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THE UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

THE EFFECTS
OF
STRATEGIC BOMBING
ON
JAPANESE MORALE

Morale Division

June 1947



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JUL 29 1947

This report was written primarily for the use of the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conclusions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as limited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpretation in the light of further studies conducted by the Survey.

FOREWORD

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was established by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944, pursuant to a directive from the late President Roosevelt. Its mission was to conduct an impartial and expert study of the effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be used in connection with air attacks on Japan and to establish a basis for evaluating the importance and potentialities of air power as an instrument of military strategy for planning the future development of the United States armed forces and for determining future economic policies with respect to the national defense. A summary report and some 200 supporting reports containing the findings of the Survey in Germany have been published.

On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested that the Survey conduct a similar study of the effects of all types of air attack in the war against Japan, submitting reports in duplicate to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy. The officers of the Survey during its Japanese phase were:

Franklin D'Olier, *Chairman*,
Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, *Vice
Chairmen*.
Harry L. Bowman,
J. Kenneth Galbraith,
Rensis Likert,
Frank A. McNamee, Jr.,
Fred Searls, Jr.,
Monroe E. Spaght,
Dr. Lewis R. Thompson,
Theodore P. Wright, *Directors*.
Walter Wilds, *Secretary*.

The Survey's complement provided for 300 civil-

ians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The military segment of the organization was drawn from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and from the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all possible assistance in furnishing men, supplies, transport, and information. The Survey operated from headquarters established in Tokyo early in September 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and with mobile teams operating in other parts of Japan, the islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland.

It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime Japanese military planning and execution, engagement by engagement, and campaign by campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on Japan's economy and war production, plant by plant, and industry by industry. In addition, studies were conducted on Japan's over-all strategic plans and the background of her entry into the war, the internal discussions and negotiations leading to her acceptance of unconditional surrender, the course of health and morale among the civilian population, the effectiveness of the Japanese civilian defense organization, and the effects of the atomic bombs. Separate reports will be issued covering each phase of the study.

The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japanese military, government, and industrial officials. It also recovered and translated many documents which not only have been useful to the Survey, but also will furnish data valuable for other studies. Arrangements have been made to turn over the Survey's files to the Central Intelligence Group, through which they will be available for further examination and distribution.



Japan and the Japanese:
A compact island nation.
A relatively homogeneous people.
Relatively small resources.
A regimented society.

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"When air raids got severe, and there was no opposition by our planes, and factories were destroyed, I felt as if we were fighting machinery with bamboo . . . We could hardly stand it. The government kept telling us that we would defeat the United States forces after they lauded here, but as my house was burned down and I had no food, clothing, or shelter, I didn't know how I could go on."

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The air attack on Japan was directed against the nation as a whole, not only against specific military targets, because of the contributions in numerous ways of the civilian population to the fighting strength of the enemy, and to speed the securing of unconditional surrender. The American attack against the "total target" was successful. In addition to enormous physical destruction, the strategic bombing of the home islands produced great social and psychological disruption and contributed to securing surrender prior to the planned invasion.

This report, which is in part a history of Japanese morale during the war, uses "morale" as a shorthand term for a complex of factors which indicate the willingness and capacity of the Japanese to follow their leaders and to work and sacrifice to win the war. A cross-section survey of Japanese civilians, special interrogations, and a wealth of Japanese documents (most never intended for foreign eyes) have been used in the analysis.

Principal reliance has been placed on the cross-section interviews, and in interpreting the findings it is important to understand the limitations of the sample used. The sample gives a relatively accurate miniature of the Japanese adult civilian population, excluding those living in Hokkaido, Shikoku, and certain remote parts of Kyushu (Chapter 2 and Appendix I).

Over-All Effects

At the time of Pearl Harbor the Japanese people were a little weary of the China war and were not spoiling for a fight with the United States. Their first reaction to the news of war was apprehension; but in the wake of the early Japanese victories their spirits rose markedly. Thereafter, and especially after the loss of Saipan, their morale began to disintegrate. The process was one in which an accumulation of prolonged war weariness, social unrest, increasing consumer shortages (especially of food) and a succession of military reverses weakened the will to resist. Then air attack brought direct and immediate pressure on large segments of the population, and morale abruptly went into decline.

Analysis of an important component of morale—confidence in victory—indicates that once the decline set in, in the latter part of 1944, morale cracked

at an ever increasing rate (Charts 1 and 2). Military reverses and air raids were said by the Japanese to have been the most important factors in causing them to doubt victory or to become certain that Japan could not win. Consumer shortages were relatively much more important in making individuals feel unable to continue fighting than in causing them to feel uncertain of victory.

The importance of the air attacks in depressing morale is indicated by the fact that Japanese said they were:

The most important single factor in causing them to have doubts of victory.

The most important single factor in causing them to feel certain of defeat.

The most important single factor in making them unwilling to continue the war.

Their greatest worry during the war, and the thing which made most of them happy that the war was over.

Supporting morale were a number of factors from which the Japanese drew strength to continue, namely:

Fear of the consequences of defeat.

Faith in the "spiritual" strength and invincibility of the nation.

Obedience to and faith in the Emperor.

The black-out of information about the war.

Despite these, however, morale did fall and deterioration of the social fabric became general. People became critical of their leaders and lost confidence in one another. Even though the unity of the nation was falling apart, people were not able to organize for revolt; they simply became more and more obsessed with finding individual solutions to their own severe and urgent personal problems.

Direct Effects of Bombing

As a result of the American air offensive against Japan, 500 separate targets were bombed and an average of 43 percent of Japan's 66 largest cities were destroyed. More than two-thirds of the civilian population experienced air raids, and more than one-third personally experienced bombing. As estimated from the Morale Division sample survey, approximately 1,300,000 people were injured and approximately 900,000 killed as a result of the

bombings.¹ Bombing, or the threat of bombing, resulted in mass disruption of the lives of countless millions of people, including the evacuation of more than 8,500,000 persons from cities.

The primary emotional response to the bombings was fright and terror. Many people abandoned their "battle stations" as fire fighters and fled to shelters when the raids overwhelmed defenses.

Night bombing was feared more than daylight bombing, and high explosives were feared more than incendiaries.

The Japanese were dissatisfied with air-raid protection and post-raid welfare services. Significantly, they more often blamed their own leaders for the raids rather than the Americans.

Bombing Experience and Morale

As previously noted, many Japanese mentioned air attack as the principal reason for their defeatist feelings during the war. A good proportion of the people who spoke of air attack influence, however, had only indirect experience with bombing—they had seen planes fly overhead, they had read or heard of the destruction of the raids, their friends and relatives had been bombed out, or they suffered some deprivation as a result of the economic and social disorganization caused by the raids. But, in many cases, they had not personally undergone bombing. In order to obtain some measure of the specific effects of bombing experience on morale, bombed persons were compared with unbombed, and those in heavily bombed cities were compared with those in less heavily bombed and damaged places.

The principal conclusion drawn from these comparisons is that personal and community bombing experiences did not produce sharp differences in morale. The effects of bombing in depressing morale were pervasive and affected the entire population, not merely those who personally experienced raids or lived in heavily bombed places. Besides, such variables as military losses and consumer deprivations were at work, uniformly undermining morale in all places.

Some differences do appear when comparisons are made, however:

More of the bombed persons tended to feel that the attitudes and behavior of Japanese toward each other changed for the worse.

More of the bombed persons tended to feel that there was inequality of suffering.

More of the bombed persons tended to become critical of both home front and military leaders.

The extent of certainty that Japan could not win because of air attack tended to increase with bombing experience.

The more people were bombed, the more they tended to become unwilling personally to go on with the war.

People who were bombed, in sum, tended to have lower morale than unbombed people.

Small but consistent differences between bombed and unbombed people, and between people in heavily bombed and lightly or unbombed cities, give support to these conclusions.

Morale and Work Behavior

Japanese labor was pressed into war service by sweeping mobilization laws. As hostility and resentment developed, the laws were brutally enforced.

When the morale of various occupational groups and industries is compared, it is found more closely to correspond rather than to vary. Some of the more significant differences are that the professional, managerial and official groups—the leaders of the home front—had probably the lowest morale, doubted victory earlier and proportionately more at all times, and were certain of defeat earlier than other occupational groups. This may have been due partly to the greater access of these groups to official and unofficial information about military losses, which was kept from the mass of the population. The next lowest groups, ranked according to morale, were manual workers, farmers, and white collar workers. The non-working group—housewives and students—had the highest morale.

Despite rigorous manpower controls and heavy propaganda campaigns to keep workers at their jobs, about three in every five members of the Japanese labor force admitted to being absent one or more days during the war months of 1945. Approximately two in every five workers admitted absence of more than 14 days during this period.

Urban people were absent more than rural; manual workers more than other occupational groups. Sickness was the most frequent reason given for absence, the necessity of making provision for family needs was the next most common, and third were reasons related to the work situation: damaged factories, disrupted transportation, and lack of materials.

¹ Somewhat corrected estimates of injured and killed, derived from official Japanese sources, are respectively about 475,000 and 330,000. For discussion of the differences between the cross-section survey estimates and the estimates based on Japanese sources, see Appendix J.

The members of the labor force with the highest morale appear to have been absent least, but for the rest of the labor force there appears to be no discernible relation between morale and absenteeism.

Air attacks were cited as an important reason for absenteeism and lowered morale, but the chief effect of bombing appears to have been on the capacity of the people to work. The workers would still go to work or could still be forced to go, but they could neither be utilized nor driven to produce as in previous years. The effects of the raids reached into all segments of the economy in a remarkably consistent way, and the small differentials which appeared were in a direction most crippling to the economy: the leaders, the factory workers and the farmers were most affected.

Evacuation and Morale

Widespread and disruptive evacuation—mass flight from the cities—was an important secondary consequence of bombing. Although the authorities had early made plans for a selective and orderly evacuation, the great mass of evacuees did not leave their homes and cities until the danger from raids was imminent or until they actually had been bombed out. The mass movement from the cities began after the great fire raids on Tokyo in March 1945; when the provincial cities were struck in the last months of the war, their populations, too, began to leave.

It is estimated that more than 8,500,000 persons moved—roughly one-fourth of the urban population of Japan. They were a selected group, but not selected entirely on the basis established by government orders. In general, those persons moved who could move—women, children and the young. Significantly, about one-third of the evacuees were war workers, of whom only one out of nine said he left because his place of work had been evacuated. Many left because they had been bombed out; others left to escape bombing and to relieve their anxieties. Although, from the standpoint of livelihood, the evacuees tended to have a hard time, their reception in refuge areas was good, and they found safety. They spread all over the islands—wherever they had rural or other urban roots or connections to which they could obtain transportation.

Those whose morale was least stable were the most likely to evacuate, and at the time of their evacuation their morale reached a low point. Thereafter, their spirits no longer declined; relieved of the anxiety about bombings, their morale may have recovered a little, but by then the damage had been

done. Both by the stories they told and the way in which they acted, evacuees had a most unsettling effect upon the communities in which they sought refuge. They went everywhere, spreading news of disaster and eating into the meager resources of their hosts.

Their leaving resulted in disorganization of family life, and the abandonment of passive defense against bombing in their communities, which were already under heavy strain from the physical results of bombing. Yet it could not have been avoided. No matter how bad the results of evacuation, millions of people were forced from their homes. Had they been physically restrained within their own city limits, the results would have been even more disruptive. The breakdown of defense, the limited resources of the nation, and the organizational inefficiency of the government created a situation in which evacuation could only be a disaster for the war effort.

But evacuation did at least serve a purpose for the people. It was a last desperate individual measure to cope with a situation which could not be overcome. It did provide safety and security for some against the horrors of war.

The Atomic Bombings

Physically devastating as the atomic bombs were in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, their effects on Japanese morale were limited by a number of factors. Among these factors: only two of these bombs were dropped, and not until late in the war when other influences had already driven the Japanese into approaching desperation; and the news of the bombs was effectively confined for a time to the immediate vicinity of the two cities.

The two target cities largely had been spared from heavy air attacks prior to the atomic bombings in order to provide relatively "pure" cases for measuring the results. Therefore, morale prior to the bombings was comparatively high. Reactions to the explosions were indescribable terror and panic. However, less than one-fifth of the people who were living in or near the two cities after the explosion expressed hatred of the Americans for using the bombs. Like the people of other cities, they turned most of their resentment against their own leaders.

In the months following the surrender, news of the bombs spread throughout Japan and, when the survey was made, only an insignificant portion of the people had not heard of them. Even fewer throughout the country than in Hiroshima and

Nagasaki felt hatred of the Americans for using the bombs, and many expressed admiration for the scientific know-how behind them.

From the standpoint of the politics of surrender—and by August 1945 politics was the key—the atom bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not essential. From its studies of Japanese resources, military position, and ruling class politics, the Survey estimates that the government would have surrendered prior to 1 November and certainly before the end of the year, whether or not the atomic bombs had been dropped and Russia had entered the war. In the 10 to 15 weeks between the actual and probable surrender dates, the air attack from the Marianas, augmented by the Okinawa-based forces, would have reached a new high. Furthermore, morale probably would have continued its already steep decline to complete demoralization. The atomic bombs hastened surrender, but did not themselves provide the major motive. In any case, the mounting aerial bombardment, the growing production and economic crisis, and declining morale in August and September would have weakened the position of the die-hard militarists in the ruling coalition, and added urgency to the maneuvers of the conservative peace faction, faced with the threat of a completely disorganized and grumbling populace.

Morale Information and Control

Japan, in ways characteristic of embattled totalitarianism, choked off the channels which are normally open in representative governments for communication between the policy makers and the people. In their place a variety of repressive and directive controls over popular thought and feeling was established.

The highly centralized educational system was readily bent to the purposes of the militarists. The Army progressively brought the schools under its heel after 1935. Youth corps were developed, and the inculcation of nationalistic ideas was systematically carried on among teachers. By every measure the program succeeded, and the energies and enthusiasm of youth were harnessed to the purposes of the state.

Religion as an instrument of social control was formalized and exploited with great deliberateness. Adherence to State Shinto as a national belief was required of all Japanese, and the basic tenets of Emperor-worship and blind obedience to the purposes of the state became convenient moral justification for wartime expansionism.

The "sectarian religions" were more difficult to mobilize, and some were viewed as a threat to the established control pattern. All religions were closely supervised, organized, and even consolidated. But these controls did not succeed wholly in preventing or weeding out undesirable aberrations on the part of the Christians, Buddhists, or even sect Shintoists during the war. Despite the diligent efforts of the government to build the priests and churches into the war program, it does not appear that they served as active morale builders in the final crisis, or that they were effective propagandizing agents during the war.

Government propaganda and information activity was relatively ineffective despite the fact that its authority over the mass information media was complete. It was hampered by a failure on the part of the highest officials to recognize the importance of propaganda and information control, and by factionalism and splits within the ruling group. Army-Navy conflict in particular made difficult the coordination of news releases.

Other contemporary dictatorships have grasped and developed totalitarian controls with the aid of highly disciplined political mass organizations. This was not necessary in Japan for the militarists to climb to power: they had only to exploit the factional strife among political leaders in order to become dominant. Some attempts were made, after their accession, to develop political organizations to buttress militarist rule, but in general the organizations lacked a mass base of their own, were split with factionalism and were comparatively ineffective. Only the Imperial Rule Assistance Association Youth Corps succeeded in becoming a vigorous, well-indoctrinated political group.

Despite such guidance efforts and despite the considerable social discipline which had become a basic trait of Japanese society, the problem of subversion was considered threatening. Communists and other leftists were the chief suspects, but ultranationalists and Christians were also kept under surveillance.

Some activities considered subversive by the government occurred among all groups. Most of these activities seem to have sprung from privations suffered, rather than from ideological convictions. The police establishment, which consisted of two independent and poorly coordinated agencies, owed much of its effectiveness to settled habits of conformity and deference to established authority among the population. It operated in an aura of fear which was sufficiently awe-inspiring to cover

up obvious inadequacies of operation; even when military police and civil police clashed, both of them continued to be feared, though perhaps not respected.

Propaganda and Counterpropaganda in Japan

The Japanese propagandists made elaborate attempts to hide the progress of the war from the people, but they were betrayed by events. For a time, prior to the bombing of the home islands, the people believed official assertions as to what was happening to the south of the home islands. But once the facts of the war were brought home personally to the people by privation and the ruin of air raids, Japanese propaganda progressively lost its effect.

American propaganda to Japan had limited effects. Where it succeeded, it did so for the same reason that the Japanese effort failed. It was able to take advantage of a series of events which were known to the Japanese people and which their government could not effectively deny. Where American propaganda directly reached its audience, it had the most chance to be successful.

Morale and the Decision to Surrender

Even in Japan, a "police state" which was characterized by ruthless suppression of dissidence and organized pressure for conformity, the level of popular morale was an underlying influence in the decision to surrender. This was the case despite the fact that public opinion in Japan was traditionally more often ignored than heeded.

As a political force, morale found its opportunity for expression in the existence of factions within the controlling group. Although acquiescence in the military adventure was fairly general in the early days of the war, there were fissures within the governing group which gradually widened as reverses occurred. A faction emerged which had more to lose by continuing the war than by surrender, and popular morale was involved in this struggle in two ways. First, as morale disintegrated, it was seen as an internal threat to the oligarchy. In this way deteriorated morale assisted in forcing the hand of the conservative peace group; secondly, the low state of morale was counted upon by the peace faction as insurance against public support of a coup d'etat by the militarist die-hards, should that be attempted.

Aftermath of the War

The surrender announcement dazed and saddened the Japanese people. Though most of them had long since suspected that Japan could not win, they

held on to a last desperate hope. The snapping of this last thread, plus apprehension about what would follow the surrender, left them deeply depressed, happy only that the horror of the air raids had stopped.

Nevertheless, the cessation of the raids did not mean the end of suffering and privation for the Japanese. Food was extremely short, black marketeering was rife, and severe inequities existed in the distribution of the limited supplies of all necessities. As a result, the mass of the population had little time for or interest in political affairs as such. They were driven to forage individually for food to keep alive.

Hence, their suggestions for social and political changes in Japan were vague and scattered. The emotional attachment to the sole symbol of unity and security in the disorganized nation—the Emperor—remained strong; but he did not fill the need for leadership in political affairs. Individuals varied as to whether they looked to Japan's past, to Russia, or to the United States for guidance in the future. But one fact was crystal clear; leadership was needed, in the form of an ideology, a symbol, a program, and a set of national goals.

The reactions to the initial phases of American occupation must be viewed in this context of a need for social and economic direction. The Japanese were happily surprised by the behavior of American troops after they arrived, and they were overwhelmingly favorable in their comments. But reactions were almost entirely in terms of troop behavior, not American policies. There was a tendency, already noticeable in the early months of the occupation, for the Japanese not only to accept the dictates of the conquerors willingly, but also to shift responsibility for the physical welfare of the nation to them. There doubtless will be blame placed upon the conquerors if this imputed responsibility is not met or shifted back. The difficulty is thus twofold. That the subsistence problem be solved is imperative; but the choice of means to accomplish this end must be governed by a regard for the fact that unless the Japanese are guided in the direction of self-help, the policy may produce a potentially rebellious dependency, not a democracy, in Japan.

Conclusion

Japan, by the time of the surrender, was a thoroughly defeated nation. Her war machine was starved for materials by the blockade and smashed by bombardment; her population was burned out, injured, and caused to flee in large numbers.

Throughout the small nation the effects of the bombings were remarkably uniform. The effects were general more than specific, and were not confined to the target areas. The drop in morale which took place throughout the country was not the fac-

tor which defeated Japan, but it was one important factor among several. At the time the surrender was announced, it was rapidly becoming of greater importance as a pressure on the political and military decisions of the rulers of the country.



Contacting a respondent selected for interview in the cross-section survey. The Japanese man is an official of a local ration board, from whose lists respondents were chosen. Navy language officer makes appointment for interview.



At the appointed time, the respondent, dressed in her best, leaves her home, escorted by language officer. He carries sampling list, to insure that the right person is coming.



The Survey provided transportation to the interviewing rooms. In many cities, local transportation was seriously disrupted by the bombings.



Waiting for the interview.



The interview: The respondent has been greeted and brought to his desk by the interviewer. He is an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, who has spent many years in Japan.

PURPOSES AND METHODS OF THE MORALE SURVEY

Why Study Morale?

There may be those who feel that civilian morale is a matter which can be ignored in the strategic planning of war. But among the great majority of professional military men, and among other citizens as well, morale has come to be recognized as one of the primary targets of attack and an essential consideration in the organization of defense.

Tojo's chief cabinet secretary, among others, testified that the Premier was almost completely uninterested in Japanese civilian morale during the war. It was not so much that he felt he could rely upon it—it was more that he deemed it unimportant, according to the testimony. Yet even Tojo and his government took morale into consideration in deciding to go to war with the United States. The original Japanese strategic plan, in part, contemplated the quick occupation and fortification of a Western Pacific island perimeter, while the United States was slowly mobilizing its strength. The stubborn defense of this captured perimeter over a long period of time would undermine the determination of Americans to support the war. The plan pre-supposed an eventual negotiated peace, favorable to Japan, as the consequence. For, as the Chairman's report of the USSBS puts it:

The weakness of the United States as a democracy would make it impossible for her to continue all-out offensive action in the face of the losses which would be imposed by fanatically resisting Japanese soldiers, sailors and airmen, and the elimination of its Allies. The United States in consequence would compromise and allow Japan to retain a substantial portion of her initial territorial gains.

Tojo's evaluation of the will to resist and the will to win of the American people proved wrong.¹ The dark days of 1941-42 did not crack American morale. And, when the tables were turned, his own people were put to the test.

The war against Japan exemplified clearly a number of the distinguishing characteristics of modern warfare. The attack was directed against the nation as a whole—not only against the army, the fleet, the factories and the supply lines, but also against the entire population and its ability and will to resist. Thus the people of Japan were directly and indirectly involved in the fight. American bombs were aimed at them and their homes because of their critical importance to the fighting strength

of the enemy. They were workers, and the ultimate outcome or length of the contest rested in good part on their output of weapons and tools. They were citizens whose willingness to make sacrifices would enable the enemy to throw his full strength into the fight, or whose unwillingness to make sacrifices would require him to turn resources away from the purposes of the war. They were fire fighters or victory gardeners, whose courageous participation in the war effort would strengthen the enemy's resistance, or whose fright and apathy would turn them into evacuees or black marketeers. They were relatives of men in the fighting forces who could either encourage or discourage the soldiers by what they said and did.

They were potential fighters whose indifference or resentment about the war might cause the political and military leaders of the nation to doubt the nation's ability to resist invasion or even continue its support for the war. Finally, and of great importance, they were potential saboteurs and revolutionaries, who, if they became sufficiently angry at their leaders and the state of affairs, could organize and threaten the institutions of the state.

The American attack against the civilian population of Japan was successful. In addition to enormous physical destruction, the strategic bombing of the home islands produced comparably great psychological and social disruption. These latter consequences limited the capacity of the nation to produce to the limit of its plant and resources and were persuasive influences in causing the leaders of Japan to surrender before the inevitable, costly, bloody invasion occurred. This report will be a partial history of Japanese wartime morale and of what bombing did to morale. Together with the reports on physical damage, health, and economic effects prepared by other divisions of the Survey, it forms part of the total picture of devastation which was heaped on the enemy.

Definition and Measurement of Morale

Although this report is not addressed primarily to an audience of social scientists, some refinement and exact definition of the much-abused term "morale" is necessary. The concept of "morale" comes into common use in wartime, but there is generally

¹ As a matter of fact, the military clique held to this view to the end! In resisting the pressures toward surrender applied by the peace group within the government, the militarists argued that the American casualties resulting from the repulse of the expected invasion of the home islands would lead to a negotiated peace.

little agreement on what the term means. Definitions are dodged.

Morale is no simple thing. It is a concept constructed to explain or predict certain events, and not everyone necessarily constructs it the same way. Its essential components may vary in importance in war and in an era of reconstruction. Similarly, differences exist in what is important in morale for a nation on the offensive and a nation which is on the defensive.

Basically, however, most definitions agree that morale of a group in wartime is as "good" as its consistent long-term readiness to persevere against the enemy and against hardships, and to work together under leadership to achieve the common goals. The implication is that there exists a commonly accepted series of goals in which the individual feels he has a stake, and that there are socially defined channels through which the individual may work toward these goals. In a nation on the defensive, struggling to prevent the enemy from imposing his will upon the group, morale has often been termed "the will to resist," and the aspect of morale expressed in willingness to sacrifice and yet continue the struggle has been stressed. At times, it has been termed "the will to win."

Because it is not a directly measurable quality, the evaluation of morale among the members of a society involves evaluation of its components.²

1. The most general evaluation can be made in terms of the individual's personal willingness to go on with the war, his war weariness, or the attitude he would have toward national surrender.

2. Personal acceptance of the purposes of the war: i. e., personal identification with the common goals.

3. Confidence in the possibility of achieving these goals—confidence in victory.

4. Confidence in leadership.

a. Military leaders—ability to achieve victory, protect the people from attack, and retaliate against enemy attacks.

b. Civil leaders—ability to take care of and concern for home front welfare.

5. Group solidarity—feeling that all elements in the population are working together, and making equal sacrifices.

6. Psychological and physical well-being of the individual.

a. Security or insecurity engendered by the

organizational efficiency of the community and of the nation.

b. Sense of orientation—feeling of knowing what is happening in community, nation, and war (even though the knowledge may be objectively false).

c. Fear of the consequences of defeat, and reaction to the enemy. Many people regard anxiety and fear as equivalent to "poor" morale. Actually, under some circumstances, fear of the consequences of defeat can be a morale-building factor.

d. Feeling of well-being, based on living circumstances, standard of living, and physical health. General security or insecurity in daily living.

In sum, what we shall consider represents the individual's hopes, fears, aspirations, his sense of security, and his attitudes. The ultimate test of morale lies in concrete manifestations of support of the war: work behavior and work attendance, compliance with wartime restrictions, acceptance of wartime deprivations, extent of disruptive behavior such as black market activity and rumor-mongering, amount of subversive and oppositional activity against the status quo, and reactions to critical events such as surrender.

However, the way in which and the extent to which morale expresses itself in overt behavior does not depend solely on the psychological bases of morale. To evaluate morale in a totalitarian state from behavior alone, during a period of defeat, is to underestimate the depression of war-supporting attitudes and motives. First, overt expression of morale tends to be kept down because of long indoctrination in the necessity for overt obedience, and fear of police and police spies. Then, lack of knowledge of the attitudes of other members of the wider social group, who are under similar restraints, prevents expression for fear of the strong group sanctions against unseemly behavior. Psychologically, morale can sink quite low, confidence in victory, leaders, and social solidarity can decline, but in a "police state," and in a society in which group solidarity is so highly valued, this is mostly expressed in apathy and negativism, as it was in Japan, and only obliquely in positive ways.³ If a measure of nonconformist behavior exists, it can be reasonably assumed that morale has fallen more

² The factors listed here were considered the components of morale for the purposes of this study. The Morale Index, used extensively in this report, provides a composite measure (Appendix K).

³ Being under attack from without tends to promote cohesion in a society, at least initially, experience has shown. The group sanctions against speaking out, unless things are genuinely and universally bad in a group, are very strong.

than the nonconformism indicates. (Indeed, the data bear this out for Japan.) Personally, an individual can feel extremely defeatist, depressed, despairing, and anxious. Yet while he is still a member of a functioning society, or while he lives under police surveillance, he may have no recourse but to go along.

From these statements, this much should be clear: This report does not construe "morale" to be "what a worker in a war plant feels" after a theatrical performance and rally during his lunch hour. The sense of participation in the war effort engendered may affect morale positively, but it is not what we mean by "morale" here. Similarly, fears must not be interpreted as "poor morale." There is, in fact, a large amount of clinical and observational material to show that fear may as often raise morale as lower it, depending on what action is taken as a result of fear. What is meant by morale here is best summarized in two phrases: confidence in victory, and social solidarity.

