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Chapter V:
The Turret Problem

Flying at high altitude under abnormal atmospheric conditions amid the presence of fighter opponents that may strike at any time and at any angle and attempting to fire accurately under such conditions present a situation entirely different from firing at a ground target. Add to the aerial situation suggested the necessity of understanding and manipulating a turret and the picture becomes even more complicated. Turrets had to be installed in planes for which they were adapted, sights had to be installed in turrets, power had to be provided for operation, and the whole delicate mechanism, to be effective, had to be kept in balance.

The importance attached to the understanding of turrets may be indicated by reference to the programs of instruction in 1942 and 1943. In the former year 20 hours were assigned to turret drill and 15 to turret maintenance; in the latter, 18 to turret manipulation and 32 to turret maintenance.1 Maintenance consisted in part of installing and boresighting guns, mounting sights, checking the operation of the fire interrupters and of the turret, gun, and sights, and loading

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ammunition. Manipulation consisted in part of adjusting the sights properly, entering and leaving the turret correctly, locating and using correctly all switches, interphone connection, and oxygen connection, and engaging and disengaging all clutches. Much of the manipulation had to be done when the gunner was blindfolded. The two operations--maintenance and manipulation--were, it appears from the above description, so complementary as often to make one unable to distinguish between them.

In order to improve the quality of maintenance training, steps were taken in the fall of 1942, at the suggestion of the Director of Individual Training, to develop a program on central sighting station and remote-control turret equipment. In response to this suggestion, it was recommended that station operator gunners be given a special gunnery course on central sighting station equipment which "should include all necessary calibration, adjustment, minor repairs and inspection." Power turret and gun sight specialists, it was suggested, "should be selected from graduates of the turret school end given an additional course on maintenance of central sighting station equipment."2 Remote control, however, did not actually come into effect until the use of the B-29 in 1944.3

The slow progress in turret training in 1942 is an interrelated phase of the slow, yet gradual, progress which was being made in other

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phases of flexible gunnery training during that experimental year, The lack of any technical training on the part of many students combined with the required knowledge of numerous turrets made the task doubly difficult, Such trainers as the E-1 Spotlight and E-5 did not at first prove satisfactory for that type of training. Securing of equipment, as pointed out elsewhere, was a major problem. Frequently parts needed for the repair of turrets were not available, and sometimes when repair was not necessary trained personnel were lacking for operation. A special board of officers, created to investigate training being conducted by the four-engine schools of the Flying Training Command and of the replacement training units, reported that in the Second Air Force many gun turrets in training airplanes, though not in use, had not been removed so an to be used elsewhere. In many cases the planes were not being used because damage had resulted from the mishandling of the turret structure by insufficiently trained personnel.4

Maj, Gen, Barton K. Yount declared on 25 June 1942, that "although the scheduled production of gunners per month is approximately 2000 there is not one airplane in the gunnery schools mounting a turret."5 Even after turrets were mounted on planes, there remained the problem of coping with atmospheric conditions while manipulating a turret. To clear malfunctions, adjust guns and gun solenoids, and reload. ammunition

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when flying at high altitude attack. During the latter part of 1942 Headquarters AAF urged the flying Training Command to see to it that all students received training in high altitude flying and in the actual use and adjustment of oxygen equipment. Such a policy had been initiated in the three training centers as early as 7 July 1941, but shortage since that time of the necessary type of plane had prevented execution of the policy. Renewed efforts, it was stated, could be taken along that line.6

The most significant step taken in connection with this phase of training was the provision, early in 1943, for specialized turret training. There were in use at that time in the air forces six types of turrets: Consolidated tail, Sperry upper and Sperry lower, Martin upper, Bendix upper and Bendix lower.7 To understand all or any considerable number of them seemed to many too difficult an undertaking and represented an unwise scattering of the energies and efforts of the gunner forever, the assigning of particular turrets to particular planes and special designations of the latter to the respective gunnery schools helped simplify the problem of equipment. Several factors were responsible for the triumph of the specialization principle. Through its Sperry maintenance representatives in England, the Air Service Command reported the unfavorable attitude in that country toward the training the turret gunner was receiving in the United States. Those

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representatives felt that there was too much emphasis upon training men as radio operators or engineers instead of as gunners and upon diversified rather than specialized turret training.8 A report of a special board of officers stated that students were not being trained in aerial turret gunnery, that they were often assigned to the use of equipment with which they were unfamiliar, and that low morale was due in part to fear generated by lack of special training.9

