

OKW DIRECTIVES FOR THE INVASION OF U.K.

OPERATION SEELÖWE

SUMMER AND AUTUMN 1940

O.K.W. F.H.Q. 2.7.40

Prosecution of the war against England

The Führer and Supreme Commander has decided:

1. Invasion of England is quite possible under certain conditions of which the most important is the gaining of air superiority. For the present, therefore, the time at which it will take place remains an open question.

Preparations for carrying out the operation will be begun immediately.

2. As ground work for these preparations Cs-in-C of the armed forces will submit as soon as possible:

Army

- (a) an estimate of the English army as it was originally intended, probable losses (of every kind of material) and its probable effective state after partial re-equipment in the next few months.
- (b) an appreciation for the employment of coastal artillery in order to provide additional cover for transport and shipping assembly areas against English naval attack (in co-operation with the navy).

Navy

- (a) a survey of landing possibilities for large military forces (25 - 30 divs) and AA groups with representation of the coastal configuration of South England and English land and sea defences.
- (b) an appreciation as to the sea zones and the means by which troops and supplies for them can be conveyed across with sufficient protection. In connection with this, whether landing on a broad front would probably facilitate the army's advance will be considered.

/ (c) ...

- (c) reports as to the kind and extent of transport available and the time needed for fit out and preparation.

Airforce

- (a) An appreciation of whether and when a decisive air superiority will probably be attained. This will include estimates and assessment of the English air force.
- (b) with what forces and in what way can the invasion be supported by a landing from the air. Air transport will take precedence over all other tasks.
3. The first theoretical preparation will be for C-in-C, in co-operation, to examine all questions which arise as to composition and organisation of the invasion troops necessary, to economise shipping and air transport and to make the best possible use of them.

The landing forces will be considerably superior to the English troops, especially in armoured groups and, in addition, will be highly motorised. They will be covered by strong AA units.

4. All preparations must take into account that the plan to land in England has by no means taken full shape and that it is a question only of preparation for a possible event.

The planning circle will be as restricted as possible.

C-in-C Armed Forces
KEITEL.

O.K.W. Berlin 10.7.40

Artillery cover for transport to England

Pursuant to OKW/Armed Forces Operation Staff/Sec 1 No. 33 124/40 Corps HQ para 2b concerning artillery protection for transports to England, the Führer has ordered:

All preparations will be made for strong artillery support for covering front and flanks of a future crossing and landing on the coast line from CALAIS (CAP GRIS NEZ) - BOULOGNE. Under command C-in-C Navy all available and suitable heavy batteries will be mounted and will be dug in with the co-operation of the Todt organisation.

C-in-C Air will be responsible for protecting the existing batteries already in position and those under construction from enemy air attack and will arrange, as far as their deployment permits, that AA batteries in this zone can be brought up for giving cover from attack by sea.

C-in-C Navy will organise preparations for unit fire control, and will report progress as soon as possible and will state probable time needed for preparations.

C-in-C Armed Forces
KEITEL

/ The ...

DIRECTIVE No.16

Preparations for the invasion of England

Since England, despite its hopeless military situation still gives no sign of any readiness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare for invasion of that country and, if necessary, to carry it through.

The aim of this operation will be to eliminate England as a base for carrying on the war against Germany, and, should it be requisite, completely to occupy it.

For this purpose I am issuing the following orders:-

- 1) The landing will be carried out as a surprise crossing on a broad front from the neighbourhood of RAMSGATE to the area WEST of the ISLE of WIGHT; some Air Force units will play the role of artillery and some naval units will act as engineers. Exercises will be carried out on the part of all units of the armed forces to ascertain whether it would be practicable before the general operation to under-take small-scale actions, such as the occupation of the ISLE of WIGHT or CORNWALL and the results will be reported to me. The final decision I reserve for myself. Preparations for the entire operation must be completed by the middle of August.
- 2) These preparations include the creation of those conditions which can make invasion possible;
 - (a) The English Air Force must be beaten physically and morally to a point that they cannot put up any show of attacking force worth mentioning.
 - (b) Lanes will be swept through the mined waters.
 - (c) The Straits of Dover must be cut off on both flanks by a thickly laid minefield and the Western entrance of the Channel in a line about from ALDERNEY to PORTLAND will be blocked as well.
 - (d) The coastal area on the immediate front will be held under fire by strong coastal artillery to form an artillery screen.
 - (e) It will be an advantage to pin down English Naval forces, shortly before the operation, in the NORTH SEA and in the MEDITERRANEAN (by the Italians) and an attempt will now be made to cripple naval forces based in England by air and torpedo attacks.
- 3) Organisation of conduct and preparations

C-in-C's will direct the forces concerned under my order and according to my general directive.