In the measurement of morale, then, many indicators or combinations of indicators may be used—some attitudinal, others behavioral. Often the morale effects of external events and individual experiences will be most clearly manifest in one or more of the components, and not necessarily all, or in one particular type of behavior rather than another. However, the understanding of over-all morale requires analysis of many of its aspects. The weakness of one aspect may be more than compensated for by the heightened strength of another. Furthermore, it was technically most convenient to measure the timing of decline of morale only for the component of confidence in victory. In the analysis presented in this report, morale has been measured generally as a composite of elements, and segmentally in terms of its components.

Research Approaches and The Sample

Cross-section survey. Several kinds of research materials have been used in the analysis. Primarily, the attempt is made to present findings in quantitative, statistical terms. Therefore great reliance has been placed on some 3,150 interviews which were held with a carefully selected cross-section of the Japanese population. Interviews were conducted between 10 November and 29 December 1945. All respondents were asked a standard set of questions by a staff of interviewers who spoke acceptable Japanese and were of Japanese ancestry. If a respondent happened to be an evacuee, if members of his family had evacuated, or if he lived in a

community to which evacuees had come during the war, he was asked an additional set of questions.

In interpreting the results presented which are based on the sample survey, it is important that the limitations of the sample which was used be thoroughly understood.

1. Because Morale Division was commissioned to survey the morale of the wartime civilian population of Japan, all persons who served in the armed forces at any time during the Greater East Asia war were excluded from the sample. This means that the young men of Japan are under-represented in the data presented here.

2. Because of practical difficulties of time and in supplying and affording military protection to field teams, it was necessary to exclude the following areas of the Japanese home islands from the sample: Hokkaido, Shikoku, and southeastern Kyushu, in addition to the very small islands scattered off the coasts.

3. Only persons between the ages of 16 and 70 years were interviewed, and persons extremely ill or in institutions such as prisons and asylums were excluded.

Throughout the report, where it is stated that findings represent the views of "the Japanese people," it will be understood that such an expression is merely a convenient shorthand for what the sample represents in an exact sense, as specified above. However, few sharp differences were found between the urban and rural areas surveyed, and differences between the several regions of the country in which interviews were taken were not great, so there are some grounds for expecting that the sample used is roughly representative even for those sections of the home islands in which interviews were not taken. Furthermore, the population from which the sample was drawn included about 86 percent of the civilians of the nation.

Interrogation of informed persons. The second major source of data for this analysis was interrogations held with specially chosen local and national Japanese leaders and well-qualified informants. Their opinions have been used throughout as secondary evidence to illustrate or explain the data from the cross-section interviews, except in the sections dealing with propaganda, the police, and the decision to surrender, in which the opinions of top officials in the various agencies have been accepted, of course, as the basic sources of information as to what government policy was, for instance, or what official actions were taken (Appendix II).

Background studies. The third major source of information was local officials and prominent individuals in each area in which sample interviews were conducted. On forms supplied by the Survey, these persons were asked to give a large amount of factual information about the locality, such as crime rates during the war, changes in morale, number of casualties from bombing, absenteeism in local plants, etc. This factual information has been used as background data in terms of which other findings might be interpreted. In all cases it was supplemented by interviewing or background data sources (Appendices F and G).⁴

Documentary and other materials. Finally, various other sources have been exploited. A large number of Japanese publications and secret documents have been translated and used. The material collected by other divisions of USSBS have been drawn upon freely in all cases where corroboration was necessary or where conflicting evidence had to be reconciled. In general, consistent attempts were made to verify facts by seeking information from a number of independent sources.

The Special Case of Japan

What happened to morale in Japan under bombing was obviously something of a special case because of a number of factors which operated in Japan and which would be present to a different degree or absent altogether in another situation. Which is simply to say that every country will react to catastrophe in ways which are somewhat peculiar to itself. As a result, under the same degree of disruption from outside the Japanese would show a greater degree of conformity and obedience than many other peoples might. A number of the factors which might differentiate Japan from other countries can readily be identified.

Geographically, Japan is comparatively small and isolated. Partly as a result of this, it might be expected that it would be possible for the government to suppress news of distant military defeats, but it would be most difficult to suppress news of the effects of bombings of the home island, and the ubiquitous sight of the B-29, coming and going from raids. Thus, communication of the plight of the compact nation to all areas could be accomplished by means which did not require elaborate radio, newspaper, and telephone systems. The rural origins of many city people made communication by letter or word of mouth particularly effective.

⁴ In addition, mayors and local police officials prepared statements, often very extensive, on morale trends, living conditions, reactions to propaganda, and conditions among workers.

More than the people of Russia, the United States, and Germany, the people of Japan are homogeneous in background, and even think of themselves as one great family. From the standpoint of the military leaders of Japan, this had great advantages. The problems and frictions that might arise from the presence of many sizable minority groups were minimized. Moreover, it was possible to build propaganda appeals on a common national base of tradition, cultural ties, and group feeling.

The propagandists and educators of Japan did not fail to capitalize on this advantage. By the time of Pearl Harbor the building of the psychological defenses of the nation had long since begun. The importance of the Emperor and the symbol of the nation-family was greatly magnified. People were repeatedly exposed for long periods of time to the doctrine of Japan's "divine mission" in Asia. The Japanese derived considerable "spiritual" strength from the popular racial myths which continued throughout the war.

The low standard of living in Japan, the dearth of natural resources compared to those of the United States, and the vulnerability of the nation to blockade severely limited the extent to which the economic shock of war, including the devastation of the air raids, could be cushioned. High morale in a nation at war depends, among a number of things, upon the assumption of sufficient food to sustain life—and in Japan the threat of starvation was always sufficiently real to be an effective damper on popular enthusiasm.

The lack of traditions of a free press and radio, and the fact that control over the mass media of information was held by a small number of persons made it feasible for the government to establish not only complete censorship of all news, but also, its exclusive right to originate all releases which dealt with the events of the war and political matters. In any country, the more effective the news "black-out" that the government establishes, the more lag there will be between events and public reaction to them. In Japan, because of the isolation of the islands, it was possible to check the spread of bad news about distant military losses to a greater extent than would be possible in other situations.⁵

As discussed previously, the extent to which low morale will be manifested in overt actions depends on several kinds of controls to which the individual

⁵ The arrival of the B-29s confirmed the break-through of information. At first, only rumor and returnees from war zones brought news to members of the general public. From Saipan in July 1944 the government allowed the press to carry bad war news, which it was difficult to hide. It even played up bad news then in an effort to overcome home front apathy.

is subject. Culture patterns and traditions may serve as "internal" restraints upon him; or police controls, the more brutal and extensive they are, serve more effectively as "external" controls. In Japan, police control over the actions and expression of sentiments of the people was intimate, ubiquitous, and ruthless. One would have had to be much more than merely discouraged to have had the temerity to do anything against the militarists. Too, the general lack of experience in national political participation would tend to dissipate much of the discontent engendered by the war, insofar as it was expressed at all, in diffuse grumbling and carping, and in only a few instances of more or less organized and overt antiwar acts.

But perhaps most important in evaluating the extent to which morale developments in Japan during the war may be considered as a case study for general applicability is the fact that the war against America lasted only three and one-half years. The weariness of the long "China Incident" was overcome by initial victories; the moves south, in late 1941-42 acted as "a shot in the arm" to revive morale. In a nation with as well integrated culture as the Japanese, with political institutions and practices developed over many years, and with a totalitarian system of government which was able to exercise unlimited power in the manipulation of the nation, the social fabric and the web of accustomed practices, viewpoints, and relationships are most difficult to destroy in a relatively short period of time. The support of a nation for war may be said to range from enthusiasm and high morale to low morale or apathy, and finally to open revolt. Because of the numerous and powerful internal and external controls on the Japanese, because of the long established national institutions and well-integrated culture patterns, it could hardly be expected that revolt could occur in less than four years of fighting a major opponent, after winning the early part of the war.

On the other hand, powerful forces were operating to divide the country, which might be less important in other lands. Japan began to emerge from her economic and social hermitage less than 100 years ago. In the few decades before the war she had succeeded in superimposing an industrial economy upon a feudal society. As a result, the stresses and strains in the society were great and worked as forces for the fractionation of the nation and the division of its fighting strength. Since the Meiji restoration, Japan has had over 60 more or less local peasant revolts; assassinations of leaders by "radicals" have occurred in crises. The feudal

cultural values of obedience, discipline, and sacrifice had been fairly successfully indoctrinated in the people, even in modern times, and certainly these values were generally conformed to overtly; but the strains were such that the stereotyped "passive Japanese" was more fiction than fact, although the general picture showed strong adherence in behavior to the cultural values; besides, there were very few social channels through which to express popular discontent.

These many factors which influenced the morale of the Japanese during the war were mainly of secondary importance, however, as regards the actual outcome of the conflict. As will be mentioned in succeeding chapters, low morale was not the great factor which caused the Japanese to surrender. But there is considerable evidence that the state of morale in the latter stages of the war, as estimated by the ruling clique, was an important influence in the surrender decision. Constantly falling morale limited the possibilities of fighting off an invasion: to the conservatives, it forebode internal upheaval if unchecked, even in regimented Japan.

The analysis which follows, therefore, should be read not simply as an historical account of certain wartime developments in Japan, nor should too much discount be made for the fact that the Imperial rescript of 14 August 1945 resulted from several factors and not simply the depths of morale. A whirlwind was brewing, which under not very different circumstances could have destroyed a nation's power to wage war months before the surrender, and which under any circumstances might in a few more months have been the critical element in Japan's defeat.

Conclusion

It is impossible to know the extent to which the course of Japanese wartime morale indicates what would happen in other countries at other times. In a more highly industrialized country, with a population made up of several diverse nationalities and spread over a continental land mass, and with a different set of national beliefs and cultural traditions, developments might be different in many ways. And warfare of a different nature than that which the Japanese experienced—including atomic rather than incendiary bombs, for instance, and employing guided rocket missiles rather than B-29s—might produce different specific morale effects. However, the probabilities are that the basic patterns of individual psychological disorganization in war and the deterioration of the social fabric which are described here, would obtain.



Propaganda poster: "The Emperor is the life line of Japan."

Chapter 3

MORALE OF THE NATION AS A WHOLE

Civilian Attitudes on the Eve of Pearl Harbor

In the light of statements made to the Survey by Japanese officials and other prominent and informed individuals, it is clear that the Japanese people at the time war with the United States broke out, were more than a little weary of the sacrifices which the struggle in China had required and were generally hopeful of a peaceful settlement of the "American problem." The consensus of American writers who lived in Japan prior to the start of the war supports this view. The efforts of the government to win popular support for the war in China had not been fruitful enough to suppress what one police chief described as "dilatoriness." Many people were skeptical about government-disseminated news; the many shifts in information policy which occurred in the course of numerous official attempts to whip up enthusiasm caused still further mistrust to develop regarding the alleged purposes and causes of the war.

A high official of the Ministry of Education remarked:

The cause of the China war was always changing. First they said it was to defend the Chinese against Communism, and then they said it was to defend the Chinese and all Orientals against invasion by the Western Powers.

A reflection of the state of affairs was the attempt of the police and the military to "control" the existing disaffection. In 1938, the Special Higher police—the "thought police"—had become greatly concerned with "disturbances on the home front which foment anti-militaristic feelings, exaggerate the calamities of war, and spread rumors." Amendments were enacted to the civil laws and the peace maintenance law in March 1941, imposing stiffer penalties for the expression of "dangerous thoughts," and generally requiring stricter surveillance by the police. But all of these actions were not enough, it seems, to eliminate the problem.

During the period of the China conflict, according to the great majority of persons who gave testimony to the Survey, the Japanese people were on the whole friendly toward the United States. However, as Japanese leaders came more and more to the belief that war with the United States was inevitable, and not far off, they attacked the problem of fostering hostility toward America among their people.

Much of the propaganda, in Japan as in Germany, was on the theme of "encirclement," and took the form of allegations that the United States and Great Britain were frustrating Japan's efforts to "settle" the China war and were enforcing an economic blockade of Japan. Picturing the United States in a bad light undoubtedly had an effect on people's attitudes, but at the time of Pearl Harbor, and in spite of the efforts of the government, it appears that most of the Japanese would have preferred not to have war with the United States.

Japanese officials who were interrogated commonly made a comparison between the degree of popular support for the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 and the more recent one. According to their testimony, when the earlier war broke out there had been "hate," "fierce enmity," and much "strong feeling" against the enemy. Prior to the Russian war, the "mind" of the people was "thoroughly prepared" for war. Dr. Kazuo Kawai, chief editorial writer for the Nippon Times, expressed this view at some length:

I do not think that the popular morale was ever high, even in 1941, at the beginning . . . It was in striking contrast to the Russo-Japanese war. The people then had been taught to hate the Russians and to regard them as enemies, so the war was popular. This time it was a matter of indifference and shock.

Consequently, the news of Pearl Harbor was greeted with mingled feelings in Japan. Some were surprised or shocked; others were apprehensive, fearful, gloomy. For many the news of the opening attack blasted their hopes of peace and filled them with concern.

Whatever their feelings, however, the great mass of the population went along, accepting without open protest the decisions of the rulers. An industrial engineer said:

When war broke out, I felt Japan would lose, but there was no alternative but for Japan to fight. That was the feeling of the majority of the educated class . . . We thought that although we might lose, it couldn't be helped.

A high government official expressed the view as follows:

No one at that time thought that Japan could win against the greatest powers in the world—the United States and Great Britain—but as war was being declared they thought that they must do their desperate best.

Certainly not all groups felt the same about the conflict; there were differences ranging from bright optimism to the darkest pessimism. Most of the population were not delighted by the prospect, however, and the burden upon the police and the propagandists to promote unity was great. However, once plunged into war, it was a case of "sink or swim"; there was no recourse but to follow the national leadership, hope for the best, make maximum efforts toward victory, and feel some security in the oft-stated "facts" that Japan had never lost a war, that her forces were invincible, and that hers was a righteous war.

The militarists were leading—pushing—a population who, through long years of police surveillance and brutality, had no choice but to obey their masters. But profound discontent, growing out of the sacrifices in standard of living which heavy armament expenditures had required, and feelings that sacrifices had not been equally shared were a drag on their efforts. To overcome the resistances it was necessary to exploit the symbols of nationalism—the Emperor, the myth of the nation-family, and the Yamato Damashii (the "spirit" of the "divine race")—to the utmost. It was never contemplated that the war was one for "freedom," "emancipation," or for the "common man," and thus there never existed the possibility of harnessing the energy of social unrest to a positive program of economic war aims. Indeed, it is questionable if these slogans would have had much meaning to the Japanese. Pure faith was the offering made by the official propagandists to the citizens to arouse their enthusiasm, and it appears that the offering was neither especially attractive at the beginning of nor during the war.

The general lack of enthusiasm for further military adventures which characterized home front attitudes prior to Pearl Harbor was followed by a strong upsurge of hope and enthusiasm after the initial Japanese military successes. When news of the rapid succession of victories in the Pacific and on the Asiatic mainland began to pour in, it seemed to the Japanese that their apprehensions had been indeed groundless, and that Japan was on the march to glory.

The state of mind of at least some Japanese, at the time, may be compared in certain respects with that of a type of depressed and insecure person. To get out of his depression, he willingly yields to the first fair wind and allows himself to be borne upwards into the realm of optimism, even though he may at heart entertain misgivings as to where

the wind will ultimately carry him.¹ This optimism can collapse at the prick of adversity—which, in fact, Japanese morale started to do after the middle of 1944. The striking characteristic of Japanese morale during the war with the United States, therefore, was not so much its steadfastness, but rather its extremely steep climb during the period of initial victories and its precipitate fall toward the end.

In the following sections of this chapter an attempt is made to describe in detail the general process of the disintegration of Japanese civilian morale. This process was one in which an accumulation of prolonged war weariness, deprivations, social unrest, and military reverses weakened the foundations of the will to resist; and air power brought to bear in its time, severely battered the undermined structure. Military reverses brought premonitions of defeat; food shortages brought fatigue, questioning of the social structure, and criticism; and finally air power brought direct and immediate pressure on the will and ability to resist. Total demoralization was not accomplished by the time of surrender, but such great inroads had been made that it seemed well on its way. The extent to which the civilian population would have resisted invasion, at the call of the Emperor, is a moot point. The data, however, are persuasive in suggesting that zest for the final battle had taken severe blows.

The Disintegration of Morale

Food, a Foundation of Morale. In the United States the existence of extensive under-employed resources and facilities made it possible to meet the demands of war without really seriously cutting the civilian standard of living. But in Japan, although the resources of Manchuria and other conquered areas were exploited, there was little slack in the economy to be taken up. To equip and supply their fighting forces, Japanese civilians had to make relatively greater material sacrifices than Americans did and, more important, the standard of living which prevailed even in peacetime in Japan contained few luxuries that could be dispensed with. Therefore, the threat of starvation and the reality of meager supplies of all necessities are both fundamentally relevant considerations to any discussion of war-time morale in Japan.

¹ This is not to say that reasonable grounds for optimism didn't exist at the start of the war. The decision to go to war, validated by early victory, was made on assumptions that seemed quite realistic to the leading Japanese at the time (Report of Over-all Effects Division, USSBS). Even those always optimistic had their attitude augmented, at the time of early victory.

As the war continued, the supplies of fish and rice fell seriously, and almost uncontrolled inflation permitted inequities to develop in the distribution of the limited amounts which were available.

Japan normally imported about 20 percent of her food supply, and her vulnerability to blockade made the situation of the people in the homeland particularly precarious. By 1943 imports of rice had fallen 50 percent; by 1944, 70 percent; and by 1945 they had virtually disappeared. In addition, shortages of labor, fertilizer, and farm implements, and the disappearance from cultivation of over a million acres of land between the years 1933 and 1943, combined drastically to lower domestic production of staples and supplemental foods.

Before the war Japan had been a great consumer of fish, but the outbreak of hostilities with the United States changed this greatly. By 1945 the quantity of fish available for food had fallen 35 percent below normal because of wartime restriction on oceanic fishing.

Rice rationing was begun in April 1941. By 1942 it became necessary to mix barley and wheat with the rice ration. Starting with four percent, this adulteration had increased to 18 percent by 1945, when even potatoes were being used to supplement the rice. With rationing and the decrease in food supply, the black market flourished. By March 1944, four percent of the rice and wheat, 36 percent of the vegetables, and 39 percent of the fish consumed were being bought on the black market at fantastic prices. And those who could not pay simply did not eat.

The net result of this situation, the mass of evidence shows, was widespread undernourishment, nutritional disease, social conflict, and depression of the will to resist. The state of apathy induced by the food situation is described in an April 1945 report of the official Domei News Agency to the government:

Other reports describe the existence of such psychology as "our minds are too occupied with the problems of food; as far as the war is concerned, let someone else do it; we are not too greatly interested." Attention should be focused on these statements as barometers which reveal how much more the people are wearied by the problem of obtaining food than by foreign enemies.

The alarming food situation provides the backdrop against which the other factors influencing morale during the war should be interpreted—military reverses, government propaganda, and the effects of air raids.

Early Victory, High Confidence, and the Beginnings of Dismay. For the Japanese, the first few months

of the American war was a paradise of easy victories, and public confidence soared as the good news came in day after day. But this feeling of confidence was not entirely spontaneous—it was also fed by the official propaganda machine. In the early months, up to May 1942, the "line" of the Cabinet Board of Information was that outright victory over the Yankee was certain, and sure to come swiftly. The propagandists and leaders watched the people's spirits climb to new heights—not, however, without misgivings in certain quarters, where it was felt that perhaps the people were being stimulated to overconfidence.

When Japan suffered her first military set-backs—first in the Coral Sea and later at Midway and at Guadalcanal—the news was successfully kept from the people by censorship and misrepresentation. But, as Japanese defeats began to accumulate in the latter months of 1943—at Tarawa and Makin—and still more in the early months of 1944—at Kwajalein and Eniwetok—the bad news became impossible to suppress. The government continued to use a variety of ruses and deceptions to rationalize or explain the defeats, but apprehension began to grow. The Japanese versions of the German inventions of "advances to the rear" and "tactical withdrawals" were slightly more involved, but had the same general purpose: the propaganda maintained that defeats were really "tenshin," the "change of advance to other sectors"—or that Japan was merely consolidating her inner circle of defense and clearing up her outer circle.

However, the facts filtered through to the homeland and were reflected in public attitudes. Documentary and interrogation data are convincing on this point. For example, a report by the information section of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board, dated 22 April 1944, described public reaction to the series of military defeats up to that time. With a little insight one can read between the more optimistic lines the typical introduction to bad news, in official Japanese reports, and see the truth—that many were becoming dismayed at the situation. The report says, in part:

The people from all walks of life were overflowing with hostile feelings to annihilate the enemy, and morale was high. Although our offense and defense have become very serious this year and the Imperial Headquarters announced the landings in the Marshalls, followed by the invasion of Truk and the Marianas, and also the defeats at Kwajalein and Wotje, indicating an unfavorable war situation, the mass still is trusting the military and believing in final victory. However, there are some who are frankly amazed at the quick and mighty strategy of the enemy and fear the threat of invasion of the mainland, some who desire the

announcement of the truth, and some who fear for the safety of our fleet. These people who are vainly driven by anxiety and impatience are not few in number. Those who go to the extreme criticize military strategy, exaggerate the announcement of our losses, and consider the war to have already been decided. Also, those who are totally unconcerned with the war situation and show a trend toward defeat and war-weariness, just longing for speedy end of war, have been seen here and there, and these people are being kept under scrutiny. Furthermore, there is still another group who have been carried away by the victories and are still vaguely holding an optimistic view of the war. This situation necessitates consideration and counter-plan.

The Break in Morale. The first great shock to public confidence, however, came with the loss of Saipan in June-July 1944. It was with the news of that loss—which could not be concealed—that faith in victory was shaken throughout the entire country. The Tojo Cabinet resigned. People tended to become doubtful of official news, and the gap between the military and the people began to widen noticeably. The military propaganda line thereafter shifted; the new line of presentation became:

Although Japan is losing a great deal, there is a large amount of blood-letting on the American side, which is the one thing that the United States fears most. Soon the United States will give up because of her great losses in men although they are winning ground.

Soon after the battle for Leyte opened on 20 October 1944, the regular bombardment of the home islands started from B-29 bases in the Marianas. Until that time popular morale, in outward appearance at least, seemed still secure. But the acids of discouragement, resulting from the mounting and cumulative effects of many factors, had begun to honeycomb its foundations. Thereafter the simultaneous occurrence of air-raid disasters, the spread of news of military defeats, and the cut in rations makes it very difficult to separate the influence of each in producing the sharp drop in morale which followed. It is clear, however, that successive events after the air bombardment began had a greater and greater effect on people's spirits, which suggests that their confidence had been considerably weakened before that time.

The morale effects of the defeat at Leyte must be viewed in that light. The battle for Leyte had been played up to the Japanese public as the climax of Japan's defense—as another "tennosan," a crucial last-stand defense celebrated in Japanese history. When the climax passed as a defeat, and was followed by the unsuccessful stand of Japanese forces on Luzon, hope even for a stalemate declined abruptly.

Thus, while Saipan was a shock to the home front,

really widespread depression and apprehension came after the Philippines campaign. With the Philippine reverses, morale was shaken, even the morale of those who had been comparatively unmoved by military events, either through general ignorance or because of the previous news black-out. A Domei report described conditions after the event:

The developments (in the Philippines) have been too disappointing. The people had never dreamed of such a possibility. The fear of American and British armed might has now just struck their consciousness. For the first time their conviction of ultimate victory has been shaken . . . Some areas go so far as to report that any rosy views which might have existed heretofore have now disappeared from the minds of all classes of people.

Large groups of people felt that the Philippine disaster meant certain invasion, and speculation about possible landing points ran high—accompanied by requests for arms for defense. By the time the news of the loss of Okinawa came, on 25 June 1945, the nation was on its way to utter demoralization, its weariness with the war becoming more and more complete. But by this time, a more terrible scourge than the news of relatively remote military disasters had fallen crushingly on the Japanese people: the systematic ruin of the cities of Japan by bombs dropped from the air, which began in earnest after the fall of Saipan, had reached a crescendo by March 1945.²

The general nature and consequences of that attack is the subject of the following section.

Air Power Against Japan

The American air offensive against Japan was characterized by three principal types of attack:

The attack against industrial targets, using high-explosive bombs and high-level tactics, mainly from June 1944 until February 1945.

The attack against the major urban areas, using incendiary bombs and large-scale, low-level tactics, mainly from March until May 1945.

The attack against the provincial cities, using incendiary bombs and low-level tactics, mainly from June until August 1945.

² On 10 July 1945, the "thought police" issued a secret report, the results of a survey of public reactions to Imperial Headquarters' announcement on the loss of Okinawa on 25 June 1945. The major conclusion seems to be that "the publication of Okinawa's fate has apparently given rise to no special trend in public thought." The reason for this, according to the report, was that morale was so low anyway, and Okinawa's loss just added to defeatist feelings. The report concluded:

The trend of public thoughts after the loss of Okinawa has been painted thickly in defeatism. This is resulting in an alarming antipathy to the war and listlessness among the mass of the people. We are worrying about the infiltration of defeatism together with the intensified air raids, the hard way of living (as a result of shortages of foodstuffs and unabated inflation), and war weariness. On the other hand, the generality of accusing the army, the government, and its officials for the war situation growing worse is also a trend in public thought which we should keep a strict watch on in the future.

The physical devastation accomplished by these raids is generally known. Less widely understood is the fact that they also produced, coming as they did after an extended period of defeats and worsening consumer shortages, a spectacular collapse of morale.

Loss of Confidence in Victory. The course of this collapse has been determined by analysis of three useful and convenient indicators of morale:³

The growth of doubts of victory.


The increase of certainty that Japan couldn't win.

The increase of personal unwillingness to continue the war.

The analysis of these three factors is based on the answers of Japanese civilians to the following three questions:

"As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?"

GROWTH OF DOUBTS OF VICTORY (1)



- (1) More specifically, this chart is a presentation of the total percentage of Japanese who said they had doubts of victory, at successive stages of the war. The chart is based on answers to the following questions: "As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win? When was that?"
- (2) This category includes persons who gave no answer or whose answers were irrelevant.


³ In interviewing, it was found most feasible to elicit material on trends in morale via questions on confidence in victory. Other morale components' changes were more difficult for respondents to time. A thorough attempt was made to develop an over-all evaluation of morale trend from the entire interview. No reliable coding technique could be developed. The analysis staff felt that the material which follows in this chapter represented the best available technique for charting morale trends.

"When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?"

"Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go with the war?"

These factors will, when considered together, be said to reflect loss of "confidence in victory."⁴ The following charts represent the course of developments from Pearl Harbor until the surrender.

GROWTH OF CERTAINTY THAT JAPAN COULDN'T WIN (1)



- (1) More specifically, this chart is a presentation of the total percentage of Japanese who said they were certain Japan couldn't win, at successive stages of the war. The chart is based on answers to the following questions: "When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory? When was that?"
- (2) This category includes persons who gave no answer or whose answers were irrelevant.

Obviously, what happened to a critical component of Japanese morale was not a sag, nor a decline; it had something of the characteristics of a crack-up.⁵

⁴ It is impossible, at least at present, to construct wholly "unbiased" questions. The questions on confidence in victory (as well as those designed to elicit other morale attitudes) were pre-tested on a fairly large group of Japanese, and seemed appropriate to ask of a defeated people. It was clear that there was no question that doubts of victory and certainty that victory was impossible existed, if only at the surrender. In the latter case, the response was categorized as "never doubted" (during the war) or "never certain" (during the war). The concept of "sure victory" was the recurrent theme of Japanese propaganda.

