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History of the Indian Mutiny

Book 13 – Bombay, Central India, and the Dakhan

Chapter 1 – Lord Elphinstone, Mr. Seton-Karr, and Mr. Forjett

May 1857

The Bombay Presidency

The western, or Bombay, Presidency of India comprises a long, narrow strip of country of varying breadth and irregular outline. Including the province of Sindh, the administration of which- is subordinate to it, it occupies the western coast of the peninsula from the mouths of the Indus to the northernmost point of Goa, and from the south of that territory to the borders of Maisur. It is thus bounded on the west by Baluchistan and the Arabian Sea; on the south by Maisur; on the east by the Madras Presidency, Haidarabad, Barar, the central provinces, the states forming the central Indian agency, and Rajputana; on the north by Bhawalpur, the Panjab, and Baluchistan.

Its area and population

The area of the British portions of the Presidency is one. hundred and thirty-four thousand one hundred and thirty-five square miles, supporting fourteen millions of inhabitants; but, in subordinate political relations to it, there are, or rather there were in 1857, native states comprising seventy-one thousand three hundred and twenty square miles with six millions of inhabitants.

The native states contained in it

The principal of these were Barodah, Kathiwar, Kachh, Kambhayat, Mahikanta, Rewakanta, Kohlapur, Sawantwari, and Khairpur.

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Lord Elphinstone

In 1857 Lord Elphinstone was Governor of Bombay. A man of culture and ability, Lord Elphinstone had enjoyed more experience of India than generally falls to the lot of governors unconnected with the civil or military services.

His previous career

He had been Governor of Madras from 1837 to 1842; and, although the records of the Madras Presidency throughout his incumbency had marked no stirring events within its borders, yet the first Afghan war, with its early success and its later collapse, had excited the minds of the natives throughout the country, and had called for the exercise of tact and judgment on the part of the rulers. These qualities Lord Elphinstone was eminently qualified to display, and he had displayed them. He was called, however, to deal principally with administrative details. The manner in which he performed. these duties gained for him the confidence of the natives. His measures for improving the resources of the country, and for establishing means of communication in all directions, are spoken of to this day.

His travels in India

Lord Elphinstone revisited India at the time of the first Sikh war, 1845-6, and marched in company with the 14th Light Dragoons, then commanded by the late Colonel William Havelock, who had been his military secretary, from Bombay, through central India, to the head-quarters of the British army before Lahor. On the transfer of Kashmir to Gulab Singh, a proceeding following the treaty of 1846 with the Sikhs, Lord Elphinstone formed one of the party which first visited that famous valley. After a residence in it of nearly three months, he set out for Ladakh by the Husora valley, and endeavoured to proceed thence up the Gilgit valley – in those days an utterly unknown country. Forced, perhaps fortunately, by the objections of the authorities, to renounce this expedition, Lord Elphinstone crossed the Hurpo pass to Rondu on the Indus, being the first Englishman by whom that journey had been attempted.

His qualifications for his post

It will be seen, then, that when in 1853 Lord Elphinstone was called to the post of Governor of Bombay, he brought to that office experience such as few men, . not trained in the Indian services, could command. His knowledge of men, his courtesy, his genial bearing, gave effect to that experience. Up to the outbreak of the mutiny in 1857 his conduct as Governor of Bombay was

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invariably marked by temper, judgment, and discretion. Calm and dignified in manner, courteous to his colleagues and to all with whom he was brought in contact, he evinced, on every occasion likely to test his action, the possession of a guiding mind, of a will not to be shaken, a resolution that went direct to its aim.

Well fitted to encounter the crisis of the mutiny.

The crisis of 1857 was just one of those occurrences which Lord Elphinstone was constitutionally fitted to cope with. He at once realised its difficulty and its danger, and rose equal to encounter the one and to neutralise the other. In the words of a contemporary writer, generally unfavourable to him, he displayed “the courage of the soldier who knows his enemy1.”

Lord Elphinstone’s action on hearing of the mutiny at Mirath

The truth of this judgment was proved by the action taken by Lord Elphinstone when the news reached him of the outbreak of the 10th of May at Mirath. Lord Elphinstone was at Bombay when he heard of that event. It happened that General Ashburnham, commanding the expeditionary corps on its way to China, was staying with him.

with reference to General Ashburnham

So greatly did the importance of the intelligence impress the Governor, so certain did he feel that the Mirath revolt would spread, and that it should be met at once by bringing large reinforcements of European troops without delay into the country, that he urged General Ashburnham to proceed immediately to Calcutta, and to offer his services, and the services of the China expeditionary force, to the Governor-General.

It was a fortunate circumstance that the war with Persia had just been brought to a successful conclusion. Fortunate, likewise, that the disaffection had not spread to the native army of Bombay. Lord Elphinstone thus felt himself equal to the most decisive measures.

to Mr. Frere

He at once authorised the Commissioner of Sindh, Mr. Frere, to transfer the 1st Bombay Fusiliers from Karachi to the Panjab.

regarding the regiments on their way from Persia

He arranged that the 64th and 78th regiments, then on their way from Persia, should proceed forthwith, without landing at Bombay, to Calcutta. The more speedily-to carry out this object, he caused vessels to be equipped and prepared for the reception of these regiments, so that on the arrival in the Bombay harbour of the transports

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which were conveying them from Bushir they might be transhipped without loss of time. This measure was duly and effectively carried out. The men moved from the one transport into the other, and reached Calcutta in time materially to influence the campaign.

regarding the Madras Artillery in Bombay

But Lord Elphinstone did more. He despatched on the instant to Calcutta a company of Madras artillery which happened to be on the spot, taking the duty of the Bombay artillery, then absent in Persia.

He prepares to assist Rajputana

He at the same time sent instructions to the officer commanding at Disa, to hold the 83rd regiment and a troop of horse artillery at that station in readiness to march on Ajmir, on the sole condition that, in the opinion of the local authorities, the departure of the only European troops in the vicinity of Ahmadabad and Gujrat might be hazarded without the absolute certainty of an outbreak.

and sends to the Mauritius and the Cape for reinforcements

And, still penetrated by the necessity to concentrate on the scene of the mutiny as many European troops as could be collected, Lord Elphinstone chartered, on his own responsibility, two steamers belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental Company, the Pottinger and the Madras, provided them with all necessary stores, and despatched them, under the command of Captain Griffith Jenkins of the Indian navy, to the Mauritius and the Cape, with letters to the Governors of those settlements, dwelling upon the importance of the crisis, and begging them to despatch to India any troops they could spare.

Result of his application to the Mauritius

I may here state that the result of these applications was such as might have been anticipated from the characters of the men to whom they were addressed. The Governor of the Mauritius, Sir James Higginson, embarked on board the Pottinger the head-quarters and as many men of the 33rd as that steamer could carry. Not content with that, he took an early opportunity to charter and despatch another transport to convey the remainder of that regiment, a battery of artillery, and as much money as could be spared from the treasury of the island.

and to the Cape

Nor was the Governor of the Cape, Sir George Grey, animated by sentiments less patriotic. It fortunately happened that an unusually large force of British regiments was, at the moment, concentrated at Cape Town. Sir George despatched, without delay, as many of them

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as he could spare. The 89th and 95th he sent to Bombay; the 6th, the 1st battalion 13th, the 2nd battalion 60th, the 73rd, 80th, and 31st to Calcutta. In subsequent vessels he despatched horses in as large a quantity as he could conveniently procure.

Responsibility nobly assumed by Sir George Grey

The despatch of Lord Elphinstone to Sir George Grey had painted the urgency of India’s needs in terms so glowing that that able Governor considered himself justified to stretch his powers. He did not hesitate assumed to direct the commanders of the transports conveying the China expeditionary army so far to divert from their course as to call at Singapor for orders. The result of this patriotic action was most happy. The intelligence which met these transports at Singapor induced their commanders, in every case, to bear up for Calcutta.

Lord Elphinstone suggests sending a special steamer to England

To return to Bombay. So important did it appear to Lord Elphinstone that reinforcements should promptly be sent from England by the overland route – route till then untrodden by British troops – that, sending telegraphic communication being open with Calcutta, he suggested to the Governor-General the propriety of sending to England a special steamer, which he had ready, with despatches, impressing upon the Home Government the urgency of the need. There can be no doubt that the suggestion was a wise one. A fast lightly-laden steamer, travelling at her highest speed, would have anticipated the ordinary mail steamer by three or four clays at the least.

but Lord Canning refuses

This, too, at a time when the most important events depended on prompt and decisive action. But Lord Canning did not view matters in the same light. He refused to interfere with the ordinary mail service. The steamer, therefore, was not sent.

Effect of the precautionary measures above recorded

Before I pass from the record of the precautionary measures taken in the early days of the revolt, to describe the actual occurrences in the various parts of the Bombay Presidency, I wish to advert for a moment to one material result which followed them. Those measures undoubtedly saved Bombay from serious outbreak. They did more. They secured an important base of operations against central India and Rajputana, and they preserved the line of communication between those provinces and the provinces beyond them and the seaboard. It is difficult

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to over-estimate the importance thus gained, solely by the exercise of timely foresight.

Lord Elphinstone meets a breach of law in Bharoch.

