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History of the Indian Mutiny

Book 18 – The Civil Districts

Chapter 1 – The Territories under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal

Plan of this volume

I purpose, in this final volume, to place on record the deeds of those Englishmen in India, not necessarily soldiers, who, placed in most difficult circumstances, with no support but that afforded by their own brave hearts, living in the midst of a population surging around them, exposed to imminent danger, not only from the revolted Sipahis, but from the prisoners whom they had sentenced now broken loose from the gaols, and from the miscreants whom they had once controlled but who had now become the leaders in slaughter and outrage, never lost their nerve, never ceased to bear themselves proudly, never forgot what was due to their own honour and their reputation as Britons. The glorious action of these men in the stations, which were also military stations, has been recorded in the five preceding volumes. Whenever it may be necessary to return to those stations to recount, as in the case of Kanhpur, the civil measures which followed military retribution, I shall ask the reader to accompany me thither. But my main object, in this volume, is to tell the story of the stations which were not military stations, in which the civilian, isolated from his fellows, uncheered by the society of any one, save, perhaps, of a stray planter or an assistant, or, as in some cases, having upon him the responsibility for the lives of women and children, had no aid but that afforded by his trust in God, by his own stout heart, and by a fixed determination, that, happen what might, he, at least, would show himself not unworthy of the land

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which gave him birth, that to the very last hour, however terrible the trial, he would do his duty. The record will show that the Civil Service of India possessed, as I believe it still possesses, many such men, heroes in the truest sense of the term. Of the dangers to which such men were exposed, of the trials they endured, of the resolution and gallantry with which they fought their way to ultimate triumph, this volume will, I hope, be a permanent record.

I propose to take the subject in its geographical arrangement, constituting each Governorship, each Lieutenant-Governorship and each Chief Commissionership the initial unit, parcelling out then each unit into its several particles called divisions or commissionerships, each division into its several districts, each district into its several stations. In this manner I shall take the reader to every spot in British India in which there was tumult or outbreak during the period of the revolt of the Sipahis.

I begin with the territories under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.

The territories under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal

The territories under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, called sometimes the Lower Provinces, lay1 between under longitude 82° and 97°, the most westerly portion being Bhokar in the Chutia Nagpur Commissionership, and the most easterly point, that of Sadia in Upper Asam, and between latitude 20° and 28°, the most southerly point being the Chilka Lake in Orisa, and the most northern points Tirhut and Sadia. These territories were bounded to the north by Nipal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and the lands occupied by the Aka, Miri, and Mishmi tribes; to the east, by Burmah; to the south by Burmah, the Bay of Bengal, and the Madras Presidency; to the west, by the Central Provinces, Rena, and the North-Western Provinces. The area of these territories was estimated at 280,200 square miles, the population at sixty-five millions. The races constituting this population are more various than those of any other part of India. The Hindu population contains all the castes of the Hindus with many subdivisions. Of these the Kayaths, proceeding from a Kshatriya father and a Sudra, or low-caste, mother, are the most numerous. These supply the clerks and

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copyists, of whom Bengal is so prolific. The Brahmans trace their origin to Brahmans who immigrated from Kanauj when that famous city felt the tyranny of the Muhammadan invader. The Muhammadan population, which is most numerous in the south-eastern parts of Bengal, consists of descendants from Afghans and a large number of converts from low Hindu, Arakanese, and aboriginal tribes. Aboriginal tribes, who cling to their old customs, are chiefly met with in the mountainous parts of Asam, in eastern Bengal, in Orisa, in Chutia Nagpur, and in the Rajmahall hills. Immigrants, from these tribes are freely employed in the tea districts of Asam. The languages spoken are as various as the populations. In Bengal there is Bengali with its several dialects; in Orisa, Uriya; in Asam, Asamese; in Bihar, Hindi and Hindustani. I am unable to enumerate all the languages spoken by the aborigines.

Modern nomenclature of these territories

In the time of Clive these territories were spoken of as the provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orisa; but at the present day this division is purely geographical. The territories under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal were, in 1857, divided into divisions or commissionerships, and these again were subdivided into districts, that is, every Commissioner of a division had under his control a certain number of districts under an officer responsible primarily to himself. These districts combined went to form the division.

Names and numbers of the divisions and districts

In 1857 the number of divisions was eleven. They were Orisa, containing three districts, Katak, Puri, and Baleshwar; Bardwan; Western Bengal, with its five districts, Bardwan, Bankura, Birbhum, and Haurah, and Midnapur; the Presidency, with Calcutta and the twenty-four parganahs, Nadia, and Jessor; Rajshahi, with its seven districts, Murshidabad, Dinajpur, Malda, Rajshahi, Rangpur Bagura, and Pabna; Koch Bihar, with Darjiling, Jalpaiguti, and the tributary state of Koch Bihar; Dhakah, with its six districts, Dhakah, Faridpur, Bakirganj, Maimansingh, Silhat, and Kachhar; Chitragaon, with Chitragaon and the hill tracts, Bhalua (Noakhali), Tiparah and Hill Tiparah; Asam, with its nine districts, Goalpara, Kamrup (Gauhatti), Durang, Naugaon, Sibsagar, Lakkhimpur, the Garo hills, the Khasia and Jaintia hills, the Naga hills; Patna, or, more correctly, Western Bihar, with its six districts, Patna, Gaya, Shahabad, Saran, Champaran, and Tirhut; Eastern Bihar, with Munger, Bhagalpur, Purnia, and the Santal parganahs;

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Chutia Nagpur (the south-west frontier Agency), with Lohardaga, Hazaribagh, Singhbhum, Manbhum, and certain tributary Mahalls, such as Bhokar, Korea, Sirguja, Udaipur, Jashpur, Gangpur, Bonai, Sarunda, and others equally small, covering altogether an area of 12,881 square miles.

Orisa

I begin with Orisa with its three districts, Katak, Puri or Jagannath, and Baleshwar2 and its nineteen tributary Mahalls. Until 1803 Orisa bad belonged to the Maratha family called the Bhonsla, which ruled in central India, with Nagpur as its capital. But in that year Marquess Wellesley and his illustrious brother had wrested the province, as it was then called, from the Bhonsla, and it has since remained an integral part of the British dominions in India. The majority of the inhabitants are called riyas, but the term is often applied to indicate the lower classes only. The chief classes among the Hindus are the Brahmans, the Karans, the Khandaits (swordsmen); there are also Talingas and Bargis, descendants of the Marathas. The Musalmans of this division are chiefly descended from the Pathans, who, under Sulaiman Kararani, King of Bengal, and his general, Kalapahar, defeated, in 1507, Mukund Deo, the last Hindu king of Orisa. In the tributary Mahalls are still to be found aboriginal tribes, some of whom, such as the Bonds, were in the habit, within the experience of living men, of sacrificing human beings. These aboriginal tribes speak a language differing from Uriya, which is the general language of the division.

Katak

Katak is in one respect the principal district of Orisa, for its capital. also called Katak3 forms the headquarters of the division. This town is built on the apex of the delta of the -Mahanadi river, which rising in the Raipur district of the central provinces, and running a course of 529 miles, pours down upon the delta through the narrow gorge of Naraj, seven miles west of the town, and, dividing into two streams,

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encircles Katak on the north and east, and by its branch, the Katjuri, on the west. The town contains fifty thousand inhabitants. In 1856 the officers, to whom was confided the charge of the division of Orisa, were the commissioner, Mr. G. F. Cockburn; the judge of Katak, Mr. J. J. Ward; the magistrates, of Katak, Mr. R. N. Shore; of Puri, Mr. A. S. Annand; of Baleshwar, Mr. H. M. Reid; and the deputy collector at Puri, Mr. C. Jenkins.

Peacefulness of the Orisa division

But few signs of disaffection occurred in this division in the early days of the general revolt. In his narrative of events the Secretary to the Government of Bengal was almost invariably able to give the happy assurance that “the public peace has remained undisturbed in this district and the tributary Mahalls.” So undisturbed did that peace continue that, as related4, the Government were able to direct that the Madras troops there located should march to a part of the country where their service would be more useful. The Sipahis of that army had resisted the suggestions made to them by some malcontent-that it would be to their advantage to take the law into their own hands, as European troops were coming to disarm them and then to march them hundreds of miles away, and had continued faithful to their salt. A slight variation from the customary favourable report took place in November 1857, by the mention of the fact that the Rajah of Bamnughati was apprehensive of an outbreak amongst the Dharuahs, one of the aboriginal tribes of the division. But under the influence of events which occurred at no great distance from the scene of apprehended disaffection about this period, notably the defeat of the rebels by Major English at Chatra5, in Chutia Nagpur, the Dharuahs changed their minds, and did not venture to disturb the public peace. Nor after this period was there any suggestion of disturbance in the province of Orisa, save that which may have been occasionally caused by passing bodies of fugitive Sipahis. It will be seen in the course of the narrative that this comparative tranquillity in his own district had the effect of impelling Mr. Cockburn, the commissioner, to work with untiring energy and success for the maintenance or restoration of order in districts which were not so fortunate.