⁵ The trend of confidence in victory may also be said to chart the trend of morale, in general. Confidence in victory is a vital component in morale, by any definition. The only way in which the trend in confidence would not be coordinate with the trend in general morale would be for other aspects of morale—especially those related to social solidarity and determination to see things through—to rise in compensation for decline in confidence. The weight of documentary, interrogation, and interview evidence is that no such compensatory rise occurred—quite the contrary.

Several reasonable hypotheses have been advanced to explain why it occurred so precipitately—each of which doubtless contains only part of the truth. It may have been that the first air attacks brought the war home to the people in such a way that the government could no longer maintain a news “fog-out.” The startling appearance of the B-29s through the curtain of official deception may have caused the plunge.

Or it may have been that because many Japanese never had too much heart for the war to begin with, the confidence in victory inspired by the early successes was a target the B-29s could puncture with ease.

Why Confidence Was Lost. However, the full answer is made up of many pieces. People were tired of war after many years of it. Living conditions were harsh, and the burden of material sacrifices heavy. Government propaganda backfired. The sharp edges of economic and social inequality sawed against the “spiritual” and cultural ties that bound the nation together. And the horror of the raids themselves was such as to justify almost any feeling of hopelessness. All of these elements, and others, which worked their effects cumulatively and at the same time, are reflected in the reasons which people gave for their doubts of victory and their certainty that Japan could not win. It should be empha-

TABLE 1.—Reasons for doubts of victory ¹

	Percent
<i>Doubted victory:</i>	
Because of the air attack ²	34
Because of military losses and reverses.....	28
Because of knowledge of shortages of war materials.....	7
Because of consumer shortages.....	5
Because of belief in greater strength of enemy, generally.....	5
Because they always had doubts of possibility of victory.....	3
Because of miscellaneous, or unspecified reasons..	14
<i>No doubts of victory:</i>	
Never doubted Japan's victory.....	11
No doubts indicated, but later felt certain of Japanese defeat.....	2
No answer.....	4
	3113

¹ The question was: “As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?”

² About one-quarter of the 34 percent mentioning air factors referred to air raids on their home towns and their beliefs that the air attack was destroying the Japanese war potential. The rest spoke of the air attack generally.

³ Percentages add to more than 100 because some people gave more than one answer.

sized that interviewing, as far as possible, was not conducted in the context of bombing. Questions about bombing appeared only toward the end of the interview. Consequently, such mention of the air attack as respondents made in reply to questions on aspects of morale or living conditions tended to be spontaneous on their part (Appendix D). Other possible sources of bias are mentioned in a later chapter.

The two most important causes of doubts, the Japanese said, were the military situation and American air activity over Japan. These factors differed, however, in respect to the time at which their weight was most acutely felt: of those who came to doubt final victory because of military events, the majority were worried by the end of 1944, while of those who came to doubt because of air activity, only 18 percent reached that point by June 1944. Thereafter the increasing tempo of bombardment was the greatest influence in producing doubts.

Military repulses and air factors the Japanese said, ultimately caused them to be certain that victory could never be attained. These were the same factors that first gave rise to doubts.

TABLE 2.—Reasons for certainty that Japan could not win¹
Certain that Japan could not win:

	Percent
<i>Because of the air attack:</i>	
American air activity over Japan generally.....	18
Air raids, and inability of Japan to halt them or retaliate by air.....	8
Air raids on home town.....	7
Air raids produced belief that Japanese war potential was impaired.....	4
Atomic bomb raids.....	10
<i>Because of military losses and reverses.....</i>	
Because of knowledge of shortages of war materials.....	5
Because of consumer shortages.....	3
Because they were always certain of defeat—initially opposed to war.....	1
Because of miscellaneous reasons.....	7
<i>Never certain that Japan could not win, until Imperial announcement.....</i>	
	26
No answer.....	6
	116

¹ The question was: “When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?”

² This figure, like all individual figures in this table, has been computed on the basis of percentage of population: it corrects for multiple answers within the “air attack” category, to permit legitimate comparison with other single categories in this table. It does not include those who mentioned the atomic bombings.

³ Percentages add to more than 100 because some people gave multiple answers.

As in the case of doubts of victory, military defeats exerted influence earlier than the air attack in making people certain Japan couldn't win.

TABLE 3.

Of those who cited—	The following percentages became certain that Japan could not win, between these dates:				
	December 1931 and March 1945	April and June 1945	July 1945 and end of war	No answer	Total
Military defeats	Percent 33	Percent 58	Percent 5	Percent 4	Percent 100
Military defeats and air attack. ¹	28	48	16	8	100
Air attack ¹	29	37	28	6	100

¹ Air attack exclusive of the atomic bombings.

On the whole, people who were certain because of military events reached that point before those who were certain because of air raids; 91 percent of the former group were certain by June 1945, but only 66 percent of the latter group were certain by that date.⁶


At the time of surrender there remained a sizable group (26 percent) who still felt that Japan might not lose the war, although most people were doubtful of victory and certain that Japan could not win. The doubters and discouraged ones did not protest openly, for despite the deepest feelings of defeatism, fear of the police organizations still existed. And perhaps of even greater importance, the social and cultural controls upon the individual, which acted internally to restrain him from certain types of "disapproved" behavior, were still operative. Being discouraged did not mean that people would openly say they wanted to quit; and, especially, it did not mean that they would have quit even if the Emperor had ordered them to continue fighting. It appears that a godly segment hoped against hope for some sort of termination, preferably a negotiated peace, "defeat" being so hard to swallow.⁷ *War Weariness*. As a measure of something more than feelings of uncertainty about victory, the Survey collected data on the extent to which the Japanese people felt "personally unwilling to continue the war." To what extent these feelings would have caused people to rebel, or to lay down their arms against orders, is impossible to state; but it is certain that they reflect a somewhat greater detachment of the individual from the official views and goals of the state than feelings of doubt and despair.

The following chart and table indicate the development of these attitudes during the war, and the reasons people gave for them.

⁶ Analysis shows that this time differential is partly a reflection of differences in educational level: the more educated people were not only better informed about events of the war but also has a clearer understanding of the meaning of the defeats at Saipan and Leyte than the uneducated groups, and thus became certain of defeat earlier.

⁷ It is interesting to note that the defeat of Germany, Japan's axis partner, and the Russian entry into the war were each mentioned by less than one percent of the persons interviewed as reasons for doubts of victory or certainty that Japan could not win.

GROWTH OF UNWILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE THE WAR (1)



- (1) More specifically, this chart is a presentation of the total percentage of Japanese who said they were unwilling to continue fighting, at successive stages of the war. The chart is based on answers to the following questions: "Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war? When was that?"
- (2) This category includes persons who gave no answer or whose answers were irrelevant.

TABLE 4.—Reasons for having reached a point of unwillingness to go on with the war.¹

Reason	Percent
Because of the air attack.	
American air activity over Japan generally	14
Raids produced personal suffering—bombed out, fatigue, anxiety, etc.	7
Air raids produced belief that Japanese war potential was impaired	4
Atomic bomb raids	10
Because of consumer deprivation—shortages of food, home front difficulties	16
Because of knowledge of shortages of war materials	9
Because of military losses and reverses	6
Because of initial opposition to war	1
Because of miscellaneous, or unspecified reasons	9
Never reached such a point	28
No answer	8

³112

¹ The question asked: "Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war?"

² This figure, like all individual figures in this table, represents the percent of the population who cited the air attack as the reason for their unwillingness to continue. It will be noted that the figure is one percent less than the combined total of percents for the various individual reasons, inasmuch as some individuals gave more than one reason related to the air attack in their answers.

³ Percentages add to more than 100 because some people gave more than one reason.

The statements of one respondent, a middle-aged machinist, illustrates the general attitude:

When air raids got severe, and there was no opposition by our planes and factories were destroyed, I felt as if we were fighting machinery with bamboo. Also, the food rationed to us was not enough to keep us working. We could hardly stand it. The government kept telling us that we would defeat the United States forces after they landed here, but as my house was burned down and I had no food, clothing, or shelter, I didn't know how I could go on.

On the other hand, a young housewife tersely summed up the feelings of the 28 percent who never reached the point of willingness to quit:

No, I never thought that way. I was prepared to fight till the last ditch. I was even willing to give up my children and fight till the death.

Psychologically, there appears to be a significant difference in the factors which most directly affect the feeling that "Japan will lose," or that "Japan may lose," and those which are related to the feeling that "I personally cannot carry on any longer." When people talked about the judgments they made regarding the chances of a Japanese victory, that is, whether or not they felt Japan would lose, they mentioned most often American air activity and military reverses. In making their appraisals they included matters outside their own direct personal experiences.

On the other hand, when respondents talked about the reasons causing them to feel that they personally were unwilling to continue, they placed greater emphasis on matters of direct personal experience.⁸ They talked about consumer deprivations more frequently, and they mentioned psychologically distant matters like "military reverses relatively seldom."⁹ Three times as many people mentioned consumer shortages as a cause of not being able to go on with the war as mentioned them as a cause of doubts that Japan would win. When the effects of consumer shortages on feelings of certainty that Japan would lose are compared with their effects on feelings of unwillingness to continue, the contrast is even more striking.

From the table, it will be observed that the big shifts in the relative importance of factors affecting the three measures of confidence used occur with respect to military reverses and consumer shortages. The factor of air activity, however, predominates

⁸ Forty-three percent of those who felt that Japan still had a chance to win the war decisively were, even so, personally unwilling to go on with the war. The main reasons they gave were consumer shortages and the impact of the air attacks on their personal lives.

⁹ Yet feelings of deprivation and the military situation have an intimate relation; it is success in battle, one of the purposes for which sacrifices are made, which helps give meaning to belt-tightening. Awareness that Japan couldn't win may have heightened feelings and complaints of deprivation.

TABLE 5.—*Effects of consumer shortages, military reverses, and the air attack*¹

Of those who expressed—	These percentage of people mentioned as reasons—		
	Consumer shortages ²	Military reverses	Air attack ³
Doubts of victory-----	6	30	38
Certainty of defeat-----	4	28	43
Personal unwillingness to continue the war.	22	8	33

¹ Table is calculated using as a base only those who actually had doubts of victory, etc.

² A small percentage of people who mentioned consumer shortages also mentioned military or air considerations.

³ Air attack exclusive of the atomic bombings.

and remains constant throughout. Thus, from the standpoint of morale, the great importance of air power lay in the fact that it brought the war home to the individual and affected his attitudes in a way nothing else did—not even the food shortage. Even if he himself had not been bombed, a person living in the home islands could feel the threat from the air more intimately than the threat implicit in military defeat on Pacific islands.

That air power was a crucial determinant in the destruction of civilian morale is shown by the fact that 43 percent of the respondents replied to the question, "Do you feel you are better or worse off now than you were during the war?" in such terms as "I feel better off because the air raids have stopped." While the frequency of this response is impressive in itself, it becomes even more so when it is realized that it occurred four times as often as any other response to this question.

The importance of air power in bringing the war home to the individual is further illustrated by the answers to the question, "What things worried you most during the war?" Almost twice as many responses referred to air raids as to any other worry. While 41 percent of the responses in all Japan mentioned air power, this figure climbs to 58 percent in the urban areas.

TABLE 6.—*Principal worries during the war*

	Percent
Worries about air raids-----	41
Worries about food and other commodities-----	23
Worries about losing the war-----	21
Worries about relatives in the armed forces-----	19
Worries about general welfare of relatives-----	11
Miscellaneous worries-----	11
Worries about draft—self or relative-----	3
No worries-----	5
No answer-----	1

1135

¹ Since some respondents mentioned more than one factor, the percentages add up to more than 100.

Air power, family problems, and consumer shortages—the factors that brought the war closest to the individual—caused the greatest worry among

civilians. Worry about losing the war—with its dire, but still more remote consequences—was out-ranked as a source of anxiety by the known factors of deprivation and attack from the sky.¹⁰

Summary. The special importance of air power in depressing morale must be considered in the light of certain general circumstances. The Japanese people entered the war against the United States without any particular enthusiasm. A prolonged series of military defeats preceded the beginning of the aerial bombardment of the home islands. By the time the air raids began, and afterwards, the strangling air and sea blockade around the islands made living conditions for the population extremely difficult.

The air attacks had the special effect of coming, therefore, at a time when other factors had already begun to undermine morale. They brought the horrors of war to the very doorstep of the nation, the shock of which was amplified because official propaganda, before the raids began, had nurtured a false sense of security among the people. It is the individuals themselves, those who had to live day and night under the actual or threatened attacks, that give the most eloquent and terrible testimony regarding the disastrous effects of air attack.¹¹

The consensus of the Japanese people was that air attacks and their effects on conditions of living were:

The most important single factor in causing them to have doubts of victory.

The most important single factor in causing them to feel certain their country couldn't win.

The most important single factor in making them unwilling to continue the war.

Their greatest worry during the war.

The thing which made most people happy that the war was over.

From the data the effect of the air attack on Japanese morale must be described as severe.

Factors Sustaining Morale

Thus far emphasis has been placed on those factors which tended to lower the morale of the Japanese. The data showing lowered confidence in victory and its course have been examined. Obviously, however, the level of morale at any given

¹⁰ For an example of American wartime analysis of Japanese morale, the reader is directed to the excellent Office of War Information report, *Japanese Home Morale Under Bombing*. (O. W. I., Foreign Morale Analysis Division, Area III, Overseas Branch, 30 July 1945.) It contains valuable background information.

¹¹ The effects of personal and community experiences with bombing are analyzed in detail in Chapter 5.

time is the resultant of a complex of forces, some of which tend to depress it, others to sustain it. Inasmuch as the Japanese were a defeated population, it is to be expected that the negative elements should be most easily perceptible. Yet there were a number of factors which sustained the fighting spirit of the population and made it willing to carry on.

Consequences of Defeat. Probably most important among these, at least as the war went on, was fear of the consequences of defeat: The propagandists, throughout the war, instilled in the Japanese a fear of the dire consequences of an American victory, until the overwhelming mass of them expected anything from enslavement to annihilation if Japan were to lose the war. To the question, "During the war, what did you think would be in store for you and your family if Japan lost the war?", almost three-fourths of the responses were in this vein. As a woman munitions worker in Hagi said:

I thought that all the people of Japan would become slaves. At one time we thought that if we lost we were going to die in a mass. Even in schools we were taught that the Americans were rough people. In school we were told that the Americans were going to squeeze our throats and kill us and make a hole in our ears and string a wire through it—and that they were going to torture us. They told us that before the war started. I thought that it was better to be dead than to be captured. I hated to die suffering. I thought that it would be better if we died together happily.

TABLE 7.—*Expectations if defeated*

	Percent
Brutalities, starvation, enslavement, annihilation.....	68
Didn't know; wondered what would happen.....	10
Didn't expect defeat.....	9
Good treatment.....	4
Miscellaneous.....	5
No answer.....	4
	100

Accompanying these expectations were the emotional reactions of hatred, terror, and contempt of the enemy that were carefully fostered by the government. In spite of an understandable tendency to refuse to answer or to hedge on the question, "How did you feel about the Americans, during the war?" (one-fourth of the people gave no answer), 40 percent spoke in terms of hatred, anger, or contempt; and in spite of an understandable wish not to offend the conquerors, only 11 percent answered that they had no ill feelings toward the Americans. In about the same ratio, Americans were conceived of as "the enemy"—cruel, barbaric, savage, hateful, sadistic, egotistical.

People with high war-supporting morale tended to have most hatred for Americans during the war,

and conversely, people with low morale were most likely not to think badly of them.¹²

TABLE 8

- Of people with the highest morale—
 27 percent said they didn't think badly of Americans.
 43 percent said they thought badly of Americans.
- Of people with the lowest morale—
 36 percent said they didn't think badly of Americans.
 31 percent said they thought badly of Americans.

"*Japanese spirit.*" In Japan, as perhaps in many countries, a number of the factors which sustained morale were of a "spiritual"—or even mystical—nature. One of these was the notion that Japan was a specially favored place and under the protection of the gods. Not only had Japan never lost a war; the very idea of losing was, to many people, inconceivable. Even as the bombings became more and more intense, many of the people continued to have faith in divine intervention of some kind, and this faith was expressed in the popular escapist thought of "victory in the last five minutes," and the Kamikaze—the Divine Wind—rescuing Japan. As one villager put it:

Although there were no material reasons for us to expect to win the war, I depended upon the fact that we had never been defeated in the past 2,600 years.

The reactions of the Japanese to the end of the war indicate the persistence of this hope of victory, somehow, even at the end (Chapter 12). Despite the drastic fall of confidence that Japan would win, and the widespread feeling of discouragement and indifference among the population, which existed during the last few months of the war, there remained a last fugitive hope. Even individuals who reported relatively early doubts of victory often described themselves as emotionally upset at the surrender announcement. It is almost as if popular feeling held to a conviction in the nation's ability at least not to lose, even if not to a faith that Japan would win. Defeat was a notion which had no place in the average Japanese's frame of reference about his nation. The emotional upset at the surrender announcement was widespread. A professor at Tohoku Imperial University for example, said:

The people of Sendai were not expecting peace. They thought that the broadcast would be an exhortation to keep up the fight and resist on the mainland. They were so certain of this that, even as they listened, they could not be-

¹² The measure of high and low morale used here is the Morale Index. See Appendix K for the construction of this index. Reaction to Americans during the war, discussed herein, is not a component of the Index. The Morale Index includes: (1) confidence in victory; (2) personal willingness to go on with the war; (3) confidence in home front and military leadership; (3) feelings of group unity or disunity, including belief in equality of sacrifice; (4) reaction to the end of the war.

lieve the broadcast to be true. Everyone acted as though in a dream. We were just stunned. Even two or three days later, many people doubted that it was true. It was all too sudden.

Even expecting defeat did not soften the emotional blow of experiencing surrender, in a large segment of the people.

Some Japanese knew from the beginning of the war of the tremendous superiority of the United States in physical resources, industrial plant, and skilled manpower. As the war continued, many more came to realize, or at least to suspect, the fact. The B-29 helped them along. It was possibly the awareness of the great material disparity between the two nations that made Japanese propagandamongers emphasize the spiritual resources of Japan. Even early in the war Japanese propaganda for home consumption stressed Yamato Damashii—the "Spirit of the Divine Race" and Nippon Seishin—"Japanese Spirit" as the great strength that would eventually enable Japan, surmounting all obstacles, to triumph over the Occidental enemy. The people seized upon this. While a bare 12 percent of the respondents expressed confidence in any material resource of Japan, 44 percent voiced faith in some spiritual aspect of Japanese culture.¹³ Even the faith in the Kamikaze corps can be interpreted in this light. The strength of the Japanese faith in spiritual power is well illustrated by the following quotations from interviews:

The physical body may decay, but our spirit would live forever and fight again and again to protect our country. We were educated that way.

I thought the Japanese were strong in that they had a spirit of unity to unite in one ball and unitedly strike against the enemy.

In response to the question, "During the war what did you think was Japan's greatest strength in waging war?" the answers were distributed as shown in Table 9.

TABLE 9.—*Japan's greatest strength*

	<i>Percent</i>
Spiritual things (Yamato Damashii, spirit of sacrifice, fighting spirit, etc.).....	44
Kamakazi corps.....	7
Material things—natural resources, industry, scientific knowledge, military power.....	12
Confidence in military and political leaders.....	1
Submissiveness to higher-ups.....	1
Miscellaneous.....	3
Japan had no strong points.....	7
Don't know.....	20
No answer.....	5
	100

¹³ Whereas 53 percent of the people of highest morale declared that Japan's greatest strength lay in "spiritual" superiority, only 40 percent of those in the lowest morale group held to this view.

When the respondents were asked, "During the war, what did you think was Japan's greatest weakness?", 58 percent replied that they thought the greatest weakness lay in the lack of material strength—armaments, natural and industrial resources, production, commodities, scientific knowledge, etc. Thus the Japanese felt that somehow their great spiritual resources would eventually enable them to triumph over their material weaknesses. As the war continued, however, the Japanese lost faith in their own spiritual strength to the degree that just before the surrender about two-thirds of them had reached the point where they felt they could no longer continue the war (Table 4). This is one of the great by-products of the war—the undermining of the Japanese faith in their own spiritual resources and even in their gods. A physician of Hiroshima spoke in these terms:

I am a doctor and have some education. From olden times, the uneducated have believed in such things as kamikaze, the divine wind which saved Japan from Ghengis Kahn. To me that is all foolishness. During the war the unintelligent people believed that something like the kamikaze would stop the B-29s. The leaders encouraged this, in fact, made them believe it. But my point of view was proved to be right; and when the B-29s dropped bombs on the Ise Shrine, then if ever the gods would have done something to stop them. I told people I met that the Japanese should not rely on such things but should study science. I want you to understand what the Japanese mean by kamikaze. There is a big difference between the way they think about Christ in Europe and in America, and the way the Japanese think about kamisama (gods). After the bombing of Ise and the castle in Nagoya, the people's conception of the gods changed. It is without doubt the truth that the Japanese fought this war relying on the gods, rather than on machines. In each emperor's rescript this is written: Tenyu wo hoyushi. This is very important. (Here the Doctor wrote the words out in Chinese characters—We are always guarded by the gods above.) The rescripts say, "We, the Imperial Family of Japan, who are guarded by the gods above, issue this statement to you, the people of Japan." This is the type of thing the children get in their education. They are taught that Japan is guarded by the gods, even if it does not have planes, guns and battleships. Therefore, if you fight with all your might you will win. "Look at Japan's history of 2600 years without a defeat," they say. Even some of the intelligent people believe this stuff about aid from the gods. This is one big place where Japan falls below America. It is all right to believe in the gods, but it is pure foolishness to think that the gods will help you out of holes like this.

As the mayor of Kano said during an interview:

Many, if not most people are angry because the gods did not send the divine winds to save them in their hour of need.

The Emperor. The attitudes of the Japanese toward the Emperor are too involved with deep emotional

factors to be analyzed simply in terms of "reasons" for them, or "types of responses" expressed.¹⁴ The nature of the feeling was described to interviewers by a prominent Japanese writer:

"Regarding the matter of Emperor, it is a sort of faith which is a part of my very being, and therefore, I would like to have him retained. One might say that it is a kind of belief on my part and it should not be misconstrued that I am attempting to justify (the Emperor) by arguments."

The sentiments of other persons are quite similar:

I want the Emperor retained. Unless we have him, Japan cannot carry on. The Emperor is like the sun; without him it's all darkness.

As long as the Emperor appeared to want the Japanese people to continue the conflict, the people appeared willing to follow him. The extent to which they would have followed him to the death, however, is a moot point. Many glib assertions have been made about Japanese "fanaticism," and it has been argued that had the scheduled invasion of the home islands occurred in November 1945, the entire nation would have fought to the death. According to Japanese themselves, however, the picture is confused.

Undoubtedly there were a number of persons who would have fought to the end:

It's not the question of whether it's good or bad to surrender. Up until the surrender I was willing to sacrifice my life; when the surrender came, my only alternative was to obey orders.

A Domei report of April 1945, prepared for government use, classified four trends of thought which prevailed in the islands at that time:

1. Those who express the determination to fight to the last man to win the war.
2. Those who ask if it would not be better, if victory is not possible, to surrender for the time being and plan for a comeback, and if such a peace would not be more in accord with the purpose of guarding our Empire.
3. Those who assume a spectator's attitude in the belief that no great change would affect their lives even though the war should be lost.
4. Those who are war-weary as a result of their own hopelessness.

From other Japanese observers it appears that the number genuinely in the first category were relatively few, and the *Domei* report suggested that much of the talk about fighting to the death was just that—talk.

Since such expressions (about fighting to the death) are only proper in times like these they are voiced loudly and widely. Such words are naturally expected of the people; and it would be too much wishful thinking to believe that

¹⁴ The President of the United Church of Christ in Japan (*Kyodan*) told interrogators that all 400 ministers of the Holiness Church in Japan were arrested. He said:

"The chief reason was (that the Holiness Church held) the doctrine of the second coming of Christ, which was considered by the authorities to be contrary to the prerogatives of the Emperor."

they are the true echo of the innermost thoughts of our citizens.

The questioning of a Kamikaze pilot give a clue to what might have happened had the people been asked to make the last sacrifice—social pressures would have compelled many to obey, but some would have faltered at the crucial moment:

Q. How did you feel about being designated as a suicide pilot?

A. It is unmanly of me to say so, but truthfully, I was saddened to tears at receiving the death sentence.

Q. Did the other pilots feel as you did?

A. One more in my squadron did. He and I were the only ones who had university education. The ones who had been trained in military schools and the ones who had little education seemed to be quite happy at the honor.

Q. Did you protest or do anything to show that you didn't like the assignment?

A. There wasn't much I could do. However, I was planning perhaps to make a landing on the ocean rather than crash my plane into a ship.

Q. Did you know of any others who did this?

A. I had heard rumors that some did.

Q. How were personnel selected for suicide missions?

A. They were always designated.

Q. Were there ever any volunteers?

A. I never knew of any.

On the other hand, there were many Kamikaze pilots who did their work only too well, and the history of Japanese troops in the war shows an extraordinary capacity for fighting in the face of certain death. Possibly some of this capacity existed in the Japanese public; probably a reservoir of "spiritual" strength could still be tapped.

Parallel to this faith in spiritual resources was the Japanese obedience to and faith in the Emperor. While 37 percent of the Japanese were definitely critical of their leaders' conduct of the war, and 60 percent criticized home front leadership, the Emperor remained practically immune from criticism; he was above and beyond any schism between people and leaders (Tables 12 and 15). The impression one gets from the data given below is that the end of the war left the Emperor in almost as strategically secure a position as he held at the beginning.

TABLE 10.—Attitude toward the Emperor ¹

	Percent
Retain him.....	69
Don't care either way.....	4
Can't discuss such a high matter.....	12
Drop him.....	3
No answer.....	12

100

¹ Respondents were asked: "In your opinion what changes should occur in Japan in the future?" Responses to this question were followed by the question: "And what about the Emperor?"

Information Black-out. Hatred and fear of the Americans and faith in the Emperor and their own "spiritual" resources were accompanied by a general lack of knowledge of the progress of military events. The great ignorance of the military situation on the part of Japanese civilians is reflected in the very late development on the home front of doubts of victory. In spite of the defeat at Midway, the loss of Guadalcanal in late 1942, and the succession of setbacks in the Southwest Pacific, it was not until the period July-December 1944 that any appreciable number of civilians began to have doubts of victory (Charts 1 and 2). This is ascribable, at least in part, to the government's general policy of withholding news of defeats. Until the very end of the war the Japanese home front did not know that the Imperial fleet had been largely lost.

Therefore, ignorance of the extent of the disaster that was overtaking them must also be considered a major factor in the late realization of Japanese civilians that Japan could not attain "sure victory." Censorship and control of information media gave Japanese government propaganda a clear field, uncontradictable, in the main, except by the oncoming American might. Thus, the grim procession of defeats that pushed the "outer perimeter" ever closer and closer to the homeland left Japanese morale comparatively unshaken at its foundations, until, with the taking of Okinawa and the coming of air-borne incendiary storms to the home islands, disaster sat on the front doorstep.

Now was the time when Japan's history of geographical isolation, abetted by centuries of cultural isolation, became a liability. The insularity of leaders and people, bred by isolation, was reflected in feelings of remoteness from attack, and invulnerability of the home islands. The B-29s rudely awakened them from the dream of security.