A rather serious breach of the law at Bharoch in the month of May, originating in a dispute between the Parsis and the Muhammadans, might have led to important consequences but for the firmness with which it was met, in the first instance, by the officer commanding on the spot, and, in the next, by the Governor. The spirit of Lord Elphinstone’s action may be judged from the fact that, to prevent the spread of the riot, he despatched a hundred and fifty men of the 86th to Surat – a movement of troops which left only three hundred and fifty European troops of all arms in Bombay itself.

He designs a policy of offensive defence

The riot at Bharoch was, for a time, the only indication of ill feeling manifested in the western Presidency, and it was entirely unconnected with the great revolt then raging in the north-west. Lord Elphinstone, whilst carefully repressing it, did not abate a single effort to carry out the policy which he was convinced was the only sound policy – the policy of offensive defence.

to hold the line between Bombay and Agra

Almost from the very first he had designed to form, at a convenient point within the Presidency, a column to secure and hold the great line of road between Bombay and Agra. Not only would the line thus secured form a base for ulterior operations, but a great moral advantage would be gained by its tenure. In the crisis which then afflicted India, it was not to be thought that any portion of the empire would stand still.

and, by advancing to meet the evil coming from outside, to prevent it entering within

The attitude of folded arms was an attitude to invite danger. To check the approach of evil, the surest mode was to go forth and meet it. A column marching towards the north-west would encounter the elements which, having brewed there disturbance, were eager to spread it, and, encountering, would annihilate them.

With this view forms a column under General Woodburn

The presence of such a column, marching confidently to the front, would, moreover, go far to check, perhaps even to suppress, any disloyal feelings which might have been engendered in the minds of the native princes whose stales bordered on this line of communication. For these reasons, then, at a very early period of the crisis, Lord Elphinstone proposed in council, and ordered, the formation of a column, under the

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command of Major-General Woodburn, to open out communications with central India and the North-West Provinces.

Composition of the column

The column formed in consequence, under the command of Major- General Woodburn, was but small in numbers. It consisted only of five troops of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, Captain Woolcombe’s horse-battery of artillery, and a pontoon train.

June

it is ordered to march to Mau

It set out from Puna on the 8th of June, under orders to march with all speed to Mau, with the view to save that place while there was yet time, and to prevent the spread of the insurrection in Malwa, and along the northern frontier of the Bombay Presidency2.

Possibilities before General Woodburn

The state of affairs at Mau and at Indur was such as to demand the most prompt action on the part of General Woodburn. It was just possible that, making forced marches, he might approach so near to Indur as to baffle the plans of the discontented. The dread that he might do so for a long time paralysed their action3. Circumstances, however, occurred which baffled the hopes expressed by Lord Elphinstone, when, acting on his own unaided judgment, he pressed upon the military authorities the necessity for General Woodburn to advance.

Aurangabad

The city of Aurangabad – once the capital of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, and, at a later period, the favourite residence of the Emperor Aurangzib – occupies prominent and important position in the north-western corner of the dominions of the Nizam. The corner of which it was the capital juts like a promontory into British territory. To the east and north-east it touches western Barar and the central provinces; to the south, the west, and the north-west, the northern portions of the Bombay Presidency. Beyond the northernmost part of that Presidency, and within easy distance of Aurangabad, lies Malwa.

Disaffection was known to reign in Malwa, and it was of the highest consequence that that disaffection should not spread southward to Bombay. But at Aurangabad, the capital of the small promontory I have described, almost touching Malwa on one side and running into Bombay on the other three sides,

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Garrison of Aurangabad

were quartered the 1st and 3rd Cavalry, the 2nd Infantry, and a battery of artillery, of the Haidarabad Contingent. These regiments, commanded by British officers, were composed chiefly of Muhammadans, and one of them – the 1st Cavalry – had, in the early part of June, displayed symptoms of disaffection.

Aurangabad is distant from Puna a hundred and thirty-eight miles; from Ahmadnagar, about midway between the two, sixty-eight miles. In the ordinary course of events, General Woodburn, armed with positive instructions to push on with all speed to Mau, would not have entered the dominions of the Nizam.

Disaffection of the garrison

It happened, however, that the authors of the disaffection I have spoken of as prevailing at Aurangabad proceeded on the 13th of June to more open demonstrations, and in consequence General Woodburn received, not from Lord. Elphinstone, instructions to deviate from the line urged upon him by that nobleman, and to march upon Aurangabad.

Reasons of the disaffection

In explanation of the open demonstrations at Aurangabad, I may state that a rumour had reached that place that the cavalry regiment stationed there would be required to join General Woodburn’s column and march with him on Dehli. The rumour was founded upon truth, for it had been intended that the regiment in question should join General Woodburn’s force. But to the minds of soldiers who were not British subjects, who lived under the rule of the descendant of a viceroy appointed by the Mughul, the idea of fighting against the King of Dan was peculiarly distasteful4. They showed their dislike on the moment. On the 13th of June the men of the 1st Cavalry openly expressed their dissatisfaction, and – it was stated at the time – swore to murder their officers if pressure to march against Dehli were put upon them.

Judicious conduct of Captain Abbott

Fortunately, the commanding officer, Captain Abbott, was a sensible man. He summoned the native officers to his quarters, and discussed the question with them. The native officers declared that, for their own part, they were ready to obey any lawful order, but they admitted that their men would not fight against the mutineers. Captain Abbott

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then, after communicating with the Resident, resolved to adopt a conciliatory course.

Order is restored, but not confidence

He gave the men assurances that they would not be required to march on Dehli. In this way order was restored. So little confidence, however, in the stability of the compromise was felt on both sides, that the officers proceeded to barricade themselves in their mess-house, whilst the mutinous cavalry boasted over their moral victory in every quarter of the city.

Woodburn enters Aurangabad and disarms the mutineers

Matters were in this state when, on the morning of the 23rd of June, General Woodburn’s column entered Aurangabad, marched at once to the ground occupied by the mutineers, and ordered the men to give up their arms. With the exception of one troop of the 1st Cavalry, all obeyed. The general gave the men of that troop six minutes to consider the course they would pursue. When the time elapsed, the men, instead of submitting, put on a bold front and attempted to ride away. In this attempt most of them succeeded. The next morning some three or four, convicted of attempts at assassination, were hanged, and order was restored.

Lord Elphinstone urges Woodburn to press on to Mau

General Woodburn was under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Somerset. In the opinion of Lord Elphinstone, the danger at Aurangabad had not been so pressing as to necessitate the deviation of the field force from the direct road to Mau. He thought that, in the presence of two dangers, that which would result from the mutiny coming down to Bombay from central India and Malwa, was greater even than the disaffection of a portion of the troops of the Nizam. Forced, however, to accept General Woodburn’s action at Aurangabad, he lost not a moment in urging him to press on towards Mau. “I am persuaded,” he wrote to that officer on the 22nd of June, “that the local officers greatly exaggerate the danger of a rising in our own provinces. I have no fear of anything of the sort; and, if it should happen, I trust that we should be able to put it down speedily. But I feel confident that it will not happen – at all events, for the present. If you allow the insurrection to come down to our borders without attempting to check it, we shall almost deserve our fate; but if by a rapid advance. you are able to secure Mau you will also, in all probability, cave Mehidpur, Sagar, Hoshangabad,” &c. Lord Elphinstone

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followed up these noble words, displaying the true conception he had formed of the situation, by a letter addressed, the same day, to Sir Henry Somerset: “I am very much obliged to you,” he wrote, “for the perusal of General Woodburn’s letter. I conclude that since it was written be has received his orders to continue his march to Mau with all possible expedition.”

Woodburn, however, delays to try his prisoners

But General Woodburn did not move forward. In reply to the letter I have just quoted, he wrote, on the 25th, to Lord Elphinstone, urging the various reasons which, he thought, would necessitate a long stay at Aurangabad. These reasons might, in the presence of the greater danger at Mau, be justly teamed trivial. They consisted in the possibility of a fresh outbreak after his departure, and in the necessity of trying some sixty-four prisoners by court-martial.

Lord Elphinstone combats his reasons and still urges him onwards

Lord Elphinstone answered the objections to advance urged by the general in a very decided manner. “I wish you to remember,” he wrote to him on the 27th of June, “that it was for the object of relieving Mau, and not for the purpose of chastising a mutinous regiment at Aurangabad, that the field force was formed. The latter is an incidental duty, which it was hoped would not interfere with the main object. I am perfectly aware that, in these times, circumstances may occur to divert your force from its original destination, but I do not think they have yet occurred.” He then proceeded in a few forcible words to urge the folly of wasting unnecessary time upon trials5, and the necessity of disarming regiments which might show disaffection, instead of delaying a movement of the first importance from a fear that a revolt might take place after the departure of the British troops.

Lord Elphinstone is ordered further to diminish his strength

This letter, I have said, was despatched to General Woodburn on the 27th of June. On the morning of the 28th Lord Elphinstone received a despatch from Calcutta, instructing him to send to Calcutta by sea the wing of the 12th Lancers then stationed at Puna. This diminution of his available European strength, already extremely small, following immediately upon the departure

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from the Presidency of General Woodburn’s force, and accompanied by reports received from many district officers to the effect that rebellion was only watching its opportunity, so affected Lord Elphinstone, that for a moment he felt inclined to authorise General Woodburn to halt at Aurangabad.