From 1.8.40 Command HQ's (Army, Navy and Air Force) will

/ be ...

be within a radius of 50 kms (at the outside) from my HQ (ZIEGENBERG).

I think it would be an advantage to have the command HQ (Army and Navy) jointly stationed in GIESSEN.

C-in-C (Army) will therefore interpolate an army group for directing the invasion army.

The operation will be called "Seelöwe".

In preparing and carrying out the operation, units of the armed forces will have the following tasks:-

(a) Army

Will draw-up a plan for the operation and will tabulate a ferry plan for the transport of the groups of the first wave.

AA guns detailed for the first wave will be under the command of the Army (the individual ferry groups) until they can take their share of the tasks of support and cover for ground troops, for disembarkation harbours and for occupied air bases.

The Army will further distribute ferrying craft to the individual ferry groups and in agreement with the Navy will determine places of embarkation and landing.

(b) Navy

Will ensure transport craft and will sail them according to the wishes of the Army, as far as they conform with the naval point of view to the individual embarkation areas. As far as possible shipping of conquered enemy states will be seized.

For every crossing point, the Navy will create the necessary HQ with escort ships and covering forces.

Beside the Air Forces employed in providing cover, the Navy will protect both flanks of the whole Channel crossing.

Orders will follow ref the organisation of command during the crossing.

Another Naval task will be the disposition of coastal artillery, that is the unit grouping of all batteries, Army and Navy, for sea targets and the organisation of the general control of fire.

The largest possible number of heavy artillery pieces will be deployed at the earliest moment to ensure the crossing and to screen the flanks from the enemy naval action.

In addition, railway artillery supplemented by all available captured guns, except those batteries (K5 and K12) intended for long-range shelling of targets in England will be brought forward and set up, using railway turntables.

/ Apart ...

Apart from this, all the available heavy coastal batteries will be built in under concrete in order to withstand the heaviest air attacks and thus, in all circumstances, command the Straits for as long as they can remain effective.

The Todt organisation will be responsible for the technical work.

(c) Task of the Air Force will be:

To prevent counter-attack by enemy air forces, to neutralise coast fortifications which could be brought into effect against the landing positions, to eliminate initial enemy resistance on the part of ground forces, and to destroy any reserves on the march. The closest co-operation between individual Air Force groups and Army transport groups is essential for this task.

Further tasks will be:-

To destroy important roads used for bringing up enemy reserves and to attack approaching enemy naval formations in areas far removed from the crossing positions.

I am requesting schemes for the employment of parachute and air-borne troops. It is a question to be examined in liaison with the Army, whether it would be advantageous to keep them for the present as a reserve which could be quickly put in in case of emergency.

- 4) Necessary preparations for signals communication from France to England is the province of the Chief of Armed Forces Signals. The construction of the remaining of East Prussian Cable will be undertaken with the co-operation of the Navy.
- 5) I am requesting Cs-in-C to submit to me at the earliest moment -
 - (a) the intentions of the Army and Air Force as to their proposed schemes for crossing the Channel (see para 2),
 - (b) the disposition of coastal batteries in detail (Navy),
 - (c) a survey of the shipping tonnage to be employed and methods of getting in readiness, and fitting out. Participation of civil authorities (Navy),
 - (d) the organisation of air cover for assembly areas of invasion troops and transport (Air Force),
 - (e) the operational and transport plans for the Army, organisation and equipment of the first wave,
 - (f) the organisation of the Navy and Air Force and the measures taken for carrying out the crossing itself, providing cover and support for the landing,

/ (g) ...

- (g) proposals for the employment of parachute and airborne troops as well as for the deployment and control of AA guns after sufficient ground has been gained on English soil (Air Force),
- (h) proposed situation of Army and Navy Command HQ's.
- (i) an appreciation from Army, Navy and Air Force as to whether and which minor operations would be considered advantageous,
- (k) proposals from the Army and Navy for the chain of command during the crossing.

HITLER

Führer HQ 30.7.40

C-in-C Air Force received the following message at 12.20 on 30.7.40.