Summary. Part of the underpinning of Japanese home front morale was fear of the consequences of defeat, the simple incredibility of defeat—since Japan had never lost a war—faith in the spiritual resources of Japan, devotion to the Emperor, and ignorance of the progress of events. An even deeper fundament was the result of long intensive indoctrination.¹⁵ However, these factors simply prolonged the period of optimism, retarded the final collapse of morale; yet they also produced a considerable amount of nervous apprehension. They were not

¹⁵ One aspect of indoctrination the Survey attempted to study was personal identification with the purposes of the war. Several questions in this area were pre-tested, but they uniformly produced stereotyped responses and slogans. The people had too long and too thoroughly been exposed to the doctrine of "a war for peace and a greater East Asia."

adequate to overcome the effects of the inexorable progress of military events, the terror of the B-29s, hunger and disease, and economic and social unrest. These things at last undermined confidence in victory to the extent that the Japanese began to realize, in logical moments, that they could not win this war even though they had won all others, and made them begin to lose faith in their own leaders and even in their spiritual resources. A well-informed community leader in Kyoto observed:

Throughout the whole war the attitude of the people towards the Emperor did not change, for they regarded him as the father of his people and the symbol of all that is good and great in Japan. Towards their other leaders from the prime minister down, the attitude of the people changed greatly. At first the people were proud of and greatly trusted their leaders, but as news of war reverses began to leak through, and as cabinet changes took place, the confidence of the people in their leadership was rudely shaken and finally utterly shattered. It cannot be denied that the leaders did not use the people in their fullest capacity, and the people themselves were not fully united in the latter part of the war.

Of course, the home front was never really put to the crucial test, and we shall never know whether civilians would have met the invasion with their bamboo spears. All we know is that, although by the end of the war there were many whispered hopes for peace, there was yet no outcry for surrender. Indoctrination and police controls were still working. The society was still a going concern, but it was rapidly approaching bankruptcy.

The Social Fabric

Continued military adversity is like a cancer in the social body—it attacks the whole thing. When the morale of the Japanese population began to deteriorate it was perceptible in all parts of the social and political structure. A social event does not make itself felt in a single direction; rather, it is like a stream, with many branches above and below the ground. Shortage of food not only makes man hungry, but causes him to want to seek the food of his neighbor or to turn upon his leaders in anger. The destruction of houses not only puts people out into the cold, but throws them upon the mercies of those whose houses are not destroyed, and directs them to the authorities to ask for help. As adversity grows in magnitude, therefore, the bonds of human relationship are strained. At a certain point they snap. That is the point of rebellion.

The Standard of Living. The air and sea blockades and the bombings had far-reaching effects on the social fabric of Japan through their effects on the standard of living. This came about partly in the following way: food shortages resulted in the tight-

ening of ration controls, and a reduction in the ration. This caused an influx of food to the black market. Black market supplies were more accessible to the upper than to the lower classes. The lower classes, aware of the inequality of sacrifice, became hostile toward the more fortunate members of Japanese society.¹⁶

As the war continued, the disappearance of food from its accustomed and legal channels resulted in mounting undernourishment and disease. Nutritional diseases and tuberculosis increased, inadequate food was one of the major causes of decreased work capacity. Indeed, close to half of those who said they were absentees gave sickness and weakness as the cause (Chapter 6).

In the presence of this threat to their health and that of their children, the poorer Japanese had to stand by and watch the richer and more influential classes satisfy their needs through the black market, while they themselves went hungry. This situation is reflected in the answers to the question: "Did you think that all kinds of people suffered alike during the war?" Over 40 percent of the respondents said that the richer and more influential classes suffered less than they did. The potentially explosive quality of this sense of injustice is shown by the relation of confidence in leadership to the belief that not everyone was suffering equally.

TABLE 11

Of those who complained of inequality of suffering—
44 percent were critical of leaders' conduct of the war.
72 percent were critical of leaders' conduct of the home front.
Of those who thought that everyone suffered equally—
29 percent were critical of leaders' conduct of war.
53 percent were critical of leaders' conduct of the home front.

The characteristic bitterness in attitudes of this kind is expressed in interviews like the following:

I don't think that everyone suffered alike. (Her emphasis was strong.) There are people who started black markets and got rich by this war. Most of them are the people in the larger cities. Those who go to black markets are the rich people. Above that, they paid off so that their sons wouldn't have to go out fighting for our country, while we had to let many of our loved ones fight for our country. (Here she asked: "Won't I get into any trouble for telling you all these things?") During wartime we felt that they (the government officials) didn't worry too much about us. At that time the government gave us to go, two shaku of rice and practically told us that we had to do some black marketeering. The government was opposed to it but we had to do something to keep ourselves alive. The higher-

¹⁶ The statistical data are quite clear on these points. Food ranks next to the air attack and its effects as a major source of anxiety during the war, and even outranks fear of loss of the war itself in this regard (Table 6).

ups used to tell us to do everything, while they didn't do anything. They didn't do us any justice. They used to tell us to get up early in the morning and work until late at night, while they came late in the morning and left early.

The decline in the Japanese standard of living was, finally, an important factor in bringing people to the point where they were no longer willing personally to continue the war. In this regard it outranks military defeats, and is second to air power alone. A 1945 secret Home Affairs Ministry document, "Trend of People's Thought as Seen from Censorship of Communications," stated:

The recent food situation has deeply affected the people's thought. There have been successive increases in the number of people who made public their war-weariness and their antiwar sentiments. It can be recognized that, spiritually, a portion is already approaching the action stage. On one hand, there is a tendency toward a gradual increase in people who resent and despise the present administrators and the upper classes for their attitude of daily living, and who slander the policies of the present administration. In viewing the deterioration in the people's feeling for logic and the relation between war and the food situation, such tendencies are of a nature which definitely cannot be ignored.

However, in spite of food shortages, in spite of "adulteration" of the rice ration, so that more and more other cereals and even potatoes were mixed with it, in spite of the growing lassitude and illness caused by the shortened rations, only a quarter of those who indicated a willingness to give up the struggle mentioned food or other consumer shortages.

Leadership. The food situation rather than having acted directly on the will to resist, seems to have acted in an indirect way—it drastically undermined confidence in the home front leadership. The fact that toward the end of the war the government diverted all available shipping to the transportation of food, cutting down drastically on the shipping space allotted to raw materials, is an indication of the fact that the leaders had got wind of the mounting discontent growing out of the food shortages. The extent to which the people's criticism of home front affairs was rooted in the food and general consumer situation is shown by the following table:

TABLE 12.—Attitudes toward leaders' conduct of the home front, and reasons ¹

	Percent
Total critical.....	260
Critical—leaders not interested in common people's welfare, as indicated by severe or improper rationing, excessive rice quotas for farmers, etc.....	30
Critical—because of inequality of treatment of classes in regard to food and other consumer goods.....	11

TABLE 12.—Attitudes toward leaders' conduct of the home front, and reasons ¹—Continued

	Percent
Critical as a result of miscellaneous factors related to food and other commodities.....	11
Critical as a result of factors other than commodities..	16
Non-critical.....	21
Don't know, or no answer.....	19
	3108

¹ The question was: "In regard to the way your leaders conducted the home front, what did you think of it during the war?"

² Since some respondents gave multiple reasons for their criticism, this figure represents the over-all percent of the population critical of home front leaders.

³ Percentages add to more than 100 because some respondents expressed more than one reason.

The data in Table 13 dramatize the devious and intricate relationship between the home front situation—as expressed in critical attitudes toward leadership—the weakening of confidence in the social structure itself, and finally in confidence in victory:

TABLE 13

Of those critical of home front leadership:

- 51 percent noticed less cohesion in the social group.
- 49 percent complained of inequality of suffering.
- 52 percent blamed the bombing of Japan on Japan.
- 8 percent never doubted that Japan would win the war.
- 20 percent never felt certain that Japan would lose.
- 24 percent never were unwilling personally to go on with the war.

Of those not critical of home front leadership:

- 30 percent noticed less cohesion in the social group.
- 28 percent complained of inequality of suffering.
- 35 percent blamed the bombing of Japan on Japan.
- 18 percent never doubted that Japan would win the war.
- 39 percent never felt certain that Japan would lose.
- 36 percent never were unwilling personally to go on with the war.

These are the terms in which the critical people spoke; a young carpenter of Kure:

I often worried about our leaders' conducting the government. I wondered why there could not have been one person good enough who could have looked after the people of Japan more faithfully.

A Kyoto fireman:

The leaders were getting more than their share of food and what we got was left-overs. They might have a beer and lots of white rice for dinner, while all we could get was rice mixed with potatoes. Since they were the leaders they were entitled to better foods; they told us to be satisfied with what we got. If it's this way, I thought, our country cannot win this war.

A farmer's wife in Nagano:

Our leaders told us to work hard, cultivate every bit of land, and grow as much as we could. Those crops that were grown were taken away for rationing purposes; these were usually gobbled up by the upper class people. The farmers that did have enough hung on to them, and sold them at

black market prices. Those that did have time and money were able to live fairly well because you can always seem to buy the things you want if you are at the right place with money. All the small people who went out to buy rice in the country, or who received some from their families in the country, had to be on guard all the time, for the police hung around the stations and caught all those who tried to bring rice into the city. I began to wonder if the police only caught the small-time operators and let the big ones go. Oftentimes, when we ladies got together, we used to talk about Tojo and his cohorts, wondering what kind of clothes they wore and what kind of food they ate. We were darn sure it wasn't the kind of food that we ate.

The deputy mayor of Kobe:

The people felt that the government did not take proper measures to defend them and safeguard their welfare. Therefore, faith in leaders gradually dropped, and became less and less as the war progressed.

Since most of the criticism of home front leadership is on the outgrowth of the shortages of food and other consumer goods, it begins to look as if the frustration, anxiety and resentment born of hunger overflowed to eat like acid at the social fabric of Japan and, indirectly, at its hopes of ultimate victory.

This, of course, oversimplifies the case. But what we do have is a close interweaving of the sociological and psychological lines of force. All of the morale factors are interrelated in a very intricate way. You cannot have doubts of victory without attacks on leadership; you cannot expect people to maintain their confidence in leadership while they lose their sense of unity in the society; you cannot expect that people will be critical of their leadership and still imagine that they are going to put the blame on the Americans even for the bombing of their own homes. Morale is an interrelated unit; weaken one part and you weaken the entire structure.

For example, the question may be asked as to whether criticism of home front leadership is related to criticism of those who conducted the war. Is there a pattern of criticism of leaders? Table 14 indicates the answer:

Thus, while critics of war leaders were about five or six times as likely to be critical of home front leaders, those who were uncritical were equally likely or unlikely to criticize the conduct of the home front.

TABLE 14

Attitude toward home front leaders: ¹	
	<i>Percent</i>
Critical	80
Uncritical	14
No answer	6
	100

TABLE 14—Continued

Attitude toward war leaders: ²	
	<i>Percent</i>
Critical	45
Uncritical	46
No answer	9
	100

¹ The question was: "In regard to the way your leaders took care of the home front welfare, what did you think of it during the war?"

² The question was: "In regard to the way your leaders conducted the war, what did you think of it during the war?"

Actually, analyzing the content of criticisms of the military, as expressed in interviews, a surprisingly minor part is directed at failure in the conduct of operations in the field, away from Japan. The concentration is in terms of failure to defend the homeland from air attack, and the meddling of the military in production and civil affairs, resulting in oppression and disorganization. A study conducted by the "thought police" late in the war reported:

People are saying that the responsibility for the defeat in battle lies with the military and the war leaders. Anti-military and anti-government attitudes are coming to the surface. Criticism of weak air raid defenses, location of the Japanese fleet, of the advance of the military in the political and economic fields, inability of the government officials to act, are gaining strength, and the people's distaste for war, which has always existed deep down in their hearts, is gradually coming to the surface. Scribbings on walls, letters to editors, and people's talk indicate their desire for peace, and defeatism.

On the other hand, there are others who, seeing the adverse course of the war, are concerned about the future of our country and say: "We can't win this war by acting this way" and demand positive action by the government. They want renovation in internal politics, even in military government. Such a trend of thought also is gaining strength.

The long-standing insularity of the Japanese common man and his political attitudes are reflected not only in the extent to which the war leaders escaped criticism, but also in the large number of people answering "I don't know" to the question: "In regard to the way your leaders conducted the war, what did you think of it during the war?"

TABLE 15.—Attitude toward leaders' conduct of the War

	<i>Percent</i>
Critical	37
Don't know	18
Non-critical	29
No answer	16
	100

For the practical purposes of civilian solidarity behind the war effort, the individuals who answered "Don't know" were almost as useful as those who say they had full faith—neither group of those people could be expected to offer much opposition to

government policy. Even a highly-educated school teacher in Gifu said:

I thought it was a shame to train little children to grow up and become soldiers, but aside from that I didn't give much thought to whether the leaders were conducting the war rightly or not.

Thus the 37 percent of critical people was more than balanced by the 47 percent of the people who had no critical attitudes whatsoever. Nevertheless, a good part of the latter, being indifferent or passive, could not be depended on for positive, enthusiastic support.

Limited as it was by its shallow depth of focus in regard to large political events, civilian criticism of conduct of the home front was almost twice as extensive as criticism of the conduct of the war. Because for generations the Japanese had been shut off from outside news sources, and because the government carefully controlled all information channels, the people could not possibly be fully aware of what was involved in waging the war; nor could they possibly know much about the military decisions made. On the other hand, every day they could feel and see, in terms of empty stomachs and disorganization, the muddled situation on the home front. Hence they felt in a position to be more critical of the home front management.

But it would be a mistake to consider the extent of dissatisfaction with military leaders in such terms as "only a little more than one-third criticized them." This view would discount the long-existing and thoroughgoing hold of the military on the people, from childhood on; it would ignore the great prestige of the military, and their envelopment with the most precious national symbols. The way a war was conducted was never deemed their concern or their business by the people, and in any case they would have no channels for influencing the military.

The concentration of criticism on home affairs, however, was not an unmixed evil from the Japanese government point of view, for it directed attention away from the dangerous military situation. Resentment and unrest that might have been focused on the military situation was directed instead against labor conscription, economic oppression, the ration system, and those responsible for the distribution of civilian supplies. In the end, of course, this situation could have become very dangerous, and it did, but for awhile it served a useful function. Where the concentration on home front criticism made itself most effectively felt, finally, was in the minds of those conservative nonmilitary leaders, who were spurred to conclude the war, partly

through fear of popular revolt. Indeed, if the testimony of Japanese leaders is to be believed, a major reason for the fall of the Koiso cabinet and Admiral Suzuki's appointment as premier (with a directive to end the war) was the great outburst of domestic discontent with living conditions and the failure of home front leaders to provide a solution.¹⁷

Group Unity. While the drastic reduction in the food supply helped undermine confidence in leadership and intensified the cleavage between the "haves and the have-nots" among the Japanese civilians, the consequent competition for the necessities of life, together with heightened nervous tension and mounting difficulties brought on by the air raids, struck at the nerves of individuals. As the war progressed, people began to distrust each other more, they became ruder, more selfish, more short-tempered and more inclined to pick fights. In answer to the question, "Did the people's attitudes and conduct toward each other change during the war?" almost one-half of the responses indicated growing tension among civilians.

TABLE 16.—*Changes in people's attitudes noticed*

	Percent
Less feeling of unity: tension, selfishness, rudeness, fights, etc.-----	44
No change-----	30
Greater cooperation-----	11
Don't know-----	4
No answer-----	11
	100

An "ideal" civilian population organized for total war would report 100 percent "greater cooperation" or 100 percent "no change." In this connection, therefore, it is significant not only that a mere 11 percent of the Japanese reported "greater cooperation" but that less than a third reported "no change." Thus, although about one-third of the population noticed no change for the worse, they noticed no turn for the better either. The net effect observed, therefore, was a deterioration in social relationships that was not counteracted by a sharp upswing in cooperation. When these groups are further analyzed, it is found that the people with highest morale tended to think that there had been no change in group cohesion and that it had grown greater; on the other hand, it was the people with

¹⁷ Successive changes in government during the war, from the Tojo to the Koiso to the Suzuki cabinets, seem to have been interpreted as adverse signs by the people. Some 65 percent say that they interpreted the changes as signs of military difficulty and government inefficiency. The changes resulted in decreased confidence in victory ("or else why would they resign?"), feelings of confusion, disorganization, and uneasiness (Chapter 11).

lowest morale who thought social cohesion had declined.

TABLE 17.—*Relation of morale and group cohesion*

	Less unity	No change	Greater co-operation	No answer; don't know	Total
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
People of highest morale. ¹	26	42	16	16	100
People of lowest morale.	58	21	7	14	100

¹ Measure used is Morale Index. Only the data for the two extreme morale groups each comprising about one-fifth of the sample, are presented. The two middle morale groups are intermediately distributed in feelings on group cohesion. The group cohesion measure is not a component of the Index (Appendix K).

An outstanding, although expected, characteristic of the individuals who complained of growing tension and loss of a feeling of unity was the conviction that there was no real equality of sacrifice in Japan. The majority of the respondents who said they sensed a loss of unity felt also that not everyone was sacrificing equally for the war.

TABLE 18

- Of those who said there was less unity: 52 percent complained of inequality of suffering.
- Of those who said there was no change: 32 percent complained of inequality of suffering.
- Of those who said there was greater cooperation: 32 percent complained of inequality of suffering.

The debilitating effects on various aspects of morale of the loss of a sense of social cohesion is further shown by the extent to which criticism of leadership, and doubt about the final outcome of the war, was expressed by the people who felt a growing selfishness and rudeness in their fellows.

TABLE 19

- Of those who said there was less unity—
 - 7 percent never doubted Japan would win.
 - 22 percent never felt certain Japan would attain sure victory.
 - 43 percent were critical of the leaders' conduct of the war.
 - 71 percent were critical of the leaders' management of the home front.
- Of those who said there was no change—
 - 15 percent never doubted Japan would win.
 - 32 percent never felt certain Japan would attain sure victory.
 - 37 percent were critical of the leaders' conduct of the war.
 - 60 percent were critical of the leaders' management of the home front.
- Of those who said there was greater cooperation—
 - 15 percent never doubted Japan would win.
 - 32 percent never felt certain Japan would attain sure victory.
 - 27 percent were critical of the leaders' conduct of the war.
 - 50 percent were critical of the leaders' management of the home front.

These comparisons illustrate the extent to which loss of the sense of security in one's fellows is related to morale in general. Actually there is a reciprocal relation: although, for example, loss of a sense of security will affect confidence in leadership, it is also true that loss of confidence in leadership will affect one's general sense of security in one's fellows. It is obvious, that if the Japanese leaders had been able to straighten out the home front muddle there would not have been so much scrambling for food and other commodities and there would have been less circumventing of the ration system. People then would have not appeared so rude and so selfish. Confidence in leadership would have been stronger, and the sense of social solidarity also would have been stronger. A middle-class housewife of Ogaki expressed herself this way:

Yes, definitely—everyone became inconsiderate. Stores didn't extend services; riding trains and streetcars was a mad commotion. I think the people became irritable due to lack of food. They are always hungry and dissatisfied and naturally they try to blame their suffering on someone. And a Tokyo sociologist remarked:

Sentiment began to degenerate. Those who had suffered became somewhat bitter at those who had not suffered. People became more greedy than they had ever been before. Much evacuated property was stolen. As materials became more and more scarce, the situation became worse. In public transportation vehicles the people would push ahead, thinking only of themselves, whereas before the war people had been very polite and considerate of each other. Also the black market became more and more severe, adding to the bitterness. In this respect the leaders set a particularly bad example. This had a real demoralizing effect on the people. Also, as air raids became more severe, rumors began to be spread among the people, and distrust of leaders and the government grew.

That almost half the Japanese complained of a loss of feeling of unity not only indicates that the social fabric was weakening, but suggests at the same time that people were not united to the degree that they could cooperate to tear it wide open. This is always the situation when society totters on the brink, because the very forces that are pushing the society to the brink are also setting people against one another. This makes it hard for them to cooperate even for rebellion. In this case food shortages, bungling and corruption in rationing, hesitancy and fumbling in leadership, military reverses and air attack were combining to tear down Japanese society. But—and this is the paradox—these forces were also setting people against one another. Hence organized pressure for social change was not conceivable. Many regimes have been saved from destruction in this way, and it very likely helped to save the Japanese ruling clique in

the months of the final debacle. Criticism of their leadership was mounting; the food shortages were acute; air-raid protection was a fiasco; provisions for the bombed-out were utterly inadequate. But the people, even in their extremity, were not yet ready to unite and put an end to it all.

Conclusion

Thus, the trend of wartime morale and some of the factors influencing it have been discussed. An



“The planes came over and I heard a noise and looked out and smelled gasoline and the houses were burning . . . At that moment everything was in a turmoil and I wished I were dead or the war would end soon so I wouldn't have to go through this again.”

attempt has been made to assay the role of air power. One among many morale depressants, it nevertheless had a unique impact.

Civilian morale was preponderantly, but not completely destroyed. Just before the end of the war there was still roughly one-fourth of the civilian population with some confidence in victory and willingness to go on. Social solidarity held up somewhat better, generally, than confidence in victory. To a great extent, attachment to national symbols remained strong. But all was not right on the home front, and the general state was apathy in behavior, friction in social intercourse, and weakness in morale. Both leaders and people had no realistic basis to expect this situation to improve, as long as the ground and air power of America was closing in. Indeed, the future looked more gloomy than the present.



“Our shelters were crude and useless. We were unprotected. It was the same all over Japan. The blame is on our leaders. They did nothing to protect us after getting us into this war.”

Chapter 4

THE DIRECT EFFECTS OF BOMBING

In the previous chapter we have seen that Japanese civilian reactions to the war against America were at first rather unenthusiastic but quickly became more favorable with the early military successes. With military losses, misgivings became generally prevalent, and when the war was brought home to the Japanese people by our all-out air attack in the later stages of the war, morale quickly sank to a low level. In this chapter the air attack will be described briefly and its consequences will be examined, both in physical and psychological terms.

The Air Attack Against Japan

June 1944 through February 1945: Industrial Targets. While America was thrilled by the daring attack made on Tokyo by Doolittle's fliers on 18 April 1942, the strategic air attack against Japan was not really initiated until 15 June 1944, when a flight of 68 B-29s bombed the Imperial Iron and Steel Works in Yawata (Kyushu) from Asiatic bases.¹ This was the first of a series of attacks based on high-altitude daylight precision bombing, using high explosives, and directed essentially at Japanese industrial installations. These attacks continued until March 1945, during which time new bases closer to Japan were being conquered and equipped, combat wings established, and many valuable tactical lessons to be put in use in later phases of the attack were being learned. As a result of the establishment of bases in the Marianas, the area of Japan covered by the attacks actually and potentially increased. While the over-all damage caused by the operations during this phase of the attack was not great, it served as an omen to the Japanese of what was in store for them once America turned its full attention to the bombing of Japan.

March 1945 through May 1945: Urban Area Attacks. It was during this period that the air war was really

¹ Very few of the civilians interviewed recalled anything about the Doolittle raid. On the basis of information supplied by officials it appears that its major effects were: (1) to strengthen civilian morale and (2) to impress officials with the need for further development of air-raid protection activities. The effects of this isolated raid, while extremely important for American morale, cannot be said to have been of positive value in the attack on Japanese morale. Government propaganda made the most out of the vengeance taken on the captured fliers, and American incapacity to repeat the bombings. The degree of sustained air attack, and the possibility of retaliation, are critical factors in the effects of air power on morale.

brought home to the people of Japan. While the previous ten months had introduced bombing to the Japanese, it was not until 9 March 1945, when 334 B-29s were sent against Tokyo in a low-level (7,000 feet) night raid in which 1,665 tons of incendiary bombs were dropped on the most highly inflammable section of the city, that the terrible consequences of the air attack were felt by any large number of Japanese civilians. This highly effective attack set the pattern of the future air attack against Japan. In a ten-day period from 9 to 18 March 1945, 9,365 tons of incendiary bombs, three times the tonnage dropped in the previous three and one-half months, were dropped mainly on four of the largest cities of Japan (Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe), destroying 32 square miles of built-up area, with the lowest crew loss rate yet attained.²

The urban area attacks continued in April, May, and early June, with interruption because of lack of incendiary bombs and the need to lend tactical support to the Okinawa invasion, until over 102 square miles of industrial urban areas of Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe were destroyed. The target, as one air commander put it, had become "the Japanese mind." Thousands of people had been injured or killed, hundreds of thousands had been made homeless, thousands of small workshops had been burned and many large industries had been crippled. This was not enemy propaganda which could be kept from the people; it was the propaganda of the deed; its awful consequences could not be repressed. The news traveled fast and far.

June 1945 to 15 August 1945: Urban Area Attacks. With the essential destruction of the five principal industrial cities and the increased material strength and know-how of the Twentieth AF, the air attack could now be brought to bear on the smaller urban industrial areas. The tactics were changed some-

² The B-29 became a significant symbol of American might to the Japanese. The 10 April 1945 Domei general survey of Japanese opinion, prepared for government use, reported:

"In repeating the rumors about the B-29s, an enormous number express their envy of the amazing construction, equipment and capacity of the Superfortresses and lament their superiority. The confidence in our planes wanes with every raid, while the fear of the B-29s grows stronger than ever."

Many respondents in the Morale Division sample survey expressed similar sentiments.

at in that low-level attacks were most frequently used, and both daylight-precision and radar-incendiary tactics were employed, depending on the weather and time of attack; smaller formations were used, depending on the size of the target. The implicit strategy now was to mount such an air offensive that Japan would be forced to surrender because of the disruption of its organized economic, political, and social life, without an actual military invasion of the home islands. To this end, every plane and crew was used to the maximum, and in two months, from mid-June to mid-August, 8,014 sorties carried 54,154 tons of incendiary bombs and succeeded in the substantial destruction of 52 cities and the partial destruction of six others. In addition, the atom bomb attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki largely destroyed these cities. The air attack not only pointed up the futility of further resistance but also effectively demonstrated that further resistance meant extinction to the Japanese nation. It came at such a tempo and in such concentration that it generally left no time for recuperation of morale.

Sixty-six Cities Wrecked. More than 500 separate targets in Japan were subjected to bombing attack during the period June 1944 to 15 August 1945. The large majority of these received precision bombing on specific industries or installations but 66 cities were subjected to urban area saturation tactics, attacks directed against whole areas of the city rather than specific targets. Of the 160,300 tons of bombs dropped on Japan, 128,000 tons were dropped on the 66 cities. Damage in these cities ranged from 99 percent of the built-up area of Toyama to 11 percent in Amagasaki, with an average of 43 percent per city, by American estimates.

As a result of the bombing of Japan, over two-thirds of the civilian population experienced air raids, including United States airplanes overhead and alerts. More than one-third of the people actually had the personal experience of having bombs fall in close proximity to them; 15 percent had more than one experience with bombing. More than one-third had bombs dropped in their residential neighborhood. Twenty percent had their homes seriously damaged by bombing; of these about 80 percent lost their homes. Loss of personal property was suffered by 20 percent. As estimated by the cross-section survey, 1,300,000 people were injured and 900,000 were killed as a result of the bombings. The official Japanese casualty estimates were considerably lower.³ Bombing or the threat of bomb-

³ Appendix J indicates the derivation of casualty figures from the sample survey. The official Japanese figures, as modified somewhat by the USSBS Medical Division, were at maximum about 330,000 dead and 475,000 injured.

ing resulted in the disruption of countless millions of lives, including the actual evacuation of over 8,500,000 people from cities.⁴

What was the emotional reaction of the people who experienced this bombing? What was their behavior during the raids? How did they adapt themselves to subsequent raids? What types of bombing were most feared? How completely were they satisfied with the air-raid protection activities and air defenses designed to protect them from bombing? How adequate did they consider the welfare measures which were taken to alleviate their suffering after bombing? What influence did their experience with bombing have on their will to resist?⁵ These are the questions which can be answered by an examination of the information gained from interviews with a cross section of the adult Japanese civilian population. The information concerns attitudes, as much real and serious consequences of bombing as physical damage and casualties.

