AN

ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF

THE BUREAU OF SHIPS DURING WORLD WAR II

VOLUME IV

U.S. Bureau of Ships

FIRST DRAFT NARRATIVE PREPARED BY THE HISTORICAL SECTION BUREAU OF SHIPS

TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME IV

 

PART V

 

CHAPTER

"WAR RECAPITULATIONS AND THE POST-WAR WORLD”

PAGE

XVIII. VICTORY AND THE AFTERMATH

1

The Projected Plan:

Operation OLYMPIC.

Operation CORONET.

Comparative Fleets at the War's End.

Post War Construction.

Dynamic Leadership of the Bureau

RAdm. E. L. Cochrane.

RAdm. E. W. Mills.

XIX. SHIP DESIGN IN WORLD WAR II

35

General Design Advancements.

Battleships.

Cruisers.

Carriers.

Destroyers.

Destroyer Escorts.

Submarines.

Landing Craft.

Minor Combatant Vessels.

Auxiliaries and Miscellaneous.

Post-war design.

XX. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

127

Naval Research Program.

Bureau of Ships' Program:

Wartime Organization and Accomplishments.

Post-War Research and Development.

Laboratories.

XXI. ELECTRONICS

233

Introduction.

Early History and Organization.

Design.

Procurement.

Installation and Maintenance.

--iii--

CHAPTER

PAGE

XXII. OPERATION CROSSROADS

329

Mankind has cone to a Crossroads.

Origins of Atomic Bomb Tests.

Director of Ship Material.

Bureau of Ships Group.

Electronics.

Evaluation of Operation Crossroads.

Conclusions.

XXIII. NAVY YARD REORGANIZATION

397

Wartime Navy Yard Organization.

The Reorganization and Establishment of Naval Shipyards.

Lines of Authority.

Shipyards' Internal Organization.

XXIV. THE RESERVE FLEET

445

Planning.

Organization Plan.

Preservation.

Conclusions.

XXV.

WHAT IS PAST IS PROLOGUE

473

--iv--

TABLES

Table No.

Page

75

Comparative Naval strength of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, as of 1 January 1946

11

76

Post-war shipbuilding construction, July 1945 projected through December 1947

15-17

77

Semi-annual value of ship completions for two post-war years, July 1945 projected through June 1947

18

78

Battleships - Comparative statistics of selected World War I, Peacetime and World War II designs

39

79

Heavy Cruisers - Comparative statistics of selected pre-war and wartime designs

44

80

Light Cruisers - Comparative statistics of selected pre-war, wartime and post-war classes

56

81

Aircraft Carriers - Comparative statistics of pre-war and wartime selected classes

62

82

Destroyers - Comparative statistics of selected Pre-war and wartime classes

75

83

Destroyer Escorts - Comparative statistics of the classes

81

84

Submarines - Comparative statistics of selected World War I, peacetime, and World War II classes

87

85

Bureau of Ships Research and Development Program

204-211

86

Roster of Officers-in-Charge, 1903-1944, Radio and Electronics Divisions

249

87

Key Civilian personnel of the Radio Division, 1903-1940

250

88

Electronics Procurements

291

89

Monthly Electronics Procurements

307

90

Undelivered balances, Electronics Procurements

308

--v--

TABLES, Cont'd

Table No.

Page

91

Production of Electronics Equipment by firms according to their size

310

92

List of target vessels for the Bikini Test

349-350

--vi--

CHARTS

Chart No.

Page

XIX

Functional Chart, Research and Development Branch, Ship Design and Shipbuilding Division, Bureau of Ships, November, 1947

141

XX

Organization Charts, Radio Division, Bureau of Ships, 1 July 1944 and 15 September 1944

241-243

XXI

Organization Chart, Electronics Division, Bureau of Ships, 1 March 1945

245

XXII

Work load of the Design Branch, 1938-1945

256

XXIII

Sample Requirement Report

282

XXIV

Sample Production Report of equipment requiring electronics components

298

XXV

Sample Production Report, Electronics Division

299

XXVI

Organization Chart - Office of the Director, Navy Electronics Production Agency

303

XXVII

Deliveries of electronics equipment by prime contractors

305

XXVIII

New Ships and New Electronics Equipments - Comparison of monthly deliveries

306

XXIX

Search Radar Program

327

XXX

Organization Chart, Bikini Test, Director of Shin Material

339

XXXI

Organization Chart, Bikini Test, Bureau of Ships Group

340

XXXII

Organization Chart, Bikini Test, Bureau of Ships Technical Group

341

XXXIII

Organization Chart, Bikini Test, Bureau of Ships Electronics Group

363

XXXIV

Organization Chart, Bikini Test, Ships Instrumentation Group

374

XXXV

Organization Chart, Bikini Test, Oceanography Group

379

--vii--

CHARTS, Cont'd

Chart No.

 

Page

XXXVI

Organization Chart, Bikini Test, Ships Technical Photography Section of the Photography Group

386

XXXVII

Flow Chart, Naval Shipyards

429

XXXVIII

Former District Organization

430

XXXIX

Sponsorship and management control at a Naval Base

431

XL

Organization Chart, Naval Shipyard

432

--viii--

PART V

WAR RECAPITULATIONS AND THE POST-WAR WORLD

--ix--

CHAPTER XVIII

VICTORY AND THE AFTERMATH

--x--

CHAPTER XVIII - VICTORY AND THE AFTERMATH

I. THE PROJECTED PLAN:

The war ended with a suddenness and completeness almost equal to that with which it began at Pearl Harbor 44-1/4 months earlier. The first atomic bomb, dropped on 6 August 1945, levelled the city of Hiroshima; on 8 August Russia declared war on Japan; a second atomic bomb, this time on Nagasaki, forced the Japanese Empire to accept on 14 August the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation for unconditional surrender. On 2 September the unconditional surrender papers were signed aboard the battleship USS MISSOURI by representatives of all countries involved.

Investigation of the Japanese homeland by officials of the United States brought to light even more forcibly than imagined the part which sea power had to play in the winning of the war. Strategic bombing had unequivocally damaged the Japanese cities and production centers and the atomic bomb had proved "the straw which broke the camel's back" as well as the excuse with which to "save face". However, the less apparent, but perhaps more important, ravages the Japanese suffered, stemmed from the overwhelming sea power used against them. This sea power was composed of the surface and submarine blockade which brought them near starvation, and reduced their fuel and strategic material resources to almost nothing; of the air and submarine attacks which reduced their merchant marine to a small fraction of its former size and their combatant fleet to veritable extinction,

--1--

 


HIROSHIMA

--2--

and of the power which made possible the capture of the long string of Pacific islands pointing to the heart of the Japanese Empire, islands from which land based aircraft were able to launch their devastating bombings.

All of this sea power, based upon the unprecedented production under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships, had for its final purpose to proposed invasion of the main Japanese islands. The scope and impact of this operation, which would have been unparalleled in the history of the world, reflect more vividly than charts the Bureau's production record and make imperative that an account of this operation be included herewith. The most succinct account, that of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, directed to the Secretary of the Navy on 8 December 1945, is quoted in full, to depict not only the invasion plans but also the comprehensive nature of the logistics and bases with which the Bureau was so vitally concerned.

--3--

"Before the conclusion of the war, plans were maturing for the invasion and occupation of the main Japanese islands. Two major operations were projected: the first, with the code name of "Olympic", against southern Kyushu; after consolidation there, the next -- "Coronet" -- into the Tokyo plain area which is the industrial heart of Japan. The amphibious parts of these operations -- involving the preparation of landing beaches by mine sweeping,

underwater demolition teams, bombardment and bombing; the transportation of the assault troops; and the initial landing for the establishment of firmly held beachheads -- were to have been the responsibility of Fleet Admiral Nimitz.

The large-scale bombardments and bombings of the Third Fleet that began on 10 July were actually in preparation for operation "Olympic". In mid-August, as the war ended, the United States Navy had in the Pacific 90 per cent of its combatant vessels of submarine size or larger and 42 per cent of its combatant aircraft. These ships, aircraft, support auxiliaries and landing craft included:

Battleships

23

Aircraft carriers

26

Escort carriers

64

Cruisers

52

Destroyers

323

Escort vessels

298

Submarines

181

Mine craft

160

Auxiliary vessels

1,060

Large landing craft

2,783

Combat aircraft

14,847

Transport, training and utility aircraft

1,286

All six Marine divisions, or 100 per cent of the Marine Corps combat strength, were also available for Pacific operations. The "Olympic" and "Coronet" operations as planned would have been the largest amphibious operations in history. While the Third Fleet provided strategic cover and support for the amphibious forces making the invasion, the Fifth Fleet was to have executed the amphibious phases of the invasions of Kyushu and Honshu by transporting their troops and equipment to the attack position on shore. By the application of naval force they would have established the necessary ground troops in positions favorable for further maneuvers to complete the destruction of Japanese ground forces.

In discharging its responsibilities for the amphibious phase of the Kyushu or "Olympic" operation the United States Navy would have employed 3033 combatant and noncombatant vessels of a size larger than personnel landing boats. Although the application of our sea power in its various forms proved sufficient to bring Japan to terms without the necessity of invading her home islands, the possibility of invasion on the scale contemplated indicates the amazing progress in matters of supply and support that had been made in less than four years of war.

--4--

In this evolution advance bases have played a vital role. The 1940 Navy had no properly equipped advance bases other than Pearl Harbor. More than 400 have since been established in the Atlantic and Pacific areas in order to maintain the fleet and air forces in the forward areas where there was fighting to be done. As we progressed across the Pacific, islands captured in one amphibious operation were converted into bases which became spring boards for the next advance. These bases were set up for various purposes depending upon the next operation. At first they were mainly air bases for the support of bombers and for the use of protective filters. This gradually changed to the establishment of staging bases for the anchoring, fueling and refitting of armadas of transports and cargo ships, and for replenishing mobile support squadrons which actually accompanied the combat forces and serviced them at sea. Further advances made necessary the development of repair and refitting bases for large amphibious forces.

As we progressed further and further across the Pacific, it became necessary to set up main repair bases for the maintenance, repair and servicing of larger fleet units. The first of such large bases was set up at Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides and was followed by a main repair base at Manus in the Admiralty Islands. It was then determined that so long as ships were in condition to function in the battle line, minor battle damage and derangements should be rectified in the forward area, thus eliminating the necessity of returning ships to continental bases or even to the Hawaiian Islands.

These conditions were recognized and steps were taken to support the entire fleet in the Marianas, Philippines and Okinawa areas. A very large base, capable of supporting one third of the Pacific Fleet, was set up at Guam; another large base was established at Leyte-Samar; a third was in process of construction at Okinawa when the war ended. Each of these bases was designed to dock ships of various sizes, some being able to take ships of the heaviest tonnage. All of the bases could repair major battle damage to hull and equipment. Facilities were established ashore with piers, roads and machine shops, in large measure duplicating the type of facilities found at any of our navy yards. There was also provided the replenishment storage necessary to restock every type of vessel with fuel, ammunition and consumable supplies as well as food. The stocks currently on hand at Guam would have filled a train 120 miles long. The magnitude of the fuel supply alone is indicated by the total of 25,026,000 barrels of bulk fuel which was shipped to the Pacific in June 1945 for military purposes. At Guam alone one million gallons of aviation gas were used daily. As these bases were gradually pushed forward, assault forces were brought two to five days' steaming nearer the enemy. By proper selection of the strategic points necessary to accomplish the advance, we were able to by-pass and ignore many bases established by the Japanese which they could no longer use because of their loss of command of the sea.

But for this chain of advance bases the fleet could not have operated in the western reaches of the Pacific without the necessity for many more ships and planes than it actually had. A base to supply or repair a fleet 5000 miles closer to the enemy multiplies the power which can be maintained

--5--

constantly against him and greatly lessens the problems of supply and repair. The scope of the advance base program is indicated by the fact that the personnel assigned directly to it aggregated almost one fifth of the entire personnel of the Navy -- over half a million men, including almost 200,000 Seabees. In the concluding months of the war 82 per cent of the Seabees were in the Pacific, the vast majority of them at work on bases. In the Naval Supply Depot at Guam there were 93 miles of road. At Okinawa alone there were more than fifty naval construction battalions building roads, supply areas, airfields and fleet facilities for what would have been one of the gigantic staging areas for the final invasion of Japan.

In the period covered by this report almost two million measurement tons of materiel were shipped in connection with the advance base program.

An essential element in the facilities of our advance bases were floating drydocks, which were capable of receiving vessels ranging from small craft to the battleship MISSOURI. One hundred fifty two of these docks were produced. They proved their special value in the speed with which damaged ships could be returned to combat.

As our advance came nearer to the Japanese islands, the rear areas which had been the scene of combat operations in earlier months were utilized for logistic support. In the South Pacific, for example, more than 400 ships were staged for the Okinawa operation. They received varied replenishment services, including routine and emergency overhaul as required. Approximately 100,000 officers and men were staged from this area alone for the Okinawa campaign, including four Army and Marine combat divisions plus certain headquarters and corps troops and various Army and Navy service units. Concurrently with the movement of troops large quantities of combat equipment and necessary material were transferred forward, thus contributing automatically to the roll-up of the South Pacific area. Similarly in the Southwest Pacific area Army service troops were moved with their equipment from the New Guinea area to the Philippines in order to prepare staging facilities for troops deployed from the European Theater. The roll-up was similarly continued and progress made in reducing our installations in Australia and New Guinea.

This vast deployment of our forces throughout the Pacific required careful planning not only at the front but also in the United States. During the last six months of the war the problem of materiel distribution became of primary importance, and throughout this period our system of logistic support had to be constantly modified to meet the rapidly changing tactical conditions. War production had shifted the emphasis from procurement to distribution; that is, while production was still of high importance, a still greater problem was that of getting well balanced materiel support to designated positions at certain fixed times. Put another way, motion, not size, had become the important factor. It was, nevertheless, essential in insuring the uninterrupted flow of material through the pipe-line of supply to our forces overseas that the reservoir within the United States which kept these pipelines full did not become too large. On 1 June 1945 a set of standards for Navy inventory control was promulgated which stressed a

--6—

balance between procurement and inventory. The attainment of these standards was of primary importance to efficient distribution of materiel within the United States, and particularly on the west coast, which was our major base for the logistic support of the Pacific Fleet.

It has always been a cardinal principle of our Pacific logistic support policy that the west coast be utilized to its maximum capacity. There are two reasons for this: the source of supply must be as close to the point of requirement as possible so that inventories at advance bases may be kept to a minimum; secondly, greater utilization of shipping can be achieved by the shortest haul possible. The integration of these two elements, supply and shipping, was a major task in 1945.

When the collapse of Germany was imminent, a review in conjunction with the Army of our policy of maximum west coast utilization was necessary. It was concluded that approximately 68 per cent of the Navy's predicted logistic requirements would have to be moved from the west coast to bases in the Marianas, Philippines and Okinawa, as well as to the mobile logistic support forces - Service Squadrons Six and Ten. Bases in the Admiralties, New Guinea,

and the Hawaiian Sea Frontier, since they were in nonoperational areas, could be supported from the east and Gulf coasts. In May, after a joint Army-Navy study, a ceiling was set on the amount of materiel which could, be shipped to the Pacific from the west coast by the Army and Navy; this ceiling was based on the estimated capacity of the six major west coast porta. By detailed study of the capacities of port facilities and supply activities, as well as a complete analysis of the types of commodities shipped by the Navy since the first of the year, Commander, Western Sea Frontier (who coordinated naval logistic matters on the west coast) reallocated the Navy's share of west coast capacity among the various ports. Estimated tonnages were set for each port, both by types of commodity and by overseas destination to be served.

In the establishment and execution of this planned employment of west coast facilities, Commander, Western Sea Frontier provided one of the major links between the distribution systems of the continental United States and Pacific Theater. Since the flow of materiel and the ships to carry it are immobilized when more ships have sailed to a destination than that destination can receive, the planned employment of west coast ports was a matter of vital concern.

This was facilitated by the expansion of the functions of the Western Sea Frontier which had taken place in November 1944 when the necessity for coastal defense had assumed relatively minor proportions. The expansion of function included placing every major activity of the three west coast naval districts under a single command, with a view to coordinating all essential matters of materiel and personnel and to eliminating activities within the Western Sea Frontier which did not contribute to the major effort.

While defensive operations became secondary, the responsibility of the Western Sea Frontier to regulate the movement of ships and aircraft through frontier waters was greatly increased. The eastern Pacific had become a

--7--

network of channels for the passage of traffic to the forward areas. These channels were the most heavily traveled military highways on and above the sea. In the period covered by this report there were over 17,000 sailings of vessels large and small through the six million square miles of Western Sea Frontier waters. In the same period an average of and aircraft arrived on or departed from the west coast each fifteen minutes on the longest overwater flight lane in the world.

The substantial increase in the level of Navy materiel movement which occurred between March and July 1945 fully justified the planning for an increased west coast load which had been undertaken. Total exports, excluding aircraft, from May through July showed a 25 per cent increase over March and April shipments. Items used in the construction of new bases doubled during May and July as compared with March and April. Ammunition shipments doubled, because of the considerable expenditures during the Okinawa campaign (where 50,000 tons of 5-inch to 16-inch projectiles were fired by surface ships) and the necessity for building up a reserve for the assault upon Japan.

By the vast system thus developed the great concluding operations in the Pacific were supported. Each month in the immediate past we shipped out 600,000 long tons a month into the Pacific Ocean areas. The momentum generated by this materiel operation can be imagined. The problem presented by the deceleration of this great tide of supply after V-J day can also be imagined.

The following steps taken in the days immediately after the surrender of Japan indicate the effort the Navy has made to reduce its logistic energy as rapidly as possible without damage either to the domestic economy or to the support of fleet elements still at sea. All shipments of ammunition and of advance base components were stopped except those required for occupational purposes and those specifically requested by the fleet commanders as necessary for further operations. Maintenance materiel movements overseas were subjected to careful review and reduction. Stock levels at overseas bases of provisions, clothing, equipment, medical needs, aviation requirements and spare parts items were reduced to a thirty-day minimum and a sixty-day maximum. Orders prepared in advance cancelling procurement of materials were mailed in tremendous volume from the Navy Department on the night of 14 August. All continental public works construction projects, including those actually under construction and those on which it was possible to begin construction, were carefully reviewed -- projects which were not required for demobilization purposes or postwar purposes were cancelled.

--8—

HIROSHIMA!

--9--

 

HIROSHIMA!

II. COMPARATIVE FLEETS:

"The destruction of the Japanese Navy followed the Nelsonian doctrine that naval victory should be followed up until the enemy fleet is annihilated."

Of the 12 battleships in the Japanese Navy throughout the war, 11 were sunk; of 26 carriers, 20 were sunk; of 43 cruisers, 38 were destroyed; of 167 destroyers, 134 were sunk; of 161 submarines, 142 were lost. Of those vessels which remained afloat, few were of military value in view of the extensive damage. On the United States' fleet side of the ledger, 2 old battleships were lost at Pearl Harbor but 8 new battleships joined the fleet during the war; against 5 carriers and 6 escort carriers loot, we completed 27 carriers and 110 escort carriers; while we lost 10 cruisers, 48 new cruisers were commissioned; against 71 destroyers and 11 destroyer escorts lost, we completed 349 and 498 respectively; against 52 submarines lost, we completed 203.

Such was the overwhelming operational and production record of the United States Navy during World War II. The statistics of Table 75, depicting the comparative naval strength of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan at the war's end (as of 1 January 1946), evidence the thoroughness with which this Nelsonian policy was carried out.

--10--

TABLE 75

COMPARATIVE NAVAL STRENGTH OF UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND JAPAN AS OF 1 JANUARY 1946

UNITED STATES

JAPAN

GREAT BRITAIN

No. Tonnage

No.

Tonnage

No.

Tonnage

Battleships *

23

791,400

1

33,000

14

452,020

Aircraft Carriers

32

758,400

4

78,470

12

228,020

Carrier Escorts

75

665,105

--

--

29

288,031

Heavy Cruisers

26

336,750

2

24,000

12

108,945

Light Cruisers

41

380,325

2

11,170

.50

328,409

Destroyers

353

713,070

41

51,910

204

213,541

Escort Destroyers

--

--

--

--

55

57,050

Destroyer Escorts

345

488,250

89

77,622

238

326,179

Submarines

206

322,560

39

69,789

116

94,328

Total

1,101

4,455,860

178

345,961

730

2,096,523

[hr]

* Includes Battle Cruisers

--11—

And Thus Did World War II Formally Come To An End.

--12--

III. POST-WAR OBSTRUCTION

As Japanese sea power was reduced to a token force, the Secretary of the Navy on 10 August 1945 approved the termination of contracts for the construction of 56 combatant ships and 39 vessels of other types. Following the surrender of Japan, however, a complete review was made of the status of the construction and conversion program of auxiliaries, landing craft, district craft and small boats, in consequence of which the total number of cancellations was raised to the following:

Combatant vessels

56

auxiliaries

94

landing ships

2

patrol craft

44

district craft

121

small landing craft

over 8,000

The planned tonnage from August 1945 to July 1947 was to be approximately 2,225,000 tons; actually, however, the cumulative tonnage produced never exceeded 1,400,000. The major portion of this construction was comprised of about 158 combatant vessels totaling over one million tons. While suspended construction on the 45,000 ton BB 66 left it in a state of 73% completion, 22 carriers did come off the ways following the cessation of hostilities, including the three super CVBs of 45,000 tons each. By the end of 1947, 20 post-war cruisers, 77 destroyers, and 32 submarines also joined the fleet, while the five destroyer escorts under construction came off the ways within a year after the war’s end. The only other type of ship not falling severely under the cut-back was the auxiliary, of which only the hundred-odd vessels, totalling one-quarter million tons, already begun were completed by the end of 1946.

--13--

The programs for self-propelled district craft and large landing craft, each averaging almost 57,000 tons, terminated little more than a year following the war's end.

The 2,699 small landing craft and 52 patrol craft under construction in August 1945 were completed within six months.

All mine craft, except 31 minesweepers (AM) totalling 21,705 tons and 1 motor minesweeper (YMS), were cancelled immediately upon the surrender of Japan.

Most of the 102 non-self-propelled district craft already under construction were quickly completed before the end of 1945. The breakdown of this post-war production by type of ship from July 1945 as projected through the year 1947 is presented in Table 76. In terms of dollar value, the two year expenditures of this post-war new construction program during the last half of 1945 through the first half of 1947 are listed in Table 77.

--14--

TABLE 76

POST-WAR SHIPBUILDING CONSTRUCTION JULY 1945 PROJECTED THROUGH DECEMBER 1947

July to Dec. 1945

1946

1947

No.

Tonnage

No.

Tonnage

No.

Tonnage

COMBATANT

Battleships (BB)

1

45,000

Aircraft Carriers:

CV

3

81,300

4

108,400

CVE

6

80,520

4

53,680

CVL

2

29,000

CVB

2

90,000

1

45,000

Cruisers:

CA

4

54,500

4

58,000

3

51,000*

CB

1

27,500

CL

2

20,000

6

52,700

1

14,700

Destroyers (DD)

35

77,000

40

88,000

2

4,100**

Destroyers Escort (DE)

1

1,275

4

5,100

Submarines (SS)

13

20,058

18

27.908

1

1.570

Total Combatant

66

424,653

85

540,288

7

71,370

MINECRAFT

Minesweepers (AM)

19

13,205

12

7,500

0

0

Motor Minesweepers (YMS)

1

207

0

0

0

0

Total Mine Craft

20

13,412

12

7,500

0

0

PATROL CRAFT

Motor Gun Boats (PGM)

2

550

0

0

0

0

Motor Torpedo Boats (PT)

50

1,762

0

0

0

0

Total Patrol Craft

52

2,312

0

0

0

0

[hr]

* Work suspended on CA 141 8/12/45; not included here.  
** 2 DD's - no date available included in 1947.

--15--

POST-WAR SHIPBUILDING CONSTRUCTION JULY 1945 PROJECTED THROUGH DECEMBER 1947

July to Dec. 1945

1946

1947

No.

Tonnage

No.

Tonnage

No.

Tonnage

AUXILIARY

Destroyer Tenders (AD)

5

40,000

6

48,000

Miscellaneous Auxiliaries (AG)

2

10,600

Motor Torpedo Boats Tenders (AGP)

3

4,470

Net Laying Ships (AN)

1

545

Gasoline Tankers (AOG)

5

9,175

Barrack Ships, Self Propelled (APB)

3

6,000

3

6,000

High Speed Transport (APD)

12

16,800

Barrack Ships (N.S.P. ) (APL)

14

16,800

Repair Ships (AR)

1

8,000

1

8,000

Repair Ships Battle Damage (ARB)

2

2,980

Repair Ships Landing Craft (ARL)

9

13,410

Salvage Vessels (ARS)

4

4,708

Salvage Vessels (ARS(D))

4

3,384

Salvage Craft Tender (ARS(T))

1

1,490

Submarine Tenders (AS)

1

8.680

Submarine Tenders (ASR)

4

6,392

Ocean Going Auxiliary (ATA)

11

6,600

4

2,400

Ocean Tugs, Fleet (ATF)

7

8,022

2

2,292

Ocean Tugs, Rescue (ATR)

1

852

Seaplane Tenders (Large) (AV)

1

8,500

Seaplane Tenders (Small ) (AVP)

2

3,132

Total Auxiliary

85

160,416

24

86,816

DISTRICT CRAFT (SELF PROP)

Degaussing Vessels (YDG)

1

625

Covered Lighters (YF)

31

9,920

Garbage Lighters (YG)

6

1,110

5

925

Fuel Oil Barges (YO)

30

12,400

1

422

Gasoline Barges (YOG)

9

3,798

1

422

District Patrol Craft (YP)

2

750

Harbor Tugs (Big) (YTB)

51

15,750

3

930

Harbor Tugs (Little) (YTL)

28

1,736

Water Barges (YW)

17

7,174

Total (S.P.) District Craft

175

53,263

10

2,699

--16--

POST-WAR SHIPBUILDING CONSTRUCTION JULY 1945 PROJECTED THROUGH DECEMBER 1947

July to Dec. 1945

1946

1947

No.

Tonnage

No.

Tonnage

No.

Tonnage

DISTRICT CRAFT (NON-S.P.)

Open Lighters (YC)

21

2,910

Aircraft Transportation Lighters (YCV)

4

1,708

Covered Lighters (YF)

43

19,340

1

200

Oil Storage Barges (YOS)

14

1,540

Floating Workshops (YR)

2

1,080

3

1,620

Sludge Removal Barges (YSR)

14

2.748

Total (N.S.P.) District Craft

98

29,326

4

1,820

LANDING CRAFT (LARGE)

Landing Ship, Dock (LSD)

4

18,000

1

4,500

Landing Ship, Tank (LST)

3

4,860

Landing Ship, Medium (Rocket) (LSM(R))

25

18,250

Landing Ship, Medium (LSM)

23

11,270

Total large Landing Craft

52

47,520

4

9,360

0

0

LANDING CRAFT (SMALL)

Landing Craft, Electric .16 T.

58

9.3

Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM(6))

456

10,077.6

landing Craft, Personnel (LCP(L))

110

704.0

Landing Craft, Personnel (LCP(R))

63

403.2

Landing Craft, Vehicle & Personnel (LCVP)

906

7,248.0

Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT(3))

305

3,324.5

Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT(4))

691

7,601.0

Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT(A)(5))

110

1,892.0

Total Small Landing Craft

2,699

31,259.6

0

0

0

0

--17--

TABLE 77

SEMI-ANNUAL VALUE OF SHIP COMPLETIONS FOR TWO POST-WAR YEARS JULY 1945 PROJECTED THROUGH JUNE 1947

CLASS AND TYPE OF VESSEL

1945

1946

1947

2ND HALF

1ST HALF

2ND HALF

1ST HALF

NEW CONSTRUCTION - TOTAL

$1,109,444,826

$1,039,552,482

$377,401,000

$132,600,000

COMBATANT

674,644,058

878,117,000

339,121,000

132,600,000

BATTLESHIP BB

0

0

0

AIRCRAFT CARRIER CV

53,200,000

330,000,000

0

AIRCRAFT CARRIER, LARGE CVB

144,404,500

0

70,500,000

AIRCRAFT CARRIER, SMALL CVL

0

32,165,000

32,165,000

AIRCRAFT CARRIER, ESCORT CVE

82,035,600

54,000,000

0

LARGE CRUISER CB

0

0

53,240,000

HEAVY CRUISER CA

81,273,000

119,700,000

33,500,000

100,500,000

LIGHT CRUISER CL

24,656,000

89,200,000

76,700,000

32,100,000

DESTROYER DD

225,011,000

191,802,000

59,016,000

DESTROYER ESCORT DE, BDE

4,485,000

3,500,000

3,500,000

SUBMARINE SS

59,578,958

57,750,000

10,500,000

MINE CRAFT

40,696,000

260,000

4,200,000

PATROL CRAFT

14,195,222

AUXILIARIES

185,201,000

125,314,190

33,400,000

LANDING CRAFT

112,486,646

21,881,800

DISTRICT CRAFT

82,219,900

13,979,492

680,000

--18--

IV. BACKBONE OF THE SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM: DYNAMIC LEADERSHIP.

It is not in post-script that we now consider one of the most vital factors in the successful fulfillment of the unprecedented shipbuilding demands made upon the Bureau of Ships: dynamic and intelligent leadership.

With the formation of the Bureau in June 1940, Rear Admiral S. M. Robinson, until then the head of the new abolished Bureau of Engineering, was appointed as the Chief of the Bureau of Ships; Rear Admiral Van Keuren, who had been head of the Bureau of Construction and Repair which also had been abolished under the consolidation of June 1942, then became Assistant Chief of the newly formed Bureau of Ships.

When Vice Admiral Robinson transferred to the head of the Office of Production and Management (OPM) soon after our entry into the war, Rear Admiral Van Keuren succeeded him as Chief of the Bureau and Rear Admiral Jones became Assistant Chief.

Less than a year later, however, on 1 November 1942, two officers, who were to lead the Bureau throughout the rest of the war in that period of unprecedented ship production, assumed leadership of the Bureau of Ships. Captain (now Vice Admiral) E. L. Cochrane, USN, received the rank of Rear Admiral upon his appointment as Chief of the Bureau, and Captain (now Vice Admiral) E. W. Mills, USN, advanced to the rank of Rear Admiral upon his appointment as Deputy Chief at that time. Since the extreme success enjoyed by these officers in their responsible positions reflected to a considerable degree their comprehensive preparatory background, it may be well to include herewith a brief biographical sketch of each ae a prelude to a discussion of their accomplishments as Bureau chiefs.

--19--

VICE ADMIRAL EDWARD L. COCHRANE, U.S.N.
Chief, Bureau of Ships, November 1942 - November 1946

--20--

A. VICE ADMIRAL EDWARD LULL COCHRANE, U.S. NAVY

Edward Cochrane, son of the late Brigadier General Henry Clay Cochrane, U. S. Marine Corps, Retired, and Mrs. Elizabeth Lull Cochrane was born in Mare Island, California, March 18, 1892. He attended Chester, Pennsylvania High School and the University of Pennsylvania before his appointment to the United States Naval Academy from Pennsylvania in 1910. While a Midshipman, he won his letter in fencing. He was manager of the fencing team, the Academy Sabre, fencing champion in his second class and senior years, vicepresident of the Intercollegiate Fencing Association in 1914 and a member of the "Lucky Bag" there. His name was engraved on the cup presented by the General Society, Sons of the American Revolution, as the midshipman most proficient in great gun target practice or practical ordnance and gunnery. He graduated with distinction, standing second in his class. He was commissioned an ensign in June 1914, and joined the USS RHODE ISLAND, serving in her during the occupation of Vera Cruz, Mexico, and until January 1916. Selected for further training in preparation for transfer to the Construction Corps,

Ensign Cochrane reported in January 1916 to the Post-Graduate School, Annapolis, Maryland and upon completion of his course them, was ordered to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he was taking the special course in Naval Construction when the Halted States entered the World War I. His course at Massachusetts Institute of Technology thus interrupted for active participation in the war, he was appointed an assistant Naval Constructor in June 1917 as a lieutenant (jg) in

--21--

the Construction Corps and served throughout World War I in the Hull Division of the Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

In October 1919, as a Lieutenant senior grade, he reentered Massachusetts Institute of Technology to complete his post-graduate course and in June 1920 received his Master of Science degree in Naval Architecture. He then returned to the Philadelphia Navy Yard where he served in the Hull Division, first in charge of construction of two battle cruisers and later in charge of repairs until April 1924 when he reported for duty in the Design Division (Submarines) of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Navy Department, Washington,

D. C. On 5 June of that year, Lieutenant Cochrane assumed the rank of Lieutenant Commander. In 1929 he served as technical adviser to the United States Delegation to the Conference on Safety of Life at Sea held in London, England. After his return to the United States in September 1929, be assumed duty in connection with submarine construction at the Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, where he remained until May 1933, when he was ordered to duty as Force Constructor on the staff of the Commander Scouting Force, United States Fleet, serving in this capacity until August 1935. During this service, Lieutenant Commander Cochrane was promoted to the rank of full commander. In September 1935, Commander Cochrane returned to the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Navy Department, where he served in the Design Division until September 1940 with the exception of three months under instruction at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, in 1939. During this period, the Bureau of Construction and Repair was consolidated with the Bureau of Engineering in June 1940

--22--

and designated the Bureau of Ships and coincident with this consolidation Commander Cochrane was transferred to the line of the Navy and designated as engineering duty only.

In September 1940, Captain Cochrane went to London, England as assistant Naval Attache at the American Embassy. During the war blitz of 1940-41, he studied battle damage to British warships and also made a survey of anti-submarine warfare, returning to the Halted States in January 1941 with an understanding of the need for small anti-submarine vessels. This idea subsequently grew into the destroyer escort design.

Upon his return from England, Captain Cochrane reported for duty as assistant to the Bead of the Design Section in the Bureau of Ships, Navy Department, where he served until November 1942. In December 1941 Captain Cochrane accompanied the Secretary of the Navy, the late Frank Knox, to Pearl Harbor for the purpose of inspecting the damage resulting from the Japanese attack and to aid in planning for the salvage and repair of those ships. On 1 November 1942, Captain Cochrane was appointed Chief of the Bureau of Ships with the rank of Rear Admiral.

--23—

VICE ADMIRAL EARLE W. MILLS, USN,
Assistant Chief, 1942 - 1946 Chief, Bureau of Ships, November 1946.

--24--

E. VICE ADMIRAL EARLE W. MILLS, U. S. N.

Earle W. Mille was born in Little Rock, Arkansas on 24 June 1896. After finishing high school at Nashville, Arkansas, in 1913, he entered the University of Arkansas that same year looking toward an Electrical Engineering degree. He withdrew from the University of Arkansas in 1914 to accept appointment to the Naval Academy.

At both the University of Arkansas and the Naval Academy, he took a prominent part in athletics playing varsity football for three years. In 1917 he was awarded the Thompson Trophy Cup as the midshipman who had made the outstanding contribution to athletics at the Naval Academy during that year.

His graduation from Annapolis was advanced to June 1917 because of the impact of World War I and during that conflict Ensign Mills served as a junior officer in the USS MINNESOTA until that ship was damaged by a mine, after which he was transferred to destroyer duty. He served as a regular line officer in the Navy in all grades from ensign to lieutenant commander during the period 1917 to 1933 and performed duty in battleships, destroyers and cruisers.

In 1922 to 1924 he took a post-graduate course in Electrical Engineering at the Naval Academy and at Columbia University where he earned his Master of Science degree in Naval Engineering. He also served in the Production Department of the Navy Yard, Puget Sound from 1928 to 1930. As a junior officer, Admiral Mille had several tours of staff duty and was Flag Lieutenant to the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet from 1930 to 1932 when he became Engineer Officer of the TBS MILWAUKEE. After four years of design work in the Bureau of Engineering, Lieutenant Commander Mills was ordered to duty as Engineer

--25--

Officer on the staff of Commander Destroyers U.S. Fleet and served in that capacity until late 1939 when he returned to design duty in the new Bureau of Ships.

In order to study the ship and machinery damage sustained by the British Fleet, Commander Mills was ordered to England in the fall of 1940 as an observer during the blitz of that period. He was promoted to captain for permanent rank on 30 June 1942 and five months later on 1 November 1942, Captain Mills assumed the rank of Rear Admiral upon his appointment as Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Ships.

--26--

C. BUREAU LEADERSHIP:

With these complementary backgrounds, the two chiefs of the Bureau were able to face each problem with a wealth of valuable experience, either individual or collective, from which they might draw. As specified by Congressional legislation, one possessed a thorough background in naval architecture while the other specialized in engineering.

Admiral Cochrane had been concerned with the design of almost every type and class of ship; he knew the construction of a vessel from the secondary component manufacturers’ level up; he had been closely associated with private industry and therefore recognized the prime necessity for sound relations and common understanding between government agency and business; he had been intimately involved in the ship salvage work and repair of the British fleet damaged during the 1940 "blitz" and of the American fleet damaged and sunk at Pearl Harbor; and, he recognized with considerable foresight the U-boat menace which was to prove ao formidable a threat to our lines of communications in the Atlantic and he therefore planned for an anti-submarine ship design and building program.

Admiral Mills carried the hall through his naval service as he did on the gridiron: with great drive and enthusiasm. Although his one year of college training had centered upon electrical engineering, Admiral Mills became a regular officer of the line following hie graduation from the Naval Academy during World War I. He did return to electrical engineering, however, in the early twenties with two years of post-graduate work and then with two years of production work at the Puget Sound Navy Yard. This duty, compounded with several tours of staff assignments, gave him an excellent

--27--

initial administrative background. Hie four years of design work in the Bureau of Engineering in the early thirties, followed by engineering officer duties ship board and on staff further increased his technical experience and knowledge of engineering problems at first hand. Returning to the newly formed Bureau of Ships, Admiral Mills joined forces with Admiral Cochrane (both then Commanders) and began the "two-man" team which carried on through the war with such flying colors. One was Assistant to the Head of the Design Division, the other Machinery Assistant. During the "blitz" during the fall of 1940, both officers went to England to study the ship damage, salvage and repair sustained by the British fleet. The knowledge they gained there, applied to our ships at Pearl Harbor, proved of inestimable value during a critical period in our fight for national survival. Then, in November 1942, the "two man" team skyrocketed from assistants to the Head of the Design Division to the highest post of the rapidly expanding Bureau of Ships, thereby assuming responsibility for the design, construction and maintenance of the proposed Five Ocean Navy.

Admiral Cochrane in August 1944 made a three months' trip to the Pacific to study battle damage and to observe the operational conduct of our vessels, including the invasion of Palau. In July, 1945, Vice Admiral Cochrane accompanied Secretary of Navy Forrestal on a trip to Germany, where he visited a number of industrial plants and technical centers. From Germany they returned to England where similar visits were conducted. The early events leading up to V-J Day, however, occasioned the shortening of this trip and he returned to Washington August 14, 1945. Upon his completion of duty as Chief of the Bureau of Ships in November 1946, Admiral Cochrane then became Chief of the Material Division, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

--28--

For his outstanding achievements during World War II, in which period the U.S. Navy became the greatest seapower in the history of the world, Vice Admiral Cochrane was awarded the Honorary Knight Commander of the Military Division of the Order of the British Empire and the Distinguished Service Medal, the citation of the latter being quoted herewith in full.

--29--

JANUARY 14, 1946

CITATION FOR DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL PRESENTED

"For exceptionally meritorious service to the Government of the United States in a duty of great responsibility in the Design Division of the Bureau of Ships from December 7, 1941, to November 2, 1942 and as Chief of the Bureau of Ships from November 23, 1942, to August 31, 1945. An administrator of foresight, judgment and extraordinary professional ability, Vice Admiral Cochrane achieved distinctive success in his skilled direction of the design and construction of a vast number of vessels, many of new and revolutionary types during a period of critical urgency. Inspiring in his subordinates his own high standards of accomplishments in the performance of exacting duties, he was directly instrumental in enlarging the United States Fleet and in fitting it out for combat at a rate unprecedented in the history of Naval warfare. His distinguished service throughout this period contributed essentially to the successful prosecution of the war and reflects the highest credit upon Vice Admiral Cochrane and the United States Naval Service."

***

--30--

Admiral Mills, in the administration of the Navy's shipbuilding program, worked closely with the Maritime Commission, particularly in connection with the construction of the large numbers of troop transports cargo vessels, escort carriers, frigates and landing ships, which the Maritime Commission carried on for the Navy's account and which proved of such tremendous operational importance to our fleet. At the end of the year 1945, he advanced to the rank of Vice Admiral for temporary services and, on 1 November 1945, with the transfer of Admiral Cochrane, he assumed duty as Chief of the Bureau of Ships. Assignment to this important post lasting for a period of four years, the vital post-war responsibilities of the Bureau fall entirely into his competent and experienced hands. For his extremely meritorious services during World War II, Vice Admiral Mills had conferred upon him the rank of Commander in the Order of the British Empire and, by the Secretary of the United States Navy, the Distinguished Service Medal, the citation of which follows in full.

--31--

JANUARY 14, 1946

CITATION FOR DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL PRESENTED

"For exceptionally meritorious service to the Government of the United States in a duty of great responsibility as Engineering Assistant to the Head of the Design Division in the consolidated Bureaus of Engineering and Construction and Repair from September 1939 to November 1942 and as Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ships from November 1942 to November 1945. Responsible for vital decisions concerning the engineering and electrical plans of all major fleet units designed since 1939, Rear Admiral Mille supervised the development of the adapted designs and provided for the fleet electrical and engineering installations which were reliable and highly resistant to damage by excessive operation or enemy action. His judgment and foresight were essential factors in the development of high pressure, high temperature, steam, main machinery for the ships of our Fleet. Throughout this prolonged period of duty Rear Admiral Mills has rendered invaluable service to the Navy, both in establishing the Bureau of Ships and in expanding and maintaining the United States Fleet. By his professional ability, leadership and devotion to the fulfillment of important assignments he contributed materially to the successful prosecution of the war and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

--32--

Thus the Bureau of Ships enjoyed the skilled, forceful leadership of two officers whose cooperation, complementary abilities and experiences, and high-mindedness set a standard of action which was reflected throughout the entire organization. An embryonic Bureau, born out of internal conflict and disagreements, sprang rapidly to full responsibility and maturity through capable leadership and under the pressure of international conflict.

V. ATOMIC AGE AND THE BUREAU OF SHIPS:

As instantaneously as an atom splits to destroy and to convert itself, so, in the relative historical scheme of things, was the world thrust headlong into what might be termed "The Atomic Age". However dark and malignant the hand of fear which spreads throughout the globe with the advent of this new "omnipotent force", the Navy approaches the post-war era with this force as only another of the many important conditioning factors in the military order of things. In order to discuss fully this post-war approach of the Navy, this last section of the Bureau's history will concern itself not only with various aspects of the atomic bomb but also with a full account of the other important naval factors relative to the past, present and future.

Chapter XIX contains, first, a discourse upon the design developments of U.S. naval vessels in World War II according to class and type, as well as upon the post-war design advancements.

Chapter XX follows with a study of the all important research and development program of the Bureau of Ships which aided so materially in making the United States' Navy the best equipped and moat technically advanced sea-power in the world.

--33--

The next chapter then covers the comprehensive field of electronics in all of its variegated wartime and post-war aspects; design, procurement, distribution, installation and maintenance, and its organizational set-up within the Bureau.

Another section concerns itself with the historic "Operation Crossroads"; the testing of the effects of atomic bomb upon naval vessels.

Chapter XXIII then discusses the Navy Yard reorganization effected after the cessation of hostilities. Based upon experience acquired during wartime operations and administration, this stream-lining of the lines of authority and of the use of men and materials would prove of utmost value in any re-activation of shipbuilding in the event of any future mobilization.

Chapter XXIV follows with a description of the reserve fleet and how technical advances aided in the preserving of inactive vessels so that they might be returned to battle readiness in a minimum of time at a minimum of cost.

The last chapter summarizes the past, which is prologue, and from it we glean lessons for the future.

--34--

CHAPTER XXX

SHIP DESIGN IN WORLD WAR II

--34b--

CHAPTER XIX

DESIGN DEVELOPMENTS OF U.S. NAVAL VESSELS IN WORLD WAR II.

It is stated by Navy Regulations that: "The Bureau of Ships, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, is charged with and responsible for the design, construction, and maintenance of all ships of the Navy..." Although this study has already

shown that the Bureau of Ships put into effect a war-time construction and maintenance program never equalled in the annals of history, it has yet to discuss the degree of success the first responsibility design - enjoyed during World War II.

In this regard the qualitative characteristics of the Bureau's wartime program fully equalled the quantitative. Not only did new construction coming off the ways incorporate the latest in design developments, but also the older vessels received last minute improvements wherever possible and the completely new types of vessels introduced to naval warfare - such as landing craft - were designed with such care and skill that few modifications of original plans were required in later production. These vessels newly introduced designs which challenged the most imaginative minds and were produced in numbers thought impossible by pre-war standards.

It may be stated that in general three principal factors conditioned these developments of ships' designs during the war: the introduction of electronic devices and the considerable operational

--35--

dependence upon them; the development of high-pressure, high-temperature main propulsion machinery and greater reduction in reduction gears of main propulsion machinery of all ships from destroyers up; and, the necessity for increased armament.

In order to depict the design developments of World War II, each type of ship will be studied according to design evolution as reflected in successive classes. In view of the limited scope of this study, however, only major changes or developments will he mentioned of the following ship types discussed: Battleships, Cruisers, Carriers, Destroyers, Destroyer Escorts, Submarines, Minor Combatant Craft, Landing Craft, Naval Auxiliaries and Miscellaneous Types.

--36--

1. BATTLESHIPS (BB)

The major design changes of the "Battlewagon" in World War II were the increase in size and displacement, the introduction of more powerful main propulsion machinery with a resultant increase of speed, the improvement of anti-aircraft defense, armor changes, and internal rearrangements due to electronic innovations.

In anti-aircraft protection, the battleships constructed in World War II made great advances over previous designs. The 1.1" guns were changed to the more effective 40mm Bofors, and the relatively ineffective .50-cal. guns were replaced by the 20mm Oerlikon. In order to add additional as well as more effective guns, boats and cranes were removed to make platforms available.

With regard to protection, the NORTH CAROLINA class used external slanting armor plating and improved steel, thereby decreasing their vulnerability, but in the later ships ---- SOUTH DAKOTA and IOWA classes ----- an internal slanted armor belt resulted in even further improvements.

In addition, remote fire control was incorporated within the original designs of these ships built during the war. This new method later replaced the old straight-forward, follow-the-pointer system on five old "wagons".

The development of electronics caused considerable internal design alterations also, for the CIC's plotting, fire control, etc. necessitated a rearrangement and redesign within the ships to house

--37--

the equipment and to provide stations where the information might be coordinated.

In general, other principal improvements included increased sea-keeping qualities over-all, highly improved air conditioning and living conditions, degaussing of all ships ---- an activity which commenced just before the outbreak of war ---- the substitution of twin rudders for a single one, and increased fuel capacity for the re-fuelling of ships at sea.

At the inception of war, the United States Fleet had in its ranks 19 battleships, two of which ---- ARIZONA and OKLAHOMA ---- were sunk in the attack upon Pearl Harbor. These, however, were more than compensated for by the placing in service of the two great battleships NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON one month prior to the attack. Since that date, eight more have joined the Fleet. SOUTH DAKOTA, INDIANA, MASSACHUSETTS, ALABAMA, IOWA, NEW JERSEY, MISSOURI, and WISCONSIN. The last, fittingly enough, was launched on 7 December 1943 --- two years to the day following the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor.

Some of the developments in the design evolution of battleships may be most readily compared in the following Table 78 of different selected classes.

--38--

TABLE 78

BATTLESHIPS (BB)

COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF SELECTED WAR I, PEACETIME AND WAR II DESIGNS

--39--

BB No.

Name

Built

length
o. a.

Displ.
Trial

Speed
Trial

Horse
Power

ARMAMENT

Main

Secondary

Anti Aircraft

36

NEVADA

1916

575'

32,750

20 Kts.

25,000

10-14", 45 cal.

12-5", 51 cal.

8-5", 25 cal

42

IDAHO

1919

624'

37,000

21.7

40,000

12-14", 50 cal.

12-5", 51 cal.

8-5", 25 cal

55

NORTH CAROLINA

1941

740'

42,000

27.6

121,000

9-16", 45 cal.

20-5" 38 cal.

24 quad. 40mm

57

SOUTH DAKOTA

1942

680'

42,900

27.8

130,000

9-16” 45 cal.

16-5" 38 cal.

17 quad. 40mm

61

IOWA

1943

867'

53,900

32.5

212,000

9-16" 50 cal.

20-5" 38 cal

19 quad. 40mm

--40--

USS NEVADA

--41--

USS WASHINGTON

--41—

NAVY YARD, NEW YORK, JULY 24, 1944
F1112C228 – U. S. S. BB 63 – USS MISSOURI -45,000 CLASS

--42--

2. HEAVY CRUISERS (CA)

The principal differences between pre-war and wartime heavy cruisers centered about slight increases of length, beam, and horse power; a jump of about 50% in displacement tannage; and a considerable improvement in armament. The incorporation of electronic equipment within the original design of later ships of the wartime BALTIMORE and post-war OREGON CITY classes, improved to a marked degree the fighting characteristics of these heavy cruisers, although all older ships were also converted to accommodate this gear in the best manner possible.

In order to better compare statistics of the 18 pre-war heavy cruisers (as illustrated by the NORTHAMPTON class, the USS CHESTER, CA27, commissioned in June 1930), the 17 wartime cruisers (the BALTIMORE class, designed between July 1940 and December 1941), and the 3 post-war cruisers (the OREGON CITY class completed very soon after cessation of hostilities and the SALEM designed at the end of the war), Table 79 contains the statistics of the principal differences already mentioned.

--43--

TABLE 79

HEAVY CRUISER COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF SELECTED PRE-WAR AND WARTIME DESIGNS

SHIP CLASS

LENGTH
O. A.

BEAM

TRIAL
DISPL.

TRIAL
SPEED

SHAFT
H. P.

ARMAMENT

MAIN

SECOND

AA

NORTHAMPTON

USS CHESTER CA 27
Comm: 6-'30
Cost: * $10,815,000

600’

66'

10,707

33

107,000

9 - 8" - 55 cal.

4 5" 25 cal.
(single D. P.)

BALTIMORE

USS BALTIMORE CA 68
Comm: 4-'43
Cost: * $23,618,000

672'

71'

16,570

32.6

120,000

9 - 8" - 55 cal.

12 - 5"-38 cal.
(twin D. P.)

12 quad
40mm

OREGON CITY

USS OREGON CITY CA 122
Comm: 2-'46
Cost: * $25,171,000

673’

71'

16,570

32.6

120,000

9 - 8" – 55 cal.

12 - 5"-38 cal.
(twin D. P.)

11 quad
2 twin
40mm

SALEM

USS SALEM CA 139
Comm: 6-48
Cost: *$28,550,000

717'

76'

19,930

33

120,000

9 - 8" – 55 cal.
rapid fire

12 5" – 38 cal.
(twin D. P.)

12 3"/50
cal. twins

[hr]

* Contract price of hull and machinery.

--44--

With regard to armament, the original anti-aircraft batteries of the NORTHAMPTON class consisted of .50 caliber and 1.1" automatic weapons. With the war, however, all boats and cranes (except aircraft) were removed to allow for an increased allowance and conversion to 40mm ---- five quad, and four twin ---- and 20mm anti-aircraft batteries. In addition, three 5"/25 cal. were added.

While the first four ships of the BALTIMORE class had two aircraft cranes on the fantail and a conning tower (an armored steering house for battle), the following vessels eliminated one crane and the conning tower.

Within the BALTIMORE class itself, additional design changes were made as the war progressed. The CA 68-71 were designed as Division Flag vessels: that is, having accommodations and offices for a heavy cruiser division commander's staff. The CA 72-75 were for Force Flag which meant an even greater increase of flag rank and staff accommodations and facilities. The remainder of

this class ---- CA 130-133, 135 and 136 ---- became non-flag ships but possessed flag plotting rooms should battle damage force the command and staff to transfer from the flag vessel to this type ship.

The post-war OREGON CITY class CA 122-124 ---- improved the heavy cruiser design by incorporating within its original plans space for the latest system of electronics, a minimization of above deck structures with only one stack and with one crane on the fantail, a lower silhouette, and accommodations and facilities as a division flag ship.

--45--

The SALEM class ---- CA 139, 134, and 148 ---- completed in 1946 and designed near the war's end, also incorporated within its design all of the latest improvements dictated by war experience. Undoubtedly the greatest advancement in heavy cruiser effectiveness became apparent in this ship, with the introduction of main battery rapid fire 8"-55 caliber guns.

--46--

USS PENSACOLA, CA-24

--47—

U. S. S BALTIMORE, CA-68
Starboard Side.

--48--

 

3. LARGE CRUISERS (CB)

The design of the large ALASKA class was the result of a series of studies commenced when treaty limitations went by the board and we found ourselves no longer bound by any limitations on the size of ships. This resulted in the construction of three large cruisers, the contracts for which were signed in September 1940, the first keel being laid ten days after Pearl Harbor, the second in the following February, and the last in December 1943. The first two, completed at costs of $45,616,000 each in June and September of 1944, were able to participate in the late operations of the war, while work on the third was suspended.

The primary difference between the CBs and the CAs rested in characteristics of length, beam, displacement, accommodations, and shaft horse power, and in the increased power of the main batteries to 12" guns. Brief statistics for the ALASKA, GUAM, and HAWAII include:

Length Over-All:

808' 6"

Extreme Beam:

91' 1"

Trial Displacement:

35,264 Tons

Trial Speed;

31.4 Knots

Accommodations:

   Officer:

140

   Enlisted:

2,111

Shaft Horsepower:

150,000

--49—

“U.S.S. CB-1
SURFACE VIEW ‘BROADSIDE’
NAVY YARD, PHILA., PA,
JULY 30, 1944
1512-44”

U.S.S. ALASKA

--50--

 

Armament:

Main Battery:

9- 12"-50 cal. in 3 turrets

Secondary:

12- 5"-38 cal. (twin D. P.)

40-MM AA mounts:

14 quad.

--51--

4. LIGHT CRUISERS (CL)

Since the two classes of light cruisers developed during the war differed considerably in physical characteristics in view of their dissimilar operational missions, a comparison with pre-war cruisers may best be presented in tabular form as listed in Table 80.

The two principal classes developed during the war were the ATLANTA and CLEVELAND. In view of its anti-aircraft mission, the ATLANTA class had as its main battery 16 5"/38 caliber guns and numerous 40MM and 20MM anti-aircraft mounts. As a consequence, this ship was smaller in every respect to the CLEVELAND class which possessed 12 6"/47 caliber guns in the main batteries and 12 5"/38 caliber guns in the secondary to accomplish its principal mission against surface and land targets.