C-in-C Air Force,

The Führer has issued an order that preparations for the great offensive by the German Air Force on England are to be accelerated to the utmost so that the operation can begin within twelve hours of the issue of the executive command.

The other Armed Forces units have not yet been informed from this HQ.

JODL

The Führer and Supreme Commander of Armed Forces. Führer HQ 1.8.40

DIRECTIVE No.17

For prosecuting air and sea war against England

I have decided to carry on and intensify air and naval warfare against England in order to bring about her final defeat.

For this purpose I am issuing the following orders:

1. The German Air Force with all available forces will destroy the English Air Force as soon as possible.

The attacks will be directed first against airborne aircraft, their ground and supply organisation, and then against the aircraft industry including the manufacture of AA equipment.

2. After gaining temporary or local air superiority air attack will be continued on harbours, paying special attention to food storage depots and further on food storage depots in LONDON.

/: In

In view of our own intended operations, attacks on harbours on the South Coast must be kept to a minimum.

3. Attacks on warships and on merchant shipping will be of secondary importance to those versus enemy air power except when specially favourable opportunity targets present themselves, or additional effect may be provided within the framework of attacks quoted in para 2, or where supplementary training is necessary for air crews.

The intensified air war will be so planned that adequate forces may be diverted at any time for favourable opportunity targets.

Moreover, fighting strength must be maintained at disposal for the operation "Seelöwe".

5. I am reserving terror attacks as reprisals.
6. Intensification of the air war can begin on 5.8.40. It is for the Air Force staff to choose the exact time, in accordance with the completion of preparations, and according to weather conditions. The Navy will at the same time announce the planned intensification of naval war measures.

HITLER.

OKW FHQ 1.8.40

On the report of C in C Navy (31.7.40) that preparations for Seelöwe cannot be completed before 15.9.40, the Führer has decided.

1. Preparations for Seelöwe will be continued and will cease on 15.9.40 for the Army as well as for the Air Force.
2. After eight or at the most fourteen days reckoned from the beginning of the great air attack on England which can begin about 5.8, the Führer will decide, according to the results of this battle, whether or not operation Seelöwe can still take place this year.
3. If the decision is against carrying out Seelöwe in September, all preparations will be continued in spite of it but however in a form which will avoid severe damage to the economic situation by the crippling of internal shipping traffic.
4. Strategic preparations will continue for the present as broadly planned, in spite of the Navy's report that they can only cover a narrow sector (Westward about as far as EASTBOURNE).
5. Orders in Directive No. 16 Sec 3 para 2 as regards transfer of operations staffs will remain in force, with the proviso that they be kept at a minimum so that taking over near the Führer's operational HQ will only take place shortly before the operation and members of the OKH can remain in the Army HQ which they are now occupying.

C in C Armed Forces
MEITEL

OKW FHQ 5.8.40

The great air offensive against England will begin within a few days, and will receive full army and naval support in the following manner:-

Army

1. In vulnerable areas, MG battalion and Flak MG units will be employed to supplement protection for Air Force ground installations.
2. Long range batteries on the Channel coast (K5 and K12) will support the great air force offensive by destructive shell-fire on England. Expenditure of ammunition must be limited in view of supporting a later landing.

Navy

1. Air-sea rescue service will support the great air attack with all suitable craft on the narrow coastal area of the Channel, as far as preparation for a landing will allow.
2. The possibility must be taken into account that the enemy will interpret the air operation as a preparation for a landing and will consequently concentrate stronger naval forces in the Channel zone as far as the present intended blockade will permit, by employing U boats and other means.

C-in-C Armed Forces
KEITEL

OKW FHQ 7.8.40

Directive on deceptive measures to maintain appearance of constant threat of invasion of U.K.

Aim of deception:

Whether or not we invade England, the constant menace of invasion must be maintained against the English people and Armed Forces. Hence the corollary that the main German operation shall appear to be preparing for landing on the English East coast, as well as invading Ireland.

According to German information Channel coast defences are to be made to appear to be so strong that only fake operations are to be prepared on a grand scale in this zone; a real attempt to invade, however, is to be made to appear as out of the question.

Detailed organisation for passing on such intelligence to the enemy through the various channels (among others military attaches) will be the task of the Director of Counter-espionage.

Measures of Armed Forces Units

Deception through intelligence channels will only gain credence and set English counter-measures in motion if the corresponding German measure can be confirmed by the reports of the English Intelligence Services.