Emotional Responses Produced by Bombing

In the interview, people were asked, "What bombing experience have you personally had?" In their answers they indicated the number of raids and the kind of bombing they experienced, and when the bombing occurred. The tabulation of the replies given below indicates that more than one-third of the people of Japan actually experienced bombing. More than one-half of the urban people and one-fourth of the people interviewed in rural areas had been bombed.

TABLE 20.—*Bombing experience*

	Japan	Urban ¹	Rural ¹
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
No bombing experience	64	40	75
Bombed—once	20	32	15
Bombed—more than once	15	27	9
No answer	1	1	1
	100	100	100

¹ The rural and urban classifications used in this chapter refer to persons interviewed in these areas. Thus, the rural group included some evacuees from cities as well as bona fide rural residents and the urban group includes those who never left the cities and those who had returned by the time the survey was conducted. Furthermore, a small percentage of farmers were sampled within the limits of organized cities.

However, the degree of homogeneity between respondents in urban and rural areas in nearly all comparisons, even when evacuees are extracted, is great. It appears that the bombings, consumer shortages, and military reverses had a pervasive effect upon the entire nation. Some of the reasons why this was the case are suggested in Chapters 3 and 5. When significant urban-rural differences do exist they will be mentioned, throughout this report.

In interpreting a table where data for urban and rural areas and Japan as a whole are presented, the latter figure cannot be obtained by simple averaging of urban and rural figures. Since different sampling ratios were used in urban, rural, and atomic-bombed areas, the all-Japan data represent averages of weighted data from the areas (Appendix I).

⁴ The data in this paragraph are for all Japan, urban and rural. Just considering Japan's cities, the main targets, the effects become magnified. The data are derived from the sample survey, with the exception of the evacuation data.

⁵ This question was discussed in the previous chapter and will be considered in greater detail in the next chapter.

The type of bombing experienced, high explosive or incendiary, and the time of attack, day or night, is indicated below. The principal type of attack experienced was incendiary and the most common time of attack was at night.

TABLE 21.—*Kind of bombing experienced*

	Percent
Night and incendiary.....	56
Day and high explosive.....	25
Day and incendiary.....	18
Night and high explosive.....	12
(strafing).....	(5)
Atomic bomb.....	2
Bombed, but no information on type or time.....	8

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¹ Since many persons experienced more than one type of attack, the percentages add to more than 100. The table presents calculations solely for those who did experience bombing in close proximity to themselves.

A classification of the emotional reactions to bombing experience was made, based on responses to the questions "What bombing experiences have you had?" and "Can you tell me more about your personal bombing experiences? Tell me what happened, what you did and how you felt." It reveals that fright was by far the most common emotional reaction to bombing experience. Many thought that they would be killed. Others were so paralyzed that they could neither think nor act. Few claimed that they were not frightened and practically none indicated that their experience heightened their desire to carry on the war against the United States.

TABLE 22.—*Emotional reactions to bombing experiences*

	Percent
Fright and terror.....	39
Fear that respondent and his family would be killed..	18
Other responses indicating fear.....	8
Confusion, paralyzed action and thinking.....	10
Excitement at time of raid.....	9
No fright at time of raid.....	4
Relief that he and/or his family not injured.....	3
Other responses indicating composure.....	2
No answer; no emotional reactions indicated.....	23

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¹ Percentages total more than 100 because some respondents gave multiple answers.

From an interview with a Tokyo mother comes a dramatic description of the personal suffering and fear of many persons who experienced bombing.

On the night of the 23rd of May, I opened the window and looked out, wondering if it would be safe tonight. It was a rather cold night. Three planes came over together; two of them circled overhead and then passed by while the third let loose with the bombs. There wasn't very much time to prepare for it, since the air-raid warning didn't go on until the planes were practically overhead. I ran out

with my two children. As we stepped out, flames enveloped us. Flames fell on my chest and in back of me. I was terrified. The child that I was holding got caught in a little hole; so instead of extinguishing the flames that were burning my chest and face, I gave the child a yank and she pried herself loose. The child cried in fear and started to put out the fire. Between us we extinguished the flames. It was driving me mad. My whole face ached with pain. I couldn't see very well. I did put out the flames on my chest but did not succeed too well with the fire on my back. We fled from one place to another. It seemed that the fire was trying its best to swallow us. From 12:30 AM till 5 AM the three of us ran here and there. The burns that I received impaired my sight, so I was dragged here and there by my eight-year-old grandchild, while I hung on to the baby. Until 5:30 in the morning I did not receive any medical aid.

While most people only expressed fright, confusion, or terror at their experience, some, like the housewife quoted below, hoped the war would end.

Each time there was a raid our town was spared, but I had made preparations. As I took the last piece of furniture to the shelter, the planes came over and I heard a noise and looked out and smelled gasoline and the houses were burning. I was going to fight the fire, but the fire was too strong so I left the burning area. At that moment everything was in a turmoil and I wished I were dead or the war would end soon so I wouldn't have to go through this again.

In the bombed areas, the terror was greatest. The 10 April 1945 Domei report on air-raid conditions stated:

The people of the bombed areas are highly sensitive to all flashes of light and all types of sounds. Such a condition may be said to be a manifestation of the most primitive form of fear. To give instances: they are frightened by noises from radio, the whistle of trains, the roar of our own planes, the sparks from trolleys, etc.

But even in unbombed areas, urban and rural, anticipation of bombing caused considerable fear. For example, a Kyoto official said:

In the last year of the war there was a marked change in the emotional status of most people. Many became irritable, unstable, and critical of each other. In March 1945, when the people in Kyoto thought that they were going to be bombed, many became quite hysterical. For a good many days the streets of the city were filled with people pulling carts, bicycles, and other vehicles laden with their possessions, out of the city. Word had gotten out that Kyoto would be wiped out by bombs and there was a near panic.

This pattern seems to have been repeated many times. Even people of rural areas, especially those near cities, did not escape terror. A headman of a village mentioned the common fears:

In general, the people became terrified of the war, and the number of those continued to grow who stored their household baggage in air-raid shelters or intrusted it to relatives and friends in the far mountain regions. Especially just before war's end air-raid warnings sounded morning, noon, and night, and there were few people who slept soundly for listening to the air-raid reports over the radio.

Various escapist nostrums and myths spread through the unbombed cities, towns, and villages, far and wide. Areas around camps where American prisoners were confined were rumored to be safe from bombing; similarly, large industrial works were supposed to be safe, because America would want to use their capacity after the war. (On the other hand, an even stronger counter-rumor that large plants were prime bomber targets made workers reluctant to stay on the job.) Somewhat irrationally, Western clothes were supposed to insure the individual from air attack. Many cities were wishfully declared to be safe, because they harbored the dear friends, relatives, or the mother of prominent Americans—President Truman and General MacArthur, for example. Kyoto was said to be the burial place of General MacArthur's mother, and thus immune from bombs.

Superstitious recipes for protection from bombs, should one's home town be bombed, were common: Rubbing an onion on one's head spared him from physical injury; a pickled onion, symbolizing a bomb, placed on top of a bowl of rice and beans, was deemed especially efficacious.

In sum, the Japanese experienced or anticipated a situation to which no response could be really adequate. The only reaction that seemed reasonable was to escape from cities, or to be alert to escape at the first danger signal. The terror of bombing was augmented by the fear of anticipation. Physical escape was augmented by irrational escapism.⁶

Disruption of Normal Behavior of Civilians

That the raids exerted a tremendously disrupting influence on the normal behavior of the Japanese people is shown by the fact that most of the adults experiencing air raids immediately ran to shelters when the raids began, and remained in them, instead of making any effort to combat the destruction resulting from the bombing. Others remained out of the shelters but made no attempt to fight the fires and a few left town. Only 18 percent gave any evidence of having fought the fires instead of trying to escape, either individually or with their families. This is a reflection of the relatively poor and inadequate air-raid protection training the Japanese people were given as well as of the disruptive influence of the air raids. Indeed, considering the nature of AAF tactics and the congestion with-

in the inflammable cities, the general conflagrations would require exceptional strength and discipline of fire fighters.

TABLE 23.—*Behavior during raid*

	<i>Percent</i>
Respondent ran to shelter or took family to shelter; made no comment about fighting fires, etc.....	45
Fought fires.....	18
Remained outside of shelter, no indication of fighting fires.....	12
Left town immediately after raid.....	5
Miscellaneous behavior.....	7
No answer.....	15
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A young father in Sendai, when interviewed, illustrated the escape behavior of most people in the face of an intensive incendiary attack:

It was 9 P.M., July 9th. First a single plane appeared over the city. The alarm was sounded so we took shelter; but the all-clear signal was given right away and we went back to our beds. Then I heard many planes roaring overhead, and in the next instant there was an explosion and fire breaking out everywhere. Then I heard the raid alarm. I immediately took my two-year-old son into my arms and prepared to get out of the house with my wife. We gathered up what clothing we could. When I looked outside, I was horrified to learn that almost everything I could see was enveloped in a sea of flames. My wife was hysterical. In the confusion that ensued, we somehow managed to escape toward the shrine grounds.

That many people thought only of escape, and especially of their own safety and that of their 'oved ones, is exemplified in one young woman's experience:

I was terrified. I thought that we could not win; that our country would be annihilated by such power . . . Incendiaries fell in the adjoining section, and I unfortunately ran out to a large field where incendiaries also fell. Had I stayed at home I would have been safe. The flames enveloped my head. I was carrying my three-year-old child on my back. I stumbled into a shelter. Some one yelled, "Your child's kimono is on fire!" I was desperate and pulled the child's clothes off and stamped out the fire. The occupants of the shelter kept on yelling at me to get out. I was burned slightly on my left wrist and my child was burned about the face.

An official of the Police Bureau of the Home Affairs Ministry, whose job was to keep track of public reactions to the air raids, described the big raid on Tokyo.

(Begins to talk volubly.) I recall especially well the extremely windy day of March 10. The raid was in an area off the Sumida River and canals—criss-crossed by small rivers and canals, with many bridges. This was all encircled with fire at first and then the central part was bombed with incendiaries. People were unable to escape. They were found later piled up on the bridges, roads and in the canals, 80,000 dead, and twice that number injured. We were

⁶ The official propagandists used the familiar tactic of seeing some good in evil. Thus, the Japanese radio, in May-June 1945, pointed at some "advantages" brought by the bombings—bomb fragments would be made into weedcutters and other implements, bomb craters would be used as fish pools and reservoirs.

instructed to report on actual conditions. Most of us were unable to do this because of horrifying conditions beyond imagination.

After this raid, the government came to the conclusion, and it was the natural conclusion reached by the people too—all air-raid protection was hopeless and it was best to avoid injury and death by fleeing. The government issued such orders to the prefectures and gave up completely any idea of air-raid protection.

The condition was so terrible I could not well describe it. After a raid I was supposed to investigate but I didn't go because I did not like to see the terrible sights. [Laughing.]

Adaptation to Continued Raids

Those people who had experienced more than one bombing were asked: "Were you more afraid as the raids continued, or did you get used to them?" For the Japanese population as a whole the same proportion (41 percent) said they got used to them as said they became more afraid. (Urban people, who experienced more continuous bombing and therefore represent the better test on the question of adaptation, clearly indicate that they became better adapted as their bombing experience increased, while rural people, who had less direct and less frequent experience, became more afraid.) These facts are shown in the following table.

TABLE 24.—Adaptation to continued raids

	Percent
Became better adapted—as raids continued, fears decreased; became used to it.....	41
Adaptation did not change. Did not fear raids either at beginning or at end.....	1
Adaptation did not change. Feared raids at the beginning and feared them just as much as raids went on.....	4
Adaptation variable—fear increased or decreased according to circumstances.....	5
Became less adapted—fears increased as raids continued.....	41
No answer; don't know.....	8
	100

From this evidence it should not be concluded that continued air raids commonly reduced the emotional upset which earlier raids produced. Actually, in over one-half of the cases in which people said that their fears decreased, they gave as the reason their feelings of resignation and hopelessness in the face of bombing which they could do nothing to prevent. In the words of one Tokyo respondent:

There was no reason to become more frightened. Each raid was as bad as the next and there was nothing I could do. Everything would be destroyed anyway. Fate would decide who was next.

This feeling of complete resignation was common. Those whose fears decreased for more positive reasons, such as their ability to protect themselves and their property from the consequences of bombing, were few in number.

The most common reason given for increased fear was that the raids increased in frequency, size, and proximity. Hearing about or seeing casualties and the extent of bombing and a general feeling of helplessness and impending doom also contributed to increased fears as the bombing continued.

Night Bombing Versus Daylight Attacks. Even though the choice of time for air raids was usually a tactical decision based on the weather, available equipment, the enemy's defenses and other considerations, it is interesting to compare the reactions of civilians to day and night raids. Of those who had experienced bombing, the question was asked, "What kind of bombing do you think is worse, day or night?"

A great majority of the people said they feared night raids more than day raids:

TABLE 25.—Night vs day raids

	Percent
Night worse.....	71
Day worse.....	15
One as bad as the other.....	9
No answer.....	5
	100

The reasons most commonly given were that it is more difficult to get away from the fires and destruction at night, when orientation is more difficult, and that in the darkness the flashes and sounds of bombs are psychologically exaggerated and produce more fear. The confusion caused by night raids was mentioned as follows in an interview with a young man of Osaka:

Night bombing is worse, because at night it's so dark that you don't know where you are going or what you are doing, and the flames seem greater at night. I even appreciated a little moonlight, because it helps out a lot in seeing what you are trying to do.

The exaggerated effect of night bombing is made clear by a Tokyo resident:

Night bombing was worse. On account of the darkness, the incendiary bombs show the effect of their destruction at night by flames rising all over. These fires look much closer than they actually are. During the day you can't see the fire but only the smoke, and it doesn't make you feel as bad. The night raid on March 9, 1945, was the worst raid I have witnessed.

Those who feared daylight raids most gave as their reasons lack of advance preparation, the unexpected coming of the raids, and the fact that it

was fearsome to see the bombs dropping. As one evacuee said:

Day raids are worse because we can see the planes, and usually we are outside and the raids come unexpectedly. At night we made advance preparations and usually slept in the shelters. I just hate to talk more about it.

High Explosive Bombs Versus Incendiaries. Despite the fact that the great damage done to Japanese civilians resulted mainly from the great urban area attacks in which incendiaries were the principal type of bombs used, most bombed civilians feared high explosives more than incendiaries. The replies to the question, "What kind of bomb do you think is worse—incendiary or explosive?", are classified below:

TABLE 26.—*High explosives vs. incendiary bombing*

	Percent
High explosive worse.....	63
One as bad as the other.....	17
Incendiary worse.....	15
No answer.....	5
	100

The reason most commonly given for greater fear of high explosive bombing was that it is much more difficult to escape injury or death from high explosives. Another common reason was that it is more difficult to control the effects of the high explosive bomb. The frightening effects of explosion and its noise were also mentioned as making the high explosives more feared.⁷ The following quotations from interviews, both with young housewives, illustrate these points:

I was more afraid of explosive bombs than incendiaries. I felt so because we were able to check incendiary fires, but when it comes to an explosive bomb, there isn't a chance. Even if a bomb explodes at some distance, there is a chance of being killed by fragments and bomb concussion.

* * * * *

Incendiaries could be controlled if the buildings were not so close together; but the noise from the explosives and the hopeless feeling they create cause one to give up all hope. Every time I heard an explosion, I thought I would die. One of them dropped very close . . . I was paralyzed.

Those who said they feared incendiaries more often gave as their reason the fact that it was better to be killed quickly than to be burned to death. This reason was stated by an Osaka laborer:

I was more afraid of incendiaries. With the incendiaries, everything goes up in flames and nothing is left. Only the unfortunate die with the explosives and victims are few in number. Anyway it is better to die quickly.

⁷ The AAF capitalized on this reaction by including a few small high explosive bombs in incendiary urban area attacks.

Fixing Responsibility for the Bombings

The question of whom the Japanese people blamed for the bombing of Japan is important. It reveals how a nation which has been led to believe that it is invulnerable to air attack may turn its wrath against its leaders when the attack comes, and nothing is done or can be done to stop it or to retaliate. This is apparent from the answers to the question, asked of all respondents, bombed and unbombed, "When the American planes bombed Japan, on which side did you feel the responsibility lay?"

TABLE 27.—*Responsibility for the bombing of Japan*

	Percent
Japan's fault.....	48
"It is war".....	17
Fault of United States.....	9
Never thought of it.....	14
No answer.....	12
	100

Allowing discount for politeness, the chances are that no large proportion blamed the United States.⁸ However, nearly half felt that Japan was responsible because Japan started the war or because Japanese military leaders had been able to do little or nothing to repulse the attacks or to retaliate. That the failure of Japanese leaders to prevent the bombing was a major factor in the loss of faith in leadership will be shown in greater detail in another section.⁹ Still another large segment of the Japanese people took the position that the responsibility for the bombing could not be charged to either nation but was an inevitable consequence of modern war, rather than a moral question. These reactions are illustrated in the following quotations from interviews with Japanese civilians. A Japanese housewife from Kobe said:

The responsibility is on both sides because it is war, and there is no war with only one side wrong.

A factory worker from Osaka said:

The responsibility was Japan's. After all, Japan started the war. Our leaders should have known better than to start a war with America.

Lt. Col. K. Sasaki, of the public relations section of the Cabinet Board of Information, commented:

People directed their resentment for the bombing not at the Americans as was expected, but against the Japanese military and the Air Defense Corps especially. They were

⁸ On other questions which permitted expression of aggression, hostility, or blame against Americans, the percentages of people making such responses were about as high as in this case.

⁹ Whereas one-third of those of highest morale (as measured by the Morale Index) held Japan responsible for home island bombings, this view was expressed by two-thirds of those with lowest morale.

equally critical of the government officials for their failure to carry out their duties of relief and protection.

Sasaki's statement is repeatedly borne out by the evidence of documents and interrogations. Indeed, according to Domei's report to the government, not even the bombing (accidental) of the most sacred shrine aroused much anger against America:

The Toyouke Shrine (at Ise) has also been desecrated by the detested enemy planes. Despite the fact that a great wave of violent anger against the enemy and an upsurge of fighting hatred toward the foe was expected at the time, the result were quite contrary to expectation. The people maintained their usual calm, which could be interpreted as virtually pure indifference. This fact is nothing short of astounding. (Sagamihara in the Kanagawa prefecture, Oita.) That those belonging to the student groups could not be stirred into action is regrettable beyond words. (Osaka) Only the old people wept, saying, "It's a sad state of affairs when the gods are bombed by the enemy." (Kiso in Fukushima.)

From this bombing of the shrine we can conclude that the enemy has switched from a war on nerves to strategic warfare, whereby he aims to break and crush the closely-knit ties of the Japanese people, which is the land of the gods. (Tsu) The enemy in attacking the center of worship of the nation has finally launched his full-array strikes against our material and spiritual targets. (Komatsu)

Air-Raid Protection and Post-Raid Welfare Services

Air-Raid Protection. For many reasons, Japan was inadequately prepared to protect its civilian population from air attack. Until too late, Japanese leaders never realistically anticipated that American military and naval victories and American air superiority would reach the point where Japan would be subjected to heavy bombing. Like most Japanese, they tended to feel that the home islands were remote and invulnerable. To the people, long fed on the propaganda of "sure victory," such warnings as the government gave from 1942 on had a touch of unreality. As a result, air-raid protection facilities were ill-developed. When it became apparent that Japan would be bombed heavily, the primary responsibility for protection was left to the civilian population and the police. Even though individual air-raid shelters were constructed and fire raid drills made more exacting, there was little adherence to the rules, and the police, who were already overburdened by other duties, could do little to enforce them; consequently none of this was adequate to combat the effects of the raids. Furthermore, very little was done by the military to protect civilians from raids. Fighter planes were hoarded to combat the expected invasion; and antiaircraft guns, limited in quantity as they were, were used principally to guard military targets. For these

reasons, air-raid protection was considered a farce by most Japanese civilians. This is shown by the fact that only 10 percent felt that air-raid protection was adequate while 76 percent said it was definitely inadequate. Those proportions are based on replies to the question, asked of all respondents, "In your opinion, how well was your home town protected against air raids?" The most common complaints concerned the lack or inadequacy of air-raid shelters, fire fighting equipment, and antiaircraft guns. A Kokura resident said:

We were unprotected. It was the same all over Japan. The blame is on our leaders. They did nothing to protect us after getting us into this war.

A resident of Osaka said:

They were useless—everyone who went into them died. Many people were injured by falling into them at night, so I think the shelters did more harm than good.

The mayor of Taira, a sizable city, complained in an interview of lack of antiaircraft guns, as did other mayors:

Q. Were there ever any antiaircraft guns to defend the city?

A. There were not. People of course disturbed and complained to the prefectural government, asking that the Army put up guns for their protection. The Army said, however, that other places were more important than Taira. So people became more and more disturbed—and morale did not go up.

Q. What did people think of such a lack of guns?

A. Ideas such as this appeared—"We've lost Saipan, Iwo, Okinawa. We don't have enough guns for Japan. We're fighting a losing war."

A newspaper reporter summarized the situation as follows:

There was no proper way to prevent mass attacks of B-29s. It was no wonder that the metropolitan, medium, and small cities fell easily under the furious flames of B-29 attacks.

The only defense measure which remained was the defense activities of the Suicide Attack Corps of the Army and Navy, but their activities became ineffective. Gradually they left the skies and, near the end of the war, no planes took off to meet the enemy. Therefore, the people were trembling with unrest and fear.

Post-raid Welfare Services. Although plans had been made for official post-raid welfare services, like air-raid protection, they were considered completely inadequate when the raids came with real intensity. This is shown by replies of Japanese civilians to the question, "How good were the special measures and welfare services after the raids?" Only 8 percent of the people who were bombed thought them adequate. Twenty-three percent

specifically said absolutely nothing was done for them and 30 percent more said that what was done was totally inadequate. A resident of Yokohama voiced the common complaint when interviewed:

I did not receive any help from the government or anyone else. We just had to look after ourselves; nothing was given to us. I felt bitter toward the government and wished we had never started the war.

The fact that there was no organization and no assistance in most cities for the reconstruction of homes, added to the already serious war-time housing and building materials shortages, was another factor in the decline in confidence in victory and in faith in leadership. The common sight of people living in makeshift shacks caused some concern to the government. A "thought police" report of April 1945 said:

The number of people living in shacks is increasing. In the Metropolitan Tokyo area the number of people living in shacks in the bombed-out places already has reached 67,000 households, or 227,000 people, and if one should add to this the 100,000 people in Yokohama and 90,000 people in Osaka, this total is considerable. As the small and middlesized cities are bombed, people living in shacks will increase by bounds. Unless measures are taken to provide the people with adequate wartime housing and unless some direction is given to their thinking, the defeatist attitude of war weariness such as "No matter whether we win or lose we will never be worse off than we are now, so it doesn't matter whether we win or not," will be nurtured in a certain group of people as fighting becomes more furious and as food shortage becomes more and more critical.

And the April Domei report, in a section labeled "Demands Asked of the Authorities by the People: The Swift and Special Distribution of Daily Necessities to Bombing Victims," echoed:

The survivors of those who have been killed in the bombings weep, saying that those dying on the battlefield are regarded as the heroic war dead, but that those who lose their lives in the bombings are treated as persons who have died an undesirable death. This, they aver, shows that the means of "a total mobilization war" (*soryokusen*), demanded by the native, is lost in mere empty words. This is one of the examples showing the direction in which the ideas of the people in general are tending.

Psychological Blow. Air raids brought the war home, psychologically as well as physically, to the Japanese people. Forty-one percent gave as the main source of their wartime worries the air raids or the threat of them (Table 6). Among urban residents the proportion was 58 percent. The statement by a Tokyo woman clearly illustrates this point:

My greatest worry during the war was that I and my family would be killed by the air raids. The raids almost seemed continuous in Tokyo. Many of my neighbors and

friends had lost their homes and some had been injured or killed. I could stand everything else but I couldn't help worrying about the air raids.

The answers to the question "Do you feel you are better or worse off now than you were during the war?" give further evidence of the pervasive psychological effect of our air attack on the Japanese people. In all, some 70 percent of the Japanese civilians said they felt better off than during the war, and 43 percent gave as their reason the cessation of the air raids. When these points are considered in light of the fact that most of Japan's cities lay in ruin, and many if not most Japanese people were already suffering from lack of food, fuel, housing and clothing, this admission gives some indication of the fear in which the Japanese civilians held our air attacks. As a Japanese housewife put it:

We are suffering from lack of food and clothing and my house was badly damaged by the air raids, but I feel that things are better now that we don't have to worry about being killed in an air raid. Things don't look easy for the next winter or even after that, but at least they are better now than during the air attacks.

Summary and Conclusion

It has been shown in this chapter that the main air attack against the Japanese civilian population was of relatively short duration but of terrific intensity, lasting about five months and having terrible consequences. The built-up areas of 66 cities were destroyed, 43 percent on the average. Two-thirds of the people experienced air raids—one-third were actually bombed. One-fifth had their homes seriously damaged. Estimated deaths numbered 900,000 estimated injuries 1,300,000, and more than 8,500,000 were forced to evacuate as a result of the air attack.

The primary reaction to bombing was abject fear and confusion. People felt helpless in the face of the raids and could only seek shelter. Few remained behind to combat the fires. While some became better adapted to continued raids, most civilians either feared them more than ever or simply resigned themselves to fate. People feared night raids more than day raids mainly because they were less able to escape their effects at night. While everyone feared both incendiary and high-explosive raids, high-explosive raids were the most terrifying to most people because of their great and rapid destructive power and the noise they created. Most Japanese civilians blamed Japan and the Japanese leaders for the success of American bombing. The fact that the people were helpless and that

little was done by the military to prevent bombing was a major factor in decreased confidence in military leadership. Nearly everyone thought the air-raid protection system and post-raid welfare services were entirely inadequate and most of them blamed their leaders for these inadequacies. Most Japanese civilians felt that they were better off after the surrender than during the war and the principal

source of wartime worries of the Japanese people was the air raids or the threat of them. All of this indicates that the air raids brought the war home to the Japanese people, psychologically as well as physically, and made them realize as nothing else could that the mere factor of geographic remoteness does not insure a nation against the terrible consequences of modern air warfare.



“Everyone suffered equally in the air raids. The rich and poor alike lost their homes.”

RELATIONS BETWEEN BOMBING EXPERIENCES AND MORALE

In Chapter 3, an attempt was made to describe the broad trends of Japanese morale during the war, and to assess the relative importance to morale of such factors as the air attack, military defeats, economic discontent generally, and consumer shortages in particular. Chapter 4 explored some of the more specific experiences and attitudes connected with the bombings.

In the main, the statements of respondents themselves were used as the basis of the assessments in those chapters. For example, if a person said that the air attack was the reason for his doubts of victory, even if he himself did not experience bombing or his home town was not attacked, that statement was considered as evidence of a kind.

In the present chapter an attempt will be made to evaluate the importance of bombing experience as an influence on morale. Groups of people who differ mainly in their bombing experiences will be compared; some of these people were repeatedly bombed—others escaped the attack completely. Any differences which may appear may then be attributed to bombing experience, and will be a measure of its special influence. Thus, while Chapter 2 told something of the considerable importance of American bombing generally, its impact may or may not have been greatest among those most exposed. The air attack may have paid dividends in lowered morale extending beyond just bombed people and communities.

The major topics examined here which bear on morale are (1) social solidarity, as indicated by people's attitudes and conduct toward each other, belief that equality of suffering existed, and confidence in home front and military leadership; (2) confidence in victory, as reflected inversely in people's doubts of ultimate victory, their feelings of certainty that Japan could not win, and their personal unwillingness to have the war continued; and (3) work behavior, as indicated by absenteeism and work capacity.¹

¹ The reader is reminded at this point that, in the actual interviewing process, considerable effort was made to insure a reply which would not be prejudiced in favor of bombing. No mention was made at any point in the process of the fact that the interview dealt with the effects of bombing. Only when bombing was mentioned by the respondent as a factor in his reactions, attitudes, or overt behavior, was bombing introduced into the interview situation, until late in the interview when specific questions dealing with his personal bombing experience were asked.