This order, for a moment, causes Lord Elphinstone to waver

Indeed, on the spur of the moment he wrote that officer a letter, expressive of his deep regret and disappointment at having to request him to give up a measure which he believed to be of great importance. But the night dissipated his anxiety. In the morning he had resolved to dare all, to risk all, for the supreme advantage of saving central India.

But only for a moment

On the 29th, then, he wrote again to General Woodburn, cancelling that portion of his previous letter which had given him authority to defer the projected movement.

Woodburn falls ill and is replaced by Major Follett

But before this letter could reach General Woodburn that officer had become incapacitated for command by ill- health. The Government promptly replaced him by Colonel C. S. Stuart, of the Bombay Army, then commanding the 3rd Regiment Native Infantry. Pending the arrival of that officer, the command of the field force devolved upon Major Follett, 25th Regiment Native Infantry.

Follett inherits Woodburn’s opinions

Major Follett had a grand opportunity before him. He had only to move forward. Unfortunately, he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief a letter in which he dwelt upon the impossibility of leaving Aurangabad in the then condition of the Nizam’s regiments. More unfortunately still, Major Follett’s representations were strongly supported by the head of the army.

Difficulty of Lord Elphinstone’s position

Lord Elphinstone’s reason and instincts still told him that the further delay thus proposed was the delay of red tape – the natural consequence of the absence of a clear mind and a firm will. But he was in a very difficult position. He was not a soldier. And although he would unhesitatingly have regarded the scruples of Major Follett, unsupported by higher authority, he could not treat with contempt the weighty support given to those scruples by the officer who was Commander-in-Chief of the armies serving in India. Unwillingly, then, and solely in deference to the strong opinion expressed by Sir Henry Somerset, Lord Elphinstone consented to the delay.

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July

Major Follett is converted to Lord Elphinstone’s views

A few days proved how true had been his judgment. On the 7th of July, Major Follett convicted himself and the chief who supported him of a hasty and, premature decision. On the 7th of July that officer wrote to Lord Elphinstone6, declared that it was perfectly feasible to leave Aurangabad, and announced his intention to march for Mau on the 10th, leaving a troop of cavalry and two guns for the protection of the Aurangabad cantonment.

Lord Elphinstone promptly requested Sir Henry Somerset to confirm this change of feeling by cancelling his previous orders. This was, in effect, carried out.

Colonel Stuart comes to command the force and sets out for Asirgarh

The force led by Colonel C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, who joined it on the 8th, quitted Aurangabad on the 12th, too late to prevent the mutinies at Mau and Indur, but not too late, under the guidance of Colonel Durand, who joined it at Asirgarh, to restore British authority in central India. To the further movements of this column I shall return in a subsequent chapter. Its march beyond the Bombay frontier was due solely to Lord Elphinstone7. Had he been unfettered, and had its first commander been a man after his own heart, it

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would have taken place in time to prevent much evil in central India.

But the despatch of Colonel Stuart’s column to central India was not the only aid proffered by the Bombay Presidency for the suppression of the mutiny. I have already alluded to the splendid self-abnegation by which the province of Sindh was denuded for the benefit of the Panjab. Again, the western Presidency was prompt to comply with the indent made upon it by Colonel G-. St. P. Lawrence, the Governor-General’s agent in Rajputana8.

Lord Elphinstone places a column at the disposal of Colonel Lawrence

The greater part of the garrison of Disa, consisting of a troop of horse artillery, one regiment and one squadron of native light cavalry, a detachment (four hundred men) of the 83rd, and a detachment of the 12th Native Infantry, was formed into a movable column,. and placed at the disposal of George Lawrence, ,just then nominated Brigadier-General in Rajputana. Lord Elphinstone was prompt to confirm this arrangement – an arrangement which gave General Lawrence a power, exercised. with remarkable ability and judgment, to maintain order in a country ruled over by the great Rajput chiefs9. Further, on the 23rd of July, four companies of the 86th Regiment were sent from Maligaon to join Colonel Stuart’s column on its way to Mau. Marching direct by the Bombay road, they did not join till after that column had arrived at Mau.

First symptoms of mutiny in the Bombay Presidency

Whilst Lord Elphinstone was thus actively employing a policy of aggressive defence alike to keep the evil from his own borders and to crush it in the provinces beyond them, the spirit which had worked so much the mischief in the north-west suddenly raised its head. - on his very hearth. The first symptoms of mutiny in the Bombay Presidency broke out shortly after the march of the columns whose movements I have just recorded.

The southern Maratha country

The southern Maratha country comprises the territory between Satarah and the Madras Presidency to the north and south, and between the Nizam’s dominions and the western ghats to the east and west. It has country; an area of fourteen thousand square miles and a population of about three millions, for the most part of pure its blood.

Its area

Within this country are the two’

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and native states

collectorates, Belgaon and Dharwar, the native state Kolhapur, and numerous small semi-independent states, each with an annual revenue rising up to, but in no case exceeding, fifty thousand pounds. In 1857 the principal of these were Sangli, Miraj, Savandr, Kurandwar, Jamkhandi, Nargand, and Mudhol.

Character of Mr. George Berkeley Seton-Karr

Of this important country the Collector and Magistrate of Belgaon, Mr. George Berkeley Seton-Karr, had political charge. Mr. Seton-Karr possessed remarkable natural abilities, and these had been developed by an education which had continued up to the date of which I am writing. He was a firm advocate for the rights of native princes, for continuing to them the power to adopt, for interfering as little as possible with their customs which, however little understood by Europeans, were harmless in themselves, and which were hallowed by the practice of ages. He was one of those men who, whilst possessed of a firm and decided character, yet preferred to try to their fullest extent the arts of persuasion before having recourse to intimidation or violence.

Internal condition of the southern Maratha country

The internal condition of the southern Maratha country when Mr. Seton-Karr assumed charge of it in May 1856, then just twelve months prior to the revolt, was one of brooding discontent.

The Inam Commission

The annexation by the Government of India of Barar and of Oudh had been in the one case followed, in the other preceded, by an Act known as Act XL of 1852, under the operation of which an Inam Commission was empowered to call upon all landed proprietors to produce the title-deeds of their estates. A new tribunal had, under this Act, been invested with arbitrary jurisdiction over this vast mass of property. The holders of estates, careless and improvident, unacquainted with law, and accustomed to consider that thirty years’ possession conferred an irrefragable title, had failed in many instances to preserve the most valid muniments of their estates. In some cases, indeed, no muniments had ever existed. Chiefs who, in the anarchy which prevailed in India subsequent to the death of Aurangzib, had won their estates by the sword, had not been careful to fence them in with a paper barrier – in that age utterly valueless – but they had transmitted to their descendants the arms and the retainers who had constituted their right to possession, and with whose

The Maratha Country

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The manner in which that commission affected many of the chiefs and landowners

aid they had learned to consider mere titles superfluous, as without it they were contemptible. In other cases, men who had acquired land in the general scramble which preceded the downfall of the Peshwa’s Government, had transmitted their acquisitions to their children fortified by no better titles than entries in the village account-books. To both these owners. classes the Liam Commission had. been a com- mission simply of confiscation. In the southern Maratha country the titles of thirty-five thousand estates, large and small, had been called for by the new tribunal. In twenty-one thousand cases that tribunal had pronounced sentences of confiscation. Thousands of other landowners, still unevicted, looked on in dismay, tremblingly awaiting the sentence which was to add their wail of distress and resentment to that of their impoverished neighbours10.

Their discontent

Can it be wondered at, then, that Mr. Seton-Karr, when he assumed charge under these circumstances in May 1856, found the native landowners of the Southern Maratha country in a state of moody discontent, which was prevented from bursting into open disaffection only by a sense of the utter hopelessness of success?

The right of adoption

But another cause increased, even intensified, the discontent, and, by its connection with the religious feelings of all classes, added greatly to the danger of the situation. Of all the rights devolving upon a Hindu landowner, the right to adopt is at once the most cherished. and

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the most sacred. It is an observance enjoined upon him by his religion. Should he fail to beget a child, he is bound to provide for himself an heir by adoption.

A religious rite necessary for the Hindu

On the child so adopted he bestows all the care and the affection ordinarily lavished on the offspring of love. Taught by his rite in religion to believe that his own happiness in the for the other world depends upon the transmission to the adopted son of the inheritance of his fathers, he is ever careful to instil into his mind that he actually is of the family, and will be, after his death, the representative of its traditions and its honours. The idea that he might die heirless is to the Hindu landowner not blessed with offspring an ever-present canker-worm. It is sufficient to make him moody, despairing, miserable. The prohibition to find for himself such an heir might even make him reckless.

The policy of Lord Dalhousie

But the Anglo-Indian Government had, in many instances, The policy pronounced such a prohibition. The policy of absorption adopted by Lord Dalhousie had shown no respect for the principle of adoption. Under its action large states had been absorbed, and the power to adopt had been denied to lesser landowners.

denies the exercise of this rite to many influential chiefs

This refusal had been extended to the landowners of the southern Maratha country – amongst others, to the important chief of Nargund. The prohibition produced consternation. The effeminate early training of the Hindu upper classes often rendered it absolutely necessary to employ the rite of adoption to prevent the extinction of a family. The custom had been hallowed by time. The prohibition of it by a paramount power, alien in race and faith, could be attributed only to greed for the land. When, then, the prohibition was extended, and the landowners saw family after family disappear, a great fear fell upon them.