Under the post-war program, the WORCESTER class incorporated all of the improvements gleaned from war experience in its original design and, as may be seen in the following table and pictures, is an expanded edition of the CLEVELAND class.

--52--

USS OMAHA, CL-4

--53--

USS BIRMINGHAM, CL-62

--54--

USS HOUSTON, CL-81 (ex-VICKSBURG)

--55--

TABLE 80

LIGHT CRUISERS (CL)

COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF SELECTED PRE-WAR, WARTIME AND POST-WAR CLASSES

SHIP CLASS

Length
Overall

Extreme
Beam

Trial
Displace.

Trial
Speed

Shaft
H. P.

Accommodations

Armament

Anti Aircraft

Officer

Enlisted

Main

Second.

OMAHA CLASS
USS OMAHA CL4

Comm: 2-’23
Cost:* $8,620,450

555'6"

55'4"

7,095 T.

34.7 K

90,000

64

617

12-6"/53 Cal. #

4-3"/50 Cal. D.P.

ATLANTA CLASS
USS SAN DIEGO CL53
Comm: 1-'42
Cost:* $12,226,000

541'6"

55 '2"

8,200 T.

31.8 k.

75,000

46

766

16-5"-38 Cal. (twin D. P)

6 quad 2 twin 40MM

CLEVELAND CLASS
USS CLEVELAND
CL55
Comm: 6-'42
Cost:* $17,990,000

610'1"

66'4"

14,000 T.

31.6 k.

100,000

62

1223

12-6"-47 Cal.

12-5"- 38 Cal. (twin D. P.)

4 quad 6 twin 40MM

WORCESTER CLASS
USS WORCESTER CL144
Comm: 1946
Cost:* $27,800,000

679'6"

70'8"

14,000 T.

53 K.

120,000

95

1286

12-6" 47 Cal. +

4-3"/50 Cal. (twin D.P .)

2-3"/50 Cal.

(single)


[hr]

*  = Contract price of hull & machinery.
+  = In 3 turrets

" = 8 single, 2 twin

--56--

 

5. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS:

In production and design of aircraft carriers one of the most outstanding records of the war was achieved. Although, the U. S. Navy had but six carriers commissioned at the time of Pearl Harbor, by the war's end 158 more had been constructed, of which 31 "baby flattops" were transferred to the United Kingdom. In all respects, the "flat top" program proved to be the most dynamic of all the combatant vessel programs. In view of the foregoing information and of the extreme operational importance of carriers, during the conflict, it may be well from an historic standpoint to study this program in greater detail than the others.

It was not until over a year after the armistice of World War I that the first plane took off from a naval vessel - the USS PENNSYLVANIA. Realizing the significance of this event in naval operations, the Navy converted an auxiliary collier vessel into the first aircraft carrier, the USS LANGLEY, which was commissioned on 20 March 1922.

In 1927, CV 2 and CV 3 - the LEXINGTON and SARATOGA - were commissioned. Their flight decks rested upon converted hulls of battle cruisers which had been ordered during World War I. The SARATOGA's lengthened flight deck of 909,5" even now stands as the longest vessel on the Navy List except for the three CVB class carriers. Then, in 1931, the keel, was laid for CV 4 - the RANGER - , the first United States vessel to be built and designed solely as a carrier. This smallest of CVs displaced only 14,500 tons and had an overall length of 769'.

--57--

During the revival of our shipbuilding program in the early 1930's, CV 5 and CV 6 - the YORKTOWN and ENTERPRISE - were ordered and by 1938 both were commissioned. This 20,000 ton, 810' YORKTOWN class had still another sister ship - the HORNET, CV 6 - which was commissioned in 1941 but not completed until after our entry into the war. The CV 7, the WASP, came under the terms of the London Peace Treaty of 1922 limiting this ship to 14,700 tons.

While the last of these ships were being constructed, however, perhaps the most important program came to pass with the development of Escort Carriers or "Baby Flat-Tops". These carriers were either converted from or originally designed with auxiliary tanker or cargo hulls. This simplified design permitted greater production at a fraction of the cost of the larger carriers and enabled these vessels to serve as escorts for convoys, as aircraft transports to deliver assembled aircraft to strategic areas in large quantities, and as combatant carriers to supplement the main air striking force of the fleet. In view of their less intricate design, these ships conformed to mass production methods and constituted over 75% of the carrier construction program. The first CVE, the LONG ISLAND, was converted from a Motorship in 1940 and commissioned in June 1941. Nine months later the second CVE, the CHARGER, was commissioned, having been converted from a C3 passenger and cargo liner. The feasibility of these conversions having been proved and the wartime submarine menace having increased to serious proportions, four fleet oilers were converted to the SANGAMON class

--58--

CVE and commissioned by the fall of 1942. At the same time C3-S-A1 cargo hulls proved satisfactory for such transformation, so that before September 1942 37 CVEs of the BOGUE class were launched, 26 of which went to the United Kingdom. Then in July 1943 one of the most unusual programs commenced, for, within a period of twelve months, fifty CVEs of the CASABLANCA class were constructed by the Maritime Commission for the Navy. Although many difficulties arose from jurisdictional controversies and the non-Navy specification equipment used on these ships, in the realm of production this was a record scarcely equalled throughout the war. Immediately thereafter we developed the COMMENCEMENT BAY class, which used the same hull and approximately the same characteristics as were used in the SANGAMON class but which was designed internally as a carrier. Although the first ship of this class was not launched until May 1944, almost all nineteen of the vessels constructed were commissioned before the war's end.

The next development in the regular carrier design occurred with the ESSEX class. The first of these, CV 9, was laid down in April 1941 and commissioned at the end of 1942. This 27,000 ton carrier had twelve sister ships under the first contract and eleven more on the "repeat ESSEX class of 1942-1943", of which only four were commissioned prior to the surrender of Japan. This class ship incorporated in its original design considerable improvements over the pre-war vessels.

It was capable of carrying a greater number of planes, of carrying heavier planes, and of handling aircraft more rapidly, principally through the introduction of the deck edge elevator; it had increased catapult capacity, included much new electronic equipment,

--59--

provided greater protection of the gasoline system and had improved fire fighting equipment, especially fog foam, greater underwater protection, and increased armament.

Coincident with the ESSEXs design and development there evolved another class of carrier, the CVL or "small flat-top". The nine vessels of the 11,000 ton INDEPENDENCE class, converted from light cruiser hulls laid down just prior to Pearl Harbor, were all commissioned during 194-3. In 1944, two 14,300 ton CVLs of the SAIPAN class assumed the hull of heavy cruisers but were built from the keel up as carriers. Despite their increased operational ability, neither of these classes of ships engaged in combat.

In like manner the last class of "flat-top" developed. The CVB, or large aircraft carrier, although never having smelled the smoke of battle, stands as the supreme combat element of the post-war U.S. Fleet. These longest and heaviest of ships yet built for the Navy - the MIDWAY, F. D. ROOSEVELT, and CORAL SEA - have a full load displacement of approximately 60,000 tons and an overall length of 986'! Incorporated within the design of these Goliaths of the fleet are all of the latest developments. They have the capacity to handle bombing planes larger than any which heretofore have operated from the decks of "flat-tops".

With regard to protection, they have considerably increased firepower, together with a substantial reduction in vulnerability to bomb and torpedo attack.

--60--

In this fashion, then, the Navy not only fulfilled its fundamental wartime need for overwhelming carrier strength, but also accomplished this with the immediate application of all technical advancements and with a rapid production of "baby flat-tops" at a fraction of the coat of conventional carriers.

--61--

TABLE 81

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF PRE-WAR AND WAR II SELECTED CLASSES

CLASS

LENGTH OVERALL

DECK BEAM

STAND. DISPL.

TRIAL SPEED

HORSEPOWER

AIRCRAFT

CREW

ARMAMENT

MAIN

SECONDARY

USS SARATOGA (CV 3)
Comm: Nov. 27,

910'

106'

33,000

33.9

180,000

80+

2500+

8-8" 55 cal.

12-5" 25 cal. AA

USS RANGER (CV 4)
Comm: June 1934

769'

110'

14,500

29.7

53,500

80+

2000+

8-5" 25 cal. AA

--

USS ENTERPRISE (CV 6)
Comm May 1938

810'

83'

19,900

34.0

120,000

80+

2200+

12-5" 25 cal.

--

ESSEX CLASS:
USS ESSEX CV 9

Comm: Dec. 1942

872'

148'

27,100

32.7

150,000

80+

2500+

12-5" 38 cal. D. P.

17 quad. 40mm

INDEPENDENCE CLASS:
USS INDEPENDENCE CVL 22
(ex-CL)

Comm: Jan. 1943

623'

109'

11,000

31.6

100,000

45

1400

None

2 quad., 9 twin 40mm

BOGUE CLASS:
USS BOGUE CVE 9
(ex-M. C. Hull)
Comm: Sept. 1942

496'

112'

17.6

8,500

21+

800+

2-5", 38 cal.
D. P.

10 twin 40mm

CASABLANCA CUSS:
USS CASABLANCA CVE 55
(ex-M. C. Hull)
Comm: July 1943

512'

108'

19.3

9,000

21+

800+

1-5" 38 cal.
D. P.

8 twin 40mm

MIDWAY CLASS:
USS MIDWAY CVB 41

Comm: Post-war

968'

136'

45,000

33

212,000

100+

3000+

18-5" 54 cal. D. P.

21 quad. 40mm

--62—

--63--

USS SARATOGA, CV-3

--64—

U.S.S. ESSEX CV-9

--65--

USS MIDWAY, CVB-41

--66--

U.S.S CVL29
SURFACE VIEW “OFF THE QUARTER”
NAVY YARD, PHILA., PA., MAR. 2, 1944
[397-illegible]
U.S.S. BATAAN

--67--

USS LONG ISLAND, AVG-1

 

--68--


CVE 65
PORT BROADSIDE
NORFOLK NAVY YARD
PHOTO SERIAL 8670(44) NOV. 9, 1944
U.S.S. WAKE ISLAND

--69--

USS DAVIS, DD-395
1850 class. Starboard Bow Aerial

--70--

6. DESTROYERS (DD)

In general, the principal advancements in wartime design of destroyers included an increase in armament, size, and horsepower of main propulsion machinery, and the incorporation of the electronic developments.

In World War I, "four stack destroyers" performed a yeoman's job and, despite the introduction of new types commissioned in 1934, several of these ships remained in the fleet and again contributed materially to sweeping the seas in another world conflict. Of the "four pipers" retained in service, some continued as destroyers principally in the role of escort duty; fifty were transferred in 1940 to Great Britain, who used them for general service; the remainder were converted into high speed transports, seaplane tenders, light minelayers, and high-speed minesweepers.

In 1934 a major design development was introduced with the FARRAGUT or DD 348 class. Although this larger ship differed noticeably from the War I destroyers, the primary improvement centered about the engineering developments, with modest increments in armament.

The horsepower ratings jumped from 16,369 H. P. for the War I ALLEN destroyers to 42,800 H.P., while the armament improved from four 4", 50 caliber and one caliber AA guns to five 5”, 38 caliber guns. The eight destroyers of this class, together with the eight of the PORTER class and the sixteen of the MAHAN class commissioned in 1938, possess considerable similarity in design and operational performance.

--71--

In 1937, however, an even greater advancement came to pass in destroyer design, with the introduction of high-pressure, high-temperature propulsion machinery in the SOMERS or DD 381 class. The five ships of this 1,850-ton class had improved armament also, while the 1,500 ton FANNING and CRAVEN classes, developed at the same time but commissioned entirely in 1937, did not have the fire power or the horsepower rating of this newest ship class. Up until our entry into the war, few advancements were incorporated within the succeeding classes: MCCALL, SIMS, BENSON, and LIVERMORE, all of which displaced less than the SOMERS. During our participation in hostilities, two classes of destroyers were introduced: FLETCHER and SUMNER. The FLETCHER or DD 445 class, contracted for in 1940 and delivered in 1942, formed a large portion of the new "tin can" building program. In all, 175 destroyers of this class were constructed during 1942, 1943, and 1944.

As compared with the earlier ships, they were larger (2050 tonnage standard displacement), had greatly increased horsepower rating (60,000 H. P.), and were more effective operationally by the utilization of the same technical developments that permitted similar improvements in our cruisers. Despite the increased propulsion rating, the speed dropped, due to the expanded dimensions and to the heavier loading of armament, electronic gear, and personnel complement.

The 2200 ton SUMNER or DD 692 class, developed from the FLETCHER, utilized virtually the same machinery and hull but possessed improved

--72--

armament and electronic equipment. The main battery now became three twin 5", 58 cal. instead of five single 5", 38 cal. mounts, while the 40mm-AA mounts changed from five twin to two twin and two quad, mounts. With the increase of Japanese suicide dives against our fleet in the later stages of the war, many of the DD 692 destroyers became "Picket Boats" with latest electronic devices added and torpedoes removed to make place for more 40mm-AA mounts. The SUMNER class also had a modification within itself. The majority of the seventy 2200 ton DD 692 class destroyers were constructed in 1944, while 105 2400 ton destroyers, called the DD 710 class (long hull), built in 1945 and 1946, had a 14 foot section added in order to increase cruising range; in all other respects it remined essentially the same.

One of the principal factors in the predominance of the FLETCHER class among operational destroyers during the war may be found in the acceleration in the rate of delivery. By 1941 the average monthly production of destroyers was 1.33. By 1943 the rate had jumped to 10.83 or about eight times the pre-war output. This enabled the construction of approximately 173 DD 445 class and about 110 DD 692 class destroyers during the war.

7. DESTROYER ESCORTS (DE)

One of the foremost production records coming under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships occurred in the design and construction of 374 destroyer escorts. Often referred to as Admiral Cochrane's "brainchild",

--73--

the destroyer escort program was planned and the ships designed prior to our entry in the war. It may unequivocally be stated that this foresight proved one of the most important factors in our successful operations during the defensive and turning of the tide phases of the war, when the enemies' submarine activities were such a critical menace.

Contracts were first 1st in November of 1941, one month prior to Pearl Harbor. Following our entry into the war, highest priority was assigned the destroyer escort program, which enabled the first ship to be delivered less than fifteen months later.

In general, all of the DEs were the same except for their main propulsion machinery, which differed to such an extent that the ships became designated by class according to type of propulsion rather than by number.

Two types of hulls were used: the "short" being 289'5" and the "long" 306'. Armament and general characteristics of all ships were otherwise similar except for the machinery. The type of propulsion led to the following classifications:

GMT (diesel electric drive with short hull)
DET (diesel electric drive-long hull)
FMR (same as DET with diesel gear drive)
TE (turbo-electric drive-long hull)
TEV (same as TE but with 5" guns)
TEP (same as TE but removed torpedo tubes for additional armament)
WGT (turbo-gear drive with 5" guns)

--74--

TABLE 82

DESTROYERS (DD)
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF SELECTED PRE-WAR AND WARTIME CLASSES

CLASS

Length
Over
All

Extreme
Beam

Trial
Displac.

Trial
Speed

Shaft
H. P.

Accammoda.

Armament

Off.

Enl.

Main

40mm-AA

Torp. Tubes

SAMPSON CLASS
USS ALLEN
DD 66
Comm: 1-'17
Costs: * $800,000

315'3"

30'6"

1,065 T.

31.0 K.

17,500

11

88

4-4"-50 cal. S. P.

None

2-21" Triple

FARRAGUT CLASS
USS FARRAGUT DD 348
Comm: 6-'34
C ost:* $3,034,500

341'3"

34'3"

1,594 T.

37 K.

42,800

16

171

5-5"-38 cal.

2-21" quad.

MAHAN CLASS
USS CUMMINGS DD 365

Comm: 11-'36
Cost: * $5,400,000

341'4"

35'5"

1,729 T.

39.2 K.

49,000

16

192

5-5"-38 cal. D. P.

3-21" quad.

FLETCHER CLASS
USS FLETCHER DD 445
Comm: 6-'42
Cost: * $6,330,000

376'5"

39'7"

2,800 T.

35.2 K.

60,000

20

309

5-5"-38 cal. D. P.

5-twin

2-21" quin.

SUMNER CLASS (short hull)
USS SUMNER DD 692
Comm: 1-'44
Cost: * $6,250,000

376'6"

40'10"

2,882 T.

34.2 K.

60,000

20

325

6-5"- 38 cal. D. P.

2-twin 2-quad.

2-21" quin.


[hr]

* = contract price of hull and machinery.

--75--

USS DUNCAN, DD-46

--76--

USS BORIE, DD-215

--77--

[USS KULA GULF]
CVE 108
STARBOARD BROADSIDE
WILLAMETTE IRON & STEEL CORP.
MAY 1945

--78--

USS BRADFORD, DD-446
--79--

USS JOHN W. WEEKS, DD-701

--80--

TABLE 83

DESTROYER ESCORTS (DE) COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF THE CLASSES

DESIGN

LENGTH

BEAM

TRIAL
DISPL.

TRIAL
SPEED

ACCOMMODA.

SHAFT

ARMAMENT

OFF.

ENL.

H.P.

MAIN

40mm AA

GMT

289'5"

35'

1436 T.

21.5 K.

15

183

6,000

3-3"-50 cal.
D.P.

1 quad.

TE

306'

37’

1650 T.

23.6 K.

15

198

12,000

do.

3 twin

TEV

306’

37’

1650 T.

23.6 k.

15

206

12,000

2-5"-38 cal.
D.P.

1 quad. 3 twin

FMR

306'

37’

1490 T.

21.2 K.

15

201

6,000

3-3"-50 cal.
D.P.

1 quad.
2 twin

DET

306'

37'

1525 T.

20.9 K.

15

201

6,000

do.

3 twin

WGT

306’

37'

1600 T.

24.3 K.

15

207

12 000

2-5"-38 cal.
D.P.

1 quad.
3 twin.

 

--81--


USS BRENNAN, DE-13

--82--

U.S.S. SLATER – DE-766 – PORT BOW AERIAL

--83--

8. SUBMARINES (SS);

As a result of the orderly progress which had been made during the peacetime years in the design and construction of submarines, the main problem to be solved upon the advent of war was merely the expansion of facilities. The underwater craft were undoubtedly the best prepared type of vessels in the U.S. Fleet. What they lacked was use under warlike conditions; for example, during peacetime maneuvers a dive of four hours was considered a good day's submersion -- in war, however, 18 hours under the water day after day was not uncommon.

In general, the major advances proved to be the installation of radar, the development of means to muffle main propulsion and auxiliary machinery, installation of sonar, improvement of habitability (air conditioning, better cooking facilities, etc.), improvements in fire control and torpedoes (under Bureau of Ordnance), and the improvement in diving time effected by cutting more holes in the bottom of the vessel despite the increased hazards.

As indicated by the pictures and Table 84 which follow, the pre-war submarines varied in design to a considerable degree. The O and R classes, designed during World War I, were the first large modern underwater craft. The first class approximated 172' in overall length while displacing 565 tons; the R class was larger: 186' and 610 tons. With the introduction of the S class in 1923 great strides were made for the increase in length to 231' and tonnage to 950 became possible through the greatly expanded horsepower rating from 880 to 2,000 H.P.

By 1930, however, the evolution of submarine design skipped quite a few rungs up the ladder of progress with the construction of the SS NARWHAL. The two ships of this class were among the largest submarines in the world,

--84--

displacing 3150 tons surfaced and 4,050 tons submerged and having an overall length of 371'. This permitted a great increase in armament, to two 6"-53 caliber deck guns, and an increase in horsepower rating of 6,000 for the main propulsion machinery.

The pendulum then swung quickly the other way with the introduction of the CACHALOT class which measured only 271' in length and had a displacement of 1,260 tons. The PORPOISE, SALMON, SARGO and TAMBOR classes which followed in quick succession returned to the larger design (300-312' overall), with minor improvements and modifications occurring in successive classes.

When the European War began, a new attempt was made to develop experimental designs for a small craft with a length of 243 feet and displacement of 940 tons. Further plans concerning these small, long-range submarines were quickly abandoned as the war clouds hovered over the United States.

Then, during the war, three classes of submarines were developed: the 212 or GATO class, the 285 or BALAO class, and finally the 435 class with two modifications.

The first war development -- the 212 class -- incorporated within the light hull all of the pre-war advancements. The first ship was commissioned less than a month following Pearl Harbor. The 285 class, contracted for immediately upon our entry into the war, used the same design as the GATO (212) but was constructed of high tensile steel which increased, their operating depth considerably. The last class, the 435, improved internal arrangements to contain the latest operating equipments developed and moderately increased the fuel capacity.

Armament changed somewhat during the war, not according to classes but rather by individual ships. In general, the standard armament at the war's inception consisted of one 5"-25 caliber single purpose gun mounted aft of the conning tower, and one or two 20mm-AA guns fore and aft of the tower. As the

--85--

war developed, another 5"-38 caliber gun was mounted forward of the conning tower and the more effective 40mm replaced one of the 20mm-AA guns. No deviation, however, occurred in the complement of ten torpedo tubes, although one class carried four of them topside.

The post-war underwater craft, the fastest in the world, contains all of the wartime improvements incorporated within the original design.

--86--

TABLE 84

SUBMARINES (SS)
COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF SELECTED WAR I, BETWEEN WARS, AND WAR II CLASSES

CLASS

LENGTH
OVERALL

BEAM

TRIAL
SPEED
SURFACE

NORMAL
DISPL.

Tons

FUEL
NORMAL
Gals.

CAPACITY
EMERG.
Gals.

ACCAMODAT.

ARMAMENT

Off.

Enl.

Main

40mm-AA

Tubes

O CLASS
O-2
Comm: 10-'18

172'6"

17'11"

14.6 K.

565

10,000

21,000

3

30

1-.50 cal.
AA MG.

--

4

S CLASS
S-11
Comm: 1-'23

231'

21'10"

14.8 K.

950

20,000

35,000

4

40

1-4"-
50 cal.

--

5

NARWHAL CLASS
SS 167
Comm: 5-'30

370'7"

33'4"

17.0 K.

3150

47,000

147,000

11

89

2-6"-
53 cal.

--

10

TAMBOR CLASS
SS 198
Comm: 5-'40

307'3"

27'3"

21.1 K

1770

54,000

113,000

10

69

1-5" - 25
cal. S.P.

1

10

212 CLASS
SS GATO
Comm: 12-'41

311'9"

27'3"

20.3 K.

1810

54,000

116,000

10

70

do.

1

10

285 CLASS
SS BALAO
Comm: 2-'43

311'8"

27'3"

20.3 K.

1810

54,000

116,000

10

70

do.

1

10

435 CLASS
SS CORSAIR
Comm: post-war

311'9"

27'3"

20.3 K.

1845

60,000

113,000

10

71

do.

1

10

 

--87--

USS R-1, SS-78

--88--

USS L-3, SS-42

--89--

USS ARGONAUT, SS-475

--90--

USS SNAPPER, SS-185

--91--

USS GREENLING, SS-213

--92--

USS SHAD, SS-235

--93--

9. LANDING CRAFT

Perhaps the most stimulating and spectacular of all design programs in World War II was the landing craft program. Although the Navy had begun to experiment with small landing craft in 1936, we had only a few thousands tons in this category when we entered the war. The style of warfare that subsequently, evolved required that, in 1942, a billion dollar program for the construction of landing craft be superimposed on the already heavy building schedule and that the work receive top priority until the desired quota was filled many months later.

This production included a tremendous variety of vessels, from small rubber boats to the tank landing ships more than 300 feet in length and the landing ship, dock, over 450 feet long, designed to transport and launch LCTs and LCMs. Within this range are craft designed to carry only a few men and ships with accommodations for 326, tracked craft capable of crawling over coral reefs or up beaches, craft for landing tanks or vehicles, craft for landing guns, craft for giving close fire support -- in fact, all types necessary for success in that most difficult of military operations, lending on a hostile shore.

--94--

U.S.S LUDENWALD – LSD-6 Landing Ship Dock – Broadside Aerial

--95--

LCM (Landing Craft Medium) in LSD (Landing Ship Dock)

--96--

LSM 258
STRB. BOW

NORFOLK NAVY YARD
PHOTO SERIAL B167(44) JULY 23, 1994
LANDING SHIP MEDIUM

--97--

LST 334
STBD. BOW VIEW
NORFOLK NAVY YARD, PORTSMOUTH, VA.
PHOT SERIAL 4462 (43) JAN. 5, 1943
LANDING SHIP TANK

--98--

LCI(L) – 1 JULY 1944
COMMERCIAL IRON WORKS
PORTLAND, OREGON
LANDING CRAFT INFANTRY (L)

--99--

7-PERSON BOAT
CONTRACT NO. NXS-5111
THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
LCR(S) LANDING CRAFT RUBBER (SMALL)

--100--

LCM-3 Landing Craft Medium Starboard Bow

--101--

LCT (6) Landing Craft Tank – MK VI

--102--

LCVP Landing Craft Personnel Starboard Stern Aerial

--103--

LVT-3 Landing vehicle tracked (armored) MK III

--104--

LVT(A)(1) Landing vehicle tracked (armored) MK I “Water Buffalo” armored Turret Type

--105--

 

10. MINOR COMBATANT TYPES

For a properly balanced Navy, a well founded program of minor combatant types was necessary.

Particular emphasis was placed upon patrol craft, the first designs of which were developed immediately prior to our entry into the war. This included the 110-foot sub-chaser and the 136-173 and 184-foot steel vessels. The greatest emphasis on this type of ship, as we have seen, prevailed prior to and during the German submarine offensive off our Atlantic Coast and in the Caribbean. Also included in this patrol vessel class were the PG (Coast Guard Cutter), PF (Frigates with overall length of 301 feet, of which about 100 were constructed during the war), PG (Gunboats consisting of private yachts, commercial surveying ships, cable ships, and old gunboats, all of which were pressed into war service for patrol duty), PGM (Motor gunboats, converted from SC hulls), EE (Eagle Boats), PY and PYc (ex-yachts), and, last but far from least, the PTs (Motor Torpedo Boats which were used so effectively in all theatres during the war).

Another class of minor combatant vessels playing an important role in the war was the mine vessels. This included the CM (mine layers), DM (light mine layers), DMS (mine sweepers, high speed), AM (mine sweepers, which constituted a sizeable portion of the ships for this type mission), YMS (motor minesweepers which also were produced in great numbers), AMb (harbor minesweepers), and AMc (coastal minesweepers).

--106--

These vessels formed a sizeable numerical portion of the U.S. naval vessels and were important in both defensive and offensive operations of the war.

--107—

SC 1370 – COMPLETION PHOTO
BROADSIDE – DEAD IN THE WATER
FELLOWS & STEWART, Inc., Terminal Island, Calif.
August 1943,
SUBMARINE CHASER 110’

--108--

PC1230

--109--

PT-579 Motor Torpedo Boat – Starboard Bow

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COMPLETION PHOTOGRAPH
PGM 11

COMMERCIAL IRON WORKS
PORTLAND, OREGON
6 DECEMBER 1944

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USS ROCKFORD, PE-48

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USS WEEHAWKEN, CM-12, Minelayer

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USS DEFT, AM-216 – Large Mine Sweeper – Starboard Bow aerial

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USS KNIGHT, DMS-40

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11. AUXILIARIES AND MISCELLANEOUS CRAFT

The tremendous increase in the number of fighting ships and the global nature of the war required the acquisition of a commensurably large fleet of auxiliaries and miscellaneous associated craft.

The auxiliaries were obtained by construction, by conversion of standard Maritime Commission commercial hulls and by acquisition and conversion of commercial vessels. A considerable number of conversions of standard Maritime Commission types were accomplished under the supervision of the Maritime Commission itself. Probably the most important vessels produced under this program during the first half of the war were those which took part in actual landing operations, consisting of attack transports, attack cargo vessels, and general headquarters ships. The demand for repair ships of standard and special types, however, which increased continually after the tide of the war had changed in mid-1943, was met by new construction and conversion. Some general classifications within this auxiliary category included ships for transports, cargo, hospitals, ammunition, provisions, tenders, combined operations headquarters, surveying, net cargo, general stores issue, aircraft ferry, oilers, gasoline tankers, wounded evacuation, repair, special military missions, etc.

In addition, district patrol and coastal small craft formed a sizeable portion of the smaller vessels pressed into service. The YPs (district patrol) included a great many miscellaneous fishing craft and others to serve as armed outpost, tugs, and patrol boats. Similar craft included AM (mine craft), AG (miscellaneous auxiliaries), and PYc (coastal yachts) already mentioned under minor combatant vessels, and YDG (degaussing), IX (unclassified), YMT (motor tug),

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YT (harbor tug), barges and lighters. In view of the magnitude of this particular program, the above mentioned types and missions serve only to create a general idea of this comprehensive program.

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AKA 19 (USS THUBAN)
9701-45-84
VIEW 45° OFF CENTERLINE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
6 JULY 1945

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U.S.S. BARNSTABLE
APA-93
COMMERCIAL IRON WORKS
PORTLAND, OREGON
2 JUNE 1944
STARBOARD AERIAL

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AH-16 U.S.S. REPOSE – Hospital Ship – Starboard Aerial

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USS CIMARRON, AO-22

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1129-40
U.S.S. PRAIRIE
STERN VIEW (PORT SIDE)
NAVY YARD, PHILA., PA.
SEPT. 23, 1940.

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USS NORTON SOUND, AV-11

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12. POST WAR DESIGN:

This highly classified sphere of activity may only be discussed in most general terms. In light of the lightning like technical advances in all realms, the reader may imagine the

concomitant design alterations and developments which are being instituted. In general, the three conditioning factors on post-war ship design are: atomic radiation protection, highly improved armament, and extremely improved and new electronic equipments.

Principally based upon information gleaned from Operation Crossroads, technical experts have made considerable advancements in protection against atomic radiation.

In the field of armament, the introduction of rockets on smaller ships and the effective use of heavy rockets, such as the V-2, during the war have led to innumerable experiments for the installation of this armament on our capital ships. Rapid fire, heavy caliber guns were an innovation in the later stages of the war and are of increasing importance in the armament alterations on the newest ship designs.

The post-war developments in the field of electronics not only stagger the imagination but also prove to be a source of considerable consolation for the military minded. Continuing to pursue the policy established during hostilities, the U.S. Navy's immediate incorporation of the latest gear in the original design of post-war ships makes these vessels the most technically advanced in the world.

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Continual inspection and study of ships' damage reports submitted during the war also enable technicians to design better our latest ships for the withstanding of damage and for improved maintenance. In the field of post-war design, all hands of the U.S. Navy may well be proud.

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CHAPTER XX

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

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CHAPTER XX

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DURING WORLD WAR II

When surveying the fundamental reasons for the Allied victory in World War II, naval historians and officers of the line conclude alike and without qualification that the research and development program carried out under the U.S. Navy's jurisdiction proved to be unsurpassed by any other one single factor in contributing to our operational successes.

Since it is impossible to segregate from this field of naval research and development only those projects applicable to, or conducted by, the Bureau of Ships, it is feasible to include first in the history an account of the program of the Navy as a whole. Following this, the Bureau's program may then be discussed as an integral part of the totality and may better be seen in its true perspective.

The vast number of programs conducted by various activities in this field are closely related to one another, for each new or modified device or technique of offense and defense in the art of warfare has its countermeasure and its influence upon other naval elements with which it may be related. To say, for example, that research and the introduction of rockets applied solely to the Bureau of Ordnance would be an absurdity. The repercussions of this weapon's introduction are unbelievably comprehensive: the Bureau of Ships had to convert ships such as LCIs and PTs to rocket boats and had to develop new electronic devices to serve not only as control elements but also as countermeasures; the Bureau of Aeronautics re-designed planes for the in-

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(Martin PBM Mariner using rocket-assisted take-off pods to take off from water.)

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stallation of rockets; the Office of Naval Operations revised operational methods and procedures to include this new weapon; and so on through all the activities concerned with naval warfare. Such is the chain reaction of practical research developments; for every action there is a reaction!

This review of the Bureau of Ships' research and development program includes a discussion of its objectives, scope and lines of attack; the Bureau's organizational chart of the Research and Standards Branch and one wartime contributions of each of its technical sections; the post-war programs of all sections considered as a whole for the two fiscal years, 1946 and 1947; and, lastly, a listing of the laboratories and activities most intimately involved with the research and development coming under the Bureau's cognizance.

A. NAVAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DURING WORLD WAR II.

In order to present a comprehensive account of the entire Navy's research and development program during the war, an appropriate chapter in the third report of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, to the Secretary of the Navy dated 8 December 1945, will be reproduced herewith in full. Although this excellent broad survey touches upon only a portion of the Bureau of Ships' design and research of World War II, it does outline in general terms the over-all aspects in this field of endeavor and the interrelationship between the various programs.

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"In December 1941 the United States faced seasoned enemies, who not only had long been preparing for war but who had actually been waging it for several years. Within the limited facilities and means available throughout the years of peace, the United States Navy had, however, equipped itself with weapons the equal of, or superior to, those of other navies and had laid the groundwork for still further development. During the war the science and industry of this country and our allies were mobilized to apply existing scientific knowledge to the perfection of these weapons and the development of new and more deadly means of waging war. As a result the United States Navy was able to maintain the technical advantage over the navies of our enemies, which contributed so materially to the outcome of World War II.

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The means of accomplishing this were not so much directed towards making new discoveries, as towards the exploitation of the skills and techniques which civilian scientists had already cultivated in years of peace. When war appeared imminent, the War end Navy Departments and the National Academy of Sciences gave close attention to the most profitable manner of utilizing the strength of American science in military and naval research.

It was decided to attempt a solution involving the maximum flexibility and initiative, in which the fundamental principle would be cooperation between science end the armed forces, rather then to bring the scientists into military and naval laboratories, as was done in England. The principle proved thoroughly sound. The arrangement adopted was the establishment by executive order of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, which had as its scientific and technical working bodies the National Defense Research Council, the Medical Research Council, and later the Office of Field Service. To assure full integration of the potentialities of these organizations with the Navy’s own research and development program and the needs of the service, the late Secretary Knox, in July 1941, established the office of Coordinator of Research and Development. Throughout the war, the development of new weapons and devices has been accelerated by the teamwork between the users, the scientists, the engineer-designers and the producers.

The devices end weapons resulting from the research and development program have been put to use in every phase of naval warfare. Particular examples, cited because of their complexity and diversification, are amphibious warfare, carrier warfare, submarine and antisubmarine warfare. In each of these cases, our combat effectiveness has been materially increased by improvements in communications, navigational devices, fire control, detection equipment, firepower, aircraft performance (range, speed, armament, handling characteristics) and by advanced training methods end equipment.

Perhaps the greatest technological advances of the entire war have been made in the field of electronics, (see Chapter XX) both within the naval laboratories and in collaboration with the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Pre-existing radar sets were developed and new models created for ship and air-borne search, fire control, and for accurate long-range navigation. Identification and recognition equipment were developed for use in conjunction with radar systems. New end highly efficient short-range radio telephones were used for tactical communication. In the successful antisubmarine campaign in the Atlantic, small radio-sono-buoys were used; these, when dropped from aircraft, listened for the noise made by a submarine end

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automatically relayed the information to the searching plane. Great strides have been made in electronic antisubmarine detection equipment. Underwater echo-ranging gear and listening equipment have been improved in quality and extended in function since the outbreak of the war. Countermeasures have been developed for jamming enemy radar and communication systems, disrupting the control signals for his guided missiles, and counteracting his measures to jam our own equipment.

The foundation for our shipboard radar systems had been laid before the war. The earliest observations of radio phenomena of the kind that are exploited by radar were made at the Naval Research Laboratory by groups working with Dr. A. H. Taylor and Dr. R. N. Page, and the military possibilities were immediately grasped by these scientists and by Rear Admiral E. G. Bowen, then Director of the Laboratory. Because of this, at the outset of the war, our Navy alone had on its ships a search radar specifically designed for shipboard use. We had already incorporated in these radars the technical development of using a single antenna for transmission and reception. Radar of this type contributed to the victories of the Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal. Over 26,000 sets of air-borne radar equipment were produced from the Naval Research Laboratory's redesign of British air-borne equipment. Ours was the first navy to install radar in submarines. Similarly, a highly efficient supersonic echoranging gear for submarine end antisubmarine warfare had been completely developed, and was installed before the war began. The success of ell these electronic devices can be traced back to intensive early development of new types of vacuum tubes.

Initially, from want of experience against an enemy attacking with the persistence demonstrated by the Japanese, our antiaircraft batteries were inadequate. Particularly was this true in the case of automatic weapon batteries, consisting at that time of the .50-caliber and 1.1-inch machine guns. The main antiaircraft batteries in the fleet, consisting of 5-inch and 3-inch main batteries were controlled by directors employing optical range information. Although antiaircraft fire-control radar was under development, no installations were operative in the fleet.

By the time Japan surrendered, our defenses had been revolutionized. The fleet wes equipped with accurate antiaircraft fire-control radar. Our antiaircraft gun defenses consisted of multiple power-driven 40-millimeter mounts, 20-millimeter mounts, and 5-inch twin and single mounts, many of which were controlled by small intermediate range radar-fed gun directors. The VT, or proximity influence fuse, initially sponsored by the Navy and by the Office of Scientific Research and Development, marked a radical change from previous methods of detonating a projectile and vastly increased the effectiveness of antiaircraft defenses.

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At the end of the war, the 8-inch rapid-fire turret had been developed and was ready for introduction to the fleet. Completely automatic in action, it can be used against ship, aircraft, or land targets. The guns are loaded from the handling rooms automatically and are automatically laid.

When the threat of the German magnetic mines became known in 1939, the Navy immediately mobilized scientific talent and industrial capacity to produce a countermeasure. Several methods of demagnetizing our ships were developed. These were applied before Pearl Harbor to all combatant vessels, and later to all other vessels, and were of material assistance in maintaining the safety of our vital shipping lanes. At the same time, acoustic and magnetic firing devices were developed and produced in quantity for our mines and depth charges. Electric torpedoes were developed to supplement the air-steam torpedo, which at the outbreak of war was our weapon of underwater attack.

Rockets and rocket launchers were developed, with the assistance of California Institute of Technology and other agencies, for use on board ships and aircraft. Appropriate types of rockets were developed for use against submarines, for the support of amphibious landings, and for aircraft. These allowed heavy firepower to be concentrated in light craft.

Fighter-plane speed was greatly increased during the war. At the end an experimental model ready for combat use had a speed of over 550 miles per hour. This plane was powered with turbo-jet engines, little known before 1941. Development of the conventional aircraft engine had also progressed; whereas initially the maximum size was 1000 horsepower, improved types of 3000 horsepower are now in use. Torpedo bombers, scout bombers, patrol bombers, and scout observation planes have all been rapidly developed during the period. Carrier-borne aircraft with increased speed, range, and armament carried the battle to the Japanese homeland, and patrol aircraft with high speed, long range, and greater offensive power aided in supplying the information necessary to the success of those operations. Development of the arresting gear, launching catapults, and handling equipment of our surface ships kept pace with the increasing weights of planes, and allowed more planes per ship to be carried than had been possible in peacetime.

Our aircraft were a focus for developments in many fields. Radar opened new possibilities for search, night combat, and operations under poor visibility conditions. Aircraft guns were increased in size from the .30-caliber World War I weapon to 20-millimeter,

37-millimeter, and 75-millimeter guns. Air-borne rockets up to 11.75 inches in diameter radically increased the striking power of conventional aircraft, with little penalty on performance. Rocket power was

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also used on seaplanes for assistance in take-off with heavy loads and in high seas, making possible the rescue of many downed aviators and thereby reducing our combat losses. Development of the "fire bomb" further extended the tactical versatility of aircraft.

Training was enormously expedited by the introduction of a great variety of synthetic training devices. These endeavored to offer trainees an approximation of battle experience and to develop the reactions of a veteran before actual combat. As an example, it is now possible for the entire crew of a submarine to rehearse approaches end torpedo attacks against enemy task forces in trainers on dry land, which provide simulated visual observation of the enemy, simulated radar and sonar information, and in which all of the complex battle gear and fire-control mechanisms operate as they do in a real submarine.

Certain developments, whose progress was most promising, were not completed in time for extensive combat use. These are primarily guided missiles and pilotless aircraft, utilizing remote control by electronic apparatus. These new developments will play a major role in warfare of the future, carrying new explosives over greatly increased ranges.

In the early days of research leading towards the application of atomic energy for military purposes, the Naval Research Laboratory was the only government facility engaged in this type of work. At the Laboratory there was developed a liquid thermal diffusion process for separation of uranium isotopes. Enriched chemicals, as well as basic designs and operating practices, were later supplied to the Army and used in one of the Oak Ridge plants manufacturing the atomic bomb.

The complexity of modern warfare in both methods and means demands exacting analysis of the measures and countermeasures introduced at every stage by ourselves end the enemy. Scientific research can not only speed the invention and production of weapons, but also assist in insuring their correct use. The application, by qualified scientists, of the scientific method to the improvement of naval operating techniques and material, has come to be called operations research. Scientists engaged in operations research are experts who advise that part of the Navy which is using the weapons and craft-the fleets themselves. To function effectively they must work under the direction of, and have close personal contact with, the officers who plan end carry on the operations of war.

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During the war we succeeded in enlisting the services of a group of competent scientists to carry out operations research. This group was set up as a flexible organization able to reassign personnel quickly when new critical problems arose. Fiscal and administrative control of the group was originally vested in the Office of Scientific Research and Development. The group as a whole was assigned to the Navy for functional control, and in the course of time was attached to my Headquarters.

The initial impulse toward the formation of such a group arose in April 1942, during the early days of the antisubmarine war. With the cooperation of the Antisubmarine Division of the National Defense Research Committee, seven scientists were recruited by Columbia University and assigned to the Antisubmarine Warfare Unit, Atlantic Fleet.

During the year 1942 the group was considerably increased in size, and in July 1943, at a strength of approximately forty members, it was incorporated into the staff of the Tenth Fleet as the Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research Group. Subsequently the administrative responsibility for the group was transferred from Columbia University to the Office of Field Service, without alteration in relationships with the Navy in October 1944, with the decline of the submarine menace, the group wee transferred to the Readiness Division of my Headquarters and renamed the Operations Research Group. At the close of the war it consisted of seventy-three scientists, drawn from a wide variety of backgrounds. Many of the members were attached, as the need arose, to the staffs of fleet and type commanders overseas, and at operating bases in war theaters. So far as possible they were afforded the opportunity of observing combat operations at first hand.

Operations research, as it developed, fell into two main categories: theoretical analysis of tactics, strategy and the equipment of war on the one hand; and statistical analysis of operations on the other. Each type of naval operation bed to be analyzed theoretically to determine the maximum potentialities of the equipment involved, the probable reactions of the personnel, and the nature of the tactics which would combine equipment and personnel in an optimum manner. Action reports, giving the actual results obtained in this type of operation, were studied in a quantitative manner in order to amplify, correct, and correlate closely the theoretical analysis with what was actually happening on the field of battle. The knowledge resulting from this continued cross-check of theory with practice made it possible to work out improvements in tactics which sometimes increased the effectiveness of weapons by factors of three or five, to detect changes in the enemy's tactics in time to counter them before they became dangerous, and to calculate force requirements for future operations.

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The late war, more than any other, involved the interplay of new technical measures and opposing countermeasures. For example, the German U-boats had to revise their tactics and equipment when we began to use radar on our antisubmarine aircraft; and we, in turn had to modify our tactics and radar equipment to counter their changes. In this see-saw of techniques the side which countered quickly, before the opponent had time to perfect the new tactics and weapons, had a decided advantage. Operations research, bringing scientists in to analyze the technical import of the fluctuations between measure and countermeasure, made it possible to speed up our reaction rate in several critical cases.

Likewise, in their struggle to counteract our improved convoy escort tactics, the U-boats introduced the acoustic torpedo, which steers for a ship by listening to the sound it makes under water. Our development of countermeasures was based on studies by the Operations Research Group into the pattern of sound produced in the sea by ships' propellers and on the probable reaction of the torpedo to various decoy devices. In this and other cases, information derived from intelligence sources was interpreted by the members of the group in the light of their own scientific knowledge and utilized to devise improved countermeasures.

Submarine and antisubmarine operations are closely complementary, Methods developed for attack have as a counterpart methods for defense based on the principles underlying both. In the subgroup devoted to submarine warfare, theoretical and operational studies were carried out on coordination of attack by groups of submarines; torpedo fire control; effectiveness of rescue of downed aviators; causes of loss of United States submarines; the relative merits of various types of torpedoes under differing circumstances; and enemy countermeasures to our radar search equipment.

Research on air problems has been devoted in the main to perfection of tactics designed to minimize flak hazard to navel aircraft attacking gun-defended targets, and to analysis of accuracy and effectiveness of aerial weapons, primarily against seaborne targets. Bombs, rockets, and torpedoes are designed for distinct uses, conditioned by the accuracy of launching and by their lethal effectiveness. Studies of the peculiarities of these weapons have led to recommendations for tactics and training procedures.

Studies were carried out by other subgroups on defense of task forces against suicide attacks, on the effectiveness of antiaircraft fire, and on problems of naval gunfire as a support for amphibious landings.

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The Operations Research Group, to be renamed the Operations Evaluation Group as more closely descriptive of its function, will be continued as part of the naval organization at an appropriate peacetime strength.

The assistance end cooperation of industry and science have been indispensable. Without this assistance, many of the weapons which have come into being as the result of intensive wartime research and development otherwise never would have been completed and introduced into the fleet.

It had often been predicted that in a national emergency the totalitarian countries would have a great technical advantage over the democracies because of their ability to regiment scientific facilities and manpower at will. The results achieved by Germany, Italy and Japan do not bear out this contention. Studies made since the close of the war indicate that in none of these countries was the scientific effort as effectively handled as in the United States. The rapid, effective end original results obtained in bringing science into our effort are proof of the responsiveness of our form of government to meeting emergencies, the technical competence of American scientists, and the productive genius of American industry.

It would be unfair to others to single out by name individual scientists who made important scientific and technical contributions to the improvement of old or the development of new weapons. There were thousands of such contributions. It is generally conceded that with respect to originality of ideas and individual resourcefulness the scientists in the axis countries were as competent as our own. Where American science outdistanced the axis powers was in the superior administration of the over-all effort so that the available scientific manpower of the country could function with the maximum effectiveness. The leadership for whet may be broadly termed the civilian emergency scientific effort was provided by the same individuals during the entire war period. These individuals deserve special mention among those responsible for the superb administrative efficiency which characterized the American conduct of the war throughout. Dr. Vannevar Bush as the Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development carried the over-all administrative and technical responsibility for that organization. Under him Dr. James B. Conant as Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee; Dr. Alfred N. Richards as Chairman of the Committee on Medical Research, end Dr. Karl T. Compton as the head of the Office of Field Services administered the scientific and technical activities of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. Dr. Frank B, Jewett as the President of the National Academy of Sciences and of its working body the National Research Council, and Dr. Jerome C. Hunsaker as the Chairmen of the National Advisory Committee for

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Aeronautics directed the activities of these organizations during this period. The coordination of the work of these groups with the Navy was handled by the Office of the Coordinator of Research and Development headed by Rear Admiral J. A. Furer.

I wish to pay particular tribute to the group of scientists, industrialists and officers of the Army and Navy who, under the direction of Major General L. R. Groves, USA, achieved the final outstanding technical success of the war-the development of a practical atomic bomb and the method of using it from aircraft.

Sufficient progress in the technical development and use of improved weapons and associated equipment has been made during the war to emphasize the necessity for continued progress. Working under the stress of an emergency, the factor of primary importance was immediate effectiveness against the enemy. This resulted in "crash designs" and production that required considerably more personnel, weight and space, than the more seasoned designs that might have been produced had time been available. Thus, the rapid expansion and development of new weapons and devices during the war was often at the cost of factors of major importance, such as the reserve buoyancy and stability of the ships in which they were installed. Those war time designs, while they have well served their purpose against the enemy, have nevertheless created problems of refinement and improvement in the ultimate design of equipment, which must be so resolved that a minimum of personnel, weight and space will be required to attain the desired effect. These problems must be energetically attacked in the coming years of peace. Only by continuing vigorous research and development can this country hope to be protected from any potential enemies and maintain the position which it now enjoys in possessing the greatest effective naval fighting force in history."

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Landing Ship, Medium (Rocket)

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B. Bureau of Ships' Research and Development

1. Bureau Research Organization and Wartime Accomplishments.

"All research and development undertaken by the Bureau of Ships is directed towards the development of new or improved materials, components, equipments, machinery, systems and structural factors entering into the construction, maintenance, and operation of Naval vessels to enable these vessels to better fulfill their mission."

This definition indicates the scope and comprehensive nature of the Bureau of Ships' endeavors in research end development. The functional organization within the Bureau concerned with this mission is indicated by Chart XIX. Although this organization is depicted in the status two years following the war's end, it does illustrate the general lines of authority and the number of sections concerned with specific integral programs of the over-all research. The Bureau of Ships' important accomplishments in research and development during the war years may best be studied by investigating the contributions of each section possessing a code number in the following organizational chart.

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CHART XIX
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT BRANCH
SHIP DESIGN and SHIPBUILDING DIVISION
BUREAU OF SHIPS
FUNCTIONAL CHART
NOVEMBER 1947

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MATERIALS DEVELOPMENT

CODE 330a

ADMINISTERING

Code 331 - Petroleum and Special Fuels
Code 334 - Metallurgical and Mechanical
Code 336 – Chemical
Code 344 – Rubber
Code 344a- Plastics (post-war)
Code 350 - Standards Code 357 - Purchase Specifications
and
Code 335 - Electrical (disbanded at war's end)

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(1a) WARTIME ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE PETROLEUM SUBSECTION
(Codes 331 and 341)

The accomplishments of the Petroleum Subsection during World War II may be divided into the fields of development, testing, and approval of new products, devising methods for maintaining standards of quality, and improving maintenance procedures and auxiliary equipment to insure proper performance of petroleum products.

Under the program of development and testing, four major Naval petroleum products must be considered. The first involves a boiler fuel oil known as Navy Special fuel oil now used by all steam driven vessels in the Navy. This product was designed to have optimum pumpability as well as stability in heater coils, so that fueling and burning operations could be conducted most efficiently. In addition to these factors, the problem of mixing fuels from various refinery sources became acute because not all types of fuels were fully compatible. At one time Fleet operations were slowed down because incompatibility resulted in the fouling of heaters and sludging of fuel in storage. Therefore test methods were developed and, with the consultation of the Navy Cooperative committee on Fuels and Lubricants, fully compatible fuels were made available by industry from all sections of the Continental United States. This program was then extended to foreign refineries in the British West Indies, Netherlands West Indies, and the Middle East, so that the Navy’s fuel requirements are known world-wide and sources are now available from every major petroleum supplier in the world.

The British Admiralty has included the main features of the Navy fuel oil specification in their own latest fuel oil specification. As a matter of interest, no single case of sludging or heater fouling difficulties has been

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reported in the Fleet since the inclusion of stability and compatibility requirements in the Navy Special fuel oil specification.

The second major Navy petroleum product ie Diesel fuel. The Navy is the largest consumer of Diesel fuel in the world, and only through the furnishing of high quality fuel has the high performance of Navy Diesel engines been guaranteed. The Navy's Diesel fuel was used by all the Allied Forces in the occupation of Europe and gave outstanding performance.

The third major Navy petroleum product is heavy duty Diesel engine lubricating oil. This product was the forerunner of additive type lubricants in which a radical departure was made from the conventional use of normal 100% hydrocarbon oils. The use of additives to insure certain performance qualities which are never found in mineral oils, as well as to improve certain properties of the mineral oils themselves, has been extremely successful as proven by the outstanding service of this product. This lubricant was developed by the industry primarily for use in small automotive type Diesel engines. Bureau of Ships initiated action to extend the use of this lubricant to all types of Diesel engines, as well as gasoline engines in the Fleet. Service tests were conducted on submarines well in advance of the National Emergency, so that all the service problems of shipboard use requiring changes in performance requirements of the lubricating oil, as well as necessary auxiliary equipment, were well worked out in advance of Fleet needs. By means of advance planning, testing in laboratories as well as in the Fleet was so coordinated with the development of manufacturing facilities that the greatly expanding war-time needs of the Navy were adequately met. As a result of this radical change in lubrication, the performance of Diesel engines in the Navy has been outstanding and maintenance records indicate

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that the lubrication protection of Navy engines has been excellent and had greatly extended the operational efficiency of the Fleet.

The fourth major refinery petroleum product is a non-rusting turbine oil known as Navy symbol 2190-T. During 1941 it was apparent that two main problems might interfere with efficiency of turbine driven ships in war time, that of sludging of turbine oils and the problem of rust formation in turbine lubrication systems. The over-all operation of turbine driven vessels in hot and cold climate presented an operating problem which was apparently too severe for normal petroleum lubricants previously used by the Fleet. The development of an additive type turbine oil, which eliminated sludge formation and deposits in turbine systems and at the same time gave adequate protection from the formation of rust due to sea and fresh water, was pursued actively and was coordinated so that at the outbreak of the war this product was completely tested and approved. This included extensive laboratory tests, and service tests in destroyers, and cruisers; the resulting product was made available in quantities satisfactory for the needs of the U. S. Fleet. In addition, Allied Navies have been using this product and are adopting specifications very similar to those of the U. S. Navy.

Miscellaneous developments have been made in the field of lubricants and greases to meet the specific demands of the Fleet which, as a result of service performance, indicate complete satisfaction.

In order to maintain quality control of the petroleum products used by the Navy, as well as all the Armed Forces, the Naval Petroleum Inspection Service was originated in 1941. This group was organized by the Bureau of Ships with the intention of hand picking petroleum specialists qualified in all phases of manufacturing, testing, and using all forms of petroleum products. Shortly

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after the inauguration of this program the Bureau of Ships was assigned the responsibility for quality control of all Lend-Lease petroleum products. In addition to inspection of shipments, this control consisted of review of all Lend-Lease requisitions prior to purchase by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, to insure that the products which were to be shipped to all foreign points would contain a sufficiently high percentage of material suitable for the military, as well as to insure adequate civilian stockpiles which might be drawn on by the military in emergencies. This procedure has been of extreme value in maintaining supplies to the Fleet in emergencies, when the Naval chain of transportation has been interrupted. The petroleum inspection service has now grown to a world-wide organization in which Naval Petroleum Inspectors are located in practically all the major refineries in the world. Naval Petroleum Inspectors have, in connection with direct Navy liftings, Lend-Lease shipments, and through Navy inspection of Army procured petroleum products, inspected a majority of the bulk petroleum movements off shore during the war. At its height the Naval Petroleum Inspection Service consisted of approximately 300 officers and enlisted men, and their performance of duty in quality control of petroleum products for the Armed Forces has been outstanding.

In order to improve performance of fuels and lubricants in the Fleet, many new procedures for more efficient use of these products have been developed.

