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Chapter IV – Sir Colin Campbell retrieves Windham’s Disaster

The second chapter of this book left Sir Colin Campbell, followed by his staff, crossing the bridge of boats into Kanhpur. The shades of evening were falling, and the light was the short twilight which in India follows the setting of the sun. As he ascended at a gallop the road leading to the gate, some men of the Rifle Brigade, posted on the rampart, recognised their general, and their loud and repeated cheers announced his arrival alike to Windham’s soldiers and their enemy.

Sir Colin reaches the intrenchment

Windham was within the intrenchment, and Sir Colin had hardly reached him when a demand for reinforcements arrived from the Baptist Chapel – a proof that even then Carthew was still, with the small means at his disposal, attempting the impossible. The reinforcements were sent, but they arrived too late, and Carthew fell back in the manner already related. With his arrival within the intrenchment the fighting for the night ceased.

Nov. 29

After conversation with Windham, returns to his camp

Sir Colin remained some time with Windham, listening to his report and asking questions. He then communicated to him his plans. He would recross the river to his camp; as soon as possible the next morning drive the rebels with his guns from the positions they had taken up near the bridge, and then send over his infantry. Sir Colin then rode back to his camp “into which, all night, the guns, stores, women, and sick continued to stream133.”

Early the following morning Sir Colin proceeded to execute his plans. Peel’s heavy guns had reached the ground, from their march of thirty miles, only an hour before sunrise. The

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The rebels attempt to break the bridge of boats

astute leader of the rebel army had noticed with the early light of the morning the mass of soldiers filling the plain on the Oudh bank of the river, and that sight had told him that unless he could break the bridge his chances of ultimate victory would melt away. But there was yet time to break the bridge. He had therefore brought down his heaviest guns to the positions on the banks of the river whence he had the previous day driven the 64th, and had opened upon it a heavy, but fortunately an ill-directed, fire.

Sir Colin, foreseeing the attempt, baffles them

Sir Colin Campbell had foreseen that the rebels would try this last chance. Allowing, then, the men of the Naval Brigade but one hour for rest and food, he despatched them at sunrise to a point above the bridge of boats whence they could play on the enemy’s guns. The artillery fire from the intrenchment was directed to the same point. For some time the artillery combat appeared not unequal, but gradually the guns of the British asserted their superiority. Then commenced the passage of the cavalry, the horse artillery, and of Adrian Hope’s brigade.

The enemy fire the captured stores

As they crossed, dark masses of smoke mingled with sheets of flame, arising from the store-laden buildings so well defended by Carthew the previous day, proved that the enemy had given up the contest for the bridge, and that they had set fire to the stores to cover their change of position. But it was yet possible that they might attempt a counter-stroke on the weakened camp, crowded with non-combatants, on the Oudh bank of the river. The upper course of the river was in their possession; they had numberless boats at their command. What could be easier than to take advantage of the divided state of the British force and overwhelm the weaker portion?

Sir Colin takes measures to meet every eventuality and every attack

But the contingency had entered into the calculations of Sir Colin. By 9 o’clock he had crossed the troops I have already mentioned. On reaching the Kanhpur bank he directed these to take up a position facing the city, their right resting on a point near the intrenchment, their left stretching towards the grand trunk road.

The passage of the troops continues without a break till the evening of the 30th

November 30th

As soon as they had done this, Sir Colin crossed himself and established his headquarters on the Kanhpur side, leaving Brigadier Inglis to protect the convoy until all the troops should have passed over. At 3 o’clock in the afternoon the passage of the convoy commenced. During that

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afternoon, during the ensuing night, and till 6 o’clock on the evening of the 30th, the passage of the convoy and of the troops forming the rear-guard continued. Practically it was not interrupted by the rebels, and by the hour I have mentioned it was accomplished. The ladies and children, sick and wounded, were taken across the canal to a camp on the plain near “the mouldering remains and riddled walls of the position Wheeler had held so long.”

Confidence of the rebels

The rebels still continued to hold the town and the line of the canal passing through it to the westward. They were in considerable numbers, had a strong force of artillery, were flushed with victory, and they had as their leader a man of very great natural ability. They were evidently resolved to try conclusions with Sir Colin, and they had perhaps some reason for believing that even Sir Colin might find it a very difficult, perhaps an impossible, task to drive them from the position they had occupied.