Effect produced by this refusal

They felt, one and all, that their turn would come; that their names, too, Would perish; that none would succeed to commemorate their deeds and the deeds of their ancestors, and to appease their manes by yearly celebrations. In the common despair old feuds were laid aside, hereditary enmity was forgotten. A common dread produced a common sympathy, and the indignation or alarm of each was supported and increased by the sense that it was shared by all. For the moment, indeed, the aggrieved landowners had no thought to combine against the British Government. But

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though tranquillity prevailed, it was not the tranquillity which is based upon contentment. The landowners were tranquil simply because successful revolt seemed impossible. The British authority seemed too firmly fixed to be easily shaken. But, were it to be shaken, it was always possible, considering the intense and widespread discontent of the landowners, that their hopeless apathy might become the audacity of despair.

State of the southern Maratha country in May, 1856

Such was the state of the southern Maratha country when, in May, 1856, Mr. Seton-Karr assumed charge of it. But a few weeks elapsed before his experienced mind had mastered the causes of the discontent country in which he found everywhere prevailing. It was difficult, even for a man who condemned the policy of the Government and who sympathised with the native landowners, to allay it. He found, in fact, that in almost every instance the landowners had been grievously wronged. The influential chief of Nargund had been denied the rights of adoption in terms which – owing to the faultiness of the translation of the original English – added insult to injury. Other landowners of ancient lineage, and possessing weight in the country, were found by Mr. Seton-Karr estranged from their loyalty by the causes to which I have adverted – the Inam Commission and the withholding of the right of adoption – and plunged in moody mistrust of the Government.

Mr. Seton-Karr’s powers, in respect of the grievances, restricted

It was not in the power of Mr. Seton-Karr to carry out the only act which would have restored. confidence – to moderate the action of the Inam Commission and to restore the right of adoption. Nor, conciliatory and sympathising as he was, was he more able to restricted; reconcile the native chiefs and landowners to the new order which had to them all the effects of a revolution.

but he uses all his influence to soothe the discontented

But all that an earnest and high-minded man could do he did. He visited every landowner. Their individual characters he carefully studied. To their complaints he listened with patience.

He wins the confidence of the land-owners

He met them generally with such explanations of the policy of the Government as might remove misapprehension as to its general intention; whilst in cases of individual hardship – which he was powerless to remedy – he endeavoured to soothe the sense of hardness and injustice by kindly expressions of sympathy. In this way he won their confidence. He made the landowners

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feel that in the highest official in the province they had a real friend. More it was impossible for him to effect. Regard for the individual in no way obliterated resentment at the action of the Government. A sense of deep injury still continued to rankle in each breast.

Effect produced in the Maratha country by the revolt at Mirath

Such was the state of affairs when, on the 21st of May, 1857, the news of the mutiny at Mirath and Dehli reached Belgaon. The effect of this news, and of the worse tidings which continued to follow, upon the peoples of the southern Maratha country, was electric. The Muhammadans were at once aroused to an intense pitch of excitement. The Hindus, on the other hand, were far more reticent, and for some time concealed their inner feelings by an impassive exterior. British authority seemed so firmly rooted in the country that they hesitated to believe that it could be suddenly destroyed.

The means at Mr. Seton-Karr’s disposal totally inadequate

Mr. Seton-Karr was fully alive to the dangers of the crisis. The force at Belgaon consisted of one regiment of native infantry, the 29th, a weak battery of European artillery, and the depot of the 64th Foot, composed of about thirty men fit for duty, guarding upwards of four hundred women and children belonging to that regiment. Exclusive of the artillery, not more than a hundred Europeans fit to carry arms could be mustered in the place; whilst between Belgaon and Puna, and Sholapur there were more than two thousand native, and only a hundred and twenty European, soldiers. The defences of Belgaon consisted of a fort nearly a mile in circumference, the ramparts of which, unrepaired for years, presented breaches in several places. In a military point of view the place was, in fact, untenable, but it had, nevertheless, to be regarded as the sole refuge for the European non-combatants, consisting of some five hundred including children.

General Lester

Belgaon was the head-quarters of the southern division of the army, and Major-General Lester had arrived there on the 11th of May to assume that command. Mr. Seton-Karr at once placed himself in communication with that officer, and, under his direction, such improvements as in so brief a time were practicable were made to the defences.

An emissary arrives from the north-west

During the week or two following, the unusual exaltation of the Muhammadans alone gave evidence of the effect produced by the bad news from

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the north-west. But in the early part of June Mr. Seton-Karr discovered that an emissary from that part of India had arrived some days before, and that he had been in daily communication with the Muhammadan leaders.

He is arrested

Prompt to act in the presence of real danger, as he was slow to use violence when the end could be accomplished by peaceable means, Mr. Seton-Karr caused this intruder to be arrested and confined. He did not act one minute too soon. The Sipahis, many of them natives of Oudh, had for some days previous displayed an unaccustomed insolence. It had become hourly more and more evident that they sympathised with the action of their brethren in the north, and that they would grasp at an opportunity to follow their example. In the proportion in which their insolence displayed itself did the peril of Mr. Seton-Karr’s position increase. It was still further augmented by the action of Nana Sahib at Kanhpur towards the end of June.

Relationship of many of the southern Maratha chiefs to Nana Sahib

To understand this it is requisite only to remember that Nana Sahib claimed to be, and in the eyes of his countrymen actually was, the adopted heir of the last of the Peshwas; and that some of the most important estates in the southern Maratha country – the estates of Singh, of Jamkhandi, of Miraj, and of Kurandwar – were held by branches of the great Patwardhan family, the most illustrious of the dependants of the Peshwa. The fact that Nana Sahib was married to the first cousin of the chief of Sangli; that his most active lieutenant was that chief’s uncle; and that the chief himself, on the verge of his majority, had evinced a taste for low and intriguing associates, did not certainly lessen the danger of the position.

The discontent of the Desais of Nipani

There were other chiefs whose discontent was hardly less formidable. Prominent amongst these were the Desai of Nipani, a small fortress built on the model of Bharatpur, forty-five miles from Belgaon – a chieftain who had lost a large portion of his estates under the operation of the Inam Commission, who was known to be disaffected, and whose disaffection would cut of communications with Bombay;

of Jamboti

the Desai of Jamboti – a chieftain whose family, settled for many generations amongst the forests which stretch onwards from the Ghats, had come to be regarded as the natural lords of the wild population of the jungles, and who, in his own person,

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had been reduced to penury by the action of the same arbitrary tribunal. The temper of this chieftain had been soured by his misfortunes. He had little to lose, everything to gain, by rebellion. It was in his power to draw after him a large portion of the jungle population, and by their means to sever the communications of the British with the sea.

of Kittur

Not less dangerous was the adopted son of the late Desai of Kittur. The retainers of this family, twenty-four years previously, had crowned a rash insurrection by a gallant defence of their fort, only twenty-six miles from Belgaon, in the siege of which a political agent of that day had fallen. The fast representative of the race was then living as a pensioner upon the bounty of his father-in-law, commanding in his fallen state the sympathies of the whole Lingayat population. He, too, had nothing to lose, everything to hope, from rebellion.

and of Wantmuri

His father-in-law the Desai of Wantmuri, though a cautious and prudent man, did not possess the strength of character to resist extraordinary pressure placed upon him by his co-religionists.

also of the chief of Nargund causes apprehension

Add to these the chief of Nargund, connected with some of the most powerful families in the southern Maratha country, and known to be, thoroughly disaffected; odd, moreover, that the population, naturally turbulent and warlike, had retained the arms which had all lint gained empire for the Marathas; and the reader may gather some idea of the position which, difficult in May, became dangerous in the early part of June, and threatening as every day witnessed a closer approach to the advent of July.

Mr. Seton-Karr applies for extended powers and responsibility

For long Mr. Seton-Karr met the increasing danger from the resources suggested to him by his long experience, and by his thorough acquaintance with native character. But as time went on, each post bringing with it intelligence of further outbreaks in the provinces of the north-west, that gentleman deemed it at last his duty to bring the situation of the provinces under the eyes of the Government of Bombay. He did this on the 20th of June. Cognisant, however, of the great difficulties which Lord Elphinstone had to encounter, of the unselfish foresight which had induced that heroic man to denude his own Presidency that he might crush rebellion upon

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its borders, Mr. Seton-Karr did not ask for aid, material or other. He merely asked that his own powers might be extended. He asked, in fact, that the entire responsibility of meeting and encountering the crisis might be cast on him alone.

His request is complied with

It was a noble request; especially noble at that crisis; especially noble considering the resources at his disposal – a native regiment in a state of veiled rebellion, a weak battery of artillery, about a hundred Europeans – to meet the rebellion which might occur at any moment. The request was complied with.