The Bureau of Ships, Petroleum Section, in cooperation with the Diesel Engine Section, has developed filters for all internal combustion equipment to insure clean fuels and lubricants for shipboard use. In addition, many design changes for both turbine and Diesel engine driven vessels have been initiated by this Section. By means of technical recommendations and close cooperation, the fuels and lubricants handling facilities and procedures for the Navy Department as a whole have been actively investigated and improved by this Section. An example

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of this has been in the installation of filters for Diesel fuel on all shore stations where Navy Diesel-driven vessels are serviced. The problem of insuring deliveries of clean petroleum products to ships has been an extremely vital one which this Section has given the highest priority. In connection with the proper handling procedures for petroleum products, Naval petroleum technical officers from the Naval Inspection Service have been sent to advance bases and fleet activities of all kinds responsible for the issue and performance of petroleum products in the Fleet. Only through this intimate contact by properly qualified personnel have operating problems of the Fleet been adequately understood and cared for.

It is believed that the petroleum organization of the Bureau of Ships is unique, in that development of products in Naval Laboratories and industrial laboratories, quality control after manufacture up to the point of delivery to Naval vessels, and the proper evaluation of the operational characteristics of the petroleum products aboard Naval vessels are all coordinated and controlled by one central organization. It is believed that this system results in the most expeditious and efficient means of obtaining the proper quality of petroleum products for the Fleet.

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(1b) WARTIME ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF METALLURGICAL AND MECHANICAL SUB-SECTION
(Code 334)

This section is concerned with a multiplicity of ferrous and non-ferrous metals and alloys, together with a great amount of equipment made therefrom.

One of the section's principal responsibilities has been its relationship with standardization and specification plans, which include authorization and guidance of laboratory testing, inspection procedure, specification interpretation, substitutions, etc. As a part of the Research and Standards Branch, this section has further concerned itself with the initiation of action involving the general administration of laboratories under the cognizance of the Bureau. The section also distributes the testing load for materials under its cognizance in the various laboratories and distributes reports within the Bureau to interested sections for their recommendations concerning the action to be taken as based upon the technical sections’ requirements.

Another of the section’s most important functions has been the furnishing of innumerable recommendations to the Bureau’s technical sections and ship type desks regarding the suitability of metals and alloys for specific applications. This fact, although impractical to record for historical purposes, has been of inestimable value to the Bureau and to the Navy in general, as well as to many other governmental departments.

An additional important function, but difficult to record, has been the activity of the section with appropriate laboratories in connection with the determination of causes and prevention of failures of metals and alloys, employed either structurally or as components of board-ship machinery. Of these the principal metals and alloys have been plain carbon and alloyed steels, aluminum alloys, bronzes, zinc, chromium-nickel and copper nickel alloys. One

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of the prime problems posed by tremendous requirements during the war, however, was the relative scarcity of basic and alloying elements. Tungsten, for example, was cut off from China; shipments of aluminum from South America became increasingly difficult; and shortage of tin presented itself with the Japanese occupation of the Malaya Straits.

Ingenious manipulation of available supplies did much to alleviate those trying times. Use of increased amounts of molybdenum in high speed steels, for example, extended the use of tungsten. Aluminum castings and wrought aluminum specifications were relaxed to permit higher percentages of impurities, although in such cases, surface treatments were employed to maintain corrosion resistance. Restrictions were also imposed with regard to the number of alloys permitted to be used. Although severe restrictions were placed on the use of Monel metal (nickel copper alloy), the use of copper-nickel-alloy (70% copper-30% nickel) in condenser tubes continued in view of its superior performance. While corrosion resistant steel (18% chromium-8% nickel) requirements and uses were revised to reduce the amount of ingot scrap, action was also taken to reduce its applications. Thirteen percent chromium alloy with no nickel was employed in appropriate applications.

One particularly interesting development early in the war was that of the National Emergency steels - particularly those containing about one-half percent of chromium and nickel and already available as scrap. With the addition of approximately one-quarter percent of molybdenum, these steels made it possible to divert large quantities of nickel ordinarily used in structural steel, such as for armor plate.

For over two years, the section led the search for a less critical element in bearing metal to replace tin which had been used in babbitt bearings for

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several decades and, as a result, a lead alloy is now available as a suitable substitute whenever necessity requires its use. In addition, to conserve tin a considerable reduction in thickness of bearing linings was made wherever possible, and a specification for low tin-lead-base alloy solder was prepared after extensive laboratory tests of commercially available alloys. This low tin solder has been used for certain applications where 50-50 tin-lead solder had formerly been employed.

Vanadium became critically short and the Bureau's high tensile plate and shape specifications were revised to eliminate this element entirely. The resulting chemical range introduced undesirable welding characteristics, particularly during cold weather, with the result that intensive investigation was made of the factors leading to this trouble which in turn led to specification of a considerably smaller percentage of vanadium than that originally required. In addition, a companion investigation from the welding angle developed an electrode having highly desirable characteristics.

Since bronzes were essentially alloys of copper and tin, both wartime critical materials, malleable cast iron and steel had to be substituted in many instances. Where bronze proved necessary, scrap material was used as a basic charge in the foundry to the greatest extent possible and bronzes containing more than 12% tin were practically eliminated. As the use of brass became highly restricted, requirements were changed to permit the use of "cartridge brass" scrap instead.

On the more or less negative side of the picture, this same metallurgical talent investigated the addition of iron to copper-nickel alloy to reduce erosion and corrosion by sea water; the development of alloys for use at high temperatures in gas turbines; the use of sintered powdered metals for piston rings and other applications; and many other more minor developments.

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In an endeavor to increase production of large forgings, industry encountered difficulties such as flaking and non-metallic inclusions. After considerable inspection and testing, this Section established standards for character, size and number of inclusions which materially helped the inspection forces. In addition, the Section has been called upon from time to time to prepare specifications to fill specific needs such as resistance welded tubes, pump casings and rolled shafting.

The composition of certain copper-base alloy castings were standardized in cooperation with the Federal Specifications Executive Committee, Society of Automotive Engineers, American Society for Testing Materials and the Conservation Division of the War Production Board. As a result of this standardization, the specifications for these copper-base alloys of each of the above specification writing bodies have the same chemical requirements.

In collaboration with the Welding and Casting Section (692) and several Navy Yards and Laboratories, this Section wrote a Foundry Manual for the purpose of providing clear, concise, up-to-the-minute information for personnel manning advance bases and repair ships.

A project at Naval Research Laboratory was authorized for the purpose of developing proper foundry practices through research on several non-ferrous alloys. By this project, foundry technique should be developed so that nonferrous alloys can be consistently produced possessing improved structural soundness, castability, mechanical properties and corrosion resistance. The effect of mold gases and fluidity on the above factors continued to be investigated.

In this connection, a series of meetings of metallurgical and foundry personnel of various Bureaus, Yards and Stations was originated for the purpose of coordinating recent developments in the art of casting and of exchanging and solving local problems.

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Investigations have been conducted to determine the relative effect of marine corrosive influences on various copper and aluminum alloys with respect to pitting, loss of weight, reduction of tensile strength, etc., these inquiries proved exceedingly valuable in the selection of alloys for numerous applications.

In the realm of so-called Metallic Equipment, 200 items of galley equipment were transferred from the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to Bureau of Ships. During the war, it is estimated that more than a million dollars was saved on tableware alone by eliminating hand engraving, simplifying design and reducing the pieces used.

Suitable alternate less critical or non-critical materials were written into several hundred specifications for equipment including builders and marine hardware, boat and ship fittings, plumbing equipment, hose, fittings, etc.

This section not only played a significant part in the development of fire fighting fog nozzles, which have proven so effective on shipboard, but also developed specifications for high pressure gas cylinders made from tubing by spinning and welding the bottom, in lieu of billet piercing and plate drawing - a process which has greatly increased production.

In view of the enormous increase in the use of wire rope assemblies in the Navy, resulting in bottle-necks in wire drawing, wire rope and fitting industries, this section tested suitable alternates for such items as cargo lashing, rope, davit ropes, beach gear, minesweeping rope, towing and mooring lines.

A further interesting development was that of a new low alloy ballistic plate which saw tremendous use on our landing craft and as splinter shields on larger vessels. Quality control was exercised jointly by the producers and the Bureau and led to lower cost, meeting of schedules and improved

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“FIREMEN OF THE FLEET” USING FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT DEVELOPED BY THE BUREAU OF SHIPS RESEARCH

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ballistic properties. Joint quality control also applied to the production of high tensile steel plate for ships’ structure.

Of further interest were the chrome plating of cylinder liners, which increased the life of internal combustion engines, and the development of metal spray and hard chrome plating to build up and salvage worn internal combustion engine parts - a step which contributed greatly to the solution of the spare parts problem.

To insure the quality of metals and alloys going into ship construction, several important inspection tools, such as gamma and x-ray radiography and magnetic powder inspection, have seen greatly increased usage. The application of quantitative spectrographic analysis alone has saved hundreds of thousands of dollars and countless man-hours; in fact, without this tool, chemical analysis by regular methods would have prohibited thousands of analyses because of the time factor alone.

An interesting application of known principles took place during the war when magnetic search coils were developed and employed on some destroyers to detect the presence of improperly heat-treated steel tubing.

As mentioned previously there was considerably increased interest in welding problems, which has led to a better understanding of the effects of base metal composition and electrode design. Several important investigations conducted were:

(a) Weldability of titanium, vanadium and silico-manganese high tensile steels.
(b) The causes of weld and under-weld cracking.
(c) Exploration of weldability tests.

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(d) Development of automatic welding equipment.
(e) Determination of instrumentation for recording electrical characteristics in welding equipment and welding operation.

In connection with the above, a far reaching investigation into the causes of failures on Liberty ships was held, which proved of assistance not only to the Maritime Commission but also to the improvement of Naval vessels. With respect to Naval vessels, however, this problem is not tied in with failure in a seaway but with a better understanding of the effects of high rates of loading and application of multiaxial stresses on ships' structure as for example, by underwater explosion (mine or torpedo) and by shell fire.

Austenitic steel welding electrodes also underwent considerable development and, along with this development, it became apparent that satisfactory welds could be produced using alternating current. As a result an "AC-DC" grade was introduced into Specification 46E4 for austenitic electrode.

The attack on Pearl Harbor, the burning of the Normandy and other events led to the development of highly suitable underwater cutting electrodes. These were introduced in Bureau specifications in 1943, together with the preparation of manuals for underwater cutting and for underwater welding. Thus did the Metallurgical and Mechanical Section contribute to the Research and Standards' success in such comprehensive fields.

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(1c) WARTIME ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE CHEMISTRY SUB-SECTION
(Code 336)

This section engaged in such a wide variety of projects dealing with chemistry, their accomplishments may best be illustrated by listing each development and by discussing it briefly.

Cordage In order to conserve the use of Manila fiber for use in rope constructions for the most important applications, new rope constructions were developed using American hemp, sisal, jute and mixtures of these fibers.

Brush bristles All paint brushes were developed to use the natural hog bristles from China and France. When these were no longer available, synthetic fibers of the NYLON type were developed for use in these brushes and found to be very satisfactory.

Gunbucklers When leather of suitable grade became unavailable, the Bureau

experimented with 3-Ply canvas, bonded and coated with rubber or synthetic rubber and found it to be an improvement over the leather bucklers.

Hull Insulation Corkboard is probably the best material for use as bulkhead and shell insulation from the standpoint of insulating value, but it is dangerously combustible. A rigid board made of glass fiber bonded with synthetic resin has been developed and is in use on all ships for combat duty.

Flame and Water Resistance Treatments Many materials necessary to the construction of Navy ships, in their natural state, lack resistance to flame and/or water. Chemical treatments have been developed for use on such items as canvas for general use, fabrics for use in life saving equipment, artificial leather for upholstering, bedding bags, decking materials including matting and

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linoleum, marine plywood for emergency repairs and for a large number of applications where fire and water are destructive elements.

Shark Repellent Kit A material for the protection of personnel from attack by sharks has been developed. A water soluble material and a chemical have been combined and enclosed in a unit designed to attach to the individual users life jacket. The unit has a quick opening device for immediate use.

Salt Water Soap and Laundry Methods Conservation of fresh water aboard all ships is of major importance. Ae a large amount of water is required for use by the ship's laundry, a salt water soap and instructions for its use in laundry practice has been developed which saves from 5,000 to 7,000 gallons of fresh water per day on a cruiser class ship.

Mess gear of High Impact Strength Glass and china tableware suffer considerable damage from shock due to gun firing. Tableware made of glass and of plastic material has been developed which reduces this breakage to a minimum under battle conditions of today.

Asbestos-Glass Insulation Lagging Cloth A shortage of asbestos fiber and facilities for weaving cloth necessitated development of an alternate. By twisting an asbestos yarn around a glass yarn, a glass-asbestos yarn was produced which actually produced a better and more workable cloth of about 1/2 the weight and which used about 1/2 the asbestos used in the Standard asbestos cloth.

Resin-Bonded Bearing Strips. Lignum Vitae has been the standard bearing material for stern tubes for years. A natural rubber bearing strip was found to be more satisfactory than wood, but the shortage of natural rubber necessitated an alternate for rubber bearing strips or going back to wood.

The resin bonded materials were developed and have given satisfaction.

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Fire Retardant Interior Paint. Under battle conditions interior paint has been a serious source for the spread of fires. To minimize this condition, a fire retardant paint for one coat application was developed. This paint gives adequate hiding power and other performance characteristics and serves to increase the fire resistant properties of textiles and other fabrics to which it is applied.

Synthetic Resin Interior and Exterior Paints. Quicker drying and increased durability have been obtained for interior and exterior parte by the development of a paint using a synthetic resin of the alkyd type.

Anti-fouling Pigment. Cuprous oxide is a major constituent of anti-fouling bottom paints. Due to the heavy demand for this type of paint, a shortage of cuprous oxide threatened a shortage of paint. This has been overcome by the development of a novel metallic copper pigment, the by-product of another process.

Shipbottom Paints. The condition of ship's bottoms is the principal factor in the efficient use of the fuel used in its propulsion. To assure the best condition, an underwater painting system has been developed consisting of a wet sand blasting operation to prepare the metal surface for paint, a chemical treatment to prevent rust between sandblasting and painting, a hot plastic anti-fouling paint and an electrically heated spray equipment for its application. Critical mercury compounds have been replaced in this paint by other less critical and equally effective materials.

Method of Predicting Anti-Fouling Action in Paints. After a series of studies of the leaching rate of the toxic ingredient of paint in sea water, it is now possible to predict the amount of protection which will be given by a particular formulation. In the case of copper, it has been found that a leaching rate of 10 mg. of paint film per liter of sea water per 24 hour day is the minimum that will secure adequate anti-fouling performance.

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Corrosion of P.T. Propellers. In the first P.T. boats, corrosion of the propellers was so rapid that replacement was necessary after short service. After a study of the matter, it was found that corrosion could be prevented by proper design of the grounding system and installation of zinc anodes of the proper size and at the proper position. Replacement of propellers because of corrosion is now negligible. This study also resulted in the removal of 25 sq. ft, of copper plates thought to be necessary for grounding radio.

Steel Shafts on Wood Hull Ships. Original designs of wood hull ships were faulty in that steel shafts were coupled to a large area of bronze on propellers, struts, and rudders with inadequate zinc anodes. Very rapid corrosion of the shafts was prevented by various methods including coating of the shafts with rubber, thiokol and other materials, changes in the grounding system and changes in the zinc anodes.

Erosion and Corrosion of Salt Water Piping. It has been determined that corrosion can be kept under control in salt water piping if steel is used instead of copper when copper-nickel is not available. Electrolysis or stray currents are not important causes of failure. Excessive velocities appears to be the principal cause of failure. Copper anti-fouling paint does not cause excessive corrosion of steel pipes. By considering these various factors, failures have been reduced to the minimum.

Zinc Anodes. Tests under simulated service conditions have shown that zinc will prevent corrosion of steel coupled with bronze in sea water having a velocity of about 20 knots. Tests of zinc alloys for anodes have shown that very pure zinc is much more effective than impure zinc or zinc alloyed with aluminum.

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Non-Skid Decking. Steel weather decking is continually slippery from the action of heavy seas, rains and moisture. To assure footing an effective non-slip decking using a synthetic resin and an abrasive has been developed. This is made in paste form and applied in a manner similar to painting or the coating material is applied to a fabric and cemented to the deck, linoleum fashion.

Alternate for Teak Decking. Teak wood from Asia has been the standard deck planking for years. When its availability declined, domestic Douglas fir was developed for this use. An improvement on the Douglas fir was the development of a laminated lightweight lumber using a combination of Redwood and either Cottonwood or Basswood. This laminated lumber has advantages over the natural teak as it can be used where weight is a factor, as in carrier flight decks.

Corrosion from Welding Currents. At the beginning of the construction program, the great extension in welding methods resulted in serious damage of many ships hulls by stray welding currents. A study of the situation showed that by proper arrangements of the welding circuits and at very little added expense, it was possible to entirely prevent this cause of corrosion. The welding circuits in building yards are now arranged so that stray current damage cannot occur.

Fouling Prevention in Salt Water Piping. A method for treating the salt water as an alternate to coating the interior of pipes with anti-fouling paint has progressed to a point where it is indicated that electrolytically generated chlorine can be used for this purpose.

Gasoline Resistant Pneumatic Life Preservers. Frequently personnel find themselves adrift in their pneumatic life jackets in water on which gasoline and oil is floating. The gasoline disintegrated the jackets. To overcome this condition, a material was developed which resists the action of gasoline and oil.

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Treatment to Prevent Wood Decay. When it becomes necessary to use wood for hulls in Naval vessels, it was found that decay of wood was to be a definite problem which paint alone would not solve. A chemical wood preservative was developed which can be applied with a spray or by brushing to add years to the life of the wood.

Treatment to Prevent Shipworm Attack. Marine borers, which are found in almost all salt waters and are especially active in tropical waters, can completely riddle and destroy hull planking in as short a time as 3 months. Chemical treatments have been developed for slow moving heavy vessels and as well for the lighter faster vessels in conjunction with the copper bottom paints. This treatment aids adhesion of the paint to the hull.

Laminated Timber for Boats and Ships. It became apparent early in the accelerated building program that there were insufficient supplies of seasoned white oak of grades and sizes suitable for construction of boats and ships. Methods of laminating white oak have been developed using new resin glues which can be cured at low temperature (below 200°F) and are insoluble in water. By this procedure small dimensioned pieces can be bonded together to form any size timbers which are practicable to handle, free of defects and properly seasoned. Many of the small vessels built for the Navy during 1944 have employed this method for fabricating such parts as keels, stems, shaft logs, skegs, frames and other structural members.

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(1d) WARTIME ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE RUBBER SUB-SECTION
(Code 344)

The Rubber Sub-section of the Research and Standards Branch is responsible for the development and quality control of mechanical rubber goods used by the Navy. The problem of developing, testing, and checking on Fleet performance of mechanical rubber goods consists of two definite phases. One problem has been to develop satisfactory mechanical goods from the point of view of meeting all service requirements and the second has been to accomplish this primary purpose while coordinating at the same time a dwindling supply of probably the most critical material used in large scale war-time manufacture. The stockpile of crude rubber steadily diminished from the outbreak of the war; the section was faced with no hope of replenishment until the war's end. The use of synthetic rubber by the Bureau of Ships had been planned well in advance of the emergency and as early as 1939 steps were taken to evaluate the performance of all available synthetics. The early program of substitution was undertaken mainly with the view of obtaining certain desirable properties from synthetic rubber which were not obtainable using crude rubber. As early as 1940, however, it was considered that making Bureau of Ships independent of crude rubber as a source of raw material would be a very desirable step. The program of substitution became complicated by the fact that over 5000 different compounds were required in the manufacture of various types of rubber mechanical articles under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships. The success of this whole program can be Judged by the fact that approximately 85% of Bureau of Ships and Navy Department Specifications that specified rubber in pre-war days came to specify synthetic rubber during the war.

Every attempt had to be made to manufacture materials completely satisfactory for war-time use so that no decrease in quality would result during the conversion

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from crude rubber to synthetic rubber. This problem became outstandingly successful, in that service performance indicated a very fine standard of quality with the various synthetic rubber materials used aboard ship. In many cases decreases in desirable physical and chemical properties in specifications resulted during conversion, but in no case vers decreases tolerated which would have any appreciable effect on service performance.

The problem of conversion to synthetic was further complicated by the fact that during the whole program the availability of the various synthetics changed radically practically over night. At any one period no definite manufacturing program could be planned making use of a single synthetic, as the priority assigned to Bureau of Ships articles changed many times, and this forced the Bureau to switch from one source of supply to a completely different one. This problem was foreseen during the early stages of conversion and research and development tests were undertaken with the point of view of evaluating all possible available synthetics for as many Bureau of Ships items as could be tested in the time and with the facilities available. There occurred many switches of material following this early development period, depending on progress of construction of the various synthetic rubber plants.

By making specifications flexible, the use of each synthetic was coordinated with available supply without greatly altering the quality of the finished product issued to the Forces Afloat.

The Rubber Sub-section, during this whole program, kept very close contact with manufacturing facilities and methods for two reasons. The primary reason was to enable a better prediction of the availability of materials for future specification requirements. Secondarily, a basic knowledge of plant processes was necessary in order to predict possible effects on finished

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products which would result due to certain chemical and physical manufacturing details of the synthetic rubbers themselves. Through the activities of the Mare Island Rubber Laboratory this program enjoyed great success. With regard to compound development work, the Laboratory contributed considerable information to the industry, which helped it to meet Navy requirements better.

In addition to close contact with synthetic rubber manufacture, the Bureau participated actively in the investigation of all possible crude rubber substitutes. This included cooperative work with the Department of Agriculture on crude rubber materials from all sources of plant life. The Bureau gave its support to the creation of a fund to finance the planting of guayule shrub and the construction and operation of factories to recover crude rubber from guayule. Mare Island Rubber Laboratory, under the direction of the Rubber Sub-section, contributed a great deal of the research and test data now known on the properties of guayule and on manufacturing technique required to blend it with synthetic rubbers.

One of the major problems encountered in the substitution of synthetic rubber for crude rubber proved to be in test methods used for evaluation of finished mechanical goods. It was found early in the program that the normal physical and chemical tests used for crude rubber articles were not a similar measure of satisfactory performance when synthetics were used in the same finished article. For this reaeon many new techniques for testing had to be devised. More important than this change in test methods however was the proper service evaluation which had to be coordinated with these new methods in a very short period of time. It was very definitely established that synthetic rubber compounded articles, meeting the physical and, chemical requirements of specifications previously requiring crude rubber, did not give adequate service performance. New test methods then were devised and in turn

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correlated with service performance so that the conversion to synthetic rubber could be made as quickly as possible without overall decrease in the quality of shipboard mechanical goods. In order to expedite this program the Rubber Sub-section coordinated work done by the Mare Island Rubber Laboratory, the Material Laboratory New York and the Naval Research Laboratory, and channelled information from other Government agencies and industry so that the best data could be quickly supplied to the manufacturer. This enabled the rubber manufacturer to know the needs of the Navy based on the use of synthetic rubber goods and at the same time enabled him to profit from compounding data obtained from all possible sources.

In addition to normal Bureau of Ships and Navy Department Specification items, the Bureau required a large amount of rubber for items not covered by specifications. Large amounts of crude were being consumed for such purposes and the Rubber sub-section attempted to expedite the conversion to synthetic rubber in these cases.

As a result of the Bureau's coordinating the work of all the activities concerned with rubber, there soon remained exceedingly few Bureau of Ships items which required 100% crude rubber.

The accomplishments of this whole substitution program were two fold: the immediate war-time emergency problem of eliminating crude rubber in Bureau of Ships specification items proved highly successful, and, secondly, many items manufactured from synthetic rubber and used aboard ship proved to have more desirable properties than crude rubber. In spite of the program of emergency substitutions, it may be safely stated that the over-all shipboard performance of mechanical rubber goods during the war proved of a quality fully adapted to the war-time needs of the Fleet.

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(1e) PLASTICS SUBSECTION (POST-WAR ADMINISTRATION)

During the war, plastics came under the administrative and research jurisdiction of many codes within the Bureau of Ships Research and Standards Section. The accomplishments of these codes are included within the discussions of their developments, but suffice it to say that in the over-all research picture plastics proved to be a major item of emphasis. The advancements accomplished and the uses to which they were put were exceedingly comprehensive.

The post-war work in this field is discussed under post-war years, but now falling under the cognizance of its own sub-section: Code 344a.

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LEAD AGAINST PLASTICS! LAMINATED GLASS-CLOTH JACKETS USED AS FLAK SUITES BY AVIATORS AND PREPARED FOR THE MARINES’ INVASION OF THE JAPANESE MAINLAND.

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(1f) THE STANDARDS SUB-SECTION
(Code 350)

The Standards Section, Code 350, was established to aid the technical sections in the work of standardization within the Bureau and to coordinate Bureau liaison with other Bureaus, agencies and societies on standards. In detail, this Section has the following responsibilities:

(a) Acts as the Bureau of Ships liaison with other Bureaus and other Government agencies and committees such as the National Research Cornell and the National Bureau of Standards when standardization is involved. In this capacity, for instance, the Standards Section coordinates Bureau approval of standards proposed by ANEESA, insuring that such approval is concurred in by all interested Bureau sections.

(b) Acts as the Bureau of Ships liaison with all non-governmental technical societies, associations, and committees which promulgate standards and in which the Bureau holds membership. This involves some four hundred committees and sub-committees in twelve societies. Bureau representatives to attend meetings of these various committees are selected from the various interested sections after agreement with the Section Heads concerned. The Standards Section is the clearing house and repository of information in the Bureau regarding activities of these committees and societies.

(c) Is responsible for the administration of established policies and acts as a consultant on matters of policy in the preparation of Navy Department, Federal, and Joint Army-Navy Specifications where standards are involved in accordance with Administrative Order 46-53. It is recognized that the end

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use of a product may require a test which is not in accordance with an established standard. The deviation from the standard is the responsibility of the cognizant section. For example, a non-standard shock test may be required for some particular type of equipment. As a further example, a particular type of screw thread may be required for a certain application which is not contained in Handbook H28.

(d) Develops standard methods of field inspection and inspection testing to determine compliance with the requirements of specifications, for inclusion or reference in purchase specifications.

(e) Suggests to cognizant technical sections projects to develop new or improved standards of quality and takes technical cognizance of the project in those cases where no cognizant section exists or where cognizant and interested sections agree that the Standards Section should control the project.

(f) Assists technical sections originating the developments of standards for certain products, and insures that any proposed action is desired by all interested sections.

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(1g) THE PURCHASE SPECIFICATIONS SUB-SECTION
(Code 357)

To complement the work of, and to work in close conjunction with, the Standards Sub-Section (Code 350), the Purchase Specifications Code (357) was established with duties and responsibilities centering about the editing, processing and issuing of Bureau of Ships, Navy Department, Joint Army-Navy and Federal Specifications, as well as the processing of contract specifications. By this work, this sub-section aids the technical sections in standardization work and specification development.

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(1h) WARTIME ELECTRICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(Code 335 - disbanded at war's end)

Research, development and standardization in the electrical field changed at an accelerated rate from the peace time program to those problems dealing with war emergencies and in a direction which had not been indicated as a result of previous experience or planning.

CONSERVATION

In line with the thought expressed above, it became necessary to develop a whole new series of materials to be used in applications where materials previously used were no longer available, due to loss of our sources of supply during the war, or due to the rate of consumption which caused the available production or supply to be inadequate for the total war program. There were very few materials not affected, but, to name specific instances where alternates had to be developed, reference may be made to synthetic jewels where natural sapphires were normally imported through Switzerland; the use of different cellulose-filled laminated products took the place of aluminum and other structural parts where the metal had become highly critical as to supply; the use of synthetic resinous insulation for magnet wire where silk from Japan was previously employed; the use of materials other than rubber in general for all electrical applications where it had been replaced by synthetic plastic; development of specially treated paper to replace fiber in fuse cases; and many other modifications in materials where this step had to be taken because of the lack of an adequate amount of those products normally used in electrical designs.

HIGHER OPERATING TEMPERATURES AND REDUCED MACHINERY SIZES

During the war and even before, a continual development was underway in the search for electrical insulation that would be useful in machinery where

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the operating temperature is allowed to reach a point far above that of boiling water. When the insulation used in this manner could be considered to have a life of approximately twenty years - the estimated life of a capital ship -then we might greatly reduce the size of such machinery and thereby make available more space in the ship for armament and for ordnance equipment.

This work, which was started a number of years ago, greatly accelerated because of the intensive interest created in private laboratories to fill the demands, primarily of the Armed Forces. Although there is in limited production an insulation of a type which represents a milestone of progress in the electrical engineering field, the details of materials are as yet retained in a confidential status.

JOINT ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION AND STANDARDIZATION

One of the greatest advances in the electrical research and standardization field from the standpoint of conservation of effort and increased efficiency in operation was the combination of the efforts of different branches of the Army and Navy. This meant that where a product or equipment had a common application in the Armed Forces it was covered by a joint Army-Navy Specification and used by both Armed Services. A still further advance in this direction related to the pooling of efforts of the combined laboratory facilities of the Armed Forces where an Army Service had agreed to accept test results of a Navy Laboratory or where the Navy Bureau accepted the test data provided in an Army Laboratory. The several hundred joint approvals issued by the Armed Forces under a common specification proved of considerable importance and brought about an improved effectiveness of operation for all parties concerned.

MISCELLANEOUS MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT IMPROVEMENTS

Such a large number of designs and materials were developed or improved during the war period that their enumeration would be impossible within the

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scope of this study. However, it is feasible to list briefly those items which may be considered as representative of the general trend, scope, and variety developed.

(a) PLASTIC GLASS

Materials have been developed from synthetic resin so that they may be used in instrument windows or other electrical applications requiring transparency and where the finished product will not break during severe shock so as to represent a flying glass hazard to personnel,

(b) CABLE

Cable developments have been very extensive. Starting with the satisfactory completion of the flame-proof-cable design, the later developments included flexible cables having heat, oil and sunlight resistance (non-cracking under these conditions), elimination of all rubber from the cable insulation, and the sealing of the cable core to prevent the passage of water along the length of the cable.

(c) CIRCUIT BREAKERS

Circuit breaker design improved gradually until the power handled 1a now in terms of ten of thousands of amperes. If this value of current is disconnected in an electric circuit, it is necessary to have equipment that will not explode or become ignited. This design progressed so fast that plane were completed to provide complete special test facilities for the high currents indicated.

(d) BATTERIES

Much work was done on batteries so that designs might be made available under all types of weather conditions as well as for special military applications of a confidential nature. This work proved of wide interest throughout both the Army and Navy.

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(e) HIGH FREQUENCY INSULATION

The older type of electrical insulation commonly known as "Bakelite" required further development in new forms and from different sources in order to serve the special needs of such equipment as radar and associated designs.

(f) FUNGUS

Our entry into the South Pacific waters created a special problem because of the destructive attack by fungus or mold on electrical insulation. Materials were rapidly developed to resist the attacks of fungus and other destructive growths.

(g) LUMINOUS MATERIAL

Great advances were made in different kinds of luminous materials progressing from those that contain radium and can be seen continually in the dark without further exposure to light, to those types that are fluorescent and will glow when ultra violet or black light illuminates the surface.

(h) TORSIONMETERS

A problem of utmost importance to the Navy is the accurate measurement of the horsepower output of the ship's propulsion machinery. This is done by the use of instruments that measure how much the shaft is twisted in terms of 10 thousandths or 100 thousandths of an inch for any given shaft horsepower. Much work was done to develop instruments that would measure this shaft twist successfully and accurately.

(i) SHOCK TESTING EQUIPMENT

The enormous shook of gunfire was not visualized completely until some experience was made available as a result of operation on warships during World War II. Enormous machines were developed and built to produce a shock like that of gunfire and in some cases the foundation for these machines

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weighed over 50 tons. Electrical equipment was installed on the machine and subjected to shock to determine its ruggedness. Many new equipment designs that have increased shock resistance were produced as the result of this testing.

(j) SHIPBOARD LAUNDRY EQUIPMENT

The laundry problem aboard ship was an important factor from the standpoint of maintenance of personnel and required adequate equipment for this purpose. In order to determine whether the washing machines were doing the Job properly studies were made through Pennsylvania State College where a bundle of cloth materials with standardized dirty places were washed in different machines and it was determined whether or not these machines were suitable for shipboard use.

(k) ELECTRIC COOKING

During the war shipboard electric cooking equipment was fully developed to replace the old oil fired galley equipment. However, instead of having 110 or 220 volts for the power supply as is the case with home equipment furnished, shipboard ranges or ovens used 440 volts. Since this higher voltage meant that much shipboard space and weight could be saved, it required considerable development before the higher voltage could be used successfully.

ELECTRICAL LABORATORY DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION

Practically all of the laboratories working on wartime electrical problems had to increase their facilities. A brief summary of these improvements is tabulated in the following:-

(a) MATERIAL LABORATORY, NAVY YARD, NEW YORK

Although this new building was laid out just prior to the war in order to fill all of the needs that were foreseen at that time, it soon became necessary to expand practically every section in the laboratory because of intensive testing needs. It is of particular interest to indicate a few of

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the major improvements such as the installation of high impact shock testing equipment, the development of the cable testing section to handle enormous quantities of contract inspection tests, and the installation of equipment to provide enormous electrical loads, (as much as 100,000 amperes) for fractional parte of a second to be used in testing new circuit-breaking equipment such as fuses, switches and circuit breakers.

(b) NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY

Naval Research Laboratory increased its testing capacity in the I. C. Division, including the modification providing a complete floor for the testing of electrical lamps. A high impact shock testing machine was also added at the Laboratory, as well ae a special project in the Chemistry Division where the electrical and chemical performance of the insulation was studied for purposes of development of improved types of electrical insulation. Additional facilities were provided in the Mechanics Division for the testing of torsion-meters under simulated operating conditions with full size shaft. In the Optical Section, expansion was completed in order to provide for the testing of various types of luminous materials.

(c) BUREAU OF MINES, PITTSBURGH, PA. (NAVY SECTION)

The Navy Section of the Laboratory at the Pittsburgh Experiment Station of the Bureau of Mines had been enlarged and improved by the addition of test chambers which accommodate large size motors and controllers to be tested in an explosive atmosphere. Large test chambers were added where the effects on cable due to fire might be observed through glass portholes and where the gases in the chamber might be analyzed to determine to what extent they proved poisonous to shipboard personnel.

(d) FOOD AND DRUG LABORATORY (FSA)

The facilities of the Food and Drug Laboratory were employed temporarily for studies on electrical insulation.

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(e) SEMI-TROPICAL TESTING LABORATORY, MIAMI, FLORIDA

The facilities of this commercial laboratory were utilized for a study of effect of weather on luminous materials exposed to out door semi-tropical conditions.

(f) ELECTRICAL TESTING LABORATORY, NEW YORK

Testing facilities of this laboratory were used to collect masses of data on magnet-wire performance. It is expected that the data forthcoming as the result of this work will be of considerable value in determining possibilities of different types of insulated magnet wire.

(g) SOMERSWORTH ELECTRICAL LABORATORY, NEAR PORTSMOUTH, N.H.

A new laboratory was set up to test standard-plan fittings and associated equipment.

(h) MARE ISLAND NAVY YARD LABORATORY, MARS ISLAND, CALIF.

Important research facilities were provided at this laboratory to study the effect of different kinds of compounding on electrical insulation. Work at this laboratory became instrumental in pointing out where certain manufacturers could improve the formulation and use of some of the new insulations developed to replace rubber.

CONCLUSION

Summarizing briefly the outstanding wartime accomplishments of the Electrical Research and Development Sub-section in broad terms, it may be said that those having a major effect on the war and forming the pattern as a future guide for periods of national emergency were the joint Army-Navy development of standardization work and the realization that in modern ware there can be no such thing as self-sufficiency of any country as regards its raw materials and production facilities. It is therefore essential that the lessons learned at this time be used in future planning to prevent, insofar as possible a recurrence of the difficulties through which we have undergone in the past.

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TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE LIAISON CODE
330c

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(3) TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE LIAISON SUB-SECTION
(Code 330c)

On June 6, 1945, by Administrative Order No. 45-56, the control of technical intelligence information within the Bureau of Ships was transferred from the Bureau Security Office, Code 205 of the Administrative Division, to the Research and Standards Branch, Code 330, of the Shipbuilding Division. This transfer of function was made in order to provide for essential administration of the increased flow of technical intelligence resulting from the activity of the Naval Technical Mission to Europe. To carry out this work, Code 330c was established under Code 330 of the Research end Standards Branch.

In implementing the directive establishing the section, Code 330c established liaison with the Office of Naval Intelligence and other technical intelligence offices for the procurement end routing in the Bureau of Intelligence reports from Naval Technical Mission, Europe, Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee, British Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee, Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, Naval Technical Mission, Japan, War Department Agencies, Naval Attaches, British groups and other technical intelligence information end the procurement of captured enemy equipment and prisoner of war reports to interested technical desks. Conversely, Code 330c coordinated requests made by interested technical codes for further information on subjects revealed by abstracts end other information made available to them by Code 330c.

In pursuance of its objective to expedite the placement of technical intelligence in the hands of cognizant technical codes so as to effect the earliest possible exploitation, the Bureau of Ships, by agreement with the Technical Intelligence Center of the Office of Naval Intelligence, arranged for direct shipment to the Bureau of approximately 5000 enemy technical documents,

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primarily of Bureau of Ships interest, which had been captured by the Naval Technical Mission then operating in Europe. This arrangement contemplated dissemination, translation of particular items and other processing, normally functions of the Technical Intelligence Center, by Code 330c.

To carry forward the necessary cataloging and the dissemination to interested technical codes of lists showing information available, an index was prepared by screening the Technical Intelligence Center (Op-32-F2) files and intelligence abstracts, revision of Technical Mission report indices and cataloging of documents not processed by Op-32-F2. This index was issued on January 8, 1946 and followed by Supplement No. 1 on March 4, 1946,

On January 17, 1946 a translating unit composed of 31 German prisoners of war was established at the U.S. Naval Engineering Station, Annapolis, Maryland to service requests for translations of German technical documents. Secret Service regulations, which prescribed that Pw's could not be stationed within 10 miles of the White House, precluded better proximity of this group. This group produced excellent work for the Bureau and it was with reluctance that the Bureau, on orders resulting from the decision of the Secretary of War to repatriate this group, disbanded the group on March 30, 1946.

In order to carry out the provisions of the SecNav's Restricted Serial 2076716 of 19 July 1945, concerning the review of classified matter for declassification, the office of the Technical Assistant, Code 330c was designated by Administrative Order No. 46-1 of 5 January 1946 to serve as the clearing house for all matters concerned in the declassification of classified material within the Bureau of Ships. The purpose of this declassification program was to enable release promptly to industry of as much information as possible, without injury to the national interest and in order to promote reconversion, the public

welfare and safety, and to stimulate employment.

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On June 27, 1946 Code 330c absorbed from the Lend-Lease Branch of the Bureau the control of disclosures of classified technical, scientific, and industrial information to persons not a part of the U.S. Naval or Military establishments.

The activities of Code 330c were further expanded when Comdr. Otto P. Otteson, head of 330c, was nominated as Bureau of Ships member on the Security Classification Control Board. The function of this Board has been to collaborate in the revision of Article 76 of Navy Regulations. It is now engaged in the preparation of a security manual for the Navy.

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PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION CODE
330b

ADMINISTERING

Code 337 - Laboratory Administration (SRD Projects and Priorities)

Code 337L - Technical Library.

Code 340 - Budget Clerk.

Code 345 - Progress Planning (post-war)

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(2a) SRD PROJECTS AND PRIORITIES - LABORATORY ADMINISTRATION
(Code 337)

In the early part of 1943 it became apparent that the several Naval laboratories under the technical control of the Bureau of Ships were so far behind in their work that something drastic had to be done about it; in short, since all authorized tests could not be accomplished in time to meet war's needs, certain ones, the most important ones, had to come first.

A "laboratory committee" was established by the Head of the Research and Standards branch to advise him on such matters, among others, and this committee made a series of studies of the laboratory situation. The "SRD" card was worked up by the laboratory committee so as to gain a truer picture of the projects in work and their justification. This was intended to develop the true significance of the many individual projects in relation to the total laboratory workload, and to indicate their relative importance in terms of laboratory effort and of time limitations. In other words, it was the beginnings of a logistic approach to test scheduling and the birth of Code 337. Although never "established" in the usual sense of the word, with clearly defined duties and responsibilities, it just grew from odds and ends of ideas, situations and personalities as these were called upon to meet the changing situation growing out of World War II.

Many laboratory committee meetings were held on the subject, attended by the various technical sections of the 330 branch, since these sections were at that time handling all test authorizations emanating from the Bureau of Ships as a whole. Many conferences were also held with the various technical sections within the Ship-Technical Branch in order to establish the relative importance, and hence the precedence, of such of their work as conflicted

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one with another, or served to retard their individual section efforts. A special group headed by a Commander, USNR, was then directed to visit the several laboratories, study their situations and report back to the Bureau with the facts and the recommendations of these laboratories. This group grew to a respectable size during the latter days of World War II and accomplished some very commendable work. Code 337 grew out of nothing into this able group. With the war's end and because it was built up almost entirely from reserve and war service personnel, Code 357 shrank rapidly as these were let out of the service.

While this sub-section inherited the SRD projects and the priorities phases of the wartime Code 337, certain other phases of this work are now being accomplished by various other sections within and without the Research Branch. Unfortunately, the severe reductions in personnel of the branch and of the Bureau have forced the abandonment of some work of a rather important character.

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(2b) TECHNICAL LIBRARY OF THE BUREAU OF SHIPS
(Code 337L)

When the Bureau of Engineering and the Bureau of Construction and Repair were consolidated in 1940 the libraries of each were combined.

The story of the Bureau of Ships Library throughout the war years might be summed up in the word "growth". The war-time Bureau itself grew in size, in duties, and in interests; the library had to keep pace. The main concern then, as now, was to maintain a source of information, ready on demand. In meeting that demand, the library was confronted with a problem that called for an immediate and continuous line of action: namely, to make from two old established groups of books and materials a new and live unit. That meant first (due to limited space) the discarding of many out-of-date books and materials, and their replacement by new ones, as rapidly as possible. The best of the old were retained, many of which are classic and contain valuable basic material. The discarded books were sent to other libraries and archives or to sections of the Bureau that wished to retain them. Funds, which had previously been small in one Bureau and entirely lacking in the other (dependent on the scant bounty of other sources), were immediately made available for the purchase of new books and periodicals, and a study was made of the needs of the Bureau.

In order to establish and maintain the increased and specialized library services required by the Engineers and Scientists in the Bureau, the Library staff was enlarged with a WAVE Officer in charge and a program of expansion was initiated early in 1944.

In the summer of 1944 the collection of books and periodicals belonging to the Electronics Division was transferred to the Technical Library at the

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request of the head of the Electronics Division. Now, all fields of Bureau activities were covered by a central Horary.

About the same time the Research and Standards Branch authorized that the Library assemble and catalog all important reports from Naval Laboratories and other activities having reference value to the Bureau of Ships. In addition to maintaining a reference file for use in the Bureau, the Library would also clear through the cognizant section requests from outside agencies for Bureau of Ships reports.

To bring to the attention of interested personnel new material available in the Library, the semi-monthly Technical Library Bulletin, a restricted list of books, publications, and reports received in the library, was issued in January, 194-5 and a list of confidential reports in fall 1947.

Dissemination of articles appearing in current journals and pertinent to the interest of the Bureau has resulted in extensive routing of periodicals and indexing services such as Engineering Index cards.

The Library, not restricting its services to the Bureau proper, cooperates with the librarians in the laboratory libraries under the cognizance of the Bureau in matters pertaining to organization and in inter-loan activities. Emergency collections of technical books, publications and reports assembled for various Projects under the cognizance of the Bureau include the Harvard computation project in 1945, three Bikini libraries in 1946, and the 1947 Oak Ridge collection.

Post war research has emphasized the importance of specialized library services. Naturally with the establishment of specialized services there has been a continuous expansion in selective reference and enumerative bibliographical services,

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(2c) BUDGET CONTROL OF BUSHIPS' RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(Code 340)

Code 340 was established to compile the Budget and to maintain the financial record of funds allocated to the Research and Standards Branch. This branch, as we have seen, is but a part of the Research and Development Section of the Bureau of Ships' Maintenance Division.

Funds handled during the war and post-war years by this code were as follows:

1942

$15,008,605

1943

19,808,686

1944

17,117,304

1945

16,100,000

1946

28,500,000

1947

39,000,000

Although a detailed analysis is omitted, it must be observed that the poet-war increase of appropriations for research and development is not only striking but also most reassuring under the international dynamic and turbulent conditions.

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(2d) POST-WAR PLANNING FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(Code 345)

One of the main post-war functions of the Research Section of the Bureau of Ships is that of "coordination" of long range research and development programs. Since such programs represent substantial financial undertakings, they stem from the Bureau of Ships annual budget for research and development. For purposes of technical and administrative review and approval, the various types and classes of programs, projects or undertakings are broken down by this code into a series of groupings as shown on the Master Chart (Tables 85a-h)

The principle of staff planning and coordination employed in this set up is very simple - it starts with the overall "mission" or objectives shown at the top of the Master Chart; breaking these down into nine portions numbered NS-000 to NS-800 inclusive. Each of the nine portions of the total objective are then broken down into still smaller portions known as "charts", "programs" or "program charts". Each such chart is broken down still further so as to show what specific projects are so related to each other that the whole of that group forms a "program".

In essence, the overall plan represents a "Dewey decimal system" of so classifying the thousands of separate projects that they, when pieced together, form a coherent whole. Thus, each of the many thousands of separate projects, as numbered by the CNO plan of two letters and six digits (for example NS-033-111) shows by its very number, its coordinate relationship to every other project. For a more complete example, note the entry NS-033 near the horizontal center of the first column of the Master Chart; it contains the one word "rubber", but the Program Chart NS-033 shows a total of 149 numbered items.

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Many of the thousands of projects, while individual wholes or entities in themselves, have a multiple relationship to many other projects. This "relativity" of each to the many, when so arranged and numbered as to display their spatial relationship in this series of vertical and horizontal webs, is intended to approximate as nearly as practicable, their coordinate (ordinates and abscissas) relation.

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APPLIED SCIENCES
CODE 330d

ADMINISTERING

Code 332 - Physics

Code 333 - Statistical Analysis

Code 339 - Countermeasures (including Code 330g- Submarine Countermeasures)

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(4a) WARTIME ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE PHYSICS RESEARCH SUB-SECTION
(Code 332)

The Physics Research Section (Code 332) was formed in September 1943 by consolidating the Noise Reduction Group, the Applied Mechanics Group, and the Structures Group.

The Noise Reduction Group (Code 352), was formed in 1941, to handle problems in underwater noise measurements, noise reduction, sound, acoustics, and laboratory work on shook and vibration studies. The Structures Group (Code 342), formerly part of the Bureau of C&R Research Branch, was concerned with the solution of structural, ballistic, special material problems, and fluid mechanics. The Applied Mechanics Group, (Code 457), formerly part of the Design Branch was concerned with problems of shipboard and torsional vibrations.

None of the activities of the separate groups were discontinued with the consolidation; rather, due to the partially overlapping functions of the groups, a more efficient organization was obtained, and additional types of work taken on, including optics and fundamental physics. The Computation Laboratory at Harvard was organized as a part of this section and was concerned with the solution of mathematical problems. It makes use of the sequence type calculating machine and is staffed with mathematicians who have been trained in the operation of the machine.

A large part of the problems on which this section has worked either did not exist or were not considered particularly important prior to the national emergency; therefore, practically no previous Naval experience was available and little Laboratory work was underway. The problem of getting personnel with a background in acoustics, vibration, and electronic instrumentation for the Bureau, the Naval laboratories, and submarine noise ranges, had to be met.

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Much of the work requested of this Section was of a consultative nature and was accomplished in cooperation with the type desk or technical section having cognizance. In many cases the solution was applicable primarily to the specific problem. Several hundred such jobs in the field of vibration and sound have been done, covering practically all types of ships and equipment.

On those problems which had a broad or continuing application, or where the need for new equipment or techniques was apparent, development projects were started. Some carried through to a useful conclusion, others were held up due to lack of time, personnel, or facilities.

In the field of noise reduction, it is well known to all naval engineers that ships, and particularly submarines, can be detected and located by the noise which they may transmit to the water. During the recent war, all combatant navies developed instruments of various degrees of efficiency by means of which it was possible to "hear" the sounds emitted by submarines operating several miles away. The actual distance of detection depended upon the speed and operating conditions of both the submarine and the "listening" vessel and upon the state of the sea. From the interest of the submarine, therefore, it became very important that it should be able to operate with the least possible amount of underwater noise. Such noise generally arose from the engines and other ship machinery, and from the propeller as it churned the water. Loose and rattling shipboard equipment and even the dropping of a hammer or wrench on the deck by one of the crew, would also produce noise which would betray the vessel to a listening craft. Many investigations were undertaken therefore for the purpose of reducing the noise emitted to the water. Machinery and equipment which functioned satisfactorily for normal non-naval use had to be maintained and adjusted to perfect operating conditions. It frequently proved necessary to support equipment on rubber mountings in order to prevent the

transmission of the noise to the hull and thence to the water. Sometimes it

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became essential that a new design of machine be developed and built which produced less noise than any thus far available. While it was imperative to have a quiet ship for reasons of military safety, there were additional advantages. The engines and machinery operated much more efficiently and the crew performed their difficult and complex duties more efficiently because of less noise within the ship and, where new designs of equipment were necessary, the lessons learned eventually became available to industry for use in the commercial world.

In the field of shock, protection for machinery and equipment on naval vessels proved essential if these ships were to continue on their missions after surviving a direct projectile hit or near miss from an enemy. Such enemy action caused extremely severe shocks throughout the vessel, and under these forces important instruments and items of equipment were subject to breakage or derangement unless adequately designed, constructed and mounted. The loss of some of this equipment during the critical period of a repeat attack could result in the total loss of the ship. Many investigations were initiated to determine more accurately the nature of the forces involved when a vessel was subjected to shock, to develop laboratory methods of proof-testing equipment under shock, and to devise design procedures for shock-resistant equipment and ship structure.

In the structural field, numerous investigations were conducted to determine the strength of structural connections or special designs of components for naval vessels. Theoretical methods of analyses were not always adequate to determine the adequacy of a design and experimental tests were undertaken.

For example, the ability of an entirely new design to give adequate protection against a projectile or bomb explosion could only be ascertained by actual tests with models. It was also necessary to conduct special laboratory testa to

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determine the more fundamental characteristics of materials under dynamic loading, such as fatigue and impact. Information on these characteristics was required by all the engineering professions and the Bureau of Ships cooperated with industrial and educational interests in obtaining greater knowledge regarding them.

Investigations in aerodynamics were undertaken to determine the magnitude and character of wind forces acting upon equipment and structural components on board ship. Exposed items had to be adequately designed and supported to withstand winds of hurricane intensity, Other studies were made to determine means of improving wind flow over exposed navigating areas for the protection and greater efficiency of personnel; studies for eliminating the flow of stack gas over ship structure and aircraft carrier flight decks; and studies of wind forces on moored ships so as to permit more adequate and economical design of ship moorings.

In the field of vibration, investigations and studies were constantly underway to reduce vibrations to the point where they were not objectionable. Vibration arises from many causes, but generally from machinery in motion and impacts. In the case of a ship moving through the water, the ship is vibrated by the impulse of each propeller blade, and in a heavy sea the impacts of the waves cause the ship to vibrate. Due to these causes, objectionable vibration frequently occurred locally and prevented the effective use of instruments and equipment such as gun directors. In some rotating machinery such as diesel engines the rotating shaft was subjected to "torsional" vibration which may have caused the stress to be excessively high and to result in shaft breakage after a short period of operation. Investigations were therefore made where troublesome vibration was reported or where, through previous experience, vibration was likely to occur and preventative measures would be instituted

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beforehand. Here again the Bureau of Ships cooperated very extensively with engine, machinery, and equipment manufacturers to improve design and installation procedures for the reduction of destructive vibration.

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(4b) WARTIME ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS SUB-SECTION
(Code 333)

This code has dealt with work in the field of mathematical statistics applied to the analysis of engineering and other technical data during the war in the Bureau's programs of Research and Development and in Quality Control.

During the past twenty years, statistical methods have been used on an expanding scale in agricultural research and in industry. During this period new techniques have been developed at a rate which has outstripped the publications. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities a few far-sighted engineers in the Naval establishment applied these so-called "modem methods” to engineering problems and to several important studies, making use of statistical methods.

As a result of a study made by the National Academy of Sciences at the request of the Bureau, recommendations were made which increased personnel experienced in the field of mathematical statistics. As a result, two statisticians of national repute were commissioned for duty and the statistical unit began to function in December of 1942.

From the outset there were always more statistical problems to be solved than the available people could handle. Additions were made to the group from time to time but the greatest difficulty was encountered in the shortage of statisticians with the required training. None with an engineering background were available. In order to deal with the situation, a project system gradually evolved. The leading members of the group were given the responsibility for statistical studies in certain engineering fields. An in-service training program was initiated to train computers and assistants. For identification

purposes, the group was divided into subsections but actually they operated on a task force basis.

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With the growing amount of work, the group made more and more use of the machine methods of computation. The International Business Machine facilities at the Bureau were used extensively in the fuel rate studies and for the analysis of variance and correlation problems. Methods of the Sequence Controlled Calculator at Harvard University were adapted to the solution of Multiple Regression problems.

The Research Group of the Bureau had already laid down the general lines of attack when this unit started to function. During the war years these lines have been extended and new ones added. From the vantage point of the present it is possible to survey the field and single out three general areas where the use of modern statistics has made important contributions. These are in the field of Operational Analysis of ship performance, the Design of Experiments and Quality Control.

In the field of Operational Analysis one objective was the analysis of engineering data related to the service performance of machinery equipment and materials. It is separate from the more restricted analysis of tactical operations which will be touched upon later. One of the weakest points in the Bureau's operation was the lack of a comprehensive file of technical information on the service performance of the vessels and the equipments. No plan for the channeling of information to the Bureau existed. While major derangements and certain operation records reached the Bureau, there was no orderly plan for the analysis of this technical data and, furthermore, there was no system for the processing of the data ready for use by the Bureau's engineers. As a net result, actions were frequently based on inadequate information and on opinion. Frequently the remedies were delayed while opinions conflicted.

As a few well organized and pertinent facts could have guided the action of the constructive activities, efforts were made to channel the basic data, to process it and to present it to the interested desks.

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Five examples are listed to illustrate the work of the group in the field of operational analysis:

(a) the analysis of the service performance of ship bottom parts.
(b) the war service fuel consumption of the surface vessels of the fleet.
(c) the incidence of machinery failures as obtained from damage reports.
(d) the war service performance of machinery from the information contained in the machinery history cards.
(e) the cause of frequent failures in specific items of equipment such as reduction gears

Because of the controversial nature of the discussions on the comprehensive qualities of various bottom paints, statistical methods were utilized to establish a valuated method of comparison and to reduce assumptions to a basis of fact.

