an attempt on the baggage, but, though they surprised and killed some ten or twelve of its defenders, they were eventually driven off. That night all the baggage of our men was stored in the Alambagh, and a guard of two hundred and fifty men was placed there.
At last the day of trial dawned. General Havelock, in consultation with Sir James Outram, had resolved to advance, not by the direct route to the Residency, but by another and more circuitous road skirting the Charbagh canal. At half-past eight o’clock on the morning of the 25th, the 1st brigade, headed by Maude’s battery, with two companies of the 5th Fusiliers leading, moved off in column of sections, right in front. They had advanced but a short distance when a tremendous fire opened upon them. From the Alambagh to the Yellow House before alluded to the advancing troops had to encounter a perfect storm of round and grape shot and a sharp fire of musketry. Vigorously pushing
on, they approached the enclosure called the Charbagh, and a village, both filled with the enemy. From these the musketry fire was very galling Our men, however, dashed at the enemy, and expelled them.
The next point to be reached was the Charbagh bridge, the only opening left into Lakhnao. This bridge was barred by an earthen parapet about seven feet high, stretching completely across it, and having in the centre an opening, overlapped on both sides by the walls of the parapet, through which it was possible for only one man to pass on foot. On this parapet were mounted six guns, two of them 24-pounders. To the right of the bridge, on the side by which the British were advancing, were some enclosures occupied by the enemy. On approaching the position the force halted; Maude brought two guns to the front and opened fire, whilst Outram, taking with him the 5th Fusiliers and the Sikhs, proceeded to drive the enemy from the enclosures on the right, with the view of bringing a reverse fire on the guns defending the bridge.
The enemy, on their side, had not been slow to reply to the challenge given them by Maude, and for some time the artillery duel raged with great fury. In this the enemy had the advantage of numbers and position. They had heavy guns, and those guns were under cover. Maude had but two light guns, and they were in the open.
When the duel had lasted half an hour, it became evident that Maude could make no impression on the enemy. He had lost twenty-one men at the Yellow House, and others had fallen in front of the bridge. In his despair he appealed to young Henry Havelock, then standing by his side, to “do something.” Havelock rode at once to Neill, who was standing, on the opposite side of the road, and suggested to him that he should charge the bridge. But, in the absence of Outram, Neill conceived that he would not be justified in giving such an order until that general’s turning movement should have made itself felt. Fraser-Tytler made a similar attempt, and with the same result.
Something, however, had to be done. Under these circumstances, young Henry Havelock, always bold, daring, and adventurous, imperilled his commission to carry out an idea which had flashed through his brain. Turning his horse’s head, he galloped off in the
direction of the post occupied by his father. After making the turn of the road, he halted, waited for three or four minutes, then, galloping back to Neill, saluted him and said – as if bringing an order from the general, whom he had not seen – “You are to charge the bridge, Sir.” Neill at once issued the order. Tytler and Havelock carried it across the road, formed up the men, and gave the order to advance.
Arnold of the Madras Fusiliers dashed on to the bridge with the advance of twenty-five men, Tytler and Havelock accompanying them mounted. Tytler’s horse was shot dead, and he was pierced through the groin. Every other man of the twenty-five, the mounted Havelock and a private named Jakes excepted, was shot down by a discharge from the enemy’s six guns loaded with grape. Havelock, unable to pass the overlapping barrier of which I have spoken, sat in his saddle, his sword in his hand, calling on the men to come on. Jakes stood by his side loading and firing as fast as he could. The interval between their first touching the bridge and the arrival on it of the storming column was, probably, not more than two minutes, but it seemed an hour. Standing alone on the bridge, the two Englishmen – the daring officer and the gallant private – were exposed to a fire from all the neighbouring houses, every wall loop-holed, every window fortified by sand-bags, and every roof occupied. In the language of Outram, “they were the target for many muskets.” Just at this moment, when the storming party was coming on, a rebel Sipahi jumped on the parapet, within ten yards of Havelock, and took at him a deliberate aim. The direction was true, but the musket threw high, for the bullet passed through the centre of the top of his hat. Havelock paid him back in truer coin. Returning his sword to the scabbard, he drew his revolver and shot him, as he was reloading, through the body.
A few seconds later the Madras Fusiliers came up with a rush, swarmed over the parapet and through the gap, and carried all before them. The 78th Highlanders belonging to the 2nd brigade followed; and the captured guns were spiked186. The entry into Lakhnao was won!
On the regiments of the 2nd brigade closing up, the whole force advanced, but, in pursuance of the resolution already referred to, instead of moving straight on through the city, it took a turn to the right at the, bridge, and pushed on by a very bad and narrow. road along the outskirts. The troops pressed along this road, subjected here to but little opposition.