From the division of Orisa we proceed to that of Bardwan. This division is bounded on the East by the river Hugli, to

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Bardwan

the north by the Santal Parganahs, to the west by Chutia Nagpur; and to the south by Orisa. Its principal inhabitants are Hindus of all castes with a proportion of Muhammadans. The languages spoken are Bengali and Hindustani. The division, which is also called the division of western Bengal, is subdivided into five districts, viz.. Bardwan, Bankura, Birbhum, Hugli and Haurah, and Midnapur: to this last pertained, in 1857, the salt stations of Tamluk and Hijli. The chief station of the division is Bardwan. In 1857 the officers stationed in this division were the Commissioner, Mr. W. H. Elliott; four judges. Mr. J. H. Young, Mr. P. Taylor, Mr. H. V. Bayley, and Mr. G. P. Leycester; the magistrates, Mr. H. B. Lawford, Mr. A. J. Elliott, Mr. J. J. Grey, and Mr. G. Bright; the collectors, Mr. P. H. Schaleh and Mr. W. H. Broadhurst; the deputy collector, Mr. H. C. Raikes.

The division of Bardwan was fortunate in having no history during the time of the great Mutiny. It had, no possesses no doubt, its alarms and its occasional episodes of mutinous history. interest. Thus it was at Haurah that, as recounted in the second volume6, Neill astonished the stationmaster by forcibly detaining the train till his troops should reach the right bank of the river. It was from Chinsurah, in the Hugli district. that the Highlanders marched to disarm the Barrackpur brigade. But there was no outbreak. The fate of the Bardwan division was linked with that of the Presidency, and the fate of both depended on the turn affairs should take in Calcutta, at Barrackpur, at Jalpaiguri, in the two Bihars, and in eastern Bengal.

The division next to that of Bardwan is called the Presidency division. It comprises the capital, Calcutta, and the twenty-four Parganahs, Nadia, Jessor, and the Sundarban7, a marshy district south of the twenty-four parganahs, intersected by many branches of the Ganges and rivers such as the Matla, the Kapadak, the Mollinchu, the Marjata, and the Haringhata. It is unnecessary to name all the officers, civil and military, of this division. Those upon whom lay the greatest weight of responsibility, and who contributed the most to ensure the safety of the capital, will be mentioned in the following pages.

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The political events which occurred in Calcutta and the neighbourhood during the memorable years 1857-8 have been recounted with sufficient fulness in the Calcutta. preceding volumes. It has been abundantly proved that the members of the British mercantile and trading communities were not only free from panic, but that they discerned the signs of the times and the proper method of dealing with the difficulties of the hour far more clearly than did the officials who surrounded Lord Canning. To that noblemen I have endeavoured to render full justice. In 1857 he was yet new to India, and he dealt with the sudden emergency on the advice of the officials he had inherited from his predecessor; hence his early mistakes. It is not too much to affirm that on every one of the points on which he differed from the non-official community he was wrong, and the members of the non-official community were right. I need only mention (1) the first refusal to accept the offer of the European community to form a volunteer corps; (2) the slowness in dealing with the mutiny at Barhampur, and the mode of dealing with it; (3) the delay in depriving the native troops at Barrackpur of their arms – a delay which caused the memorable panic of the 14th of June, a panic which did not reach the members of the mercantile community nor the European residents of Calcutta generally, but which drove many of the highly-placed officials to take refuge or to send their families to take refuge on board the ships lying in the river, and thousands of Eurasians to scour in terror the plain leading to Fort William. Of this I was an eyewitness8. The fourth matter in which the mercantile community showed greater prescience than the ruling power, was in the earnestness with which they pressed disarming of the regiments at Danapur. In the famous interview their leaders had with Lord Canning at a moment, be it remembered, when

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that nobleman had in hand a sufficient number of troops for the purpose, and when those troops were being sent off daily by the river route which would take them by Danapur, they foretold all the evils which would happen if the Government should fail to display a lack of firmness and decision. Attached at the time to the Military Audit Department of the Government of India, I naturally was not present at the interview, but I received an account of what happened there within half an hour of its conclusion from the lips of the principal spokesman and leader of the mercantile community, Mr. Daniel Mackinlay.

Sound views of the mercantile community

From him I learnt that Lord Canning was very curt, and very downright in his refusal; that, after he had listened with firmly-pressed lips to the prayer of the deputation to the effect that they had vast interests in western Bihar, that those interests would be seriously imperilled if the earliest opportunity were not taken to disarm the native regiments at Danapur, and that such an opportunity now presented itself; he replied in the fewest possible words that these troops should not be disarmed. The actual instructions which the Government gave on the occasion9 – the thrusting of the responsibility which properly belonged to them on to the shoulders of an old officer at the station itself – have been related in the third volume. The four subjects I have referred to indicate the measure of foresight and capacity which characterised the men whom Lord Canning had inherited from his predecessor as the advisers whom he could trust. They were the unsafest of guides. Their advice was always wrong. In every instance they had to retrace their steps, and to do that which they had publicly declared they would not do. But their incapacity to arrive at a right decision, to act on that decision after it had by accident been arrived at, marked them out as most unfortunate advisers to a Governor-General new to India and her traditions. A Wellesley, indeed, would have swept them aside with a contemptuous wave of his hand; but Lord Canning, though a brave, conscientious, and, in many respects, an able man, was not a

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Wellesley. When, then, one of these men advances the claim, as one of them has done, to have been “the right hand of Lord Canning” during the earlier stages of the revolt, and whilst that Lord was yet in Calcutta, he prefers a claim which his opponents may well admit, for it is absolutely condemnatory of himself.

Mr. J. P. Grant

To the general feebleness and incapacity of the counsellors and staff-officers of the Governor-General there were exceptions. To one of these, Mr. J. P. Grant, I have made special reference in the third volume. Mr. Grant was a man of remarkable ability. He pointed out to Lord Canning in vigorous words the dangers of the situation. To his penetrating glance, Mr. Beadon’s line of six hundred miles was all “moonshine.” He was constantly urging action, and action in the right direction. Had Mr. Grant’s advice been followed matters would have progressed far more satisfactorily. But Mr. Grant was not a soldier; and there were two soldiers in the Supreme Council, Sir John Low and Sir Patrick Grant. The latter had come up on special call from Madras, because, from his previous acquaintance with the Bengal Army, of which he had been Adjutant-General, he was supposed to possess the knowledge requisite to enable the Government to deal successfully with the situation. It was but natural then that on military matters Lord Canning should prefer the advice of this experienced soldier to the counsels of his civilian namesake.

Sir Patrick Grant

Of the proceedings of Sir Patrick Grant in Calcutta two stand revealed. There are, in fact, no others of moment. On reading what these two proceedings were, one is tempted to inquire whether, to obtain such advice as he gave, it was worth the trouble and the expense to send for Sir P. Grant from Madras. The first of these refers to his reasons for not taking the field in person10: the second to his thrusting on the shoulders of General Lloyd the responsibility of disarming or of not disarming the Sipahis at Danapur11. It may be urged that Sir Patrick knew General Lloyd, and that a commander-in-chief is justified in casting a portion of his responsibility on a subordinate whom he knows and trusts. The result proved that Sir Patrick’s action was a mere shifting of responsibility to a man who, if Sir Patrick knew him at all, he must have known was not strong enough to bear the burden. The occasion was eminently one in which a strong man would have said: “The

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times are critical; everything, possibly the very safety of Calcutta, depends upon the prompt disarming of the three Sipahi regiments at Danapur. We have troops at hand who will pass that station. I will warn General Lloyd and tell him he must take the first opportunity to deprive these men of their muskets. The disarming will not then detain the regiments more than twenty-four hours at the utmost. A great danger will then be removed. I will at once issue the necessary orders.” A strong man, I repeat, would have argued in that way. Sir Patrick Grant did not. He, I repeat, was content to shift the responsibility to the shoulders of General Lloyd. But though he shifted it for the moment, the real responsibility of the non-disarming of the Sipahis and of the consequent horrors and bloodshed rests, and will rest, on the shoulders of Sir Patrick Grant.

The mercantile community wise during the event

I can fancy some of my readers exclaiming in words similar to those employed by Sir John Kaye when the evidence in favour of the Government was too weak for him to express an unexplained approval of its the policy: “It is so easy to be wise after the event12.” But my contention is that Mr. Mackinlay and the mercantile community were wise at the time. They pressed the policy, now admitted to be the right policy, upon Lord Canning and Sir Patrick Grant. Their vision, at least was clear. It was the Government of India which was blind and deaf at the time and became wise only after the event. The mercantile community possessed the prescience in which the Government was deficient.

Some of the members of the Government have, indeed, since admitted that on one point at least the Government were wrong, and those whom the Government persecuted were right13. And I have no doubt whatever but that they have made the same admission with respect to other instances. I am sure that Lord Canning would have done so. His conduct after he had shaken off his Calcutta advisers presents a marked contrast to his conduct during the time he was under their influence.