However in some cases it was impossible to keep information as to the title and purposes of the visiting field team from being known in a community. In two fairly large cities articles appeared in local newspapers; local officials were shown USSBS credentials. However, whether this has any effect on any large segment of the sample, i. e., scattered individuals in a community—is doubtful. This problem was studied in some detail in one community.

In the analysis that follows, two measures of bombing experience are employed: (1) Personal experience with bombing, as indicated by actually having had bombs drop near one's person, and (2) community experience with bombing (bombing strata), a composite index of the bombing suffered by the community in which the person resided. This index takes into account the size of the city, the tonnage of bombs dropped, and the degree of physical damage caused by the bombing. On the basis of these factors, five urban bombing strata were set up. The first stratum includes three metropolitan cities, Osaka, Nagoya, and Kobe, each of which received over 6,000 tons of bombs and suffered a high degree of physical destruction. These cities were the first, after Tokyo, to be subjected to urban area raids. The second stratum includes only Tokyo, which is analyzed separately. As the capital of Japan and also one of the world's largest cities, it was considered a special target by the AAF. The total tonnage dropped on Tokyo over a period of 14 months was more than 16,000 tons. The third stratum consists of six cities, with a median population of 175,000 each of which received over 750 tons of bombs, and suffered a high degree of destruction. The fourth is comprised of six cities with a median size of 200,000, each of which received over 350 tons of bombs and suffered comparatively light physical damage. The fifth includes 13 cities with a median population of 60,000, which were either unbombed or very lightly bombed, with little or no physical damage. Thus, the urban strata are in order, from one to five, beginning with the greatest value of the tonnage-destruction-size index.²

Two rural strata are also included in the analysis for purposes of comparison. One stratum includes residents of rural communities and the other includes persons living in rural areas (termed "urban evacuees" in the tables) who are evacuees mainly from the heavily bombed cities.

Personal and community bombing experience were chosen from the criteria available because they clearly focus the analysis on the two contrasting and crucial levels of bombing experience. Personal bombing experience, i. e., actually having had bombs dropped near one's person, places the emphasis on the direct experience with bombing whenever it may have occurred and gives us information

² (Appendix M). The Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas, which will be treated separately and in some detail later in this report, are excluded from the bombing strata.

on individual reactions to this experience.³ Community experience with bombing, on the other hand, provides information on the disruptive influences of bomb load and destruction on the morale of the community as a whole.⁴ In these ways the comparative reactions to different bombing experiences may be studied.

Changes in Social Solidarity

In Japan the emphasis on group unity is a deep-seated culture pattern. It is expressed not only in personal politeness, informal visiting, mutual aid and trust, but also in public spirit, unity in the achievement of national aims, faith in leadership, and formal cooperation in attainment of common goals. During the war this already strong tendency toward group cohesion on the national and local levels was played upon by national leaders in an attempt to unite the people solidly behind the war effort. There is evidence that the people, reacting to the stimulation of their leaders and the flush of early victories, were solidly united behind their military and home front leaders during the early days of the war. However, as the war weighed more heavily on the people because of consumer deprivations, military losses, and finally as a result of the actual bombing of the home islands, group unity and cohesion began to break down and people became more critical of their leaders, less sure of the high purposes of the war, more distrustful of each other, and more selfish for themselves and their families.

Changes in Attitude and Behavior toward Each Other.

In response to the question, "Did people's attitudes and conduct toward each other change during the war?", people who had experienced bombing were more likely to assert that group cohesion had declined than were those who had not. However, both groups indicated to a high degree that people's attitudes and conduct toward each other had changed for the worse as the war progressed, as the following table reveals.⁵

³ Bombing experience brings out differences in morale components among the different experience groups more consistently than other measures of personal contact with air attack. Such measures were studied as: injury to respondent as a result of bombing, damage to home and property by bombing, a composite index of home and property damage plus death and injury in the respondent's family, number of times bombs dropped in respondent's neighborhood and number of air raids experienced. Most of these measures were not consistently related to morale factors, nor did they generally show differences in morale for different degrees of personal contact with the air attack.

⁴ The age, sex, and educational composition of the various bombing strata and bombing experience categories generally did not differ sufficiently to account for such differences in attitude as are found in the analysis which follows.

⁵ Throughout this chapter, it should be kept in mind that a series of influences acted to minimize differences in morale between the bombed and unbombed persons and communities. These factors are discussed in this chapter.

TABLE 28.—*Bombing experience and group cohesion*

Of those who had—	Less cohesion	Felt there was—			
		No change	More cohesion	No answer	Total
No bombing experience.	Percent 40	Percent 33	Percent 11	Percent 16	Percent 100
Bombing experience.	50	24	12	14	100
Once	49	27	12	12	100
More than once.	51	21	11	17	100

The results by bombing strata are shown below:

TABLE 29.—*Bombing strata and group cohesion*

Bombing strata	Less cohesion	No change	More cohesion	No answer	Total
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Large cities; heavily bombed; high destruction.	56	23	10	11	100
Tokyo	54	21	14	11	100
Smaller cities; heavily bombed; high destruction.	55	20	7	18	100
Smaller cities; heavily bombed; light destruction.	42	28	15	15	100
Lightly bombed and unbombed cities.	43	32	10	15	100
Rural communities.	38	33	11	18	100
Urban evacuees.	52	25	11	12	100

There is a clear-cut distinction between the residents of the more lightly bombed communities and those in the large, heavily bombed cities, with 42 to 43 percent in the lightly damaged and unbombed cities and 56 percent in the large, heavily bombed cities having thought there was less group cohesion. The residents of rural communities, who experienced little or no bombing, were least prone to feel there had been a lessening of urban evacuees to the rural areas, and react more like the people in the heavily bombed or damaged cities.

The evidence from this analysis indicates that those with the most bombing experience were most likely to feel that group unity had declined. Some of the typical ways in which this was manifest is shown in the following quotations from interviews with Japanese civilians:

Yes, there was change in the people's attitude toward each other. The most noticeable thing was in the trains. Men's attitude toward the women became rough. With the slightest provocation, fights would start. What before the war

would be forgotten with a slight apology, oftentimes ended in a fight. We girls couldn't even open our mouths.

When some family got goods through the black market, the families who did not and could not get anything usually talked very badly of the other more fortunate family.

The attitudes of the people changed a lot. They thought only of themselves and did not care about the next fellow. The farmers sold most of their produce into the black market and the ordinary people had a vary hard time trying to cope with the high prices. The people became greedy.

Belief in Inequality of Suffering. Another evidence of group cohesion or group solidarity is to be found in answers to the question, "Did you think that all kinds of people in Japan suffered alike during the war?" In the light of Japanese cultural conditioning and the government emphasis on group unity, those who believed that suffering was spread equally among all classes and groups of people may be said to show a high degree of group cohesion, those who believed that suffering was unequal a lower degree of group cohesion.⁶ None of the responses of those who felt that suffering was unequal showed that they accepted inequality of suffering as part of a normal wartime social scheme — it was clearly resented.

Those who experienced actual bombing were somewhat more pronounced in their opinion that suffering was not equal than were those who had not had personal bombing experience, as the tabulation below shows.⁷ Against the background of Japanese conditioning, this lack of expressed belief in equality of suffering is an indication of the inroads made into Japanese morale as a result of bombing.

TABLE 30.—*Bombing experience and equality of suffering*

Of those who had—	Unequal suffering	Felt there was—		
		Equal suffering	No answer	Total
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
No bombing experience.	38	56	6	100
Bombing experience—	47	48	5	100
Once-----	49	46	5	100
More than once--	43	53	4	100

The reactions by bombing strata are by no means clear-cut, as indicated by the following tabulation.

⁶ Chapter 3 discusses the relation between group cohesion and attitude toward equality of suffering. Reading through responses to the question on equality of suffering impresses one strongly with its close relation to general social solidarity.

⁷ The fact that those who were bombed several times were more likely than those bombed only once to feel that suffering was equal is probably explained by the fact that the heavily bombed people answered the question primarily from the standpoint of suffering caused by bombing. They saw that their neighbors and friends suffered equally from the air attacks.

There is no consistent tendency for people in cities with more bombing experience to be inclined to complain that suffering was unequal.

TABLE 31.—*Bombing strata and equality of suffering*

Bombing strata	Unequal suffering	Equal suffering	No answer	Total
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Large cities; heavily bombed; high destruction.	41	55	4	100
Tokyo-----	46	50	4	100
Smaller cities; heavily bombed; high destruction.	45	50	5	100
Smaller cities; heavily bombed; light destruction.	46	49	5	100
Lightly bombed and unbombed cities.	42	51	4	100
Rural communities--	38	56	6	100
Urban evacuees-----	48	46	6	100

The reason for the somewhat greater belief of the people in the most heavily bombed cities that suffering was equal may be that they were answering the question primarily in terms of the suffering caused by bombing; since suffering was so widespread in these cities, they saw little difference. As a bombed resident of Kobe put it:

Everyone suffered equally in the air raids. The rich and poor both lost their homes.

A fruit store clerk in Yokohama, who was bombed, viewed the question in a more general and critical way:

The wealthy people, the farmers, and the black market dealers had it pretty good. The ordinary wage earner was the worst off. The black marketeers charged high prices and the farmers sold practically everything to them. The only people who could afford these things were the rich. The farmers wanted the war to last a little longer because they were getting very good prices for their produce. They were exceedingly greedy.

Criticism of Leaders. In a totalitarian nation like Japan, in which the ascribed role of the common man is to accept without question the dictates of those in authority above him, expressed criticism of national leaders is quite uncommon in times of peace and is considered criminal in times of war. The whole cultural conditioning of the Japanese civilian is one which not only prohibits the free expression of such opinions but in some measure prevents the formation of them. In light of this, the existence of critical opinions and their expression, even to representatives of the occupation forces after the surrender, is a good indication of the extent to which the social solidarity of the Japanese had been fractured by the end of the war.

Two questions were asked which had direct bearing on attitudes toward leaders. These were, "In regard to the way your leaders conducted the war, what did you think of it during the war?" and, "In regard to the way your leaders took care of the home front welfare, what did you think of it during the war?"

People who had direct personal bombing experience were more often critical of their home front and military leaders than those who had no personal bombing experience. Those who experienced bombing more than once were somewhat more likely to criticize than those who experienced only one bombing. A striking difference is the uniformly greater criticism of home front than war leaders, previously noted.

TABLE 32.—*Bombing experience and criticism of home front and military leaders*

Of those who had—	Were critical of leaders' conduct of the war	Were critical of leaders' conduct of the home front
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
No bombing experience.	32	57
Bombing experience . . .	41	64
Once	38	64
More than once	45	65

The replies classified according to bombing strata are shown below:

TABLE 33.—*Bombing strata and criticism of home front and military leaders*

Bombing strata	Critical of leaders' conduct of the war	Critical of leaders' conduct of the home front
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Large cities heavily bombed; high destruction.	43	67
Tokyo	40	69
Smaller cities heavily bombed; high destruction.	38	62
Smaller cities heavily bombed; light destruction.	29	60
Lightly bombed and unbombed cities.	31	60
Rural communities	33	57
Urban evacuees	45	63

Criticism of both the war leadership and home front leadership, although common to all groups, was least common among the residents of the urban communities least subjected to bombing and most common among the residents of the heavily bombed and damaged cities. The rural people were much less critical of the leaders than the evacuees, most of whom had had bombing experience in cities.

The most common criticism of the leaders was their lack of interest in the people's welfare. Respondents said that leaders did not share the suffering and deprivations forced on the common people by the long war. In fact, many charged that leaders were actually "feathering their own nests." Another common criticism directed toward both military and home front leaders by bombed and unbombed civilians alike was that they did little or nothing to prevent the bombing—despite earlier promises that no American plane would fly over Japan—or to help the bombing victims after the raids came. A report prepared in the police bureau of the Home Affairs Ministry, based on local "thought police" reports, said, in April 1945:

Among the points mentioned above, those which deal with the distrust of the military to defend the homeland and outright anti-military sentiments, and the feeling of hatred toward the people who have not suffered war damages, are the ones which we must give special attention, since those are the sentiments which are spreading over the whole country and which are becoming deeply imbedded in the thoughts of the people, as the raids on the middle-sized and small cities are coming into the main phase and as the tempo of the war is intensified.

The failure of the Japanese military leaders to retaliate not only brought home to the people the desperate military situation; it also left them with no choice but to turn their feelings of aggression toward the leaders who had promised so much.

Some quotations from interviews illustrate these points. A prominent man in Kyoto said:

When air raids became severe in the spring of this year, the people lost confidence in winning the war. Government and higher officials lived luxuriously and made fools of those who honestly and conscientiously tried to observe all the rules and regulations demanded by the former. This was another factor that caused the Japanese people to lose confidence in their leadership.

A Tokyo official remarked:

The government and the Army said that there would be no bombing, but the planes came over anyway, so the people's faith in both of these dropped a great deal. People asked: "Why can't the Army do more for us?"

A nurse in Yokohama said:

They just talked about the winning of the war and never did anything about the welfare of the people. Even when the people suffered, they always asked for more sacrifice. We were pressed down so much that we were even afraid to form an opinion by ourselves.

The widespread tendency to blame their leaders for their plight is clearly shown by the fact that people who had personally experienced bombing and those who had not were alike in that nearly half of them, 45 percent and 49 percent respec-

tively, fixed the responsibility for the bombing of Japan on their government and military leaders, and only a small proportion, 8 percent and 10 percent respectively, blamed the United States.⁸ Interviews with informed government officials reiterated this point:

The people began to hate the militarists more and more as a result of the bombing. They did not hate the United States but rather the military. Despite the military propaganda, people did not hate the United States nor blame them for the bombing.

* * * * *

They blamed the Army. The people blamed the military separately from the government. They blamed them for letting planes come in. The government also blamed the Army for not telling them that the raids would be great.

Further evidence of the dissatisfaction of the Japanese people is the fact that 74 percent of those who had not been bombed and 81 percent of those who were bombed were dissatisfied with the air-raid protection system and protested against their civilian leaders' lack of foresight in not setting up an effective system of shelters, fire-fighting equipment, and post-raid welfare services. They were equally critical of their military leaders, who had failed to provide adequate fighter planes and anti-aircraft installations to prevent the raids.

Summary: The Influence of Bombing Experience on Social Solidarity. From the evidence presented in this section, and elsewhere, it is clear that many people felt social solidarity had declined during the war. People who themselves experienced bombing, and the residents of the more heavily bombed cities were somewhat more likely to notice the decline in social solidarity and to be more critical of other elements in the local community and nation. Bombing experience thus seems to have been an influential factor in disorganizing social relations.

The more emphatic conclusion of this report, however, is that many forces operated simultaneously to split the nation. Bombing, with its influence on living conditions and the popular picture of the state of the war, was but one. These many forces acted in a pervasive manner. Thus bombing experience alone is not sufficient to differentiate clearly between those who felt that social solidarity had declined and those who did not.

Decreased Confidence in Victory

In a nation at war, doubts of final victory are a positive indication of loss of morale. This is especially true in a totalitarian state where domestic

⁸ The question asked was: "When the American planes bombed Japan on which side did you feel the responsibility lay?"

propaganda is well controlled, as it was in Japan, and where most enemy propaganda is effectively kept from the people. When these doubts ripen into certainty that the war cannot be won and finally culminate in personal unwillingness to carry on the war, morale has reached a point which is dangerous to the effective ability of a nation to resist its enemies.

Most people in Japan came to doubt the chances of victory before the final surrender. What part did bombing experience play in these doubts? Two sources of information bearing on this question are available: (1) the distribution of doubters and the reasons for their doubts according to bombing experience; (2) the time at which these doubts first occurred, i. e., before or after bombing experience.

Relatively few Japanese civilians were free from doubts about Japan's ultimate victory; only 8 percent of those bombed more than once and 12 percent of those never bombed asserted that they never doubted. Both bombed and unbombed civilians were more prone to attribute their doubts to air raids than to any other factor, but a slightly greater proportion of those with bombing experience claimed that bombing was the important factor. The following statement from an interview with a munitions maker in Osaka illustrates the point:

I first had doubts at the time of the battle of Okinawa. My doubts increased when Japan's industrial zones were rapidly being destroyed by bombing—particularly when we saw no fighter planes going up to intercept the B-29s.

The factual evidence follows. It consists of answers to the interview question, "As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?"

TABLE 34.—*Bombing experience related to doubts of victory, and reasons for doubts*¹

Of those who had—	Never doubted	Had air reasons for doubts	Had military reasons for doubts	Had other reasons for doubts or did not answer
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
No bombing experience.	12	32	27	32
Bombing experience—	11	38	31	27
Once-----	13	38	28	27
More than once.	8	38	35	26

¹ Since some respondents gave more than one reason for their doubts the percentages total more than 100.

The proportions who doubted the possibility of victory, and the reasons given for these doubts are grouped below according to bombing strata.

TABLE 35.—*Bombing experience related to doubts of victory, and reasons for doubts*¹

Bombing strata	Never doubted	Air reasons for doubts	Military reasons for doubts	Other reasons for doubts or no answer
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Large cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	11	42	32	21
Tokyo	11	40	28	25
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	12	34	27	31
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; light destruction.	15	31	33	24
Lightly bombed and unbombed cities.	15	30	27	31
Rural communities	11	32	27	34
Urban evacuees	7	43	33	24

¹ Since some respondents gave more than one reason for their doubts, the percentages total more than 100.

There were few in any city who said that they did not doubt victory until the very day of the surrender. Those who lived in lightly bombed and unbombed cities were only very slightly less likely to be doubters than those in the heavily bombed and heavily damaged places, although a significantly higher proportion of people in the heavily bombed cities attributed their doubts to the air attack than people in the less bombed and damaged places. It appears that the overlapping effects of several factors, which operated on morale concurrently, caused a general decline in belief in victory. The particular effects of bombing were not only obscured by competing influences, but also by the fact that the disruption caused by the raids was not confined to the target areas. Although the bombs fell on selected targets, they helped raise doubts throughout the nation.

However, the analysis of timing of doubts does indicate that the residents of the more heavily bombed cities, especially the large cities bombed early in the air attack, tended to doubt victory much earlier than people in other places. Naturally enough, the same holds true for the people who experienced bombing several times.

As doubts of victory developed into certainty that Japan could not win, the same general tendency for the residents of the more heavily bombed cities to be most certain, and for reasons deriving from air raids to weigh most heavily in this attitude, is apparent. However, there is one notable exception—Tokyo—which had the highest proportion of those who said that until the surrender they were never certain.⁹ This is shown in responses made to the

⁹ The "deviant" behavior of the residents of Tokyo on this and other questions is examined in some detail in a later section of this chapter.

interview question, "When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?"

TABLE 36.—*Bombing strata and certainty that Japan could not win*¹

Bombing strata	Never certain	Certainty because of air raid factors	Certainty because of military factors	Certainty because of atomic bomb	No answer certainty for other reasons
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Large cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	23	39	17	9	15
Tokyo	34	29	18	10	12
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	25	33	20	9	16
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; light destruction.	28	27	22	15	10
Lightly bombed and unbombed cities.	31	27	22	10	14
Rural communities.	25	32	20	8	18
Urban evacuees	25	35	25	12	10

¹ Since some people gave more than one cause of their certainty, the percentages total more than 100.

Some of the reasons given by Japanese civilians for their feelings of certainty that victory could not be achieved illustrate the influence of the air attack.

Every city was bombed, factories were destroyed, and we were told we must prepare to attack the enemy when he landed on our homeland. Viewing this situation, I knew there was no hope for victory.

* * * * *

The residents of the heavily bombed cities and the evacuees tended to reach the point of certainty earlier than did the residents of the less heavily bombed communities. This is doubtless because of the fact that they experienced not only more bombing but experienced bombing earlier than did the residents of the other communities.

When bombed and unbombed people are compared, there is no great difference in the proportion who were certain that Japan could not win. However, the differences that do exist show that only slightly more of those with bombing experience were certain and were prone to give air-raid reasons for their certainty. Also those who were bombed reached the point of certainty somewhat earlier.

Personal Unwillingness to Continue with the War. Before the surrender came, most of the Japanese people, regardless of their bombing experience, already had reached the point where they were personally unwilling to have the war continue. This is shown by the answers to the question, "Did you

at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war?" The principal reasons given are listed in Table 37.

TABLE 37.—*Bombing experience and principal reasons for personal unwillingness to continue the war*¹

Of those who had—	Were never unwilling	Were unwilling because of air factors	Were unwilling because of consumer deprivation	Were unwilling because of atomic bomb	Were unwilling because of military losses
No bombing experience.	Percent 27	Percent 23	Percent 18	Percent 8	Percent 5
Bombing experience.	31	28	13	11	6
Once.....	32	28	13	11	5
More than once.	28	29	13	12	8

¹ Percentages do not total to 100 or more because only the reasons given by any appreciable proportion of respondents are presented in this table along with the percentage of respondents who said they were never unwilling to go on.

Both the bombed and unbombed were almost alike in their unwillingness to go on with the war. The reasons for this unwillingness were quite varied but air factors were the most important considerations for both groups. Consumer deprivations were commonly given by both groups, but especially by those who had no personal bombing experience. Doubtless some of these deprivations were either produced by the air raids or greatly increased by them.

The major reasons for personal unwillingness are well illustrated by the statement of a machinist in Funabashi:

Yes, I reached the point when I was unwilling to go on with the war. It was when the air raids became severe and our homes and factories were destroyed but there was no opposition from our planes. I felt as if we were fighting machinery with bamboo. Also, my food ration was not enough to keep me working. I could hardly stand it. The government told us we would defeat the U. S. forces when they landed in the homeland, but since my house was burned, my clothing gone, and I had no food, I knew I could not go on.

Personal unwillingness to go on with the war was widespread among the people in all bombing strata but was most marked among the people in the heavily bombed cities, with the exception of Tokyo. There, the highest proportion (40 percent) said that at no time during the war did they reach the point where they felt that they personally could not continue. While the reasons given for this unwillingness were many and quite varied, those relating to air factors were most common in all cities and were most important among residents of those cities experiencing the heaviest bombing. Military losses

TABLE 38.—*Bombing strata and principal reasons for personal unwillingness to continue the war*¹

Bombing strata	Were never unwilling	Were unwilling because of air factors	Were unwilling because of consumer deprivation	Were unwilling because of atomic bomb	Were unwilling because of military losses
Large cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	Percent 22	Percent 35	Percent 14	Percent 10	Percent 6
Tokyo.....	40	30	8	10	5
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	29	27	11	8	6
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; light destruction.	37	21	9	15	6
Lightly bombed and unbombed cities.	34	23	13	10	5
Rural communities.	25	24	19	8	5
Urban evacuees..	28	27	14	11	8

¹ Percentages do not total to 100 or more because only the reasons given by any appreciable proportion of respondents are presented in this table along with the percentage of respondents who said they were never unwilling to go on.

and consumer deprivations, commonly given as reasons for feeling personally unable to continue, showed little or no relation to bombing strata.

The cumulative effect of doubts of Japanese victory, certainty that Japan could not win, and personal unwillingness to continue with the war have been summarized in a single measure called the Confidence in Victory Index.¹⁰ While there are no significant differences between the bombed and the unbombed in the proportion with high confidence in victory, a greater proportion of those with more than one bombing experience were in the lowest confidence group: 54 percent as against 48 percent of the unbombed. In the analysis by bombing strata, only 16 percent of the residents in the most heavily bombed cities exhibited high confidence in victory and 51 percent were in the lowest group, while in the less heavily bombed cities 25 percent were in the high category and 45 percent in the lowest category. Again Tokyo stands out. While it is not significantly less represented in the lowest group, it had the highest proportion with high confidence in victory, 27 percent.

Bombing Experience and Morale Index Scores. A more general summary of the influence of bombing on morale can be gained by comparing the scores of the bombing experience groups in the Morale Index,

¹⁰ (Appendix L). Three categories were established by the Index: high, medium, and low confidence in victory.

which was constructed by combining several of the more critical indicators of Japanese civilian morale. These include: doubts of victory, certainty that Japan would or would not win the war, personal willingness to continue the war, attitude toward home front and military leaders, belief that equality of suffering existed, and reactions to the surrender. This index is a summary measure which indicates the relative morale of respondents.¹¹

The results of the application of the Morale Index to the various bombing experience groups reveals that persons with no bombing experience tend to be equally divided between the higher and lower morale categories, while those with bombing experience tend to be more often in the relatively lower morale category. This is most marked in the case of those who have been bombed more than once, as the table below indicates.

TABLE 39.—*Bombing experience and morale*¹

Of those who had—	Had relatively low morale	Had relatively high morale
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
No bombing experience.	50	50
Bombing experience...		
Once.....	56	44
More than once...	54	46
	57	43

¹ Measure used is the Morale Index. Each of the two morale groups used represents approximately half of the sample, divided on the basis of Morale Index scores.

The results by bombing strata are shown in the following table:

TABLE 40.—*Bombing strata and morale*

Bombing strata	Had relatively low morale	Had relatively high morale
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Large cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	56	44
Tokyo.....	50	50
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	51	49
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; light destruction.	46	54
Lightly bombed and unbombed cities.	47	53
Rural communities.....	51	49
Urban evacuees.....	61	39

The residents of the large, heavily bombed cities and the evacuees from urban areas still living in the country tended to be in the lower morale group to

¹¹ For full discussion of the Morale Index, see Appendix K.

a greater extent than were the residents of the less bombed cities, Tokyo residents, and residents of the rural communities.

The "Deviant" Responses of Tokyo Residents. The explanation of the relatively greater confidence in victory and personal willingness to continue the war shown by Tokyo residents, despite the fact that on all other measures of morale they tend to agree with other heavily bombed cities, is by no means completely apparent. However, several factors which have bearing on these results may be offered in partial explanation.

First, since Tokyo was a primary target and was subjected to heavy bombing over a longer period than any other Japanese city, it probably experienced a greater degree of selective evacuation than other cities. It is quite probable that factors were in operation which tended to take out of the city a high proportion of people with low morale and to leave behind those who were more hopeful and willing to go on. Certainly it must have taken more determination to remain behind in Tokyo and face continued raids than it did in other cities where the raids were fewer and less continuous.¹²

Second, the Tokyo sample contains a relatively high proportion of government employees, 20 percent, whose identification with the war effort was probably much closer than that of persons in other occupations and even than government workers in local and prefectural governmental units elsewhere.¹³

Third, the higher proportion of highly educated people found in the nation's capital would tend to increase the percentage of those never unwilling to continue the war. There is evidence that with respect to willingness to go on, the more educated stand high (Appendix R).

Fourth, the people of the capital city may well have been more closely identified with the international war aims of Japan than were the provincial residents, whose interests were more closely tied to local problems. The fact that Tokyo residents showed greater feelings of hostility in comparison with 41 percent of the residents of the other heavily bombed large cities; also, 14 percent placed the responsibility for the bombing of Japan on the

¹² The chances are that it took a really die-hard disposition to stick to the heavily bombed and ruined cities. This may be a reason for the relatively small differences between bombing strata.

¹³ A tabulation of those who were never personally unwilling to continue the war shows that government workers rank much higher in this characteristic than any other economic activity group.

United States while only 7 percent of the residents of other heavily bombed cities did so.¹⁴

Fifth, it is possible that the people of Tokyo were more completely indoctrinated toward the belief in ultimate victory than were the residents of other communities because they were in close contact with the sources of government propaganda.

Sixth, it is possible that the fact that Tokyo residents were not interviewed until relatively late in the survey has some bearing on their responses in that they had enjoyed a longer period of recovery from the effects of bombing (especially since their bombing experience also came earlier than in other cities) and consequently tended to forget or minimize their actual wartime reactions.