This decision established the desired course to be followed and focused attention upon the various conditions and to the surface preparation. Shorn of prejudice and opinion, the studies emphasized the need for surface preparation and the results of such action have been proven conclusively.

The field of underwater coatings remained open for further investigation in the improvement of bottom finishes which, although more ideally smooth, will permit an attack to reduce the frictional resistance coatings.

One of the outstanding contributions in the field of statistical analysis 1a made in the study of fuel consumption under war conditions. At the outbreak of the war the best information available on fuel consumption was based upon peacetime performance of vessels operating under rigid economics. Starting with the data made possible through the establishment of the neutrality patrol, the first work in this field was done by the methods of descriptive statistics. The commissioning of leaders in the field of mathematical statistics permitted the

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application of the latest techniques in the measurement of variance. At the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, this group completed the operations which eventually became FTP218 (War Service Fuel Consumption of Naval Vessels). These studies, individually and collectively, constitute the most comprehensive analysis of wartime fuel rates and cruising radii ever made and were of extreme value in the logistics problems. In the field of the analysis of machinery performance, the ground work was laid for a continuing study for the incidence of machinery breakdowns which, when time permits and sufficient data have been outlined, will be of inestimable value to the design sections and the logistics of spare parts and equipments. It will bring to light deficiencies in material and design and will, above other things, furnish a guide for the direction of research along channels to produce the greatest improvement with the least expenditure of time and money.

The use of statistical ideas and procedures in the plan of experiments has been one of the most important developments of scientific methods. The group worked extensively to gain the confidence of engineers in the Bureau and its laboratories. The successful solution of problems proved the usefulness of the methods. The design of experiments has been recognized as an important element in the management of the Bureau's research and development program.

Units were established with the various Naval functions to carry this work into the future. The unique contribution of statistical methods is to rule out mere chance as an explanation but this can be done only if the experiment is properly designed.

In the field, of quality control the work has been concerned with the stating of quality level by means of specifications and is known in the Bureau as specification of quality control. A second field is concerned with the discovery of the causes of undesirable quality and the development or remedies,

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Outstanding results in the reduction of rejects and the determination of substitute materials were done during the war years.

The use of modem statistics was amply demonstrated during the war. It can be definitely stated that a system of such marked accomplishments under the pressure of war possesses virtues which make its continuation in peacetime mandatory.

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(4c) WARTIME ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE COUNTERMEASURE SUB-SECTIONS
(Codes 339 and 330g)

Section 339 of the Bureau of Ships was organized in 1942 as the Acoustics and Electronics Section. The duty of this Section became one of conducting research and development work in the fields of air and underwater acoustics and serving as a central information source for the Bureau in these fields.

In the post-war period, however, submarine countermeasures became an administrative entity of its own - Code 330g - although it continued to work closely with other countermeasure projects.

Research and development was undertaken on the various means and methods of producing underwater noise and noise in air, in connection with deception. This led into research and development on countermeasures for use in many phases of undersea warfare, some of which went into submarine service, others into anti-submarine service. These countermeasures introduced a new phase or era of submarine warfare. They are credited with having saved a number of U.S. submarines from destruction. By the war's end, the field of countermeasures for use in undersea warfare had grown immensely.

During 1942 and 1943 development was undertaken and completed on a surface acoustic decoy which was used jointly by the American and British Army and Navy in Africa and during the invasion of Sicily.

At about this same time intelligence information showed that the Germane were about to introduce a new homing weapon for use against allied shipping.

An extensive program of research and development on countermeasures for this anticipated weapon was undertaken under the coordination of the Section. One of the countermeasures went into service shortly after the weapon appeared and

this was credited with saving a large number of merchant and naval vessels during the latter part of the battle of the Atlantic.

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Toward the end of the war, the enemy introduced still a new type of homing weapon against surface vessels. The development of a countermeasure to combat this weapon was undertaken and was ready for production when the war ended. This countermeasure is now being installed on a group of Naval vessels.

The advent of the great variety of homing remote and controlled weapons in naval warfare has brought with it the continuing need for research and development on a similarly great variety of countermeasures. Because of the high classification of the countermeasure work, it is not possible to give details here of the important and almost imagination defying work carried on during the war by this office. When revealed to the public, this section's work will prove to be one of the most exciting chapters of the war.

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2. Post War Research and Development

In order to fulfill the objectives of this program in the postwar years, the major lines of attack pursued fell under nine general categories:

Basic materials, processes and principles.
Ships systems.
Nuclear energy power plant for ship propulsion.
Guided missiles.
Submarine countermeasures.
Ship type development.
Ships machinery and equipment.
Naval architecture.
Mine countermeasures.

Although five of these lines of attack are highly classified and therefore prohibited from this study in any detail, it will prove enlightening to define the purposes of these nine general categories and to break them down into their component parte where security permits. This is accomplished in the following Tables 85a-h.

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TABLE 85a

BUREAU OF SHIPS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM NS-000

BASIC MATERIALS, PROCESSES, AND PRINCIPLES

 

PURPOSE;

"Study of basic materials (metals, non-metals, chemicals, paints, rubber, plastics, ceramics, etc.) in all their phases, including new and improved properties, treatments and processes. Determination of behavior, methods of manufacture, processes and testing with particular emphasis on extremes of temperature, high stress and dynamic loadings. Also includes studies of fuels and lubricants suitable for use in machinery at high speeds, heavy loads and under extremes of temperature. Consideration of a variety of applications and availability of supply during emergencies. Re-evaluation of and improvements in presently available materials for new and special applications."

 

SCOPE;

Metals;

1. Metals-Structural (Ferrous).
2. Metals-Structural (Non-Ferrous)
3. Metals-Machinery.
4. Forgings end Castings.

 

Functional (Electric and Electronic):

1. Conductive.
2. Dielectric.
3. Resistive.
4. Contactive.
5. Emissive.
6. Arcing.
7. Magnetic.
8. Radio Interference.
9. Instrumentation.

 

Metal Processing;

1. Welding.
2. Brazing and Soldering.
3. Riveting and Allied Processes.
4. Metal Coatings.
5. Powder Metallurgy.

 

Functional (Non-Electric);

1. Protective Coatings.
2. Erosion and Corrosion.
3. Decontamination.
4. Decking.
5. Insulation (Thermal).
6. Packings and Gaskets.
7. Packaging and Preservation.
8. Mathematical Analysis.

 

Non-Metals:

1. Textiles, Cordage, and other Fibrous Materials.
2. Wood, Wood Products and Related Materials.
3. Rubber.
4. Plastics.
5. Refractories, Ceramics, etc.
6. Materials for Flotation and Personnel Protection.

--204--

TABLE 85b

BUREAU OF SHIPS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM NS-000 (Cont'd.)

BASIC MATERIALS, PROCESSES, AND PRINCIPLES

 

Chemicals:

1. Industrial Chemicals.
2. Electro-Chemicals.
3. Chemical Warfare Materials.
4. Compressed Gases.
5. Miscellaneous.

 

Fuels and Lubricants:

1. New and Source Materials.
2. Liquid Fuels
3. Solid Fuels.
4. Lubricating Oils.
5. Greases.
6. Gear Oils.
7. Hydraulic Fluids.
8. Unassigned.
9. Unassigned.

 

Nuclear Studies (except propulsion):

(classified)

 

Miscellaneous:

1. Laboratory Admin, and facilities.
2. Miscellaneous and unforeseen.

 

PROGRAM NS-100 SHIPS SYSTEMS

PURPOSE:

"Involves modifications and improvements to a variety of miscellaneous systems and composites to meet the new conditions of operations such as greater pressures, higher temperatures, increased power, reduced weight, and possibly nuclear energy propulsion. Applies to piping systems, air conditioning, water treatment, electric light and power, interior communication, fire control and navigational systems, industrial gases, personnel protection and training, damage control, fire fighting, life saving, ship salvage, diving and salvage gear, etc."

 

SCOPE:

Piping Systems:

1. Fuel.
2. Air and Gas.
3. Feed and Condensate.
4. Steam.
5. Salt Water.
6. Drainage.

I.C.-F.C. and Navigation Systems:

1. Interior Communication.
2. Fire Control.
3. Systems Research.
4. Navigational.

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TABLE 85c

BUREAU OF SHIPS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM HS - 100 (Cont'd.)

SHIPS SYSTEMS

 

Piping System Components:

1. Piping.
2. Valving.
3. Fittings.
4. Insulation.
5. Corrosion and Erosion.

 

Industrial Gases:

1. Generating Plants and Processes.
2. Gas Storage, Distribution and Handling.
3. Miscellaneous Components.
4. Measurement Devices.

 

Air Conditioning:

1. Physiological Considerations.
2. Circulation.
3. Cooling.
4. Heating.
5. Dehumidification.

 

Protection, Rescue and Salvage:

1. Personnel Protection and Training.
2. Damage Control.
3. Fire Fighting.
4. Life Saving.
5. Ship Salvage.
6. Diving and Salvage Gear.

 

Water Treatment:

1. Filtration.
2. Distillation.
3. Chemical Purification.

 

Electric Power and Lighting Systems:

1. Generation and Distribution.
2. Lighting.
3. Circuit Protection.

PROGRAM NS-200

NUCLEAR ENERGY POWER PLANT FOR SHIP PROPULSION

PURPOSE:

"Cooperating with the Manhattan District, Industry and the Office of Naval Research to study and develop the use of one or more forms of atomic energy for Ship Propulsion."

SCOPE:

(classified)

--206--

 

TABLE 85d

BUREAU OF SHIPS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM NS-300

GUIDED MISSILES

PURPOSE:

"Covers only the handling, stowing and launching of Guided Missiles and Pilotless Aircraft; and fuel and-or propellants handling and stowage including finding of suitable materials for the same."

SCOPE:

(classified)

Piping and Valves for GM Fuels:

Handling and Stowage GM:

Stabilized Launching Platforms:

Fuels Stowage and Systems:

PROGRAM NS-400 SUBMARINE COUNTERMEASURES

PURPOSE:

"Fundamentals applicable to countermeasures, study of phenomena leading to new classes of countermeasures, investigations of phenomena of underwater noise generation, study of audible and mechanical noise from engine and gear assemblies. Countermeasures are grouped broadly into "Pro" countermeasures (destruction of enemy submarines) and "Anti" countermeasures (protection of U.S. submarines from enemy countermeasures)."

SCOPE:

(Classified)

PROGRAM NS-500 SHIP TYPE DEVELOPMENT

PURPOSE:

"Complete ship type work, aimed at development of hulls for improved operation, far better performance in all categories including weight, space and noise reduction, increased speeds and cruising radius, improved maneuverability, and greater resistance to underwater and air borne explosions.

SCOPE:

(classified):

--207--

TABLE 85e

BUREAU OF SHIPS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM NS-500 (Cont'd.)

SHIP TYPE DEVELOPMENT

Submarines:
Destroyers and Escorts:
Aircraft Support Vessels (Carriers and Tenders):
Battleships and Cruisers:

1. Machinery.
2. Structures.
3. Systems and Equipments.
4. Special Materials and Processes.
5. Operational Test and Evaluation.

Mine Craft:

(see program NS-800)

Amphibious Vessels, Craft and Vehicles:

Small Boats:

1. Plastic boats.

Auxiliary Vessels and Yard Craft:

Operational Evaluation:

1. Operational Force Development.
2. Pilot Installations.
3. Fleet Evaluation.
4. Full Scale Trial Instruments.

--206--

TABLE 85f

BUREAU OF SHIPS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM NS-600 SHIPS MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT

PURPOSE:

"Includes new and improved design and materials that increases power, efficiencies, life and reliability; and reduces weight and maintenance of the following: boilers and combustion equipment, prime movers, propulsion components, auxiliary machinery, heat transfer equipment, galley and messing equipment, furniture, personnel service equipment, electrical machinery and equipment, fire control and interior communication equipment, and navigational equipment."

SCOPE:

Boilers and Combustion Equipment:

1. Boilers.
2. Boiler Appurtenances.
3. Fuel Oil Burning and Miscellaneous Combustion Equipment.

Electric Machinery and Equipment:

1. Rotating Machinery (except ship propellers.)
2. Electric Cable, Wire and Installation Devices.
3. Switching, Control and Protection Equipment.
4. Lighting, Fixtures, Lanterns, Searchlights.
5. Electric Heating, Melting, Welding.
6. Electric Ship Propulsion (Motors, Generators, Control).
7. Electric Batteries.
8. Special Applications, Miscl.

Prime Movers:

1. Steam Turbines.
2. Gas Turbines.
3. Internal and External Combustion Engines.

Propulsion Components:

1. Reduction Gears, Speed Changers and Clutches.
2. Shafting and Propellers.
3. Bearings.

 

Communication and Fire Control:

1. Telegraphs, Alarms, Signalling, Indicating.
2. Telephones.
3. Public Address and Battle Announcing.
4. Recording and Reproducing.
5. Sound and Still Projection.
6. Fire Control.
7. 400 and 800 Cycle.
8. Indiv. Communication Components.

--209--

TABLE 85g

BUREAU OF SHIPS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM NS-600 (Cont'd.)

SHIPS MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT

Auxiliary Machinery and Components:

1. Pumps, Blowers, Compressors and Purifiers.
2. Steering Gear, Hoists, Winches, Cranes, Elevators.
3. Heat Exchangers, Evaporators, Ejectors.
4. Refrigeration Machinery.

Navigational Equipment;

1. Compasses (Gyro, Magnetic).
2. Celestial Instruments, Binoculars, etc.
3. Dead Reckoning and Miscl. Nav. Equipment.

Shop Equipment, Ships Rigging and Tackle:

1. Tools and Tooling.
2. Anchors, Chains and Attachments.
3. Wire Rope, Connections, Assemblies
4. Cargo Handling, Mooring and Towing.
5. Miscellaneous.

Utility Service (Personnel):

1. Galley, Food Handling and Messing.
2. Furniture, Hardware and Hospital Equipment.
3. Laundry and Clothes Handling.

--210--

TABLE 85h

BUREAU OF SHIPS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM NS-700

NAVAL ARCHITECTURE

PURPOSE:

"Studies in the static and dynamic strength of structures and the protection of vessels from underwater and airborne explosions; and the investigation of stability, noise, shock and vibration. Includes basic studies in the mechanics of materials and structures."

SCOPE:

Applied Physics:

1. Mechanical Shock.
2. Mechanical Vibrations.
3. Mechanical Noise.
4. Optics.
5. FLUID MECHANICS

Ballistic Protection:

1. Against Projectile Impact.
2. Against Missile Impact.
3. Against Air and Gun Blast.
4. Against Underwater Explosion.

Mechanics of Materials and Structures:

Structural Components and Fittings:

PROGRAM NS-800

MINE COUNTERMEASURES

PURPOSE:

"Covers new and more effective countermeasures for all present types of moored, influence and energy type mines; also countermeasures for anticipated U.S. and foreign mine developments. Program includes basic research pertaining directly or indirectly to all types of physical phenomena, including geological and oceanographic conditions, considered important to mine countermeasures."

SCOPE (classified):

Studies of Firing Influences:

Develop Countermeasure Gear for Each Type of Influence:

Develop Mechanical Sweeps for Contact Mines:

General Studies of Minesweeping Gear:

 

General Studies of Mine Characteristics:

Develop Mine Detection and Location Devices: Basic Research Not Bearing Directly on Minesweeping:

 

--211--

 

(a) Post-War 1945 and 1946

Despite the serious curtailment in available personnel and funds that was occasioned by the cessation of hostilities, research and development problems were pursued to the utmost in the later months of 1945 and during 1946. Of necessity, administrative emphasis had been directed to program revision to cover peacetime planning end greatly decreased facilities. Obviously, reductions in technical personnel and funds required the closest examination of research policies in the light of operational intelligence in order that National security would not be jeopardized.

Only those problems considered most urgent end vital were being continued, and the Research and Development projects thus considered may be divided roughly into the following categories:

(a) Improvement of existing material to overcome deficiencies noted under combat conditions.
(b) Investigation, application and improvement of captured end surrendered enemy technical developments.
(c) Research and Development in new fields and concepts.

In carrying out its projects, the Bureau of Ships maintained close liaison with other Bureaus of the Navy Department, the Office of Naval Research, the Naval Research Laboratory, the various corps of the War Department, all other Governmental agencies, and industry. In maintaining its own laboratories, a technical staff thoroughly cognizant of shipboard requirements had been developed.

--212--

In brief resume, the projects of greatest interest undertaken during the first post-war year included research in shipboard application of guided missiles; improvement in metals, alloys and basic materials; research in vibration and shock phenomena and development of suitably resistant equipment; reduction of noise emitted by vessels underway; and, development of countermeasures for undersea warfare. Investigation of synthetic fuels and lubricants included both application to the present equipment and to the development of new means of propulsion.

In the field of propulsion, great efforts were expended toward the development of the gas turbine, toward closed cycle operation of submarines, and toward improvement of the present day internal combustion engine. German developments in the use of hydrogen peroxide end other chemicals as fuel came under closest study.

Statistical methods were adopted for the analysis of wartime machinery derangements end for the establishment of optimum material inspection procedures.

Great reliance had been placed by the Bureau on the technical personnel and laboratories of industry. Receiving excellent cooperation, it became possible to effect the maximum in scientific advancement with a minimum of technical staff, thus reducing expenditures to a large degree. An excellent example in this regard was the assistance offered by the petroleum industry and the engine manufacturers in the development and application of synthetic fuels end lubricants. Other industries also proved exceedingly cooperative.

--215--

Peace time plans for research and development included prosecution, to the maximum extent consistent with the availability of funds and personnel, of all new ideas and fields of endeavor for possible shipboard application, and the continued analysis of operating experience to promote improvement of materiel. In carrying out these plans, close liaison had to be maintained with other Naval and Governmental research activities and with industry in order that the maximum exchange of information and the greatest possible progress would be obtained.

(b) 1946 Research and Development:

During the fiscal year 1947 the research end development program of the Bureau of Ships had been directed toward the development of new or improved materials, components, equipment, machinery, systems, structural factors, and principles processes and techniques entering into the construction, maintenance and operation of naval vessels to enable them to better fill their mission. The principal emphasis, however, centered around new ship types, new systems, new components and materials and new environments and conditions, new offensive measures and countermeasures, which undoubtedly will characterize the naval warfare of the future. Included in the future requirements, and in the objectives of many of the year's projects, were: increased speeds greater strengths, higher temperatures, increased pressures and heavier loads; reduction in weight, space, noise and vibration; more resistance to shock, vibration, corrosion, erosion and other influences; and the improvement of conditions under which personnel perform their assigned work.

--214--

The master program during the year has already been outlined in Tables 85a-h of this Chapter. This outline, following in general the Dewey decimal system, proceeded from the nine main or general programs, (NS-000 to NS-800) through the intermediate sub-programs to the specific sub-sub programs, each of which lists the individual research and development projects related to the subject.

Such panoramic charting is providing the means by which the Bureau's programs may be evaluated, balanced and adjusted to post war needs. It is providing the necessary information for budgeting and for setting up facilities in naval and commercial laboratories, universities and industry; for the elimination of unnecessary duplication; end for a full exchange of information end sources of information, both within and without the Bureau. It also is providing the basis for a system of identification and record keeping. The coordination of the Bureau's research and development is similar to the Office of Naval Research service to the Navy and Joint Research and Development Board's service to the Army, Navy and Air Force.

The basic elements on which the Bureau of Ships Research and Development program is pursued might be listed in the following sequence:

(a) Navy's mission
(b) Ship function to fulfill mission
(c) Ship types to perform functions to fulfill mission
(d) Ships structures, systems, machinery and equipment to operate ship types to perform functions to fulfill mission.

--215--

(e) Materials that will assure performance of structures, systems, machinery and equipment.
(f) Material processes, techniques and availability.
(g) Countermeasures.

These logical sequences ere not pursued one at a time, nor could they be,

even if conditions remained static, which they do not. All phases are carried on simultaneously because they are interdependent one on the other, Compromises are the order of the day. It cannot be said that welding research and development must provide means for welding any materiel selected, nor could it be held that only materials readily welded should be selected. Research and Development is approaching the subject from both directions and will find some midway solution. The overall allotment for research end development for 1947 fiscal year was $39,000,000, which in round figures, breaks down as follows:

Contracts - $19,000,000
Naval Laboratories:
Research and Development - 9,000,000 Maintenance - 11,000,000

Specific examples of progress or accomplishment in the several fields of research end development are given below.

Materials

Metals

Four general metallurgical categories having to do with reduction in size or increased efficiency performance are:

--216--

(1) Development of processes for manufacture of materials capable of operating temperatures on the order of 1500°F for gas turbine work and for steam services above 850°F.

Progress has been made to the point where it is considered that low alloy steels will be available which will fulfill the broad needs for higher temperature service.

(2) Reduction in size and increased efficiency of power generating and transmission machinery. Recent metallurgical developments point to early probability of considerable reduction in size of gearing.

(3) Development of very tough, high strength, structural steel and plate having high impact resistance at all operating temperatures.

(4) Development of materials and methods of fabrication of systems for transmissions of sea water at velocities much higher than have heretofore been practicable. Tests have produced valuable data leading to overcoming of turbulence, or protection against it where it cannot be eliminated.

Advances have been made in arc welding electrodes for welding high tensile steel for production of joints equal in strength to the steel and elimination of underbead cracking.

Close cooperation with industry has been maintained in metallurgical developments and in improving welding procedures.

--217--

Fuels and Lubricants

A Special Diesel Fuels Test Program is being carried on under contract with 3 engine manufacturers at a cost of $130,000. Eight special fuels varying in cetane number from 29 to 120 and in other characteristics are undergoing test.

Supplementary tests and analyses are being made with the cooperation of ASTM, SAE, Bureau of Mines and Industry to develop routine laboratory method of hydrocarbon type diesel fuels, for purpose of improving fuels and utilization of them. A Boiler Fuel blending program exploiting two German scientists is underway at the Naval Boiler and Turbine Laboratory.

Investigation of shale oil, coal tar oils, as blended with petroleum, and correlation of German test methods with U. S. test methods is being made with a view to increasing availability of fuel oil by use of synthetics and take advantage of fuel knowledge of Germans.

Plastics and Rubber

Research and development in plastic materials has been accelerated with a view to structural applications. Boat hulls 28 feet in length, molded of plastic, are under development. The expected advantages are reduction in weight, increase in strength due to one piece construction, low man hours required in mass production, and low maintenance cost.

--218--

Plastic covers for reduction gear housings have been developed with a decrease of 90% in weight compared to the steel counterpart and lower noise transmission value. Plastic enclosure for the bridges of ships to protect personnel from weather and gun blasts are under development. Superior electrical insulations have been developed using glass fibers in combination with silicone and melamine resins.

A compendium of rubber test methods and classification schemes was published which form the basis for revision of the Federal Specification for Rubber Test Methods used by all Government Departments . Important improvements in hose were made which will insure increased rate of fueling-at-sea. Adoption of flame sprayed coatings for rudders and other underwater surfaces will materially decrease corrosion. Other major improvements were rubber standing mats to reduce fatigue, blisterproof synthetic rubber bearings, and high temperature resistant rubber asbestos gaskets.

An innovation was the preparation of an inspection manual to be used by all naval inspectors in evaluating visual defects of all types of hose.

Much emphasis has been placed on a development program to improve the cold weather properties of synthetic and natural rubbers.

Wood

Improved modified wood decking materials utilizing redwood and resin treated hardwood of domestic origin have been developed

--219--

surpassing existing decking materials in wearing qualities and protection against plane landing accidents on flight decks end as a replacement for teak on other types of vessels.

Textiles

Silicone resin treated fibrous glass has been adopted as a buoyant medium for life jackets as a result of extensive laboratory and accelerated service tests.

Neoprene foam mattresses have been adopted for submarines as a result of 12 months service tests following laboratory testing with improved comfort for the crews.

Instrumentation

An improved power tube already under development, a program for investigation and study of electronic motor controller, and a project for development of Ship's motion recorder have been initiated and established. The delivery of automatic recording instrumentation for study of shipboard equipment service conditions is expected in near future. Laboratory projects for the development of test methods and of equipment for the evaluation and application testing of Servo systems, stable elements, and magnetic amplifiers have also been established.

Chemical Indicator for Water Analysis

A new improved chemical indicator which will enable ships' boiler operators to conduct water tests with greater speed and more accuracy has been introduced.

--220--

Water Treatment for Diesel Engines.

The development and institution of an improved water treatment method for cooling water systems of internal combustion engines has occasioned a marked effectiveness in lowering the incidence of cracked cylinder liners and in reducing corrosion of water systems.

Metal Degreasing

A kerosene-emulsion degreasing compound having a high flash point and exhibiting unusual effectiveness in the removal of grease and oil contaminations from metal surfaces by contact has been developed.

New Insecticides

The initial phases of investigation into the shipboard utilization of a new insect toxicant have been completed. The material offers great promise in that it was found to possess about ten times the killing power of EDT, when used against the German cockroach.

Application of Infra-Red Spectra.

An investigation into the application of infra-red absorption spectrography in the chemical analysis of benzene hexachloride (a new insecticide) and its various isomer components has also been finished.

--221--

Dehumidification of Ships

Final stages of work were completed in connection with the ability of various desiccant materials to adsorb gases encountered in ships' atmospheres. Final test report reveals that all dehumidified spaces were safe for entry by Naval personnel. This information has since been corroborated by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Cleaning of Fuel Oil Tanks

Preliminary work was concluded in the development of a vapor injection method for removing oil and sludge from shipboard fuel oil tanks. The method holds great promise in replacing the current methods (Wheeler and Butterworth Systems) which are more costly in labor and money and less efficient.

Improved Antifreeze Compound

In cooperation with a leading antifreeze compound manufacturer a greatly improved materiel was developed, tested and approved for Naval use. The new material offers the unique advantage of continuous service in cooling water systems for at least three years.

Sea-water Degreasing

Progress has been made in the development of a new degreaser compatible with sea water. The need for this type material was evident in reports of difficulties aboard aircraft carriers where secure footing is imperative on flight decks. The new material offers promise in reducing this hazard and in limiting the need for critical fresh rinse water supply.

--222--

DDT Specifications

Specifications and test methods were developed for a new DDT Emulsion Concentrate. This represented a pioneer effort in this direction and industry has readily recognized the value of these specifications. The Federal Specifications Board has already initiated a Federal Specification based on this new Navy Department Specification.

STANDARDS

The Standards Section of the Research and Standards Branch has during the past year acted as the liaison activity representing the Bureau of Ships, and in several cases, the Navy Department, as member of technical societies and committees. This includes about 300 committees and subcommittees of technical societies such as the American Society for Testing Materials, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, American Standards Association, and Interdepartmental Boards, and is the depository for all activities of these committees.

Proposed international standards for screw threads have been prepared and are being processed. Standard methods of simulative service tests are being prepared. Revision of the Interdepartmental Screw Thread Standards, H-28, has been prepared.

SPECIFICATIONS

Specifications have been processed as follows:

Bureau of Ships Specifications and Amendments

30

 

--223--

Contract Specifications and Amendments

346

Navy Department Specifications (Sponsored by BuShips)

139

Permanent Electronic Specifications and Amendments.

23

Sub-total

538

Joint Army-Navy Specifications (Sponsored by BuShips)

-

TOTAL

560

 

APPLIED PHYSICS

Noise Reduction

Application of effort to reduce noise created on, and emanating from, submarines and surface vessels has been accelerated. A "Ship Design Advisory Committee on Noise" has been established to study all aspects of the surface vessel noise emanation problem. Work to reduce underwater noise from submarines is continuing with the establishment of new noise-measuring groups and through continuing technical investigations and developments. Plans have been approved for construction of an acoustical laboratory building at the U. S. Engineering Experiment Station for investigating ship machinery noise. New and improved noise measuring instruments are being developed. A survey is being made preliminary to the establishment of airborne noise limits for shipboard spaces.

Shock

Plans for full scale shipboard shock tests were discussed in several conferences and arrangements for such tests on two

--224--

APA type vessels, which are already available for other underwater explosion tests, are now underway. It is hoped that these tests will be followed by similar work on surplus combat type vessels, if availability of such ships could be granted, in order that much-needed information regarding the nature of shipboard shock due to explosions can be obtained for bull and machinery design purposes. Studies of the limited shock data available have been made in efforts to solve current problems. Modifications have been made to existing laboratory shock testing machines for improved performance. Development work was initiated for improved shock measuring instruments. A continuing project is underway for improved mountings to isolate equipment from ship-board shock, with emphasis on the resilient element material as well as the design of the mounting.

Vibration

Numerous requests have been fulfilled for investigating and alleviating severe vibration on board vessels and in laboratory experimental test installations. Very comprehensive surveys of machinery, hull, and equipment vibrations were made during standardization trials of CVB 41 and CVB 42. Other shipboard vibration surveys of a lesser extent were arranged and carried out on other aircraft carriers, destroyers, and auxiliary vessels. Analyses have been made of the torsional vibration characteristics of diesel engines and investigations made of crankshaft failures which occurred in service. A survey and investigation were initiated to

--225--

determine more accurately the nature and causes of such engine crankshaft failure. Analyses were made of high experimental machinery installations for determining the causes of shaft failure and remedial measures therefor, and for determining the adequacy of the design to avoid failure. Studies were made in connection with the development end design mountings for vibration-isolation of equipment.

Structural

Ballistic tests were completed on four specially constructed full scale uptake armor grating specimens to determine the most efficient means of supporting such gratings. Evidence for further improvements and lower costs are being investigated. Explosion and gun blast tests were carried out both on shipboard watertight doors to improve their efficiency and on items of shipboard equipment such as ammunition chests and ventilation ducts to determine means of reducing damage to such items. Comprehensive studies are underway for the improvement of a gun blast simulating device used for routine testing of small equipment, for investigation of the nature of blast waves and the effects on ship structure, for investigating the strength of aircraft carrier flight decks under heavy aircraft landing loads, and for determining the strength of structural connections and materials under high speed impact loads and repetitive loads. improvements end new developments have been made also on testing equipment and instruments required for investigations of dynamic strength problems.

--226--

3. Laboratories:

Staffed by Naval officers and trained civilian specialists having intimate knowledge of the practical aspects affecting material of seagoing vessels, the laboratories under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships are equipped to deal with problems unique to the Navy. Although administered either as independent commands or as activities under the Commandant of Naval Districts or Naval Yards, each laboratory is placed under the cognizance of a Bureau most intimately concerned with its principal output.

Laboratories which fell under the cognizance of the Bureau of Ships during the war included:

Naval Research Laboratory, Anacostia, D. C.
Naval Engineering Experiment Station, Annapolis, Md.
Naval Boiler and Turbine Laboratory, Navy Yard, Phi1a., Pa.
Industrial Test Laboratory, Navy Yard, Phila., Pa.
Materials Laboratory, Navy Yard, New York, N.Y.
Industrial Laboratory, Navy Yard, Mare Island, Calif.
Radio and Sound Lab., San Diego, Calif.
Naval Mine Warfare Testing Station, Solomons, Md.
Paint Laboratories at Navy Yards, Mare Island, and Norfolk.
Rubber Research, Mare Island, Calif.
Metals Laboratory, Munhall, Pa.
Rope Laboratory, Boston, Mass.
Petroleum Laboratory, Houston, Texas.
Experimental Diving Unit, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.
Industrial Laboratory, Navy Yard, Puget Sound, Washington.

These laboratories have undertaken, in addition to their work on Bureau of Ships projects, research and testing for any Naval Bureau and any other governmental activity as their facilities and workloads permitted. The character of the work done in the laboratories has varied from fundamental research and investigation leading to major inventions or modifications of current practice to the routine testing necessary to maintain the standards

--227--

and specifications of Naval material. The two most important wartime laboratories from the Bureau of Ships' point of view were the Naval Research Laboratory end the David W. Taylor Model Basin. The Naval Research Laboratory, although distinguished for its contributions in the field of electronics and particularly radar, has also made major contributions in the field of mechanics, electricity, optics, chemistry, metallurgy, communications, and sound. The David W. Taylor Model Basin has had as its basic function the solution of problems concerning the design and operation of Naval vessels by testing models in a long, narrow water tank under controlled conditions. This tank was so precisely constructed that the middle of the 2700 foot basin is 5/8 inches higher than the ends so as to allow for the curvature of the earth. The models representing ships of various forms and shapes, have been built accurately to scale and towed under controlled conditions. The performance of the models was carefully recorded and from the data thus obtained the performance of full scale vessels of similar shapes could be predicted. The advantages of this procedure are obvious, for changes found necessary in the course of model tests have been effected with relative ease at that stage, whereas alterations on the full scale vessel would have proved difficult, costly and time consuming. It also has investigated problems in the field of minesweeping, torpedoes, end underwater explosion, and later in the war facilities were developed for the Bureau of Aeronautics to test airplane models and to investigate aeromechanical principles.

--228--

Two of the most important testing laboratories under the Bureau's cognizance have been the Naval Engineering Experiment Station, Annapolis, Maryland, and the Naval Boiler and Turbine Laboratory, Navy Yard, Philadelphia. The activities of the first Station have embraced the fields of chemistry, metallurgy, welding, mechanics (with emphasis on internal combustion engines and Naval machinery), and physics (electricity and acoustics). Included are the specifications for fuels (other than boiler fuels), lubricants, packing, machinery and equipment for Naval use; the testing of these items for compliance with specifications when supplied under contracts; analyses and determination of causes of machinery failures in the Fleet; the solution of engineering problems relating to the machinery and equipment of the ships; and the instruction in specialized technical matters of Naval personnel.

The latter laboratory has conducted full scale tests of shipboard boilers and appurtenances as well as full scale tests of turbines and reduction gears for ship propulsion. In addition, a large amount of test and development work has been performed on boiler fuels, refractories, and fuel oil burners. This has permitted evaluation of machinery performance and reliability prior to installation aboard ships.

With considerable emphasis placed on research and development in the fields of plastics, rubber and derivative materials, the Materials Laboratory at the New York Naval Shipyard accelerated work on development of all important practical tests to determine quality level of high strength structural plate steels which differ in temperature range at which transition from ductile to brittle fracture takes place but which otherwise have

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similar properties. This laboratory also has tested portable and machine tools for specification development, conducted instrument research end ferrous welding projects, and worked in connection with electrical and electronics tests and development.

This activity and the Industrial Test Laboratory, Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, have proved basically complementary to each other with respect to Bureau of Ships' development projects. In short, the Industrial Test Laboratory has conducted development work on the following: Life floats, jackets, and buoyant fibers, spectrographic studies, marine borer investigations, insecticides, detergents, corrosion investigation (surface passivation), topside paint investigations, dehumidification tests, nonferrous welding development instrument research (identification by X-ray diffraction), tool development (long term specification revisions covering twist drills and abrasive wheels only) and textiles development work.

With regard to ship-borne and land-based naval equipment, it may he well to mention two more of the Bureau's activities which have contributed measurably to the progress in this sphere. The U. S. Navy Electronics Laboratory, Point Loma, San Diego, California, has conducted research, development, and test work in all phases of electronics including radio, radar, sonar, countermeasures, circuit components, missile guidance, radiological instrumentation, test equipment, training devices, and special communication systems to increase the fighting efficiency of the Fleet. While this laboratory successfully undertook a major portion of the development of electronics systems for air-sea rescue, the Underwater

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Sound Laboratory, New London, Connecticut a permanent field activity of the Bureau of Ships engaged in the research, development and testing of such phases of electronics as particularly applied to pro- and anti-submarine warfare. The projects involved sonar, infra-red, radio and undersea communications, and other special applications of electronics devices, services, and systems.

In addition to these specific laboratories described and those listed previously, the Bureau has had a rather extensive contracting program with universities and research foundations. For example, a basic study of the physics of noise generation has been supported in the hope that the findings will remove those limitations on the range of sonar equipment that are caused by noise. In the electronic field, also, such projects as the improvement of the magnetron -- the heart of radar -- have been in progress in these contracted activities. The extent and influence of their work cannot be minimized in the research and development program of the U. S. Navy.

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CHAPTER XXI
ELECTRONICS

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CHAPTER XXI
ELECTRONICS

I. INTRODUCTION

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King stated in his official report of the war that "perhaps the greatest technological advances of the entire war have been made in the field of electronics". It is the purpose of this chapter to review these technological advances in light of their organizational, design, production, installation and maintenance aspects.

The electronic program continues in the post-war period to be dynamic, fast-moving, and a challenge to our most able and imaginative minds.

In view of the importance of electronics in the future, however, this report will serve not to extol the praiseworthy performance of the Bureau of Ships during World War II, but rather to preserve in official form the problems and their solutions presented during this wartime program. It is said of women that "their styles change but their designs remain the same". In electronics, this feminine characteristic is reversed for the designs may change but the styles (of production, etc.) remain the same. It is with this in mind that this Chapter is written.

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THE EYES AND BRAINS OF THE MODERN WARSHIP

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II. EARLY HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE ELECTRONICS DIVISION.

The first use of naval radio seems to have been the wireless test, communication between Washington and Annapolis around 1902. This test, conducted by the newly conceived Radio Division of the Bureau of Equipment, used German equipment and was based on study of various European techniques. This Bureau actually stationed an officer in Europe to keep it advised of the latest wireless developments on the continent, an arrangement which wisely continued for a number of years. From 1903 to 1906, as a result of this first test, wireless stations were set up at 20 shore stations, including all Navy Yards and Naval Stations, and equipment installed on 14 lightships, 13 battleships, 26 cruisers, and 14 other vessels. The first messages, largely time signals, soon proved useful in communicating news, such as reports of the San Francisco fire. In one year, 1906-1907, shore stations sent or received about 60,000 messages, but as a whole, wireless was still regarded in the fleet as a "luxury".

With the abolition of the Bureau of Equipment in 1910 and the establishment of the Bureau of Engineering, a new Radio Division came into being and continued to set up high-powered stations (until the end of World War I) at such places as Arlington, Virginia; Pearl Harbor; Cavite; and Alaska. Wireless telephone became established in the fleet for ship to shore communications, and then battleships tested portable radio Bets and underwater sound detection devices. The latter proved successful, principally as a result of Bureau sponsored laboratory experiments at New London and Pasadena conducted by scientists from electrical companies

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and universities. Navy Yard manufacture of Navy equipment encouraged standardization of all types and instituted a system to coordinate and to assign numbers to drawings in order to eliminate confusion between yards.

During World War I the Radio Division procured, installed, and maintained all radio equipment on 1800 Shipping Board vessels. Trans -Atlantic communication between Annapolis, Maryland, and France was arranged to supplement cable communication and to serve as a standby in case the latter were disrupted. Incidentally, pigeon service, a major means of limited communication during World War I, fell under cognizance of the Radio Division, later to be transferred to the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Marine Corps.

During the interwar period naval radio continued to develop under the coordination of the Radio Division of the Bureau of Engineering. Officers, assigned by the Bureau to the field as Radio Material Officers, handled material features of the Naval Communication Service. Research and Design, consolidated at the Naval Experimental and Research Laboratory In 1923 under Dr. A. Hoyt Taylor, advanced rapidly with the adoption of high frequency radio, the equipping of ships for simultaneous transmission and reception, and the replacement of spark damped-wave vacuum tubes by continuous wave transmitters.

The Radio Corporation of America was formed with Navy encouragement, and acquired the remaining property of the Marconi Company, while other requisitions by American Companies eliminated foreign ownership and control in the United States and its possessions. Underwater

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DR. A. HOYT TAYLOR
FATHER OF AMERICAN RADAR

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sound detection, cognizance of which was transferred during the first World War to the Radio Division, expanded gradually during the 1920's and the 1930's, but by 1936 fewer than 100 ships had the equipment.

The birth of radar, also, occurred during this period between wars. In 1922, Dr. A. Hoyt Taylor and an assistant, Mr. Leo Young, observed that certain radio signals reflected from steel buildings and metal objects. They observed also that ships passing by a transmitter and receiver at such frequencies gave a definite interference of pattern. From these observations came the query as to whether or not two ships some miles apart could detect by this method a ship passing between them, irrespective of fog, darkness or smoke screen. During the years that followed research continued, based upon this imaginative, searching, preliminary suggestion.

In the reorganization of the two bureaus of shipbuilding into the Bureau of Ships in June 1940, the Radio Division lost its status and became the Radio and Sound Branch of the Design Division. Before this change, the Division was organized partly according to the use to which electronics equipment was to be put (aircraft radio, shore radio, ships radio, Marine Corps, and underwater sound) and partly according to function (procurement, research and design). At that time also, no radar, with its attendant developments for air-surface-airborne search, fire control, loran, racon, counter-measures, bombsights, and the like, existed in the fleet. Relatively few ships and planes carried elaborate radio gear and relatively few ships were being built.

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Then, with the reorganization and the declaration of a limited emergency, emphasis was placed upon fostering and coordinating the design and development of radio and sound equipment; establishing military characteristics and setting up specifications for their production; determining ship allowances; estimating requirements on the basis of those allowances, and asking the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to procure the equipments on a competitive bid basic; and, planning installation and maintenance.

The extent to which the electronics program expanded is astonishing. In 1940 the Bureau of Ships spent about six million dollars for equipping and maintaining ships and shore stations with electronics equipment and for electronics developmental work. Five years later the annual figure totalled more than $l,000 millions. During this time, civilian and officer personnel had expanded from 39 in January 1940 to a total of 1205 in September 1945.

The growth of the electronics program during 1940 and 1941, however, placed the organization under great strain. The development of radar seemed to require the setting up of a separate unit, because it required new skills and a new vocabulary. The fleet did not know how to use it, Yards did not know how to install it, prime contractors did not know how to design, engineer, or produce it, or even how much it would cost to make it. Specifications did not exist and military requirements had not been determined. Thus, radar evolved from the Special Development Section of Design into a separate unit, almost a

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miniature branch, handling its own design, installation and maintenance, training, and procuring for the Bureau of Ships, Bureau of Aeronautics, Bureau of Ordnance, and Marine Corps.

The Research and Design Section initiated research, coordinated it, and prepared specifications for all the radio types except radar. Installation and maintenance of radio equipment and initiation of their procurement, on the other hand, were handled separately for each equipment use (ship, shore, Marine Corps, and the like).

The procurement of equipments was not consolidated, with the result that progressers and expediters were competing with each other in the same plants, sometimes for the same equipment types. This situation continued after the declaration of war and up to the end of 1942, the growing pressure to expedite procurements becoming a disadvantage of first magnitude.

In view of the increasing radio and sound expansions and the even more rapid development of the electronics art, the first and perhaps the only fundamental reorganization, that of October 1942, made the Radio Branch into a separate Bureau of Ships Division. As indicated in Chart XX, A, this organization arranged the Division according to functions -- Design, Procurement and. Production, Installation and Maintenance, and Equipment -- rather than equipment.

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CHART XX, A
BUREAU OF SHIPS
RADIO DIVISION

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[blank, back of Chart XX, A]

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CHART XX, B
BUREAU OF SHIPS
RADIO DIVISION

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[blank, back of Chart XX, B]

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CHART XXI
BUREAU OF SHIPS
ELECTRONICS DIVISION

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[blank, back of Chart XXI]

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This reorganization brought together the various officers and civilians having similar training, talent, and jobs; standardized and coordinated research in radio, radar, and sonar, especially for components; consolidated field staffs; and, coordinated procurement so that the Electronics Division bought and expedited as a single unit. The only other important reorganization, that of September 1944, as indicated by Chart XX, B, detached the procurement functions from the Electronics Division and gave them to the Contract Division.

Following mid-1944, the new organization included three Branches: Design, Equipment, and Installation and Maintenance. The Design Branch prepared design and performance characteristics from military characteristics laid down by OP-25 of CNO, established manufacturing specifications, and initiated and coordinated design and development, including airborne design which had been transferred from the Aircraft Branch in November 1943.

The Equipment Branch took over determination of requirements from installation and Maintenance and the work of distributing equipment to depots and yards. It also performed the technical aspects of contract planning such as recommending contractors best fitted to do the work from a technical point of view, setting up the production schedules, and performing progressing and expediting, including the work of aiding the contractor in securing labor and materials to meet his schedules.

The Installation and Maintenance Branch made out type allowances, and, working with the type desks of the Bureau, planned installations and assumed responsibility for proper electronics installation and maintenance

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ashore and afloat. It directed the work of the Radio Material Officers of the Yards and of the manufacturers' field groups, and it coordinated electronic publications and schools.

The transfer of the fire control procurement to the Bureau of Ordnance under the reorganization stemmed primarily from the fact that fire control procurement amounted to only five or six million dollars monthly and was concentrated almost entirely in one company, Western Electric.

By contrast, however, the Bureau of Aeronautics' procurements constituted a very large volume -- even larger than that of the Bureau of Ships -- and were scattered among many of the same companies furnishing Bureau of Ships' requirements. To allow the Bureau of Aeronautics to procure independently would have split the Navy contracting into competing and administratively independent camps; thus, the entire activity was relegated to the Bureau of Ships. Immediately prior to the war's end in 1945, the Division adopted the name "Electronics".

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TABLE 86

Roster of Officers-in-Charge
Radio and Electronics Division

1903 - 1944

Bureau of Equipment, 1903 - 1910:

Lieut. A. M. Beecher -- 1903
Lieut. J. M. Hudgins -- 1903-1904
Lieut. J. L. Jayne -- 1903-1904
Lieut. S. S. Robison -- 1904-1906
Lt. Comdr. Cleland Davie -- 1906-1910

Bureau of Steam Engineering end Bureau of Engineering, 1910 - 1940:

Lt. Comdr. D. W. Todd -- 1910-1913
Lt. Comdr. A. J. Hepburn -- 1913-1915
Lieut. S. C. Hooper April -- 1915 - July 1917
Lt. Comdr. H. P. LeClair -- July 1917 - August 1918
Comdr. S. C. Hooper August -- 1918 - July 1923
Capt. R. W. McNeely -- July 1923 - March 1926
Comdr. S. C. Hooper -- March 1926 - July 1928
Comdr. E. C. Raguet -- July 1928 - December 1930
Comdr. S. A. Manahan -- December 1930 - October 1933
Comdr. W. J. Ruble -- October 1933 - June 1938
Lt. Comdr. J. B. Dow -- June 1938 - January 1940
Comdr. A. J. Spriggs January 1940 - June 1940

Bureau of Ships, 1940:

Comdr. A. J. Spriggs June 1940 - December 1941
Comdr. (now Commodore)
J. B. Dow December 1941 -

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TABLE 87

Key Civilian Personnel of the Radio Division

1903 - 1940

Abbey, Harold Austin, L. W.
Cummings, B. L.
Floyd, W. H.
Forbes, E. D.
Haslett, L. J.
Hill, Guy Isbell, A. A.
Johnson, T.
Lewis, George  
O'Brien, Arthur  
Parker, J. E.
Pratt, Haraden  
Russel, Philip T.
Stewart, John M.
Trogner, A. M.
Young, A. L.

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III. ELECTRONICS DESIGN

A. DESIGN POLICY BETWEEN WORLD WARS I AND II.

One great lesson learned by the Navy between the World Wars was not to depend on the surpluses of one war to carry it through the lean appropriation period after that war. As a consequence of this philosophy, most appropriations flow into material items, to the detriment of research and design. Following World War I, available funds barely permitted equipment needs to be met, so that limited use was made of the large commercial laboratories for developing new instruments. In retrospect it is easy to see that the Navy would have fared far better with fewer but more advanced equipments serving as a basis for large scale manufacture when war proved imminent. As a consequence of this almost unsurmountable error, it became necessary in World War II to concentrate advancement in design while simultaneously attempting mass production.

It is not the purpose of this history to malign or to slander our predecessors. Instead we approach this particular phase of the Bureau's history from the standpoint expressed by one of our leading naval officers: "The judgement of a schoolboy in retrospect is better that the greatest general on the field of battle." In retrospect, then let us view the facts concerning our lack of attention upon research-facts which now appall us, but which may permit us to gain some valuable experience.

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The fault probably lay in fixing too much attention upon meeting material needs of the moment rather than accepting something less in order to devote more time and money to advancing research and development. Whatever the reasons for this near catastrophe, we must be alert to this danger, which will always be with us, for it is only human to prefer tangible goods to gambling on developments which may turn out to be unsuccessful. That the Bureau should have asked for more money for the specific purpose of electronic design and development is painfully evident now. As late as 1939, for example, the Bureau requested and received for research and development the incredibly small sum of $25,000!

All war plans for electronics made during years of peace were not only qualitatively but quantitatively inadequate. This fault was a common one and indicated that the general refusal of the public to think about war in realistic terms and with imagination was reflected in the planning of the Department.

The Naval Research Laboratory, founded at the suggestion of the Edison Board of World War I, proved to be an immensely profitable venture, particularly in its development of underwater sound and radar. However, it never received the Navy's wholehearted support, the attitude of which rapidly approached that of a business man interested chiefly in large-scale production and distrusting untried theories and longhaired professors. Indeed, all research was stopped and the Naval Research laboratory almost wiped out in an economy wave of the early 1930's!

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Unhappily, the same suspension of research also occurred in industry, where emphasis was placed on production that had already been engineered.

The laboratory department of Westinghouse, for example, faded into oblivion. What basis do we have now for not believing, if peace continues for a dozen years or so, that interest in new development will not again subside?

B. DESIGN POLICY AND WORK LOAD DURING WARTIME

Despite our failure to maintain research and design in peacetime, the war years proved that one vital qualification of this criticism must be observed. To say that our complex problems of equipping the wartime fleet with modern electronic equipment stemmed wholly from an inadequate development program is somewhat of an oversimplification of the situation. This conclusion is based on the assumption that with adequately developed equipments as of the beginning of the war, designs could have been frozen and full emphasis devoted to standardization and maximum production. Actually, such an action could never have been fully adopted, since it was a basic policy of the United States throughout the war, and in all fields, to deliberately sacrifice some measure of efficiency in production in the interest of constantly improving its weapons. It 1a interesting to note that such a philosophy was in direct opposition to that adopted by Germany, where early standardization was established in an effort to squeeze out the last measure of production. Thus, even though research and development had been carried on during peace, efforts to improve equipment by

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applying the lessons learned in actual combat would have continued.

In so doing, therefore, production problems would have remained relatively as complex and pressing, but our designs would have been more advanced.

Concerning the inter-relationship between design and production, one job facing the Design Branch before the war and in its early stages was the need to indoctrinate a large number of officer and civil service engineering personnel in methods of arriving at suitable designs and of transmitting data to hundreds of contractors. Contractors had to be trained also, for most of them were inexperienced in meeting Navy specifications.

Another early problem proved to be the standardization of material parts, equipments, and systems. An outstanding job was accomplished by the Bureau in the Joint Army and Navy specifications simplifying equipment design; reducing the numbers, types, and sizes of the hundred or more components of an average equipment; reducing the burden on the tooling and plant facilities, and simplifying the Army and Navy stocking and spare parts problem; and achieving greater interchangeability of parts and equipments. This job saved a great deal of material and man hours in production, and simplified maintenance and installation. Standardization was accomplished partly by cutting red tape and partly by personal contact between officers in parallel billets in the two services. For example, an Army engineering officer assigned to the Bureau of Ships would work on specific standardization problems with a Naval Officer on the same assignment.

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The Bureau of Ships performed a particularly effective job in the case of tubes, cables, and connectors, although standardization in this field was carried on primarily at the Army Signal Standards Agency at Red Bank, New Jersey, with Bureau of Ships' assistance.

The magnitude of this design task facing the technical minds of the Armed Forces and private industry of our nation can scarcely be grasped by even the most interested reader. Chart XXII plots the new design developments as a function of calendar years from 1938 until the war's end. From forty-seven new designs in 1938, this load sky-rocketed to 528 in 1944. Figures alone, however, present but a superficial picture of the over-all proportions of this comprehensive program. Undisclosed is the fact that in this period entire new systems were designed, based on principles which had scarcely been considered before the war. The most widely known and appealing to the public and technicians alike is radar. However, many others involving equal or almost equal technical problems were conceived, developed, tested, produced, and installed in time to play an effective part in the successful outcome of the war. Typical of these are loran, IFF, television, beacons, ground controlled approach systems, automatic bearing indicator direction finders, radio and radar countermeasures, bathythermographs and their tactical usage, meteorological apparatus, cryptographic and cryptoanalytical devices, radio teletypewriter systems, and communications equipment in the ultrahigh frequency region. Concomitantly, each of these new projects required a host of attendant advances in the related fields of vacuum tubes, components, controls, antennas, etc.

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FIG. 1 WORK LOAD OF DESIGN BRANCH

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Major design problems, however, were not restricted alone to new devices. Equally challenging situations arose in the adaptation of standard equipment to new usages. For example, the construction of an unprecedented amphibious fleet created an urgent demand for newly designed communications, radar, and sonar equipments suitable for the special needs of these craft. With the Pacific invasions came large and unpredictable demands for mobile units of all kinds. The solution necessitated major modifications in the design of existing equipments to meet these specialized needs.

The field of countermeasures would require a lengthy history in itself adequately to tell the complicated story of new problems arising in actual combat and solutions in the form of new equipments being conceived, designed, produced, and installed in time to meet the need. A typical example of this procedure was the successful neutralization of German guided missiles by the use of jamming transmitters. Another was the development of jam-free radar receivers in the face of actual and threatened enemy countermeasures.

Improvements in existing equipments were constantly being made. Fast Time Constant circuits were added to radars to enable them to track planes through land masses. Indication of bearing error in sonar equipment (BDI) was developed and incorporated in old and new models. Constant major and minor changes followed these typical examples -- all designed to make the equipments more effective, more rugged, more closely representative of actual combat requirements.

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To present the history and development of each electronic device would prove an impossibility within the scope of this history, since the story of each would necessitate a volume in itself. However, in order to indicate the Herculean efforts of the Bureau of Ships in electronics design and research, it is incumbent to describe briefly the development in the following major fields: sonar, radar, communications, infra-red, and others.

C. SPECIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMS

1. UNDERWATER SOUND.

The underwater sound program throughout the inter-war period proved to be the most important and involved of the Navy's research programs. Research and development in this field, prior to the end of World War I, centered at New London, Connecticut, but in 1919 this activity transferred to the U. S. Naval Experimental Station at Annapolis, Maryland. Very soon thereafter, the multishot microphone lines were developed for use with electrical direction-finding compensator and these together became the generally accepted devices for detecting submerged submarines. In addition, the sonic depth finder for navigational aid was developed at Annapolis, but after 1923 all this research work continued at the Naval Research Laboratory and the Navy Yard in Washington as well as at the various commercial laboratories.

Prior to this development, underwater sound detectors, hurriedly designed and manufactured mainly from design knowledge of telephone circuits and equipments, had proved the solution to the "U" boat menace. However,

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when the enemy "denoised" their submarines to minimize the effects of such noise makers as pumps, fans, motors, gears, bearings, propellers, etc., this form of detection equipment became almost completely inefficient. Out of the necessity for a more adequate device, the echo ranging means were devised. Echo ranging devices provide means whereby the searching vessel transmits or sends out an underwater sound signal in all directions. The presence of a target within a reasonable distance produces a returning echo for this transmitted signal. By means of accurate timing and bearing determining mechanisms, this equipment is enabled not only to detect the presence of the target but also to locate its position in distance and bearing. From the words: "Sound-Navigation-Ranging" comes the name "SONAR" for this type of equipment.