Major Orfeur Cavenagh

An officer who rendered marked service to the Governor-General in Calcutta during the early days of the mutiny, and indeed to the very end, was the Town-Major, Major, now Sir Orfeur, Cavenagh. Major

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Cavenagh was a very gallant officer, who, attached to the Irregular cavalry, had lost his leg at the battle of Maharajpur, had afterwards been appointed to accompany Jang Bahadur during his tour in Europe, and had at a later period been appointed Town-Major of Fort William, then under the direct authority of the Governor-General. He had returned from Europe only in the November of the year preceding, 1856. During his journey to Calcutta from Bombay he had learned from loyal natives, and had himself noticed, the great change which had taken place in the feelings of the people towards his countrymen. Disaffection to the British rule, he was told, was very general throughout the country, and had even extended to the soldiery. Major Cavenagh was not much surprised at this last statement, for the tendency of the centralising system in the army, for many years in progress, had been, he knew and had deplored, to deprive commanding officers of their powers, and reduce them to the status of mere cyphers, with but slight interest in their work or in their men.

Discovers the plot of the Sipahis in January 1857

Major Cavenagh had returned but little more than two months when the symptoms which he had noticed began to develop. On the 26th of January, 1857, the telegraph-house was fired at Barrackpur. The same day one of the sergeants attached to the fort related to Cavenagh a remarkable conversation he had overheard between two Sipahis. It was to effect that the Europeans in the garrison were entirely in the hands of the Sipahis; that the arsenal and magazines could be easily mastered; the Europeans surprised in their sleep and murdered: that then it would be easy to seize Fort William. They added that the programme had been begun by the firing on the previous evening of the telegraph bungalow at Barrackpur.

baffles it

The story did not come as an absolute surprise to Cavenagh, and he at once took steps to guard against the threatened mischief. As soon as he had completed the necessary preparations, which, he truly says in his autobiography14, “in all human probability saved Fort William and Calcutta, and possibly our Indian Empire.” he drove to Government House, saw Lord Canning, and gave him a full account of all that had happened, and of the measures he had taken.

Obtains Lord Canning’s approval

Lord Canning expressed

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his entire approval, and, at Cavenagh’s suggestion, sanctioned the transfer of an additional company of the 53rd Foot to Fort William.

Fear of the Sipahis

The precaution taken by Cavenagh baffled the mutineers for the moment. Two days later, however, as he was walking in his garden he was accosted by the non-commissioned officer of his Sipahi guard. This man told him that the Sipahis, especially the old soldiers, whilst gratefully recollecting the benefits the Government had showered upon them during their period of service, were really afraid that an attempt was about to be made, by means of the new cartridges, to take away their caste; that it was reported among them that those cartridges were being prepared with hog’s lard and beef suet, and that the best way of proving to the men that their suspicions were unfounded would be to appoint a high-caste Hindu and Muhammadan to superintend the preparation of them in the arsenal. Cavenagh listened attentively to the man’s talk and then told him that he must be perfectly aware that neither the Government nor their officers would sanction any plan detrimental to their religious tenets, adding that it would be easy, he thought, to arrange that they should witness the manufacture of the cartridges. This opinion, repeated to the men, and followed by the granting of the required permission, seemed to remove all doubts from their minds. “Unfortunately,” adds Cavenagh, “the arsenal authorities objected to the arrangement, and the permission was afterwards withdrawn.”

The Botanical Gardens plot

For more than a month nothing further occurred to rouse the suspicions of the Town-Major. But in March, the ruler of Gwaliar, Maharajah Sindhia, visited Calcutta. The story of the fête contemplated to be given in his honour at the Botanical Gardens on the 10th of the month, and its postponement, has already been told15. That the Sipahis really contemplated the seizure of the Fort and the massacre of the Europeans whilst the élite of the British population should be separated from them by the breadth of the unbridged Hugli, is, I think, abundantly clear.

is baffled by the postponement of the fête

The postponement of the fête led their guilty minds to suspect that the plot had been betrayed, and that the postponement was the

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consequence of that betrayal. Various circumstances combined to fix this idea in their minds: none more so than the sudden return of Cavenagh to the fort when he had given out that he was about to cross the river16. Disconcerted by a change of programme, the reason of which seemed so apparent, the Sipahis in and out of the fort resolved to continue to feign loyalty, and actually made prisoners of a body of their own comrades, who, unaware that the plot had been postponed, were carrying out their part of it. These men were brought to trial and were sentenced to fourteen years’ penal servitude. Cavenagh took advantage of the parade of the troops of the garrison for the purpose of witnessing the placing of the condemned men in irons, to give a warning and exhortation to the assembled Sipahis. They listened with apparently respectful attention.

Naïve remark of a native officer to Cavenagh

But after the parade had been dismissed, a circumstance happened which must, in the light of the events which were shortly to happen, be regarded as, at least, very curious. “A native officer,” writes Cavenagh, “who was a member of the court-martial, observed to me, in the course of conversation, that we did not know how to treat Orientals; that when I had satisfied myself of the guilt of the prisoners, instead of convening a court-martial, and thus delaying their punishment, I ought to have ordered a parade the next morning, and caused them to be blown away from guns, as such a measure would have had a beneficial effect in deterring others from following their example.” It is more than probable that this very man was one of the plotters.

The celebration of the Queen’s birthday

Shortly afterwards, the mutiny broke out at Mirath, and the alarm spread all over the country. Cavenagh, responsible for the safety of a large fortress, to guard which he had but one wing of an English regiment, redoubled his precautions. The native brigade at Barrackpur still remained armed, and it was known that the Sipahis composing it were for the most thoroughly disaffected. Ten days after the news of the events at Mirath and Dehli reached the Presidency, there fell the anniversary

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of the Queen’s birthday. The Queen’s birthday is always a great day in India, and when the Viceroy is in Calcutta, he gives a state ball in honour of the occasion. The troubled condition of affairs in 1857 did not permit of any deviation from this practice, and the invitations were issued for the 25th May. But the feeling of insecurity was very widely spread. The reticence of the Government; the knowledge that Fort William was but slenderly held; that the public buildings throughout the city were guarded by troops, believed, and believed with reason, to be steeped to the eyes in mutiny; that four regiments of Sipahis were within three hours’ march of Government House; and the possibility that those troops, those in the fort, and those on duty at the public establishments, thoroughly conversant with the habits of the English on the celebration of the birthday of the Queen, might take the opportunity to make a clean sweep of the assembled guests at Government House17 on the night of the 25th of May, justified a suspicion that the celebration of the Queen’s birthday might be made the occasion for a tumult, and warranted the Government in taking precautions to meet the possible danger. It devolved on the Town-Major to make or at least to suggest the precautions that should be taken. The birthday, for some good reason, was I have said, kept on the 25th May. Major Cavenagh tells that he waited on the Governor-General on the 24th May to take his orders as to the parade which was always held in honour of the occasion.

Cavenagh suggests precautions

He proposed “that the balled ammunition in pouch with the native troops, which would, as usual, be exchanged for the blank cartridges required for the fee de joie, should not he returned to them.” True to his policy, or rather to the policy of his advisers, of feigning confidence even when they felt none, Lord Canning would not sanction this arrangement “unless any symptoms of disaffection were displayed.” In vain did Cavenagh plead that whilst there was not the slightest chance of any overt act being committed on parade, yet that if

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any disturbance were to arise in Calcutta, the fact that the Sipahis were in possession of several rounds of service cartridges would make a considerable difference in the strength of the detachment he would send from the fort for its repression.

which are not sanctioned

“The argument,” he tells us, “was not deemed convincing.” The Sipahis, then, retained their balled cartridges. The parade and the ball passed off quietly; but, in the light of after events, there can be no doubt but that a great risk was deliberately encountered, and encountered on sentimental grounds only.

Formation of a Sikh battalion

A few days later, the 4th June, a soldier of the Sikh nation suggested in conversation with the Town-Major, a mode of strengthening the resources of the Government at which the fertile mind of Cavenagh eagerly caught. The Sikh represented that there were in his regiment quartered at Barrackpur about a hundred of his countrymen untrammelled by the religious prejudices of the Hindus, ready to go anywhere and do anything, and that they would be glad to be incorporated in a distinct corps. Cavenagh brought the matter to the notice of Lord Canning, and, a little later, the suggestion of the Sikh soldier became an accomplished fact. The Sikhs were carefully taken from all the regiments at Barrackpur, formed into a separate body-, and employed with excellent effect in guarding the important post of Raniganj, the then terminus of the railway.

The Sipahi guards are replaced by Europeans

Four days later the danger of feigning a confidence which was not felt having been brought home to Lord Canning and his advisers, Cavenagh was directed to replace the native guards at the Treasury, the Bank, and the Mint, by European details. Cavenagh carried out the instructions which he received on this head with remarkable tact and discretion. In this way, one great danger was averted.

The Volunteer Guards

Regarding the formation of the Volunteer Corps, or as it was called, the Volunteer Guards, which rendered such efficient service in Calcutta, and, there can be no doubt, averted many dangers, Cavenagh was consulted by the Governor-General on the 11th of June. The idea had presented itself spontaneously to the Europeans in Calcutta some time before, and had been received by the Government with a refusal which was regarded, and I think justly regarded, as insulting. They were told by the Secretary to Government

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in words which have been often quoted in the preceding volumes, and which cannot be referred to too often, conclusive as they are of the blindness of the Government even so late as the 25th of May, that “everything is quiet within six hundred miles of the capital. The mischief caused by a passing and groundless panic has already been arrested; and there is every reason to hope that in the course of a few days tranquillity and confidence will be restored throughout the Presidency.” In conclusion, the Home Secretary contemptuously told the applicants that if they felt any alarm they might apply to the Commissioner of Police, who, it transpired, had received orders to supply them with clubs.