He gradually unfolds his plans

Free now to act, Mr. Seton-Karr developed his plan. The use of force was out of the question. The only possible policy was conciliation. In carrying this out Mr. Seton- Karr enjoyed advantages which would have been denied to many men. During the year immediately preceding the mutiny he had carefully cultivated friendly relations with the chiefs. Over the minds of many he had acquired an extraordinary ascendancy. This ascendancy he now tested – and in the most cases with the happiest results. Valuable information was placed at his disposal; the intercommunication of the disaffected was prevented; a vigilant watch upon their movements was secured.

and retains the confidence of the chiefs

In this way, and by a show of confidence towards all, by impressing upon each chief the idea that his neighbour was loyal, and by the expression of a confidence, really felt, that the scare would soon pass away, leaving the British complete master of the situation, Mr. Seton-Karr succeeded in staving off the fatal day and in averting the dreaded explosion.

Mutiny at Kolhapur

Difficulties, however, continued to increase. On the 31st of July the 27th Native Infantry mutinied at Kolhapur, plundered the treasury, and, after murdering such officers as fell in their way, set off for the Ghats. Kolhapur is sixty-five miles from Belgaon. Communications between the 27th Regiment and the 29th at the latter place had been frequent.

Its position with respect to Belgaon and Dharwar

At Dharwar, forty-two miles from Belgaon in a direction opposite to that of Kolhapur, the 28th Regiment had been for some time on the very verge of revolt. Mr. Seton-Karr was thus occupying a position between one station where the garrison had just mutinied, and another the garrison of which was on the verge of mutiny – the troops at the central point

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being also infected.

August

Mr. Seton-Karr and General Lester adopt plans for preventing the spread of mutiny to Belgaon

It happened, however, that the native officer of the 29th – the regiment stationed at Belgaon – who was the secret leader of the disaffected, one Thakur Singh, was known to Mr. Seton-Karr. That gentleman at once, and before the news of the mutiny at Kolhapur was generally known at Belgaon, entered into communication regarding this native officer with General Lester. To arrest him might have precipitated a calamity. It was more easy to devise a pretext to remove him honourably from the station. Such a pretext was soon found. Two companies of the 29th, that of Thakur Singh being one of them, were ordered on command to Badami, a small town some ninety miles distant, near the south-western frontier of the Nizam’s dominions. The two companies set out on the morning of the 2nd August, still ignorant of the mutiny at Kolhapur.

which succeed

When the tidings of that mutiny reached the sipahis left behind at Belgaon they were too disconcerted by the absence of their leader to act on the moment. The opportune seizure and the condign punishment of an emissary from Jamkhandi who had come to incite them to an immediate outbreak, awed them into still longer inaction.

Conspiracy of Muhammadan population at Belgaon

The danger, however, was by no means removed. Concurrently with the events I have just related, Mr. Seton-Karr discovered a plot of the Muhammadan population of Belgaon. He soon found that this conspiracy had its ramifications at Kolhapur, at Haidarabad, and at Puna, and that its outbreak was to be signalled by the seizure of Belgaon itself. The arrest of one of the chief conspirators at Puna seemed likely to precipitate the outbreak.

Is baffled by Mr. Seton-Karr

Mr. Seton-Karr, therefore, no sooner received information of this event, than he secured the local leaders at Belgaon, all of whom he had carefully watched. The evidence regarding some of these proved defective, and they were discharged. But the principal conspirator was convicted on the clearest evidence, and he was blown from a gun in company with the emissary from Jamkhandi just spoken of.

Three days before this execution – the 10th of August – a small detachment of European troops arrived to reassure the authorities at Belgaon. Another detachment went on to produce, a similar good effect in Dharwar. General Lester at

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once proceeded to repress the rising mutinous spirit of the 29th Native Infantry.

The arrival of reinforcements enables General Lester to suppress the ill-feeling in Belgaon and Dharwar.

Five men of that regiment were tried, one of them was condemned to death, the remainder were transported for life. Taking advantage of the good effect produced by these proceedings, Mr. Seton-Karr began the work of the disarming the district, including the towns of Belgaon and Shahpur. On the 24th of August a further reinforcement arrived in the shape of a detachment of the 86th Foot. Its presence, combined with other precautionary measures he had taken, enabled Mr. Seton-Karr to steer his state bark through the great Muhammadan festival of the Muharram11 without disturbance – and, for a time, the Europeans in the southern Maratha country felt that they could breathe freely.

Review of the success of Mr. Seton-Karr’s measures and the reason of that success

Mr. Seton-Karr had thus succeeded, by a combination of firmness and tact, the result of good judgment directing intimate acquaintance with the native character, in guiding the territories committed to his charge through the most dangerous crisis of the mutiny. Considering the previous discontent of the chiefs and landowners, the fact that he was supported. by no force, that he had only his own energies upon which to rely, this result will ever be quoted as a marvellous instance of skilful management of men. It is not too much to say that a single false step would have produced the most fatal consequences. Not only would it have involved the southern Maratha country in revolt, but it would have kindled a flame which would have spread throughout the dominions of the Nizam. Had Mr. Seton-Karr diverged, but for one day, from the line of vigilant forbearance which he had laid down as his policy; had he hurried the ill-disposed into open insurrection by any unguarded word of suspicion or slight; or had he encouraged their designs by supineness, a great calamity would have been inevitable.

The truth of the argument proved by subsequent events

Unhappily, subsequent events proved only too truly the truth of this assertion. When in an evil moment, to be related hereafter, the charge of political affairs was removed from the hands of Mr. Seton-Karr to those

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of an officer distasteful, from his previous connection with the Inam Commission, to the chiefs and landowners, one month did not elapse before the rebellion, no longer controlled by good management, began its course with murder. All honour, then, to the wise and far-seeing officer who kept it within bounds when its outburst would have been far more dangerous12.

Kolhapur

Before returning to Bombay, I must ask the reader to accompany me for a brief period to Kolhapur. The state of this name, ruled over by the descendants of Sivaji, had up to the year 1842 suffered from continuous disorder and misrule.

Its previous history

To such an extent had the evil proceeded, that in the year I have mentioned the British Government was forced to interfere and to nominate a minister to introduce order and good government. The efforts made in that direction by this enlightened man, a Brahman named Daji Krishna Pandit, to deprive the corrupt party in the state of their illicit gains, provoked a rebellion. This rebellion having been suppressed, the British Government assumed the direct administration of the state during the minority of the Rajah. Within this period, which did not expire till 1862, the forts of every description were dismantled, and the system of hereditary garrison was abolished; the native

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military force was disbanded, and a local corps, officered by three English officers, was substituted for it.

Reasons for the discontent of the people

These measures, especially those for the disarmament of their forts and the disbandment of their native force, though in view of the many previous rebellions absolutely necessary, had been regarded with great disfavour by the higher orders in Kolhapur, and had tended not a little to the unpopularity of the paramount power.

Effect of the Mirath mutiny at Kolhapur

Such was the state of affairs in the province when the mutiny broke out at Mirath. Hopes and wishes similar to those which I have described as actuating the Muhammadan population of the Belgaon district, at once took possession of the minds of their neighbours in Kolhapur. To a people accustomed to revolt, living on the memories of plunder and corruption, and hating orderly government, the occasion seemed singularly favourable. The town of Kolhapur is distant only sixty-five miles from Belgaon.

Garrison of Kolhapur

It was garrisoned by one native regiment, the 27th, and by the local corps raised on the disbandment of the native force. There were no European troops nearer than Belgaon, and it was impossible to spare any from that place. Satarah was eighty-one miles to the north, and Puna, whence European aid was alone possible, seventy-one miles further. The political superintendent of Kolhapur was Colonel Maughan. Major Rolland commanded the 27th Native Infantry, Captain Schneider the local corps.

The mutinous regiments at the various stations intercommunicate

I have already stated13 that communications between the 27th Native Infantry at Kolhapur, the 29th at Belgaon, and the 28th at Dharwar, had been frequent during the months of June and July. Supported, as the various they were, secretly, by discontented chiefs, almost openly by the disaffected Muhammadan populations, these three regiments had the game in their own hands. Concerted and simultaneous action was only necessary to their success.

The one blot in their plan

Happily on this, as on so many occasions at this eventful period, the conspirators failed in this essential particular. It would seem that they reckoned without the telegraph. Instead of deciding to rise on a settled date, they arranged that the example should be set by Kolhapur, and followed at once by Belgaon and

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Dharwar. The 27th Native Infantry accordingly rose on the 31st of July at Kolhapur. But for the telegraph the regiment at Belgaon would have received by express intelligence of the movement, and have followed the example. But the telegraph forestalled their express. And Mr. Seton-Karr, using his priority of news with judgment, averted, as we have seen, the calamity from that place.

Mutiny at Kolhapur

But the mutiny at Kolhapur was a reality. During the night of the 31st of July the 27th rose in arms and detailed parties to attack their officers’ bungalows. The native adjutant, a Jew, and a Hindu hawaldar ran to give warning only just in time to permit the ladies to escape from their houses before the Sipahis came up and poured volleys into them. Some of the officers nobly endeavoured to bring back the rebels to their duty, but their efforts were vain. The treasury and the bazaar were plundered, and riot reigned supreme. Three officers who had escaped into the country were shot and thrown into the river. The remainder took refuge in the Residency, about a mile from the cantonment, but near the lines of the Kolhapur local regiment, which happily remained loyal14.