Hence:

/ 1 ...

1. The various sections of the services must extend their preparations for readiness and embarkation of troops, allocation of shipping space, air defence, supply organisation etc. to conceal the actual intentions by deploying considerable forces in Norway and Denmark (landing on English East coast), Netherlands (landing North of the mouth of the THAMES), BREST and area BISCAY (landing in Ireland).

After the completion of preparations, the denying of certain areas to civilian traffic may be considered in order to increase the verisimilitude of the preparations.

Those individuals below a specified grade of the High Command, who are concerned with the preparations, are not to be informed that their tasks are aimed at deception.

2. From now on, but only on command of the Führer, preparations shall be undertaken

by C in C Army The transfer of the forces in question to the specified embarkation areas.

C in C Navy Assembly of shipping space.

C in C Air Force Apparent measures to ensure embarkation cover.

3. C in C Navy will draw the enemy's attention away from the actual landing sectors by a display of naval strength in connection with the landing.
4. C in Cs are asked to report their plans and intentions.

C in C Armed Forces
(Signed) KEITEL

OKW FHQ 12.8.40

Under the suppositions that:

- (a) Operation Seelöwe can not be carried out this year,
- (b) The Italian offensive against the SUEZ Canal either does not succeed or indeed is postponed until autumn,

the possibility has to be faced that the Führer may decide to transfer armoured forces to the Italians for this attack or for its resumption.

In this case the Cs-in-C, without surveying Italian feeling for the present, are asked to form an opinion on the following questions:

C in C Navy

1. How will the scale of operations in Egyptian coastal sectors be estimated?
2. Are supplies and stores ensured for about an armoured corps?

3. How long will the change over of troops and equipment for the new employment take ?
4. How long will the transportation to the South Italian harbours take ?
5. If an armoured corps were provided can the new dispositions allocated be carried out (in certain circumstances leaving behind cadres).

C in C Army

How will the transport possibilities from South Italy to Libya be estimated ?

C-in-C Armed Forces.
pp. JODL

BERLIN 15.8.40

Summary of the situation referring to invasion of U.K.

1. The landing operations must not founder in any circumstances. Failure can have political repercussions far outweighing the military setback.
2. As far as it is humanly possible to eliminate failure, I am in agreement with the Army that it is essential that:
 - (a) landing must be simultaneous from FOLKESTONE to BRIGHTON BAY,
 - (b) within four days ten divs should be landed in this sector,
 - (c) within the succeeding four days at least three divs with complete equipment should follow across the Straits even if sea conditions do not permit the use of flat bottomed craft (barges) while the troops landed further to the West will be reinforced by airborne troops,
 - (d) generally on the English South coast English war transport should have been destroyed, especially in PORTSMOUTH,
 - (e) effective counter-action by the English Air Force is or can be neutralised.

I believe that (d) and (e) will be accomplished by the Air Force and the next eight days will clarify the situation.

Should the navy, however, (and this can not be determined exactly), not be in a position to fulfil conditions (a), (b) and (c), then I consider the landing to be an act of desperation which would have to be attempted in a desperate manner, but which we have at this stage no reason whatever to contemplate.

3. England can be brought to her knees in other ways. For this purpose, however, I maintain that a much closer military cooperation of the Axis powers than has hitherto been the case, is necessary.

This aim can be accomplished by

/ (a) ...

- (a) Carrying on the air war until the economic destruction of South England has been brought about. All Italian air forces not employed now should be transferred for this purpose,
- (b) Stepping up U-boat warfare from the French bases by means of attaching thereto half the Italian U-boat strength.
- (c) Taking Egypt, if necessary with Italian help and,
- (d) Taking GIBRALTAR in agreement with the Spanish and Italians,
- (e) Avoiding operations which are not necessary for the conquering of England, but declaring worth while war aims which can be easily accomplished after the conquest of England (Jugoslavia). We should fight for victory and not just conduct operations on military objectives. From now till early next year England's will to resist must be broken, if not by a landing then by every other means. This most important task will take precedence over everything else.

We are now entering into the decisive battle against England. Therewith within our coalition the general principles of war will remain valid - to concentrate all strength in the decisive undertaking - that is air and U-boat warfare against England.