Great strength of their position

That position was, indeed, extremely strong. “Their left,” to quote from the actor in the scene whose graphic journal I have so largely used134, “was posted among the wooded high grounds, intersected with nullahs, and thickly sprinkled with ruined bungalows and public buildings, which lie between the town of Kanhpur and the Ganges. Their centre occupied the town itself, which was of great extent, and traversed only by narrow winding streets, singularly susceptible of defence. The portion of it facing the intrenchment was uncovered; but from the camp of our army it was separated by the Ganges canal. Their right stretched out behind this canal into the plain, and they held a bridge over it, and some lime-kilns and mounds of brick in its front. The camp of the Gwaliar contingent was situated in this plain, about two miles in rear of the right, at the point where the Kalpi road comes in.” The reader will be able the better to picture to himself the position if he will bear in mind that the right of the enemy was in the position whence they had dislodged Windham on the 27th; the left, that whence they had driven Carthew and Wilson on the 28th; and that the town, between the two, and up to the Ganges canal, formed the centre. This position was held by an enemy whose numbers were at the time computed at twenty-five thousand men, with forty guns.

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Their numbers

It is certain that, even granting the correctness of this computation, the number of their trained soldiers. did not exceed fourteen thousand.

As a preliminary to attacking them

To attack a position so strong, and so numerously guarded, Sir Colin felt that he would require the services of all the men of whom he could dispose. It was then, obviously, a main condition to despatch to Allahabad the ladies and children, the sick and wounded, before engaging in an action. Victorious though he felt he would be, the presence of the convoy near the battlefield, whilst constituting a danger to its members, would deprive him of the troops necessary to protect it against contingencies. His first care, then, was to arrange for the despatch of the convoy.

December 1–3

Sir Colin arranges to despatch the ladies and children to Allahabad

I have already stated that, by 6 o’clock on the evening of the 30th November, every man, woman, and child had crossed into Kanhpur. The days of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd December were devoted to the perfecting of arrangements for the despatch of the convoy to Allahabad. The rebels did not fail occasionally to remind the Commander-in-Chief of their presence. On the first they attacked the British outposts.

Although they were not in great force, and were easily repulsed, they managed, nevertheless, to effect some damage. Ewart, of the 93rd, whose gallantry at the storming of the Sikandarbagh will be remembered, had his left arm carried away by a round shot, his regiment being at the time under cover of the unfinished barracks.

The enemy try to interrupt him

On the 2nd the rebels opened a very brisk cannonade, apparently pointed at the tents occupied by Sir Colin Campbell and the headquarter staff. The cannonade became so pronounced, that the Commander-in-Chief detached a body of riflemen to occupy some houses near the canal, commanding the position occupied by the battery which was annoying him. This movement compelled the enemy to withdraw.

The convoy starts on the night of the 3rd December

At length the arrangements for the transport of the convoy were completed. The communications between Kanhpur and Allahabad, interrupted during Sir Colin’s absence, had been restored, and, on the night of the 3rd December, the convoy, composed of the women and children who had survived the dangers and trials of the siege of Lakhnao, of the wounded

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who had shared those dangers and trials, or who had bled to relieve them, started for Allahabad. If for them war ceased thenceforth to be an affair of personal concern, inasmuch as they were no longer exposed to the fire of the enemy, the memory of its dread effects could not fail to accompany them. The sufferings of more than a lifetime had for many of that gentle cohort been crowded into the brief period of three months. There were few amongst them who had not experienced the loss of some one near and dear to them, of a husband, a child, a relation; and, rescued though they were, many were still leaving behind to the chances of death from a ruthless enemy the one dear companion, without whom the burden of life would be indeed hard to bear.

The attack delayed till the convoy should be out of distance

Relieved from the anxiety which the presence of such a convoy within his lines could not fail to produce, Sir Colin Campbell prepared to attack the enemy. One strong reason moved him to delay still for a few days. For, whilst the convoy was near, it was always possible for the rebels, though beaten in action, to double round and destroy it. He wished, too, to arrange for the disposition of those slightly wounded men whom it had not been considered necessary to despatch to Allahabad. These were brought within the intrenchment.

