Appendix B

(Page 117 of text.)

From Sir James Outram to the officer commanding the relieving force.

[Along with the following important and deeply interesting letter, Sir James Outram forwarded a plan of the ground intervening between the Alambagh and the Residency, together with minute descriptions of every position and building capable of being held by the enemy. The plan was based on the surveys made by the late Captain Morrison prior to the outbreak, the only surveys that had been made of Lakhnao. The copy of this plan, which will be found at the end of the volume, should be consulted in the perusal of the following letter. It is Plan No. I.]

My communication of the 14th instant informed you I consider your first operation should be the occupation of the “Dilkusha” house and park, by a direct movement to that place from the Alambagh. The fort of Jalalabad, which is situated a mile or a mile and a half to the right of that route, is said to be occupied by the enemy, with two guns; but it is too distant to interrupt that line of communication, and it is not likely to be maintained after the Dilkusha, in addition to Alambagh, has been occupied in its rear. I think it hardly worth while, therefore, to waste

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time against that place, which at the commencement of the outbreak was little capable of defence, and is not likely since to have been repaired. or stored sufficiently to admit of its retention. The guns now there appear to have been sent merely to interrupt the forage parties from Alambagh. (A description of Jalalabad, as it was just before the outbreak, is appended.) Yet it will be prudent, in afterwards communicating with Alambagh, to afford a strong escort until it is known whether or not Jalalabad is evacuated.

The direct advance from Alambagh via Charbagh, and the main street marked (1) (1) (1) on the plan, should not be attempted, very formidable opposition being prepared on the opposite side of the Charbagh bridge, the bridge itself being destroyed, and the passage strongly fortified; besides which, there are two miles of street to pass through, in which every means of obstruction has been prepared, the houses loopholed, and guns in position at various points, with ditches, mines, and other obstacles. For the same reason I would deprecate any attempt to force the street which runs from the junction of the Dilkusha and Martinière roads to the Kaisarbagh, marked (2) (2) (2).

At Dilkusha, it is stated, there are at present only some Rajwari matchlockmen, with cavalry at Bibipur village perhaps, and at the Martinière; but these are almost certain to decamp when you approach, and may perhaps suffer considerably ere they get across the canal, if followed up sharply by cavalry and horse artillery. Two guns were said to be at Dilkusha, some days ago, probably those now at Jalalabad. If still there, they would have to be abandoned ere they could be crossed over the canal, if followed up.

It is possible that some of the so-called Regular Infantry may be sent over to the Dilkusha when they hear of your approach. If so, they will but add to their own confusion and panic flight when you attack, for never by any chance do they stand in the open. Two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, sent out to oppose Major Barston’s convoy, fled at his approach without firing a shot; and on every occasion where whole hosts of them were opposed to ourselves it was just the same. The Dilkusha palace cannot be maintained under fire of our artillery, having large windows on every side. If any force of the enemy is assembled there, they must suffer awfully from your guns in escaping across the canal; Or, should they fly to the Martinière, they will be in a similar predicament when you follow them up.

On seeing the Dilkusha occupied by your troops, the enemy would most probably occupy the Martinière. After lodging your baggage in the garden to the rear of, and commanded by, the Dilkusha, house (and surrounded. by walls without houses, something like Alambagh, and easily defensible), you would proceed against the Martinière through the road marked (3) (3) (3). But it would be well, ere getting within musket-range of the building, to throw a few shells and round shot into it, in case it should be occupied by the enemy, whose fire from the terraced roof might cause much loss ere you get near enough to rush up and blow open

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doors for entry. It would be well for you to have some one with you well acquainted with the Martinière building. And it may be a matter for your consideration whether it would not be better, if the place appears strongly fortified, to mask it by encamping your troops between the road (3) (3) and the canal, contenting yourself by bombarding the Martinière during the day and night, which will almost ensure its evacuation before morning. The mound marked (4)264 would be a favourable site for a 24-pounder battery, which would command the opposite bank of the canal, where you purpose effecting your passage to protect the sappers in making a road for your guns.

It is possible the bridge leading to the Martinière may not be destroyed, and that you may prefer advancing over it. But, on reconnoitring, you will, I believe, find places where the canal may be crossed without much difficulty further down, towards (6), which would enable you to turn any defensive works the enemy may prepare on the main road (2) (2) (2). If you cross the bridge, therefore, I would recommend you turning to the right after passing it, and making your way through the mud huts (indicated by the brown colour on the plan) until you get into the road running from (6) to (W) (W) (W) – W denotes some deserted and destroyed infantry lines – leaving the houses, marked D D D, on your left, and thus making your way into the road (7) (7), which passes the open front of the enclosure in which the barracks are situated. Should the barrack buildings be occupied (they were precipitately abandoned when we advanced from the same quarter), it may be prudent to throw a few shot and shell ere the infantry advances to the attack. Having large doors, open on both sides, as is customary in European barracks in India, I anticipate little difficulty in your effecting an entry. Staircases lead to the terraced roof from the interior of the centre room. The terrace is considerably raised above, and therefore commands the houses of the Hazratganj), and a few rifles placed there could keep down any musketry fire from thence (Hazratganj), which alone could disturb the party left in occupation of the barracks when you advance further. But it would be necessary to throw up a parapet of sand-bags, or screens of shutters, to protect the riflemen on the roof, as it has no parapet. The south wall of the enclosure is, however, sufficiently high to afford some protection against direct fire.