Summary: The Effect of Bombing Experience on Confidence in Victory. A previous chapter showed that the confidence of the Japanese that they would emerge victorious declined seriously as the war progressed, and that the decline accelerated during the period of the air attacks, in the final phases of the war. However, the air attacks hammered morale at a time when it was receiving blows from a number of other directions. Furthermore, the air attacks themselves tended to blanket the country with fear and forebodings; their effects by no means stopped at the city limits of the targets.

For these reasons, the general picture is more of uniformity than of difference. The differences between bombed and unbombed people, and between various cities, are less striking than the homogeneity of the nation in its reactions. The small and generally consistent differences which exist among these groups of people and cities, however, suggest that bombing experience had some part in causing decline of confidence in victory, and the general decline of morale. Of special interest is the finding that a higher proportion of people who were bombed or who lived in more heavily bombed and destroyed places say they felt unwilling to go on with the war, at some time before the surrender. Tokyo, of course, was the exception.

¹⁴ A highly-placed cabinet official said: "I am not definitely sure, but I think the morale of Tokyo was not bad at all. Many were bombed out, but they were overheard saying that 'Now we're bombed out and we feel as if there is nothing to worry us' This attitude comes from their former earthquake experience, so it wasn't surprising. Only when they were rational did they begin to wonder what the war was all about. The ordinary masses of Tokyo were not pessimistic, on the whole, but Osaka and towns in the west were pessimistic. Pessimism was also found in the small towns—where people's minds were not prepared, because it was thought small towns would not be bombed. . . . Every place has its own particular morale tendency, as in Chicago, Philadelphia, the East, the Middle West, and so on. Even Japan has its own local opinion. . . . Tokyo on the whole was optimistic; the Eddoko (old Tokyoites) and the old-time spirit, but morale differs in various localities, and you should investigate all over the country."

Bombing Experience and Work Behavior

Absenteeism. The extent of absenteeism in a nation, community, or plant is usually considered as a reasonably sensitive indicator of the level of workers' morale. The reason for this is that the usual personal factors which enter into a worker's decision to remain away from his work—such as fatigue, desire for recreation, satisfaction with his income, and even family responsibilities of a serious nature—are, in the case of the worker whose morale is high, overcome by his personal identification with the war effort and the resulting conviction that his contribution is so essential that personal considerations are minor in comparison. Thus, a high rate of absenteeism in a country at war is usually considered to be indicative of a low incidence of identification with the national war effort as well as a serious menace to production.¹⁵ In the next chapter, the morale of the labor force will be analyzed in detail. Here, the study of the effects of bombing experiences will be specifically treated.

In interviews with home front leaders and plant managers, one of the most common complaints was that absenteeism, which had been effectively held down during the early years of the war, had increased greatly during the bombing period. As one observer put it:

Owing to the rising fear of air attacks, workers in general were reluctant to work in the factories, and attendance fluctuated as much as 50 percent. The worst morale was among the munitions workers. Absenteeism was rampant. Plant owners and the authorities were helpless in enforcing attendance at factories.

In interviews with the Japanese people the question was asked of the gainfully employed, "How many working days were you absent from your work during this period (January 1945 to the end of the war)?" Those who had personally experienced bombing were not only considerably more likely to have been absentees but also were more likely to have been the more serious absentees. These were in the group who had absented themselves for a total of more than 15 days during the period.

¹⁵ Much absenteeism in Japan resulted not only from psychological influences but also from objective effects of bombing and economic difficulties such as damage to factory or place of work, shortage of raw materials, and disruption in transportation. Since the two factors are highly interrelated, it is difficult to separate and evaluate their effects. No attempt was made to do so in this survey. Therefore absenteeism is considered not only as a morale indicator but also as an effective consequence of bombing. Its value as a clue to morale is indicated by the fact that there is a relationship between morale as measured by the morale index used in this study, and absenteeism. (Table 60).

TABLE 41.—*Bombing experience and absenteeism*

Of those who had—	Were not absent	Were absent 1-14 days	Were absent 15 or more days	Total
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
No bombing experience.	46	20	34	100
Bombing experience—				
Once	34	24	42	100
More than once	36	23	41	100
	32	25	43	100

The results by bombing strata are shown below:

TABLE 42.—*Bombing strata and absenteeism*

Bombing strata	Not absent	Absent 1-14 days	Absent 15 or more days	Total
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Large cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	26	26	48	100
Tokyo	34	21	45	100
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	36	24	40	100
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; light destruction.	43	25	32	100
Lightly bombed	42	22	36	100
Rural communities	44	21	35	100
Urban evacuees	40	27	33	100

¹ Evacuees were probably likely to quit their jobs before leaving cities or to have considered that they had effectively quit. Thus, time taken for evacuation might not be deemed absenteeism by gainfully employed evacuees.

The most heavily bombed cities had the lowest proportion of gainfully employed persons reporting no absences from work while the relatively lightly damaged cities and the residents of rural communities had the highest proportion. Also, when serious absenteeism is considered—instances in which absences are over 15 days—the more heavily bombed cities clearly suffered the most absenteeism.

The influence of bombing on absenteeism is brought into focus by answers to the question asked of absentees, "What prevented you from going to work on those days (on which you were absent)?"

Persons who had suffered direct bombing experience were of course much more likely than those who were unbombed to give reasons deriving from air raids for their absence.¹⁶ Those who had experienced more than one bombing were especially prone to blame air factors for their absence, as the following table indicates:

There is a clear-cut relation between the extent of bombing and bombing destruction and the pro-

¹⁶ Further, those who were serious absentees (absent over 15 days) were clearly more likely to give air reasons for their absences than were less serious absentees (absent less than 15 days): the proportions being 30 percent and 19 percent respectively.

TABLE 43.—*Bombing experience and reasons for absence*

Of those who had—	Mentioned as the cause of absence—		
	Air reasons ¹	Non-air reasons only	Total
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
No bombing experience.	18	82	100
Bombing experience—			
Once	40	60	100
More than once	34	66	100
	46	54	100

¹ These figures include all absentees who mentioned reasons for absence related to the air attack, whether or not they also gave additional reasons not related to it. The same holds true for Table 44.

portion of the population giving air reasons for their absence, as the table below shows:

TABLE 44.—*Bombing strata and reasons for absence*

Bombing strata	Air reasons	Non-air reasons only	Total
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Large cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	53	47	100
Tokyo	48	52	100
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	34	66	100
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; light destruction.	30	70	100
Lightly bombed and unbombed cities.	19	81	100
Rural communities	21	79	100
Urban evacuees	37	63	100

The most common reasons given by those who claimed that air-raid factors were responsible for their absence from work include: anxiety about raids at the factory or at home, worry about the safety of their family and property, taking family to the country, personal property or home damaged by raids, and difficulties in getting to work because of air-raid damage to transportation facilities. The non-air-raid factors most frequently mentioned were: illness, fatigue, lack of materials, time spent in obtaining food in the country, and family duties. Many of these reasons doubtless were indirectly caused by the raids or were rationalizations of fear of bombing.

Working Capacity. While absenteeism is looked upon as perhaps the most serious consequence of the low morale of workers, equally important—although less dramatic and less apparent—is the lowered working capacity of those who did not necessarily absent themselves from work.¹⁷

The influence of bombing on working capacity was especially noticed by officials of the heavily bombed cities. The vice mayor of Wakayama said:

¹⁷ For the relation between work capacity and morale, see Table 65.

Some people were so frightened by the bombing that they could not work at all. However, these were the exceptions. Most people worried about the safety of their children and their families, and although they continued to work, could not work efficiently.

A city official in Sakai observed:

As raids increased, the fighting spirit decreased because people were tired and frightened. Also, the desire for peace increased and work capacity was lowered.

Japanese workers were asked, "How was your working capacity during this period (January 1945 to the end of the war) as compared with other years?" A decrease in working capacity was admitted by over two-thirds of them. While there were no great differences, those who had bombing experiences were more likely to admit lower working capacity than were those who had not. The loss in working capacity, it may be seen, was especially more common among those who had been bombed more than once.

TABLE 45.—*Bombing experience and work capacity*

Of those who had—	Report their working capacity			
	Lowered	Unchanged	Increased	Total
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
No bombing experience.	76	18	6	100
Bombing experience—				
Once-----	80	14	6	100
More than once--	76	17	7	100
	82	12	6	100

The only really striking difference is that between workers in the large heavily bombed cities and those of all other cities—but especially those in the lightly bombed and unbombed cities, as the tabulation below shows:

TABLE 46.—*Bombing strata and work capacity*

Bombing strata	Lowered	Unchanged	Increased	Total
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Large cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	85	5	10	100
Tokyo-----	74	22	4	100
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	73	17	10	100
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; light destruction.	75	21	4	100
Lightly bombed and unbombed cities.	70	25	5	100
Rural communities---	79	15	6	100
Urban evacuees-----	75	17	8	100

The reasons people mentioned for reduction in their work capacity were classified according to whether they were of a subjective character, such as: worry, anxiety, dissatisfaction, fright, etc., or of

an objective nature, such as: inadequate food, working conditions, transportation difficulties, the physical effects of air raids, etc. These were further classified as to whether they were directly due to air raids or to reasons not immediately ascribable to the air attack.

An illustration of the anxiety caused by the air raids, which in turn reduced working capacity, is found in the statement of a worker in Chiba prefecture, who said:

My working capacity decreased greatly. The frequent air raids caused me to live in suspense. I always was expecting them and was always preparing to flee to the shelter with my family. This anxiety made it impossible for me to work efficiently.

The influence of objective factors is revealed in the following quotation from an interview with an airplane factory employee in Sakai:

I think my working capacity went down about one-half. Before the war, I was able to work overtime, but as the war went on, I got physically tired, especially from the long hours spent in getting to work. I had to leave home, after our factory was evacuated because of bombing, at 6:00 a. m. By the time I got home, it was 6:00 p. m., and when there was an air raid, it would be after 9:00 p. m. Thus, it was awfully troublesome to go to work. Once in a while I stayed home to get food or work in my garden. All these things kept me away from work and gradually I lost interest in my job.

Reasons for lowered work capacity of both a subjective and objective nature, deriving from the air raids, were more commonly given by persons with bombing experience than by those who had no personal experience with bombing. In the case of objective factors, those with more than one bombing experience are less likely than those who have experienced several raids to have given air reasons for their absence; however, this seems to hold less for subjective factors. The tabulation is shown below:

TABLE 47.—*Bombing experience and reasons for lowered work capacity*¹

Of those who had—	Objective		Subjective	
	Air ²	Non-air only	Air ²	Non-air only
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
No bombing experience.	40	60	47	53
Bombed-----	63	37	56	44
Once-----	58	42	58	42
More than once--	68	32	53	47

¹ Table is calculated only for those who said their work capacity was lowered. Thus, the base (100 percent) represents 77 percent of the total gainfully employed (see Chapter 6).

² The percentages refer to those who gave some reason for lowered work capacity directly related to the air attack, whether or not they also mentioned some non-air reason.

The results by bombing strata are as follows:

TABLE 48.—*Bombing strata and reasons for lowered work capacity*¹

Bombing strata	Objective		Subjective	
	Air ²	Non-air only	Air ²	Non-air only
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Large cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	66	34	80	40
Tokyo	68	32	54	46
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; high destruction.	58	42	49	51
Smaller cities, heavily bombed; light destruction.	60	40	56	44
Lightly bombed and unbombed cities.	52	48	59	41
Rural non-evacuees	42	58	45	55
Rural evacuees	55	45	63	37

¹ Table is calculated only for those who said their work capacity was lowered. Thus, the base (100 percent) represents 77 percent of the total gainfully employed (see Chapter 6).

² The percentages refer to those who gave some reason for lowered work capacity directly related to the air attack, whether or not they also mentioned some non-air reason.

In both subjective and objective reasons for lowered work capacity, air attack reasons (with or without other reasons) are clearly more commonly given than just non-air reasons. While there is no clear-cut relation between bombing strata and subjective reasons derived from air raids or the threats of air raids, other than between residents of bombed cities and the rural communities, there is such a relationship for objective air-raid reasons. The two most heavily bombed urban strata had the highest proportions (66 percent and 68 percent respectively) who mentioned air-raid reasons for their lowered working capacity, while the unbombed cities and the residents of rural communities had the highest proportions giving non-air reasons, 48 percent and 58 percent respectively.

Summary: Bombing Experience and Work Behavior. It is clear from the analysis in this section that bombing not only increased absenteeism but also was a factor in the decline in the working capacity of those who had personally experienced bombing. Further, the residents of cities which experienced the greatest amount of bombing and the greatest extent of bombing destruction, regardless of their personal bombing experience, were much more likely to be absentees and suffered greater reduction in their working capacity than did residents of the unbombed and lightly bombed rural and urban communities. These conclusions are important not only as a reflection of low morale but also because of their direct effect on essential civilian and war production.

Summary and Conclusions of Bombing Experience And Morale.

From the evidence presented in this chapter, bombing experience, as such, seems to have had a small but consistent consequence in lowering morale of Japanese civilians. The major conclusion of this report, however, is that the effects of the air raids were not confined to the specific areas and people subject to attack; furthermore, the effect of the air attack must be considered in the context of the many depressants of morale, analyzed more extensively in Chapter 3.

In comparing bombed with unbombed people, the following differences appeared, although in some cases their size was rather small, and at the borderline of statistical significance: bombed people were more likely than unbombed people to believe that suffering was unequal and that people's attitudes and conduct toward each other became worse as the war continued. They tended to be more extensively critical of their leaders' conduct of the war and home front. They also were a bit more likely to doubt victory, a bit more certain that Japan could not win and more likely to be personally unwilling to continue the war, than were those who were unbombed. Further, these evidences of war-weariness were quite closely related to air-raid experiences, as shown by the reasons they gave for these attitudes and by their timing. Finally, those with personal bombing experience were more likely to say that they had absented themselves from their work and for longer periods of time, and were somewhat more likely to say they had suffered loss in working capacity than were unbombed people. Air-raid factors were more commonly given by bombed workers than by unbombed workers as the reason for their absenteeism and lowered working capacity.

The analysis of the relation between bombing strata and morale gives essentially the same results, in that residents of the most heavily bombed cities in general show lower morale than residents of unbombed and lightly bombed communities. The residents of heavily bombed cities tended more to say they believed that suffering was unequal and that people's attitudes and conduct toward each other became worse. They were also more likely to be critical of their leaders' conduct of the home front and of the war. They were more likely to doubt victory and, with the exception of Tokyo residents, were more certain that Japan could not win and more unwilling personally to continue the war than were the residents of the less bombed communities. Their war-weariness came earlier and was due to air-raid factors to a greater degree than

was true of the residents of communities less subjected to bombing. Likewise, the residents of the heavily bombed cities were guilty of greater absenteeism and suffered greater loss in working capacity than did residents of unbombed and lightly bombed communities. The effect of urban area raids was felt by the community as a whole, not its bombed citizens alone.

In sum, the direct and indirect effects of the raids on individual, home, community, and work situations brought realization of lowered personal and national ability to carry on with the war. Nevertheless, a fair segment of the population was characterized by relatively high morale (Chapter 3).

The Radiation of the Effects of Bombing. Despite the fact that differences were found in nearly all morale measures between the bombed and the unbombed, and between the residents of heavily bombed and lightly or unbombed communities, some readers may reasonably ask, "Why were these differences not greater than they were?" In answering this question, certain facts are pertinent.

First, it must be said that bombing was not the only factor in depressing the morale of the Japanese people. As has been pointed out elsewhere, a long period of sacrifice had exercised its influence on the Japanese people even before the air attacks. Military defeats before and during the bombing were likewise depressing morale. While bombing probably precipitated the downward surge of morale, it did not alone cause it.

Second, and very important, the influence of bombing was by no means confined to actual or potential target areas, and therefore had a general rather than a differential effect on morale. Despite the fact that the principal targets were the 66 cities subjected to urban area attacks, few Japanese lacked contact with the air raids. The nature of the intensive attack against a nation small in geographic area, with American planes criss-crossing the sky as they went their unchallenged way to their targets, meant that even the most isolated Japanese frequently saw the American B-29s in the sky. This alone, especially since there appeared to be no opposition, must have had a great psychological impact upon an island people who had been told by their leaders, and were indeed at one time convinced, that their land was invulnerable to invasion from sea or sky. Here was evidence of the feared American material might, against which no "spirit" could prevail.

Further, 57 percent of even the native rural population had experienced air raids and alerts, and about

one-sixth said they had actually been bombed.¹⁸ Indeed, as other chapters show, rural people ascribed loss of confidence in victory and depressed work capacity to the air attack almost as often as did urban people. The differences were frequently not significant enough to segregate rural people, in the tables.

Those of the more than 8,500,000 people who left the heavily bombed cities went to live with their friends and relatives in rural and other urban areas scattered throughout Japan, and told of the terrible destruction caused by bombing. Often their experiences, admittedly bad, were exaggerated in the telling. All of this led to widespread rumors about bombing, over which little control could be exercised by the police and government officials. These rumors reached the ears of almost everyone in Japan.^{19 20}

Finally, the fact that the American attack seemed to be proceeding in a descending order from large cities to smaller cities must have given reason to people in smaller cities, and even villages, to feel that their turn would come—and soon.²¹ This feeling was further exaggerated by the tactic of dropping leaflets, warning the residents of various communities that they might be included in the next series of attacks.

While the Japanese government succeeded in blacking most of the early propaganda directed at the Japanese people, they failed to prevent the

¹⁸ The air-raid warning system alerted the entire ken (prefecture), when any planes came within the prefectural net. Two out of five rural people said that the cessation of air raids and their threat was a reason for their post-war satisfaction.

¹⁹ See Chapter 7.

²⁰ Although evacuees were key people in spreading rumors of the effects of bombing, of the failure of active and passive air-raid defenses, and such, they were not the sole rumor-mongers. Official reports complained of widespread rumor deriving from travelers bombed on their trips, observers who saw wreckage, and from conclusions drawn from interrupted communications.

These official sources also blame government information policy for the rise of rumors and exaggeration. For example, the Domei survey of 10 April 1945 said in Part:

"As has been previously stated, since there has been a failure to make positive statements of facts concerning air raid damages, it is quite natural for the people to fail to get the true facts. They have no choice but to believe rumors, and not only that, it also gives rise to the tendency to conjecture concerning the damage in exaggerated proportions."

The report goes on to say that unbombed rural and remote urban places, having least access to the facts, were the sites of the greatest coloring and exaggeration.

Finally, the more-or-less true tale of the air attacks had to be published. As a senior official of the Cabinet Board of Information said:

"The newspapers carried stories and news of the bombings, which were so widely experienced and known that there was no possibility of the government's hiding the facts."

²¹ The head man of Nagakubofuru machi, a small mountain town accidentally bombed said:

"Our small town of about 3,000 people is located in the mountains; thus we never expected to be bombed. When we were bombed, we all thought—if we are bombed even in a small mountain place, the war must certainly be lost."



Premier Suzuki: "However, it is most regrettable to observe that frequently, since the enemy began huge air raids not so long ago, there have been factories whose attendance rate has dropped."

American propaganda of the deed, B-29s flew over Japan unmolested, destroying military objectives, burning out cities, making people homeless, killing and injuring thousands, and forcing millions to flee cities. This propaganda could not be countermanded. Its influence on morale was widespread. In a sense, the psychological and social effects were almost as if all Japan had been carpeted with bombs, rather than specific target areas.

Does Bombing Raise Morale? Since the Battle of Britain, one question about the morale effects of bombing has perennially arisen: "Does bombing raise morale?" Sometimes it is phrased: "Are there any special conditions under which bombing will raise morale?" On the surface of things, since certain aspects of morale in Tokyo and the atomic-bombed areas (as we shall see in Chapter 8) held up better than in other less drastically bombed regions, it might appear that morale in Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki was bolstered by bombing.

The conclusion of Morale Division studies, however, is that bombing generally does not raise morale—just the contrary; and if there are special circum-

stances under which morale may be raised by bombing, they are very special indeed.

The Morale Division report on Germany went into the available evidence on British morale under bombing, and concluded that its alleged rise was more propaganda than fact.²² The German study also found that morale seemed to fall less under very severe than under more moderate attacks. The explanation offered was that apathy and immediate personal concerns were so great in the extremely heavily bombed cities of Germany, that low morale did not express itself in over-all national and antiwar disaffection. The possibility was also raised that it took something of a die-hard attitude to remain in the ruins of an almost wiped-out city.

From the evidence of this report on Japan, it cannot be said that bombing in any instance raised the morale of civilians.²³ The residents of the most heavily bombed large cities, furthermore, were

²² See USSBS, Morale Division, *The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale*.

²³ The possible exception is the Doolittle raid. It caused no extensive damage and appeared as an isolated event, not as part of a sustained air attack; the possibility of retaliation existed. As a result, some Japanese observers felt that it raised morale.



The conflict of loyalties to home and work bench were created by circumstances beyond the individual worker's control, and they must have been solved by many in terms of which appeared to them the greater immediate crisis.

shown to be consistently lower than any other group on practically every indicator of morale employed. The same is true for the residents of heavily bombed and heavily damaged smaller cities.²⁴

While it is true that those who remained to be interviewed in Tokyo were less likely to admit that they had reached a point where they felt they could-

²⁴ Differences between the morale effects in the most heavily bombed German and Japanese cities may be due to a variety of factors associated with the differences in the air attack. For example, the maximum tonnage of bombs dropped on a German city was four to five times the maximum dropped on Tokyo, the most heavily bombed Japanese city. Furthermore, the principal type of attack in Japan was the night urban area incendiary attack, concentrated in relatively few raids per city, compared with the primarily high explosive German attack. The whole span of the air attack was shorter in Japan than in Germany. The chances of selective evacuation were greater, thus, in the heavily-attacked German cities. It is also believed that the geography of Japan, and its more limited recuperative resources, caused wider radiation of the economic, social, and morale effects of bombing.

n't go on with the war, or were certain that Japan could not win, still, the great majority of even these "die-hards" had reached these points. On other components of morale, these people behaved in the expected fashion.

Thus, it must be concluded from the available evidence, that bombing, as part of an air attack or an air war, does not raise civilian morale. It may have less of a depressant effect in the remains of some communities than of others, but even this can largely be accounted for by selective evacuation. In Japan, at any rate, neither interviews with a civilian cross section, documentary sources, nor interrogations with informed persons, gave evidence that bombing raised morale, in either bombed or unbombed places.

MORALE OF THE LABOR FORCE

Among the leading original purposes of the bombing of Japan were the destruction of its war production process and end-products. Even though later targets were considerably broader in scope, they still included the will and capacity of the Japanese to produce the weapons and food necessary to continue the war. Thus, it is important to investigate the effect of aerial bombardment on the morale and work behavior of the labor force.¹

This chapter consequently will be devoted to three topics:

1. The morale of the labor force, and its relation to bombing.

2. Absenteeism among the labor-force—used as a measure of work behavior—and its relations to bombing and morale.²

3. The working capacity of the labor force—used as a second measure of work behavior—and its relations to bombing and morale.³

In each case data will be presented for broad occupational and industry segments of the labor force. Thus, even when absolute levels of performance and prewar or pre-bombing base lines are not available, the relative performance of such groups during the war can be known.⁴

Labor Conditions. The Japanese labor force worked under stringent government controls. The general mobilization law of 1938 (revised in 1941 and 1945) stated in its preamble that:

National general mobilization, as mentioned in this law, means control and employment of manpower and material

¹ The "labor force" as used here refers to those who worked for a living, who received earnings as employees, professional fees, or profits as active employers. It does not include those who were exclusively housewives, students, retired, or unemployables.

² The term "absenteeism" as used in this report is not defined strictly as "wilful absence from work when there is work to be done, and tools, materials and transportation to the place of work are available." Rather, as used here, the term means simply "absence from work on working days."

³ "Working capacity" as used here is defined by responses to the question: "How was your working capacity during this period (January-August 1945) as compared with other years?" The response indicate a self-evaluation of personal ability to work.

⁴ The basic material for the analysis has been taken from the interview answers of the Japanese people. The morale of the labor force will be judged with reference to the Morale Index and some of its constituent items previously described in the report (Appendix K). Absenteeism and work capacity will be analyzed from the questions, "How many working days were you absent from your work during this period (January 1945 to the end of the war)?" "What prevented you from going to work on those days?" "How was your working capacity during this period as compared with other years?" and "How were your working conditions during this period?" Occupation and economic activity represent the respondents' major employment during the war. These data will be supplemented and illustrated by relevant items from official documents, statements of leaders, and plant records.

resources for the highest and most efficient development of the total power of the state in time of war (including as hereinafter understood, an incident similar to war), to the end of achievement of defense objectives.

The law gave the government power to:

1. Conscript workers provided there was no interference with military conscription (Article IV);

2. Regulate the use, employment, or dismissal of workers and their wages and working conditions (Article VI);

3. Prevent or settle labor disputes (Article VII);

4. Request reports concerning the occupational ability and experience of the general population (Article XXI); and

5. Order the compulsory training of technicians in factories, training institutes, or schools (Article XXII).

On 1 July 1938, the government began nationalizing all local public and private employment offices, and guided workers into preferred industries. In December 1941, the government was authorized (through the Welfare Ministry) to conscript all male registrants, 17 to 40, and unmarried women, 18 to 25, for work in any factory.

Beginning in the spring of 1938, students were mobilized on a part-time basis and were allowed to work a maximum of 30 school days. In March 1945, all primary school graduates and high school students were conscripted for full-time work.

Through Article VII of the mobilization law, the government abolished all independent labor unions. In its stead the government encouraged the establishment of factory associations under the Industry Patriotic Society. In 1941 this society had a membership of 5.29 million in 78,146 companies. During the war practically every worker belonged to one kind of government-sponsored union or another.

Early in the war, when Japanese military forces were winning on all battle fronts, there was little overt display of dissatisfaction among the working population toward the government's sweeping mobilization laws. However, as the war became unfavorable for Japan, there developed much inward hostility among the workers in general. As a prominent Japanese labor leader pointed out:

The moment a man would grumble or obviously slacken, the Kempei would take him away and subject him either to severe questioning or actual punishment on the spot. There were many Kempei in the factories disguised as laborers, who worked right with the working men. These were really

government-paid industrial spies. Naturally, your factory worker hated this very much. Really, the Kempei exercised a very strong control, and this control was exercised by brute force. Naturally, your working man was afraid to talk about his conditions or hopes.

Statements by managerial personnel confirm these conditions. In an interview, the director of the Industrial Bank of Japan stated:

As a result of the oppressive measures taken by the Army through the gendarmerie (Kempei), many of the people actually considered the Army an enemy of the people. The Army violated individual rights of the people by forcibly putting them to work on various labor projects, from chopping down trees to digging caves.

(There were no exemptions in the enforced-labor policy of the Army. The respondent, who is a director of one of Japan's leading banks, was drafted for three days to dig a cave. He received compensation of 1.60 yen per day.)

Moreover, despite total mobilization of the nation's labor force, there was much to be desired in the way of utilizing the manpower available in the most efficient way.⁵ Such practices as labor hoarding and "pirating" by companies, paying "black-market" wages to entice workers, absenteeism among workers, and production "blocking" by disgruntled workers prevailed. Labor management disputes were never eliminated. Intraplant conflicts between conscriptees and old workers existed, and many war workers resented being forcibly removed from trade and service occupations or light consumer industry jobs. Furthermore, in most instances, wages were inadequate to meet the real cost of living in a black market economy. In January 1945, the cabinet debated "an emergency measure to increase production through spiritual power." Industrial leaders asked for measures "to boost the spirit of those engaged in labor services to defend their places to the last under an air raid." It is in this setting that we must ask our questions concerning the role of bombing on the productive capacities and performance of the Japanese workers.