The rebels still endeavour to harass Sir Colin

December 4–5

In spite of the check given to them on the 2nd, the rebels still continued their attacks on the British position. On the 4th, they floated down the Ganges a number of fire-boats, which, carried by the current against the bridge of boats, should set it on fire. This attempt was detected in sufficient time to cause it to be frustrated. On the afternoon of the 6th, they opened a heavy fire of artillery on the left pickets, whilst they threatened, or seemed to threaten, to turn that flank with infantry. The enemy’s artillery fire gradually extended along their whole front. It needed a considerable display of troops and a continuous fire from the British guns to force them to cease their attack. Sir Colin Campbell determined it should be their last. He would himself take the initiative the next day.

The one weak point of the position of the rebels

I have already described the position held by the rebels. The reader will not have failed to perceive that whilst it was strong, and, in a military sense, unassailable in the centre and on the left – as, whilst that left rested on the Ganges, both it and the centre and part of

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the right were enormously strengthened by the possession of buildings, bridges, narrow streets, and winding lanes – the extreme right was comparatively weak. It was weak because it rested almost without cover on a broad plain, intersected only by the canal. This canal, whilst it covered the centre and right, could be crossed in front of the latter only by two bridges. Whilst assailable with difficulty in front, the right was thus liable to be turned and driven in on its centre. This turning movement promised, moreover, another advantage. The troops executing that movement would naturally seize the Kalpi road – which formed, so to speak, a prolongation of the ground occupied by the enemy’s right wing; and the seizure of that road, by depriving the Gwaliar troops of their natural line of retreat, would drive them, were the execution to correspond with the design, into the British net.

December 5th

is detected by Sir Colin

This idea decided Sir Colin’s plans. He resolved to mass the largest number of troops on his left– -the decisive point – to attack and defeat the enemy’s right before it could receive assistance from the centre; then, taking possession of the Gwaliar camp, establish himself on the Kalpi road, and striking at the enemy’s communications, compel him to renounce the strong positions occupied by his centre and left.

Reasons for limiting the number of the trained soldiers of the enemy

One word as to the number and composition of the enemy’s force. I have already said that it has been computed at twenty-five thousand men with forty guns. But, I repeat, it is difficult to believe that more than one half of these, or, at the outside, fourteen thousand, were trained soldiers. The Gwaliar contingent was composed of four companies of artillery, two regiments of cavalry, and seven regiments of infantry, a total of about seven thousand men. There may have been in addition an equal number of trained Sipahi regiments, some of which had attached themselves to Nana Sahib – who commanded on the left – in the earlier period of the mutiny, others which had come in from Bundelkhand and Central India. The remainder of the force consisted of the adherents of the Rani of Jhansi, attached to the Gwaliar troops on the right; and of the undisciplined and irregular followers of Nana Sahib and of other discontented landowners on the left.

Sir Colin’s Campbell’s force consisted of about five thousand infantry, six hundred cavalry, and thirty-five guns. His infantry

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were divided into four brigades.

Number and composition of the British force.

That called the 3rd, commanded by Brigadier Greathed, consisted of the wasted remnant of the 8th, of the 64th, and of the 2nd Panjab Infantry; the 4th, under Adrian Hope, was composed of the 53rd Foot, the 42nd and 93rd Highlanders, and the 4th Panjab Rifles; the 5th, commanded by Inglis, counted the 23rd Fusiliers, the 32nd Regiment, and the 82nd; the 6th, led by Walpole, was formed of the 2nd and 3rd battalions Rifle Brigade, and a detachment of the 38th Regiment. The cavalry was the same as that which we have already seen doing such good service at the relief of Lakhnao – the 9th Lancers, and detachments of the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Panjab Cavalry, and Hodson’s Horse, commanded by the same gallant leader, Brigadier Little. The artillery consisted of the guns of the Naval Brigade, led by William Peel, of the troops of Blunt and Remmington, of the batteries of Bourchier, Middleton, Smith, Longden, and Bridge, commanded in chief by Dupuis. The engineer brigade, the same as that which had served in Oudh, was commanded by Colonel Harness. To Windham was consigned the command of the intrenchment – a command, it will be seen, of considerable importance. Hope Grant acted, nominally, in command of the whole force, but his real position was that of second to Sir Colin Campbell.