Should you cross by the bridge, your whole force would, I presume, come that way. And your next operation, after leaving an adequate guard for the barracks (say 300 or 400 infantry, some cavalry, and a couple of guns; or, probably, you might secure a gun, or two guns, which the enemy are said to have there), would be to proceed by the road (7) (7) to the Sikandrabagh (G), which, if held, could easily be breached by 24- or 18-pounders –

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the wall being only about 2½ feet thick – vide enclosed description265. It is said to be occupied by Man Singh, with some 200 or 300 Rajwaras and two guns; the former are pretty sure to bolt when your guns open upon the place, and two or three shells are thrown into it.

If you cross the canal at (6), the main body of your force should proceed by the road from (6) to (w). A regiment and portion of artillery might, perhaps, make their way by the road which leads direct to the Sikandrabagh (8) (8); but as it is not well defined, it may be more prudent to keep all together till you occupy the barracks266.

Should you have met with opposition, or been delayed much in crossing the canal, the day will be pretty far advanced ere you have occupied the barracks and Sikandrabagh. These might be the limit of your operation that day – encamping your force between, and a little in advance of, those two points, with its right rear on Sikandrabagh, and the barracks on its left rear – thus obtaining a tolerably open plain to encamp on, with almost clear space in front, from which your guns would play upon the buildings which still intervene between your camp and our position, namely, the Shah Nuja (H), Mod Mahal’ (K), Mess-house (M), and Tara Kothi (N), which, if held, might be bombarded from both our positions prior to commencing combined operations next morning. You would then decide on the garrisons to occupy the barracks and Sikandrabagh, to maintain communication with Dilkusha, where your baggage would, I trust, be secure in the garden, protected by 200 men occupying the house, and a couple of pins. About the same strength (with convalescents) would suffice for Alambagh, aided by the enemy’s guns we have there. And, perhaps, two of our own guns, supported by 100 riflemen, would hold the Martinière, with a small body of cavalry to command the plain down to the canal. A strong picquet also should be placed in the nearest huts to the road by which you cross the canal. You would, perhaps, occupy the houses D D also, as further security for your communications267. Another point to which you should turn your attention while

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delayed in breaching the Sikandrabagh is the destruction of the bridge of boats some few hundred yards thence268. If a troop of horse artillery and cavalry are sent off rapidly to any point commandiu, the boats, many men would be destroyed with the boats that would be sunk by your guns; and the destruction of the boats will prevent the enemy’s force on the other side of the Gumti coming over to molest you at night.

The signal that you are crossing the canal will be my notice to spring certain mines, and storm the posts now held by the enemy in my immediate front (9) (9); and, once in possession of these, I shall open my guns on the buildings above mentioned, and endeavour also to silence the fire of the Kaisarbagh, which commands the open space between us, to favour our junction next morning269 when our united batteries could be turned upon the Kaisarbagh. And they would, I hope, in a day or two, effect its capture, which is necessary to ensure the entire submission of the city.

NOTE BY THE AUTHOR. – This extract has been taken from Sir James Outram’s General Orders, Despatches, and Correspondence, published in 1860 (Smith, Elder, and Co.). All the notes attached to it were made by the editor of that volume. – G. B. M.

Footnotes

264. Sir J. Outram afterwards availed himself of this mound to plant a 24-pounder battery of the Shannon Brigade, which effectually kept down the enemy’s fire opened on the rear division under his command, when he finally retired to the Alambagh.

265. The Commander-in-Chief’s force met with serious opposition at the Sikandrabagh, owing to their having approached it by a cross-road from the rear, whence their breaching guns could not be brought up until the troops had been exposed for some time to a heavy fire. Had they come by the broad pakka (macadamised) road leading from the barracks, as suggested, their heavy guns could have opened upon the place while the infantry remained out of muskets fire. A practicable breach would then have been made, or the shelling would have driven the enemy out. As it was, however, the occupants, greatly more numerous than reported, had no means of egress, and were destroyed to a man; but our own troops also suffered severely in taking the place.

266. Neither the roads (7) (7) or (8) (8) were followed by Sir Colin Campbell’s force, which was taken by a more circuitous and intricate road than either, and suffered greatly before its guns could be brought to the front.

267. All this was carried out, with the exception that the barracks and the houses D D were refused in the advance to the Sikandrabagh, and had therefore, to be taken afterwards, and (it is believed) at a greater loss than had they been assailed in the first instance.

268. The enemy’s leaders themselves caused the bridge to be broken up to prevent the flight of their followers.

269. This was done. Sir James Outram’s troops stormed and took the buildings (9) (9) on the day Sir Cohn took the Sikandrabagh. Sir James then opened his batteries on the Mess-house, Kaisarbagh, &c., exactly as here proposed, until the junction was effected; and the Kaisarbagh could have soon after been taken, had it not been determined to withdraw our forces for a time. – (See the despatches of General Havelock, Brigadier Eyre, Colonel Napier, &c., in reference to these operations.)

This collection transcribed by Chris Gage
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