The Flying Training Command heartily urged the specialization idea. It claimed that unless seven weeks of training were provided shortages of instructors and equipment would make it impossible to give proper instruction in all types of turrets. Thorough familiarity with one, it felt, would pave the way for quicker familiarity with others. It requested that a survey be made showing the required number of gunners on designated types of turrets and the necessary assignment of airplanes equipped with the same type of turret as that used for instructional purposes.10 Before the end of 1942 both the Directorate of Individual Training and the Directorate of Bombardment

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Turret Training
Image: Turret Training
Turret Instruction
Image: Turret Training
Turret Instruction

 

had, expressed agreement with the Training Command.11

In December 1942 steps were taken to put the turret specialization program into effect, and on 3 January 1943, in accordance with the authority received, the Flying Training Command gave orders to translate the policy into action. Accompanying this move or just before it was the designation of flexible gunnery schools for training in specialized. aircraft. Laredo and Harlingen became 100 per cent B-24 schools, Las Vegas and Kingman 100 per cent B-17, Panama City 50 per cent B-26 and 50 per cent B-25, and Fort Myers 60 per cent B-26 (B-34) and 40 per cent light and dive bombardment.12 The Second. Air Force at this time took the graduates from the first four, or the heavy bombardment schools; the Third Air Force took the graduates from Panama City and Fort Myers.13

The orders and actions described above did not settle all differences of opinion over the specialization policy. In July 1943 the Military Personnel Division of Headquarters AAF suggested a return to

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the policy of multiple turret training. In the opinion of that division the change was justified because of the increased emphasis on the heavy bombardment program, as evidenced by the agreement with AC/AS, Training that all graduates of gunnery schools during July would be sent to the Second Air Force. In disagreeing with the suggestion, AC/AS, Training pointed out the impossibility of an enlisted gunner understanding the operation and preflight maintenance of the 10 tactical turrets then installed in light, medium, and heavy bombardment aircraft. This office spoke of the possibility, however, of having one of the two light bombardment schools change to specialization in heavy aircraft.14

The equipment problem was improved, but, of course, not solved, when the turret specialization Lies went into effect. As previously stated, the policy itself helped to simplify the problem. The Flying Training Command indicated a shortage of 196 of the 830 power-operated turrets needed.15 Malassignment of gunners in terms of their preparation was noticeable, to some extent, after the specialization program went into effect. Headquarters, Tyndall Field complained that its graduates were sometimes assigned to B-17 units where they had to use the Sperry and Consolidated turrets, though Tyndall was specializing in Martin and Bendix turrets.16 In phase checks that were carried out at Mountain Home Army Air Base in Idaho, men from both Kingman and Tyndall fields were checked for proficiency in turrets with which they

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were not supposed to be familiar.17 AAF Headquarters queried the Commanding General of the Second Air Force as to why graduates of Kingman and Las Vegas bad been consigned to B-24 units, and the Flying Training Command, in urging AC/AS Training to impress upon the training air forces that turret specialization was the accepted principle in the flexible gunnery schools, emphasized the additional work that would have to be done in operational training if they did not accept the principle.18 As late as July 1944 a report on flexible gunnery from the IX Bomber Command urged the use in combat of the same type of aircraft and the same type of equipment in which training had been given, but declared that this principle was often not followed.19

The policy of turret specialization was modified to some extent in 1944. Though the Flexible Gunnery Instructors School had been training the student in only one type, it was required in February that he be trained in all turrets and other gun positions on the plane to which he was to be assigned. Since some instructors were to be returned to the station of the command from which they originally came and some were to be assigned to the training air forces, those proportions would have to be determined before plane designations could be known. It was also necessary to know what percentage of those to be assigned to air

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forces would be trained on the respective bombardment planes. It was decided that 30 per cent of the graduates of the school should be returned to their original stations and 70 per cent should go to air forces. Of the 70 per cent to be assigned to air forces the percentage for each type airplane was indicated as follows:20 B-24, 50%; B-17, 40%, B-25, 4%; B-26, 4%; B-20, 2%; B-29, included in B-17 percentages. In May 1944 the Training Command was authorized to delete all instruction in turrets for radio operator mechanics, but to train all other gunners, whether instructors or not, in the "gun positions on the airplane for which they are specifically trained."21 This order did not represent an abandonment of the specialization principle, for turret specialization was provided in detailed fashion in a Training Command Memorandum of 31 May 1944. That same memorandum, however, required the gunners to be "familiar" with the various gun positions on the plane. Emphasis on one turret along with detailed individual aircraft specialization now became the aim.22 It seemed

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logical that along with increased facilities for gunnery training there should be at least multiple training to the point where it made for greater coordination on the part of interdependent members of an individual bomber crew.