Lord Elphinstone despatches Le Grand Jacob to Kolhapur

Character of Le Grand Jacob

The news of this disaster reached Bombay by telegraph. Lord Elphinstone acted with promptitude and decision. It happened that Colonel G. Le Grand Jacob, a man of the old heroic type, ready in council, prompt and decisive in action, had but just returned to Bombay from a command in the Persian campaign. He was about to start for Puna under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, when the telegram from Kolhapur was placed in the hands of the Governor.

Instructions given to him

Lord Elphinstone at once sent for Jacob; told him all that had occurred at Kolhapur; that he would receive orders from the Commander-in-Chief to take command of the troops in that quarter. He added that he was well aware that there were no troops to be depended upon, except perhaps the local regiments; but that he would receive special powers, and was to do the best he could15.

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Jacob sets out

Colonel Jacob set out at once, saw the Commander-in-Chief at Puna, pushed on then to Satarah, and found there a troop of horse artillery and dragoons. The rainy season was at its height, the track between Satarah and Kolhapur was composed of the black soil in which, during the monsoon, horses not unfrequently sank up to their girths, and wheels to their axles; there were several rivers and streams unbridged and unfordable.

and, despite of difficulties

Still, time was everything. Colonel Jacob then pushed on two guns with double allowance of men and horses, and riding forward himself with a few men of the Southern Maratha Horse, a loyal and capable regiment, reached Kolhapur on the 14th of August, just before midnight.

reaches Kolhapur. The mutineers have, meanwhile, been checked by Colonel Maughan

How, meanwhile, had matters been progressing in Kolhapur? There, according to all probabilities, there would have been little to check the victorious progress of the rebels! Thanks to their delays and to the prompt action of Colonel Maughan, it had happened otherwise. The Sipahis, greedy of plunder, went first to pillage the treasury and sack the station. Then, and then only, did they make their way to the town, fully expecting to find its gates open. But Colonel Maughan had closed those gates. The Sipahis, not caring to attempt to force them, took up a rather formidable position outside, close to the gates, in a small outwork where the Rajah’s horses and menagerie were kept. Here they maintained their position all night, repulsing Colonel Maughan in an attempt made by him to dislodge them. It would seem that from this time the greater part of the regiment returned to its allegiance. This movement was probably hastened by the knowledge, brought to the Sipahis by some of their still recalcitrant comrades, that the passes to the coast had been occupied by Europeans lauded on the coast by the splendid exertions of the Indian Navy. This is certain, that the recalcitrant Sipahis were checked in this way; that the greater number betook

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themselves to the jungles; whilst the minority, about forty in number, returning to Kolhapur, reoccupied the outwork close to the town. But the garrison of the town had in the meantime been reinforced. Lieutenant Kerr, of the Southern Maratha Horse, had marched a detachment of that regiment from Satarah – a distance of eighty-one miles – without a halt.

the remainder are attacked and killed

The rebels were at once attacked, on the 10th of August, in their outwork, some of their own comrades joining in the attack. They made a desperate defence – but, secret entrance to the outwork having been pointed out to Lieutenant Kerr, that gallant officer dashed in, followed by horsemen whom he had caused to dismount, and fought his way to the interior of the building. At the same time, Lieutenant Innes, with a party of the 27th, took the rebels in the rear. These two attacks decided the affair; but so desperate had been the defence, that of the forty rebels three only escaped wounds or death16.

When, then, Colonel Le G. Jacob reached Kolhapur, he found that the mutiny had been quelled. Some forty of the most rebellious men of the 27th Native Infantry had been killed in fair fight; a larger number was in the jungles; but still the great bulk of the regiment was doing its duty, and there was no evidence against any man of it.

Jacob determines to disarm the 27th Native infantry

Three days after his arrival, Colonel Jacob was reinforced by the two horse-artillery guns he had sent on from Satarah and about a hundred men of the 2nd Europeans from the coast – the same who had so opportunely occupied the passes. With so small a force at his disposal, he felt it would be impossible to act against the insurgents unless he should decide, before acting, to disarm the regiment whose conduct had been so suspicious. On the one hand was the danger of his being attacked before his force should gather further strength, or of the mutineer’s marching away with their alms; on the other, the chance of the men who were still loyal, those of the local corps especially, yielding to the temptation to join their countrymen. It was a balance of risks and probabilities. Many men would have preferred to wait. But Jacob was, as I have said, a man of the old heroic type, and, feeling the

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importance of striking the first blow, he determined to disarm the men of the 27th Native Infantry.

He disarms them

He disarmed them on the morning of the 18th of August. Under his orders were twenty-five European gunners, with two guns and two howitzers; ninety men of them. the 2nd Europeans; one hundred and eighty men of the Southern Maratha Horse; and three hundred and fifty men of the local corps. These were drawn up in a manner to command any movement tending to resistance on the part of the rebels.

Remarks on the success of the prompt action of the Bombay authorities and officers

But they made no resistance. They piled their arms in silence. The investigation which followed brought to light many hidden springs of the movement. It had; been intended, it was discovered, to delay the mutiny till the 10th of August; but the action of the Jew native adjutant on the 31st of July, in sending away his family, aroused suspicion, and prompted a sudden and ill-matured rising. This premature movement ruined the plot. Acting hurriedly and without concert with their brethren at Belgaon and Dharwar, the mutineers acted without plan or settled purpose. It required, then, only energy to baffle them, and that energy was conspicuous in the conduct of all the European officers concerned, in the conduct alike of Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, of Maughan, of Kerr, of Innes, in defence and attack, and of Colonel Jacob in striking the decisive blow.

Bombay

I ask the reader to return with me now to Bombay. Until the approach of the great Muhammadan festival of the Muharram there had been no apprehensions of an outbreak in that city.

The police force there

The Superintendent of Police, Mr. Forjett, a gentleman who, born and bred in India, knew the natives thoroughly, had deemed it sufficient, when the news of the massacre of Kanhpur reached Bombay, to obtain permission to incorporate into the police a body of fifty mounted Europeans. He reasoned justly that, as the Muhammadan population of the city exceeded a hundred and fifty thousand, it would be folly to trust implicitly to the fidelity of the native police.

It may be fitting to describe here the officers to whom was entrusted the direction of the civil and military forces, upon whose conduct depended the safety of the important town of Bombay at this critical juncture.

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General Shortt

The commander of the military forces was Brigadier-General Shortt of the Bombay army. General Shortt was an officer of capacity and intelligence. He thoroughly understood the native soldier. He was quick to decide on an emergency and prompt to carry his decision into execution. In a word, he was an officer thoroughly to be depended upon in danger, a tower of strength to the Government in the crisis which was then impending.

Mr. Forjett

The Superintendent of Police, Mr. C. Forjett, was17 one of the most remarkable men brought to the front by the events of 1857. I have already stated that he was born and bred in India.

His large acquirements

When the mutiny broke out, he was in the very prime of manhood. He was so thoroughly acquainted with all the dialects of all the languages of western and southern India, that it was easy for him to pass himself off as a native upon the most astute of natives.

His tact and judgment

Mr. Forjett gave an extraordinary proof of this talent immediately prior to his nomination to the office of Superintendent of Police.

His answer to Lord Elphinstone when offered the office of superintendent of Police

He had gained so great a reputation for ability, tact, and judgment in the performance of his duties in the southern Maratha, country, that in 1855 Lord Elphinstone sent for him to offer him the chief superintendence of the police in Bombay. Mr. Forjett came to the Presidency, saw Lord Elphinstone, and received the offer. He at once expressed his willingness to accept it, but requested that Lord Elphinstone would defer the nomination for a fortnight, so as to give him time to find out for himself the true character of the men he had been summoned to command. The request was at once granted. Mr. Forjett then disguised himself as a naive and went to places haunted by the police, passing himself off as the son of a subahdar in search of a girl whom he loved.

Forjett’s experiment on the police

He so completely deceived the natives that men of the highest caste invited him to eat with them. He found out the character, the secret longings, of the natives, who, in a few days would be his instruments. Nor did he neglect the European police. His experience with some of them was remarkable. Of those whom he tested

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not one refused the bribe he offered.

He assumes the office

At the end of the fortnight he presented himself to Lord Elphinstone, and took up the office. I leave the reader to imagine the consternation of his native subordinates when they learned who it was whom they had now to serve.

His other remarkable qualities

But quickness, cleverness at disguise, readiness of resource, represented but a small part of Mr. Forjett’s qualities. Small in person, endowed, according to all appearance, with no great strength, he united the qualities; cool courage of a practised warrior to remarkable powers of endurance.

His intellectual courage

The courage was not merely the physical courage which despises danger; it was that, and much more. It was a courage set into action by a brain cool and clear – so cool and so clear that there never was a crisis which could blind it, never a danger which it was unable to parry. I venture to describe it as the highest form of intellectual courage.

His powers of endurance

I have spoken of his powers of endurance. These were often tested in the southern Maratha country prior to 1855. If to ride a hundred miles a day, on dismounting to partake of a rude meal of the natural products of the country, and then to lie on the ground, with a bundle of grass for a pillow; in the morning to wash in the stream or in the water drawn from the well, and pursue a similar journey in a similar manner, if to do this day after day be a test of endurance, then Mr. Forjett may claim to be a passed master in the art. If, to the qualities I have recorded, I add an upright mind, a lofty sense of honour, a devotion to duty, I present to the reader an accurate portrait of the Superintendent of Police of Bombay.