The Italians have shown a certain readiness to take part in the attack on England since they themselves realise that they can bring into effect only a part of their forces in their own theatre of war. This direct preference should be translated into deeds with all enthusiasm. I believe that it could be done by a consultation with the Duce to the end that we should carry out the final campaign of this war not side by side but together.

Thus a decision will be forced more rapidly.

JODL

OKW

FHQ 16.8.40

Seelöwe

1) The Führer decided on 15.8.40 that:

- (a) Preparations for operation Seelöwe will be further continued up to 15.9, including all the necessary disposition of naval personnel.

The decision for its execution will be held up until the whole situation is clarified.

- (b) Preparations for a landing in LYME BAY, will be suspended in default of sufficient possibilities for protection.

/ Shipping ...

Shipping will be held in readiness in the coastal sector from OSTEND to LE HAVRE in order to avoid concentration in those harbours nearest the enemy coast and to conceal our intention of invasion from the enemy.

- (c) Preparations themselves will be planned so as not to preclude a crossing even on a small scale if this is ordered about eight days in advance but on the other hand the possibility also remains of crossing in one bound in the direction of BRIGHTON without heavy equipment.
- 2) On the basis of this decision of the Führer, C in C (Army) and C in C (Air) are asked to propose schemes for the employment of parachute and airborne troops paying special attention to the question as to whether they will be employed with the first wave or will be held as independent reserves for the Channel situation.

C-in-C Armed Forces
Assigned KEITEL

OKW

HQ 27.8.40

On 26.8. After an interview with the C in C (Army) the Führer has reached the following decisions:-

1) Operation Seelöwe

Army operations will be adapted to fit in with the given facts in relation to the available tonnage and cover for embarkation and crossing.

The Army Forces allocated for the crossing including the Flak groups allotted by C in C (Air) will therefore be regrouped in such a way that

- (a) embarkation can take place in the area allocated by the Navy in ROTTERDAM and ANTWERP.
- (b) from LE HAVRE, apart from motorboats and coastal flat-bottomed craft, only twenty five steamships will be employed for a single direct crossing to landing zone E, given a favourable enemy situation, while twenty five further steamships having loaded for a single crossing in LE HAVRE, will proceed along the French coast Southwards of BOULOGNE and thence to landing zone B. If sea conditions permit, these twenty five ships will likewise proceed along the English coast to landing zone E. The Führer desires OKH to prepare a survey on these lines which will state the allocation of forces, the time table of movements and landing organisation according to groups areas and times.

2) Group III

Since a mountain division will not be available at the time, C in C (Army) will be asked whether, in the same manner as is being effected with new formations in Germany,

/ a ...

a further division from those at present in Norway, may be set up and if possible provided with mountain equipment.

3) The forces at present in the Generalgouvernement will from now on be considerably strengthened. Thus

- (a) About ten divisions will be transferred to the EAST in such a way as not to interfere to any considerable extent with commercial transport.
- (b) About two armed divs from Germany will be transferred to the extreme South eastern area of the Generalgouvernement after overhaul of their equipment.

These forces will be deployed in such a way that in an emergency a motorised reserve can be responsible for the protection of the Rumanian oilfields.

C-in-C Armed Forces
KETTEL

OKW

FHQ 29.8.40

Preparation of Operation Seelöwe

C in C Navy has commissioned the Admiral in command of France to convoy vessels from their place of assembly in operational harbours, providing protection for their necessary passage through mined waters.

Since, for the accomplishment of this task, the C in C Navy has been asked to give large-scale support for the various assignments of the Army, C in C Navy will be asked to instruct the commands concerned, especially those with transport assignments to comply strictly with the relevant demands of the Admiral in command of France.

C-in-C Armed Forces
KETTEL

OKW

FHQ 2.9.40

Directive for transport and admin arrangements for "Seelöwe".

In addition to the Cs in C (Army) assigned task, according to order No.16 of 16.7.40, to set up at once a ferry plan for groups of the first wave, C in C Army in cooperation with Cs in C (Navy and Air Force) will make the necessary preparations also for all further movements of transport including supplies.

C in C (Army), on the basis of experience in the occupation of Norway will decide what HQs (Home Staff) will remain and C in C (Navy) and C in C (Air Force) will be represented.

/ The ...

The task of these HQs will be .

1. To collect and pass on all requests for sea transport.
2. to establish the urgency of all transport demands (not air transport)
3. to keep the transports ordered to sea in closest touch with the operational naval HQs
4. to pass on to QMG Air Forces all requests for air transport.