Out of these detecting and direction and depth finding equipments developed the standard high frequency echo ranging and sounding equipments (later known as Models XL-XN and QA) employing the quartz-steel type of projector. These early equipments were, until a commercial company could be interested in producing then, manufactured by the Navy Yard, which first produced and installed them, in 1930, on about 20 destroyers of the latest class at that time, the 1200-ton class.

The Rochelle Salt projectors were next developed for submarine use at slow speeds while, for higher speeds, a resonant type device which could eliminate interference from background noises was introduced. With the acquisition of the British streamlined dome, however, the Rochelle

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Salt type attained general service, due to its narrower beam width and consequent better direction. Under the Roosevelt administration, the shipbuilding program expanded during the 1950's and with it sonar development and installations increased. In 1939, only one major production source of this equipment existed although it was now working overtime to keep up with demand. The Navy now had reliable echo ranging and echo sounding equipment for large ships, but its experimental models for small craft proved wholly inadequate. In 1941, therefore, Radio Corporation of America and Submarine Signal Company were given a development contract which succeeded, after some difficulties and false starts, in turning out a successful Rochelle Salt set for small craft. While sound improvements were developed by the National Defense and Research Council, including ideas for better bearing determination and for reducing the blast on operators' ears, most improvements were borrowed from the British. Research throughout the entire war continued, however, to such an extent that up to V-J Day modifications were still being made to meet changes in the war against U-Boats.

Submarine warfare is no exception to the historically proven rule that measure and countermeasure succeed each other in swift succession, with each new weapon more terrible than the last, and each defense more difficult to provide in time. The U-Boat developments included deeper submerged depths, tougher hulls, and faster submerged speeds. These made it necessary to develop means of maintaining contact with a deep target and determining target depth in order to improve attack accuracy. Operational

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experience with High Speed Task Groups also made it necessary both to give attention to underwater streamlining in order to reduce water noise and to improve ships' search efficiency at higher speeds. VE-Day found the Germans launching a submarine capable of completely submerged operation for periods of weeks or months, equipped for incredibly deep diving, and with get-away speeds of 24 knots submerged. Allied opinion is that it could have out-distanced and probably shaken off any of our escorts which might have attacked it. Thus, we see the importance of sonar and the vital necessity for its adequate development. The extent of Allied scientific advancement in this field may be found in the Axis loss of 996 submarines in the 72 month Battle of the Atlantic.

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2. RADAR

No phase of World War II captured the imagination of technicians and public alike so much as the development of radar. The complete story behind this device is of such scope that a lengthy outline would be necessary to more than indicate the changes of the various types of equipment. Since the variety of radar available at the war's end proved kaleidoscopic and almost unintelligible to even the most schooled, this discussion will concern itself with a brief historical analysis of radar and with a general exposition of its scope.

In mid-September 1922 two research scientists, Dr. A. Hoyt Taylor and Mr. Leo C. Young, working in the Naval Aircraft Radio Laboratory, Anacostia, D. C., observed that several radio signals were reflected from steel buildings and metal objects. They also observed that ships passing by a transmitter and receiver at such frequencies gave a definite interference of pattern. These observations gave rise to the suggestion that; "Possibly an arrangement could be worked out whereby destroyers located on a line a number of miles apart could be immediately aware of the passage of an enemy vessel between any two destroyers in the line, irrespective of fog, darkness or smoke screen."

The discovery by Dr. Taylor and Mr. Young more than 20 years ago was the birth of radar (radio-detecting ranging). Their searching, preliminary suggestion marked its first consideration of its possible applications. Dr. Taylor and Mr. Young were connected

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intimately with the development of radar ever since those fateful days in September 1922.

Between 1925 and 1930, the reflection phenomena observed in 1922 was used to measure the height of the Kennelly-Heaviside layer, on atmospheric formation which acts as a reflector for certain beams. During this period Dr. Taylor and Mr. Young also measured the time required for radio signals to go around the world by reflections from the Kennelly-Heaviside layer. For this purpose extremely brief radio signals were employed and apparatus was desired to both transmit and receive such brief signals. On June 24, 1930, Mr. Hyland, an associate of Dr. Taylor, observed that aircraft crossing a line between a transmitter and receiver operating directionally gave an interference pattern clearly indicating the presence of such aircraft. Later that year the Director of the Naval Research Laboratory submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering a detailed report prepared by Dr. Taylor on "Radio-Echo Signals from Moving Objects". This report proved a great stimulus to development. In the first days of 1932, the Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War describing the work carried on at the Naval Research Laboratory. This letter contained the following suggestion: "Certain phases of the problem appeared to be of more concern to the Army than to the Navy. For example, a system of transmitters and associated receivers might be set up about a defense

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area to test its effectiveness in detecting the passage of hostile aircraft into the area. Such a development might be carried forward more appropriately and expeditiously by the Army than by the Navy." The Secretary, moreover, offered to the War Department the assistance of the Naval Research Laboratory and all other facilities and personnel which the War Department might desire to use.

By this time airplanes in motion nearly fifty miles from the transmitter had been detected under certain conditions. In July 1932, Dr. Taylor reported that the object of the current investigation was to develop instruments for the collection, automatic recording and correlating of data to show position, angle and speed of the approach of objects in the air. By March 1933, various types of apparatus and systems for detecting enemy aircraft and vessels had been developed to the degree which enabled the Naval Research Laboratory to outline in detail the theoretical military application. In 1935, the Naval Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives evidenced its interest in this development by allotting to Laboratory, on its own initiative, $100,000.00 for research purposes.

By 1937 the first rough models of radar equipment were tested in the fleet captured the imagination of the highest officials in the military services. The next two years were spent in designing and manufacturing a practical shipboard model. After continual trials, a radar set manufactured by the Naval Research Laboratory was installed on the USS NEW YORK late in 1938. This equipment was given exhaustive tests at sea during the 1939 winter cruise and

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battle maneuvers. The Commanding Officer of the USS NEW YORK was most enthusiastic and recommended that the work be continued. The Commander of the Battleship Division stated: "The equipment is one of the most important radio developments since the advent of the radio itself."

By 1939, two of the major electronics laboratories in the country, Bell and RCA were working in cooperation with the Naval Research Laboratory on radar research and development. In the following year General Electric and Westinghouse enthusiastically entered the program and subsequently became outstanding manufacturers of radar equipment.

In September 1940 representatives of the British Technical Mission met with representatives of the Navy to exchange information relating to radar. Previously it had been known that Great Britain possessed a system for detecting aircraft, but most of the details of the British system were unknown here. During this conference with the British Technical Mission, it was found that the British equipment was similar in many respects to the equipment developed by the Naval Research Laboratory and members of the British Mission stated that the British development had resulted from articles reporting the preliminary work between 1926 and 1930 of Dr. Taylor and Mr. Young of the Naval Research Laboratory and Dr. Breit and Dr. Tuve of the Carnegie Institute studying the height of the Kennelly-Heaviside layer. Using this information, the British independently had developed their radar system and independently had arrived at frequencies and circuits very similar

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to those developed in this country.

In October 1940 Rear Admiral Bowen, then head of the Naval Research, Laboratory was designated coordinator of all phases of the Navy radar program.

By the beginning of 1941 the General Electric, Westinghouse, RCA and Bell Telephone laboratories were carrying on research and undertaking commercial production. Commander Jenning B. Dow, USN, spent the greater pert of 1941 in England obtaining information on British radar methods. Upon his return to the United States, Commander Dow organized the radar branch in the Radio Division, Bureau of Ships.

At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, a few sets of radar were on hand but radar still had to be sold to the Fleet - a problem facing every new technical device which takes up space and requires trained personnel and practice maneuvers. The cloak of secrecy which surrounded radar also proved an impediment to its acceptance, for even as late as 1941 one could count on the fingers of one hand the number of people in the Navy whose comments on radar had any significance. Ideas on design possibilities had to be revised every few months and advances were so rapid that comments from the Fleet had usually been anticipated months before and up until 1943 were of little help. When the battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942 proved the value of radar as a fighting aid, acceptance by the Fleet was assured, which permitted complete concentration upon the technical development of radar and the mass procurement program.

As we shall learn, technical development was accomplished partly on the production line and partly by preparing modification kits and sending these to the Fleet in order to bring its equipment in service

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up to date. One series of equipment, for example, had over 90 modification kits and, when one considers that there finally came into being 25 series of equipment, the magnitude of the program may be imagined. These series developed from the few simple sets of 1942 into a tremendous variety of equipments for specific purposes, such as early warnings, airplane height findings, micro-waves, ship-search, and navigating aids. Fire control radars expanded to such an extent that crews of all but the smallest automatic weapons are now aided by it. Specialized airborne equipments have been installed in all types of aircraft and. even amphibious installations were made available to the Marine Corps in trailer conveyances.

The succeeding sections of this chapter may give the reader some indication of the magnitude of this program, a full exposition of which is impossible in view of the limited scope of this study.

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3. COMMUNICATIONS

Communication is the nerve center of all war time operation. Without adequate means for the transmission and reception of intelligence, military activities would be paralyzed. From tiny, extremely lightweight compact transceivers carried by paratroopers to high powered communication centers located ashore, the important movements of war are activated and directed largely through the use of electronic devices.

To illustrate the growth in this field, one needs only to realize that the entire design work, for communication purposes ashore and afloat, of the Bureau of Ships Radio Division in 1939 was handled by a staff of only 10 engineers. By the war's end this staff had grown to well over 50 engineers, which represented but a small portion of the additional number of trained specialists working on similar projects in private industry.

During the ten year period preceding the outbreak of World War II, the development of communication equipment was confined to the frequency range from 15 kc to 30 mc. Procurement was measured in terms of 100 units or less, as a general practice, owing to the limited funds available for military expenditures. By World War II standards, neither large scale procurement of production equipment nor extensive research into new fields was undertaken.

In 1939 the Navy was wholly dependent upon the Radio Corporation of America for shipboard receivers and direction finders. General Electric,

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Westinghouse and Western Electric played minor roles in these fields, since their interests were primarily confined to the transmitter field.

This situation was a direct result of the Navy being forced to make only limited procurement of communication receivers and direction finders, both of which are complex in design. Moreover, they involve great financial risk on the contractor's part. There were the rigid specifications on performance necessary to meet the military requirements and the necessity for developing new techniques and components, etc., on certain items for which there were no past precedents or experiences to fall back upon. The risks, therefore, that were involved were such that only the major radio manufacturers could afford to take the gamble.

Since limited funds were available for research and development, few of the technical personnel in the research and design section of the Bureau concentrated on the development of new equipments. The efforts of the remaining personnel were directed to projects which would enable the problems encountered in the operation of equipments in the Fleet and ashore to be met by modifications in the existing equipment, changes in operating practices, and other methods which could be handled without the expenditures of research and development funds. Under the conditions then prevailing the development of a piece of equipment required a period of approximately three years from the time of its inception until the end products were available. Following Pearl Harbor, the Navy was suddenly faced with a great demand for communication equipment and

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with a great shortage of technical personnel. One of the most interesting steps taken to alleviate this demand proved to be the reclamation of several World War I receiving equipments and their conversion to the use of modem tubes and AC current, which indicates the desperation of the Navy at this critical time. The Navy also effected the maximum possible modification of commercial designs to permit their use in the Fleet and manufactured many "stop-gap" equipments to fulfill certain needs until more permanent and advanced designs could be placed in production. These design developments, as dictated directly by operational needs, constituted the cream of the efforts expended in the Radio Division and revolutionized the standard functions of communication equipment as a whole. Advancement in the field of electronics not only influenced the modification of existing equipment systems but also permitted the creation of new devices having wide and varying applications.

The great demands on communication facilities forced the advance of equipment design first into the very high frequency and then into the ultra-high frequency band in order to obtain the necessary channels to meet communication circuit requirements. Communication stations, which, prior to the war, considered traffic at the. rate of 50,000 words a day a heavy load, suddenly had to handle anywhere from 25 to 50,000 messages a day. In order to make possible this truly prodigious increase in the transmission of intelligence, it was imperative to use new methods of control. The plan decided upon was the adoption of a modified version of the Western Electric Company's radio-telegraph multi-channel carrier control system. In general, this system made it possible to operate

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several communication circuits over one radio link. Normally, control of these circuits was by over land wire facilities, but under war conditions this was not feasible, as transmitting and receiving stations were frequently separated by great distances from the main communication center and there was the ever present possibility of having these circuits disrupted by adverse weather conditions, sabotage or enemy action. The gradual replacement of the existing methods of keying and recording with teletypewriters paralleled this development. Teletypewriters were designed originally to operate over land-lines and necessitated high performance radio equipment and new techniques, developed during the last few years, for operation in a thoroughly dependable manner over long haul radio circuits. The advent of frequency shift keying, which increased the signal to noise ratio and greatly reduced certain types of interference, played a major role in making the uae of teletypewriters practical.

General exploration into the ultra high frequency realm opened many hitherto relatively unexplored branches in the field of electronics, permitting the creation of revolutionary devices for many purposes. In communications it contributed not only by providing more apace on the air for conventional types of equipment but also by leading to new and practical methods for multi-channel communications involving equipments as sensational, in their way, as radar. A system known as pulse modulation permitted the use of simultaneous transmission of a large number of messages over telephone, telegraph and other communication services. Before then it had been possible, with a comparable amount of

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apparatus, to transmit only one message at a time. The theory of pulse modulation is not new and research along these lines has been conducted for a period of approximately 15 years prior to the war.

High frequency direction finding was developed by the Navy to provide a quick and accurate means of locating enemy submarines which were disrupting lines of communication across the Atlantic in the early days of the war. It provided the intelligence from which "killer" groups of escort carriers and destroyers were able to locate and sink the marauders. Reliable shipboard high frequency direction finders were first used by the United States Navy in January 1943. Prior to that time it was considered impossible to obtain useable high frequency direction finder bearings by shipboard equipment because re-radiation of objects on board caused unpredictable variations. Other principal uses of high frequency direction finders are in counter-measures equipment, radio intelligence monitors, trackers for radio controlled weapons and planes, navigational aids for ships and planes, air-sea rescue equipment and meteorological work.

The introduction of the Loran navigation system, which was developed at the Radiation Laboratories under the sponsorship of the office of Scientific Research and Development, contributed to the responsibilities and workload of the Design Section. This section obtained cognizance of the design of the Loran shipboard receiving and transmitting equipment, transmitter timing equipment and monitoring oscilloscopes, while private industry carried on the engineering and development of other components.

Homing Beacon equipment designed to transmit bearing and identification

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signals for the guidance of aircraft to carriers or land bases was one of the early war developments by the Navy along communication lines. These equipments boast a constant speed directional rotative antenna which may be so ingeniously synchronized with the movement of a ship that the proper signal, controlled in reference to true north, is transmitted to each 30° segment of the true bearing circle regardless of any change in either the speed or direction of the ship. As navigational aids for aircraft, homing beacon equipment is considered of such vital importance that aboard carriers their antenna structure occupies the best location.

Among other developments of major importance which occurred during the war years was the introduction of panoramic methods of signal presentation, which has had wide application and has grown from a mere novelty to practical importance in Naval services, particularly when associated with receiving equipment intended primarily for search and interception. In view of the importance of entertainment receiving equipment as a means of maintaining high morale among the fighting men, this field receives considerable attention. The trouble with receiving equipment used for shipboard entertainment was that oscillator radiation could reveal the ships' position to enemy submarines. This problem was eliminated by a process which promptly led to additional development in radio-phonograph combinations and other similar equipments for shipboard receiver use.

In the design of later, more complex transmitters, methods of mechanical tuning were developed whereby, independent of the experience of an operator, an equipment could be placed in operation, merely through

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the use of a telephone dial, within a period of approximately 20 seconds. Where automatic tuning was impractical, as many tuning elements of an equipment as possible were connected to a single control. In view of the limited technical personnel, these developments proved of extreme importance.

During World War II, communication equipment, in a sense, was the orphan child of the electronics field. It did not have the benefit of the glamor and secrecy which surrounded radar development and, to a certain extent, the Loran system. Nevertheless it held its own and important advances in the art were achieved; since that time enormous progress has been made.

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D. POST WAR DESIGN

In April 1947 the head of the Electronics Division, Captain D. R. Hull, USN, forwarded to the Chief of the Bureau the following synopsis of the post war design objectives:

Communication:

The engineering effort is being directed towards equipment in the higher frequency regions where more radio spectrum space is available. The problems of communication security and intelligence as set forth by requirements of the Chief of Naval Operation are also the responsibility of the Electronics Division."

Radar:

"Improvements are aimed towards equipment giving increased angular coverage, range and precision, at the same time decreasing weight and power consumption. Reduction of unwanted echoes from sea returns and ability to discern targets against various background signals are major problems gradually being solved."

Sonar:

"Effort is in the direction of increased range and accuracy more positive target identification and integrations of the various sonar systems for pro- and anti-submarine attacks. This work includes airborne sonar and research into underwater propagation."

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Infra-red:

[block] "Development is directed toward increased ranges by improving radiating sources and detectors. Uses include search, detection, recognition, navigational aids and communications."

Countermeasures:

"These methods are in terms of planning, investigation, research and development to provide intercept devices, jamming and deception techniques. Due to the special nature of this field of endeavor, it is one of technique and training development, rather than equipment procurement. From this standpoint, knowledge of how to do a particular job is more important than having equipment on hand in any quantity."

Radioactivity:

"A relatively new, but important, objective of the Electronics Division is the research toward and development of electronic instruments and devices to meet anticipated needs for radioactivity detection, measurements, sampling, location, remote indications, warnings and special laboratory applications."

In his report to the Chief of the Bureau, Captain Hull continued:

"In order to meet the electronics objective, certain fundamental works including propagation of electromagnetic waves, development of frequency generating and stabilizing devices, new electron tubes and components, various types of amplifying and detecting devices and associated system requirements, are being studied and evaluated.

The Electronics Division has attempted to make full use of developments consummated during the last war. As a result, the work of the Division

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has increased so that at present 60% more projects are being handled than at any time during the war. In this connection, the Electronics Division is engaged in a thorough standardization program with the Army on component design, stocking, cataloging, and nomenclature. The research and development work of the division is handled by assigning projects to various agencies and contractors. Projects are set up directly with commercial organizations and laboratories, with activities such as the Bureau of Standards, Naval Electronics laboratory, U. S. Naval Underwater Sound Laboratory and, through the Office of Naval Research, with the Naval Research Laboratory and various universities. The needs of the service are under continual review and new technological developments are under constant surveillance with the objective of having the best electronic equipment and techniques at all times."

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IV. THE PROCUREMENT PROGRAM

A. REQUIREMENTS AND ALLOWANCES

Despite the rapid advances in design, a system for determining and reporting Electronic requirements had not been developed as late as 1942. The pressure of the task, however, caused a requirement and allowance program to be projected -- a system which required starting with plans and procedures, data on size, voltage, power supply, mast heights, strength, and freedom from obstructions, and other ships data. No ship had radar equipment or any allowance for such equipment and, until radar demonstrated its worth in combat, it proved difficult to interest people in it; yet the responsibility devolved upon the Electronics Division to act as technical consultant to the CNO, so that the latter could fulfill its responsibility for issuing procurement directives.

The General Board and CNO established military characteristics of equipments and requirements for the ship class. The Bureau of Ships Electronics Division determined which equipments met those characteristics, estimated how many would be needed and then initiated and planned their procurement. If existing designs proved not suitable, the Bureau initiated design action to meet the specifications set forth.

Beginning in March 1942, the Radar Installation Section made a thorough study of physical and electrical characteristics of ships and recommended to CNO a certain class of radar for each ship type. For example, medium air search radar was recommended for destroyers as well as fire control equipment for the main battery of each destroyer. The number of such

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equipments was determined for each ship type. Completed allowances and requirements were checked by the installation planners for technical accuracy and by the Shipbuilding Division for ship stability.

Allowances having been determined for all ships of the Fleet by summer of 1942, the Electronics Division could then estimate requirements for each ship afloat and under construction.

Upon the completion of estimates of allowances and requisitions, procurements were placed for all requirements not already placed, since allowances were completed class by class. To effect these procurements, a rule was set up (not based on any experience, since none existed) that an initial or single-shot reserve by provided of 15% for battle damage and 20% for contingencies of various kinds, including provision for school equipment or requests from allied nations, such as Great Britain, Australia, Russia, and France, for equipment under Lend-Lease. Long before the equipment could be delivered to the ships, Lend-Lease requests alone amounted to more than five times the original contingency factor. In an effort to correct this, the Radio Division, in the winter of 1942-43, requested the Lend-Lease Administrator for exact estimates of requirements, but this request was never entirely complied with. Moreover, the Lend-Lease Administration continued to request new models just emerging into production instead of the original models for which quantity production had been achieved.

In the spring and fall of 1943 the determination of requirements was placed on an I.B.M. basis; a centralized system was set up providing a single requirements card for each equipment; all ship requirements became anchored to the shipbuilding program and, when the date of new construction of a ship

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changed, requirements altered automatically; moreover, the use of I.B.M. systems yielded a ready indication of district requirements, permitting shipment to the Naval Districts without need for looking up individual ship completion dates or locations of building yards.

It became obvious by the spring of 1944 that the coordination of requirements made it necessary to eliminate the duplication among claimant sections of control of equipment types. For example, separate radar requirements were estimated and procurements were made by each of the Marine Corps, ship, and shore sections in installation and Maintenance Branch. This conclusion led to the organization of the Equipment Branch in July - September 1944 from parts of the installation and Maintenance Branch and the Procurement and Production Branch.

As already described in the organizational Section, the Equipment Branch was responsible for determining what and how much should be procured and from whom. Under the terms of this reorganization, all persons concerned with determining requirements and distributing a certain class of equipment were placed in one section. The following sections were organized in October 1944; Radio and Loran, Radar, IFF, and RCM; Sonar; Functional Components. Each of these sections initiated procurement requests using (1) allowance lists established by installation and Maintenance, (2) equipment characteristics set by CNO, (3) data on number of ships to be equipped and (4) training school manuals, lend-lease directives, and so on. A stock Maintenance Section was also organized to handle items common to all of these sections; insulators, cables, headphones and switches.

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In the fall of 1944 an audit group was set up, composed of a number of officers from business fields. This group reviewed controls, the accuracy of requirements based on CNO directives, the inventory data and prospective supply data and stocks. Although it is impossible to give the radio, radar and sonar sections' precise figures, the Division instituted 119 cancellations of equipment work, totaling $70,000,000, between 1 December 1944 and 9 March 1945.

In October 1944 a unified requirements-determining procedure was set up to eliminate duplicate requirements and guesswork. Under this procedure one requirements card was established for each type of equipment and each item to be procured by Radio Division.

The system of allowance for battle damage and contingency occasioned unbalanced production, for excessive quantities might be produced of one type of equipment, while the program halted for lack of other types which might have been produced earlier by the wasted productive capacity. The unneeded extra equipment created a storage problem, as well as a problem in obsolescence, for new models were often developed before the excesses could be used. However, the use of the flat percentage was not abolished immediately. For example, it was used exclusively for sonar up to 1945 and it was still used in May 1945 for new types of equipment for which no experience existed. By the spring of 1944, however, accumulated experience made it possible to estimate how fast equipment had failed, which equipment had failed, which was subject to battle damage, and so on.

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PART I
(See Parts II & III for Army Items)

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The battle damage and contingency allowances now being based on experience rather than on an arbitrary ratio, allowances were reduced to as low as 2% for large combatant ships and raised to as high as 50% on some classes of amphibious vessels. In so doing, productive facilities were far better utilized by being geared more closely to actual operations.

To remedy inadequate scheduling of requirements, the Requirements Coordination Section, organized in May 1943, requested the other sections to submit monthly requirements for radar, radio, loran, IFF, RCM, and sonar. In the monthly printed requirements reports, every item was classified alphabetically, numerically, and by claimant (ships, shore stations, advance bases, Marine Corps, amphibious and Coast Guard). They also indicated the monthly distribution of need for requirements. These requirements reports (Chart XXIII) listed: (1) the claimant section or agency requiring the equipment and the contractor supplying it; (2) the number of equipments required and months when needed, the number on order, delivered, assigned, in inventory, undelivered; (3) the precedence category and desired monthly production; and (4) the procurement status, or amount by which the equipments under procurement were in excess or insufficient.

B. PROCUREMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

The Bureau of Ships Electronics Division procured electronics equipment for itself and the Bureau of Aeronautics, as well as for the Marine Corps, the Maritime Commission, and Lend-Lease. It procured for

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these agencies in line with the Navy policy of centering all procurement in the largest user of a given type. The chief agency for which it procured was BuAer, whose procurements, as a matter of fact, dominated BuShips throughout most of the war, although during the emergency and early war periods BuAer's electronics requirements were much smaller. BuAer, however, did control general and performance characteristics, determine the number and types of equipments required, and procure accessories and standard type test equipment and maintenance spare components. In practice moreover, it usually nominated the contractors on the ground that it (1) knew who could do the best technical job and (2) had already discussed technical problems with them. It argued that to discuss these problems with other contractors chosen by BuShips under competitive negotiation would have involved excessive delay.

The Bureau of Ships prepared detailed specifications in consultation with the Bureau of Aeronautics, negotiated the price, directed production effort, and approved all commitments affecting design and production. The Bureau of Ships also initiated the design and development of new electronics equipment, the Bureau of Aeronautics paying the direct cost.

The Division did not procure for the Bureau of Ordnance, but merely provided that Bureau with technical advice. Altogether, however, the Division procured about nine-tenths of the Navy's electronics requirements. This system gave one Bureau an overall view of the situation with

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respect to production, price, component, and labor, while eliminating duplication of many functions. The disadvantage was the delay in processing procurements through several technical Bureaus, in separating authority and responsibility, and in continually obscuring the status of procurement in the two Bureaus. The practice, moreover, of having BuAer designate the contractor reduced effectiveness of combined procurement, for the chief advantage of having BuShips handle BuAer procurements was that the former could then consider from an overall point of view factors such as keeping contractors in business, comparative pricing, labor situation, financial standing of firms. If BuAer could name contractors on purely technical grounds, these economic advantages of combined procurement were greatly reduced.

Theoretically, the function of selecting the contractor, negotiating price, and awarding the contract belonged to BuSandA, which before the war, performed this function for BuShips procurement other than electronics. For electronics, however, the technical complexity, the rapid technical development, and the huge acceleration in procurements placed the job beyond the technical competence of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

Authority for initiating procurement requests in the Electronics Division came from CNO, either (1) in correspondence setting up ship or shore allowances or requesting specific equipment, or (2) in requests for equipment from claimants (ships, etc.) resulting from CNO directives. Before July 1944, procurement requests were prepared by specialist sections

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of the Installation and Maintenance Branch. Procurement requests after that were prepared by the cognizant Equipment Section (radio, radar, etc.) from information obtained from the Design Branch, Installation and Maintenance Branch, Distribution and Stock Material Section, and other claimant agencies. This information covered the technical description of major items, the estimated price, the suggested manufacturer, the type of inspection, the packing method, the appropriation data, the quantity, and when the items would be required. The form was given to the contract planner for processing and to the various sections of the Division for signature. It then went to the Contract Division for negotiation of price and placing of contract.

As soon as the proposed contractors were approved by the Equipment Branch Procurement Planning Committee, all procurement requests involving over $200,000 were listed for submission to the weekly meeting of the OP&M Electronics Procurement Coordinating Committee for its approval. On procurements involving less than $200,000, proposed contractors were selected by Production and by Contract Planning, in consultation with the procurement planner, after getting clearance from the Loan Section of the Contract Division through the Finance Section.

The officers and civilian buyers would contact the manufacturer by phone, place orders, check delivery schedule, determine whether they could fill the order, and negotiate special provisions in contract, to be approved later by the Legal Division of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

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Any necessary precedence forms were prepared along with the procurement request and sent to the Production Section. Precedence forms were not required for off-the-shelf purchases, purchases from another Government agency, emergency small lot purchases, and nonelectronic purchases, nor were they required for a mere change in quantity of monthly requirements or precedence numbers.

If the Contract Division was unable to secure a satisfactory delivery promise within 48 hours of receipt of the emergency purchase request, it placed the order with the contractor in the form of a contract or letter of intent. Responsibility for expediting was turned over to the Production Section, which would inform the Contract Division when a promised delivery date was obtained. The Distribution Liaison Section then saw that shipments were made on promised delivery dates and kept the other section informed as to delivery status.

In the case of reduction in rate of delivery under the contract, the originating section notified the Production Section, which determined what contracts were to be terminated or adjusted as to delivery rate. The Production Section had the duty of complying with the Contract Termination Directives issued by the OP&M.

The problem of procurement in the earlier days was complicated by four factors; (1) Almost no radar designs suitable for production on a large scale existed in 1939; even as late as 1942 there was practically no radar on naval vessels or any allowances established for them. Design and production therefore had to

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proceed simultaneously, greatly slowing the speed of the procurement program. (2) No adequate organization existed for negotiating, determining requirements, expediting, progressing, and the like. (3) There was no experience on which to negotiate prices high enough to serve as an inducement to contractors and low enough to be fair to the taxpayer.

(4) There were very few firms with electronics producing experience or facilities.

The lack of pricing experience, the need for speed, and the problem of rapid changes in specification were dealt with by using, for seven-tenths of the negotiations up to July, 1944, either letters of intent or contracts specifying maximum price, with later redetermination downward only. Letters of intent described all known specifications and named a ceiling price to obligate the Government either to enter into contract by a certain date or to pay the contractor his costs of performance up to that date. They were used to get contractors started at once, wherever they were unable or unwilling to quote prices until production experience was obtained or until the Government furnished detailed specifications, or wherever the negotiators were unable to keep up with the pressure of contracts to be negotiated. These letters were converted into maximum price contracts as soon as it was possible to do so -- usually when design was completed and the company was prepared to start production. In July 1944 there were nearly 500 letters of intent outstanding to the value of nearly a billion dollars and 300 maximum price contracts.

Fixed price contracts were used wherever the contractor could quote an acceptable price properly supported by price breakdowns and, where time permitted, usually relatively late in performance of the

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contract. As repeat orders increased and designs stabilized, it became possible to use more firm-price contracts, but even in May 1945 major improvements were still being instituted, which complicated the price problem. Cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts were rarely used. Manufacturers opposed them and the Navy cost inspection service was not large enough.

The use of letters of intent has been much criticized by OP&M. Their use has been defended, however, on the ground that speed was the essence and that haggling over price would have delayed tactical operations. Nevertheless, just prior to July 1944 the Secretary's Office became concerned over the extent of the use of letters of intent in electronics contracts relative to the other Navy procurement agencies and an investigation was made under direction of A. H. Hill. As a result of this study and through Joint action of the Secretary and the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, the cognizance of procurement was transferred from the Electronics Division to the Contract Division, under a civilian head formerly with OP&M.

The use of maximum price contracts never relieved the original negotiators of an obligation to bargain carefully. The recapture of excessive profits was no substitute for sound original negotiation, especially since it was likely that the Price Adjustment Boards would cease to function before many of the existing contracts had matured.

The Navy's experience was not unfavorable up to the middle of 1944.

Navy contracts gave 45 companies about 20% profit before negotiation and 12% after, compared to a reduction in the case of the Army from 26.4% to 11.2%.

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The dearth of firms with experience and facilities made it necessary during 1942 and 1943 to rely almost entirely on the very large firms. Thus, the Production Report lists only 44 prime contractors in November, 1942, the largest 14 firms of which held 92% of the dollar volume of contracts. Many of these firms were not large in the beginning, but since they showed a better record with respect to deliveries, engineering operations, prices, and production methods, there was a tendency to concentrate orders in those firms.

The Electronics Division feels that it did succeed, later, in spreading the work out to the smaller firms, in spite of OP&M criticism as late as February 1945 that most of the backlog of undelivered balances was still with the larger companies.

One hundred fifty (150) contractors held about 25% of the contracts in April 1945, compared to 8% held by small companies late in 1942. Most of this spreading was accomplished in 1943. During 1944 and 1945 the percentage of contracts held by small firms rose only 5%. (See table 88). Partly owing to this extension of contracts to small firms, the undelivered balance of the 13 large companies dropped from 84% of outstanding procurements to 59%. On the other hand, the balances of the smaller contracts fell from 78% to 68%. Part of the reason may be the maturing of contracts held by the larger companies for longer periods.

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TABLE 88

Electronics Procurements (by millions)

A. THIRTEEN LARGE COMPANIES

(1)
Total Contracts

(2)
Balance Undelivered

(3)
Total Deliveries

Percent (2) is of (1)

1 Dec. 1942

$ 833.4

$ 702.7

$ 130.7

84.3

1 Dec. 1943

1,500.9

1,189.2

311.7

79.2

1 Dec. 1944

1,342.6

802.8

539.9

59.8

1 Apr. 1945

1,257.4

758.3

519.1

58.7

Companies included: Western Electric, Westinghouse, RCA, General Electric, Philco Corporation, Collins Radio Company, Submarine Radio Company, Hazel tine Service Corporation, Sperry-Gyroscope, Stromberg-Carlson, Federal Telephone and Radio, Aircraft Radio Corporation, National Company.

B. BALANCE: SMALLER CONTRACTORS

(1)
Total Contracts

(2)
Balance Undelivered

(3)
Total Deliveries

Percent (2) is of (1)

1 Dec. 1942

$ 73.7

$ 57.8

$ 15.9

78.4

1 Dec. 1943

386.4

325.7

60.7

84.3

1 Dec. 1944

380.0

273.4

106.6

71.9

1 Apr. 1945

438.5

299.2

139.3

68.2

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C. Contract Planning and Negotiation

Until shortly after Pearl Harbor, each individual section (Ship Radio, Shore Radio, etc.) handled its own procurement and negotiation, assisted after early 1942 by negotiators of the Procurement Branch of OP&M. A Contract Clearance Division was also set up, early in 1942 under OP&M, to review all contracts over $200,000. This gave OP&M a legal veto on such procurements, but in actual practice did not prevent teamwork between the two agencies.

In late spring of 1942 radio procurement and negotiation were centered in one Procurement Section which performed these functions until the reorganization of July 1944, which split this function between the Electronics and Contract Divisions. Many of the technically trained officers were retained in the Equipment Branch and a Contract Planning Group was set up in December to provide documents to tell the Contract Division what to buy. The Planning Group aided in preparing requests for more procurements and contract modification or change authorizations. It saw that legal clauses covered the technical problems of production: for example, that all patent right on development of the equipment should be retained by the Government, or that contract specifications agreed with what the contractor had said he could do. It helped select contractors who could turn out the best work most reasonably and quickly. The section performed the latter function through its wide acquaintanceship with contractors of specialized abilities; for example, those able to make high frequency circuits, or simple equipment at reasonable prices. Usually a half dozen companies were selected and dominated

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to the Contract Division. The financial status of the companies was checked with the Financial Section of the Contract Division, and the physical facilities, etc. were checked in the field by the Inspectors of Naval Material for the Industrial Cooperation Division of OP&M. The selections were made in meetings between contract planners, Assistant for Services, and representatives from the Design Section, and the Office of the Head of the Equipment Branch.

The Contract Division Negotiation Section, staffed by the non-technically trained men transferred from Electronics, thus received a set of papers setting forth proposed contractors; materials required, their quantities, specifications, and exceptions filed by contractors to the specifications; financial appropriation applicable; clauses governing the furnishing of material by the Government. In short,

it received the technical materials needed for bargaining on price with the contractor. It was seldom possible, however, to give the negotiators everything they needed in advance. As they negotiated they usually discovered new problems and were obliged to appeal to the Contract Planning Section for further technical help. There was tendency, therefore, for considerable joint action.

The policies of Contract Division negotiation were controlled by OP&M, not only because of the authority given OP&M by the Secretary of the Navy on its organization in January, 1942, but also because the officers in charge were OP&M personnel, and all contracts were subject to approval of the Contract Clearance Office of OP&M for price and to the approval of other OP&M sections for negotiation, award, and inspection.

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The details of negotiators' techniques varied for each negotiator and each contract, but the general principles were (1) to get several bids on the same job, for this method was found to be most efficient in cutting cost, and (2) to require prospective contractors to name a firm price based on detailed analysis of their costs.

The effectiveness of this contract negotiation is not easy to measure. Prices of electronics equipments, it is true, declined more rapidly than those of ary other major type of procurement. However, because there was no pricing experience, because there was inadequate competition, because great haste prevented careful negotiation or economical production methods, and because continual changes in design hindered mass production, prices were bound to be high initially. As contractors developed experience, as capacity and competition widened, as designs stabilized, prices of electronics were bound to fall more rapidly than those of more stable industries, regardless of the quality of negotiation.

One criticism of the present division between contract planning in the Electronics Division and negotiation in the Contract Division was that the negotiators did not have sufficient control over selection of the contractor, or over contract modification unless these were sent to be negotiated. The latter occurred only if Contract Planning was not satisfied with contractor's submitted cost. Not only were procurements strung out longer (a week or ten days), but contractors with whom a close bargain had been struck in original price might seek to recover some of the profit by inflating costs under subsequent modification orders that did not reach the negotiators. This criticism seems justified.

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D. PROGRESSING AND EXPEDITING

1. Bureau of Ships Expediting

It became evident during the summer of 1942 that the radar production program was falling behind, largely because each Design or Installation and Maintenance Section, such as ships radar and aircraft radar, was expediting its own procurements. Six or eight men from the Navy Electronics Division might be competing simultaneously with each other and with expediters from the Army to get increased output from the same plant.

Initiated as a Production and Procurement Branch this activity included a Progress Section and a system whereby liaison officers were assigned exclusive cognizance over individual plants or areas for the purpose of getting acquainted with the manufacturers, helping them solve production problems, and advising them which equipment types were the most urgent.

Two progressing officers started this expediting at a time when monthly deliveries approximated 30 million dollars. By September 1944, when deliveries totalled 100 million dollars monthly, there were 16 officers in this activity.

The many and varied Production problems typically encountered by the manufacturers and aided in solution by the plant liaison officers included increasing allocations of raw materials under CMP; raising precedence rating of an urgent end-product to enable the manufacturer to concentrate on its production; deferring men from the draft; securing financial assistance; procuring additional facilities such as buildings, land, rolling stock, tools, and machinery; and relaxing government

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regulations affecting wages and hours, fuel oil for plant heating and the like. The problems usually focused on the inability of component producers to deliver in time to meet schedules of equipment production. Inability to deliver was in turn due to lack of materials -- e.g., condensers, which may in turn have been held up for lack of mica.

Indeed, a component might emerge from a chain of seven or eight subcontractors. The expediter's job was to trace through this chain until the trouble was discovered, but first, however, the contractor attempted to solve all the problems himself before calling for Navy assistance.

In addition to helping the contractor with his production problems, the plant liaison officers had the task of seeing (1) that the contractor carried out changes specified by the Navy and stabilized his design as quickly as possible in order not to delay production; (2) that special requests from shipyards, shore stations, ships and claimant agencies such as Lend-Lease or Maritime for expediting overdue deliveries were accomplished; and (3) that equipments were produced in order of importance to the Navy. Plant liaison officers also furnished information on contractors (their reliability and the like) to other claimant agencies (Maritime Commission, etc.), helped such agencies place contracts, and scheduled components or sub-assemblies, such as meters, where production was not enough to satisfy all claimants.

While this scheduling of production among the various claimants belonged essentially to WPB, that agency left it, by tacit acquiescence, to the Navy if the latter had controlling interest in

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the output of a given plant.

In mid-1942 the Army-Navy Electronics Production Agency (ANEPA) was established with power to direct, by means of precedence listing, the order in which material should be delivered. The creation of ANEPA required that the Production and Procurement Branch be able to guide that agency. Since it needed information on equipments under contract, their order of importance, the contractors, the delivery schedules, and the quantities delivered and undelivered. This information had been lacking up to this time, except for scanty progress reports sent in on WPB forms which were thirty to sixty days old when received.

In order to provide this information, a monthly Electronics Production Report was initiated in late 1942 as illustrated by Charts XXIV and XXV. From the information gleaned in these reports, it is possible to estimate the number of useful purpose they served.

The original report for example brought out the important fact that 93 percent of the value of electronics contracts were held by the largest fourteen of the forty-four prime contractors which guided the WPB in directing the flow of critical components and raw materials.

These reports became the basis for scheduling, expediting, and all matters concerned with production.

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CHART XXIV

BUREAU OF SHIPS – NAVY DEPARTMENT
PRODUCTION REPORT OF EQUIPMENT REQUIRING ELECTRONICS COMPONENTS

--298--

CHART XXV

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS

ELECTRONICS DIVISION – CODE 96
PRODUCTION REPORT

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2. The Army-Navy Electronics Production Agency (ANEPA)

During the latter part of 1941, on advice of civilian advisors, the Army Signal Corps formed an expediting section, similar to that of the auto industry, for speeding up the production and delivery of Amy electronics equipment and reducing contractor delinquencies. This section was the forerunner of the joint Army-Navy Electronics Procurement Agency. In July the agency was renamed the Army-Navy Communications Production Expediting Agency but was kept under the Army. In October a reorganization occurred under its permanent title as a separate agency and its expediting functions were extended to radio, radar, and sonar. From an initial staff of 10 persons in 1941, the Amy expediting section expanded to 373 persons by July 1942, at which time it consolidated with the Navy organization to eliminate duplication of effort and of pressure on manufacturers.

In competing with the Army, the Navy was handicapped by an expediting organization inferior in scope and organization, for the Army had 400-500 expediters, compared to the Navy's 7 or 8, and conducted its operations in the field rather than from Washington. The Navy expediting personnel were taken over by ANEPA; the Amy furnished 25 and the Navy 28 military personnel. A year later the staff included over 1000, most of them expediters.

ANEPA had the job of speeding production of radio, radar, sonar, telephone, telegraph, and other electronics equipments being purchased by the War and Navy Departments. Its problem was to get piece parts and materials delivered to electronics equipment contractors in quantities needed and according to delivery schedules

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set up by the Procurement Precedence Committee of the Joint Communications Board. One of its jobs was to uncover all causes of lagging production of critical items. These causes could then be corrected by the manufacturer, the WPB, or the procuring agency. Another of its jobs was to develop more efficient expediting systems which became effected by the J. M. Thome Company, a private concern of management engineers.

ANEPA was headed by a civilian Director under supervision of Army and Navy officers. (Chart XXVI) It functioned through a field organization and through the headquarters offices. Special regional offices were set up in early 1943 in each of the five major electronics plants (Bendix, RCA, Western Electric, Westinghouse, and General Electric). General regional offices were set up in six geographical areas for liaison with contractors and parts manufacturers.

Three hundred fifty expediters were thus engaged in contacting 5000 different manufacturers.

The Agency's policy was "to avoid interfering with the manufacturer's operations, and to take action only after the latter had exhausted his own resources." Nevertheless, the work load increased steadily to July 1943 due to accelerated demand for electronics.

Personnel in the Electronics Division felt that ANEPA accomplished the job of expediting with less delay, lees expense, and fewer personnel than would have been possible if the Army and Navy had retained separate expediting organizations. Nevertheless, despite Navy intercession, ANEPA was dissolved in mid-1944 on the

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official ground that the demand for urgently needed equipment was no longer accelerating and that the job remaining could be done by the existing procuring organizations and by the WPB. Progressing and expediting were thrown entirely on the procuring agencies, such as the Electronics Division, and the WPB was given the job of assisting them to get components and piece parts.

--302—

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR, ARMY-NAVY ELECTRONICS PRODUCTION AGENCY
(Organization chart)

--303--

E. THE PRODUCTION RECORD

By 1 March 1945 prime contractors had delivered 2-1/4 billion dollars of electronics equipments to the Navy, yet only 5% of these deliveries had been made nearly a year after Pearl Harbor. The acceleration of deliveries starting in November, 1942 began at 30 million dollars a month deliveries and reached 85 million dollars monthly by the end of 1943 and 100 million dollars monthly by the end of 1944. Three fourths (3/4) billion dollars were delivered in 1943 and 1-1/4 billion dollars in 1944, The peak was October 1944 when 112 million dollars of equipments were delivered, but after this date monthly deliveries declined steadily to 88 million dollars in February 1945, or about the level at the end of 1943. Part of this decline however was undoubtedly due to cancellations. During seven months these totalled a quarter billion dollars, about one-tenth of the total amount of procurement and two-fifths of the awards made during 1944. These cancellations, chiefly due to design changes and overordering, were also in a large part due to the sharp decline in procurement after June 1944, the month of the Normandy invasion. They mounted rapidly during the first quarter of 1945, but the rise was not reflected in increased deliveries in that quarter. Declines in procurements in the face of rising deliveries and cancellations were also reflected in the decline of undelivered balances on procurements. 1942 might be regarded as a year of preparation, 1943 a year of cultivation, and 1944 a year of harvest. The Production and Procurement Branch focused its attention during this year on trying to attain 100 million dollars monthly deliveries, and during the last half of the year succeeded. (Chart XXVII and XXVIII) and Tables 89 and 90.

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CHART XXVII

Deliveries of electronics equipment by prime contractors

--305--

New Ships and New Electronics Equipments
Comparison of Monthly Deliveries.

--306--

TABLE 89

EXHIBIT I - Record of Production
ELECTRONICS PROCUREMENT

Procurements,
Including

Procurements,
Excluding

Date

Deliveries

Army

Army

Cancellations

1942

Millions

Millions

Millions

Millions

Nov.

$ 29.0

$

Dec.

35.0

83.2

1943

Jan.

40.7

93.8

Feb.

44.3

100.6

Mar.

50.6

85.9

Apr.

52.5

97.6

May

57.2

136.0

June

55.5

322.3

July

59.0

56.0

Aug.

54.1

92.9

Sept.

58.5

193

Oct.

67.7

204.8

Nov.

76.6

160.6

Dec.

85.3

91.5

1944

Jan.

93.5

151.0

$ 88.2

Feb.

95.0

202.5

180.4

Mar.

100.5

136.4

92.6

April

103.4

158.5

128.1

May

107.1

170.6

115.5

June

108.1

131.5

88.4

July

102.2

35.4

13.0

Aug

104.6

79.0

57.8

$ 47.1

Sept.

107.3

36.9

34.2

10.0

Oct.

112.6

58.7

42.1

5.6

Nov.

102.1

56.8

46.1

28.3

Dec.

98.0

74.3

64.5

23.4

1945

Jan.

97.0

109.3

96.4

30.0

Feb.

84.1

169.8

155.0

22.9

March

86.8

135.0

313.4

60.1

Apr.

81.4

87.4

66.0

5.2

May

82.4

67.2

49.1

13.4

June

74.3

306.4

272.0

20.8

July

72.8

79.1

53.0

19.0

Aug.

23.6

45.0

27.6

772.6

[hr]

NOTE: Figures obtained from Production Report, Electronics Division, 1 December 1942 through 1 September 1945.

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TABLE 90

UNDELIVERED BALANCES, ELECTRONICS PROCUREMENTS

1943
Millions

1944
Millions

1945
Millions

Jan.

$ 840.8

$1,471.2

$1,008.

Feb.

876.0

1,640.8

1,080.6

Mar.

939.1

1,643.4

1,037.4

April

954.6

1,665.0

1,017.2

May

1,038.8

1,668.5

1,023.1

June

1,246.8

1,559.1

1,011.2

July

1,097.8

1,456.6

997.8

Aug.

1,216.2

1,387.9

424.2

Sept.

1,304.8

1,286.5

Oct.

1,431.8

1,163.6

Nov.

1,514.9

1,076.2

Dec.

1,498.1

NOTE: Above figures are as of the close of business of the last day of the stated month. Figures obtained from Production Report, Electronics Division.

Code 130

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Prime contractors increased from 44 in November 1942 to 166 in March 1945. Most of this expansion in work, given to smaller firms, occurred during 1943, when contracts held by the largest 14 firms dropped from 92% to 79% of the contracts outstanding. In spite of the progressing organization built up in 1942, with expediters in each plant to help contractors with their production problems, the large firms were unable to deliver equipments fast enough to meet the needs of the fleet and undelivered balances doubled during 1943. It became necessary to use the smaller firms in spite of their supposed lack of technical knowledge and facilities.

It was soon found that these small firms often made quicker deliveries than the large, perhaps from greater flexibility. At any rate, during 1943 - 1944, undelivered balances of the 14 largest prime contractors dropped from 84% to 59% of the contracts in force. The pressure on the large firms was relieved greatly by the small firms' contract expansions of 1/3 billion dollars during December 1942 - April 1945. Without this expansion, undelivered balances of the big firms would have been just as large in 1945 as in 1942.

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TABLE 91

PRODUCTION BY FIRMS ACCORDING TO SIZE

Over-all
Total.
Undelivered
Balance

Percent
Large
Companies

Percent
Remainder
Companies

1 Dec. 1942

$ 760.6

92.4

7.6

1 Dec. 1943

1,514.9

78.5.

21.5

1 Dec. 1944

1,076.2

74.5

24.4

1 Apr. 1945

1,037.4

71.1

28.8

 

(1)
Total All
Contracts*

(2)
Total Large
Companies

(5)
Percent (2)
is of (1)

(4)
Total Small
Companies

(5)
Percent (5)
is of (1)

(29 Co.s

1 Dec. 1942

$ 907.1

$ 833.4

91.8

$ 73.7

8.1 (132)

1 Dec. 1943

1,887.4

1,500.9

79.4

386.4

20.5 (155*)

1 Dec. 1944

1,772.7

1,342.7

77.9

380.0

22.0 misc) (150*)

1 Apr. 1945

1,695.8

1,257.4

74.1

438.5

25.8 misc)

[hr]

*Delivered and undelivered

--310--

F. DISTRIBUTION

Before the war and up to 1942, completions under the shipbuilding program were of small dimension and electronics equipments were designed and bought not for general classes or types of ships, but for specific vessels. By May 1942 equipments were being produced on a volume basis from contracts placed before and after Pearl Harbor, but were still distributed direct from factory to Navy Yard or shipbuilder earmarked for a particular ship.

Because the material was shipped to a specific vessel, it often remained at the place of delivery until the vessel was ready for its installation. Unhappily shipments were made without much regard to ship availability or completion so that another vessel building or under repair in the Yard might be placed in Commission or return to the fleet without the new equipment which was being reserved for a vessel not ready to receive it. Indeed, materials have waited in the yard for a vessel which had been sunk.

By late 1942 it was recognized that the system had become unwieldy and impracticable. Ships were coming off the ways bo rapidly that it was impossible to keep up to date on the ships completion dates and the electronics installation dates, or to keep specific equipments tied to specific vessels.

It was decided, therefore, to create so-called pools of electronics apparatus in all Naval Districts requiring radio, radar, and sonar materials. These pools were set up in early 1943 (1942 for radar) under cognizance of the Radio Material Officer via the Industrial

--311--

Manager. Materials were shipped to the pools under requirements set up by the RMO. Material was not earmarked for specific vessels except in special cases. The RMO was to allocate the stocks according to his own judgment, keeping in mind the need for balancing new construction and maintenance needs.

The placing in pools in Navy Yards and Navy Supply Depots made the electronics equipments available for the first ship arriving or completed which had a precedence high enough to claim them. For example, a DD would have precedence over a YP. On the other hand, this system had the defect that each claimant regarded the entire pool as its own. For example, the Navy Supply Depot at Mechanicsburg had large stocks of TCS's placed there for various claimant sections. Six claimants shipped against it, and the stock ran out quickly.

This kind of situation was met in the summer of 1943 by CNO's setting up precedence categories in place of the pool system for equipments of various classes of ship and for various other uses (Marine Corps, amphibious, advance base, shore). The pool was divided into four categories;

Category 1: New construction ships, controlled by Bureau of Ships;
2: Maintenance ships, controlled by Forces Afloat
3: Shore stations, controlled by Bureau of Ships;
4; Advance bases, controlled by CINCLANT and CINCPAC jointly.

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Later a fifth category was set up consisting of material removed from ship and stations. This category was given to the Bureau of Ships for reassignment to categories 1-4.

In order to apply this category system, the Radio Division thereupon organized the Assignment Section, which used the CNO directives as a guide in assigning the total estimated production of each type to the various claimant sections representing the various field users (ship, shore, advance bases, etc.). Each claimant section was then allowed to distribute equipment to its own users.

The category system was eliminated in July 1944 because by that time there was so much equipment in general stockpiles that even a broad earmarking system was no longer needed. After that, material was shipped simply to general stock. In cases of scarcity, the requirements subsection determined who would get the equipment, and in extreme cases, the CNO was asked for a decision.

The establishment of the pool system also made it necessary, or at least desirable, to assign special personnel to the Yards with technical knowledge to receive, issue, and store electronics apparatus. The enormous complexity of electronics apparatus and parts (there are 5000 types of capacitor, an equal number of resistor types, and 2000 classes of vacuum tubes) made it impossible for ordinary Navy storekeepers and supply officers to handle radio equipment. A Supply Officer for Radio was accordingly created to help the Radio Material Officer with the technical aspects of Installation and Maintenance.

Concerning shipping instructions, the Distribution Liaison Section of the Bureau of Ships wrote letters directly to manufacturers

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and to inspectors of Naval Material on the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts letterhead and sent them daily to BuSandA for signature. Each of these letters carried a summary of the current status of shipment, including quantity not yet delivered under the contract. Copies were sent to each consignee listed in the letter for his information.

This Distribution Liaison Section of the Bureau of Ships, then acted as a clearing house and as a central point of contact between the Division and contractors, consignees, and Naval Inspectors when two or more activities, such as Marine Corps, Lend-Lease, etc. were interested in the same equipment.

Shipments were scheduled in accordance with requirements determined "by (1) the progress of new construction; (2) maintenance needs as reported monthly by the Service Forces (COMSERVLANT and COMSERVPAC); and (3) the requirements of outside claimants (Marine Corps, Lend-Lease). Once the material left the continental United States, its disposition was directed by the Service Forces.

The principal pools were located along the Central and West Coasts at Navy Yards and other Naval Establishments where material could be located or installed aboard vessels. In addition, radio pools were located at principal advance bases such as Pearl Harbor, the Canal Zone, and Guam. Several factors had complicated the problem of establishing completely adequate pools. There had always been shortages of certain special types of critical materials, and this shortage was accentuated by the rapid technical development that made types obsolete often by the time they were produced. In

--314--

addition, the Fleet and the center of war moved frequently and rapidly. By the time bases like Noumea and New Guinea were built up, Fleet operations were centered several thousand miles north. A major movement from the East to the West Coast of continental pools was called for by the collapse of Germany and the concentration of the war in the Pacific.

The actual route and mode of transport -- by air, ship, rail, and so on -- was determined not by the Electronics Division, but by the Transportation Group of BuSanda on the basis of deadline dates transmitted by the Electronics Division from Service Forces.