But the interval between the 25th of May and the 11th of June had, by the latter date, brought the intelligence of the members of the Government of India to the level which the intellect of the mercantile community had reached on the former date. On the 11th of June, Lord Canning sent for the Town-Major to consult with him as to the conditions under which he should grant the prayer which he had rejected on the 25th of Slay. The advice given by Cavenagh was characterised by his usual practical good sense.

Cavenagh’s advice as to the formation of the Volunteers

He gave his opinion that “the corps should not be highly drilled, but sufficiently so to enable the men to act together and to use their arms; that it should consist both of cavalry and infantry; that the former should be employed chiefly in patrols, and the latter stationed as pickets at the most important buildings in the town, so as to form places of rendezvous upon which others might concentrate; that the uniform should be brown holland or blue flannel; that old army non-commissioned officers (pensioners and time-expired men) should be attached, to instil into them some notions of discipline, and that the corps should be regularly divided into troops and companies, each man being, as far as possible, posted to the troop or company composed of persons living in his own neighbourhood.”

is adopted

Cavenagh’s suggestions were generally adopted, and the corps was at once formed. Subsequently, a battery of artillery was added to it.

It is impossible to leave the Calcutta Volunteer Guards without a few lines as to the men who composed the corps. They were men of all classes; men in the civil services, covenanted and uncovenanted; officers on the staff of the

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The personnel of the Volunteer Guards

Government, bound to stay in Calcutta; merchants, traders, tradesmen, clerks; Englishmen, Scotchmen, Irishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, all bound together by the determination to preserve the position of the European in the country of his temporary adoption, in times of extraordinary danger. The best fellowship ruled amongst all nationalities and all professions. The regiment attained a very high proficiency in drill. Seen on parade the men earned and deserved admiration. Every man gave his heart to the service; and the result was in all respects most satisfactory. To the Government, until the reinforcements arrived, even later, the Volunteer Guards were a tower of strength.

Montagu Turnbull

A few lines as to some of the men who composed the corps. The commandant of the cavalry was Colonel Montagu Turnbull, a splendid specimen of a cavalry officer. He belonged to the old Bengal cavalry, and, at the time, held the appointment of Government Agent for Army Clothing. Not only was he “every inch a soldier,” possessing an inspiring presence and most genial manners, but he was loved by all with whom be came in contact. I never heard a single man speak ill of him, nor do I believe that he had an enemy. He was the man of all others to secure the confidence and affection of the men of the classes forming the cavalry of the Volunteers, and he secured both18.

John Strachey

The first commandant of the infantry, was Major John Strachey, of the Engineers, now a General and a member of the Indian Council. He did not hold the post long, as when Mr. Grant proceeded to the Central Provinces in the capacity of Lieutenant-Governor, he selected Major Strachey as the Secretary to his administration.

Major Davies

Major Davies, a thoroughly competent and efficient officer, succeeded him. Would that I were able to name all the good men and true who gave to the movement their hearty and efficient support. Some of them were men who have since made their mark.

George Kellner

There was George Kellner, then a clerk in the Financial Office, who subsequently became Sir George Kellner, K.C.M.G., the confidential employé of Cabinet ministers. There were several

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young members of the Civil Service, some of whom have since risen to distinction. There was the merchant, Fred. Goodenough, bearing a name illustrious both in the army and the navy.

Wilmer, Tuckerman, Von Ernsthausen, Robert Simson, Ritchie

There were the Americans, Wilmer and Tuckerman, both trusty soldiers and boon companions; the German, Von Ernsthausen, one of the noblest and best of men; the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, Robert Simson; the Solicitor, Henry Berners, one of the most popular men of his day; the barristers, Richard Doyne and Arthur Macpherson; the Advocate-General, William Ritchie, conspicuous on his big black horse; his companions in the cavalry, the merchants, Kilburn and George Down, and many others whose names are difficult to recall, but who did their duty manfully and well. These men never forgot that, in the strictest sense of the term, they were volunteers; volunteers for the maintenance of peace and order when the staff of authority had broken in the hands of the Government which wielded it; nor, on their side, will the community of Calcutta, of which they were the noble representatives, ever fail to remember with pride the great services which their forerunners voluntarily rendered during an unprecedented crisis.

It may be profitable here to record the opinion as to the formation of the Volunteer Guards of the officer who, more than any other individual in Calcutta, was instrumental, by counsel and by action, in maintaining public order in Calcutta during the early days of the mutiny.

Cavenagh and the Volunteers

“After the first offer of their services,” writes Sir Orfeur Cavenagh, “ and the refusal to accept it, they certainly had little confidence in the Government, which they believed, and believed rightly, had failed in the first instance to recognize the extent of the danger with which our empire in the East was threatened. Hence, previous to the formation of the volunteer corps, there can be little doubt than an anxious feeling existed, a feeling that was not at all unnatural, considering that the European garrison in the fort, which consisted of only one weak regiment, would have been utterly unable, in the event of an outbreak, to afford adequate protection to the scattered inhabitants of a large town ... From the instant, however, that the corps was embodied, this feeling completely disappeared. They felt that arrangements had been made to utilise their courage and energy, and confidence was restored.”

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Indeed, so relieved was Major Cavenagh, who, be it remembered, was responsible, under Lord Canning, for the public security, that very shortly after the formation of the corps he was able to spare four hundred English soldiers to be sent to the Upper Provinces, and this, despite the fact that the anniversary of the Muharram, a Muhammadan festival, attended, even in peaceful times, with danger, was close at hand.

The eve of “panic Sunday”

On the 13th of June, the day immediately preceding that known as “panic Sunday,” Cavenagh discovered an intrigue hatched by a spy, acting professedly on the part of the King of Oudh, then residing at Garden Reach, a suburb of Calcutta, and the mutinous Sipahis. He had the spy imprisoned. That same night he received information from General Hearsey, commanding at Barrackpur, to the effect that there was every probability of an immediate rising of the troops at that station; further, a despatch from the Military Secretary, directing him to issue orders for the march of a wing of the 37th Regiment, just arrived from Ceylon, to Cox’s bungalow19; to despatch steamers to Srirampur to bring over the 78th Highlanders from Chinsurah; to despatch tents to Barrackpur for their accommodation, and, if possible, to send some cavalry to patrol the Barrackpur road. These orders were received some time after midnight.

The 14th and 15th June

The Town-Major, notwithstanding the largeness of the requirements and the lateness of the hour, was equal to the occasion, and carried out to the letter The lath lithe and the instructions he received. The last order was that which tried him the most, for he had no cavalry at his disposal except the volunteers who had been embodied but two days before, and who, although one troop of them had received their arms, had not had a single day’s drill. To the captain of that troop, however, Cavenagh applied in his difficulty. The captain responded with alacrity, summoned his men, who replied with equal zeal, and these men performed with energy the duty required of them.

Then followed “panic Sunday,” and the day following the arrest of the King of Oudh. These events have been so fully described in a previous volume20 that it is not necessary to

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repeat the story here. I will only mention that the spy who had been discovered tampering with the Sipahis, and whom Cavenagh had imprisoned, escaped in a mysterious manner.

Apprehensions regarding the Id

Throughout the month of July reports were very prevalent in Calcutta as to an intended rising on the occasion of the Id21. It would seem as though the panic had spread to the Muhammadans, for we find Cavenagh relating how a Muhammadan in a respectable position asked an officer to afford him shelter in the fort during the festival, on the plea “ that, owing to his well-known English proclivities, he was sure to become one of the first victims of his co-religionists in the event of an outbreak.” That some mischief was intended was clear. Cavenagh relates the arrest of three Muhammadans who were believed to be actively engaged in the conspiracy, and the skill which the principal of them displayed in parrying inconvenient questions, and in shaping his replies so as to ascertain exactly how much the Government did know. “It was clear,” he adds, “from the expression of his countenance, that a great internal struggle was taking place between his fears and his feeling of honour and fidelity to his companions.” Eventually the latter feeling prevailed, for he revealed nothing.

Some loyal Sipahis

An incident during the same month proved that though at this period (July 1857) the fortunes of the British appeared to be very low, all the Sipahis were not traitors. Two native plotters, who had endeavoured to seduce some men on guard in Calcutta from their allegiance – the one by revealing a plot which he had actually arranged, but which subsequently failed in execution, for blowing up a river-steamer laden with ammunition for the upper provinces; the other, who tried, by inducements of higher pay, to bring

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the Sipahis to declare for the King of Dehli – were apprehended by the Sipahis to whom they had addressed themselves, and handed by them to justice.

The Guard over Government House

Up to the 29th of the month (July) a guard of Sipahis had been on duty at Government House, the residence of the Governor-General. That the representative of British authority in India should, at such a crisis, be at the mercy, practically, of a guard of native troops, appeared to the Town-Major to be fraught with danger. The subject was a delicate one on which to address Lord Canning, for the lofty courage of that nobleman had always discountenanced any arrangement having for its object the safety of his own person. Cavenagh, therefore, solicited and obtained the intervention of Mr. Halliday and Sir Patrick Grant. The intervention produced the desired effect, and from the 1st August a European guard was detailed for night duty at Government House.