The rebels, however, having made a demonstration on the rear of the relieving force, two regiments were detached to cover the advance of the remaining brigades, as well as to protect the heavy guns, the dragging of which over the heavy road was found both tedious and difficult.
This road gradually led into the outskirts of the city, and the men were forced to penetrate through narrow streets and lanes, every one of which seemed alive with the enemy’s fire. Still the one way to win the day was to press on, and the men continued to dash forward, overcoming, or disregarding every obstacle. Suddenly, however, they found their progress impeded by a most formidable obstacle. Before them lay a narrow bridge over a nullah, with high banks on the opposite side.
This bridge lay under the lee of the Kaisarbagh, partially commanded by the two guns posted there, and by the muskets of the. numerous enemy occupying it. The infantry and the guns were forced to cross that bridge, and to cross it almost singly. The fire opened from the Kaisarbagh was tremendous. It happened, however, that a sheltered position was attainable on the other side, from which the enemy might be fired at with advantage. The troops, then, as they crossed the bridge, took up this position, and, opening a fire, to some extent covered their comrades. But the ordeal was a terrible one, and many men fell at this point.
Having passed this obstacle, the force re-united, and halted under cover of some deserted buildings near the Chatr Manzil and Farhatbaksh palaces. It was before this – before, indeed, the Charbagh bridge had
been carried – that William Olpherts performed the gallant deed which gained for him the Victoria Cross. The 90th Light Infantry, led by Colonel Campbell, had been ordered to charge and carry a battery of two guns, strongly posted at the end of a street. They charged and carried it. Whilst they held the guns, Olpherts, who had charged with them, galloped back, under a severe fire of musketry, and brought up limbers and horses to carry off the captured ordnance. This was, in round numbers, the thirtieth time that this gallant officer had deserved the Cross he so nobly wears!
To return. Darkness was now coming on. The rear-guard, with the heavy guns, the wounded, and the baggage, was behind, exposed to the fury of the enemy. In a consultation with General Havelock, Sir James Outram proposed that the force should occupy the Chatr Manzil Palace for a few hours, to permit the junction with the rearguard. The proposition showed judgment and prudence, for the Chatr Manzil was a strong position, easy to hold, and virtually communicated, by means of intervening palaces, with the Residency. Had the suggestion been adopted, the safety of the rear-guard would have been assured, and the entrance into the Residency enclosure could have been effected with comparatively little loss.
But General Havelock considered that the importance of letting the beleaguered garrison know that succour was at hand outweighed every other consideration. The troops, re-formed, accordingly pushed on. The houses in Khas Bazaar were thronged with the enemy. As the men approached the archway a tremendous fire opened upon them.
Neill, who was leading them, passed through the archway, then, suddenly pulling up his horse, he directed his aide-de-camp, Gordon, to gallop back and recall a half-battery which had taken a wrong road.
He remained there sitting on his horse, his head turned in the direction from which he expected the half-battery to emerge, when a Sipahi, who had taken post on the arch, discharged his musket at him over the parapet on its top. The bullet entered his head behind the left ear, and killed him.
Thus fell one of the bravest and most determined men in the British army. Neill had only required opportunity to become
great.
Hating pedantry, cant, and circumlocution, he was essentially a man of action. In the early days of the mutiny, when every one from highest to lowest seemed utterly abroad, Neill suddenly appeared on the scene, and by his prompt decision and quick energy had in a moment stayed the plague. He was a born warrior, very cool, very keen-sighted, and very determined His military capacity must not be judged by his condemnation of Havelock’s retreat from his first advance. He, I believe, under similar circumstances, would have acted similarly. But his judgment was clouded on this occasion by his personal feelings. He had felt deeply his supersession by Havelock, and he disliked him. Every one of his own acts was marked by judgment, by a keen appreciation of the end to be attained. In a word, he was a noble type of the northern land that owned him. Though thirty-one years have elapsed since he fell, the memory of him still lives, fresh and green, in the hearts of those who knew him – and who, knowing, loved and respected him – alike in India and in England.
Undeterred by the loss they had sustained, the British troops pressed on through the Tads Bazaar, fiercely assailed by a musketry fire. Emerging from this, the sounds of cheering from the Residency enclosure suddenly gladdened the ears of the Highlanders and their comrades. Others of the advancing force, who had forced their way through other streets, appeared on the scene almost immediately afterwards, and took up the cheers most vociferously. Well, indeed, might their hearts swell within them! Those cheers were but the natural outburst of the sweetest feelings of which the nature of man is capable--the pleasure of aiding those in dire distress.