Position occupied by the British force

The advanced positions of the British force occupied the suburb called Generalganj, an old bazaar of very considerable extent along the canal, facing the centre of the enemy. This post had been held since the 30th by Greathed, and upon him and his brigade had fallen the brunt of the skirmishing of the subsequent days.

Sir Colin’s plan of attack

Sir Colin’s plan of attack was simple. Whilst Greathed should continue to occupy his position facing the enemy, Windham was to open on the enemy’s left from the intrenchment a very heavy fire, so as to draw the attention of the rebel leaders to that point. The rest of the infantry, meanwhile, were to be massed in contiguous columns behind, and covered from view by, the old cavalry lines, buildings to the left rear of Greathed’s position, and communicating by a cross road running immediately in their rear, at a distance of rather less than half a mile, with the grand trunk road. As soon as Windham’s fire should produce the intended effect, the turning movement would be attempted. To facilitate this,

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certain orders were given to Greathed and to the other brigadiers, the purport of which the narrative of the action will disclose.

Sir Colin begins the action at 9 o’clock on the 6th December with a fire of artillery

Early on the morning of the 6th December, Sir Colin Campbell struck his camp, and, to avoid the slightest risk of accident, despatched it to the river side under guard. This having been accomplished, and the men having breakfasted, Windham, at 9 o’clock, opened fire. The enemy promptly replied, and in a few moments the earth shook with the noise of a terrific artillery combat.

December 6

Under cover of this fire, the infantry were massed in the position I have indicated, whilst the cavalry and horse artillery were held in readiness, at the same time, to cover the turning movement and to make a detour to the left, and, crossing the canal by an unguarded bridge about a mile and a half further up, to threaten the enemy’s rear, and to cut him off or intercept him when defeated.

Greathed makes a false attack on the centre

The artillery duel continued about two hours. It then gradually slackened, and Greathed, in pursuance of his instructions, moved forward on to the canal, occupying the houses near it and from them opening a severe musketry fire on the enemy’s centre. At the same time the main body proceeded to carry out the plan confided to them.

whilst Walpole, Hope, and Inglis prepare to turn the right

The position assigned to each brigade may thus be stated. Walpole, with the sixth, immediately on Greathed’s left, was to cross the canal above the town, and, advancing along its face, was to mask every gate, and prevent the enemy from affording assistance to their right wing. Meanwhile, on his left, which was the extreme left, Adrian Hope would debouch with the fourth brigade, supported by Inglis with the fifth, and carry out the turning movement.

Walpole crosses the canal

When, then, the fire of the artillery slackened, and the rattle of Greathed’s musketry was heard, Walpole, assisted by Smith’s battery, dashed with his riflemen at the bridge, crossed the canal, and moved along the outskirts of the western face of the town. As he did this, a strong fire opened from the heavy guns of the Naval Brigade, and from Bourchier’s and Longden’s batteries massed on the left.

The fire had scarcely opened when Adrian Hope brought his

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brigade into the open, supported by that of Inglis, and covered by the cavalry and horse artillery. The dust raised by the progress of the latter effectually concealed from the enemy the movements of the infantry.

Adrian Hope turns the right of the rebels

They marched to the left, in the direction given by the cross road already indicated. Suddenly, when they reached a point rather beyond a line parallel with the brick-kilns which played so prominent a part in Windham’s fight of the 27th, the infantry brigades brought forward their left shoulders – the cavalry and horse artillery still continuing their forward movement parallel with the canal. Hope had covered his advance with the Sikhs of the 4th Panjab Rifles in skirmishing order, supported by the 53rd. As these gallant men pushed forward, there opened upon them a very heavy fire of shot and shell from the enemy’s guns posted behind the canal. At the same time masses of the rebel infantry, protected by the brick-kilns and by mounds formed by the operation of brick-making, poured in a rattling fire of musketry. But the attacking troops were not to be baulked.

Splendid conduct of the 4th Panjab Sikhs and the 53rd

The Sikhs, splendidly supported by the 53rd, rushed on at the double and driving the enemy from the mounds, gained for themselves a momentary shelter. Only momentary, however. Obeying an order conveyed to them, they rushed at the bridge over which the rebels had fallen back.