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G. EXCESS MATERIALS

The problem of excess materials included not only obsolete materials kept in service until replaced and then disposed of, but also specialized inventory in excess of requirements. As an example of the latter type, the Radar-IFF-RCM section might have reported that it required 100 SG surface search shipborne radars plus 10 for battle damage. The Stock Control Section, on the other hand, having reported 200 in stock would declare an excess of 90.

Each section would discover its own excesses in conference with the Head of the Equipment Branch, and would notify the Excess Materials Section, which in turn would notify the CNO of its intention to dispose of them in ten days unless instructed otherwise. This section would then authorize the various yards and depots which stocked the excess materials under BuShips cognizance to dispose of them, provided they were unclassified and located within the continental limits of the United States. The activity at the point of storage would then report the excess materials to the Navy Materials Recovery and Disposal Agency of OP&M, which would canvass other Navy and Armed Forces activities to discover a use for them in conformity with their original purpose. If none could be found, the local activity would dispose of them through the various government civilian channels (e.g., the Defense Supply Corporation).

In the case of classified material, the same procedure was followed, up to the point of disposition. At that point the supply activity was instructed to remove all parts that made the equipment classified, these parts to be stocked if usable and needed at that activity; if not, to be

--316--

smashed and scrapped. The remaining equipment might then be disposed of as unclassified material. Usually it was regarded as economical to scrap the remainder also. Unclassified material had been largely disposed of up to May 1945, but by the war's end large stocks of classified material still remained in inventory at the Yards and Depots.

No well understood system or policy governing disposition of excess materials had been enunciated or put into effect before April 1945. Each activity interested in the disposition of excess materials (Navy Yards, Supply Depots, etc.) interpreted procedures in its own way, for no records of Excess Material Sections' activities existed.

In any future planning, this consideration may well be granted careful thought.

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V. INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE

The pre-war activities of the present Installation and Maintenance Branch were combined with those of the Design Section, while a small group known as the Procurement Section handled all of the "paper work" involved in planning and obtaining the radio and underwater sound equipments used by the Navy. Immediately upon the change to wartime conditions, the necessity for a specialized organization became apparent. The establishment of an Installation Section to plan ship installations was the first step in this line of expansion. The rapid development of new and special applications of electronics necessitated that information be rapidly coordinated and disseminated to the Naval Field and Fleet activities. Radar, a new "secret weapon," became recognized as a necessity instead of a fantasy and the varieties of electronic equipment developed so rapidly that it was impossible for even the "scientists" engaged in this development to keep abreast of the times.

The early organization of the Installation Section of the Radio Branch of the Shipbuilding and Maintenance Division consisted of two groups — one specializing in shipboard installation planning, and one carrying on the liaison and planning of shore stations. These two groups were soon again expanded as specialization became more necessary. The Ship Group was split into Sections, each dealing with a particular field of application — radio, radar, identification, fire control, underwater sound and finally, countermeasures equipments. With the wide-spread use of electronic equipment came the necessity for the study of proper maintenance to insure reliable performance.

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A Maintenance Section specializing in this work was therefore organized to gather information from the Field and Fleet, to study performance and operation of the equipments, recommend improvements and assure availability of test equipment and maintenance parts. Systems were developed for this work and monthly summaries of failure reports were instituted to assist Inspectors of Naval Material and manufacturers to overcome weaknesses in equipments. The Shore Group was similarly reorganized in Sections — Shore Stations (Communications), Radar, Advance Base Activities and Harbor Defense. Another section specializing in Marine Corps applications was organized to handle problems peculiar to those activities.

The Ship Section engaged in one of the most extensive work programs of the war. The quantities of equipments involved were proportional to the expanse of the vast shipbuilding program, multiplied by a factor of fifty or more, as each vessel completed required an average installation of that many various types of radio, radar, and sonar equipments. The multitude of landing craft and motor torpedo boats, each called for an average of five or six installations; a battleship involved seventy to a hundred installations, and other vessels required intermediate quantities; each of which involved planning, wiring, fabrication of mountings, installation of apparatus, adjustment and testing of each completed installation, and instruction of operating personnel in the operation and maintenance of the apparatus.

The personnel of the Ship Installation and Maintenance expanded from less than fifty persons in 1940 to about one hundred fifty, in August 1945.

--319--

Approximately three thousand Naval vessels of all types and sizes were completely equipped with delicate and expensive radio communication equipment during the last year of the war.

This represents an enormous amount of specially designed and built equipment which required much war critical and hard-to-obtain material. Inability to obtain many of the special materials expeditiously and in sufficient quantities caused many delays in the manufacture of this equipment. These delays in the manufacture and delivery of vital shipboard communication equipment necessitated numerous last-minute changes in detailed plans and installation to accommodate temporary substitute units. Such interruptions to orderly shipbuilding programs are very harmful and are continuously and rigorously guarded against; nevertheless, they occurred too frequently. Despite this fact, not a single vessel joined the Fleets without sufficient and satisfactory communication equipment to enable her to carry out the assigned missions of war.

Shipboard radio installations varied from one simple combination transmitter-receiver unit in small size craft to an extremely complicated multiple remote-controlled installation of one hundred twenty-eight separate, basic equipments in a large vessel. Shipboard radio communication requirements continually changed due to information gained in each new task or battle. This information frequently dictated that an entirely new type of equipment would be necessary to properly perform the duties of certain types of vessels; equipment

--320--

which had previously not been required in the Naval service and, consequently, was not available from Naval storehouses or production lines. To obtain the required type of equipment in the period of time allotted, it was necessary to draw from other war activities, such as the Army. Due to the totally different type of service for which it was designed, this equipment was not readily adaptable for shipboard installation, and therefore required considerable modification which consumed more of the precious time available. Despite many handicaps the vessels were equipped and joined their respective Fleets on scheduled time.

Installation and Maintenance of radar equipment consumed a large part of the time of the fifty-odd engineers and assistants of the Ship Radar Installation and Maintenance Section. The first six radar installations were made in 1940 on an "experimental" basis. These were the only radar-equipped USN vessels when the war started. At the war's end every combatant vessel, transport, and supply ship, as well as the MTBs, and all auxiliaries were fully equipped with the latest development in the radar field. The larger vessels had over twenty-five individual radar equipments on each ship; even the MTB carried three types of radar.

Previous to 7 December 1941, only three different types of Marine Corps radio communication equipment were designed, procured and installed through the efforts of a single Marine Corps officer. At that time, about 100 installations were in operation.

--321--

At the war's end in the Marine Corps Radio and Radar Installation and Maintenance Group there were a total of 21 personnel responsible for 36 different types of radio installation in amphibian tractors (from 1945 to 1945 there was a jump in these units from 3,000 to 17,000), approximately 3000 radio jeeps, 3700 pack radios, 10,000 handy talkies, and 6000 Headquarters Communication Stations. For use of the Marine Guards in continental navy yards and depots, 300 fixed and 1500 mobile type radio equipments were installed, thus reducing number of guards required. Marine Corps radio expenditures in 1944 amounted to approximately $75,000,000.

Practically all the Marine Corps equipment was used against Japan in the Pacific Theatre. At the war's end the Marine Corps Radio and Radar Installation and Maintenance Group wore engaged in bringing all Marine Corps radio communication equipment to a submergence-operating statute for use in landing operations and jungle warfare.

Radar gear, because of the amphibian nature of Marine Corps operations, must be easily transportable via air, pack, truck, trailer or ship, and easily and quickly set up for operation. Radar equipments varied in total weights from 550 pounds (transported in nine waterproof containers equipped with pack straps), to 21 tons. The first radar gear (searchlight control equipment) installed for Marine Corps use was delivered in 1941, weighed 21 tons, was contained in two vehicles and required several days to place in operation. It was subsequently superseded by a later version weighing 4l tons and contained in five vehicles. In 1945 this type of equipment weighed less than two tons, including single trailer, and can be placed in operation within 20 minutes from a mobile status. The Marine Corps used

--322--

19 different types of radar equipment. Expenditures for Marine Corps radar equipment jumped from none in 1941 to almost $25,000,000 in 1944, with 1650 units installed.

At the outset, in early 1942, long distance point-to-point radio circuits were in existence between only a few established Naval bases and the United States. This system of long distance communication expanded to the point that by 1945 all Naval bases throughout the Pacific Ocean Area were linked together through utilization of the most modern equipment and techniques. These techniques included such advances as frequency shift keying of transmitters, diversity receiving systems and multiplexing of several channels over one radio circuit and utilizing teletypewriters instead of conventional international Morse Code. This made possible in many cases the use of clerical personnel to operate the teletypewriters instead of the required highly skilled radio operators for other types of transmission, effectively releasing skilled operators for the Fleet. Photo radio transmission of pictures also was put into operation between several major Naval bases and the United States. From an engineering standpoint, potential traffic carrying possibilities are practically unlimited.

Shore Radio Station establishments of different types in 1941 numbered 134; in 1945, 599.

(a) The number of high power and low power radio stations in 1941 was 31, and in 1945 increased to a total of 66. These include ship-shore and point-to-point stations.

--323--

(b) Naval station activities, including air operational activities, in 1941 numbered 25. Due to the enormous increase in air activity, these increased to 37 in 1945.

(c) At the beginning of the war it was necessary to provide protection to the many harbors around the extensive coast line of the continental United States. The number of units established for this purpose in 1941 was 50; in 1945, 125.

(d) During the year 1941 the first underground radio station (transmitting and receiving) was completed at Corregidor, P. I. This type of construction was the forerunner of the 25 Gas Bombproof Communication Shelters constructed at locations outside of the continental United States.

The number of direction finding stations with modem equipment jumped from 10 in 1940 to 25 in 1945. This network was utilized by supplementary activities and assisted pilots who did not know their position in locating a safe landing field.

During the period 1940-1945, the Navy built approximately one hundred Radio Range Stations throughout the world to support its vast aeronautical program.

The story of Field Engineering Services in the Installation and Maintenance Branch for the period of June 1940 to June 1945 is the story of expansion and extension to meet the needs of the Navy. In June 1940 there was no field engineering service. A few contracts for electronic equipment required that the contractor furnish field engineering service as a part of the equipment contract. With the advent of large scale radar installations, it became apparent that a specialized group of engineers would be necessary to assist in the installation and maintenance of the equipment. In October 1941

--324--

the first field engineering services contract was let. The services proved to be so successful that contracts have been let to cover most electronic equipment. In addition, two groups beside the factory field engineers have been organized. The Anti -Submarine Warfare engineers were organized in April 1943 to assist in combating the critical submarine menace. The Electronic Field Services Group was organized in July 1944 to offer assistance as required to the field.

By June 1945, there were approximately 1000 factory field engineers at a total cost of well over $1,000,000 per month. The Anti-Submarine Warfare engineers reached a zenith of 65 engineers in November 1944. This group tapered off toward elimination on 1 June 1945, its function being taken over by the Navy. The Electronic Field Services Group consisted of 230 engineers in August 1945.

In June 1940 there was one periodical, the Radio and Sound Bulletin, issued from the Radio Division. By 1945 the publications section issued 7 periodicals, published 50 books, and each month approved 64 equipment instruction books and supervised distribution of 80,000 copies.

With the increase in complexity and quantity of electronic equipment in the Navy, an extensive program of training of material men became necessary in order to keep the equipment operating at peak efficiency. This necessitated the establishment in the Radio Division of an Electronic Material Instruction Section to act as liaison with the field, other Bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, and other sections of the Bureau of Ships.

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To illustrate the magnitude of this task, chart XXIX indicates the growth of the radar search program, only one phase of the tremendous radar field. Moreover, Appendix 18 contains a copy of Ships' publication 242A, List of Naval Radio, Radar, and Sonar Equipment, with Supplement #2. This list includes all equipments in the electronics field which were designed and procured by the Electronics Division, Bureau of Ships, including those produced during the war and those produced before the war which had continued wartime application.

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CHART XXIX

FIG. 2 – SEARCH RADAR PROGRAM

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CHAPTER XXII

OPERATION CROSSROADS

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CHAPTER XXII

OPERATION CROSSROADS

Less than a year after the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the eyes and ears of the world turned towards a little Atoll in the middle of the Pacific Ocean to discover just how cataclysmic this explosion of splitting atoms can be. While the results of the two atomic bomb tests conducted at Bikini Atoll on 1 July and 25 July 1946 are still not fully determined and while much of the information remains of a classified nature, it is possible to discuss in general terms this Operations Crossroads in which the Bureau of Ships played such an important role. Not only will this chapter serve to bring this momentous experiment into its proper relationship relative to the history of the Bureau of Ships, the Armed Services, and mankind as a whole, but also it may illustrate the complexity of combined operations.

Since "The Historical Report, Atomic Bomb Tests Able and Baker (Operation Crossroads), of Director of Ship Material, Joint Task Force One" contains a complete, detailed account of this incredible operation, this study will confine itself to unclassified experts of that report and to general comments which may serve to unify the parts.

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MANKIND AT HIS CROSSROADS

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1. ORIGINS OF ATOMIC BOMB TESTS

On 20 June 1945, when the European war had ended and the Pacific war was approaching its climactic phase, Vice Admiral E. L. Cochrane, Chief of the Bureau of Ships, and Vice Admiral (then Rear Admiral) G. F. Hussey,

Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, addressed a joint letter to the Chief of Naval Operations proposing a comprehensive program for testing high explosives against merchant and warship hulks, captured enemy vessels, and United States Navy combatant ships about to be stricken from the active list. It was desired to go beyond the model studies and full-scale caisson tests which were normally carried on by the two Bureaus. This proposal for "controlled destructive testing in a planned program to elicit fundamental information on damage to ship-like structures by high explosives" met with approval. The two Bureaus end their research agencies sped up the planning which had already been done to carry out this program. Meanwhile other forces were at work.

In the New Mexico desert, near Alamogordo, on 16 July 1945, scientists of the Manhattan District secretly carried out the "Trinity Test" with the first explosion of the atomic bomb, which had been under civilian end military development since July of 1939, when Einstein and other scientists brought the military potentialities of such a weapon to the attention of President Roosevelt. On 5 August, only three weeks after this test, the first military atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima, and a few days later another atomic bomb exploded over Nagasaki, hastening the Pacific war to its close. The Japanese, faced with this new terror as well as imminent

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invasion, surrendered unconditionally on 14 August, nine days after the first atomic bomb had been dropped. Even before technical personnel made their studies in Japan, reports of damage at Hiroshima and Nagasaki offered conclusive proof, if any were needed, of the tremendous military potentialities of this new weapon.

On 28 August, the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, Vice Admiral Cochrane, informed his design and research agencies, which were planning new programs of underwater explosion work with conventional explosives, that the Bureau of Ships "must be prepared to undertake broad-scale experiments with the atomic bomb to clear up its major influence an naval warfare before we can at all consider an extension of the underwater explosion work on the concept of TNT or its associated explosives." Exploratory discussions on this matter were held with the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and other personnel of the two Bureaus.

On 1 October, Vice Admiral Cochrane and Vice Admiral Hussey sent another letter to the Chief of Naval Operations stating that the appearance of the atomic bomb "has made it imperative that a program of full-scale testing be undertaken to determine the effects of this type of bomb, both underwater and above water, against ships of various types." This letter, which outlined the problem at considerable length, added that the two Bureaus would "prepare and present for consideration at the earliest practicable date a testing program with the atomic bomb including specific ship requirements." Requesting that various warships already scheduled for disposal be retained for the atomic bomb tests, the letter pointed out the severe limitations of model work and the need for realistic teste. Certain

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of the proposed post-war design developments in underwater ordnance and in underwater protection, the letter stated, require "realistic ship targets, either by virtue of the inherent nature of the problem, or to provide adequate guidance so that model work and simplified experiments may be prosecuted intelligently."

In a letter on 16 October, Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve a test of the atomic bomb against naval vessels. The Joint Chiefs of Staff undertook study of this proposal. When the proposal was referred to them, the Joint Staff Planners appointed a planning sub-committee under the chairmanship of Major General Curtis LeMay, Army Air Forces. The Bureau of Ships was represented on this subcommittee by Capt. L. A. Kniskern, the head of its Design Branch. The sub-committee, which first met early in December, submitted a report about a week later recommending that the tests be held.

The Secretaries of War and of the Navy made the first public announcement of the proposed tests in a joint press release on 10 December, stating that the Army and Navy contemplated a "joint test of atomic bombs against naval vessels."

On 10 January 1946, the President approved the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff essentially as made by the subcommittee; and on 11 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff created Joint Task Force One, appointing Vice Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for special Weapons, as its Commander. Admiral Blandy had already begun specific planning for the two tests, starting with consideration of various proposals for target arrays drawn up by the Bureau of Ships.

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The mission of Joint Task Force One was publicly announced by its Commander on 24 January, when Vice Admiral Blandy told the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy: "The mission of Joint Task Force One is primarily to determine the effects of the atomic bomb upon naval vessels in order to gain information of value to the national defense. The ultimate results of the tests, so far as the Navy is concerned, will be their translations into terms of United States sea power. Secondary purposes are to afford training for Army Air Forces personnel in attack with the atomic bomb against ships and to determine the effect of the atomic bomb upon military installations and equipment." He also announced that the atomic bomb tests had been assigned the code name Operation Crossroads.

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II. DIRECTOR OF SHIP MATERIAL

A. Exploratory Discussions

During this exploratory period, the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, Vice Admiral E. L. Cochrane, who would have a prime concern in any tests of the bomb against naval vessels, had been kept informed of the trend of developments. But the top secret classification of the project permitted very few other officers in the Bureau to know more than the most general facts concerning it; and then, too, the whole project was in such a nebulous state that there was no positive assurance it would be carried through. Around the middle of January, the Commander, Joint Task Force One, requested that Admiral Cochrane designate an officer with whom he could deal directly and personally on all matters affecting the proposed tests, which by now were called Operation Crossroads. As the Bureau of Ships had a paramount interest in Operation Crossroads, Admiral Cochrane recognized the great responsibility which would devolve upon the officer selected to represent the Bureau and to carry out its extensive and complex tasks. Accordingly, he decided to appoint Rear Admiral T. A. Solberg, head of the Research Branch of the Bureau of Ships, as the senior member of a large bureau group for Operation Crossroads.

Admiral Solberg had been a deputy member of the "Tolman Committee", appointed by Major General Leslie R. Groves in the fall of 1944, almost a year before the "Trinity Test" of the atomic bomb at Alamogordo, New Mexico, to investigate further technical developments in atomic energy for both civilian and military purposes. This committee, under the

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chairmanship of Mr. R. C. Tolman, had studied many suggestions from personnel connected with the atomic energy projects concerning "the use of nuclear energy for power and the use of radioactive by-products for scientific, medical, and industrial purposes."

On 17 January, Admiral Cochrane appointed Admiral Solberg to this position because it was desirable to have someone of his rank and experience to coordinate all the varied and extensive efforts of the Bureau of Ships and to insure the success of the bureau's work in the project.

Admiral Cochrane promised full support, with the assignment of an adequate number of well qualified officers to work full time on the project. He then instructed Admiral Solberg to prepare an administrative order setting up a special section in the bureau to handle Crossroads work. This order, dated 22 January, set up Code 180, the Crossroads Section; and on the same day Admiral Solberg was designated as head of the section and Captain Kniskern as his senior assistant. A number of officers took up duties in the section immediately, and others were added as rapidly as they could be freed from current duties.

B. Position in Task Force

Meanwhile, Admiral Solberg and Captain Kniskern consulted with Rear Admiral (then Commodore) W. S. Parsons as to the relationship of Admiral Solberg's group to the rest of the Task Force. In the first organization chart prepared by the Task Force, Admiral Parsons was shown as Deputy Task Force Commander for Technical Direction, and under him was the Technical Director, Dr. R. A. Sawyer, in charge of scientific aspects of the tests, particularly the preparation of the bombs and instrumentation to measure their effects.

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It was essential for one agency to coordinate all of the problems relating to the target ships themselves including special test materials on the ships and Admiral Solberg received this overall technical responsibility as "Director of Ship Material" assigned under Admiral Parsons, the Deputy Task Force Commander for Technical Direction, and parallel to Dr. Sawyer, the Technical Director. It was agreed that all instrumentation would be subject to the Technical Director's approval, but that the Director of Ship Material would have a major interest in problems involved in locations of instruments on target ships and in their installation, as well as in the results they gave with reference to ship damage. It was therefore agreed that the closest liaison between the Technical Director and the Director of Ship Material would be necessary.

C. Responsibility

Many of the Amy and Navy groups in Operation Crossroads had dual responsibilities, on the one hand to their respective parent organizations, on the other to the Task Force itself. The heavy involvement of the Bureau of Ships, which went beyond the target ships themselves to include special interests in electronics, oceanography, ships instrumentation, and explosion phenomena, made the tasks of the Director of Ship Material diverse and complex. On the one hand, Admiral Solberg was responsible for all Bureau of Ships activities in Operation Crossroads, including special projects like the oceanographic instrumentation, which was to be provided for the most part in the water rather than on the target ships themselves. On the other hand, he was responsible for all the target ships, as well as for all the materials and installations on those ships, and for close liaison with the Technical Director on all instrumentation problems affecting the target

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ships. The installation requirements of the instrumentation groups had to be coordinated initially by the Director of Ship Material and finally in liaison with the Technical Director.

The Director of Ship Material was responsible for directing the work of the groups under him, which represented various Army corps and Navy bureaus concerned with the effects of the atomic bomb on ships, aircraft, ordnance, supplies, equipment, and animal life, in brief responsible for mounting on the target ships and the material to be tested on them, for supporting the instrumentation effort, and for obtaining all the test data that affected the interests of the groups directly under his command. There were additional routine responsibilities such as the preparation of the 130 non-target vessels necessary for the operation.

D. Staff for Technical Inspections

The Array and Navy groups under the Director of Ship Material carried on the work of ship preparation, both in Washington and in field activities such as proving grounds and naval shipyards, from February through May, with some final work at Bikini in June. The Director of Ship Material staff proceeded in U.S.S. WHARTON, the headquarters ship, on 6 May to Pearl Harbor enroute to Bikini Atoll. Now that the lengthy preparation phase was virtually over, the task of inspection began to assume major importance, and the Director of Ship Material staff aboard WHARTON was reorganized for this task as indicated on Chart XXX.

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CHART XXX

DIRECTOR OF SHIP MATERIAL (014)
(Organization chart)

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CHART XXXI
ORGANIZATION FOR TARGET SHIP PREPARATION

 

BUREAU OF SHIPS GROUP (014-K)

(Organization chart)

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CHART XXXII

BUREAU OF SHIPS GROUP (014-K)

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IV. BUREAU OF SHIPS GROUP

A. Formation of Group

The Bureau of Ships Group was officially activated by the Bureau of Ships on 23 January. Rear Admiral T. A. Solberg was placed in charge of all activities of the Bureau of Ships relative to Operation Crossroads.

His subsequent assignment to the Task Force as Director of Ship Material required that, in practice, the Bureau of Ships Group act as his executive agency, under the direction of Capt. L. A. Kniskern, so that the Director of Ship Material would be able to carry out his responsibilities under the Deputy Task Force Commander for Technical Direction. The Bureau of Ships Group, with Captain Kniskern as head, worked directly under the Director of Ship Material.

The material phases of the work of the Group were carried out by the section for Ship Preparation and Inspection, which had four main subsections, responsible for large target vessels, small target vessels, submarines, and non-target vessels. Working in close association with Capt. F. W. Slaven and Capt. F. X. Forest, the heads of this section, were four special assistants for hull, machinery, electrical, electronics, with the head of the Electronics Group as the fourth assistant. In late January, Captain Forest became officer-in-charge of target ship preparation and inspection, with Capt. W. S. Maxwell as machinery assistant, Comdr. J. W. Roe as hull assistant, end Comdr. E. H. Batcheller as administrative assistant. Capts.

R. C. Bell and E. W. Lemons became members of the Group about that time, and until their departure in mid-February to become Crossroads representatives at Pearl Harbor, assisted in the preparation of the general instructions to

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target ships. Comdr. C. L. Gaasterland reported late in January for the specialized work required in preparation of submarines and Capt. P. S. Creasor joined the Group in February as electrical assistant.

Several specialists from naval shipyards were selected for particular employment with boilers, turbines, pumps, cranes, and numerous electrical items, and specialties such as welding; an officer became a member of the Group to study test effects on paint and chemicals; and two officers, joined the Group to supervise exposure and examination of navy fuels and lubricants.

One subsection on explosion phenomena was maintained by means of close liaison with the head of the Ships Instrumentation Group. Other subsections dealt with planning, progress, technical inspection, and naval architecture. The whole organization was kept fluid because of the necessity of accomplishing much of its work in scattered naval shipyards, both in United States and Pearl Harbor, and even the special assistants performed over-lapping duties in the field, as necessary.

When the Director of Ship Material staff was reorganized enroute to Bikini Atoll, Captain Forest became head of the Bureau of Ships Group, and other members of the group were assigned staff duties involved in the technical inspections. This entire group was embarked in the WHARTON.

B. Responsibility

In executing the tasks assigned its parent organization, the Bureau of Ships Group became primarily responsible for readying the

target and non-target ships for the tests as well as for inspection of

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damage. The Group was charged with carrying out the Director of Ship Material's Ship Preparation Plan and Reboarding and Inspection Plan which were the important parts of the program for exposing naval vessels to the atomic bomb, according to the Operation Plan.

The first concern of the Group was that hull, machinery, and electrical gear of almost ninety target ships, plus reserve ships, ranging from landing craft to carriers and battleships, be placed in proper material condition. Each target ship must be furnished with instructions for liquid loading and ballasting. Special equipment and specimens from pigs to aircraft had to be provided for on designated ships. Electric power must be available on certain target ships, after they were abandoned by their crews, because of special equipment to be operating during the explosions. Scarce equipment vital to our operating fleets was to be removed. Crews must be indoctrinated, first about preparing their ships, then about inspection and reboarding. The 130 non-target vessels must be equipped not only to transport personnel and supplies, but to provide laboratory space for scientific groups in their study of oceanographic, radiological, and other phenomena, and to provide facilities for press and radio as well as many civilian observers.

Apart from the actual preparation of the target ships with regard to equipment under Bureau cognizance, the Bureau of Ships Group was responsible also for coordinating the special preparations required for exposure of materials by the other various groups under the Director of Ship Material and for the installations of equipment for the instrumentation groups.

These were special tasks in support of the Director of Ship Material's work that affected all groups, especially as reflected in execution of the two Plans previously mentioned.

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C. Preparation of Target Ships

1. Preliminary and Over-All Preparations

There were a number of problems which immediately confronted the Director of Ship Material as soon as various Army and Navy groups were organized under his command. The ships which had been made available by the Chief of Naval Operations as targets were scattered in continental and overseas naval shipyards, and it was necessary to obtain firm information on their whereabouts. An overall plan had to be made effecting an orderly distribution of these ships among different naval shipyards, as their preparation would be a major task far beyond the capacity of any single yard. In many cases considerable repair work would have to be done to enable the ships to steam to Bikini and maintain themselves there. The location of instruments and test materials aboard the target ships would depend upon the positions of the ships in the target array, which was in a transitional state, undergoing frequent changes for military or technical reasons. The time limit was short to the point of urgency, with only about three months for preparing ships, materials, and instruments for the first test, which had been set for 15 May. All these interlocking factors were operating simultaneously, and they increased the difficulty of what would have been in any case a naval construction task of the first magnitude.

Since it was necessary that the target vessels be placed in the best possible material condition and that urgent repairs to hull, machinery, and electrical equipment be accomplished in the limited time available, the target vessels were assigned availabilities at the various naval shipyards. Previous to the first conference, instructions had been issued by the forces

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afloat directing all target vessels to proceed to the Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor, by 5 April 1946, where the repairs and preparations were to be made. Subsequently, it was realized that this procedure would inevitably create an overcrowded condition which would tax the facilities of that shipyard, with consequent detriment to the efficient and rapid preparation of the ships; and plans were therefore made to insure complete preparation of the large target ships prior to their arrival at Pearl Harbor from the United States. Work on the target Auxiliaries, Destroyers, Submarines, and Landing Craft remained the responsibility of the Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor, under the direction of target preparation representatives there. Conversion and modification of a large majority of the non-target ships was handled in the continental naval shipyards.

The Ship Preparation and Inspection Section, the principal agency under the Bureau of Ships Group, was organized into three sub-sections for target vessels — combatant ships, auxiliaries, and submarines — and one for non-target vessels. From time to time minor changes were made in the organization for practical reasons: for example, destroyers were transferred from the combatant to the auxiliary section because all these vessels were being prepared at Pearl Harbor where the auxiliaries had been assembled.

During the early days of the organization, all members of the Section worked together on the compilation and issuance of extensive general and detailed instructions for the guidance of the naval shipyards and the target ships, which provided the recipients with a concrete picture of their duties and responsibilities in connection with the project. Upon completion of the initial preparatory work, and as soon as personnel could be spared from the

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Bureau of Ships Group, officers were sent to the naval shipyards to assist and advise in the preparation of the target ships. This procedure proved more satisfactory for keeping yard activities up-to-date than the normal means of furnishing instructions by mail and dispatch.

The first of the units left Washington 8 February and as various other representatives left the Washington area, their duties were assumed by the remaining members of the Group, which remained as a central planning agency. Other officers of the Bureau of Ships Group were given intensive courses of indoctrination and ordered to the field.

During the Navy Yard availability of all of the target ships, the required preparation of the ships for the teat was accomplished. The condition of structural strength and watertight integrity on each ship was checked, and any serious defects in vital machinery and equipment were corrected. Special instruments required by the various scientific groups were installed. Arrangements were made for the operation of special items of equipment on specified target vessels and for equipment that was to be in operation at the time the ships were abandoned for the tests. Instructions were disseminated to the crews covering their duties and responsibilities in connection with the tests.

Certain items of historical interest or of a critical nature were removed from the target vessels before the test and preliminary inspections were accomplished. Loading of the target ships with specified amounts of ammunition, fuel oil, gasoline, water and special materials and equipment also was studied and detailed instructions issued. Ships were loaded as closely as possible to the battle or operating displacement

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of the ships. Varying percentages of the wartime allowance of ammunition and of the normal capacity of fuel oil and gasoline were carried in the ships' magazines and bunker tanks. All gasoline drums, airplanes loaded with gasoline, and similar items were placed in pans with coamings approximately eighteen inches high to prevent dispersal of the gasoline.

Since the effects of possible high waves on ships' anchoring facilities were unknown, it was necessary to devise special anchoring arrangements. It was planned that the ships be anchored with practically full scope of chain on one anchor; a second anchor chain was to be let out on short scope and hung in loops, secured by special fittings. The fittings, manufactured especially for this test, has been designed to permit fracturing of the fittings before the second anchor chain could be carried away, allowing the second chain to pay out as the ship moved.

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TABLE 92

LIST OF TARGET VESSELS

ARKANSAS

(BB-33)

GILLIAM

(APA-57)

NEW YORK

(BB-34)

BANNER

(APA-60)

NEVADA

(BB-36)

BARROW

(APA-61)

PENNSYLVANIA

(BB-38)

BLADEN

(APA-63)

BRACKEN

(APA-64)

PENSACOLA

(CA-24)

BRISCOE

(APA-65)

SALT LAKE CITY

(CA-25)

BRULE

(APA-66)

BUTTE

(APA-68)

NAGATO

CARLISLE

(APA-69)

SAKAWA

CARTERET

(APA-70)

PRINZ EUGEN

CATRON

(APA-71)

CORTLAND

(APA-75)

SARATOGA

(CV-3)

CRITTENDEN

(APA-77)

INDEPENDENCE

(CVL-22)

DAWSON

(APA-79)

FALLON

(APA-81)

LAMSON

(DD-367)

FILLMORE

(APA-83)

CONYNGHAM

(DD-371)

GASCONADE

(APA-85)

MUGFORD

(DD-389)

GENEVA

(APA-86)

RALPH TALBOT

(DD-390)

NIAGARA

(APA-87)

MAYRANT

(DD-402)

RHIND

(DD-404)

LST 52

STACK

(DD-406)

LST 133

WILSON

(DD-408)

LST 220

HUGHES

(DD-410)

LST 545

ANDERSON

(DD-411)

LST 661

MUSTIN

(DD-413)

WAINWRIGHT

(DD-419)

LCI 327

LCI 329

SKIPJACK

(SS-184)

LCI 332

SEARAVEN

(SS-198)

LCI 549

TUNA

(SS-203)

LCI 615

SKATE

(SS-305)

LCI 620

APOGON

(SS-308)

DENTUDA

(SS-335)

LCT 412

PARCHE

(SS-384)

LCT 414

PILOTFISH

(SS-386)

LCT 705

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TABLE 92. Cont'd

LCT 812

YO - 160

LCT 816

LCT 818

YOG - 83

LCT 874

LCT 1013

ARDC - 13

LCT 1078

LCT 1112

6 LCM 1 - 6

LCT 1113

LCT 1175

6 LCVP 7-12

LCT 1237

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2. Target Ships

All of the heavy target ships to be used in the tests were prepared in continental naval shipyards, with the exception of the Japanese ships, NAGATO and SAKAWA, which received the necessary handling by repair ship after their arrival at Bikini. ARKANSAS, NEVADA, INDEPENDENCE, PENSACOLA, and SALT LAKE CITY were prepared at Terminal Island, NEW YORK and PRINZ EUGEN at Philadelphia, PENNSYLVANIA at Puget Sound, and SARATOGA at San Francisco. NEW YORK and PRINZ EUGEN were retained on the East Coast so that they would be readily available to ship preparation personnel and others for study with Ship's force of staff inspection procedures. They also were used for the initial indoctrination of ship radiological monitors. Numerous visits were made to NEW YORK, particularly by the officers of the combatant ship unit, in order to obtain information for use in the preparation and ironing out of many procedures to be undertaken on the remaining target ships.

Certain ships posed individual problems whose solutions were accomplished in addition to the routine preparation activity. For example, since the PENNSYLVANIA had a weak spot in the strength of the hull, the result of crude repair of a torpedo hit which tore away the ship's shell on 12 August 1945, the Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound, was directed to examine and reinforce or to tighten as necessary the watertight boundaries of the torpedo-damaged area.

The target Auxiliaries, Destroyers, Submarines, and landing Craft were prepared at the Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor. In general, the same methods of preparation were applied to the light target ships as to the heavy target ships.

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The eight target submarines, all of approximately equal displacement, were selected from those scheduled for the reserve fleets or for disposal by scrapping. All of the submarines were in fair-to-excellent material condition, and required no alterations or major repairs for the Operation.

The Crossroads Unit at Pearl Harbor also supervised the preparation of three concrete vessels of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, a floating drydock, ARDC-13, a gasoline barge, YOG-83, and a fuel oil barge, YO-160, the latter two having Maritime Commission hulls. These vessels were used by other groups for the exposure of test materials and the mounting of instruments. The Bureau of Yards and Docks had been interested in the damage to reinforced concrete structures at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but the lack of suitable land areas at Bikini made construction of similar installations impractical, even if there had been time. The participation of this bureau, therefore, was confined to floating structures of reinforced concrete within the target array, and the three vessels were chosen from craft scheduled for disposal. The Bureau of Yards and Docks was represented on the staff of the Director of Ship Material by a small group to inspect these vessels.

3. Ship Measurements and Reference Planse

The Bureau of Ships Group requested naval shipyards to make watertight integrity studies and air tests of designated compartments of target ships. When this program seemed inadequate for obtaining the full measure data that would be required for damage analysis, Captain Forest organized a Ship Measurements Team early in February under the direction of Comdr.

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J. B. Shirley, who drew experienced personnel from the naval shipyard at Norfolk. The team was to determine how a target ship's main hull girder reacted in the tests. This required surveying the hull and establishing reference planes as a base for measuring deflections, with a thorough structural report an the ship before the tests. During the middle of February, this team worked on NEW YORK and PRINZ EUGEN at Philadelphia. Compartments were tested on the quarter lengths and bow and stern by closing up the compartments, applying a known pressure, and observing the static drop in a given period of time. This information could be compared with data taken after the tests as a measure of the effectiveness of welding, riveting, and other structural details.

After this preliminary work in Philadelphia, members of the team vent to shipyards on the West Coast and Pearl Harbor to work on target ships there, and early in May, several members vent to Bikini to inspect NAGATO and SAKAWA. By this time the program had grown until it included the installation of twist pendulums and deck deflection gauges, and studies of machinery foundations and turret structures. The main decks of target ships were surveyed for establishing reference planes which would allow damage studies of fundamental hull deflections peculiar to ships, such as hog, sag, twist, bow, and combinations of these; and additional data were to be provided by the installation of pendulums throughout the ships. The team arranged for shipyards and services afloat to install simple deck deflection gauges for measuring compression or expansion between weather decks and decks immediately below, so that studies of the rigidity and flexibility of panel structures could

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be made. Other simple means were used for measuring the relative motion between machinery foundations and hull structures, with similar measurements for ordnance structures.

4. Magnitude of Ship Preparation Task

A good idea of the magnitude of the work required in preparing the major combatant ships as targets for Operation Crossroads may be obtained from the following list, which is abridged, of the work performed on each of these ships in West Coast shipyards:

(a) Full structural examination in accordance with instructions; (b) Air test of quarter point and extreme end compartments; (c) Check of last report on water-tight integrity of each compartment throughout ship (d) Repair of compartments as necessary to prevent possible progressive flooding; (e) Complete examination of underwater body; (f) Preparation of docking report; (g) Test of fire room pressures; (h) Hydraulic test of boilers; (i) Establishment of surveyors and water level planes; (j) Establishment of vertical and horizontal reference lines for list and twist determination; (k) Establishment of location marks for turbines, gears, boilers, steering machinery, and machinery units in turrets;

(l) Installation of deck compression gages; (m) Installation of wiring, holders, and foundation for instrumentation; (n) Installation of racks for exposure of special equipment; (o) Installation of special boarding ladders on shell plating from water-line to deck edge; (p) Preparation of boarding bill; (q) Preparation of bill for closing vessel for the tests; (r) Preparation of damage inspection bill; (s) Training of ships' crews, in above organization bills; (t) Establishment of and instruction

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in procedures for starting and running special equipment to be in operation at the time of the tests; (u) Installation of pans and drains under equipment containing gasoline and/or combustible materials; (v) Painting of frame numbers; (w) Photographic record of all special installations; (x) Establishment of inspection routes; (y) Full preliminary inspection of all equipment with data recorded in special test forms.

D. Preparation of Non-Target Ships

Relatively few of the 130 non-target vessels assigned to the Task Force required conversion or modification to fit them for their proposed assignments. But a number of the ships, especially those serving as headquarters for the various groups, underwent considerable modification to adapt them to the technical requirements of Operation Crossroads. It was necessary to provide adequate accommodations for more than the normal complement of most of these ships. Office space and equipment were essential for the administrative work to be carried on, and various technical groups required laboratories and other scientific facilities.

Most of the work in converting these vessels offered no difficulty apart from the fact that a very limited time was available. The additional communications facilities, required both for the operation itself and for public relations, were provided by the Electronics Group.

E. Reboarding and Inspection

1. Preliminary

The Reboarding and Inspection Plan was evolved to provide a means of determining the effect of the bomb explosion on a formation of ships moored in close proximity, their structure, equipment, and machinery,

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special items of Army and other equipment, the physical and chemical properties of various types of material, and to determine the radius of effectiveness of the bomb used in the tests. Photographic studies, laboratory studies of selected specimens, visual examinations, readings from special instruments, and actual operating performance of machinery and equipment were to be the means of obtaining the requisite data.

2. Inspections

At the point of departure, it was essential that the condition of the target vessels be known in the most complete detail possible. Preliminary inspections were made by the ships' crews, naval shipyards, technical personnel, and representatives from the staff of the Director of Ship Material. These inspections were documented with photographs of significant damage or derangement and of the special materials loaded aboard the ships, as well as a standard set of photographs of each ship. In addition, reference planes were established by survey in the ships to provide a basis for determining major hull distortions.

The effects of the tests were established by comparing the condition of the ships as revealed by inspections after each test with the conditions indicated by the original inspections. Every effort was made to insure differentiation between damage due to the tests and damage attributable to secondary effects such as fire and ammunition explosions. The same general procedure was established for determining the effect of the tests on the special materials exposed aboard the target vessels.

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It was apparent that the maximum data must be obtained prior to the tests, so that any damages, particularly of an unexpected nature might be determined as definitely attributable to the tests. For the purpose of the tests, a complete set of instructions setting forth procedures and providing forms for the use of the ship's force were developed and prepared by the Bureau of Ships Group and the Bureau of Ordnance Group.

The inspection forms and instructions were prepared in such a manner as to provide for segregation of individual classes of equipment on each ship, so that the performance of like equipment or material on numerous target vessels could be prepared by extracting portions of the reports of individual ships. The tests and inspections by the ships' forces were designed to provide complete and detailed information on the condition of the ship, its equipment and machinery, and all similar factors before and after each test.

It was foreseen that the inspections of the nature outlined above must be limited to the capacity of the ship's forces and that further observations of a more technical nature must be provided for. The concept of a Staff Technical Inspection, evolved to achieve this purpose, provided for technical inspections by competent observers assigned to each of the activities for which the Director of Ship Material was responsible.

In addition, each naval shipyard at which target vessels were prepared made certain structural and ordnance examinations in order to establish a complete over-all picture of this material.

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The ships measurement team, proceeded to establish on each target vessel basic reference planes which were to be checked prior to the tests and between and after Tests Able and Baker. The reference planes provided means for checking changes in fore-and-aft shapes of the ship, twist and  overall deflections of bulkheads, decks, and deckhouses, and transverse changes in the shape of decks.

In order to avoid inordinate delay it was planned that vessels carrying key observing and inspecting personnel, including the ships' crews from the target vessels, would enter the Lagoon at the earliest practicable moment after radiological safety had been established, and anchor in Close proximity to one another and to the target formation.

An Initial Boarding Team, composed of the radiological safety monitor, medical safety officer, bomb and ammunition disposal or safety officer, technical representatives of the Director of Ship Material, and photographer, was the first unit to board each target vessel. The Initial Boarding Teams were ordered to observe and record the extent and general nature of the damage, and by means of a topside survey to recommend the next step in the inspection or disposition of the vessel. The Director of Ship Material was authorized to determine the order of successive boarding parties, upon the recommendation of his representative on the Initial Boarding Team. The operations of all Teams were supervised by the Director of Ship Material, who, with the head of the Salvage Unit, was embarked with one Initial Boarding Team in order to observe damage first-hand.

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The technical inspection of the target vessels which followed was to be conducted by officers and civilian specialists of the Bureau of Ships Group in accordance with detailed instructions designed to utilize the experience gained in many observations of war damage to ships. Other Groups were to conduct similar technical inspections on material under their cognizance.

F. Support of Test Operations.

When the Task Force was first formed it had been envisioned that there would be a definite need for close liaison between the staff at Bikini and the various Army and Navy parent organizations participating in the Task Force. To provide this liaison, a duplicate staff, designated as Task Force One Rear Echelon, with members representing each of the nominal positions and groups included in the staff to be at Bikini, took over the duties concerned with Crossroads in the Washington area when the staff departed.

This departure on 29 April had been timed to allow for a final check of preparations and a rehearsal of operational procedures after arrival at Bikini. This date had been made later since the President had postponed Teat Able from 15 May to 1 July. Representatives of the Bureau of Ships Group who had been working in West Coast shipyards boarded WHARTON just prior to its departure on 6 May, and those attached to the units at Pearl Harbor joined the Group shortly after WHARTON's arrival there. During the stop-over at Pearl Harbor, the entire Bureau of Ships Group was together for the first time. Frequent conferences were held to acquaint all personnel with the aspects of the operation which would be of importance

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to the Group, and civilian technical personnel made numerous acquaintance inspections to familiarize themselves with representative types of target ships. Organized units made simulated damage inspections and wrote subsequent simulated damage reports in order to became familiar with the general character of this report. Upon departure from Pearl Harbor, the staff reorganized to shift from the ship preparation phase to the approaching damage inspection phase.

1. Final Pre-Test Operations

Concurrent with the staff re-organization, the Bureau of Ships Group established the basic inspection teams which were to be used during the test operations. A broad Organization Bill set forth three possible combinations of teams for damage inspections: one, in which all members of the group were divided into two teams to provide rapid coverage of badly damaged target ships; another, in which all members were arranged in six teams to provide coverage of the maximum number of ships; and a third, in which all members not assigned to Initial Boarding Teams were assigned in three groups to assist as necessary during the initial re-boarding operations. The entire Group functioned administratively through the three units for hull, machinery and electrical and a special subsection for submarines.

On 15 and 16 June, the Director of Ship Material held rehearsals for the Initial Boarding Teams, which were realistic in every detail. The Amy Air Forces had also been conducting independent drills with bombing runs on NEVADA.

On 24 June Queen Day full dress rehearsal was held under exact conditions of the actual Crossroads operations except that a 500-pound phosphorus

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fragmentation bomb substituted for the eagerly awaited atomic bomb.

2. Test Able Operations.

Weather forecasts on 30 June indicated that the day selected for Able Day, 1 July, would be satisfactory for the bomb drop; and at 0900, the morning of 30 June, the signal was sent from MOUNT MCKINLEY designating the following day as Able Day and setting in motion the Evacuation Plan. Target ships' crews immediately begin placing the target ships in the condition of readiness that had been established for these ships.

Certain instrumentation teams made final checks of instruments before returning to their ships. The Ten Ship Boarding Teams hoarded the ships assigned them. Nearly all officers of the Bureau of Ships Group were assigned to the various teams and, as representatives for the Director of Ship Material, were responsible for safe clearance of target ships after the Test Able burst.

In the early afternoon, the non-target ships started leaving the lagoon; first, the destroyer patrols and boarding team ships, followed next by the ships of the Instrumentation Unit and repair ships, and last, the quarters transports. All vessels proceeded to special sectors outside the lagoon where they steamed throughout the night awaiting Able Day.

At 9 am on 1 July 1946 the first atomic bomb of Operation Crossroads burst.

Re-entry on Able Day and re-boarding operations completed on Able plus Three occurred without incident. After clearance of the ships, members on the Initial Boarding Teams rejoined the Group which commenced technical inspections, The data obtained by the teams during preliminary inspections of the target ships were included in the Bureau of Ships

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section of the Director of Ship Material's Gross Damage Report for Test Able, submitted on 5 July. More detailed results accruing from further inspection were included in a similar section of the Interim Report for Test Able. In addition to the technical inspections, certain members of the Bureau of Ships Group assisted in damage repairs and salvage operations. Assessment of the results of Test Able was complete by mid-July and technical inspection teams commenced checking readiness of the ships for Test Baker.

3. Test Baker Operations

Although re-organized teams were listed for Test Baker, members of the Bureau of Ships Group again participated as technical representatives or assistant representatives for the Director of Ship Material. Re-entry on Baker Day and re-boarding operations that followed, proceeded slowly as anticipated. Due to the delay in safe re-boarding imposed by the radiological hazards, Initial Boarding Teams were disbanded after clearance of only a few ships on the outer periphery of the array.

4. Reports

Operations in the Bikini area were concluded on 25 August, and the Bureau of Ships Group departed in WHARTON for Kwajalein on that date. Arrangements were made for further observations of target ships at Kwajalein, and Comdr. J. B. Shirley, a member of the Bureau of Ships Group, was assigned to the staff of Commander Naval Task Groups as technical representative for Director of Ship Material to assist in continued decontamination and inspections.

The Bureau of Ships Group arrived in San Francisco on 7 September and re-assembled in Washington in offices provided by the Bureau of Ships on 23 September to undertake preparation of the final reports.

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CHART XXXIII

ELECTRONICS GROUP (013-D)

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IV. ELECTRONICS

A. Formation of Group

The Electronics Group originated on 21 January when Capt. C. L. Engleman reported for duty as the Electronics Coordinating Officer on the Technical Staff of the Task Force. Personnel for the Group were drawn initially from sections of the Bureau of Ships concerned with electronics, and from field activities of the Bureau. later, the Group drew upon its commercial field engineers. As the plans for exposing materials on target ships grew in scope, the Bureau of Aeronautics and the Army Ground Groups furnished personnel for coordinating their work in ship preparation and inspection with regard, respectively, to airborne and Signal Corps equipment. The Bureau of Ordnance attached officers to the Electronics Group in connection with plans for fire control radar equipment. The undertaking of additional instrumentation projects made it necessary for the Group to draw many commercial, academic, and military personnel from agencies.

Contingent with the assumption of responsibility for practically all electronics instrumentation projects except those retained by the Los Alamos Group for the timing signals and bomb detonation, the Electronics Group became one of the instrumentation groups accountable to the Technical Director. The Group continued to maintain close relationship with and certain responsibilities to the Director of Ship Material, particularly with regard to exposure of target materials.

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B. Ship Preparation and Inspection

1. Preliminary

The major task of the Electronics Group was execution of the program for preparation of electronics equipment for exposure on target ships and inspection of damage. In general, the exposure program involved all the normal complement of electronics equipment aboard the combatant target ships, with the equipment in operative condition. The Group coordinated the exposure of all types of electronics equipment, shipborne, airborne, and Signal Corps, but was directly responsible only for shipborne equipment under the normal cognizance of the Bureau of Ships and the Bureau of Ordnance. Preparation of the airborne equipment on target ships was made by the Bureau of Aeronautics Group, and the Army Ground Group effected the work of exposing Signal Corps equipment. The policy was adopted that inspection of electronics equipment aboard the target vessels would be made primarily by the ships' crews, with personnel from the staff of the Electronics Group to make special inspections, as necessary, to develop special information. The Electronics Group undertook to formulate general and detailed inspection plans for training ships' crews as well as members of the Group.

2. Equipment

The program of the Electronics Group required that electronics equipment in certain target ships be in operation during the testa, not only for study of the effects of the explosions on the equipment themselves, but also as a means of carrying out some of the scientific

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investigations projected in the Instrumentation Plan. It had been decided, with reference to the types of equipment installed, that PENNSYLVANIA, PENSACOLA, WAINWRIGHT, RALPH TALBOT and PARCHE were to have operating equipment.

In addition, a program for exposure of airborne electronic equipment and inspection of damage was carried out under the Electronics Group by liaison personnel from the Bureau of Aeronautics Group,

This extensive equipment on over forty vessels was constantly under inspection and surveillance from the time of installation until the time of evacuation for Test Able. Part of this inspection come under eight field engineers contracted for by the Navy with the Raytheon Corporation.

C. Technical Communications

The Electronics Group provided the technical communications facilities, the three phases of which in magnitude compared to those required in the wartime amphibious assault forces. They involved communications for the Commander of the Task Force, the Director of Ship Material, and special projects. These tasks were carried out by Comdr, F. X. Foster, who, while a member of the Electronics Group, was Special Assistant for Communication to the Director of Ship Material. The principal objective was to supplement the normal communications facilities of ships in the Task Force with the many additional facilities required because of the nature of Operation Crossroads. During February, key groups of the staff determined their communication requirements and shipments of special equipment began.

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The many problems and special features of this project will not be discussed in this report except to mention the extensiveness of the task, which included normal radio communication, television, special devices for recording explosion sounds, walkie-talkies, etc.

D. Blast, Pressure and Shock Measurements

1. Preliminary

The Electronics Group undertook two tasks in connection with measurements of blast, pressure and shock, which comprised an important section of the Instrumentation Plan. The first of these, involving a record of pressure waves in air and water, was carried out by means of sonobuoys in a program that presented no unusual technical problems. But the second task, requiring telemetering of pressure data from target ships not likely to survive, called for the rapid development of an elaborate instrumentation program in a relatively new field, an experimental program which could not guarantee positive results. This program enlisted the services of many technical and commercial agencies to deal with numerous problems.

2. Telemetering

The fact that some of the target vessels favorably located for collecting scientific data were unlikely to survive indicated the need for a means of recording this valuable data at a safe distance. Collection and recording of data from such locations could be accomplished by telemetering which in general is an electronic system providing transmission of data from a measuring station to a remote receiving and recording station. More elaborately, a telemetering system consists of an input device whose function is to convert the phenomena to be measured into an electrical signal, an

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electronic amplifier to raise the input signal to a level high enough to modulate a frequency-modulated signal, and a distant receiver with suitable recording equipment.

The Ships Instrumentation Group was confronted with the particular problem of measuring the pressure-time relation of the air blast in Test Able at eighteen points on two auxiliaries at different positions in the target array, and the pressure-time relation of the underwater shock wave in Test Baker. In January, this group recognized the need for telemetering in working out a solution to this problem, and it soon became evident that the project should come under the Electronics Group.

In mid-February, the Electronics Group contacted several research agencies, commercial, military, and academic, which were known to have engineers working on telemetering systems.

They decided that the existing telemetering systems of the Navy Air Experimental Station, the National Defense Research Council (Princeton), and the Cornell Aeronautical laboratory apparently could be adapted for the air blast measurements of Test Able, but that a new system must be developed for Test Baker, as no existing system was suitable for measurement of the water shock wave. Telemetering equipment and technical personnel were transferred from various agencies to the Westinghouse laboratories in Pittsburgh, where the new system was devised. Upon completion in late April, the telemetering system required thirty-six independent frequency channels for Test Able and six for Test Baker.

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E. Wave Measurement

1. Television

Early in February, after the Oceanography Group had requested the use of television for measuring wave heights, the Electronics Group organized a television project. The initial project was intended for remote observation of wave formations only, with receiving equipment

installed in an aircraft and the image recorded by motion pictures. When this project was well underway, it became evident that the television cameras also would provide a means of observing at other remote stations the general area of the explosion. Accordingly, another project was set up to provide receivers for observation on MOUNT MCKINLEY, WHARTON, APPALACHIAN, AVERY ISLAND, BLUE RIDGE, and PANAMINT.

For wave measurement, two television cameras and transmitters were installed on Bikini Island on towers seventy-five feet high. The two transmitters, separated by about four miles, were fitted with nineteen inch and twenty-four inch telephoto lenses to cover a field of view about five miles wide at the center of the target array, under the explosion in Test Able. Wave height was indicated on two calibrated poles set in the water in the field of the television cameras. The television equipment was of standard Navy design: two frequency channels were assigned to the transmitters.

Successful wave measurement by means of television required a direct line-of-sight between the transmitters on Bikini Island and receivers. This condition was obtained by installing the television receivers in two PBM-5 seaplanes, which also carried automatic recording 35-mm cameras. In this way it was possible to obtain a photographic

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record of the wave heights on the calibrated poles pictured in the field of the television cameras.

Each of the observing ships previously mentioned was fitted with two receivers, one for each of the two channels, and four monitor repeaters for each receiver, providing ten viewing positions in all. AVERY ISLAND was also fitted with an additional transmitter and receiver on the bridge for testing the installations on the other ships. After the initial tests of the equipment at Bikini, modification was made to relay the transmissions received in the two PBM planes to the observer ships to increase signal strength. As a means for protecting the iconoscopes of the television transmitters on Bikini from the intense light of the initial flash of the explosion, another modification provided a device on each camera, which placed a neutral density filter in front of the camera lens a few seconds before and removed it a few seconds after the blast through the operation of timing signals. A Hobart automatic processing camera was installed on AVERY ISLAND to record the still pictures of the television receivers at one-second intervals and to project these pictures continuously thirty seconds after exposure.