It is obvious from the preceding discussion that considerable progress had been made involving the turret problem since that June day in 1942 when, in the words of General Yount, not an airplane in the gunner schools was mounting a turret. Opinions of come who had had connection with the combat air forces suggest the progress that had or had not been made. Col. V. L. Zoller of the Fifteenth Air Force felt that the basic training gunners received was "good," that "barring the necessity of using gunners in positions other than that for which

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classified and perhaps modifications with which they are not familiar, that it, modifications of now equipment, the gunner usually does show the knowledge necessary to operate his position." According to Capt. A. M. McIlwain of the Fifth Air Force, "only a small percentage" of gunners had been "taught the proper method of head space and solenoid adjustments," and many had "forgotten how to properly enter and leave a turret." Many "were very familiar with the Martin turret" but some times had to use other turrets with a resulting lack of success. Speaking for the Seventh Air Force, Col. L. E. Boutwell emphasized the point that those with "extensive training in the Martin Turret" often found the training of little use because they were required to use the Consolidated type.23

In the early part of the year 1944, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff made a report indicating serious deficiencies in the training of turret gunners sent to European theaters. In some cases, it was stated, they were "afraid to enter the turret in the air," and in others they did "not know what to do" when they entered it, with the result that too much time had to be devoted to training in combat areas. When asked by G-3 what was being done to correct these deficiencies, AAF Headquarters replied that action had been "taken within the limitations of base facilities, personnel and equipment." The reply emphasized that according to training standards

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every gunner was required manually to perform phase checks on all turret functions.24 The sweeping character of these phase checks is illustrated by the fact that gunners were expected to be checked twice in the flexible gunnery schools, twice in the OTU's, and twice in the combat theaters.25

The securing of turrets and of planes in which to install them was a prerequisite to training in maintenance and manipulation, operations which were particularly difficult during high altitude flying. Renee, much time was devoted to this phase of training. During the early stages of specialized gunnery training the gunner was required to be familiar with all types of turrets, but after much criticism of his lack of proficiency he was required early in 1943 to specialize in one turret. Coupled with this policy was one which helped solve the problem of equipment, namely, assigning particular turrets to particular planes and special designations of the latter to the respective gunnery schools. Improvement in training techniques by 1944 seemed to justify a modification of the specialization principle, and thereafter gunners were required to be familiar with all gun positions on the Plane to which they were assigned, Phase checks to determine proficiency and attempts to prevent malassignments were significant policies in respect to turrets during 1943 and since.

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Notes to Chapter V:

1. Program of Instruction for the Training of Aerial gunners (Flexible) W 4076 AC, 2-20-41, Rev, 6-3-42, W-7680, A. F.; T. C. Memo No. 50-13-1, 12 Aug. 1943.

2. R&R, AFRIT to AFDMR, 19 Sep. 1942; R&R, AFRDB to AFRAD and AFRBS in turn, 26 Oct. 1942, in AAG 353A, Training.

3. Interview with Maj. Edward Elliott, Jr., AC/AS, AAF, 11 Sep. 1944.

4. Special Board of Officers to CG AAF, 3 Nov. 1942, in AAG 353A, Training; History of the Second Air Force, 7 Dec. 1941-31 Dec. 2942, I 268-69. For further evidence of difficulties, see History of Buckingham Army Air Field, Installment 1, II, 113-23; History of Harlingen Army Air Field, II, 29-30, 39-40; History of eastern Flying Training Command, Installment 2, II, 991 ff.

5. Project Book, CG AFFTC, Flexible Gunnery Sec. 25 June 1942, 3.

6. AFRIT to CG AFFTC, 10 Oct. 1942, and. 1st ind., Hq AFFTC to AFRIT, 5 Nov, 1942, in AAG 353A, Training.

7. History of Buckingham Army Air Field, Installment 2, II, 113.

8. Memo for AFRDB by Hq AFASC, 22 Oct. 1942, in AAG 353.9C, Training General.

9. Special Board of Officers to CG AAF, 3 Nov. 1942, in AAG 3535, Training.

10. Hq AAFTC to AFRIT, 27 Oct. 1242, in AAG 353, Gunnery Training.

11. R&R AFRIT to AFRDB, 31 Oct, 1942; R&R, AFRDB to AFRIT, 22 Nov. 1942, in AAG 353A, Gunnery Training. In this same communication, AFRDB indicated the following basis for computing the numbers of flexible gunners required in terms of individual turrets: (a) Sperry trained-engineer and radio operator grinners on B-17, radio operator gunners on B-24, armorer gunner on B-17; (b) Martin trained--engineer gunners on B-24, armorer engineer and radio operator gunners on B-26, bombardiers and navigators on B-26; (c) Consolidated trained—armorer gunners on B-24; (d) Bendix trained- bombardiers and navigators on B-24, armorer engineers and radio operators on B-25, bombardiers and navigators on B-17, bombardiers and navigators on B-25. This estimate was evidently based on the assumption that all flexible gunners would have technical training, though at that time such was the wish but not the policy of AAF Headquarters.