Firm resistance of the enemy at the canal

But the bridge had been well cared for by the enemy. Upon it guns were pointed, whilst the rallying infantry of the enemy, recovering heart, again poured upon the skirmishers incessant volleys.

William Peel brings up a 24-pounder and opens fire

For a moment the struggle seemed doubtful, when a rumbling sound was heard, and William Peel and his sailors, dragging with them a heavy 24-pounder, came up with a run, dashed through the skirmishers, planted the gun on the bridge, and opened fire. The effect of this splendid deed was electric. Whilst it roused the assailants to the wildest enthusiasm, it completely cowed the enemy.

The canal is forced

Highlanders, Sikhs, and 53rd, dashing by the gun, or fording the canal, rushed on the enemy, and, capturing their guns, drove them back in the wildest disorder. The Gwaliar camp was now almost within their grasp.

and the enemy are beaten

But, before the infantry could reach it, the battery of the gallant Bourchier, always in the front, passed them at a gallop, and, unlimbering,

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opened fire. In a few minutes the infantry had repassed them, and the Gwaliar camp was their own135.

General view of the action

Sir Colin Campbell joined his two left brigades at the enemy’s camp. His measures had been completely successful. Windham’s bombardment of the rebels’ left had concentrated their attention on that quarter; then Greathed’s threatened attack on their centre so far imposed upon them, that they made no attempt, as a really capable general assuredly would have done, to pierce that – the weakest point of the British line; Walpole had successfully prevented the centre from debouching by the western faces of the town to support their right. Adrian with and Inglis, Peel, Bourchier, and the gallant officers with their brigades and batteries, had done the rest. There was but one drawback to his complete satisfaction. The guide sent with the cavalry and horse artillery had misled them, and they were not on the spot when the camp fell into our hands.

The enemy are pursued along the Kalpi road

They came up shortly afterwards, however, in time to join in the along, the pursuit which Sir Colin at once directed. Kalpi road, and which was continued by Sir Colin in person to the fourteenth milestone136.

Completeness of the victory over the Gwaliar troops

It was a great victory. The most formidable portion of the enemy’s army, the Gwaliar contingent, had been completely defeated; their camp, with all their stores, magazines, and a part of their matériel, had been captured. In a word, the right wing of the

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rebel army, its head, its brain, had been severed from the body.

The centre and left still shut up in Kanhpur

The centre and left of the enemy were thus cut off, shut up in Kanhpur. They had but one line of possible retreat, that by the Bithur road.

Their line of retreat

On the Bithur road, due north of the city, and immediately in rear of the enemy’s left, was a large tank, known as the Subahdar’s Tank. As the Commander-in-Chief had cut them off on the right, and Greathed and Windham had imposed upon them in front, the occupation of this position would, Sir Colin Campbell felt, force the surrender of the entire force of the enemy. Before, then, he had started to pursue the beaten right wing, he ordered a force to occupy it at once.

Sir Colin, before pursuing the Gwaliar troops, sends Mansfield to occupy that line of retreat

Whether he felt his presence more necessary with the pursuers, or whether, in the generosity of his heart, he desired to give a chance to one of his generals, I know not. But, considering the regard, almost amounting to affection, he felt for the officer whom he did select for this duty, it is, I think, probable that he was anxious to give him an opportunity of distinguishing himself as a commander. This officer was the Chief of the Staff, Major-General William Mansfield.

General Mansfield

General Mansfield was, in many respects, a remarkable man. Tall, and soldierly in appearance, it was impossible for any one to look at his face without feeling certain that the man before whom he stood possessed more than ordinary ability. Conversation with him always confirmed this impression. Mansfield was a man of more than ordinary ability. He could write well, he could speak well, he was quick in mastering details, he possessed the advocate’s ability of making a bad cause appear a good one. He had that within him to procure him eminence in any profession, excepting one. He was not, and could never have become, a great soldier. Possessing undoubted personal courage, he was yet not a general at all, except in name. The fault was not altogether his own. Nature, kind to him in many other respects, had denied him the penetrating glance which enables a man to take in, on the instant, the exact lay of affairs in the field. His vision, indeed, was so defective that he was forced to depend for information regarding the most trivial movements upon the report of others. This was in itself a great misfortune. It