Transport will be the responsibility of Transport HQ Staffs competent for this purpose.

C in C Army will be asked to communicate the arrangements decided upon.

C in C Armed Forces
KEITEL

OKW

FHQ 3.9.40

Operation "Seelöwe".

The following time-table for the preparation for operation "Seelöwe" is valid at present.

1. Earliest date for
 - a) departure of transport fleets will be 20.9.40
 - b) S day (invasion day) will be 21.9.40.
2. The order for the start of the operation will be given on S - 10 days that is probably on 11.9.40.
3. The final decision of S day and S time (beginning of the first landing) will follow at the latest on S - 3 day at noon.
4. All measures will be taken so that the operation can still be held in check 24 hours before S time.

C in C Armed Forces,
KEITEL

C-in-C Armed Forces.

Berlin 13 Sep 1940

NAVAL RECONNAISSANCE FORCES

The intensification of air war against England makes it necessary that all available forces at the disposal of C-in-C Air should be concentrated and brought to maximum effect.

The Navy, however, will in this connection require its own reconnaissance groups which must be tactically subordinated to it in so far as their activity closely conforms tactically with their

/ own ...

own shipping movement (observation of coastal waters; despatch and return of U-boats; protection of transport in the NORTH SEA and far Northern waters; deployment of surface craft on the French ATLANTIC coast and subsequent naval operations based thereon).

Since due to the temporarily restricted number of available craft naval operations take place only from time to time, there remains the danger that valuable reconnaissance craft, which are tactically subordinated to the navy, remain unused for considerable periods. This will be avoided by continual change of deployment under command Air Force or Navy.

I reserve provisionally to myself the issue of these orders.

From now on coastal airgroups will be deployed as follows:-

Coastal command group 606 (Do 17z)) subordinated to C-in-C Air Force. comes 18/9/40 tactically under C-in-C Navy.
" reconnaissance wing 3/406 (Do 18)	
" " " 2/106 (Do 18)	
" command group 506 (He 115)	

Should the executive order for "Seelöwe" be given, two further coastal reconnaissance wings (Do 18) will come under command C-in-C Air Force as soon as the proposed Naval operations in the NORTH SEA have been completed (provisionally on S - 1 day).

No.5 Coastal Reconnaissance Wing (Do 18) comes under command C-in-C Air Force as soon as the cruiser "Hipper" enters the sphere of operations of Group WEST.

All other unspecified coastal command units will remain tactically under C-in-C Navy.

HITLER

OKW

Berlin 17 Sep 1940

After consultation with group commanders of the Armed Forces, the Führer has reached the following decisions:-

1) "Seelöwe"

- (a) The commencement of the operation will be further postponed. A new order (gem. OKW Sec 1 No 33255/40 Corps HQ of 3.9.40 fig 2) will be issued on 17.9.40. All preparations will be continued.
- (b) Neutralisation of English long range batteries firing on the French coast will be carried out by the Air Force as soon as preparations for this purpose are completed.
- (c) In this situation it will not be necessary yet to carry into effect over the complete area the special measures provided for in the coastal sectors, (OKW No. 2552/40 Corps HQ Security IIIc of 29.8.40). On the other hand the necessary security and counter espionage measures will be tightened up within a framework to be defined between the Army GHQ (Security) and Naval GHQ and the C-in-C for the individual coastal sectors.

2) Air attacks on LONDON

Air attacks on LONDON will be carried out over wider areas than hitherto, indeed from now on will be aimed definitely on targets important from a military point of view and those vital to the life of the great city (including the Railway stations). These will continue until there are no more such targets to be neutralised.

Terror attacks against purely residential quarters will continue to be the last resort and therefore will not yet be carried out.

C-in-C Armed Forces,
KEITEL

OKW

BERLIN 19.9.40

The Führer and C-in-C Armed Forces have agreed on the following decisions:

- 1) Movements for the strategic concentration of transport shipping, as far as have not yet been completed, will be discontinued.
- 2) Concentrations in assembly harbours will be so dispersed that losses of shipping tonnage owing to enemy air attack will be kept at a minimum. It must be ensured, however, that the period of time 3 - 10 days (given by the warning order) is sufficient in favourable weather for reassembly in good time in assembly harbours.
- 3) The ten steamships of the Norwegian line allocated for operation "Herbstreise", will immediately revert to their normal employment. Six others, allocated for operation "Seelöwe", will be withdrawn singly at intervals and until further notice will be employed in speeding up supplies for Group III.
- 4) C-in-C Air Force will strengthen air cover in assembly ports as far as possible.