The Body-Guard

But there was another guard equally liable to suspicion, some of the soldiers of which attended daily at Government House, and accompanied the Governor-General on all his movements out of doors. This was the body-guard, a regiment formed mainly of Muhammadans, well armed and well mounted. On the 4th August Lord Canning spoke to Cavenagh as to the advisability of disarming these men, and Cavenagh, with his usual alacrity, took the matter in hand, engaging to report how it could best be carried out. But then a curious circumstance occurred. I will relate it in Cavenagh’s own words. “As the Baliganj lines” (the location of the body-guard) “were a little beyond the limits of my ordinary rides, and I thought it advisable to study the ground before moving down with troops in the darkness of the night, the next morning I rode to the lines, and after conversing with the native officers, and taking the opportunity of scanning the locality, so as to enable me to decide on the plan to be pursued in the event of my receiving the order to disarm the corps, I proceeded onwards as if merely taking my usual morning exercise. Previous to returning to the fort, however, I called at the residence of the commanding officer, which was upwards of a mile from the lines, to mention to him the subject of my conversation with Lord Canning, when he stated that the native officers had been with him just before my arrival, and recommended that the corps should be disarmed,

Page 22

and he believed that the work was then being carried on. This actually proved to be the case. As I had to visit some barracks in another quarter of the town, to ascertain whether the wants of some troops that had been landed that morning had been provided for, it was late when I reached my quarters, where I found an urgent summons awaiting me to proceed to Government House.

disarm themselves

The troopers of the body-guard on duty had made their appearance without their arms, and the - Governor-General was naturally under the impression that I had taken it upon myself to anticipate his orders; but when I explained that the men had voluntarily given up their arms, and despatched them under an escort to the arsenal, where they had been received just as I was leaving the fort, he was much pleased, being evidently glad to have been relieved of the responsibility of having to decide the question.” It is clear from this circumstance, and from the splendid conduct of sections of the native regiments at Lakhnao, that there were many men in those regiments who had not been contaminated, and whose direst fear was lest their comrades, who had been seduced, should compromise them. About this time another Sipahi proved his loyalty by handing over to justice a man who had tempted him by showing him a ball of wax, in which was concealed a letter, offering a large reward to any one who would blow up one of the magazines in Fort William. It was designed to throw this to the Sipahis within the fort.

As affairs took a turn for the better in Bihar and the upper provinces generally, so did the anxiety regarding Calcutta diminish. The festival of the Id passed off without disturbance.

The Yeomanry Cavalry

In the middle of August Sir Colin Campbell arrived in Calcutta, and, shortly after, reinforcements began to pour in. Prior to this Lord Canning had sanctioned the formation of a Yeomanry Corps, that is, of a body of cavalry formed of Europeans who cared to serve temporarily and to proceed north-westward on duty, wherever they should be sent.

Major J. F. Richardson

There happened to arrive at the moment from England Major J. F. Richardson, commandant of the 8th Irregular Cavalry, then quartered at Bareli. Richardson, as strong and brave as a lion, had rendered splendid service in the siege of Multan and was just the man for the Yeomanry Cavalry. Him, then, Lord Canning selected to command it. Under his orders the regiment

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rendered most useful services in the Gorakhpur and Azamgarh districts.

Enlistment of sailors

In addition to, or rather, unconnected with this regiment, Cavenagh had been engaged in enlisting stray, or unemployed Europeans, chiefly sailors, for the public service. These were formed into sections, and despatched to isolated civil stations which would have been otherwise unprotected. There they were found most useful. Major Cavenagh continued to render excellent service throughout the troubled period.

Précis of Major Cavenagh’s service and character

But the crucial epoch had passed away when the reinforcements arrived. During the earlier eight mouths of the year the fate of Calcutta had practically depended upon his zeal, energy, and good sense. It was not possible that any man should perform the duties devolving upon him with greater tact and greater success. Cavenagh was a singularly unobtrusive man. He never pushed himself forward. He did his duty quietly and most thoroughly. In the crowd of officers who thronged Government House on State occasions, he was noticeable first by the fact that, in consequence of the loss of his leg at Maharajpur, he had to use a walking-stick; secondly, by his unvarying calmness and composure. Even when, as it subsequently transpired, the most serious danger threatened Calcutta, a danger of which Cavenagh held the key, no one could have surmised, from his face and manner that the town ran the smallest risk. When others were fussy, he was always calm, always cool, always self-possessed. No one appreciated these sterling qualities more than Lord Canning. His confidence in Cavenagh grew till it became rooted. Ile said little at the time, but he never forgot what Cavenagh had done; and when, two years afterwards, a vacancy occurred in the Government of the Straits Settlements, he selected to fill the post the man whose quick insight and calm courage had been the main cause that Calcutta passed safely through the fiery trial of 1857.

Samuel Wauchope

Another officer, to whose tact and energy Calcutta was greatly indebted during the same period, was Mr. Samuel Wauchope, of the Civil Service, Commissioner of Police. Wauchope was – alas! that I should be obliged to write in the past tense – admirably constituted to carry on successfully the duties of his office in trying times. He had already rendered splendid service by clearing

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lower Bengal of dakaits (robbers). To a charming manner he united the most wonderful tact; a coolness that was proof against surprise, however sudden; a reticence, when reticence was necessary, that no provocation could disturb; and a very lovable disposition. He, too, was unobtrusive, careful of the feelings of others, the soul of honour, a gentleman of the I. highest stamp. His office made him acquainted with many episodes of life in Calcutta; but he kept his own counsel, was always cool, never ruffled, reporting what he had to report calmly, and carrying out his orders with tact and discretion. This calmness, which was not assumed, for it Has natural to the man, was a main cause of his strength and influence. He was to be seen every morning, riding alone or attended by a police-orderly, in the worst parts of the town, issuing his orders as if no danger were abroad, and often staying to see that they were carried out. if he did not come so prominently before the Governor-General as did Cavenagh, it was because the latter served immediately under the Governor-General, whereas Wauchope owed allegiance to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. But it was well indeed for Calcutta that her police arrangements were directed by a man so calm, so cool, possessing so brave a heart, and nerves that no danger could affect. Courteous to all, he was intimate only with a few. But I do not think he had an enemy in the world. For his services he obtained the Companionship of the Bath.

All did their duty

Where all did their duty nobly and thoroughly it may seem invidious to mention two only by name. But to tell of all would be to give a list of all. There was neither flinching nor panic in the European community in those days of trial and suspense. That there prevailed a deep feeling of dissatisfaction with the Government is most true. But that feeling rather spurred on the members of the European community to assist the Government when it admitted that such assistance would be acceptable. In this endeavour it is hard to say that there was a first. Mr. Daniel Mackinlay, a merchant of great energy and determination, spoke indeed the voice of the community, but its other members were, in earnestness and in devotion to duty, in the same line with him. Among the officers and members of the Civil Service there was apparent the same resolute bearing, the same desire to contribute to the utmost extent to the safety of the State.

In prominently mentioning, then, Major Cavenagh and Mr.

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Wauchope, I have mentioned the two men whose positions gave them opportunities which no one else enjoyed.

Cavenagh and Wauchope the main pivots

They were the pivots, more especially was Major Cavenagh the pivot, upon which the machine of British power in Calcutta turned. Had either given way, the machine would have broken.

The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Mr. Frederick Halliday, lived at Alipur, one of the suburbs of Calcutta.

Mr. Halliday

I have described his character in a preceding volume22. Halliday theoretically ruled over the eleven divisions which formed Bengal, as Bengal was then constituted. But in the trying times of 1857, supervision was often impossible. Events happened so suddenly, so unexpectedly, that the Commissioner of the division, the magistrate of a district, had seldom time to refer for instructions. He had to act as he judged best, on the spur of the moment. The Lieutenant-Governor’s duty was, therefore, mainly confined to the expression of approval or disapproval of an act after it had been accomplished, and in compiling a weekly report of the state of affairs in the several divisions for the supreme government. His own initiative action in western Bihar has been already recorded and commented upon. That in eastern Bengal will be narrated in this chapter.

The twenty-four parganas

Of the twenty-four parganahs, it is only necessary to state that they comprise the sub-divisions Diamond Harbour, Alipur, Damdamah, Barsat, Baserhat, Barrackpur, Satkhira, and Barnipur. Their history in 1857 is closely connected with that of Calcutta. The judge here was Mr. Latour; Mr. F. A. Lushington was the collector; and Mr. Hamilton Ferguson the magistrate.

Nadia

The same remark applies very much to Nadia, the second district in the Presidency division: there Mr. R. M. Skinner was the judge; Mr. H. C. Halkett the collector; Mr. F. R. Cockerell the magistrate. With an area of 3,400 square miles, and a population of 1,800,000, the Nadia, district is watered by the Bhagirathi river; by the main stream of the Ganges, called Padma, and its offshoots, the Jalanghi, the Matabhanga; and the branches, Bhairah, Ichamati, Churui, Gorai, and Pangasi or Kumar. Its principal station is Krishnagarh on the Jalanghi. The other stations are

Page 26

Nadia and Santipur, both on the Bhagirathi. Not far from Santipur is the field of Palasi, historically known as Plassey.