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was, in the case of Mansfield, made irreparable by a haughtiness and innate reserve which shrank from reliance upon any one but himself. He disliked advice, and though swayed, perhaps too easily, by those whom he loved and trusted, he was impatient of even the semblance of control from men who were brought in contact with him only officially and in a subordinate position. Hence it was that, when in independent command, unable to take a clear view himself, he failed to carry out the action which, to so clever a man, would undoubtedly have recommended itself, had he had the leisure to study it over a map, in the solitude of his closet.

The troops with Mansfield

General Mansfield took with him the whole of the infantry with which Sir Colin had turned the enemy’s right wing, with the exception of the 23rd and a wing of the 38th, which he left to guard the captured camp.

He advances towards the Subahdar’s Tank

It was about 2 o’clock in the afternoon. Mansfield advanced, the Rifles skirmishing in front, the heavy guns following,

then the main body, the 93rd Highlanders in reserve. The position on which Mansfield was ordered to march – and which, if properly occupied, would completely cut off the enemy – was one to the north of and close to the Subahdar’s Tank. Driving the enemy before him, he marched to this point, and there halted.

Consequence of his defective vision

He then ordered the infantry to lie down. He could not see, and would not believe, that he had placed them in a position where they could not act, and in which, if the enemy had had any audacity, they might easily have been cut off from the rest of the force. But the enemy had but one idea, that of escaping. The troops were held back, apparently to facilitate their escape.

Indignation of the troops.

Their indignation was unbounded. More than one senior officer pointed out to Mansfield the golden opportunity he was losing. But he could not be persuaded to do more than to withdraw his infantry from the false position in which he had placed them. He still insisted on keeping back his men, whilst the horse and the foot and the artillery of the rebels filed down the road to Bithur.

The enemy are emboldened and carry off their guns to Bithur

This passive action not only rendered the movement to the Subahdar’s Tank useless, but, in accordance with the invariable rule of warfare of India, it emboldened the enemy to venture an artillery attack upon the stationary British. This, indeed, was repelled, but

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Mansfield still allowed the enemy to carry off all their guns without let or hindrance137.

The left wing and centre of the enemy thus succeeded in making good their retreat on Bithur. Thus it came about that the victory, though great, was not absolutely decisive, for Mansfield’s inaction had made it necessary to follow it up with another blow.

December 8

Sir Colin rests his troops

Giving his men one clear day’s rest, Sir Colin detailed a body of troops for this duty on the 8th.

then detaches Hope Grant to follow up the escaped rebels

The officer he selected this time to command was Hope Grant – a tried, daring, noble-hearted soldier. At 1 o’clock in the afternoon of the 8th, Hope Grant set out on his mission. He had with him Adrian Hope’s brigade, composed of the 42nd and 93rd Highlanders and 4th Panjab Rifles; five hundred and fifty-one cavalry; Middleton’s field battery, Remmington’s troop of horse artillery, and a hundred sappers, or about two thousand seven hundred men of all arms.

December 9

It was known that the rebels had retreated by the Bithur road; but, as it was considered far from improbable that they might attempt to cross into Oudh by the Sarai ferry, about three miles from Sheorajpur, Grant had received discretionary power to change his route in that direction.

He traces the route they had taken

In the course of his march Grant, careful to examine the traces of the retreat, satisfied himself that the rebels had taken the road leading to the ferry. He therefore continued his march, halting only at sunset for a light meal, direct to Sheorajpur. He reached that place a little before daylight. Leaving here, under a small guard, the impedimenta not absolutely necessary for combat, Grant dashed across the country with the bulk of his force for the ferry. When within about a mile of it, he galloped to the front to

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reconnoitre. Whilst thus engaged, the men of his escort were fortunate enough to capture alive a trooper of the rebel force. From this man Grant learned that he had arrived in time; that the rebel guns were on the banks of the river, and that the crossing was to take place that day.