But they are not yet within the enclosure. The night was dark, and, before our troops could enter it, was necessary to make a way for them and for the guns. The displacement of the impediments at the gate of the Baillie Guard which had so long resisted the enemy’s assaults caused some delay. But at last they were removed, and many of the victorious troops entered. Then ensued the scene which I have endeavoured faintly to describe in the last chapter.
I have said that many of the victorious troops entered. The bulk of them, however, lay all that night on the ground
between the Baillie Guard gateway and the Farhatbaksh Palace, and rejoined their comrades early the next morning.
There still remained the rear-guard. Of that guard, even in the morning, there were no tidings. At noon, consequently, a party was ordered out to support or to disengage them.
This detachment, consisting originally of two hundred and fifty men of the 5th Fusiliers, and Sikhs of the Firuzpur regiment, and subsequently reinforced by a hundred men of the 78th Highlanders, under Captain Haliburton, and a hundred of the 32nd, under Captain Lowe, the whole commanded by Colonel Napier, R.E.187, proceeded to the walled passage in front of the Moti Mahall Palace, and found the rearguard holding that passage.
The junction having been effected, the surviving, sick and wounded were transported, on the morning of the 27th, along the river bank into the intrenchment.
It then became a great object to extricate, from the exposed position in which it had been left on the 26th, 24-pounder gun, used the previous day against the enemy. It was scarcely possible to approach this gun, so heavy was the fire maintained on it. The attempt, however, was made by three daring men, Olpherts of the Bengal, Crump of the Madras, Artillery, and Private Duffy of the Madras Fusiliers. Crump, an officer of the most brilliant promise, was killed; but Duffy, by a display of combined daring and ingenuity, managed to fasten a rope to the gun in such a manner as to ensure its withdrawal188.
The gun having been recaptured, earnest endeavours were made to open out a road for the whole of the ordnance through the palaces to the Residency. At three o’clock on the morning of the 27th, the whole force proceeded undiscovered through the enemy’s posts, and succeeded in packing the heavy guns and waggons in the garden of the Moti Mahall. The garden adjoining, and which was held in force by the enemy, was then attacked and carried by detachments of the 90th, 32nd, and 5th Fusiliers, led by Colonel Purnell and Captain McCabe. From this point measures were taken to open a road for the guns
through the palace, and by the 1st of October every gun and waggon was safely lodged in the intrenchment.
Such an operation as the relief of Lakhnao by so small a force could not indeed be effected, save at a heavy sacrifice of life. The actual loss, up to the 26th of September inclusive, in killed and wounded, amounted to five hundred and sixty-four officers and men. This does not include the casualties sustained by the rear-guard up to the morning of the 27th, amounting to sixty-one killed and seventy-seven missing. As the missing were sick or wounded men, who had been intercepted or slain, the number of killed of the rear-guard may be counted as the total of the two numbers, or one hundred and thirty-eight. This would raise the entire losses of the relief operation to seven hundred and two, officers and men. Amongst the former was Major Cooper, commanding the artillery brigade. By his death the command of that brigade devolved upon Major Eyre.
The force which had thus with such daring and persistent bravery reached the beleaguered Residency discovered in a few hours that they had reached that spot only to increase the number of the garrison. Means of transport for the combined force were absolutely wanting. Even had they the transport, was that force strong enough to escort the ladies and children in safety to Kanhpur? These were considerations which pressed themselves on Sir James Outram, who had, on the 26th, resumed command. For the moment, the result of the successful advance on Lakhnao was that more mouths were required to be fed – more lodgment had become necessary for the garrison. These were difficulties. But to meet and overcome difficulties is one of the natural tasks of a real man. How Sir James Outram met and conquered them I shall describe in the next volume.