Jessor

The third district of the Presidency division is Jessor, called by the natives Jashahar. There, Mr. F. L. Beaufort was the judge; Mr. F. C. Fowle, the collector, . Mr. F. B. Lane, the deputy collector. Its stations are Jessor, on the Bhairab Nadi; Khulna, and Bagherhat. Its tranquillity was not essentially disturbed during the events of 1857.

Rajshahi

We come now to the fourth division in the Lieutenant-Governorship of Bengal, the division known as Rajshahi. It comprised the districts Murshidabad, Dinajpur, Malda, Rajshahi, Rangpur, Bagura, and Pabna. The commissioner was Mr. F. Gouldsbury; the judges. Mr. D. J. Money, Mr. K. H. Rupell; the collectors Mr. W. T. Taylor, Mr. A. G. Macdonald, Mr. E. E. Woodcock, and Mr. A. Pigou . The magistrate. Mr. E. W. Malony, accompanied by four comrades, did good service by disarming some thirty Najibs (military police) attached to his district, and others whose names I have been unable to ascertain.

Murshidabad, the capital of Bengal when Clive landed on the banks of the Hugli to retrieve the fortunes of the British, was still the residence of the descendant of the Mir Jafar whom that great soldier had placed on the Masnad. Immediately south of it is Kasimbazar, well known in the earlier history of the East India Company; and five miles below it, on the left bank of the Bhagirathi, is the civil station of Barhampur. Barhampur, it will be recollected, was the scene of the mutiny of the 19th regiment of Dative infantry, the regiment which gave the first overt example to their comrades throughout India. But when that regiment was marched to Barrackpur, all danger of disturbances in Barhampur seemed to vanish. The Nawab-Nazim was loyal, and besides, his power had been so completely shorn that he was incapable of rendering permanent injury. Thenceforth, though there might be occasional uneasiness, caused mainly by mutinying Sawars or disbanded Sipahis, there was no permanent danger. The same may be said of the other six districts which went to form the division.

Jalpaiguri

Adjoining the division of Rajshahi, and, apparently, in 1857, under the orders of the same commissioner, is the division of Koch Bihar, comprising the mountainous district of . Darjiling and the district of Jalpaiguri. Koch

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Bihar is a tributary state, the ruler of which in 1857 was a minor, under the guardianship of the British.

At Jalpaiguri23 were the 73rd Native Infantry, and two troops of irregular cavalry, the whole commanded by Colonel Sherer. The reports of the Bengal Government show that the conduct of the men of the 73rd and of the cavalry had long spread, and continued to spread, uneasiness, and often more than uneasiness, in the surrounding districts. How Colonel Sherer managed to keep the men of both arms under restraint has been already told24 But to the official and non-official residents of Darjiling, and of the Rajshahi division, the fact that the 73rd remained armed at Jalpaiguri throughout the most trying period of the mutiny, was always a source of danger. The Sipahis of the 73rd were not more trustworthy than their comrades who rose at Allahabad and Mirath; and I cannot for a moment doubt but that if they had had the same opportunities as had the regiments stationed at those places, they would have gone over, bag and baggage, to the rebels.

Colonel Sherer

I discussed this question with Sir George Sherer, who commanded them, long after the passions caused by the events of 1857 had subsided. His idea was that the native troops did not rise, first, because he had checked the incipient attempt by an act of vigour which overawed them; secondly, and to a greater extent perhaps, because they felt themselves isolated at Jalpaiguri. They had no clear conception, till it was too late, of what was going on in the outer world, whilst the fact that at all the stations within easy distance, the British were holding their own, seemed to indicate that even were they to rise, their prospects of escape at a season when the country below them was partly inundated, were by no means assured. It is more than likely that, isolated as they were, they did not hear of the events at Kanhpur, Lakhnao, Dehli, and Mirath, until the deeds there perpetrated had been avenged. The merit of maintaining them quiet is, however, undoubtedly due, in the first instance, to Sir George Sherer. Had he contented himself with obeying literally the order he received from divisional Headquarters to dismiss from the service the proved ringleaders of an intended rebellion, he would simply have spread the

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infection of revolt throughout the district. Whereas, by dismissing them “from the muzzles of loaded guns25” he stamped it out. Still, the fact that a native regiment and two troops of irregular cavalry remained, armed, at Jalpaiguri, during the most critical period of the mutiny, was a source of weakness and alarm to the districts I have mentioned. This feeling became more accentuated, and the danger became real indeed when the fugitive mutineers from Dhakah and Chitragaon entered the district. In a previous volume I have narrated the resolute and successful manner in which Sherer met this new emergency.

Dhakah

The next division to be mentioned is Dhakah, with its districts, Dhakah, Faridpur, Bakirganj, Maimansingh, Silhat, and Kachhar: the commissioner was Mr. C. T. Davidson; the judges, Mr. J. E. S. Lillie, Mr. E. S. Pearson, Mr. W. T. Walter, Mr. F. B. Kemp, and Mr. A. G. Shawe; the collectors, Mr. R. C. Raikes, Mr. F. Radcliffe, Mr. F. A. B. Glover, and Mr. B. H. Cooper; the deputy collector, Mr. R. B. Chapman; the magistrates, Mr. H. A. R. Alexander, Mr. E. C. Craster, Mr. C. E. Lane, and Mr. T. P. Larkins. The superintendent of Kachhar was Major G. Verner. The principal station of this division was also called Dhakah, and there were stationed two companies of the 73rd Native Infantry – the regiment, the bulk of which was at Jalpaiguri, commanded by Sherer – and a detail of artillery. To afford some sort of protection to British interests in that quarter, the Government had, with a wise prevision, despatched thither, in August, eighty-five sailors of the Indian navy, commanded by the first-lieutenant of the ‘Punjaub,’ Lieutenant T. E. Lewis, a most excellent officer. The position of the 73rd Native Infantry, with the bulk of its men armed, at Jalpaiguri, and two companies armed at Dhakah, had caused great anxiety to the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal. But, whilst he hoped that the reasons mentioned in the preceding page would stave off an outbreak at Jalpaiguri, he was very nervous as to the consequences which would probably follow a successful outbreak, or even an evasion, at Dhakah. The Sipahis at Dhakah would probably, in such case, make their way to Jalpaiguri. Once that they were there, it would be no longer possible even for Sherer to retain his men within bounds. If they were to break out, the worst consequences were to be feared. The stations of Purnia, Kishanganj, and

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Muzaffarpur: the fertile districts of Tirhut; would lie at the mercy of the mutinied Sipahis. The greatest danger was thus to be apprehended from Dhakah; and it behoved Mr. Halliday to take measures which would be the most likely to baffle the inroad which a successful outbreak, or a successful evasion at Dhakah, would be certain to provoke from Jalpaiguri. In this view Mr. Halliday obtained the permission of the Government of India to enlist from 200 to 250 sailors. These he proposed to station mostly at Purnia, in the Bhagalpur division, which lay on the route the Sipahis must take, should they break away from Jalpaiguri26.

Khwaja Abdul Gani

The principal native landowner at Dhakah was a gentleman of good lineage, who spoke and wrote English well, and whose sympathies were with the British. His name was Khwaja27 Abdul Gani. On the 23rd of October, this gentleman brought to the notice of the commissioner that a feeling of alarm prevailed among the native community of the place in consequence of the rumours in circulation, that the two companies of the 73rd Native Infantry stationed there were dissatisfied, and that they had told people living near the lines that a battle would shortly be fought between themselves and the English sailors, and had advised them therefore to remove their families. The Khwaja added that, in his opinion, there was a simple remedy for the existing state of things; and that remedy consisted in removing the two companies back to their headquarters, that was, to Jalpaiguri. He concluded: “We all feel perfect confidence in the protection afforded by the sailors under Lieutenant Lewis, and satisfied that if these Sipahis were once removed, the whole native community would feel extremely grateful to the Government, and be able to pursue their several avocations in peace and quietness. This order would, also, no doubt, give pleasure to the Sipahis themselves, as they have always expressed a great wish to leave this.”

Mr. Davidson’s presence

In forwarding the Khwaja’s letter to the Lieutenant-Governor, the commissioner of the division, Davidson, stated that the removal of the Sipahis would be hailed with delight by both the native and the European community, but, with a prescience which betokened the

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possession of the large views of a statesman, he added, there was a matter of very great importance in connection with the proposal, and that was, the effect which the return of the detachment to Jalpaiguri would have on the headquarters of the regiment stationed there. “On that point,” wrote Mr. Davidson, “I am unable to offer an opinion.”

Mr. Halliday’s action

The despatch of the two companies to Jalpaiguri was of course, not to be thought of for an instant. But the possibility that they might make their way thither brought clearly to the mind of Mr. Halliday the danger which such action would cause. Then nothing could prevent the 73rd from mutinying. They would break away from Jalpaiguri. Their natural route, he recognized, would take them by way of Kishanganj to Purnia. Should they reach that place unopposed great disaster must follow; for, as I have said, not only would that station and Kishanganj be open to pillage. but Muzaffarpur and the rich district of Tirhut would be liable to devastation. It was for this reason that he asked and obtained the permission from the supreme government above referred to, to enlist a body of from 200 to 250 sailors to serve at Purnia, Dinajpur, and Rangpur.