2. Sonobuoys and Fathometers

Two sonobuoys, operating on suitable frequencies, were installed in Bikini Lagoon for the use of the Oceanography Group in its wave measurements. Twenty-five portable fathometers were provided in the same program, same of them being mounted in the Lagoon on buoys, the others on target ships. Provisions were made for auxiliary power for the fathometers normally carried on target vessels, so that these could also be used by the Oceanography Group.

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F. Other Special Projects

1. Timing Signals

Several projects were set up to assist the Los Alamos Group in providing the timing signals required for the tests. Approximately 600 crystals and installation kits were obtained for modifying RHB receivers to crystal control.

2. Navigational Radar Beacons

Three projects were undertaken for homing the B-29 plane carrying the atomic bomb. One X-band racon, was installed on Erik Island to provide radar beacon facilities for practice runs of the B-29 before the actual drop. One of the same type beacons, with auxiliary power facilities, was installed on NEVADA, the target ship, to home the plane on its bombing run in Test Able. Additional navigational aids were provided by the installation of two non-directional racons, one on Enyu Island, the other on Erik Island. These installations were completed in April and the beacons were operated daily for two two-hour periods from 10 May through Able Day.

3. Telemetering for Geiger Counters

On 15 April, upon request from the Radiological Safety Section, a project was initiated to provide telemetering of the indications from the Geiger counters installed on target ships in significant parts of the target array. The purpose of these measurements was to determine the time at which the radioactivity dropped to a level low enough to permit reboarding of target ships. The radio transmitter for the telemetering had to be capable of unattended operation for from nine to

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twelve hours and investigation revealed that the Signal Corps had a transmitter available, which met these requirements.

4. Drone Boat Program

The Technical Director and the Radiological Safety Adviser of the Task Force realized the need for collection of samples of highly radioactive waters in the Lagoon without human aid. Although testing of water samples taken within two hours after detonation at a spot within 1500 yards of the center of the contaminated area became desirable for Test Able, it was considered of vital importance in Test Baker, Believing that no personnel would be able to enter the array area for several days after the test, the only means of ascertaining the extent of the radiological hazard proved to be by utilizing some controlled device fitted with Geiger counters and transmitters. It was decided to employ drone boats for this purpose, as the Bureau of Ships had developed such boats in the wartime "Stinger" project.

The Electronics Group supplied, installed, and maintained electronics equipment in the eight LCVP drone boats which included radio receiving equipment to feed the signals to the remote control apparatus for slipping the anchor cable, starting and stopping the engine, steering, changing speed, starting and stopping the pump for collection of water samples, and starting the radar beacon. Control of six drones centered with two control ships which used TIM aircraft for observation purposes. The two remaining drones were held in reserve at Kwajalein. The drones carried radio transmitters for telemetering the counting rate of Geiger counters when the boats were guided through the lagoon to investigate the intensity of the radioactivity in various sectors prior to re-entry.

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G. Test Operations

The crew of some 100 civilian and military electronics repair and inspection men arrived at Bikini aboard AVERY ISLAND on 1 June.

During that month, these men worked in cooperation with target ship crews in inspecting and repairing items of ship electronics gear and in assisting technicians already there with special projects on the islands. Nearly 4,000 major items of electronics equipment were placed in full operating condition on the target ships and were itemized and classified in the ship inspection forms. Members of the Electronics Group did not participate with Initial Boarding Teams in the re-entry after the bombing but formed electronic inspection teams which began visual inspections of equipment after general reboarding had been authorized. Part of the Group also concentrated on the repair and re-installation of equipment to return as much as possible to operable readiness for the second test.

Although inspections after Test Able proved satisfactory, the delay caused by radiological hazards following the underwater buret of Test Baker hampered the speedy recovery of instruments and inspection of equipment. Camera film and tape record were obtained from the instruments on Aomoen Island on Baker Day by personnel who landed on the island in helicopters. General inspections on target ships were held up until decontamination processes rendered the ships safe for reboarding. So much of the equipment was radiologically contaminated that the Group decided to concentrate inspections on a few target ships located in advantageous spots which would provide a good overall estimate of results.

This contamination problem proved of such duration that target ships brought back to the continental limits some time later were still in an activated condition.

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CHART XXXIV
SHIPS INSTRUMENTATION GROUP (013-C)

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H. Ships Instrumentation Group

1. Formation

Prior to formation of the Ships Instrumentation Group, the Underwater Explosion Research Group of the Bureau of Ships took part in the early discussions of the proposed atomic bomb tests since this Group was normally concerned with the nature of underwater explosions and their effects upon ships. During the exploratory period, the Group primarily interested itself in shaping an experimental program which would reveal new information or information not yet satisfactorily proved.

Information on damage to ships involved two phenomena: first, the cut-off of the direct shock wave by an opposite shock wave (rarefaction) which might arrive at the target after reflection from the surface; and second, the cavitations resulting from the initial motions of the target under action of the shock front.

Since the time schedule would not allow the development and use of new instruments, the primary interest of the Bureau of Ships centered upon structural response of target vessels and shock phenomena aboard those vessels as well as a collateral interest in loadings.

Two special sections of the Ships Instrumentation Group were organized, one concerned with pressure and shock the other with radiation, internal pressure, magnetism, and roll and pitch. Personnel for the first section came from the Design Branch of the Bureau of Ships while the Physics Section of the Research Branch of the Bureau supplied personnel for the other section. Also the necessity of telemetering data during test explosions to a receiving station at a safe

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distance from the explosions required liaison with the Electronics Group.

The primary responsibility of the Ships Instrumentation Group became one of measuring ships response under the shook wave loading to which each was subjected by the explosions. Emphasis was placed on the structural mechanics of loading and response, so that correlation between the two might be investigated. Operation Crossroads involved other problems of interest, such as effects of temperature and radiation, internal pressure, and shock wave velocity, which were also to be investigated . It was not intended to make the instrumentation of the tests a formal study in loading and response, as may be better done in less complicated tests, but to obtain data for a correlation between explosion phenomena and damage, and to establish a basis for correlation between these tests and conventional experimentation with explosives.

Following the conferences in early January and later conferences with Los Alamos representatives, the Ships Instrumentation Group decided against use of photographic recording methods, which were subject to damage, except for the installation of one string oscillograph. This instrument would determine what happened to photosensitive paper and could be checked against alternative means if a readable record were obtained on the paper. It was also decided that no attempt would be made at stress or strain analysis. The conditions of the operations were such that principal reliance had to be placed on mechanical gauges with measurements made on a time basis.

Since structural response is of the same nature in both air and water explosions, the instrumentation for structural response was to be

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essentially the same for both tests. But shock wave loadings from air blast and underwater shock wave are of a different nature, so that the loading pattern for the two tests must be different and unrelated; in each case the particular quantities were measured as a function of distance.

In general, measurements of the properties of loading in free field were a responsibility of the Ordnance Instrumentation Group.

The Ships Instrumentation Group was interested in measurement of loading in the immediate vicinity of structure and the time properties of the loading.

2. Response Instrumentation

The Group spent its principal efforts in response instrumentation upon measuring two aspects of the response of target vessels to blast and shock waves; the motion of elements of ship structure and the motion of ship components such as equipment and machinery. The motion of the ship as a body, though adequately covered in the instrumentation, was considered least important from the standpoint of significant damage.

Time measurements of structural response were probably even more important than similar measurements of structural loading. This follows from two outstanding considerations. First, there is not enough information on the behavior of structure under impulsive loading to penult any action to be characterized by a single parameter, except perhaps in the case of simplest structures, more or less idealized. One must look further at the complete picture of loading and response. Second, a somewhat extensive series of tests concerned with non-contact explosions has built up a substantial background of measurements on a time basis, affording the best means for

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correlating the atomic bomb tests with documented experience with conventional explosives.

Nevertheless, it was decided that mechanical gauges should play a large part. Their use was not beset with the complications surrounding the use of ball-crusher gauges against the skin of the target vessels, and their use was further recommended in view of the hazards involved in the recording apparatus necessary for other types.

Since photographic or photo-sensitive recording processes had been ruled out, there arose the problem of what means of recording to use. After considerable experimentation two alternative recording methods were turned to, both offering prospects good enough to warrant their development as the recording systems used.

One scheme used a magnetic wire recorder with a frequency modulation system which compensated for the lack of uniform permeability of the wire and which obviated the use of the low-fidelity amplifier. The other scheme involved the use of the "recordograph", an acetate recorder which is also a sound recording device.

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CHART XXXV

OCEANOGRAPHY GROUP (O13-B)

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I. Oceanography Group

1. Formation

On 13 December 1945, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Special Weapons conferred with representatives of the Manhattan District, the Hydrographic Office, and the Bureau of Ships, relative to surface water waves generated by atomic explosions. In this conference the oceanographic facilities of the Bureau of Ships and the Hydrographic Office was described for representatives of the Manhattan District.

The group discussed ocean currents as they affected the choice of a safe test site, and Bureau of Ships personnel outlined their program of wave studies and instrumentation.

The Oceanography Group as a formal participant in Operation Crossroads, with the Bureau of Ships' Commander Revelle as head, organized into two main sections dealing with oceanographic surveys and wave measurement. The first of these included four subsections for radiological safety reconnaissance, physical oceanography, biology and geology, and fisheries. The wave measurement section included two subsections dealing with wave motion and seismology. Special liaison was maintained with other instrumentation groups. Civilian personnel were drawn from many public and private scientific agencies to assist in planning and carrying out the technical work of the Group.

2. Oceanographic Survey

Following the exploratory discussions, the Oceanography Group began active work not only in the technical problems of wave measurement, but also in the field of physical oceanography, biology, geology,

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and fisheries. Every effort was made to insure that all cognizant government and civilian agencies were represented and that no proper interests were neglected. Basic to the investigations in all four fields was the decision to have BOWDITCH make a survey of the physical oceanography of Bikini Atoll, for BOWDITCH eventually became the home for a large number of scientists engaged in a full-fledged scientific expedition, which was an essential preliminary to the tests themselves. The planning of the Bowditch Expedition was a major task involving many different civilian scientific agencies.

A physical oceanographic survey was made to establish the current regime and related oceanographic conditions in Bikini Atoll and surrounding waters which would influence the scattering and diffusion of radioactive substances resulting from the bursts.

Commercial fishing interests in the Pacific were disturbed, when the proposed tests first appeared in the newspapers, over the possibility of far-reaching harmful effects upon the commercial fish supply. Accordingly, on 21 November 1945, the Secretary of the Interior pointed out these dangers to the Secretary of the Navy, and rendered the technical advice of the Fish and Wildlife Service in the selection of a site where these dangers would be least. Experiments and observations were made to determine the effects of the bomb bursts, above and at the surface, of the reef and lagoon fishes of Bikini Atoll, and on the pelagic or migratory fishes, particularly tunas, in the surrounding ocean waters. The government agencies, which supplied

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personnel and equipment, pointed out the opportunity in Operation Crossroads to acquire fundamental scientific knowledge in many fields, including the effects of concussion, wave action, and radiant effects of heat, light, and radioactivity upon aquatic organisms. They planned to measure the immediate and long-range effects of the bursts upon the fish population of Bikini Atoll, and the rate of repopulation, through reproduction and immigration, of the fish populations destroyed.

Since early planning indicated that the ecological phase of the field study of Bikini Atoll and surrounding waters was an important one, the primary responsibility for the biological survey rested with the U.S. National Museum. The plane for the biological survey called for a quantitative inventory of flora and fauna at Bikini, at Eniwetok, which would likely feel only moderate effects, and at Rongerik, not likely to be affected at all. These inventories were to be made prior to the bursts, as soon afterwards as possible, and at varying intervals for a considerable period to estimate long-period effects and the rate of repopulation.

Three geologists from the Geological Survey were specifically selected to study bottom sediments, using both bottom sampling and photographic methods, and to investigate the physiography and geology of the islands of Bikini Atoll, the shore and beach processes, and the ecology of coral reefs. The purpose of the geological investigations was to study possible effects of the explosion, like erosion of the inner face of Bikini Island by waves and currents, changes in bottom topography by transportation of sediment near the explosion, and radioactive effects on the bottom sediments and the reef coral. On 11 March the Bowditch

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Expedition composed of these advanced study activities began their scientific work in Bikini Lagoon.

3. Wave Measurement

In the latter part of December, wave measurements were among the topics of discussion in a conference called by the Bureau of Ordnance, which was attended by Rear Admiral (then Commodore) Parsons, Rear Admiral Solberg, and representatives of the Bureau of Ships, the Manhattan District, and the Los Alamos laboratories. The Alamos representatives particularly emphasized the importance of wave measurements and called upon Comdr. Revelle to describe the proposed methods of measurement, which included portable echo sounders and bottom-mounted echo sounders.

As the Group elaborated upon its plans, suggestions for wave measurement were received from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, the Admiralty Research laboratory in England, the University of California Division of War Research, and the U.S. Navy Electronics laboratory. Suggestions from Mr. M. P. O'Brien, Dean of the University of California Department of Engineering, for model studies of wave generation, preliminary to the full-scale atomic bomb studies, were subsequently carried out by his personnel and others.

a. Photogrammetry and Television

At a later meeting, which dealt with photographic requirements, the head of the Oceanography Group, recommended photogramme try for wave measurements by means of simultaneous aerial and ground photography, controlled by radio links, with an installation of camera towers on the

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atoll islands, as well as television observations which were a useful addition to the photographic plan because of the desirability of obtaining estimates of wave height immediately after the tests and the impracticability of measuring breaking waves by means of pressure recorders.

A special section of the Group was organized for installing and operating two television transmitters on Bikini Island, and two television receivers with motion picture cameras in two of the photographic aircraft. After basic plans were completed, this section was assigned to the Electronics Group.

b. Model Basin Studies

The Group also arranged that a series of model tests be undertaken under the direction of Prof. J. W. Johnson of Dean O’Brien's staff. The investigations were instituted at the Woods Hole laboratories, but were transferred to the David Taylor Model Basin and finally to the Naval Warfare Mine Test Station, Solomons, Maryland, ae the size of the chargee used increased from 0.1 pound to 1,000 pounds.

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J. Ship Technical Photography Section

Although photography aboard target ships would have been impractical because of the great amounts of lead shielding which would be required for protection against radioactivity, photography proved an auxiliary method of instrumentation. All activities concerned had special requirements and each problem had to be solved individually, but the major part of the work proved to be non-technical. For that reason three special sections were formed within the Photography Group to handle technical photography for the Los Alamos, Bureau of Ships, and Aerial Groups, with their work coordinated in the Photographic Plan.

The main object of photography was to obtain detailed records of the influence of the bomb burst on the great variety of animals and equipment exposed aboard the target ships, as well as on the target ships themselves. It was estimated that 50,000-60,000 still exposures would be needed for all the before-and-after photographs.

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CHART XXXVI

SHIPS TECHNICAL PHOTOGRAPHY SECTION (013-K2)
OF PHOTOGRAPHY GROUP (013-K)

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(Atomic bomb smoke column, Test Able)

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V. EVALUATION OF OPERATION CROSSROADS

In view of the momentous importance of Operation Crossroads' results in the future of mankind the preliminary report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board for the Atomic Bomb Tests, released to the public on 2 August 1946 by the President of the United States, is quoted here in full:

PRELIMINARY REPORT FOLLOWING THE SECOND ATOMIC BOMB TEST

Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board for the Atomic Bomb Tests

30 July 1946

SECTION I

Supplement to Preliminary Report on Test "A"

In general, the observations on ship damage presented by this board in its first report were confirmed by engineering surveys. The location of the bomb burst, accurately determined from photographs, was such that only one ship was within 1,000 feet, of the surface point over which the bomb exploded. There were about 20 ships within half a mile, all of which were badly damaged, many being put out of action and five sunk. It required up to 12 days to repair all of those ships left afloat sufficiently so that they could have steamed under their own power to a major base for repair.

It is now possible to make some estimate of the radiological injuries which crews would have suffered had they been aboard Test "A" target vessels. Measurements of radiation intensity and a study of animals exposed in ships show that the initial flash of principal lethal radiations, which are gamma-rays and neutrons, would have killed almost all personnel normally stationed aboard the ships centered around the air burst and many others at greater

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distances. Personnel protected by steel, water, or other dense materials would have been relatively safe in the outlying target vessels. The effects of radiation exposure would not have incapacitated all victims immediately, even some of the most severely affected might have remained at their stations several hours. Thus it is possible that initial efforts at damage control might have kept ships operating, but it is clear that vessels within a mile of an atomic bomb air burst would eventually became inoperative due to crew casualties.

SECTION II

Observations on Test "B"

The Board divided into two groups for the observation of Test "B". Four members, after surveying the target array from the air, witnessed the explosion from an airplane eight miles away at an altitude of 7,500 feet. The other three members inspected the target array from a small boat the day before the test and observed the bomb's explosion from the deck of the USS HAVEN, 11 miles at sea to the east of the burst.

The Board reassembled on the HAVEN on 26 July, and the members have since examined photographs, data on radioactivity, and reports of other phenomena, and have inspected some of the target vessels. They have also consulted with members of the Task Force technical staff.

As scheduled, at 0835 Bikini time on 25 July, a bomb was detonated well below the surface of the lagoon. This bomb was suspended from LSM-60,

near the center of the target array. The explosion was of predicted violence and is estimated to have been at least as destructive as 20,000 tons of TNT.

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To a degree which the Board finds remarkable, the visible phenomena of explosion followed the predictions made by civilian and service phenomenologists attached to Joint Task Force One. At the moment of explosion, a done, which showed the light of incandescent material within, rose upon the surface of the lagoon. The blast was followed by an opaque cloud which rapidly enveloped about half of the target array. The cloud vanished in about two seconds to reveal, as predicted, a column of ascending water. From some of the photographs it appears that this column lifted the 26,000-ton battleship ARKANSAS for a brief interval before the vessel plunged to the bottom of the lagoon. Confirmation of this occurrence must await the analysis of high-speed photographs which are not yet available.

The diameter of the column of water was about 2,200 feet, and it rose to a height of about 5,500 feet. Spray rose to a much greater height.

The column contained roughly ten million tons of water. For several minutes after the column reached maximum height, water fell back, forming an expanding cloud of spray which engulfed about half of the target array. Surrounding the base of the column was a wall of foaming water several hundred feet high.

Waves outside the water column, about 1,000 feet from the center of explosion, were 80 to 100 feet in height. These waves rapidly diminished in size as they proceeded outward, the highest wave reaching the beach of Bikini Island being seven feet. Waves did not pass over the island, and no material damage occurred there. Measurements of the underwater shock wave are not yet available. There were no seismic phenomena of significant magnitude.

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The explosion produced intense radioactivity in the waters of the lagoon. Radioactivity immediately after the burst is estimated to have been the equivalent of many hundred tons of radium. A few minutes exposure to this intense radiation at its peak would, within a brief interval, have incapacitated human beings and have resulted in their death within days or weeks.

Great quantities of radioactive water descended upon the ships from the column or were thrown over them by waves. This highly lethal radioactive water constituted such a hazard that after four days it was still unsafe for inspection parties, operating within a well-established safety margin, to spend any useful length of time at the center of the target area or to board ships anchored there.

As in Test "A", the array of target ships for Test "B" did not represent a normal anchorage but was designed instead to obtain the maximum data from a single explosion. Of the 84 ships and small craft in the array, 40 were anchored within one mile and 20 within about one-half mile. Two major ships were sunk, the battleship ARKANSAS immediately and the heavy-hulled aircraft carrier SARATOGA after 7-1/2 hours. A landing ship, a landing craft, and an oiler also sank immediately. The destroyer HUGHES, in sinking condition, and the transport FALCON, badly listing, were later beached. The submerged submarine APOGON was sent to the bottom, emitting air bubbles and fuel oil, and one to three other submerged submarines are believed to have sunk. Five days after the burst, the badly damaged Japanese battleship NAGATO sank. It was found impossible immediately to assess damage to hulls, power plants and

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machinery of the target ships because of radioactive contamination. Full appraisal of damage will have to await detailed survey by engineer teams. External observation from a safe distance would indicate that a few additional ships near the target center may have suffered some hull damage. There was no obvious damage to ships more than one-half mile from the burst.

SECTION III

Observations and Conclusions, Both Tests

The operations of Joint Task Force One in conducting the tests have set a pattern for close, effective cooperation of the Armed Services and civilian scientists in the planning and execution of this highly technical operation. Moreover, the tests have provided valuable training of personnel in joint operations requiring great precision and coordination of effort.

It is impossible to evaluate an atomic burst in terms of conventional explosives. As to detonation and blast effects, where the largest bomb of the past was effective within a radius of a few hundred feet, the atomic bomb’s effectiveness can be measured in thousands of feet. However, the radiological effects have no parallel in conventional weapons. It is necessary that a conventional bomb score a direct hit or a near miss of not more than a few feet to cause significant damage to a battle ship. At Bikini the second bomb, bursting under water, sank a battleship immediately at a distance of well over 500 feet. It damaged an aircraft carrier so that it sank in a few hours, while another battleship sank after five days. The first bomb, bursting in air, did great harm to the superstructures of major ships within a half-mile radius, but did only minor damage to their hulls. No ship within a mile of either burst could have escaped without some damage to itself and serious injury to a large number of its crew.

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(Distant view of Test Able.)

 

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Although lethal results might have been more or less equivalent, the radiological phenomena accompanying the two bursts were markedly different. In the case of the air-burst bomb, it seems certain that unprotected personnel within one mile would have suffered high casualties by intense neutron and gamma radiation as well as by blast and heat. Those surviving immediate effects would not have been menaced by radioactivity persisting after the burst.

In the case of the underwater explosion, the air-burst wave was far less intense and there was no heat wave of significance. Moreover, because of the absorption of neutrons and gamma rays by water, the lethal quality of the first flash of radiation was not of high order. But the second bomb threw large masses of highly radioactive water onto the decks and into the hulls of vessels. These contaminated ships became radioactive stoves, and would have burned all living things aboard them with invisible and painless but deadly radiation.

It is too soon to attempt an analysis of all of the implications of the Bikini tests. But it is not too soon to point to the necessity for immediate and intensive research into several unique problems posed by the atomic bomb. The poisoning of large volumes of water presents such a problem.

Study must be given to procedures for protecting not only ships' crews but also the populations of cities against such radiological effects as were demonstrated in Bikini lagoon.

Observations during the two tests have established the general types and range of effectiveness of air and shallow underwater atomic-bomb bursts on naval vessels, army materiel, including a wide variety of Quartermaster

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stores, and personnel. From these observations and from instrumental data it will now be possible to outline such changes, not only in military and naval design but also in strategy and tactics, as future events may indicate.

L. H. BRERETON
B. DEWEY
T. F. FARRELL
J. H. HOOVER
R. A. OFSTIE
J.  W. STILLWELL
K.  T. COMPTON, CHAIRMAN

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VI. CONCLUSIONS

It seems that throughout the ages, each new weapon has been heralded as ringing the death knell of navies. Undoubtedly this vicious cycle commenced with the introduction of cannons on galleys, which immediately outmoded the oar propelled ram and. thereby ended the reign of seapower. Whitehead's automotive torpedo assuredly placed the naval vessel in the proverbial mothballs. Sea power then came to its end when Mr. Holland perfected the submarine; and again with the advent of the airplane. Now, it appears, sea power, which somehow not only managed to survive these other indefensible weapons but also managed to increase its influence, is doomed once more. This time it is the atomic bomb that sends the navies to their inglorious grave.

The student of history confesses that each new development, improvement or invention has not diminished the naval vessel but rather has expanded its importance -- if not by the utilization of that new invention to its own advantage, then by the development of defensive equipment or weapons which increased its power.

Let us say, in general conclusion, that Operation Crossroads indicated that the destructive effect of the atomic bomb is twenty thousand times greater than any other missile yet developed, which makes selectivity of targets impossible, since non-military items will be destroyed just as surely as are military objectives; that it can sink the largest ship afloat; and that the atomic bomb is a fact. This conclusion, however, has merely pointed the way for naval architects and strategists and tacticians. As the advent of airpower only aided in making seapower stronger, so may this new weapon of warfare merely make a naval force more effective.

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CHAPTER XXIII
NAVY YARD REORGANIZATION

--396b--

CHAPTER XXIII

NAVY YARD REORGANIZATION

A. Navy Yard Organization 1940-1945

At the outset of the emergency period, Navy yard organization followed a fairly consistent pattern, although many variations existed in particular yards (as already discussed in Chapter V). The Commanding Officer was the Commandant and was the representative of the Navy Department in all matters within the limits of his command. He was made fully responsible and given complete authority over all persons, civil and naval employed in the yard. Under the Commandant were certain staff officers and the various departments, major ones being the Industrial Department, the Operations Department, the Supply and Accounting Department, and the Disbursing Department. In addition, yards might include a hospital, Marine barracks, receiving station and Intelligence Officer. In charge of the Industrial Department was an officer known as the Manager of the yard, who reported to the Commandant with regard to the industrial activities of the yard. Although it was never made a matter of official record,

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the yard Manager was without exception an officer selected for "Engineering Duty Only".

The Organization Planning and Procedures Unit of the Secretary's Office submitted a "Review of the Organization and Administration of Navy Yards and U. S. Naval Drydocks" to the Secretary of the Navy 13 July 1945. This report will be referred to hereafter as the "Paget Report". In this report it was emphasized that at least 90% of the work in Navy yards should be considered as industrial. Although the Industrial Department and Manager did not have complete control over all this work, the same report estimated that 75% of the effort of the Public Works Department was industrial and 35% of the Supply Department was industrial and at least 60% of the Accounting, Medical, and Operations Departments work was industrial.

In recognition of the predominant interest of the industrial department and the primary responsibility of the Manager in the accomplishment of the main work of the Yard, the heads of Supply, Accounting and Medical Departments were given orders for additional duty under the supervision of the Manager. This arrangement, however, was a compromise and did not improve the situation in many yards. It also raised a much more serious question with regard to the functions, responsibilities and relationships of the Commandants, Managers and various departmental

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heads. An analysis of the problems and defects of this organization is contained in the Paget Report, mentioned above. This report made the following points: (1) "The principal Yard executive, the Commandant, in actuality exercises little direct management control of Yard functions." The report points out that although the Commandant's duties as established in General Order No. 11 include responsibilities comparable to those of a chief executive of a large industrial enterprise, practically no such management control was found to emanate from the Commandant, department heads looking to the Commandant mainly as an umpire and the Commandant typically having no means of keeping the operating efficiency of the Yard departments under review. In a number of cases it was frankly recognized that the Commandant's main function was to handle military affairs and public relations for the Yard. (2) "Neither of the principal Aides to the Commandant is delegated adequate authority and responsibility for the management of the Yard." (3) "A number of faulty or illogical organizational arrangements have resulted from the absence of integrated management control over the industrial work of the Yard." In discussing this point, the report mentions that the system of

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additional duty of the Supply, Accounting and Medical department heads to the Manager established by direction of the Secretary in October 1944 did not work to the satisfaction of the Manager. Managers uniformly stated that they had no direct authority to control the work of these three departments. The heads of the departments concerned were, on the other hand, confused as to the meaning of the additional duty arrangement and stated without exception that it made no change in their relation to the industrial department. On the other hand, the placing of the Public Works Division under the direct control of the Manager involved him in specialized service and control relationships to all other departments.

In addition to the problems of internal organization, the relation of Navy Yards to the Navy Department involved a veritable maze of organizational relationships. The Paget Report points out that there were three distinct types of control exercised over the Yards and that at least eight different Bureaus and offices participated directly in these controls, as follows:

(1) "The management control of Ship Yards is distributed among the Office of the Secretary, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Bureau of Ships."

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The Secretary’s Office controlled, through the Division of Shore Establishments and Civilian Personnel, policies and procedures governing civilian personnel and, through the Industrial Survey Division, the making of surveys of the industrial operations at Yards leading to recommendations for improvement. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations was directly concerned with management control in the discharge of its responsibility for the determination of priority relating to construction, repair and overhaul of ships and, through its Fleet Maintenance Division, for the regulation of availabilities of ships to the Yards and for directives to the Yard in regard to the commissioning, fitting out and reporting to duty of newly constructed or converted naval vessels. Finally, the Bureau of Ships was charged with the upkeep and operation of industrial departments, making it directly responsible for the quantity and quality of work produced in these departments. The Bureau was also responsible for the assignment of new construction workloads to the Yard.

(2) "The technical control of Ship Yards is distributed primarily among the Bureau of Ships, Ordnance, Yards and Docks, Supplies and Accounts, and Medicine and Surgery." Each of these Bureaus was concerned with the setting of standards, policies and procedures governing

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the conduct of work over which it had general cognizance; recommending the personnel complements and nomination of officers for duty in specific departments; the allotment of funds for performance of specific work by the Yard; and finally, the periodic inspection of departments under their technical cognizance. In exercising this technical control, each Bureau communicated directly with its department at the Yard, keeping the Commandant only informed in a general way of matters of policy and changes in procedure.

(3) "The military control of Ship Yards is administered by the Chief of Naval Operations through the District Commandants, the Yard Commandants, and agencies of the operating forces."

As a result of these confused departmental relationships, the Paget Report found considerable restriction upon the ability of both Yard and Bureau officials to make substantial improvements. The report was particularly concerned with the following points:

(1) "The circumscription of initiative of Yard Management."

Among the factors limiting initiative, the most important mentioned were the overlapping and duplication of investigations initiated by at least eight Bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, establishing a defensive rather than progressive attitude; the practice of the

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various departmental agencies of requiring Yard departments to follow detailed organization and procedure instructions without particular consideration to local conditions; the workload control by Bureaus of individual Yard departments without apparent consideration of the Yard function as a whole; the selection by cognizant Bureaus of heads of various departments without regard to the suitability of the individual chosen in relation to the other officials in the Yard; and, finally, the continual turnover of key executives in the Yards according to the judgment of the several Bureaus and offices.

[block] (2) "No one agency of the Navy Department is now able to assume full responsibility for the effectiveness and the efficiency of the performance of Ship Yards."

(3) "Ship Yards are the only major type of field activity which do not have a single Navy Department sponsor." [/block]

Another particularly effective criticism of Navy Yard organization and management was submitted in a memorandum of 3 March 1945 from Rear Admiral H. G. Bowen to the Secretary of the Navy in accordance with oral instructions from the Secretary of the Navy. In this memorandum Admiral Bowen emphasized the need for improvement in cost accounting as an aid in management. He also stressed the need for integration under the Manager of all officers, both line and staff, responsible for the major Industrial work of the Yard.

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As a result of these two reports, a thorough reorganization of all Navy Yards was undertaken on 14 September 1945, as described by the Secretary of Navy's directive which is quoted herewith in full.

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U.S. Naval Shipyard Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Looking East - 1945

One of the U. S. Navy's largest industrial enterprises coming under post-war reorganization

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B. REORGANIZATION OF NAVY YARDS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF

NAVAL BASES.

1. 14 September 1945

ACTION: ALL SHIPS AND STATIONS

(Enc.: (A) General Order No. 223.
(B) Advance Notice of Proposed Revision in Art, 516(f) of U. S. Navy Regulations.
(C) SecNavy directive to CNO, of 14 Sept, 1945, subject: "Composition of U. S. Naval Bases."
(D SecNavy directive of 14 Sept, 1945, subject: "Departmental Administration of U. S. Naval Shipyards."
(E) SecNavy direction to Chief of BuShips, of 14 Sept. 1945, subject; "Long-Range Program for Improving the Organization and Operating Efficiency of U. S. Naval Shipyards."
(F) UnderSecNav directive to Director of Industrial Survey Division, of 14 Sept. 1945, subject: "Continuing Appraisal of the Shipyard Management Program Initiated by the Bureau of Ships.")

1. During the past 75 years the question of how navy yards should be organized and controlled has been the subject of continuing debate. Numerous proposals and counterproposals have been made, and many "experiments" have been tried. Despite the criticisms which advocates of reorganization have made, it is an unquestioned fact that during World War II the technical performance of the navy yards, the quantity and quality of work they have produced, and their meeting of completion dates has been outstanding. The record of World War II is one of which every yard commandant, yard department head, and supervisor can justly be proud.

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2. Now that we are able to plan for the transition of the Navy from war to peacetime operations, it is the desire of everyone associated with the management of the Naval Establishment to devote our energies to the attainment of maximum operating efficiency, as fully and effectively as we devoted them to the successful prosecution of the war. I believe it is generally agreed that in effecting improvements in the Navy's efficiency ashore, first attention should be directed toward our shipbuilding and repair establishments, since they are the Navy's largest industrial enterprises.

3. During the past 6 months, Fleet Admiral King and I have devoted considerable thought to ways in which improvements in our industrial efficiency can be obtained, without sacrificing the recognized values of present navy yard organization or impairing their outstanding technical performance in serving the operating forces. This matter has been thoroughly discussed with interested members of Congress, with a number of leading private industrialists, and with various officials of the Navy Department and the shore establishment. As a result of our studies, we have come to the conclusion that there are three important prerequisites to securing greater and enduring improvement in the operating efficiency of the navy yards:

(a) First, we must centralize the internal management and technical control of the industrial activities of each navy yard

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in the hands of a properly trained, properly empowered executive.

(b) Secondly, we must concentrate adequate authority for the departmental administration of all of these industrial installations in a single agency of the Navy Department.

(c) Thirdly, we must integrate the logistic activities in the locality of each navy yard under a single military command so that the needs of the operating forces can be met expeditiously and with maximum efficiency.

4. Many plans for the accomplishment of the above objectives have been proposed and considered. It is our belief that from these many plans we have drawn together an over-all pattern which will meet the requirements stated above, with a minimum of disruption in the present organization and management of the shore establishments affected. Briefly stated, the pattern which has been developed involves five principal revisions in the organization and control of these establishments;

(a) In the locality of each navy yard organization there will be established a "naval base," which will encompass the several activities now comprising the navy yard, plus such additional logistic activities in the locality as specified by the Chief of Naval Operations. These additional activities may be a naval depot, a naval hospital, a naval ammunition depot, a naval receiving station, a Marine barracks, etc. The

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use of the name "navy yard" will be discontinued.

(b) Each naval base will be commanded by a line officer, designated commandant of the naval base, who, under the commandant of the naval, district, will exercise military command and coordination control of the components of the naval base, and will be the principal point of contact between the base and the operating forces.

(c) Each of the component activities of the naval base will have a commanding officer who will be fully responsible for the internal management of his activity, reporting to the commandant of the base for military and coordination control, and to the cognizant agencies of the Navy Department for management and technical control.2

(d) One of the component activities of each naval base established in the locality of a present navy yard will be a "U. S. naval shipyard," commanded by a technically trained officer, under whose control will be integrated all of the activities of present navy yards which are related, directly or indirectly, to the building, repairing, overhauling, docking, altering, converting, and outfitting of ships, and to related or special manufacturing.

(e) The management control of all U. S. naval shipyards will be the direct responsibility of the Bureau of Ships, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. The technical control of the work of each shipyard is

[hr]

2. See Definitions of these command relationships which are contained in SecNav directive of 4 June 1945, subj: "Command Relationships in Naval Districts." (N. D. Bul. of 15 June 1945, 45-608.)

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vested in the cognizant agencies of the Navy Department.

5. Attached hereto is a group of orders and directives which outline and authorize the installation of the above revisions.

6. The revisions prescribed shall be installed in each locality concerned by 1 December 1945, when directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. -- SecNav. James Forrestal.

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2. ENCLOSURE (A)

General Order No. 225
Navy Department
Washington, D. C., 14 September 1945

REORGANIZATION OF NAVY YARDS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL BASES

1. General Order 11 is hereby canceled.

2. The Navy yards located at Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Boston, Massachusetts; Brooklyn, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Norfolk, Virginia; Charleston, South Carolina; Bremerton, Washington; Mare Island, California; and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, shall henceforth be known as "U. S. naval bases."

3. The mission of a naval base is to furnish direct service to the operating forces. A naval base is defined as that agency in a given locality which comprises and integrates all naval activities which are capable of contributing to its mission.

4. There is hereby established within each of the abovespecified naval bases an organization to be known as the "U. S. naval shipyard" under which shall be integrated all departments and divisions of the present navy yard organization which contribute directly or indirectly to the building, repairing, overhauling, docking, altering, converting, and outfitting of ships, and to related or special manufacturing.

5. In addition to the shipyard, each of the above specified naval bases will contain other activities, which are now located

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in each navy yard or which may subsequently be made a part of the naval base by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations. Examples of such additional activities which may form a part of the naval base are a naval supply depot, a naval hospital, a naval ammunition depot, a naval net depot, a naval receiving station, a Marine barracks, etc. The activities to be included within each naval base will be designated on the basis of: (1) Their nearby physical location with respect to other natural component functions of the base, and (2) their essentiality to the base as a whole in providing direct logistic services to the operating commands dependent upon them.

6. All of the component activities of the above specified naval bases, including each shipyard as one component activity, shall be under the military command and coordination control of an officer designated commandant of the naval base, who will be directly responsible to the commandant of the naval district in which the base is located. The command relationship of the commandant of the naval base to the several component activities will parallel that of a division flag officer to the ships of the division under his command, in that the commanding officer of each component activity is to exercise autonomy within his command and produce results which contribute to the effectiveness of the naval base as a whole.

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7. The specific duties and authority of the commandant of the naval base are as follows:

(a) He shall exercise military command of the naval base, which authority is defined as the authoritative direction exercised over component activities in military matters (defense, security, intelligence, communication, fire protection, military discipline, etc.), together with the power to exercise authoritative direction in all matters when circumstances require.

(b) He shall exercise coordination control of the naval base, which authority is defined as that direction of component activities necessary to assure well-integrated relationships among component organizations, together with the authority to make such inspections as are necessary to insure coordination in providing logistic services to the operating forces.

(c) He shall represent the district commandant in all matters for which the district commandant is responsible in relation to the component activities of the naval base.

(d) He shall coordinate the provision of services to the operating forces by components of the base. In this connection he shall be in command of all vessels at the naval base, but shall limit the exercise of this command: (1) To coordinating the relationships between the commanding officers of such vessels and the commanding officers of component activities of the base and

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(2) to the enforcement of regulations pertaining to the military administration of the base, as provided in paragraph 7(a.) above. Upon arrival, and before departure, of any vessel the commanding officer shall report to the commandant of the base.

8. Each of the component activities of the above-specified naval bases, including each shipyard as one component activity, shall be under the direct control of a commanding officer. Each such commanding officer shall be under the supervision of the commandant of the naval base for matters of internal security, defense, administration of military personnel, and for coordination of his activity with other components of the naval base in providing logistic services to the operating forces. For all other matters, including assignment of work, allotment of funds, assignment of personnel, establishment of operating methods, procedures, organization, etc., each such commanding officer shall be under the direct supervision of the cognizant agencies of the Navy Department, except when such control is specifically delegated to the district commandant by the Navy Department.

9. The officer ordered to command a U. S. naval shipyard shall be technically trained in the building and repair of ships and shall have had substantial previous experience in the technical and management phases of such work, both in U. S. naval shipyards and in the Navy Department. Such commanding officer may have been designated for engineering duty only.

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10. It is the duty of the commanding officer of a U. S. naval shipyard to supervise and direct all of the work of the shipyard, to assume full responsibility for the quality and quantity of work produced, and to assure the efficient and economical performance of all of the work of the shipyard. The duties of the commanding officer of the shipyard shall be performed in accordance with the orders and directives of the cognizant agencies of the Navy Department.

11. All commissioned naval vessels at a shipyard or other component activities of a naval base shall be subject to the orders of the commanding officer of the component activity for

(1) matters pertaining to the specific services rendered to such vessels by the component activity, including ship movements, and

(2) the enforcement of the component activity's regulations relating to police, fire security, safety, communications, sanitation, and other matters of plant maintenance and protection. The commanding officers of ships are, however, fully responsible for the internal administration and handling of their vessels while at the component activity, except as otherwise provided for in Navy Regulations. The commanding officers' responsibilities regarding the inspection of work done on their vessels are as defined in the Navy Regulations. In the event of any unsatisfactory conditions regarding repairs or other services performed by a

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component activity, which cannot be promptly resolved between the commanding officer of the ship concerned and the commanding officer of the component activity, the matter shall be referred to the commandant of the naval base, in his capacity and responsibility for coordinating services within the naval base.

12. The internal organization of a U. S. naval shipyard shall include the following main departments: Planning, production, public works, supply, fiscal (including accounting and disbursing), medical, and administration (including matters of military personnel administration, security, fire protection, communications, plant protection, and various other administrative services required by the departments of the shipyard). In addition there shall be attached to the staff of the commanding officer an industrial relations division and a management planning and review division.

The detailed organization and functions of the departments and divisions of the shipyard shall be determined jointly by the commanding officer of the shipyard and the cognizant agencies of the Navy Department.

15. The U. S. Naval Drydocks at Hunters Point, California, and at Terminal Island (San Pedro), California, and any other similar shore stations that may hereafter be established, shall be known as "U. S. naval shipyards," and shall conform to the applicable requirements of this order.

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14. Additional naval bases may be established by the Chief of Naval Operations, in localities other than those specified in paragraph 2 above, as required to provide adequate logistic service to the operating forces. The component activities to comprise such additional naval bases shall be prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

15. All directives, regulations, and instructions which conflict with the foregoing are hereby modified accordingly, except that nothing in this order shall be construed to abrogate in any way instructions which have been or may be issued to sea-frontier commanders relating to district activities.

16. The Chief of Naval Operations shall place the provisions of this General Order in effect in each locality concerned not later than 1 December 1945.

JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy

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3. ENCLOSURE (C)

14 September 1945

To: Chief of Naval Operations
Subj: Composition of U. S. Naval Bases

Ref: (a) General Order No. 223

1. Reference (a) abolishes the present organization of industrial navy yards (except the Washington Navy Yard) and creates in their stead U. S. naval bases. Under the revised plan the naval base will consist of a group of component activities, each under a commanding officer, but all under the military commend and coordination control of a commandant of the naval base.

2. In order that each naval base shall render adequate service to the operating forces, it is my desire to determine at the earliest practicable date—

 (a) With respect to the specific naval bases established by reference (a):

 (1) What installations now located in each base area, but not already incorporated into the base by paragraph 5 of reference (a), should be included in the base?

(2) What new installations should be established in the future to expand the base organization in order that it may render more adequate service to the operating forces, and to permit the removal of "non-industrial" activities from the shipyard?

(b) What base relationships should be established for the U. S. Naval Shipyards at Hunters Point, California, and at Terminal Island (San Pedro), California, and

(c) What other naval bases should be established within the continental limits of the United States?

3. As you arrive at conclusions in your studies of these matters, prepare for my consideration necessary directives in connection with the above items.

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4. When the titles of naval shipyards and naval bases have been established, the question as to whether one officer shall command both a naval base and a naval district shall be determined in accordance with the circumstances existing in each case.

JAMES FORRESTAL Secretary of the Navy

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4. ENCLOSURE (D)

14 September 1945

To; Bureaus, Boards, and Offices of the Navy Department Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps Headquarters, U. S. Coast Guard
Subj: Departmental Administration of U. S. Naval Shipyards

Ref: (a) General Order No. 223
(b) Advance Notice of Proposed Revision in Article 516 (f) of U. S. Navy Regulations.
(c) SecNav directive date 4 June 1945, serial 221713, subject "Command Relationships in Naval Districts."

1. Reference (a) establishes within each naval base a U. S. naval shipyard to integrate all of the activities which contribute directly or indirectly to the building, repairing, overhauling, docking, altering, converting, and outfitting of ships, and to related or special manufacturing. Reference (b) designates the Bureau of Ships as the agency in the Navy Department which is fully responsible for the management control of the U. S. naval shipyards.

2. The Bureau of Ships shall administer the shipyards in accordance with the orders and directives of the Secretary of the Navy and in such manner as to satisfy the requirements of the Chief of Navel Operations and the operating forces. The bureaus and offices of the Navy Department which now have technical responsibilities for any of the activities of the shipyards shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 below, remain fully responsible for prescribing and providing the methods, procedures, equipment, personnel, facilities, and funds required for the performance of such work and shall deal direct with the shipyards in this connection. The administration of the work of the entire shipyard, and the responsibility for the results produced by all activities of the shipyard, shall be the direct responsibility of the Bureau of Ships, acting through the commanding officer of the shipyard, and such responsibility is no longer divided among the several bureaus and offices as heretofore.

3. The Bureau of Ships shall be kept advised of and shall collaborate as agreed with the cognizant agencies of the Navy Department in the development and issuance of orders, directives, instructions, and recommendations affecting the departmental administration of the shipyards, including the following matters;

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(a) The assignment of work to the shipyards.

(b) The allotment of funds to the shipyards.

(c) The promulgation of policies and procedures governing the employment and administration of civilian personnel, the internal organization of the shipyard, and methods and systems for the conduct of the work of the shipyard, except such policies and procedures which must be uniformly issued to all navel establishments by reason of Executive orders, laws or regulations pursuant to law issued by appropriate Government agencies.

(d) Recommendations regarding personnel complements for the departments and divisions of the shipyards.

(e) Recommendations for the detachment, replacement, assignment, and classification of department and division heads and other key personnel (both officer and civilian) of the shipyards.

(f) Recommendations and plans for the expansion, alteration, or improvement of the buildings and facilities of the shipyards.

(g) Recommendations for the location, utilization, acquisition, and release of storage space.

(h) Technical inspections of the various departments and division of shipyards which may be undertaken by the various bureaus as a part of their regular responsibilities.

Specific agreements defining the extent of the participation of the Bureau of Ships in each of the above matters shall be developed between the Bureau of Ships and the cognizant, agencies of the Navy Department, and submitted to the Secretary of the Navy via the Chief of Naval Operations for approval at the earliest practicable date.

4. In addition to the above matters which are to be coordinated by the Bureau of Ships, to the extent provided in the foregoing paragraph, it is directed that any bureau or office which desires to assign to a shipyard any new or additional work, not directly or indirectly related to the industrial mission of that establishment, must secure the prior approval of the Secretary of the Navy. Recommendations for the assignment of such new or additional work will be forwarded to the Secretary via the Chief of the Bureau of Ships and the Chief of Naval Operations. It is further directed that each Bureau undertake a review in conjunction with the Bureau of Ships, at the earliest practicable date, of all nonindustrial work now performed by the shipyards, over which each such bureau is technically cognizant, in order to determine the extent to which such non-industrial work can be transferred out of the shipyard,

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either to other existing field activities or to private concerns, without impairing service to the operating forces or causing an uneconomical expansion in the personnel and facilities of the shore establishment. Upon completion of this review, each bureau shall submit a report of findings, and a summary of actions taken, to the Secretary via the Chief of Naval Operations.

5. This directive in no way alters the military and coordination control of U.S. naval shipyards which is exercised by the Chief of Naval Operations through the commandant of each naval district, as provided in reference (c), and the commandant of each naval base as provided in reference (a).

JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of the Navy

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5. ENCLOSURE (E)

14 September 1945

To: Chief of the Bureau of Ships
Subj: Long-Range Program for Improving the Organization and Operating Efficiency of U. S. Naval Shipyards.

Ref: (a) General Order No. 223.
(b) Advance Notice of Proposed Revision in Article 516 (f) of U. S. Navy Regulations.
(c) SecNav directive to bureaus and offices regarding "Departmental Administration of U. S. Naval Shipyards," dated 14 September 1945.
(d) Report of Organization Planning and Procedures Unit, dated 13 July 1945, subj: "Review of the Organization and Administration of Navy Yards and U. S. Naval Drydocks"

1. References (a), (b), and (c) centralize authority and responsibility for the departmental administration of U. S. naval shipyards in the Bureau of Ships. It is felt that these revisions have removed a number of obstacles which have previously limited the authority of the Bureau to exercise aggressive and comprehensive supervision of these establishments.

2. In order that immediate advantage may be taken of the new opportunities afforded to improve the organization and operating efficiency of the U. S. naval shipyards, it is directed that the Bureau prepare in collaboration with appropriate agencies of the Navy Department a long-term program for the accomplishment of major improvements, to be submitted to the Secretary at the earliest practicable date. It is particularly desired that this program embody the following:

(a) A specific plan for the internal organization of, and the distribution of functions and responsibilities among, the various departments and divisions of the shipyards, in accordance with the recommendations appearing on pages 24, 25, 26, and 27 of reference (d). Upon completion of this step, chapter 41 of U. S. Navy Regulations should be rewritten, in collaboration with the bureaus and offices concerned, and submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations for clearance and issuance.

(b) A specific plan for establishing agreements with the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department defining the extent to which the Bureau of Ships will participate in coordinating departmental relationships with the shipyards, as provided by paragraph 3 of reference (c).

(c) A long-range plan for relieving shipyard activities of nonindustrial work, as required by paragraph 4 of reference (c).

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(d) A long-range plan for the rearrangement of naval-base facilities with a view to segregation of shipyard facilities, to be developed in conjunction with the Chief of Naval Operations.

(e) A specific plan for the establishment and development of a management planning and review division at each shipyard to perform the functions outlined on page 27 of reference (d).

(f) An immediate and continuing program for improving the scheduling of work and the utilization of personnel in the shipyards.

(g) A long-range plan for the development of performance indices to reflect how satisfactorily the shipyards are performing, both in terms of service to the operating forces and in terms of operating costs; and including a plan for the establishment of an adequate system of cost accounting in each of these establishments, to be developed in conjunction with the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

(h) A plan for investigating, in collaboration with the Fiscal Director, the possibility of instituting a more rational procedure governing the allocation of funds to the shipyards by the various agencies of the Navy Department.

(i) A long-range program for the rotation and training of technical officers in order to provide a reservoir of officers qualified for key positions in the shipyards.

It is recognized that the above matters represent but a partial enumeration of the various plans and programs which require the attention of the Bureau, and it is desired that the list be expanded to the extent necessary to cover all matters of major importance. The above programs shall take due cognizance that shipyards are for the support of operating forces, which themselves exist solely for readiness to conduct war. Peacetime considerations shall be aligned to this concept and due allowance made in all plans for the expansion and adaptation of shipyards in time of war or of national emergency.

5. The long-range program submitted by the Bureau in accordance with the above outline will establish the principal objectives to be attained by the Bureau in the discharge of its broad responsibilities for the management control of shipyards. In this connection it is desired that the Bureau report monthly to the Secretary on the progress being made against each of these objectives. The Bureau's reporting procedure in this connection shall be developed in collaboration

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with the Director of the Industrial Survey Division.

 

JAMES FORRESTAL
Secretary of The Navy

 

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6. ENCLOSURE (F)

14 September 1945

To: Director of Industrial Survey Division
Subj: Continuing Appraisal of the Shipyard Management Program Initiated by the Bureau of Ships.

Ref; (a) SecNav directive to Chief, Bureau of Ships, subject:
"Long-Range Program for Improving the Organization and Operating Efficiency of U. S. Naval Shipyards," dated 14 September 1945.

1. As required by paragraph 3 of reference (a), the Bureau of Ships is to report monthly to the Secretary on the progress being made in accomplishing specific objectives for improving the organization and operating efficiency of the U. S. naval shipyards.

2. It is directed that you develop in collaboration with officials of the Bureau the form and content of these monthly reports. It is desired that these reports describe the progress of the Bureau in connection with each of its stated objectives (outlined in reference (a)), and that in addition they contain a series of simple graphs to reflect the workload, output, trend in employment, and comparative performance of the U. S. naval shipyards. It is desired that the monthly reports be reviewed by your Division and submitted with your comment for the study of the Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations, and other interested officials.

3. It is contemplated that periodic meetings will be held in my office with officials of the Bureau of Ships and of other interested bureaus and offices in order to discuss matters requiring the attention and the assistance of the Secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations. It shall be your duty to maintain a record of the discussions held during these meetings.

4. While the above activities are to be in addition to the regular survey functions of the Industrial Survey Division, it is contemplated that this effort will complement the survey program, and will establish more concrete objectives for future surveys of shipyards.

A. L. GATES
Under Secretary of The Navy

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FROM THE U.S. NAVY YARD TO U.S. NAVAL BASE UNDER THE POST-WAR REORGANIZATION

U.S. Naval Shipyard, Boston, Massachusetts - Looking E.N.E. -1945

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C. CHARTS OF AUTHORITIES.

In accordance with the Secretary of the Navy's directive, the reorganization of the Navy Yards prescribed vent into effect before 1 December 1945, although in the ensuing months of post-war readjustment some minor changes from the basic plan were effected.

Chart XXXVII illustrates the flow of authority from the Secretary of the Navy through the various activities and Bureaus having authority over Naval Shipyards. This well portrays the Bureau of Ships' position in the overall jurisdiction. Chart XXXVIII graphically pictures the former district organization falling under the Commandant's authority. The activities marked with an asterisk(*) designate those functions transferred to the Naval Base of that district as prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy's basic directive of reorganization. Chart XXXIX depicts the lines of authority falling under the Commandant of the newly established Naval Base with the sponsorship and management control Bureaus also indicated for the various activities included thereunder.

Chart XL indicates the organizational chart of the Naval Shipyards which come under the management control of the Bureau of Ships.

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CHART XXXVII

FLOW CHART -- PRESENT

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CHART XXXVIII

FORMER DISTRICT ORGANIZATION

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CHART XXXIX

NAVAL BASE

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CHART XL
NAVAL SHIPYARD

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D. SHIPYARD INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

In accordance with Chart XL indicating the authorities falling under the newly reorganized Naval Shipyards, the Bureau of Ships issued a directive as of 31 January 1946 defining the approved duties of the Heads of the Departments and Division thereof, together with those of the Ordnance Officer, Electronics Officer and Aeronautics Officer. This directive is quoted in full to define the general functions and duties of this new organization.

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APPROVED FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF THE HEADS OF THE DEPARTMENTS AND DIVISION OF A U. S. NAVAL SHIPYARD

1. Planning Officer; Head of the Planning Department

(1) The Planning Officer is responsible to the Commander of the Naval Shipyard for the organization and administration of the Planning Department and the timely accomplishment of all work assigned thereto, and for such other work as may be directed by the Commander. He shall have supervision of all personnel in his department.

(2) He is responsible for the approval and the issuance of work instructions and plans, and for the initiation of procurement of necessary material and funds for all industrial work requested of the Naval Shipyard by other activities, and for all manufacturing work requested by the Supply Department; excepting work under the cognizance of the Public Works Officer.

(3) He shall be responsible for the preparation of estimates of cost of work and revisions thereof as necessary and will insure that no work order is issued the estimated cost of which is in excess of funds available; excepting for work under the cognizance of the Public Works Officer.

(4) He shall be responsible for all ship and related design work within the Naval Shipyard.

(5) When a ship arrives for overhaul, he shall arrange as soon as possible for a conference which will be attended by representatives of the Planning Department and the ship concerned, and of such other departments as the Commander may direct. At this conference the work requested by the ship and the work authorized by the material bureaus and approved by the cognizant forces afloat will be reviewed and the work to be done decided upon.