There remained meanwhile to him, to Havelock, and to their gallant comrades the inspiring conviction, that by greatly daring they had accomplished a feat unsurpassed in the annals of war. The English traveller who shall visit Lakhnao may well pause, struck with wonder and admiration, as contemplating the narrow streets and lofty houses of the city, the size of the palaces, the extent of the walled enclosures surrounding them, he calls to mind that they were a handful of his countrymen who forced their way through those narrow streets, the houses filled with armed enemies; who beat down the opposition
offered them by the foe in those walled enclosures; – to rush to the succour of other men, also countrymen, who, beleaguered in a weak position – a position in a military sense not defensible – had repulsed, during eighty-seven days, the incessant attacks of countless foes. Contemplating in turn the city and the enclosure, he will be unable to resist the conviction, that the relievers and the relieved were in very deed worthy each of the other. If he wonder at the possibility of a small force maintaining itself in the battered enclosure of the Residency, he will equally doubt the power of repeating a feat such as that which Havelock and his soldiers accomplished. Both the one and the other were impossible had they not been done. That both were achieved was due to a combination of qualities which, on another field and on a different occasion, exposed our countrymen to the taunt that they never knew when they were beaten. The spirit that had animated Raleigh, that had inspired Drake, that had given invincible force to the soldiers of Cromwell, that had dealt the first deadly blow to the conqueror of Europe, lived in these men – their descendants. It was that spirit, born of freedom, which filled their hearts with the conviction that, being Englishmen, they were bound to persevere, bound to dare every danger, every discomfort, – to conquer. It was not simply the joy of battle – the certaminis gaudia which incited Attila189 to conquest – that animated their hearts. Rather was
it the conviction that they were struggling for the right, that they were combating treacherous foes, that England looked to them for the vindication of her honour and for the safety of the trust she had confided to them, that inspired the defenders with dogged resolution:– the soldiers who followed Havelock with an élan that was irresistible. The men whose great achievements, reflecting an eternal glory on their country, I have but faintly portrayed, all lived but thirty-one years ago. Some of them are with us still. Outram and Havelock, and Inglis and Neill, and Eyre and Wilson have passed away, but there are those who remain who emulated their example. There are, too, their successors in the ranks of the British army, and recent history has proved that on these the inspiration of great deeds has not been cast away. The men whose deeds I have recorded were tried in the fire. They represented the gallant soldiers from whose minds neither the assaults of an overwhelming enemy, the privations of scanty food, incessant watching, nor the terrible trials of climate, could obliterate the fact that they were Englishmen, and as such were bound to conquer – and who did conquer. Their names and their example survive them. Carthage could boast of her Hannibal; Rome of her Scipios and her Caesar; Gaul of her Vercingetorix; France, too, can speak with pride of her Jean d’Arc, of her Henri IV., of her Villars, and of the great commanders trained in the school of Napoleon. Spain can show her Saragossa; but no other nation in the world can show a defence equal in its resoluteness and in its result to that of Lakhnao, in which every
man was a hero and every woman a heroine. To find a parallel we must search the records of England herself, and go back to Clive at Arkat and to Flint at Wandiwash.
I leave Lakhnao now, and with regret. But I leave it for a field not less noble. For I have to narrate now how it was that the imperial city of Dehli succumbed to the army which had so patiently and so persistently assailed it.
173. Private Journal of Brigadier-General Neill, unpublished.
174. Jajamao is on the Oudh side of the Ganges, twenty-two miles north-west of Unao.
175. The following is the text of the most salient part of Neill’s letter:– “I late last night received yours of 6 P.M. yesterday. I deeply regret you have fallen back one foot. The effect on our prestige is very bad indeed. Your camp was not pitched yesterday before all manner of reports were rife in the city – that you had returned to get more guns, having lost all you took away with you. In fact, the belief amongst all is that you have been defeated and forced back. It has been most unfortunate your not bringing any guns captured from the enemy. The natives will not believe that you have captured one. The effect of your retrograde movement will be very injurious to our cause everywhere, and bring down upon us many who would otherwise have held off, or oven sided with us. The troops at Gwaliar have marched, whether to this or Agra is not yet known. The troops collected at Fathgarh will very soon follow. They are now joined by the 42nd N.I., which have passed on. I could not move out and intercept them. ... You talk of advancing as soon as reinforcements reach you. You require a battery and a thousand European infantry. As regards the battery, half of Olpherts’s will be in this morning; the other half started yesterday or to-day from Allahabad. This will detain you five or six days more. As for the infantry you require they are not to be had, and if you are to wait for them Lakhnao will follow the fate of Kanhpur. Agra will be invested: this place also: the city will be occupied by the enemy. I have no troops to keep them out, and we will be starved out. You ought not to remain a day where you are. When the iron guns are sent to you, also the half-battery, and the company of the 84th escorting it, you ought to advance again, and not halt until you have rescued, if possible, the garrison of Lakhnao. Return here sharp, for there is much to be done between this and Agra and Dehli.” In his reply, Havelock described this letter as “the most extraordinary letter he had ever perused.” “There must be an end,” he went on to say, “to these proceedings at once. I wrote to you confidentially on the state of affairs. You send me back a letter of censure of my measures, reproof and advice for the future. I do not want and will not receive any of them from an officer under my command, be his experience what it may. Understand this distinctly, and that a consideration of the obstruction that would arise to the public service at this moment alone prevents me from taking the stronger step of placing you under arrest. You now stand warned. Attempt no further dictation. I have my own reasons, which I will not communicate to any one, and I alone am responsible for the course which I have pursued.”