12. Project Book, CG AFFTC Flexible Gunnery Sec., 11, 21 Dec. 1942, 11, 29 Jan, 1943.

13. AFRIT to AFPMP, 10 March 1943, in AAG-353, Gunnery Training.

14. R&R, AEPMP to AC/AS, Training, 20 July 1943, R&R, AC/AS, Training to AFPMP, 5 Aug. 1943, in AAG 353A, Gunnery Training.

15. Hq AFFTC to AFRIT, 9 Jan. 1943, in AFACT 353, Gunnery, General.

16. Tyndall Field FGES to CG SEAFTC, 1 July 1943, in AAG 353A, Gunnery Training.

17. Hq Mountain Home AAB to AC/AS, Training, 12 Nov. 1943; Hq Kingman Army Air Field to CG AFWFTC, 26 Nov. 1943, in AAG 353, Gunnery Training.

18. 1st ind.(Hq Mountain Home AAB to AC/AS, Training, 12 May, 1943), Brig. Gen. R. W. Harper to CG AFTRC, 20 Nov. 1943; 2d ind. (Hq Kingman AAF to CG AFWFTC, 26 Nov. 1943), AFTRC to AC/AS, Training, 2 Jan. 1944, all in AAG 353, Gunnery Training.

19. Maj. Gen, R. W. Harper to CG AFTRC, 9 Aug. 1944, with attached Report of IX Bomber Command of 22 July 1944, in AAG 353A, Gunnery Training.

20. Hq Fort Myers AAF to CG AFTRC, 13 Jan. 1944, and 2d Ind., Hq AFTRC to AC/AS, Training, 27 Jan. 1944, and 2d Ind., Brig. Gen. R. W. Harper to CG AFTRC, 4 Feb. 1944, in AAG 353, Gunnery Training.

21. Daily Diary, Flexible Gunnery Div., 13 May 1944; AFTRC Monthly Progress Deport, April 1944.

22. T. C. Memo No. 50-13-1, 31 May 1944. The following table shows the provisions in regard to turret specialization:

B-24 Airplanes:
(1) Bombardier --
Nose turret
 
(2) Navigator --
Nose turret
 
(3) Engineer --
Waist gun
 
(4) Radio operator --
Waist gun
 
(5) Career gunner --
Top turret
 
(6) Career gunner --
Nose turret and ball turret
 
(7) Career gunner --
Tail turret
 
(8) Armorer gunner --
Ball turret
     
B-17 Airplane:
 
(1) Bombardier --
Chin turret
 
(2) Navigator --
Waist gun
 
(3) Engineer --
Waist gun
 
(4) Armorer --
Waist gun
 
(5) Radio operator --
Waist and radio hatch guns
 
(6) Career gunner --
Top turret
 
(7) Career gunner --
Tail turret
 
(8) Career gunner --
Waist gun and ball turret
     
B-25 Airplanes:
 
(a) Mechanic gunner --
Upper turret
 
(b) Armorer gunner --
Tail turret and waist gun
 
(c) Radio Operator --
Waist gun
     
B-26 Airplanes:
 
(a) Mechanic gunner --
Upper turret
 
(b) Armorer gunner --
Tail turret and waist gun
 
(c) Radio Operator --
Waist gun
     
A-20 Airplanes:
 
(a) Mechanic gunner --
Tunnel gun and upper turret
 
(b) Armorer gunner --
Upper turret and tunnel gun

23. These opinions are found in Minutes of the AAF Training and Gunnery Conference, 31 July, 1-2 Aug. 1944, HQ 4th AF, San Francisco, Appendix B, 11, 30; 31, 33.

24. G-3 to CG ASF, 9 Feb, 1944, with attached Report of MID of 14 Jan. 1944, and 1st ind., Maj. Gen, R. W. Harper to G-3, 13 March 1944, AAG 353A, Gunnery Training.

25. Maj, Gen, R. W. Harper to Chief, TAD, 8 May 1944, in ibid.

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