The Sipahis escape for the moment

The event proved that the situation had been correctly gauged by Mr. Halliday. But the precautions, wise as they were, had they been the only precautions taken, would have been insufficient. Towards the end of November. the conduct of the Sipahis at Dhakah became so threatening, that Lewis. on the 22nd, attempted to disarm them. How, instead of disarming them all, he drove the bulk of them from the station, in the dreaded direction of Jalpaiguri; how, after running many dangers from the splendid exertions of George Yule, of Richardson, and others, the rebels finally escaped into north-eastern Oudh, only to fall there by the bullet and the sword, has been told at length in a preceding volume28. In that volume an attempt has been made to lender due justice to the gallant men, civilians, and soldiers, whose untiring exertions saved central Bengal and eastern Bihar from plunder and murder.

The remaining districts which went to form the division of Dhakah were Faridpur29, Bakirganj, Maimansingh, Silhat, and Kachhar.

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The Dhakah division

Faridpur, the chief town of the district so named, was a civil station. It would not appear that the public order was disturbed there during 1857, a proof, among many others, the people of eastern Bengal, at all events, were not disaffected. The same remark applies to Bakirganj and its chief civil station, Barisal; to Maimansingh and the station of the same name; and to Kachhar. Silhat was not only quiet in itself, but, as related in the fourth volume30, the chief civil officer there contributed, by means of the loyal Silhat Light Infantry, to the pursuit and ultimate destruction of the rebels.

Chitragaon

The seventh division in Bengal is Chitragaon, having the districts Chitragaon, Noakhali, Tiparah, and Hill Tiparah. At the station of Chitragaon was a detachment of the 34th regiment Native Infantry, the same regiment which, at Barrackpur, on the 24th of March, had allowed Manghal Pandi31 to assault his officer, and which had subsequently been disbanded. It had long been understood at Chitragaon, that the detachment was animated by the sentiments which had marked the companies at headquarters. But little surprise, then. was felt when, on the 18th of November, the detachment mutinied, plundered the treasury, released the prisoners from the gaol, burned down their own lines, fired the magazine, and then left the station, carrying with them three elephants, the property of the State, and the bulk of the treasure they had “looted.” Their subsequent action, and the pursuit and ultimate destruction of these men, has been described in an earlier volume32. The manner in which the other portions of this division were affected by the action of the rebel Sipahis has been narrated in the same chapter.

Asam

We now come to Asam, in 1857 the eighth division under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. Asam comprised the districts of Goalpara, with a chief station of the same name, situated on the left bank of the Brahmaputra, opposite to its junction with the Maas; of Kanirup, with its chief station Gauhatti, on the Brahmaputra; of Durang, with its chief town, Tezpur; of Naugaon, with its chief station of the same name; of Sibsagar, likewise with a chief station of

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the same name; of Lakkhimpur, with a town also so called as its capital; of the Gar° hills; of the Khasia and Jaintia hills; and of the Naga hills. Asam was then a commissionership, under the direct orders of the Governor-General. The commissioner and governor-general’s agent was Colonel F. Jenkins. It would seem, from the reports of the Government of India, that peace in these districts was not disturbed in 1857. The inhabitants, that is to say, displayed no sympathy with the mutineers. As a measure of precaution, however, the Government despatched thither in August a body of sailors belonging to the Indian navy, and, doubtless, the effect produced by their presence was most salutary. These men, and their comrades under Lieutenant Lewis, had a further opportunity, in the early part of 1859, of showing, in a campaign against the Abor hillmen, their dash and their efficiency. I shall refer to this expedition in a later page of this volume.

Western Bihar

The ninth division of the territories under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, the division of western Bihar, commonly called, after its capital, the division of Patna. Of this division, with its, important districts, A Patna, Gaya, Shahabad (with its station, Arab), Saran, Champaran, and Tirhut, I have written at great length in the preceding volumes33. It is not too much to say, that western Bihar was, with the exception of the Presidency division, the most important division under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. It was in touch with the revolted North-West; with Oudh; with Nipal. Its population consisted of a hardy race, inured to toil, and who, in the early days of English rule, had made excellent soldiers. Considerable tracts of territory were held by large landowners, men of ancient lineage and large influence. The city of Patna had always played a great part in the affairs of the province. At the time it was the headquarters of the dangerous sect of the Wahabis, whose policy of subverting the overlordship of the British had been, and continued to be, extremely active. A great disaster in western Bihar in the early days of 1857, any time, that is, before the end of August, would, if energetically followed up, have been fatal for the moment to British interests in Calcutta. Had, for instance, the rebel Sipahis taken Arah, the entire province would have risen. Kunwar Singh, who cared little for Dehli, but who had wrongs,

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deeply felt, to avenge in Calcutta, would, there can be no doubt, have directed the risen masses towards the capital.

Kunwar Singh

There was nothing to stop his progress. There were, in eastern Bihar, and at Barrackpur, native regiments who would have joined him. He was one of the few of the rebel leaders who had the. instincts of a real general. It is difficult to see how, under such circumstances, Calcutta could have escaped.

The men who saved Bihar and Bengal

That it did escape, was due, primarily, to three men: to William Tayler34, for maintaining order throughout western Bihar until reinforcements could reach Calcutta; to Mr. Vickers Boyle, for his prescience in preparing, victualling, and storing with ammunition, a house in which the residents of Arah could find refuge and defence; to Vincent Eyre, for his relief of the Arab garrison – a relief attempted on his own intuition, on his own responsibility, with a force considerably smaller than the force which had previously failed. That other men most gallantly assisted is most true; but except for the action of the three men mentioned, all the gallantry in the world would have been ineffectual to save the territories under the rule of Mr. Halliday from a convulsion infinitely more dangerous, and fraught with greater permanent misfortune for British India, than either the seizure of Dehli or the rising of Oudh. The survivors of the bearers of those names may be assured that to them, and not to the tardily acting Government which they served, history, and posterity instructed by history, will attribute the saving of the province of Bengal from a disaster, which, though it would ultimately have been. retrieved, would have dealt a blow at British domination in India, the effects of which would have been felt even in the times yet to come.

Eastern Bihar

The sister-division, that which divides the province of Bihar, is called eastern Bihar, though, in ordinary parlance, it, too, has taken the name of its capital and chief district under English rule, the name of Bhagulpur. Eastern

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Bihar comprises the districts, Munger, the capital of Bengal under Mir Kasim (1762-3), possessing a very solid fort; Bhagalpur; Purnia; the Santal parganahs, and the town of Rajmahall, to the north-west of which, on the right hank of the Ganges, stands the once famous fort of Teliagarhi, regarded in ancient times as the key of Bengal. In the days of Muhammadan rule, that is, in the period anterior to 1757, the district of Purnia and the Santal Parganahs were not included in the province of Bihar. In 1857 the Commissioner was Mr. George Yule.

Mr. George Yule and his noble comrades

What Mr. Yule was, and the great services Mr. Yule rendered, I have already described35. In an earlier page of this chapter I have shown how the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, dreading lest the mutinously-disposed troops stationed at Dhakah should get out of hand, quit that station, and make their way towards Kishanganj, Purnia, and Tirhut, had (October 27) applied to the supreme Government for permission to enlist sailors to defend those places from an ugly rush; and how, having obtained that sanction, he enlisted and despatched those sailors to the places indicated. With respect to the action of the Sipahis at Dhakah, the prevision or Mr. Halliday was amply justified. They did break out; they did escape; and they did make their way towards the places he had indicated. But those sailors had not reached Purnia, when Mr. Yule heard, towards the end of November, that the rebel Sipahis were on their way thither. How he at once marched on Purnia, how he, by his prompt action, saved Kishanganj, has been told in some detail in the fourth volume. The same volume has also recorded the difficulties caused to Yule at an earlier period by the revolt of the 5th Irregular Cavalry at and around Bhagulpur, and by the rebellion in Chutia Nagpur. His vigorous energy, nobly supported as he was by the civilians and pi-inters of his division, by a small detachment of the 5th Fusiliers; later, by a small body of Europeans and Gurkhas from Darjiling under Captain Curzon, and, a little later still, by the Volunteer Cavalry under Major Richardson, completely “countered” the initial blow dealt by the mutinous Sipahis from Chitragaon and Dhakah.

The hilly division called Chutia Nagpur, occupies a long

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Chutia Nagpur

stretch of land along the south face of Bihar, the west face of Bengal proper, the northern face of Orisa, and the south-eastern face of the central provinces. It comprises several petty states which had had their day of independence, and whose rulers generally were glad to try to profit from the existing turmoil. As a consequence, the rebellion throughout this division was almost general.

Captain Dalton

The acting Commissioner, Captain Dalton, was a man of vigour and intelligence. He was ably seconded by the officers serving under him, Captains Davies and Oakes, by detachments of Rattray’s Sikhs, and by other officers whose regiments had mutinied. The Rajah of Ramgarh, a petty chief whose domains were situate in the Hazaribagh district, displayed also a loyalty that was proof against temptation. Yet the difficulties Dalton had to encounter were enormous. How, by the aid, sometimes of the Madras troops, sometimes of detachments of European troops moving along, and momentarily diverted from the grand trunk – a road which the mutineers often threatened and sometimes invaded – he sometimes staved off, and sometimes retrieved, disasters, has been told in the fourth volume36. The incidents were sometimes almost tragic, the position always difficult, often dangerous; the perseverance and energy of our countrymen unsurpassed. Amongst those who specially distinguished themselves, in addition to those already mentioned, were Lieutenant Graham, Lieutenant Earle, of Rattray’s Sikhs; Lieutenant Stanton, of the Engineers; Major Simpson; Colonel Forster, commanding, the Shekawati battalion; very specially, Mr. Cockburn, of the Civil Service, Commissioner of Katak; Mr. Lushington, Commissioner of Singbhum, and the military officers mentioned in the pages referred to. Few officers were engaged in work more harassing.