176. “So great is the alarm,” wrote a journalist at the time, “that H.M.’s 90th and 5th Fusiliers have been retained, though grievously required to reinforce Kanhpur.”
177. These were the guns captured on the 29th of July. General Havelock reported regarding them that they had been “dismantled by the Commandant of Artillery; so imperfectly, however, that the enemy again fired out of them.”
178. “The only three staff officers of my force whom I ever consult confidentially, but in whom I entirely confide, are unanimously of opinion that an advance to the walls of Lakhnao involves the loss of this force. In this I concur.” – Brigadier-General Havelock to the Commander-in-Chief, August, 1857.
179. “We then took on board the Subahdar and the Sikhs. The Subahdar was looking quite happy, having recovered his two little daughters. One of them (the eldest) is really a beautiful little creature, about eight years old. Some of the Subahdar’s plundered property was also recovered, so he was in high glee altogether.” – Manuscript Journal of an Officer present.
180. Brigadier Neill’s Journal.
181. Page 87.
182. That this was the view taken by the General himself is clear from the despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, dated the 11th of September: “The importance of this success will, I am sure, be appreciated by your Excellency and the Governor-General. I now consider my communications secure, which otherwise must have been entirely cut off during our operations in Oudh. A general insurrection, I am assured, would have followed throughout the Duab had the enemy not been destroyed, they being but the advanced guard of more formidable invaders.”
183. The numerical strength of the component portions of the force was as follows:–
| European Infantry | 2,388 |
| Ditto Volunteer Cavalry | 109 |
| Ditto Artillery | 282 |
| Sikh Infantry | 341 |
| Native Irregular Cavalry | 59 |
| Total | 3,179 |
184. Regarding this officer, Lord Napier of Magdala once said to me: “I have often seen Olpherts in action, but never without his deserving the Victoria Cross.”
185. MSS Journal, kept at the time,
186. For his gallant conduct on this occasion, Havelock was recommended by Sir James Outran for the Victoria Cross. He had previously received it for his conduct at Kanhpur. Maude also received the Cross for the persistent gallantry he displayed this day. “But for his nerve and coolness,” wrote Outram, “The army could not have advanced.” Private Jakes was killed later in the day.
187. Now Lord Napier of Magdala.
188. For this act, Duffy, on the recommendation of Olpherts, received the Victoria Cross.
189. At the battle of Chalons Attila, observing the repulse of the attack of his troops on a hill which the enemy had succeeded in occupying before him, sent for the commanders of his divisions and thus addressed them: “After having conquered under my orders a great part of the world, you ought to know what sort of a man I am, and I cannot forget what you are. Let us leave to generals accustomed to slumber on the bosom of peace encouragements of an ordinary character. War is your natural condition; vengeance your sweetest passion. For you a battle is a holiday; let us celebrate this one with joy. Behold your victims; sacrifice them to your glory; to the manes of your companions whom they surprised and killed. Here, courage has nought to fear from wile and artifice. These open plains can give cover to no ambush. All is open; all is assured to valour. And what is this army that you are about to fight? It is a confused mass of weak and effeminate nations, afraid of each other, hating each other, and who were tearing each other to pieces when the fear of your arms united them. Already, before the battle, they tremble. It is terror which has lent them wings to fly to that height. They repent already of having offered battle in the plains. They seek elevated ground to be out of reach of your missiles; they would like to hide themselves in the clouds. As for the Romans we know them already. I only fear the promptitude of their flight. Without awaiting even the first blow they are accustomed to fly before the dust raised by our horses’ feet. Give them, then, no time to arrange themselves in battle array. Cast yourselves on their squadrons; then, without stopping to pursue your victory over them, charge the Alans, the Franks, and the Visigoths. They are those alone whom we have need to conquer; they are the nerves of the army; all the rest will fall with them. Think not that your individual fate depends on the enemy. No dart can reach him who is reserved by Mars to sing the song of victory. No dart can touch him who has to conquer, whilst he who has to die would meet his fate even in inglorious ease. Why should Fortune have given the Huns victory over so many nations unless it were to prepare them for the joys of this battle? Why should she have opened to our ancestors the Maeotic Marsh closed and unknown for so many ages? ... If circumstances do not deceive me – here – here before us – is the field of which so many exploits have been the promise and the forerunners. For myself, I will be the first to launch my javelin against the enemy – let him die who shall refuse to follow Attila I (Si quis potuerit Attila pugnante otimn ferre, sepultus est).” – Jornandes, de Rebus Geticis, c. 12.
This collection transcribed by Chris Gage