C-in-C Armed Forces
Signed KEITEL.

OKW

FHQ 12.10.40

- 1) The Führer has decided that from now on until the Spring, preparations for landing in England will be maintained purely as a military and political threat.

Should the intention of a landing in England in Spring or early Summer 1941 be renewed, the necessary state of preparedness will be ordered in sufficient time beforehand, until then the military groundwork for a later landing will be further improved.

- 2) All measures concerning the relaxing of the state of readiness for attack must be regulated from the following viewpoints:

/ (a) ...

- (a) The English must retain the impression that from now on we are preparing to land on a large scale.
- (b) At the same time however, German domestic economy will be released of a burden.

3) Army

Those groups intended for operation Seelöwe will undergo reorganisation and will be at disposal for other employment. In carrying this out, noticeable decreases of occupying forces in coastal areas will be avoided.

Navy

Preparations both of personnel and material will be relaxed in such a way that the necessary personnel and tonnage, especially fishing boats and tugs will revert to carrying out their tasks of sea warfare and commerce. All the necessary shipping movements connected with the release will be carried out unostentatiously over a lengthy period of time. As far as possible they will be used for merchant shipping and transport of captured material.

- 4) HQ staffs will be asked to report to GHQ the measures taken for relaxing preparations for operation Seelöwe as well as the length of time to refit for the 10-day preparation period for 20.10.40.

C-in-C Armed Forces
Signed KEITEL

OKW

FHQs 22.10.40

Directive for deception of enemy (ref. Seelöwe)

In view of the order to call off preparations for operation Seelöwe, directions for deception of the enemy (7.8.40) will be supplemented as follows:

Aim of deception

From now on, England must continue to be under threat of a landing, thereby the impression must gain ground that Norway is always said to be the main focus of preparation.

Execution

- 1) The OKW overseas Security Section in cooperation with the OKW will give out reports with the following trend:

The vast elaborate preparation observed on the Channel Coast for an imminent (or fake) operation have, according to German opinion, fully attained their objective, that is they have finally diverted English attention to the South Coast. Since the situation in England is becoming increasingly acute and will accord favourable conditions for a landing within reasonable time, preparations will henceforth be more strongly concentrated at the most important assembly base - Norway. Troops, complete with supplies will be shipped there. On the basis of experience gained on the Channel coast, the landing fleet will not be held in

/ readiness ...

readiness in Norwegian harbours but will be used for military purposes and merchant shipping to the Northern States in such a way that when the demand arises, they can speedily be assembled in shipping harbours. In addition to the preparations in Norway, others will continue in other "assembly" harbours.

2) Army

In order to avoid obvious changes in the Channel zone dispersal will be carried out as follows:

The divisions of the First Wave will be withdrawn from the coast so that their most forward element will be billeted about 20 kms from the harbours.

Groups I and II of motorised groups (second wave) will be billeted in the rear areas of 9th and 16th Armies.

Groups II and III, for the time being, will be transferred to Germany for reorganisation.

Coast defence will, as hitherto, be carried out by divisions which have not been allocated to Seelöwe.

Embarkation and similar exercises will be carried out both in Norway and on the Western end of the Channel front in order to deceive the enemy.

3) Part of the transport allotted to Seelöwe (that is about the number needed for the first "jump off") will remain on the Channel coast to hide the fact of dispersal, and will at the same time facilitate embarkation exercises in connection with the Army. The remaining units of the transport fleet will be gradually absorbed into commerce, under suitable weather conditions, spreading the movement over a considerable time. This partial dispersal of shipping for employment for Norwegian traffic should strengthen the impression in England that Norway is to be the focus of preparation for invasion. Whenever possible, ships temporarily delayed in Norway will be used for landing exercises.

4) Air Force

As has been announced by the Air Force, air cover for harbours and shipping remains unchanged.

5) Since there is no likelihood of success with spoof wireless in connection with Seelöwe, the idea has been given up.

6) HQ Staffs will be asked during the autumn and winter to report to OKW (Security Section III) in good time, what measures they have taken to deceive the enemy and make the counter-espionage reports plausible.

C-in-C Armed Forces
Signed pp KEITEL