He finds them

Having satisfied himself that the man had told the truth, Grant sent back orders for the cavalry, guns, and infantry to come on with all speed. The remainder of the story is best told in the words of the noble and gallant soldier who commanded138. “The narrow road ran sometimes parallel to, and sometimes through, a sort of quicksand. Under a high bank, and close to the river, we found the long-sought-for 24-pounder139 embedded up to its axle-trees. We had great difficulty in getting our guns over this bad ground; but at last we reached sounder soil, and then we advanced rapidly.

and defeats them

As soon as we came within one thousand yards of the enemy, a tremendous fire opened upon us; but Lieutenant Warren, a fine young fellow, who commanded the leading guns, never stopped until within five hundred or six hundred yards of the rebels, when he opened fire on them. In a few minutes Captain Middleton joined him with the remainder of the battery. Captain Remmington now galloped up with his troop, and came into action in an excellent position behind a bank, at a range of two hundred yards or less. This concentrated artillery fire told with such terrible effect upon the enemy, crowded into a mass, with their guns, bullocks, baggage, that they gave way and retreated as fast as possible along the river bank, where it would have been difficult to pursue them in force, owing to the marshy state of the ground. However, the irregular cavalry managed to overtake and to cut up some of them. My gallant regiment, the 9th Lancers, was in support of our batteries.

capturing their guns

We captured fifteen of the enemy’s guns, with the finest bullocks I ever saw, belonging to the Gwaliar contingent. We were only just in time; for, as we came up to the ferry, we found the rebels preparing to embark the guns in some boats which

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they had collected for the purpose.”

Character of Hope Grant

A gallant and effective deed of arms, told in the modest language eminently characteristic of the chief actor in the scene! But Hope Grant was as modest as he was daring, as careless of self as he was prodigal of his zeal. His forced march of twenty-five miles, and the prompt movement which followed it, enabled him to repair to a great extent the mismanagement at the Subahdar’s Tank on the 6th.

Results of the fighting on the 6th and 9th

The rebel army was now utterly crushed. In the two days’ fight, the 6th and the 9th, it had lost thirty-two guns, a strong position, and a vast number of killed. The two parts of which its army was composed had been for ever separated; the one driven headlong to Kalpi; the other, prevented from crossing into Oudh, had fled without its guns to Bithur, there still within our reach. These great results had been accomplished by the British with a loss to them of only ninety-nine killed and wounded!140

Sir Colin Campbell as a general

The battle established the right of Sir Colin Campbell to be regarded as a great commander. In attacking with five thousand men an army of fourteen thousand regular troops, in addition to some odd thousands of irregulars, occupying a very strong position, it was necessary to run some risk; and there can be no doubt that in leaving Greathed’s weak brigade, not exceeding a thousand men, to guard his centre whilst he massed the rest of his army against the extreme right of the enemy, Sir Colin did leave an opening of which a Napoleon or a Frederick would have taken advantage. But the great thing for a general is to know when to dare. Sir Colin knew that the opponents’ general was neither a Napoleon nor a Frederick, and that the soldiers he commanded were neither Frenchmen nor Prussians. He felt that with his actual opponents he could take liberties which they would not resent. It is true that he risked his centre, but the false attack which it made reduced all danger in that quarter to a minimum. Knowing his enemy, as he did, it was a sound and daring policy, a policy certain to obtain the end he was aiming at – that of preventing an attack – to order Greathed to feign an onslaught on the enemy’s position at the moment he was about to hurl the

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bulk of his forces against their right wing. This movement would appear to the enemy the necessary corollary of the heavy artillery fire to which they had been subjected from the intrenchment. The plan succeeded, as it eminently deserved to succeed. Completely imposed upon, the enemy’s centre and left remained quiet whilst their right was being destroyed. They allowed the centre to be hemmed in in front by Greathed’s weak brigade, and on the right by Walpole – and why? Simply because Greathed and Walpole played offensive and not defensive parts. Sir Colin understood Indian warfare well, and he knew that attack almost invariably made up for inferiority in numbers.

December 9–11

The theoretical weakness in his plan of attack was, then, under the circumstances of the case, no weakness at all. The plan was admirably adapted to the occasion, and the execution was worthy of the general. It was no barren victory. One section of the rebel army did indeed escape, though with heavy loss, to Kalpi, but the other, forced to evacuate the town, was pursued to the Ganges, and deprived of its power for mischief on the banks of that river.