He gains Lord Elphinstone’s entire confidence

During the two years which had elapsed between his assumption of that office and the outbreak of the mutiny, Mr. Forjett had gained the complete confidence and esteem of Lord Elphinstone. Those who knew that high-minded nobleman are aware that he never bestowed his trust until he had assured himself by experience that the recipient was fully worthy of it.

There being thus two men so capable and in all respects so well qualified at the head of the departments regulating order, it would seem that the repressal of disturbance in Bombay would be easy. But there were two causes which

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militated against Rich a conclusion.

Difference of opinion between General Shortt and Mr. Forjett

The first was the great disparity between the numbers of European and native troops. Whilst there were three native regiments, the 10th and 11th Native Infantry and the Marine Battalion, of the former there were but four hundred men. The other cause affected the concert between the heads of the two departments. General Shortt believed in the loyalty of his Sipahis but mistrusted the native police. Mr. Forjett was confident that he could do what he would with the police, but mistrusted the Sipahis. To use his own words, Mr. Forjett regarded the Sipahis as “the only source of danger.”

September

The Muharram festival at Bombay.

The festival of the Muharram was a festival of a character the most dangerous of’ all. It was a religious festival, lasting many days, the excitement of which increased with each day. Lord Elphinstone had confided to General Shortt the arrangements for preventing disturbance during the whole of the time it lasted. Granted one premise – that the Sipahis were absolutely loyal – those arrangements wore perfect.

General Shunt’s arrangements

Mr. Forjett, when informed of them, declined, without pledging himself to the contrary, to admit this premise, and he informed Lord Elphinstone of his doubts. Lord Elphinstone replied that he was sorry he had not known of his objections before, but that it was now too late to alter them. I may here state that the arrangements made by General Shortt involved the division into very small bodies of the European force under the orders of Mr. Forjett. The reply made by that gentleman to Lord Elphinstone’s remark just referred to is eminently characteristic.

Forjett’s interview with Lord Elphinstone

He intimated that he should, at all events, be obliged to disobey the orders of Government with respect to the police arrangements, because it was necessary for him to have them in hand in the event of a Sipahi outbreak. “It is a very risky thing,” replied Lord Elphinstone18, “to disobey orders, but I am sure you will do nothing rash.” Mr. Forjett construed this tacit permission in the sense in which it was doubtless intended.

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The last night but one of the Muharram

Five days of the festival passed without disorder. The next night would see its conclusion. On the eve of that night an incident, accidental in its cause, almost produced an outbreak.

A Christian drummer insults the Hindus. The Police take him into custody

A Christian drummer belonging to the 10th Regiment Native Infantry, whilst in a state of intoxication, insulted the carriers of a Hindu divinity which was being carried in procession by some townspeople, and knocked over the divinity. Two policemen, who witnessed the outrage, took the drummer into custody. It happened that the Sipahis of the native regiments were possessed by an inner conviction that their loyalty was doubted by Forjett, and they replied to the feeling they thus imputed to him with one of hatred to himself and his subordinates.

The Sipahis take the part of the drummer

When, then, the men of the 10th heard that one of their comrades, albeit a Christian, caught in the act of offering an insult to a Hindu divinity, had been taken into custody by the police, some twenty of them turned out, broke into the lock-up, rescued the drummer, assaulted the policemen, and marched them off as prisoners to their lines.

The police try to rescue their comrades, but fail

The European constable of the section at once proceeded with four native policemen to the lines, and demanded the liberation of their comrades. The demand was not only refused, but the new-comers were assaulted by the Sipahis, and, after a conflict in which two of the assailants were left for dead, and others were wounded, they were forced to retire.

Forjett is sent for

The excitement in the Sipahi lines, increasing every moment, received a further impetus from this retirement, and the Sipahis began to turn out in such numbers that a messenger was sent at full speed to Mr. Forjett, with the information that the native regiments had broken out.

This was the one danger which Mr. Forjett had all along dreaded, and against which he had taken every precaution possible under the circumstances, already noted, of his limited sphere of action. He had, that is to say, disobeyed orders, and massed his European policemen.

Forjett arrives alone

On receiving the news that the Sipahis had broken out, Mr. Forjett ordered the European police to follow him as soon as possible, and galloped down to their lines at so great a speed as to outstrip all his attendants. He found the

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Sipahis in a state of tumult, endeavouring to force their way out of the lines, their European officers, with drawn swords, keeping them back.

Fury of the Sipahis at seeing him

The sight of Mr. Forjett inflamed the Sipahis still more. They called out loudly that this was the man who had wished them all to be killed, while the European officers, seeing how the presence of Mr. Forjett excited their men, begged him in earnest language to go away.

The European officers beg him to retire

The fate of Bombay at that moment hung upon the conduct, at this critical conjuncture, of Mr. Forjett. Such are Asiatics, that had that gentleman obeyed the calls of the officers, the Sipahis would have burst the bonds of discipline and dashed forward to pursue him. He was there, alone, seated on his horse, calmly daring them. His knowledge of natives made him feel that so long as he should remain there, facing and defying them, they would not move, but that a retrograde movement on his part would he the signal for a real outbreak.

He refuses

In reply, then, to the shouts of the officers and men of the native regiments, Mr. Forjett called out to the former, “If your men are bent on mischief, the sooner it is over the better,” and remained facing them. Two minutes later his assistant, Mr. Edington, galloped up, followed very shortly by fifty-five European policemen – the men he had kept massed in case of a disturbance. Then Mr. Forjett acted.

and Crushes the incipient mutiny

Forming up and halting his men, he called out, “Throw open the gates; I ant ready for the Sipahis.” Again was displayed that complete acquaintance with the Asiatic character which was one of the secrets of Mr. Forjett’s power. The excitement of the Sipahis subsided as if by magic and they fell back within their lines. Never had a nobler deed been more nobly done!

The Muharram, thanks to Mr. Forjett, is tided over

The tide now turned. The evil-disposed amongst the Sipahis – and that many were evil-disposed subsequent revelations fully proved – were completely cowed. Nevertheless, Mr. Forjett relaxed not one of his exertions. The Muharram was not yet a thing of the past, and it was clear that an accident might yet kindle the mine. One night still remained, and Mr. Forjett, far from relaxing his precautions, bent himself to increase them. He so posted his police that the smallest movement upon the part of the Sipahis would at once become known to the main body of his Europeans, forty-eight in number, located at

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a decisive point. His precautions were not only successful, they were the cause of success. To borrow the language, subsequently revealed, of the baffled conspirators, “it was the vigilance maintained that prevented the outbreak.” The vigilance was the vigilance of the police personally directed by Mr. Forjett19.

I have already stated that, thanks to the precautions taken and to Mr. Forjett’s energetic action, the festival of the Muharram had passed off quietly. The discontented men amongst the Sipahis still, however, cherished the hope that another opportunity more favourable to the execution of their projects would soon arise. The Hindu festival of the Duali, occurring towards the end of October, seemed to them to offer such an opportunity.

The Sipahis hatch a new conspiracy

During this festival the Hindus of the upper and wealthier classes are accustomed to collect all their wealth in one room of their dwelling, and, assembling, to worship it. The discontented Sipahis resolved, in many a secret council, to break out during the Duali, to pillage Bombay, killing all who should oppose them, and then to search out of the island. Had this

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plan been carried out, it is nearly certain that the contagion would have spread all over the Presidency, and have even reached Madras.

October

which is discovered by Mr. Forjett

But again had the mutineers to reckon with Mr. Forjett, That gentleman was informed by a detective that suspicious meetings were being held by disaffected Sipahis at the house of one Ganga Parshad. Attempts to introduce a confidential agent of the police into those meetings having been baffled by the precautions of the Sipahis, Mr. Forjett had Ganga Parshad conveyed to the police-office during the night, and obtained from him a complete revelation. Fertile in disguises, Mr. Forjett subsequently became an eye-witness – by means of holes made in the wall which separated the chamber where the conspirators assembled from the ante-room – of the proceedings of the Sipahis, a listener to their conversation.

and revealed by him to Major Barrow

More than that, aware of the feeling prevailing amongst the officers regarding himself, he induced Major Barrow, the officer commanding the Marine battalion, to accompany, him, on four different occasions, to the meetings20. The information there obtained was duly reported to General Shortt by Major Barrow, and to Lord Elphinstone, through his private secretary, by Mr. Forjett.

by which means the conspiracy is nipped in the bud

Courts-martial were in due course convened. The proceedings resulted in sentences of death being passed and executed on two, of transportation for life on six, native soldiers of various ranks. But the projected mutiny was nipped in the bud.

December

Recapitulation of events at Bombay

With the story of the measures taken for the safety of Bombay closes the general sketch of events in the - western Presidency up to the close of 1857. We have seen how, displaying at once a rare foresight and a remarkable self-reliance, Lord Elphinstone had denuded his own Presidency of European troops in order to crush the mutiny beyond its borders. No man in high position recognised more truly, and applied more conscientiously,

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the maxim that the art of war consists in concentrating the greatest number of troops on the decisive point of the action.