2. Production Officer; Head of the Production Department

(1) The Production Officer is responsible to the Commander of the Naval Shipyard for the organization, administration and supervision of the Production Department including shops, facilities and personnel of that Department; for the proper execution of all work issued by the Planning Department and for such other work as may be directed by the Commander of the Naval Shipyard.

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(2) The Production Officer is responsible that all work issued for accomplishment by the Production Department is accomplished within the time and funds allowed and in accordance with the work instructions and sound engineering practice.

(5) The Production Officer is responsible for notifying the Planning Officer, in advance of the release of work on a ship or project, and based upon current and prospective work loads, of the limitations on the quantity of work which can be accomplished on the ship or project. When, for any reason, it is determined that authorized work is not to be undertaken, the authorizing activity shall be immediately informed.

(4) The Production Officer shall have custody of and shall be responsible for the maintenance of all materials removed from ships under overhaul and scheduled for reinstallation, except such materials as are turned over to the Supply Department for storage and safekeeping. He shall also have custody of and be responsible for manufactured or partially processed materials awaiting installation, except such materials as are turned over to the Supply Department for storage and safekeeping.

(5) The Production Officer shall be responsible for the cleanliness of shops, buildings, drydocks, building ways and other areas and facilities under his control.

3. Public Works Officer; Head of the Public Works Department

(1) The Public Works Officer is responsible to the Commander of the Naval Shipyard for the organization, administration and supervision of the Public Works Department, including the shops,

facilities and personnel assigned to that department. He shall have charge under the Commander of the design, construction, maintenance and repair of the public works and public utilities of the Naval Shipyard under the cognizance of the Bureau of Yards and Docks. He shall be responsible for the operation of the public works and public utilities except those specifically assigned to other departments such as floating equipment, the operation of some of which may be assigned to the Production Department.

(2) The Public Works Officer shall administer and control the transportation shop, the public works shop, and power plant. The various ratings employed in these shops shall be appropriately grouped and shall be operated in a manner similar to that employed in the Production Department and there shall be included among these employees laborers and mechanics of all ratings which are normally required for accomplishment of work falling under the

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cognizance of the Public Works Officer. When work under the cognizance of the Public Works Officer requires for its performance the employment of a class of labor not normally employed in the public works shops, such labor as may be required may be furnished from the Production Department for service under the direction of the Public Works Officer, and when such labor is no longer required, the Public Works Officer shall so inform the Production Officer.

(3) When work is to be performed by government labor, he shall prepare all schedule of materials to be used thereon and shall have charge of all labor connected therewith.

(4) He shall have as assistants such officers of the Civil Engineer Corps as are assigned to the Public Works Department, and such other junior officers as the Commander may designate, together with the civilian technical, drafting, clerical, and inspection personnel as may be required for efficient and economical operation.

(5) He shall, under the direction of the Commander, have prepared all reports of the work under his special charge and be responsible for the preparation of the annual estimates for public works developments, together with such plans and specifications as may be required. He shall make a formal annual inspection and shall report in writing to the Commander on the state of repair and readiness of all public works and public utilities in the Naval Shipyard.

(6) He shall cause a quarterly inspection to be made of all boilers ashore and those under his cognizance afloat and may call upon the Planning and Production Departments for assistance as necessary in conducting such inspection. He shall report the results of such inspections to the Commander in writing via the head of the activity using or operating the boiler or boilers in question including therein a statement as to their condition and the steam pressure to which they may be safely subjected. Work found necessary as a result of quarterly inspection shall be performed under his direction and to his satisfaction.

(7) In addition to his other duties as outlined herein, the Public Works Officer shall be "Deputy Officer-in-Charge" for all contracts under the Bureau of Yards and Docks within the Naval Shipyard. As "Deputy Officer-in-Charge" to the "Officer-in-Charge" (Public Works Officer of the Naval Base District, as the case may be), he is responsible to the Commander of the Naval Shipyard for the scope, orderly progress, scheduling and

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coordination with other yard work or work under the construction contracts to the end that the needs and requirements of the Naval Shipyard will be met and there shall be delegated to him by the "Officer-In-Charge" such authority as may be required to permit the accomplishment of these duties. He may assign as Resident-Officer-in-charge such junior officer or officers of the Civil Engineer Corps as may be required as his assistants.

4. Supply Officer; Head of the Supply Department

(1) The Supply Officer is responsible to the Commander of the Naval Shipyard for the organization and administration of the Supply Department and for such additional duties as the Commander may assign. He shall have supervision of all personnel in his department.

(2) He is responsible for the procurement, storage, maintenance while in storage, and issue of materials in his custody as required by the Naval Shipyard to discharge its functions.

(3) He shall store and have custody of all material within the Naval Shipyard not being processed by or assigned to any of the departments or divisions of the yard.

(4) Where no separate naval supply depot activity is established as a part of the Naval Base, the Supply Officer of the Naval Shipyard shall, under the direction of the Commander of the Naval Shipyard, render supply services as necessary to other components within the Naval base, to visiting vessels, to the Forces Afloat or to district activities.

5. Fiscal Officer - Head of the Fiscal Department

(1) The Fiscal Officer is responsible to the Commander of the Naval Shipyard for the organization and administration of the Fiscal Department and for such additional duties as the Commander may direct. He shall have supervision of all personnel employed in his department.

(2) He shall pay all civilian employees at the Naval Shipyard upon pay rolls certified to and approved in accordance with Navy Regulations. He shall be responsible for the correctness of the computations of the rolls of civilian employees of the different departments and divisions. In cases where over-payments have been made to employees still on the rolls he shall immediately make

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the necessary checkage. In case overpayments have been made to employees still on the rolls he shall immediately make the necessary checkage. In cases of overpayment where the employee is no longer carried on the rolls, he will immediately upon discovery of the error initiate steps toward recovery.

(3) He shall keep the accounts of all manufacturing and operating expense of the Naval Shipyard, which shall include an exact account under each department or division of all material and labor expended upon each job order, from which he shall prepare such reports of all expenditures under each bureau as may be required by the bureaus. He shall furnish monthly, or as the Commander may direct, to the heads of the yard departments, divisions and offices such labor and material data and reports of expenditure as are required by current management control procedures. He shall notify the head of any department or division when any allotment of funds for expenditure under the direction of such officer shall be so depleted that it will probably be exhausted before the end of the current month. He shall, when so requested by a head of a department or division, furnish the latter a statement of the cost to date of any outstanding job order; and when a job is completed he shall furnish promptly to the head of department or division concerned a detailed statement of the cost of labor and material charges entering into such job. He shall prepare all pay rolls, except those under the cognizance of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

6. Medical Officer; Head of the Medical Department

(1) The Medical Officer is responsible to the Commander of the Naval Shipyard for the organization, administration and supervision of the Medical Department, and for such additional duties as the Commander may assign.

(2) When not otherwise provided for, he shall provide medical care and physical examinations for personnel of Navy and Marine Corps on duty in the Naval Shipyard and their dependents, in accordance with Navy Regulations.

(3) He shall provide for physical examinations for the civilian force in the Naval Shipyard in accordance with Civil Service and other existing regulations and for providing first aid and medical care for employees who are injured or become ill while on duty, as provided by law and departmental orders.

(4) He shall be responsible for the preventive medicine, industrial hygiene, and sanitation programs within the Naval Shipyard, and will recommend to the Commander practicable measures for their execution.

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(5) He shall make a dally report to the Commander of all persons in the naval service attached to the Naval Shipyard who should be excused from duty on account of sickness and shall furnish to the heads of the several departments or divisions a copy of so much of said report as pertains to naval personnel on duty therein.

7. Administrative Officer; Head of the Administrative Department

(1) The Administrative Officer is responsible to the Commander of the Naval Shipyard for the organization and administration of the administrative department and for such additional duty as the Commander may assign. He shall have supervision of all personnel in his department.

(2) He shall be responsible for officer personnel records and reports, enlisted personnel, tugs, small craft, pilots, fire protection, intelligence, badges and passes and the disposition of the marine guard. He shall also he responsible for administrative details including central files, correspondence, communications, registered publications, and such additional files as the Commander may direct; for decoding, visual signaling and telephone operation; for management of the Naval Shipyard post office and for all public information and legal matters and for Naval Shipyard duty watches, ship movements, security and preservation of ships out of commission and commissioning details under the Commander of the Naval Shipyard, police protection, and assignment of quarters for Naval Personnel.

(3) A journal shall be kept under the direction of the Administrative Officer which he shall sign and submit monthly to the Commander for his approval. In it shall he entered the reporting for duty or detachment of officers, the arrival and departure of all vessels and the purpose of the visit, commissioning or placing out of commission of ships of the Navy, the hour of docking or undocking of all vessels, and other principal events of the Navel Shipyard, together with the daily meteor logical record. He shall also prepare the war diary when required.

8. Industrial Engineering Officer - Head of Management Planning and Review Division

(1) The Industrial Engineering Officer is responsible to the Commander of the Naval Shipyard for the organization, administration and supervision of the Management Planning and Review Division and for such additional duties as the Commander may direct.

(2) The Management Planning and Review Division is a staff division and shall serve all departments and divisions in the Naval Shipyard in all matters concerning Industrial Engineering.

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(3) The Industrial Engineering Officer shall keep the Commander and department and division heads currently advised of the performance of departments and divisions of the Naval Shipyard. He shall conduct studies and prepare reports for the Commander and each department and division of the Naval Shipyard, in order to improve and simplify organization, administration, procedures, and utilization of manpower and facilities throughout the Naval Shipyard.

9. Industrial Relations Officer - Head of Industrial Relations Division

(1) The Industrial Relations Officer is responsible to the Commander of the Naval Shipyard for the organization, administration and supervision of the Industrial Relations Division and. for such additional duty as the Commander may assign.

(2) The Industrial Relations Division is a staff division and shall serve all departments and divisions in the Naval Shipyard in matters concerning civilian employees including such items as labor relations, employment, placement, re-ratings and separations, training, leave end retirement, safety and employee services.

(3) The Industrial Relations Officer is responsible for advising the Commander and department and division heads of the Naval Shipyard on all matters affecting civilian employees in order to insure that the Naval Shipyard shall conform with Civil Service Rules and with such directives as the Secretary of the Navy may issue. He will be responsible for the establishment and maintenance of adequate civilian personnel records.

(4) An officer in the Industrial Relations Division shall normally be assigned duty as Senior Member of the Labor Board.

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10. DESCRIPTION OF THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ORDNANCE OFFICER AND ELECTRONICS OFFICER ELECTRONICS OFFICER OF THE NAVAL SHIPYARD

1. The Electronics Officer is responsible to the Commander Naval Shipyard for the technical control and inspection of all electronics work including methods and procedures and for such other work as may be directed by the Commander. He shall advise and assist the Commander in all matters pertaining to electronics work performed in the Naval Shipyard. The Electronics Officer shall have a status comparable to that of head of a department.

2. He shall have such personnel under his immediate control as may be required to discharge the duties assigned to him herein, namely, officer assistants, clerical assistants, service and test engineers and inspectors of electronics material.

3. Electronics work other than that specifically assigned to the Electronics Officer herein shall be done by, and be the responsibility of, the Planning and Production Departments but the supervision thereof shall be delegated to the Electronics Officer of the Naval Shipyard. He acts as the Deputy of both the Planning Officer and Production Officer and, in exercising supervision, he has the full authority and responsibility of each for electronics work performed in the Planning and Production Departments. Ordnance fire control radar work shall be satisfactory to the Ordnance Officer. If the Commander of the Naval Shipyards considers that circumstances dictate, he may assign shop facilities and personnel to the operational (day by day control of operations) control of the Electronics Officer subject to the approval of the Bureau of Ships.

4. The responsibility for maintenance of shore radio, radar and sonar activities of the District and Naval Bases will be assigned by the Bureau of Ships to designated Commanders of Naval Shipyards. Supervision of work relating thereto shall be delegated to the Electronics Officers of such shipyards.

In exercising the supervision he shall act as the deputy of the Commander, Naval Shipyard concerned. Where such work is performed by a Naval Shipyard it shall be considered as coining within the scope of paragraph 3 above.

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11. ORDNANCE OFFICER OF THE NAVAL SHIPYARD

1. The Ordnance Officer is responsible to the Commander Naval Shipyard for the technical control and inspection of all ordnance work including methods and procedures and for such other work as may be directed by the Commander. He shall advise and assist the Commander in all matters pertaining to Ordnance work performed in the Naval Shipyard.

The Ordnance Officer shall have a status comparable to that of head of a department.

2. He shall have such personnel under his immediate control as may be required to discharge the duties assigned to him herein, namely, officer assistants, clerical assistants, service and test engineers and inspectors of ordnance material.

3. Ordnance work other than that specifically assigned to the Ordnance Officer herein shall be done by, and be the responsibility of, the Planning and Production Departments but the supervision thereof shall be delegated to the Ordnance Officer of the Naval Shipyard. He acts as the deputy of both the Planning Officer and Production Officer and, in exercising supervision, he has the full authority and responsibility of each for ordnance work performed in the Planning and Production Departments. Ordnance fire control radar work shall be satisfactory to the Ordnance Officer. If the Commander of the Naval Shipyards considers that circumstances dictate, he may assign shop facilities and personnel to the operational (day by day control of operations) control of the Ordnance Officer subject to the approval of the Bureau of Ships.

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12. DESCRIPTION OF THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AERONAUTICS OFFICER AERONAUTICS OFFICER OF THE NAVAL SHIPYARD

1. The Aeronautics Officer is responsible to the Commander, Naval Shipyard for the technical control and inspection of all aeronautics work including methods and procedures for such other work as may be directed by the Commander. He shall advise and assist the Commander in all matters pertaining to aeronautics work performed in the Naval Shipyard. The Aeronautics Officer shall have a status comparable to that of head of a department.

2. He shall have such personnel under his immediate control as may be required to discharge the duties assigned to him herein, namely, officer assistants, clerical assistants, service and test engineers and inspectors of aeronautics material.

3. Aeronautics work other than that specifically assigned to the Aeronautics Officer herein shall be done by, and be the responsibility of, the Planning and Production Departments but the supervision thereof shall be delegated to the Aeronautics Officer of the Naval Shipyard. He acts as the deputy of both the Planning Officer and the Production Officer and, in exercising supervision, he has the full authority and responsibility of each for aeronautics work performed in the Planning and Production Departments. If the Commander of the Naval Shipyard considers that circumstances dictate, he may assign shop facilities and personnel to the operational (day by day control of operations) control of the Aeronautics Officer subject to the approval of the Bureau of Ships.

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CHAPTER XXIV
THE RESERVE FLEET

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CHAPTER XXIV

RESERVE FLEET

I. PLANNING

In all major American wars, sea power has been a decisive factor in the ultimate victory. Unfortunately, in none of the wars in which we have participated was there adequate naval strength at the beginning. Not only did we invariably find ourselves inadequately prepared at the beginning of each great war, but with equal consistency we have never failed to pare our naval strength unmercifully at the end of each event. As we have seen in this report, the rapidity and extent of United States naval expansion in World War II is unapproached in the history of the world. Great naval efforts made in a short time in past ages by the Persians, Carthaginians, Romans, Spanish and British were insignificant, by any comparison in number, size, striking power and versatility, to the United States Fleet of 1945.

This great fleet was built at huge cost both in material and in labor. At the cessation of hostilities, it was obvious that all the fleets could not be kept in use: it was also obvious that it would be both wasteful and dangerous to scrap the elements retired. The solution was to have a fleet of ships preserved so that it could be placed in active service in a short period of time. Such a fleet would be a powerful deterrent to the ambitions of any aggressor nation and, should there be war, the ability to send a large number of ships to sea in good condition in a short time would constitute an important contribution

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MANEUVERS OF THE ACTIVE POSTWAR FLEET FOR THE TRAINING OF REGULAR AND RESERVE PERSONNEL WHO WILL MAN THE “ZIPPER-FLEET” SHOULD AN EMERGENCY ARISE.
EIGHTH FLEET-GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA – MIDWAY, left; PRINCETON, left rear; F. D. ROOSEVELT, center; Cruisers MACON, DAYTON, LITTLE ROCK, center foreground; hospital ship CONSOLATION, right rear; auxiliaries, left and right foreground.

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toward any effective mobilization.

Prior to World War I, in order to attain the desired condition of readiness, the Navy kept its Reserve Fleet under the Fleet Organization and manned by Naval personnel. But all ships were maintained in a condition nearly equivalent to that of the active fleet. However, the number of men required to maintain this condition would be prohibitive for a Reserve Fleet of any size. The number of ships then in reserve were very few, probably less than one hundred. After World War I, the lack of appreciation of the importance of a Reserve Fleet, engendered by the limitation of armaments treaties and the lack of a plan for preservation based on engineering principles, led to a practice of completely dismantling the ships, dispersing all stores and most of spares and equipment, and placing the ships in the hands of caretakers, shore based. Heavy grease was used on unprotected steel. Frequent airing on "dry days" was resorted to in an endeavor to protect other materials from the ravages of moisture. The number of ships involved was less than four hundred, still a relatively small figure.

Shortly before World War II, realizing the lack of preparedness of the reserve ships, the Navy adopted a policy calling for a much improved state of readiness. While it was too late to place the new policy in effect before World War II, it has been adhered to after the war and should keep us amply prepared for any emergency. The number of ships now involved is more than five times that which we had after World War I. With the exception of a few battleships, all are relatively new ships and include a large variety of types.

On 1 April 1944 the Chief of the Bureau of Ships established the

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position of Demobilization Officer. His duties were to collaborate with the divisions and branches of the Bureau of Ships in developing and coordinating demobilization plans covering personnel, shore stations, industrial plants and the distribution and preservation of ships. Before the war's end, two other sections were added to accomplish this task, the Staff Assistant for Demobilization to the Director of Ship Maintenance and the Inactive Fleet Section.

II. ORGANIZATION PLAN

To carry out the Navy's huge Inactive Fleet readiness and preservation program, an effective organization has been worked out. An Inactive Fleet has been established on each coast, being designated as the Atlantic and the Pacific Reserve Fleets. The Atlantic Reserve Fleet is under the command of the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier and the Pacific Reserve Fleet is similarly commanded by the Commander Western Sea Frontier. These frontier Commanders operate directly under the Chief of Naval Operations. Each has a deputy commander whose sole duty is to act for him as the Commander of his Reserve Fleet. The ships of each fleet are subdivided into "Groups", each group under a Group Commander. The ships within each group are organized in sub-groups by type. Navy Regulations provides that Reserve Fleet ships shall be in one of the following three categories:

In Service in Reserve (Skeleton Crews)
Out of Commission in Reserve (no personnel)
Out of Service in Reserve (no personnel)

The terms "commission" and "service" as used in these designations are a carry-over from the vessel's state when in the Active Status.

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With a few exceptions, all ships which were in Commission while in the Active Fleet are Out of Commission In Reserve. All ships in Service while in the Active Fleet are Out of Service in Reserve with the exception of certain vessels at each berthing area which serve as barracks ships.

The ships Out of Commission or Out of Service in Reserve are under the command of the Group or Sub-Group commander and the personnel assigned to that command is charged with their upkeep. Each Group Commander is provided with a staff of officers and about 300 enlisted men who are quartered on the barracks ships. These officers and men are specially trained in the technique of preservation and in repair work.

BERTHING

The Atlantic Reserve Fleet Groups are berthed at Boston, Mass., New London, Conn., New York, N.Y., Philadelphia, Pa., Norfolk, Va., Charleston, S.C., Green Cove Springs, Fla., (on the St. Johns River 30 miles south of Jacksonville) and at Orange, Texas The Pacific Reserve Fleet Groups are berthed at Bremerton, Wash., Tacoma, Wash., Tongue Point, Ore. (near Astoria), Mare Island,

Calif, and other points on or near San Francisco Bay, San Pedro, and San Diego, Calif. A berthing area commander under the Commandant of the Naval District is assigned to each berthing area to be responsible for the condition of the ships berthing facilities and any other shore installations involved. The cost of berthing facilities of the Reserve Fleet will amount to about $100,000,000.

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III PRESERVATION

A. PRESERVATION PLAN

The material condition of readiness now prescribed is as follows: First, that the ships shall be habitable for berthing and messing.

This is necessary, for in time of emergency and mass return of ships to active service, the crews must be received an board as they report, there being totally inadequate housing arrangements ashore at the berthing sites. This changes the Navy's previous practice of stripping the ships of furnishings for officers' and crews' quarters and galleys, as well as dismantling refrigerating plants and other service units.

The cost of stripping and warehousing the equipment was considerable. Segregation of most of the equipment by ship lots was necessary. The second requirement is that hull ordnance, machinery and other equipment be in good operable condition. This does not mean a complete overhaul, but that nothing be broken, missing or in unsafe condition. The third requirement is that full allowance of equipage and supplies be stowed on board. There would he great difficulty in obtaining quickly in time of emergency even standard supplies in the large quantities required.

Spare parts and equipment special to the ship obviously must be retained if only an account of the difficulty of replacement from original manufacturer because of obsolescence. Standard supplies, if landed, would undoubtedly not be retained because of the warehousing problem and would he disposed of as surplus. Used articles such as hand tools and portable equipment in particular fall in this category.

While it is necessary for the Navy to provide for the maximum possible condition of readiness for return to active service, it is

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equally necessary that the preservation measures employed he the most economical that can be devised. A fair expenditure of money for this purpose, commensurate with the value of the ships, may be possible for equipment, preservative materials and labor when preservation is initiated, but the annual outlay in succeeding years must he reduced to the bone.

The Navy's plan of ship preservation calls for the following operations:

(1) Send ship to a Naval Shipyard (new term for Navy Yard) for drydocking and urgent repairs.
(2) Remove provisions, clothing, ammunition and certain highly inflammable stores.
(3) Clean and paint.
(4) Seal all openings and humidify the entire interior of the vessel.
(5) "Package" certain topside equipment which cannot he dismounted and stowed below in the dehumidified space.
(6) As an additional safeguard, apply thin film rust prevention compounds to all corrodible surfaces not others wise protected by paint, galvanizing plating, etc.
(7) Apply special protection measures to submarine storage batteries, ships boats, etc.

B. DRYDOCKING AND OVERHAUL

Taking up these operations one by one, drydocking is for the purpose of making urgent underwater repairs, stopping leaks, welding

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external cover plates over sea connections which it is impracticable to close off within the ship, placing protective sleeves over fairwaters of stern tube and strut bearings (for the exclusion of marine growth), and for cleaning and painting the entire underwater body.

Whether steel hull ships in the Inactive Status are to be berthed in fresh or salt water, the bottom is given a fresh coat of a superior antifouling hot plastic paint developed by the Navy. This paint has excellent protective qualities and estimates are that it will extend necessary clocking intervals to five years in salt water and six years in fresh water. It is applied up to three feet above the normal light draft water line in order to provide protection at the particularly vulnerable water line. Hot plastic costs about $1.75 per gallon mixed, and its application to a 10,000 ton cruiser, including regular docking charges, is about $10,000.

Wooden hulls are protected by a different formula of anti-fouling paint, also developed by the Navy and superior in quality to the standard commercially available paints.

Experiments are now underway to utilize the insecticidal properties of DDT in anti-fouling paint. Results so far indicate that at least for a limited period it operates well against fouling by animal life, but, as might be expected, vegetable life is unaffected. Thus, barnacles are warded off, but seaweed, moss, and other forms of marine vegetable life are unaffected.

Fouling, except in stern tube and strut bearings, is not particularly objectionable in the case of vessels in Inactive Status and it is emphasized that it is the anti-corrosion rather than the anti-fouling

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properties of this paint which dictates its use.

"Urgent" repairs referred to above are defined as those repairs which are mandatory for departure of the vessel from her base. Items broken, missing, in unsafe condition or definitely not usable would fall in this category. It almost bolls down to this: If the vessel can make port under her own power she has virtually no urgent repairs. All needed repairs, whether "urgent" or merely desirable, are listed, the latter for consideration at a later date. Every effort is made to accomplish all urgent repairs during the inactivation overhaul, but if not completed at this time they must be undertaken at the first subsequent opportunity.

C. READINESS

As previously pointed out, one of the fundamental requirements for "readiness" as prescribed by Navy Regulations is a full allowance of equipage and supplies stowed on board. Consequently, only supplies considered perishable on a three-year basis, highly combustible substances, and ammunition need be removed from the ship. As an example of how little is removed, of the thousands of items included in the machinery, hull, navigation and electronics allowance lists only a few are listed for removal, such as gasoline for blow torches and wet and dry batteries. Some fuel and Diesel oil is retained on board, the amount being at least that necessary to conduct dock and sea trials incident to return to the active status. Gasoline and alcohol are discharged except for such quantities on vessels In Commission, In Service, In Reserve as the local authorities

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determine is needed. Lubricating oil is retained on board in sufficient quantity to fill all storage tanks.

D. CLEANING AND PAINTING

The cleaning and painting of all corrodible surfaces exposed to the weather is an important feature of preservation. It is performed by the ship's personnel prior to their detachment, but must be "touched up" as necessary during the Inactive Status period. After thorough cleaning, all bare or rusted spots are touched up with two coats of Zinc Chromate Primer. A third coat of primer is applied to edges of plates, edges of lightening holes, weld lines, and other places where paint has a tendency to pull away with resulting corrosion. After priming, two coats of Haze Gray Paint is applied over all surfaces. These, and other paints prescribed by the Bureau Manuals are of high quality and if applied properly over properly prepared surfaces will give excellent protection. There is no known coating which provides better and more durable protection than good paint. It should be applied freely on all surfaces from which it would not have to be scraped when the ship is returned to service.

Paint should be used sparingly if at all in the dehumidified interior of vessels. However, a neat appearance is desired and accordingly bare spots ore touched up with Zinc Chromate Primer followed by one coat of the prescribed paint for the surfaces involved.

E. DEHUMIDIFICATION

For the interior of the ship, DEHUMIDIFICATION, the maintenance of an atmosphere sufficiently dry to inhibit corrosion, mildew, and rot, is the keystone of the ship preservation program. It entails closing up the ship tightly against free entry of the "weather air" and it

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keeps the ship's interior dust free an important factor in the prevention of deterioration of materials in storage.

Without the benefits of dehumidification, it would be necessary to open the ship frequently for airing out. This would take time and labor and would only slightly lessen deterioration. And experience has taught that the "airing out" procedure, ineffective as it is to prevent corrosion, is in addition gravely subject to such human failures as carelessness in closing up afterwards. It doesn't take long for a puddle of rain water to rust through a steel deck.

1. THE OPTIMUM HUMIDITY

For several years the Navy has been experimenting with the effects of various atmospheric humidities on numerous materials. This research, together with scientific data from non-Naval sources leads to the conclusion that a relative humidity of 60% will inhibit mildew and mold, that corrosion of clean ferrous surfaces will not take place in an atmosphere of 35% or lower relative humidity, and that air of this degree of dryness, or slightly less, is not permanently harmful to almost all other materials. Some materials, such as cordage, are weakened by being stored in such an atmosphere, but upon being exposed to average atmospheric conditions rapidly take up their needed moisture and with it their former properties. At the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard a Noah's Ark collection of materials has been assembled in each of five test chambers in which the relative humidity has been controlled for about 3 years at 15, 30, 45, 65, and 90% respectively. There is no discernible difference between the excellent condition of materials in the two lowest humidity chambers and only slight discoloration of bright steel samples in the 45% chamber. Of

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course, corrosion, mildew and rot are extensive in the 90% chamber, and to and lesser extent in the 65% chamber. The seriousness of these findings is appreciated when it is realized that at Philadelphia, one of the Navy's Inactive Fleet Berthing Areas, the atmospheric humidity rises to 90% or higher almost every summer evening.

In order to provide a margin of safety, the Navy has settled on 30$ as the percent humidity to be maintained in the interior of steel vessels. In wood hulls, 50% humidity was chosen as ideal. Unpainted corrodible surfaces would not be entirely protected in 50% humidity, but to a large extent, this would be compensated by protective coatings. The lower humidity of 30% would cause too much drying out of wood, with resultant opening of seams.

2. DEVELOPMENT

Over twenty years ago the Navy began experiments in dehumidification by the use of desiccants. Hoppers containing calcium chloride were tried out in a submarine at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. The project was fairly successful as for as reducing the humidity was concerned, but involved much labor renewing the desiccant and disposing of the brine which collected in the bottom of the hoppers as the calcium chloride dissolved. This brine is very corrosive. It attacked the hoppers themselves, and the results of spilling a little of it here and there can readily be imagined.

3. NAVY DESICCANTS

Fortunately several excellent desiccants of a different type are available. While Calcium Chloride absorbs moisture and in so doing dissolves and changes its state into a concentrated and corrosive brine, silica gel, activated alumina, and other such porous desiccants undergo no actual or apparent change of state in the process of taking up moisture,

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and can be dried out, or reactivated, and used over and over again. The ability of silica gel, activated alumina, and the like to take up moisture by adsorption, as it is called, is due to their porosity and high affinity for water. Their porous surfaces take up moisture by adhesion very much as a sponge absorbs water, but the moisture may be readily driven off by the application of heat. The porosity of silica gel is such that a cubic inch of this substance has about 50,000 square feet of moisture holding surface!

4. STATIC DEHUMIDIFICATION

The Navy applies dehumidification to ships by two methods, static and dynamic. Static dehumidification is resorted to only in spaces which it is not practicable to reach by dynamic dehumidification. Another form of static dehumidification is that applied to the inside of some plastic or metal "packages" built around topside equipment such as searchlights, gun mounts, directors, etc., when it is not practicable to remove such equipment into a below-decks dynamically dehumidified space. Examples of below-decks statically dehumidified spaces are, gasoline and alcohol tanks and in some oases oil tanks, and the chain looker. Spaces of this kind are supplied with a quantity of silica gel in perforated metal containers. Each container holds five pounds of gel and has a small quantity of indicator gel visible through a little inspection port. Special electric reactivation ovens called "reactivators" are provided for drying out saturated gel in the containers, Airtight cases holding eight containers are provided for storage of reactivated containers and for transporting them to their places of use. Any oven whose temperature can be controlled will satisfactorily perform the reactivation job.

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For example, armature ovens, bake ovens, core drying ovens, etc. can all be used.

Through experimentation, the ratio of pounds of gel to any given space has been worked out. For the initial drying, unless portable dehumidification machines are available, one container of gel is used for every 175 cubic feet of space. As this amounts in round figures to one pound per ton of salt water displacement, the Damage Control Flooding Effect diagrams show at a glance how much gel to use. The space is then inspected weekly, replacing the gel as needed until the indicator gel remains blue on two successive inspections. During initial drying a great deal of moisture must be removed, most of it not in the air, but clinging to bulkheads, painted surfaces, gear, etc. The initial drying having been completed, the quantity of gel can be reduced to one container per 525 cubic feet of space (fifteen tons of salt water displacement). This should maintain the desired condition. The next inspections are made at four-week intervals and when two successive inspections show blue indicators the inspection interval is lengthened to 12 weeks, and continued at this interval as long as the indicator remains blue. Should it be found pink at any inspection a careful search for leaks is made and when assured that all have been sealed the procedure must start all over again with the larger ratio of gel and the weekly inspections.

5. HUMIPLUGS

To assist in making these inspections without the arduous labor of removing bolted-down man-hole plates, indicator gel is available in "humiplugs", small transparent plastic capsules about an inch in diameter which can be lowered into the space on lines through sounding tubes.

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Humiplugs, if their size permits, and small perforated metal capsules containing a desiccant can also be used in instruments whose cases are airtight, and in airtight electrical junction boxes mounted above decks. After inserting the container, the case of the junction box is sealed with petrolatum, non-hardening sealing compound, or sealing tape.

6. DYNAMIC DEHUMIDIFICATION

Dehumidification of by far the largest part of the ship's interior is accomplished by the Dynamic Method. Dynamic dehumidification is dehumidification by machine. For several years a number of manufacturers, in collaboration with the Navy, have been developing machines for this purpose. While it is entirely possible to freeze the moisture out of circulated air, the refrigeration process is not employed because of the difficulty encountered at dew points below freezing. It is pointed out that a dew point below freezing may exist a large percentage of the time in the northern berthing areas. Accordingly the Navy's machines use silica gel described above or activated alumina, a granular adsorbent consisting essentially of aluminum trihydrate rendered highly porous and adsorbent. The standard machines have two beds of desiccant. The beds vary in size, the largest holding 175 pounds of desiccant each and the smallest 30 pounds each. A blower takes air from the ships interior, drives this air through one of the beds of desiccant and returns it as dry air to the ship through already installed piping, or, where necessary, through specially installed duct work. The air travels through the ship or through the "zone" allotted to that machine (in large ship with several zones and a machine for each) picking up moisture as it goes, and is returned to the suction side of the machine. When the bed in use is saturated the path of the air through the machine is

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automatically shifted to the other bed. The first bed immediately undergoes reactivation; that is, the reactivation air is heated electrically, passes through the bed to boil the water out, and the moisture-laden air from that bed is then exhausted to the weather. The shift from one bed to the other is done automatically at set time-intervals. The dehumidification reactivation cycle can be regulated to fit humidity conditions in the ship or zone. No temperature control is employed. The dry air from the machine is slightly heated by passing through a freshly reactivated bed of desiccant but this heating is merely incidental. The machine is automatically started and stopped by controlling humidistats located in the dehumidified zone, in the same manner as a thermostat starts and stops a home heating plant.

7. CIRCULATION OF DRY AIR

In general, air is drawn from the upper level of the ship's interior and, after passing through the dehumidifier, is usually returned to the interior at a low point. Firemains and other installed piping distribute the dry air throughout the ship, according to the dehumidification diagram provided by the Bureau of Ships. Interior hatches, doors, and other such openings are used for the free return of air to the machine. The ship is made tight to the weather by closing all weather deck access openings and blanking or plugging openings not fitted with closing devices, Certain weather doors or hatches, restricted to one per zone, are designated for access to the interior of the ship. All others are not only closed tight, but also are sealed with some form of non-hardening sealing compound. Plates are welded over the tops of stacks. Other smaller openings are closed by strippable film. Every effort is

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made to seal the ship against entry of water or weather air. However, this does not mean that free access to the ship's interior is barred.

Access for inspection must be allowed, one access door to each zone, and no appreciable harm is done if the same precautions are followed as when entering or leaving a refrigerated space. Access doors must be kept closed except for the minimum time to permit passage.

8. COST OF DEHUMIDIFICATION

Dehumidification has been under investigation by the Navy since 1924, was finally adopted for use in 1939, but has been much improved since January 1944. The cost of maintaining 30 per cent humidity in a steel ship runs well below 20 cents per 100,000 cubic foot of space per day at a power cost of 1 cent per KWH. A destroyer escort under preservation has about 160,000 cubic foot of interior space and at this figure the power costs amount to only 32 cents per day! This is indeed cheap preservation. The initial cost of the control apparatus will vary with the size of the ship, choice of size and type of machine, but may be estimated as not over one third to three quarters of a cent per cubic foot of space.

The cost of making the ship tight to the weather will about equal the cost of the equipment but this also depends on the size and type of ship, decreasing rapidly with increase in volume. The Navy has standardized on two sizes of dehumidification machines. The larger costs in the vicinity of $1300 and serves 400,000 cu. ft.; the smaller costs in the vicinity of $1000 and serves 150,000 cu. ft. A ship may have one or more machines depending on its size. One machine will serve a destroyer. Not more than nine are required for the largest Naval vessel.

As stated previously, the dehumidifier is started and stopped by

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means of instruments analogous to thermostats, the actuating element of which is human hair. The contraction and expansion of many strands of hair responding to changes in humidity, changes the electrical resistance in the circuits from these control humidistats to the controller-recorder located in a dehumidified space near the machine. Eight of these control humidistats are placed at separated locations in the zone. The controller-recorder averages the humidity readings of all stations and cuts the machine in and out at the demand of these averages rather than on the demand of any individual station. In addition to this it keeps a tape record of the humidity and temperature conditions at each of the control stations, recording every fifteen minutes. With this data, the task of adjusting and balancing the system is greatly simplified.

F. PACKAGING

Closely allied to the maintenance of a dry atmosphere in the ship's interior is the protection of topside equipment by "packaging", for packaging would be of little use unless a dry atmosphere could be maintained within the package. Equipment such as smaller guns, searchlights, directors, etc., which it is not practicable to remove to the dehumidified interior of the ship are protected by enveloping them in moisture-excluding packages the interior of which is dehumidified by small desiccant dehumidifiers or by the standard desiccants. Sometimes dry air may be drawn from a dynamically dehumidified space in the ship and blown into the package by a small fan, which is controlled by a humidistat within the package. For these packages two types of moisture barriers are used: "Strippable coating", developed by the Bureau of Ordnance, and light gage sheet steel.

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G. STRIPPABLE COATING

1. DESCRIPTION

This material known as O.S. 3602, vinylite chloride plus vinylite acetate plus ordnance oil, is an ingenious development. The revolutionary thing about it is that it is sprayed on. First, the equipment to be protected is cleaned and carefully coated with thin film rust preventive compound and other preservatives. All sharp projecting points are padded and scotch tape is then run between all such points, vertically and horizontally so that the initially sprayed an "cobweb" will not have to span a greater distance at any point than about 12 to 14 inches, though it is capable if needs be, of spanning a 41" square. Good weather must be chosen for this operation. Wind screens must be erected if there is any appreciable air movement, as the initial cobweb is very delicate and easily broken. The webbing mixture comes out of the spray gun in long slender fibres like strands of silk out of a silk worn and encases the equipment in what looks like an enormous tight-fitting cocoon. There then follows three sprayed-on covering coats, each of a different color so as to insure complete coverage. The first is applied dry, holding the gun at about 2 feet distance, the last two wet at about 6 to 8 inches from the work. The envelope is carefully sealed to the base of the equipment by a preparation known as Pliobond, so that any pull developed by shrinkage of the envelope or expansion of the contained air will be parallel to the banded surface. The resulting covering is very tough and elastic strong enough to support the weight of a man. During the application of the last two coats the package must be vented from bottom to top with a hot air blower to drive off explosive vapors. Finally, a square hole is

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cut for the insertion of bags of desiccants, a transparent plastic envelope of indicator gel, an inexpensive hair element humidity indicator, end a bright steel sample. The hole is then sealed up with a window of transparent sheet vinylite which provides a ready means of inspecting the indicators and thus keeping check on conditions inside the package.

A single "charge" of desiccant should last six months before requiring replacement. As an additional protection recent Navy Department experiments show that a final coating of O.S. 3602 mixed with aluminum pigment will double the life of the envelope through reflecting heat, light, and ultra-violet rays. The envelope can be cut into as necessary for replacement of gel or for other purposes and readily patched with pieces of the same material sealed with the spray gun. When it is desired to return the gun or other equipment to service, the whole coating can be stripped off in a matter of minutes.

2. COST OF STRIPPABLE COATING

Vinylite webbing material costs about $2.50 per gallon. It takes about 20 to 25 gallons to coat a 3" -50 cal. gun and 40 to 45 gallons for 5" -38. It figures out to about 40 cents per square foot. The mobile unit for the entire job of application costs between $450 and $500. Two men can enclose a 3" -50 cal. gun with strippable coating in about six hours.

3. METAL PACKAGES

For long range preservation at higher initial cost, prefabricated light gage sheet steel packages undoubtedly provide better protection than strippable coating and will be used as specified by the Department. For most purposes 16 to 24 gage thickness is satisfactory. The package is shaped to enclose a minimum volume consistent with simple shape and a

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minimum of Beams. The seams are tack welded and otherwise made moisture-proof by means of sealing or caulking compound or by soldering, and the edges of the package in contact with the deck or bulkhead are flanged to permit fastening. After the package is in place the outside is thoroughly cleaned and painted with three coats of a special aluminum paint. In all cases removable windows are provided for inspection purposes and replacement of desiccant.

4. THIN FILM RUST PREVENTIVE COMPOUNDS

Second only to dehumidification in importance to the ship preservation program is the use of the thin film rust preventive compounds. They are used to protect all corrodible surfaces not protected by paint, galvanizing, plating and the like, of all machinery, boilers, heat transfer apparatus, piping systems, etc. which must be placed under preservation in dehumidified spaces or packages, but the heavy grade (Grade I) is used, topside for such corrodible or tarnishable surfaces as are not customarily painted. Stipulated "readiness" requires that machinery and equipment be kept assembled in a ready-to-run condition. This requirement bars the use of heavy congealing greases which must be removed before the equipment can be used.

It does not bar thin film rust preventive compounds which interfere in no way with operation. Machinery protected by these compounds can, with the addition of the regular lubricants, be placed in immediate operation without removal of the compound.

The film is extremely thin, ranging from two thousandths of an inch for the heaviest Compound, Grade I, to three ten thousandths of an inch for Grade III, the lightest. The film, which is neat in appearance, is sufficiently transparent for observation of corrosion in the incipient stage. In fact, in the case of Grades II and III it is difficult to tell

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whether or not a surface is coated. Observation of corrosion through the film does not necessarily indicate failure of the protective film, but rather lack of proper surface preparation.

5. DESCRIPTION OF GRADES

Three grades of thin film rust preventive compounds are provided, each designed for a particular use:

GRADE I. This is the heaviest grade and is intended for use on ferrous and other metal surfaces exposed to the weather, and on certain equipment undercover where specifically ordered. It should not he used in any lubrication system because of same of its constituents. At present it costs about 97 cents per gallon. It must be reapplied after one year when exposed to the weather, and two years when under cover (not dehumidified).

GRADE II. This is the intermediate grade extended for use an ferrous or other corrodible surfaces where undercover storage is provided, on interior and exterior surfaces except where Grade III is specified. Grade II is used exclusively for flushing through lubrication systems. When applied to exterior surfaces two coats are required to insure full coverage.

It probably requires reapplication in about 2 years time, and at present costs 97 cents per gallon.

GRADE III. This is the lightest grade and is used on ferrous and other corrodible metal surfaces which, when in normal operation, are in contact with water or steam and for salvage purposes pending disassembly for overhaul to prevent further oxidation (rusting) of equipment which has been submerged in water. It is somewhat less expensive than the heavier grades, costing 71 cents per gallon.

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COBWEBS ON THE ZIPPER FLEET!

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6. APPLICATION

The compounds are applied by spraying, dipping, flushing, or brushing, as appropriate. Spraying and dipping are preferable methods as in this way the coating is more uniform, neater in appearance, and cracks and crevices are penetrated. It is neither necessary nor desirable to disassemble the equipment for application to interior surfaces as this can be done by flushing or by fogging (spraying) through access openings.

A high-pressure spray, creating a fog, will coat satisfactorily the interior of turbines, gears, cylinders, boilers, etc. Dipping is best for small articles such as spare parts, tools, bolts and nuts. For small piping systems either fogging or flushing can be used. Lubricating systems should be flushed to protect shaft journals.

In general, spraying or fogging is best for large machinery. Brushing has the disadvantage that bubbles are likely to form which, when broken, leave unprotected areas. Great care must be exercised not to handle surfaces prior to application as finger prints will promptly develop corrosion. Safety precautions for thin film are the same as for kerosene. As 52C18 has a minimum flash point of 100°F., due care must be exercised to ventilate spaces in which men are working to prevent accumulation of inflammable vapors. Rust preventives are harmful to insulating varnishes, tapes, fabrics, rubber, electric cable and electrical insulation and care must be exercised to prevent contact with these materials.

H. SPECIAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES.

While dehumidification supplemented by the application of thin film rust preventive compound provides excellent protection for most

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equipment, there are some items of equipment to which this general treatment applies only in part, and supplementary measures are necessary. Only two of the most important will be briefly mentioned here: storage batteries and ships boats.

1. STORAGE BATTERIES

All portable storage batteries are turned in to the nearest Naval shore establishment for survey. It is planned to place a complete complement of new batteries on board, in a dehumidified space, in a bone-dry condition. A far more complicated procedure attends the preservation of submarine storage batteries, though the end result is the same. Submarines in the Reserve Fleet will have both batteries placed in the bone-dry condition. This entails a number of steps and tests after which the batteries are removed and shipped to the manufacturer for conversion to the bone-dry condition. They are then returned to the ship and stored in the regular battery compartments which in the meantime have been thoroughly cleaned and otherwise prepared as a dehumidified place of storage. The bonedrying of submarine storage batteries is a necessary, but expensive procedure -- it costing about $50,000 to have the two main batteries of one submarine bone-dried. Even at that price, however, it is preferable to the purchase many years hence of a new battery for something over $180,000. Electrolyte for the bone-dry batteries will, it is planned, be kept in storage at the submarine berthing areas, and handling facilities will be such that all bone-dry batteries can be filled within 36 hours 2. SEEPS' BOATS

Ships' boats, if steel, are cleaned and painted in the same manner as the ship's topsides. Wooden boats require replacement of all decayed

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wooden parts and thorough calking. A wood preservative is then applied, followed by painting, first with two coats of standard Haze Gray and then with two coats of aluminum paint. Engines are treated with thin film rust preventive compound and, together with all loose boat gear, are stowed below in a dehumidified space. Wooden tar-paper covered shelters, so constructed as to permit ready inspection, are provided to shield the boat from the sun and to keep out rain.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Navy completed preserving its first large combat vessel, the USS BROOKLYN, about the 1st of January 1946. While work was progressing on the BROOKLYN, many more ships had been ordered into berthing areas for the same treatment. The vessels were laid up by the crews who manned them while in active commission and a large majority of the men being in the Naval Reserve, most of them completed their active naval service by cleaning, inventorying and preserving these ships for inactivation.

By the end of June 1946, five hundred and eighty two (582) ships of all sizes had been inactivated or preserved. Between that time and June 1947 a total of one thousand one hundred and forty (1,140) more vessels were completed making a grand total of one thousand seven hundred and twenty two (1,722) vessels preserved by July 1, 1947. By January 1948, this Reserve Fleet will be comprised of over two thousand (2,000) ships.

It is estimated that the preservation work, when completed, will have cost a total of approximately $100,000,000. The building cost of the ships preserved, however, is approximately $12,000,000,000, thus the preserving cost actually amounts to less than 1% of the total value.

Future cost for care and upkeep of these vessels is not expected to be high. Each vessel, at the present time, undergoes frequent and

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careful inspection by security patrols and by groups who are interested primarily in the condition of the hull and fittings. In addition, a program of overhaul was embarked upon beginning July 1, 1947, to enable the effecting of necessary repairs on these vessels. Many of them had unrepaired battle damage at the time they reported to the Reserve Fleet, although all were able to remain at sea. The present program will give each vessel a drydocking and overhaul every fifth year. After each vessel has received one overhaul under this program, it is expected that maintenance costs will drop sharply even though they now are very low. Present estimate for total cost of overhaul of all vessels over the first five years' span is about $65,000,000 to $70,000,000, or slightly over one half of 1% of the total value of the vessels.

At the present time, the Navy has assigned approximately 14,000 men to duty guarding and maintaining this fleet. These 14,000 men, watching over two thousand vessels of all sizes, would be sufficient to man five battleships or five aircraft carriers in time of war. The Reserve Fleet now contains about 12 battleships, 50 cruisers of various classes, 82 aircraft carriers of various classes, over 200 destroyers, and so on through many more types of vessels. In addition to keeping up with their tasks with the inactivated vessels, each man is constantly undergoing training to qualify him for advancement in rating and to keep him ready for sea-duty. Transfers from Reserve Fleet and vice versa are frequent.

It should be emphasized that the Navy's Reserve Fleet is not a "Phantom" or "Moth-Ball" Fleet. This is a unit considerably larger than the Active Fleet, and its vessels are ready and able to put to sea

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any time the country’s security demands. Schedules have been developed for all phases of this contingency, such as delivery and loading of foods, fuel, ammunition, etc. There are hundreds of functioning Naval Reserve Training Units throughout the United States to provide the majority of men needed to man them. The Navy believes that the few vessels it has already put back into active use from their preserved state are fair samples of what to expect from the other Reserve Fleet vessels - they were ready to put to sea when men were available to man them.

The title "Reserve Fleet" means a ready reserve of ships capable of augmenting the Active Fleet on short notice if and when mobilization of the nation's forces may become necessary.

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CHAPTER XXV

WHAT IS PAST IS PROLOGUE

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CHAPTER XXV

"WHAT IS PAST IS PROLOGUE"

To study the future, one must first look to the past. This history, then, is the "prologue" of the Bureau of Ships -- a record of wartime accomplishments almost unequalled in scope, integration, and success of mission. According to the extensive data presented in the preceding chapters, the Bureau's functions in attaining these accomplishments during the fiery months from 7 December 1941 to 14 August 1945 fell into the categories of planning, production, and maintenance, which may well be recapitulated briefly to describe the background from which the future will emanate.

One element of planning involved the efficacious allocation of over twenty billions of dollars during the war period. This sum went into the purchase of some 12,000,000 tons of steel and into a conservation of critical materials program which saved 30,000,000 pounds of nickel,

20,000,000 pounds of rubber, 9,000,000 pounds of tin, and 207,000,000 pounds of copper and resulted in a considerable financial economy; it went into wages for some one million shipyard workers at the program's peak load with over two million industrial workers being engaged in satellite industries at this same moment; $2,000,000 were used to expand shipyards and industrial plants to accommodate this comprehensive shipbuilding program involving over forty thousand contractors; and, sizeable appropriations were made to the Bureau of Ships' extensive training program which involved 2,000 military and 4,000 civilian personnel and to the elaborate design program involving 161 different types of vessels.

Production was concerned with the construction of 1,141 combatant vessels, 75,113 landing craft, 519 auxiliaries, which, together with other

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types, totaled 98,131 vessels of 7,465,046 tonnage produced during the war years. In addition, 1,504 ships, totalling over four and one-half million tons were converted, while almost 1200 ships of one-third million tonnage were acquired. Peak production for one month was reached in May 1944, when 4,475 vessels and craft were constructed and 30,000,000 diesel horsepower was installed. Compare this with the Navy on 7 December 1941, which included only 4,000 ships with but 16,000,000 steam and diesel horsepower! It is of interest to compare the following figures showing the building periods required for specific types of ships, according to the maximum period, the average period, and the estimated average Japanese period (a conservative estimate must be accepted with reservation):

MAXIMUM

AVERAGE

JAPANESE

Battleships

46

36

46

Destroyers

30

12

24

Submarines

27

11

12

LST

9

3

Electronics production proved almost as spectacular, with the manufacture of 35,617 radar, radio and sound equipments during the war years, plus 10,225 units for the Marine Corps.

Maintenance involved the production in varying quantities of over 2,500,000 individual service parts requiring 227 acres of warehousing. Although repair and overhaul estimates are impossible to bring under a common denominator, it may be roughly estimated that over 20,000 ships were serviced each year. Over 500 calls for salvage were answered,

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resulting in the saving of $700,000,000 worth of shipping. Finally, the vitally important post-war program includes $20,000,000 appropriated for the preservation of the Reserve Fleet.

The principal objective and motivation for this study, however, is not to eulogize the accomplishments and personnel of the Bureau; rather, it is to gather up a summary of past experience from which data may be drawn to serve as a basis in the formulation of future plans. With regard to this future, therefore, several general considerations may be gleaned from the prologue.

Many beliefs based on previous experience were rendered obsolete during the course of the last great conflict, but probably none more so than the one stating that Navies win or lose ware with ships that were in commission at the outbreak of hostilities. This is substantiated by our study of comparative fleets and of the Bureau’s production record, which permitted thousands of ships and craft which had not even been designed to join the fighting forces and to exert their strength against the enemy.

To prevent a pacifistic interpretation of this statement, however, attention must be turned from the quantitative factors in the statement to the qualitative, which rest upon a comprehensive program of research and development.

To illustrate the program's application, it has been learned that fighting men are not effective, individually or collectively, unless they are imbued with high morale, which may be defined as a state of mind wherein there is confidence, courage and zeal among men united together in a common effort -- a "conviction of excellence". One factor largely responsible for the extremely high morale of the men of the naval services in World War II proved to be their confidence in the excellence of ships, equipment, and planes provided them.

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Within the limited facilities and means available throughout the years of peace, the United States Navy had equipped itself with weapons which qualitatively equalled or surpassed those of other navies and had laid the groundwork for still further development. During the war, therefore, the science and industry of this country and of our allies were mobilized to apply the existing scientific knowledge to the perfection of these weapons and to the developments of new and more deadly means of waging war. Thus did the United States Navy maintain a technical advantage over the navies of our enemies. One of the lessons learned, however, was that a realistic approach to problems must be taken at all times and that research developments must be tested under conditions analogous to the severest of battle situations.

Despite this technical superiority and a secondary emphasis of quantity, the Navy has not been lulled into another demobilization fantasy which would prove the most lamentable fallacy of the 20th Century. The preservation of a Reserve fleet has fortunately been assured, but preservation of experienced personnel must be as forcefully underwritten. Behind this naval ship potential, there must be a proportionately large, well-trained Naval Reserve -- an adaptable body that could serve as the nucleus for rapid and efficient expansion in the event of any future national emergency.

Events within the past war indicated why this adaptable body must be up-to-the-minute in developments of naval equipment, tactics, strategy, and type of warfare. At Okinawa, for example, the greatest naval force ever assembled in the history of the world engaged in a three months continuous battle which for sustained intensity has never been equalled in annals of naval history.

Yet this operation was not against an enemy fleet, for by this time the Japanese

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Imperial Navy had virtually ceased to exist. We were fighting an island! How far a cry from the warfare of Farragut - or even Admiral Halsey's first battle. The introduction of electronic, jet-propulsion, rocket, atomic and countermeasure warfare, with their attendant daily phenomenal advancements, dictates even further the necessity for constant attention of reserve personnel - particularly specialists - to current developments.

In addition, two outstanding developments of World War II in the field of naval strategy and tactics were the convincing proof and general acceptance of the fact that naval aviation and amphibious elements proved to be and will always be integral and primary components of the fleet. Recognition of these obvious concepts must continually be reflected in all branches of the Bureau of Ships: design, research and development, maintenance, planning, etc.

Of considerable importance in the future scheme of things for the Bureau is the fact that the strength of the Navy lies in the complete integration of its submarine, surface and air elements. "The balanced fleet", Admiral King stated, "is the only effective fleet and in such a fleet the several components must be welded together rather than simply coordinated". The aircraft carrier, for example, because of its mobility and striking power and the long range of its weapons, has proved itself a major and vital element of naval strength, yet its only weakness-vulnerability-demands the support of all other types which thereby places an additional premium on the flexibility and balance of our fleet.

Finally, as integration and unification characterized every amphibious operation of the war (and all were successful), so joint

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undertakings must be emphasised at least in the spheres of research, procurement, and planning between services and within their own organizations.

To support and to maintain the peace of the world, we must be ever ready and able to back up our words with deeds. One of the principal keystones upon which this broad concept rests is the Bureau of Ships with its planning, production and maintenance of naval power for -

"peace without power is like an empty dream".

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TOMORROW??

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