His gallant associates

Throughout the disturbances in the north-west – indeed, to the very end of 1858 – Chutia Nagpur continued to be the weakest point in the very centre of Mr. Beadon’s famous line of six hundred miles. This line was at any moment liable to be pierced. It often was pierced; and, by reason of the continued turmoil in Chutia Nagpur, the danger in traversing it was always considerable.

Such were the territories under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. The points of danger, it will be seen, were, speaking broadly, six in number.

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The principal dangers to Bengal

There was Calcutta, dangerously near to Barrackpur, yet resting practically on the base by which the reinforcements necessary to meet the rebellion must arrive. Calcutta was safe, then, if she could avert insurrection till the middle of August. How nearly she approached the dangerous point; in January when, but for the precautions taken by Cavenagh, Fort William would have been seized, and the garrison massacred; in March, when the timely change of day for the fête to Maharajah Sindhia again averted an outbreak which would in all probability have led to a similar result; on any day in June up to the fourteenth, when the disarming of the troops of the Barrack-par brigade prevented a demonstration, always till then possible, and the consequences of which might have been fatal;, again, when Dunbar’s detachment was beaten back from Arah, and the military authorities at Danapur, thoroughly cowed, were in-trenching themselves at that station; once again, when the mutineers from Dhakah and Chitragaon broke from their stations, and poured into eastern Bihar. The other points of danger have been sufficiently indicated. They were western, and, a little later eastern, Bihar; Jalpaiguri, saved by the splendid audacity of Sherer; and Dhakah and Chitragaon, in eastern Bengal. There was danger. though not so near a danger, from Chutia Nagpur, which, like western Bihar, remained, long after the other places had been secured, a festering sore.

The Importance of Bengal

Times had changed since the Mughuls administered the affairs of their empire from Agra or from Dehli. Then, it was all-important that the successful claimant to the throne should maintain himself in the heart of Hindustan; should secure the possession of those two central and important cities. Then, Bengal counted for little. She was a dependent province, governed by a viceroy. From her unwarlike people no recruits were drawn. The possession of her fertile plains, though desirable, was not vital to the cause of the ruler of Hindustan. She was the very last on the list of the provinces it was advisable for him to acquire. But, in 1837, Bengal possessed an importance infinitely greater. She held the gate by passing through which British interests were to be saved. That gate was Calcutta. For some time, then, Calcutta was the most important point in India. Dehli might be taken, the province of Oudh might rise in revolt; the provinces nearer, those of eastern and western Bihar, of

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eastern Bengal; the stations of Jalpaiguri and Barrackpur might be in flames, but so long as Calcutta was held, hope – a hope amounting to certainty – of ultimate success still remained. How the watchfulness of Orfeur Cavenagh, in the very front line, and of Wauchope, in the second, saved Calcutta from the dangers within the Maratha ditch which encompassed her; how those threatening from Jalpaiguri were averted by Sherer, and those from Barrackpur by the formation of the Volunteers, and the insistence of the non-official European inhabitants of the town: how William Tayler, Vincent Eyre, Vicars Boyle and his heroic comrades at Arah crushed the danger threatening from western Bihar; how George Yule thrust the rebels from the eastern division of that province, has been told in these volumes. Thenceforward Calcutta was safe. Warfare continued, indeed, in western Bihar and Chutia Nagpur, but it was not warfare of a nature threatening to Calcutta. The capital had been saved, and, in January, 1858, Lord Canning was able to quit it for the scenes near to which rebellion was still combating for victory. Thither I propose to follow him.

Footnotes

1. I use the past tense because since the events of 1857–8 Asam and some outlying districts were severed from the territories under the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and formed into a separate Chief Commissionership. This occurred in 1874.

2. Baleshwar is generally spelt by the English “Balasore.” The spelling is barbarous and incorrect. Nothing can be clearer than the derivation and meaning of the name as correctly written. Baleshwar means “Young Lord,” and is applied in the Hindi writings to Krishna. The name commemorates the visit of the incarnate deity to the district.

3. The word “Katak,” written improperly in English “Cuttack,” and wrongly accented on the last syllable, means, in Sanskrit. “a royal metropolis,” “a city,” and also “an army.” The people of Orisa adopt the first meaning. Vide Murray’s Bengal.

4. Vol. IV. page 98.

5. Vol. IV. page 100.

6. Pages 98–9.

7. The word “Sundarban” is derived from “sundar,” beautiful, and “ban,” a forest.

8. For making this statement in the Red Pamphlet, written on the spot and with the most complete knowledge of the events, I incurred the lasting enmity of the men who either went themselves, or sent their families, to take refuge on board the ships in the river. When, some ten or twelve years ago, my name came up for selection to the “Athenaeum Club,” one of these, a member of the committee, declared that even if I were elected by every one present, he would exercise his right of veto. He subsequently explained that he had no personal dislike to me, but that he had felt so keenly the statements made in the Red Pamphlet – which, I may add, have never been denied and are absolutely true – that he had vowed that its author should never be enrolled in the club to the membership of which literary men naturally aspire.

9. Regarding this, Lord Dalhousie, the immediate predecessor of Lord Canning, wrote at the time: “The last business of Danapur exceeds all powers of imagination. General Lloyd, it is said, put undue faith in the Sipahis; but why was it left to General Lloyd, or to General or Mr. Anybody, to order the measures so obviously necessary to safety?” – Trotter’s “Dalhousie,” pages 205–6.

10. Vol. III. pages 20–21.

11. Vol. III. page 40 and note.

12. Vol. II. page 92 and note initialed G. B. M.

13. Vol. III. page 80.

14. Reminiscences of an Indian Official, by Sir Orfeur Cavenagh, page 203

15. Vol. I pages 388–9.

16. The postponement of the fête had not, by accident, been communicated to Cavenagh, and he had proceeded as far as Garden Reach before he became acquainted with the fact. His return to the Fort was, then, as great a surprise to himself as it was to the Sipahis.

17. There was much reason in these forebodings. They were founded on the practice of the Sipahis elsewhere. Only a fortnight before, at Mirath, they had chosen the day on which they knew that the European troops would be at church with their side-arms only, to rise; and, in Calcutta itself, only a short time before, they had fixed as their day of rising that on which all English Calcutta would be assembled in the Botanical Gardens, separated from the city by the river Hugli.

18. Colonel Turnbull was a great supporter of the Turf. His horse, “Hermit,” obtained in India almost as great a distinction as did his namesake in England.

19. Cox’s bungalow was a locality used as a hunting-meet, a few miles from Calcutta.

20. See Vol. III. pages 15–17, and note to page 17. I have there related what I actually saw. What I saw Dr. Mouat also saw and recorded. My house was in Chauringhi, facing the Maidan. Standing at my gate, I and others saw the Maidan covered with fugitives, making their way, some on font, some in carriages of torts, towards the fort. It was a sight never to be forgotten. Cavenagh states that on his return home he found his quarters in the fort besieged by a crowd of persons “seeking shelter in the fort, and full of rumours of the worst description,” but otherwise noted nothing particular. It is evident from his narrative that he was not on the Chauringhi side of the fort.

21. The Id, properly called Id-i-azha or Id-i-kurban, is a Muhammadan festival held to commemorate the offering up, by Ibrahim (Abraham) of his son Ishmail (Isaac).

22. Vol. III. page 29.

23. Jalpaiguri, so called from the “Jalpai,” the Indian olive, which grows there.

24. Vol. III. pages 91–93; Vol. IV. pages 297–301.

25. Vol. III. pages 91–3.

26. Blue Book. Further Papers, No. 7, pages 93–95.

27. Khwaja is a title indicating that the bearer of it is a man of distinction,

28. Vol. IV. pages 292–308.

29. The Faridpur in eastern Bengal must not be confounded by the reader who may possess no knowledge of India with the town of the same name in the Muradabad district of Rohilkhand, mentioned at pp. 366–9 of the fourth volume.

30. Page 296.

31. Vol. I. page 295.

32. Vol. IV. pages 292–7.

33. Vol. III. pages 21–89; Vol. IV. pages 310–44.

34. The mealy-mouthed men of the present day, who apparently think that murder and mutiny can be repressed with rose-water, have attributed it as a crime to Mr. Tayler that he caused mutineers, taken in the act of rebellion, or proved to be accomplices of that act, to suffer the extreme penalty of the law. They do not care to reflect that it was the conviction spread amongst the population that, so long as Mr. Tayler should remain Commissioner of Patna’. punishment would follow crime, that acted as the great deterrent to outbreak.

35. Vol. IV. pages 297–302. See also pages 91–2.

36. Vol. IV. pages 95–100; and 304–8.

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