Lord Elphinstone’s forethought, unselfishness and decision

Now, the decisive point of the action in the early days of the revolt of 1857, was not in Bombay. To Lord Elphinstone it was clear that Dehli could only, be reached from Bengal, and that it was just possible. He might save central India and Rajputana. Whilst, then, he sent every available European soldier to Calcutta, he formed, from the small remnant which was left, a number in reality not sufficient for his own needs – one column which should march on Main, another which should restore order in Rajputana. Feeling that amidst the many dangers which threatened him the most fatal was that which would come from without, he sent to meet and to crush it before it should penetrate within.

His plan of aggressive defence

His defence of Bombay was an aggressive defence. It was a policy requiring rare aggressive courage, immense confidence in his own judgment, and great resolution. In carrying it out lie exposed himself to the danger, only one degree less, of a rising within the Presidency. How nearly that was occurring I have shown in these pages.

Mr Seton-Karr

General Lester

The southern Maratha country was saved, in 1857, partly by the prudence and the judgment displayed by Mr. G. B. Seton-Karr, aided by the energy of General Lester, partly by the bungling and want of concert of the conspirators. How Lester. Bombay was saved I have just told.

Mr. Forjett

The reader will have seen that the danger was real, the peril imminent, that but for the unlimited confidence placed by Lord Elphinstone in Mr. Forjett – a man of his own selection – it might have culminated in disaster. That he dared that risk to avert a greater danger is one of the many proofs of Lord Elphinstone’s capacity. Sufficient credit has never been given to him for his noble, his far-seeing, his self-denying policy.

The attitude of Lord Elphinstone has never yet received its due meed of praise

In the presence of the massacres of Kanhpur and of Jhansi, of the defence of Lakhnao, and of the siege of Dehli, the attitude of Lord Elphinstone, less sensational though not less heroic, has been overlooked. Had there been an uprising attended with slaughter in Bombay, the story of its repression and the deeds of valour attending that repression would have circulated throughout the world. Instead of that, we see only calm judgment and self-reliance meeting one danger and defying

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another, carefully selecting the most experienced instruments, and by their aid preventing a calamity so threatening that, if it had been met by men less tried and less worthy of confidence, it must have culminated in disaster. It is an attitude which gains from being contemplated, which impresses the student of history, in an ever-increasing degree, with admiration of the noble character of the man whose calm trust in himself made possible the success of the policy he alone inaugurated.

Footnotes

1. The Friend of India.

2. Lord Elphinstone’s letter to General Woodburn

3. Vide Vol. III. page 137.

4. The splendid manner in which the Haidarabad cavalry atoned for this momentary disaffection will be found recorded in subsequent pages.

5. “To allow twenty days for the trial of sixty-four prisoners is out of the question in these times.”

6. It is probable that Major Follett’s change of opinion was due to the receipt of a despatch from Colonel Durand addressed to Mr. Plowden, and sent through the officer commanding at Aurangabad. This letter contained convincing proofs of the necessity of promptly advancing.

7. “I quite agree with you,” wrote Lord Elphinstone to Colonel Durand, the 27th of July, “in regretting the delay which took place in the advance of the force. You cannot have written more strongly than I have upon the subject, but there was a strong counter-prejudice on the part of the officers on the spot, every one of whom declared that the departure of the column from Aurangabad would be the signal of a general rising. I from the first recommended that the mutinous troops should be disarmed and dismounted. But this was considered inexpedient. It was represented that it was not so much the troops but the whole population was against us. Mr. ___ , the Deputy Commissioner in North Barar, who is reckoned a very good officer, said that there were, I am afraid to say how many, armed Musalmans in his district, who would rise the moment the column was ordered to move. Colonel ___ , who commands the Madras cavalry regiment at ___ , said it was utterly impossible to send half his regiment over to Aurangabad, as the people in that neighbourhood would attack the station.” it is immensely to the credit of Lord Elphinstone that, in spite of these and many similar reports from district officers, and of the opposition referred to in the text, he should have persevered in urging the forward movement. He was, in fact, one of the few men in high position in India who realised bow the mutiny should be met.

8. Vol. III. page 170.

9. Vide pages 171 to 174, Vol. III.

10. In writing thus of the feelings of the actual landowners, I am far from desiring to say a single word against the inquiries instituted by the Inam Commission. I wish to record only the discontent of the men who actually possessed the laud when the inquiry was ordered. I admit not only that the Government was perfectly justified in ordering that inquiry, but that it was demanded by thousands who had been violently and, in some cases, fraudulently dispossessed of their hereditary acres during the period antecedent to the fall of the Peshwa. The Inam Commission rendered substantial justice to these men. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that forty years had elapsed since the dominions of the Peshwa had been brought under British sway, and that during those years, and, in many cases, during many antecedent years, the landowners who felt aggrieved by the action of the Inam Commission had enjoyed and transmitted to their children the estates which their fathers had gained. The long possession gave them in their eyes a better right than any which could be urged by the descendants of the men who had been dispossessed. No wonder, then, from their point of view, the Inam Commission was an instrument of tyranny.

11. The “Muharram” is the name of the first Muhammadan month, held sacred on account of the death of Husain, son of Ali, who was killed by Yazid, near Kufa, in the pashalic of Baghdad.

12. The Government of Bombay was not insensible to Mr. Seton-Karr’s great merits. On the 11th of September, 1857, he was informed that “the Right Honourable the Governor in Council considers that in a conjunction of great anxiety and danger you have displayed a calmness, an energy, and a foresight which entitle you to the thanks and commendations of Government.” Again, “the judicious arrangements made by you have amply secured the future tranquillity of the southern Maratha country.” These and other commendations were repeated and confirmed by Lord Elphinstone in letters under his own hand, in which he alludes to “the marked ability and success” with which Mr. Seton-Karr had performed his duties. In his published minute on distinguished services rendered during the mutiny, Lord Elphinstone placed Mr. Seton-Karr’s name third on the list of those who had deserved well of their country. The honour was the more marked, because, as Lord Canning observed, every recommendation from Lord Elphinstone carried double weight from the fact, that out of the many who had rendered important services in western India he selected only a few names for mention. Yet, strange as it may appear, when so many were decorated, Mr. Seton-Karr received neither honours nor reward. He returned to England towards the end of 1860, his proud nature suffering from the unmerited slight which had been cast upon him. In less than two years he died, conscious that he had performed a great service which his country had failed to recognise.

13. Pages 21-2.

14. Western India before and during the Mutinies, by Major-General Sir George Le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., C.B.

15. The final orders to Colonel Jacob were not issued till the following day, as Lord Elphinstone wished, before their issue, to receive a reply to a telegram he had sent to Kolhapur. As no reply came, the orders were at once issued. “They were,” writes Sir G. Le G. Jacob, “brief and satisfactory. ‘I am aware,’ said Lord Elphinstone, ‘that in a crisis like this, a person on the spot ought to be the best judge of any action that might be at once necessary; to wait for orders may allow events to become too strong to master. I have confidence in your judgment; do your best to meet the present emergency, and rely on my full support.’ ” – Western India, by Sir Le G. Jacob.

16. Jacob’s Western India. Lieutenant Kerr received the Victoria Cross for his conduct on this occasion.

17. I am happy to add that the imperfect tense is used only historically. Mr. Forjett still lives in the vigour of healthy life.

18. “Happy was it for Bombay, happy for western India, and happy probably for India itself,” wrote Mr. Forjett, reviewing at a later period these events, “that one so noble and clear-headed as Lord Elphinstone was Governor of Bombay during the period of the mutiny.”

19. Mr. Forjett’s great services were not left unacknowledged. On the 19th of June, 1858, Lord Elphinstone thus-recorded his sense of their value The Right Honourable the Governor in Council cannot too highly praise the devoted zeal of this excellent public servant, upon whom such grave responsibilities were imposed during last year.” Referring to Mr. Forjett’s “very valuable services” in the detection of the plot in Bombay in 1857, the same high authority thus wrote:– “His duties demanded great courage, great acuteness, and great judgment, all of which qualities were conspicuously displayed by Mr. Forjett at that trying period.” All classes combined to testify to the great services rendered on this occasion by Mr. Forjett. Couched in varying phraseology, every letter received from the members of the European community indicates that, in the opinion of the several writers, it was the vigilance of Mr. Forjett which saved Bombay. I may add here that, for his services in the mutiny, the European and native communities in Bombay presented Mr. Forjett with addresses, and, with the sanction of the Government, with testimonials and purses to the value of three thousand eight hundred and fifty pounds. It was still more gratifying to him that, after he had left the service and quitted India, the native cotton merchants sent him a handsome address and a purse of fifteen hundred pounds, “in token of strong gratitude for one whose almost despotic powers and zealous energy had so quelled the explosive forces of native society, that they seem to have become permanently subdued.” In addition, and likewise after he left India, the shareholders of a company, mainly composed of natives, presented Mr. Forjett with shares, which they subsequently sold on his account, for thirteen thousand five hundred and eighty pounds

20. “Major Barrow’s astonishment when he saw some of his own men in Ganga Parshad’s house was remarkable. He exclaimed, My God, my own men! Is it possible?’ And his memorable words to me at the court-martial were: ‘It is well I was present and saw and heard them myself, but for which I should have been here, not as a witness for the prosecution, but as one for the defence; such was my confidence in these men.” – Forjett's Our Real Danger in India.

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