Bithur is destroyed

Nor did Bithur itself escape. Sir Colin Campbell, on receiving from Hope Grant a report of his success, directed that officer to march at once on the residence of Nana Sahib and destroy it. Grant set out on the 11th.

He found the place evacuated. He carried out his orders by blowing up the temple and burning the palace. Amongst the booty discovered in a large well contiguous to the palace were “some curious pots, lamps which seemed of Jewish manufacture, and spoons of a barbaric weight. All were of the purest metal, and all bore an appearance of antique magnificence.”

Two parts of Sir Colin’s plans have been accomplished

Of the large programme Sir Colin Campbell had sketched out for his operations in the North-west Provinces and Oudh, the two first had now been accomplished. He had relieved Lakhnao, and he had utterly defeated the rebel army threatening Kanhpur. His way was now clear for the performance of the third act of the drama – the opening communications between Kanhpur and the Panjab. This accomplished, he would be free to take vengeance on Lakhnao, and to reconquer Rohilkhand.

Minor parts of the great scheme to be considered

It is necessary that the reader should bear in mind that, whilst the main action of the campaign rested with the army led by the Commander-in-Chief, there were other actors who contributed effectively,

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though on a smaller scale, to bring to a perfect conclusion the general scheme which had been sketched out. In a previous chapter141 I have referred to the order given to Colonel Seaton to escort a convoy from Aligarh to the south-west. His movements, which would also serve to reopen completely communication with the north-west, will be noticed in the next chapter. I shall then have to transport the reader to the east and north-east, to witness the other operations, conducted by columns under Brigadiers Franks and Rowcroft, and by the Nipalese force under Jang Bahadur, having for their object to co-operate in the fourth great movement contemplated by Sir Colin Campbell – the re-conquest of Lakhnao.

Footnotes

133. Norman’s Relief of Lucknow.

134. Blackwood’s Magazine, October 1858.

135. “So complete was the surprise, so unexpected the onslaught, that the chapatis were found heating upon the fires, the bullocks stood behind the hackeries, the sick and wounded were lying in the hospitals; the smith left his forge, and the surgeon his ward, to fly from the avenging bayonets. Every tent was found exactly as its late occupants had sprung from it.” – Blackwood’s Magazine, October 1858.

136. “For two miles without a check the pursuit was carried on by the battery alone” (Bourchier’s), “accompanied by Sir Hope Grant and his staff. Four times in that distance did we come into action, to clear our front and flanks, until General Grant, thinking wisely we were too far from our supports, determined to wait until the cavalry arrived. A halt was called; not until it was required, for the horses, though in the condition of racers, had felt the pace. A small cloud coming nearer and nearer is seen on the left. The head of the cavalry column debauches from a grove. The order for a further pursuit is given. The cavalry spread like lightning over the plain in skirmishing order. Sir Colin takes the lead. The pursuit is continued to the fourteenth milestone, assuming all the character of a fox-hunt.” – Bourchier’s Eight Months’ Campaign against the Bengal Sepoys.

137. “Their guns might have been taken,” wrote Mansfield, in his despatch, “but I refrained from giving the necessary order, being aware that it was contrary to your Excellency’s wish to involve the troops among the enclosures and houses of the new cantonments,” &c. Whether Sir Colin Campbell was satisfied with this explanation may be doubted. Let the reader contrast the notice in his despatch, without comment, of Mansfield’s inaction, with his laudatory remarks in the same despatch on Hope Grant’s operations two days later. With respect to the absolute correctness of the account in the text of Mansfield’s operations, I appeal with confidence to the surviving officers of the 93rd and of the other regiments present on the occasion.

138. Incidents in the Sepoy War, compiled from the private journals of General Sir Hope Grant, G.C.B.

139. This was one of the two 24-pounders captured in the Kalpi road on the 6th, but which mysteriously disappeared whilst our troops were continuing the pursuit.

140. The official return was: two subalterns, one sergeant, ten rank and file, killed; two field officers, three captains, four subalterns, one staff-sergeant, five sergeants, seventy-one rank and file, wounded.

141. Page 83.

This collection transcribed by Chris Gage
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