The Morale of the Labor Force

The morale of the Japanese workers, i. e., their willingness and capacity to produce the goods and services necessary to continue war participation, is a complex problem. As pointed out in previous chapters, it was the subject of attack from many sides: from direct bombing, from the submarine and air campaigns against the shipping lines to the

⁵ For more details with reference to manpower policy and problems, see the report of the Manpower, Food, and Civilian Supply Division, USSBS.

south, from military reverses, and from the increasingly heavy impact of home front problems.

This section will be concerned first with the overall effect of these factors on the morale of various segments of the labor force, and secondly, with an attempt to isolate the effects of bombing.⁶

Relative Morale of Various Parts of the Labor Force. It would appear that the intelligentsia (professionals, proprietors, managers, and officials) had the lowest level of morale, that the manual workers and farmers were the middle morale groups, and that the white-collar workers (clerical, sales, and service), together with the non-workers (housewives, students, retired, unemployed, etc.), had the highest relative morale (Table 49). Reasons for this will later be adduced, but it is important here to note that it was the supervisory segments of the labor force that had the lowest morale. On 10 April 1945, a Domei News Agency summary of national morale said:

There are, of course, some provincial people in whom the hatred of the enemy is blazing and whose morale is high. Most of such persons are found among the lower classes. The people of the higher classes, however, such as the capitalists, regional officials, intellectuals, and businessmen, are not stirred nor are they filled with hostility toward the foe. Rather they are oppressed by pessimism.

TABLE 49.—*Morale by occupation*

Occupation ¹	Relatively ² higher morale	Relatively lower morale
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Intelligentsia	40	60
Manual workers.....	45	55
Farmers	46	54
White-collar	51	49
Non-workers.....	53	47

¹ "Intelligentsia" represents professionals, semi-professionals, and proprietors, managers, and officials. The term "intelligentsia" is used in conformity with Japanese practice. "Manual workers" represents skilled semi-skilled and unskilled workers. "White-collar" represents clerical, sales, and service workers. "Farmers" represents farm owners, tenants, and farm laborers. "Non-workers" represents housewives, students, retired, unemployed, and unemployables.

² Measure used in the Morale Index (Appendix K). Each of the two Morale Index groups in the table represents approximately one-half of the sample, ranged in order of Morale Index scores.

Less variation is found if the interviews are grouped according to the economic activities by which the respondents were employed. Those engaged in war industry, non-war industry, and agriculture had the lowest morale. Those in the service

⁶ It should be remembered, of course, that the Morale Index, which provides much of the evidence for this section, is a measure of relative morale and probably represents the situation as it existed toward the end of the war. Its use is restricted to such questions as which segments of the labor force had the lowest or highest morale in relation to the others at that time. However, some inferences concerning the level of morale and its course during the war can be made on the basis of the "doubts of victory" and "certainty of defeat" questions; other such information is available in the opinions of officials, of other leaders, and in documents.

activities appear to have had slightly higher morale, and the "no industry" group had the highest relative morale.⁷

These results for occupations and activities are, of course, not independent of each other. The "non-worker" and "no-industry" categories include almost the same population, overlapping 99 percent. "Farmer" and "agriculture" overlap 98 percent. "War industry" and "non-war industry" are 74 percent and 70 percent "manual workers," respectively, and the "service activities" are 45 percent "white-collar."

On the basis of these occupational concentrations and of the knowledge we have of the morale level of each occupation group (Table 49), it is not hard to see why the above morale levels of activities occur as they do. But it is worth noting that the people in war industry were not of better morale than those in other economic activities.

What factors can be adduced to account for the morale difference among occupations? A factor highly correlated with these occupational differences is the age-sex composition of occupation groups. Women of all ages have higher morale than the men, and within each sex the young generally have higher morale than the old (Appendix R). This is verified in various special interviews and reports. The head of the Women's Association in Gifu city stated, in regard to changes in women's morale during the war:

There was no change in their determination to carry on, no matter what hardships they might bear. Even air raids did not seem to affect their determination to carry through to the end.

With respect to age, for example, the chief of police of a small town stated:

After the starting of air raids, despite the fact that young students were unaccustomed to their work, they defended with their very lives their workplaces. Experienced workers, who form the nucleus of production, became absentees one after the other, especially using as an excuse the disruption of traffic facilities by air raids.

Now, women—particularly young women—make up a far larger proportion of the white-collar occupational group than of any other occupation group (excluding the non-workers). The non-worker group has the next most favorable sex-age compo-

⁷ "War industry" represents war manufacturing (aircraft, ships, ammunition, etc.). "Non-war industry" represents non-war manufacturing (textiles, canning, etc), construction, transportation and communication, and mining. "Service activity" represents retail and wholesale trade, government and service activities (medical services, shoe repairing, etc.), and amusements. "Agriculture" also includes forestry and fishing. "No industry" represents housewives, students, retired, unemployed, and unemployables.

sition for morale, followed by the manual workers and the farmers, and finally by the intelligentsia.

This correlation between the morale and age-sex composition of occupational groups leads to the further question of why morale is so highly correlated with age and sex. Factors of possible worth here are the long years of working under pressure that the males had endured, particularly the males over 30; the greater status involvement of males of all ages in victory or defeat, and their greater educational level; the greater family responsibility and worry shouldered by the older people; the greater vigor and more recent indoctrination of the young people; and the traditional training of the women in Japanese society. On the basis of a national survey of morale, Domei stated on 25 April 1945:

Among those who are toughened through these adversities are the few who are primarily strong and those young people who are both physically and mentally fit and are burning with the spirit of constructiveness.

A prominent Japanese labor leader said:

The government brought in many factory workers from the farms and many youngsters from schools and elsewhere, who were filled with the "spirit of war." These believed the government propaganda line. I believe I can say truthfully that the old laborers, those we usually think of as members of the laboring class, thought the government propaganda was foolish.

The director of an aircraft corporation at Kawasaki said:

The women were better in respect to morale than men because more of them were young and were not so bound with responsibility toward a home and a family.

However, the age-sex composition of occupational groups is not the only factor of use in explaining occupational morale differences. The intelligentsia had access to more knowledge of the progress of the war and of American strength, and this, as will be seen later, was a factor in lowering their morale. For example, a corporation lawyer stated in an interview:

People who were able to think fairly clearly did not have too much confidence in the leaders. For example, the changes of the diet and changes in the high command (Navy and Army) were such as to make people believe that the war was not going as satisfactorily as reported. The farmers had no way of getting any idea of what was going on, except through the local authorities, and therefore, were influenced wholly by the government. They were given a very rosy picture, and were satisfied to carry on as before. To the average person, however, it was fairly obvious that the trouble of securing cabinets, consular changes, high command changes, all meant things were not going too well . . .

Morale Shifts and the Contribution of Air Factors. The Morale Index, as was stated earlier, provides no basis for estimating morale shifts or their causes. But "confidence in victory" is an indicator of morale, and two questions on confidence were asked the Japanese: "As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?" and "When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?" These may be used to infer the time and the cause of morale shifts in the various occupation and industry groups.

The times when the persons in each occupation and industry group first began to doubt a Japanese victory were analyzed. More than 50 percent of each occupation group already doubted victory between April and June 1945, but the intelligentsia had the largest block of early doubters, and maintained the highest proportion of doubters to the end.⁸

In an interview, an executive of a ball-bearing factory stated:

I have talked to many newspaper reporters and they told me victory was impossible. I doubted our victory ever since the battle of Guadalcanal. I thought the idea that we could win the war was wrong from the beginning.

The manual workers were the next earliest doubters and reached the level of the intelligentsia sometime around April 1945. More of the white-collar workers doubted than the farmers or non-workers but they never reached the intelligentsia or manual workers in extent. Thus the primarily urban occupations doubted earlier and reached a greater proportion of doubters than the farmers or non-workers.

All activity groups likewise had over 50 percent of their members doubting victory by April-June 1945. Nonwar industry appears to have had the highest proportion of early doubters and had the greatest proportion of doubters till the end. War industry and the service activities were next most affected, the former finally reaching the level of nonwar industry by the end of the war. Agriculture and the nonindustry group had proportionately the least doubters at all times after July 1944.

The two major reasons given for the doubts by those who held them are as follows:

TABLE 50.—Main reasons for doubting Japanese victory¹

	Air raids	Military losses	Never doubted
	Percent	Percent	Percent
Occupation:			
Intelligentsia.....	32	41	5
Manual workers.....	38	34	9
White collar.....	35	25	13
Farmers.....	32	23	12
Nonworkers.....	33	25	13
Activities:			
War industry.....	37	33	8
Nonwar industry...	33	41	9
Service activities...	35	34	11
Agriculture.....	33	24	11
No industry.....	33	25	10

¹ Percentages do not add to 100 or more because only the two reasons most frequently cited by respondents, and the percentage of respondents who said they never doubted victory are included in the table.

The intelligentsia had the smallest proportion who had not reached the doubt stage by the end of the war and is the only group that stressed "military losses" more than "air raids" and their effects. In general, as a previous chapter has indicated, those who were most aware of the military situation became the earliest doubters, the other groups appear to be approximately alike in the matter of "never doubting."⁹

Activities show the same differences in doubt pattern as do occupational groups. Military reasons are the chief determiners of doubt for the nonwar industry group, and much the least important for agriculture and the non-industry group. Both types of reasons shared about equally for war industry and the service activities.

On the basis of these data one can say that air reasons were specifically referred to in a greater part of the cases as the determiners of doubt, a higher percentage than references to military losses except for those with most access to information and wider outlook, who grasped the war situation earliest, and therefore began to doubt. The important thing is that these people tended to be among the key people in Japanese production and social organization.

The times when persons of various occupation and industry groups first felt certain that victory over America could not be attained were as follows:

⁹ For finer occupational analysis of those who said they never doubted, see Table 53.

⁸ For example, by June 1944, twice as many of the intelligentsia were doubters as compared with any other occupational group.

TABLE 51.—When Japanese became certain Japan couldn't win

	The following percentage of persons felt certain than Japan could not win— ¹		
	By March 1945	By June 1945	By August 1945
	Percent	Percent	Percent
Of those in the occupations below:			
Intelligentsia.....	26	60	78
Manual workers.....	21	47	68
White collar.....	18	47	67
Farmers.....	20	46	69
Nonworkers.....	16	40	62
Of those in the economic activities below:			
War industry.....	21	54	75
Nonwar industry.....	23	43	68
Service activities.....	23	51	67
Agriculture.....	20	47	69
No industry.....	16	40	63

¹ The figures for each date represent those who had become certain that Japan couldn't win by that time. Thus, the 26 percent of the intelligentsia certain by March are also included in the 60 percent certain by June. Hence, 34 percent grew certain in the interim.

As expected, the intelligentsia sensed defeat earliest and apparently had the highest proportion of believers that Japan could not win. Among activities, war industry held the same place. The other groups of workers and activities appear to have lost their faith in victory at about the same rate, only the non-worker group lagging behind. The three main reasons for this defeatism are given below:

TABLE 52.—Main reasons for believing Japan could not win¹

	Air raids	Atomic bomb	Military losses	Never certain Japan could not win
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Occupations:				
Intelligentsia.....	30	9	32	22
Manual workers.....	36	9	22	26
White collar.....	31	10	19	32
Farmers.....	33	8	21	20
Nonworkers.....	29	11	17	31
Activities:				
War industry.....	36	11	24	25
Nonwar industry.....	32	8	21	30
Service activities.....	30	9	23	27
Agriculture.....	34	9	21	20
No industry.....	28	12	17	31

¹ Percentages do not add to 100 or more because only the three reasons most frequently cited by respondents, and the percentage of respondents who said they were never certain that victory was impossible are included in the table.

By comparing the reasons for belief that Japan couldn't win (Table 52) with the reasons for doubts of victory (Table 50), it is seen that air activity bulks relatively larger in the thinking of the believers that victory was impossible than in that of the

doubters; military defeats are less frequently mentioned. This is true of "air raids" alone, and when "atomic bomb" is added, air factors are as frequently mentioned by those certain of defeat as almost all other reasons combined. Among manual and white-collar workers and for war industry as a whole, the preponderance of air reasons is very evident. It is interesting to note that the implications of the atomic bomb seemed no more apparent to the intelligentsia than to others less educated and less privileged, and the extent to which the air attack made itself felt, even among farmers.

A national security report, dated August 1945, makes this statement concerning the trend of labor morale:

The transition in the labor situation accompanying the increasing intensity of air raids can be divided into periods according to changes in conditions and the scale of the enemy air attacks. The first period was from November 1944 to February 1945. The enemy air attacks had not yet reached their true continuous state. Therefore, although absences, tardiness, and early departures of the laborers in factories that had become targets for bombing had developed, this was only temporary. Moreover, stability was very conspicuous, and laborers as a whole followed a sound course. However, after the big air raids on the eastern provinces of Japan (Kwanto district) by the enemy, bombings on large cities were severely intensified. The tremendous number of casualties among laborers living in large cities and damages inflicted on factory areas especially, mixed with wartime depression, has created marked pessimism in the workers' trend of thought. The majority of workers in these areas disengaged themselves from production and became very interested in their own self-preservation. This behavior, too, is gradually deepening the tendency toward defeatism, and the trend is following a course which warrants attention to the preservation of peace.

The occupational groupings which have been used here are necessarily broad for technical reasons.¹⁰ However, with caution, it is possible to examine the differences concealed by these large clusters of occupations. In Table 53 each of the previously used groups is broken into its main constituent occupations, and a new analysis, the proportion "never unwilling to carry on with the war" is used.¹¹

The students, the most recently indoctrinated youth, were the only group who had more than half its members still willing to carry on. The professionals apparently were the next most willing group and differ considerably from the rest of the intelligentsia in this regard. Despite the fact that fewer

¹⁰ The purpose of grouping occupations and economic activities was to assure sufficient numbers of cases within each group to permit more reliable evaluation of differences.

¹¹ The question was: "Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war?"

TABLE 53.—Proportions of occupational groups who said they "never doubted victory," and were "never unwilling to carry on with the war"

Occupation	Never doubted victory	Never unwilling to carry on with the war
	Percent	Percent
Professionals and semi-professionals.	7	41
Proprietors, managers, officials.	2	27
Skilled workers	5	23
Semi- and unskilled workers.	9	23
Clerical and sales workers.	11	33
Service workers	11	24
Farmers	12	19
Students	16	58
Housewives	12	26
Unemployed, retired, etc.	7	16

of them said they were confident of victory, despite their more extensive criticism of leaders, despite their generally lower morale, the professional people tended to want to hold out.¹² They probably had the most to lose by defeat, while at the same time they were least affected by the economic unrest, destruction of business property, and poor living conditions which impinged more strongly on the other occupational groups (Appendix R). The farmers and the "unemployed, retired, disabled" group appear to have been most willing to give up. The other groups lie in between and do not differ from one another too greatly, except in the case of the clerical and sales group whose high young female composition probably is important in this connection.

Another significant datum emerges when personal unwillingness to go on with the war is analyzed by economic activity. The proportion of those never unwilling to go on with the war ranges from 41 percent among government workers to 19 percent among farmers. Government employees, of all types, far outstrip any other activity group in extent of willingness to go on.

Summary: Morale of the Labor Force. The pattern of morale disclosed in this section generally shows

TABLE 54

Occupation	Critical of home front leadership	Critical of war leadership
	Percent	Percent
Intelligentsia	77	58
Manual workers	67	42
White-collar	63	39
Farmers	55	31
Non-workers	54	29

¹² Criticism of leadership shows an interesting occupational pattern:

much more homogeneity than difference among occupational and activity groups. The rapidly mounting and finally high level of doubt and uncertainty is characteristic of all segments of the labor force.

However, in addition to this general picture of similarity, there are some differences that may be significant:

The professional-managerial-official group (intelligentsia), the leaders of the Japanese home front, had probably the lowest morale; they doubted victory earlier and proportionately more, at all times, were certain of defeat earlier and proportionately more certain of it at all times than other occupational groups. And from the evidence of Table 53, it would seem that this status was in large measure due to the managerial-official component of this group. A clue to one factor in the low morale of the leading group is the greater importance its members placed on "military losses." This was the group that knew most about the progress of the war and could most rationally evaluate the chances of victory. This is exemplified well in a summary of an interview with a Japanese physician:

When the war first started, most of the people in Japan were very happy. The intelligentsia had misgivings. The little group that Dr. X belonged to talked among themselves, and they felt that no matter how the war came out they stood to lose and they felt very blue about it. If Japan lost, they thought they would of course be lost too. If on the other hand, Japan won, the militarists would be permanently entrenched in power and the outlook would be very black indeed for people such as themselves.

It was toward the end of 1942 that Dr. X first came to believe that Japan would lose the war. This occurred as the result of a specific incident. After Java was taken, he was offered a position as professor in a Javanese University. Before deciding whether or not to accept, he sent word about this through an intermediary to a general he knew and asked his advice. The general sent word back that if the appointment was only for a year, it would be all right, but the general said he would not be responsible for the doctor's staying longer than this for he could not guarantee what would happen. Dr. X took this to mean that people high in the Army were very doubtful of their ability to hold the East Indies. Later on, in the succeeding months, he heard, again through a reliable intermediary, that Admiral Yamamoto in a private conversation had given the Japanese about a year to stay in the East Indies, and was very pessimistic about the whole situation. Then, two of Mrs. X's brothers who were in the Navy came home from the southern islands, and they told very discouraging stories of the Japanese situation.

Among the other groups, the ranking from relatively low morale and pessimism to higher morale and less pessimism would appear to be manual workers, farmers, white-collar workers, in that order;

and among activity groups, the ranking would be war industry, non-war industry, agriculture, and service activities. Thus the effects of wartime conditions fell somewhat heavier on the morale of the production workers and production activities than on the white-collar workers and those in the service activities.

The non-working group—housewives and students primarily—appear to have had the highest morale, to have been among the least doubtful of victory and among the least certain of defeat. These were the most successfully indoctrinated and sheltered groups in the economy. But the small differences between them and their relatives in the labor force is not surprising. The more surprising similarity is that between farmers and the workers of the cities.

Work Behavior and Absenteeism

The reactions of the Japanese labor force to the events and conditions of the war include their willingness to go to work and their capacity to work while on the job. These are critical but complex matters. In this section the former will be discussed.¹³

Absenteeism Estimates. The question "How many working days were you absent from your work dur-

TABLE 55.—Number of working days absent
(1 Jan.—15 Aug. 1945)

	Percent
No days absent ¹	39
1-14 days.....	23
15-30 days.....	15
Over 30 days.....	23
	100

¹ "No days absent" is intended to represent "No unauthorized days absent." Most Japanese workers during 1945 were permitted 2 days a month off. These authorized absences are not included as absenteeism. However, it was not always easy to make such a distinction in the coding.

Furthermore, between 10 and 15 percent of the gainfully employed, who indicated they had been absentees, did not specify the number of days absent except in vague terms. Their responses to the question on absence were analyzed with some care, and they were compared with both absentees and non-absentees on responses to other questions on work and morale. They apparently form no distinct group, nor are they like any other group of absentees, or non-absentees. Consequently, in the calculation of this table, the "unspecified absence" group was distributed proportionally among the three categories of absentees.

¹³ The sources of information on absenteeism in Japan for this report include (1) the main interview questions previously mentioned: "How many working days were you absent from your work during this period (January 1945 to the end of the war)?" and "What prevented you from going to work on these days?"; (2) data and statements on absenteeism from the community background reports, (3) material obtained by interviewing industrial and labor leaders and (4) documents secured from government files. The data from background reports, leaders, and documents are spotty and in many cases impressionistic. The answers to the main interviews are subject to the vagaries of memory and to rationalization or evasion. But from this evidence it is possible to get some idea of the behavior of the workers during the fateful years of the war and particularly the hard months of 1945. It should be mentioned here that the definition of "absenteeism" as used on the various sources may not be the same. Documents are not always clear on this point.

ing this period?" asked with reference to the seven and one-half months of war in 1945, brought the following estimates for the gainfully employed in Japan as a whole:

Thus, if we are to take as reliable the estimates of members of the labor force themselves, the absenteeism rate would be approximately 8 percent, which is about the same rate as is estimated for the American labor force during a similar period.

The absence situation for the various segments of the labor force, as reported by the gainfully employed, is as follows:

TABLE 56.—Number of working days reported absent
(1 Jan.—15 Aug. 1945)

Of those who were—	Said they were—			Total
	Never Absent	Absent 1-14 days	Absent 15 or more days	
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Intelligentsia.....	43	23	34	100
Manual workers.....	24	28	48	100
White-collar.....	40	25	35	100
Farmers.....	43	20	37	100

It is readily seen that manual workers took considerably more time off than the other occupation groups. Moreover, the manual workers led in all degrees of absenteeism, 48 percent of them being absent over 14 days. It should be noted, however, that over 40 percent of the other members of the labor force reported no absenteeism, and, even among manual workers, 1 in 4 reported no absence during this seven and a half month period.¹⁴

The war and non-war industries and the service activities had substantially the same pattern of absenteeism, although war industry had a slightly

¹⁴ It is the opinion of the Survey that even without direct air attack on Japanese cities and industry, Japanese war production would have very seriously declined from the peak levels of 1944 due to the interdiction of oversea imports. The lack of raw materials for industrial operations would make the problem of absenteeism due to non-production reasons less important; however, the government first of all realized that absenteeism indicated poor morale; secondly, the government apparently still thought that it needed the absent manpower, despite materials shortages, as evidenced by the strong measures taken to combat absenteeism, especially in the aircraft industry. This key industry, to which the maximum attention was given by the government, did suffer in production from absenteeism, according to several aircraft plant managers interviewed by Morale Division. A Domei dispatch dated 24 May 1945 reported an address by Premier Suzuki to leaders of the aircraft industry:

"There must not be such an outlook toward war as fighting the enemy with bamboo spears. Indeed, we must possess an unshakable determination to decide the outcome, with aircraft serving as the core. . . . What is considered the most fundamental requisite in the aircraft industry is the persistent spirit—the perseverance—of the industrial fighters. . . . However, it is most regrettable to observe that frequently, since the enemy began huge raids not so long ago, there have been factories whose attendance rate has dropped. . . . You must be particularly sympathetic toward your workers. You must be careful not to neglect a single act of good will, or to slight the feelings of a single worker."

poorer record than the other two. Agriculture has the best record with reference to "no absence," but it appears to have higher percentages of its absences in the longer categories.

Reasons for Absenteeism. In the previous chapter may be found an analysis of the relationship between bombing experience and absenteeism which indicated that those who had more bombing experience tended to give air reasons for their absenteeism more than those who had less. This section will inspect these reasons in more detail and will present them by occupational and activity groups.

The answers to the question, "What prevented you from going to work on those days?" are summarized below for absentees in both urban and rural Japan:

TABLE 57.—Reasons for absenteeism¹
(January–August 1945)

	Air reasons only	Air and other reasons	Other reasons only	Total
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Japan.....	14	12	74	100
Urban.....	19	15	66	100
Rural.....	13	11	76	100

¹ "Air" reasons include: Home hit in raid, anxiety about raids, transportation difficulties due to raids, took family to country to avoid injury from raids, place of work damaged in raids, injured in air raids. "Other" reasons include: sickness, fatigue, time spent procuring food and other supplies, lack of materials, rain (for farmers), injury from accident.

Air attack reasons are thus mentioned by 34 percent of the urban people and by 24 percent of the rural. These percentages are, of course, minimized by the technical requirement that air had to be specifically mentioned in order to be coded "air." Thus sickness, for example, is classified as non-air, but the disruption of community life by raids was not unimportant in producing sickness. Nevertheless the bulk of absenteeism was, according to the testimony of absentees, caused by factors not directly associated with the air attack, but related to economic and living conditions.

When reasons for absenteeism are classified in terms of persons' lives, the following picture comes out:

Health and psychological reasons are by far most important. For example, about half of the absentees said that sickness, weakness, anxiety, and fatigue were contributing causes. Only 1 percent mentioned personal injury.

Family reasons—procuring foods and consumer goods which were so scarce, taking one's family to the country to avoid raids, rebuilding one's home—were next in importance, and especially so among urban absentees.

Reasons related to the work situation: damaged factories, lack of materials, disrupted transportation.

Air raids undoubtedly contributed in some way to most of these reasons for absenteeism, even though such contributions are difficult to measure. As the general manager of the Masashino plant, Nakajima Aircraft Company, Tokyo, said:

The biggest factory problem was air raids. We had them several times prior to March 10, but they did not have much effect. At that time, however, Tokyo was very badly hit and from then on, absenteeism became increasingly difficult. Not only were there transportation difficulties, but workers were very anxious about their homes and families and just stayed away from work.

Aside from air raids . . . the biggest reason for absenteeism was the scarcity of food. The wage rates were small here in the factories and some of the conscripted workers had been getting pretty high wages before they came into the factory. After they were conscripted we know that many of them did outside work in order to supplement their pay. This tendency became much greater in the later periods.

In this connection, it will be remembered from the previous chapter that air reasons for absenteeism were mentioned in 46 percent of the cases by persons bombed more than once, in 34 percent of the cases by persons bombed only once and in only 18 percent of the cases by persons with no bombing experience (Table 43). But these figures again are based on direct reference to air operations, and would be even greater if the indirect effects of the bombing could be appraised. For example, a document compiled by the peace preservation section of the Home Ministry gives the following data for Tokyo:

The attendance percentage immediately following the large-scale B-29 raids of April 25 and 26 were:

Extent of damage	No of factories	Average attending work
		Percent
Completely burned.....	37	24
Partially burned.....	69	55
Undamaged.....	121	70

Following this, the attendance percentage as of the end of May was 63 percent—a slight climb. However, in comparison to the former average of 80 percent, this indicated a considerable decline.

In analyzing reasons for absenteeism as given by those reporting absence in the various occupational and industry groups, we find that in all cases the proportions specifying air reasons are larger for the urban areas than for Japan as a whole, a result which conforms to the previous finding that bombed people give air reasons for absenteeism more than do the unbombed. As might be expected, farmers

appeared to believe that their absenteeism was less due to air factors than does any other occupational group.¹⁵ Among the other groups, the manual workers, largely workers in factories, seemed most affected by air factors.

TABLE 58.—Reasons for absence, by occupation

Occupation	Air ¹ reasons	Non-air reasons only	Total
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Intelligentsia	25	75	100
Manual workers	46	54	100
White-collar	34	66	100
Farmers	22	78	100

¹ This category includes all who gave air reasons for absence, whether or not they also gave non-air reasons. The same category is used in this way in succeeding tables (Tables 59, 60, and 61).

There was, of course, much variation between individual factories and at different times. The peace preservation report previously mentioned gives the following for four Nagoya plants:

The average percentages in attendance during April were:

Factory	Managerial and clerical	Regular male manual workers	Students	Women	Average
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
A	71	66	78	65	68
B	91	84	89	86	88
C	89	86	91	75	81
D	76	64	62	73	70

This condition was maintained for a while. However, since the concentrated bombings of May 17 and June 9 on factory areas, fear of air raids among workers increased and the percentage of attendance fell markedly. In the case of the above factory C, notwithstanding the fact that damage was extremely slight, the attendance percentage after the above-mentioned raids was only 60 percent of what it had been beforehand.

The relationship between amount of absence and the type of reasons given for it is shown in Table 59.

TABLE 59.—Reasons for absence by amount of absence

Absenteeism	Air	Non-air	Total
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1-14 days	20	80	100
15-60 days	29	71	100
Over 60 days	32	68	100

¹⁵ Over half of the farmers said they were absent from work on working days during the first two-thirds of 1945, and over one-third mentioned long absence (Table 56). The reasons given by farmers show features similar to urban occupations, and special aspects. Thus, over two-fifths mention sickness, weakness, and fatigue. Sizable proportions mention time lost under the threat of raids on near by cities, (53 percent of the farmers experienced air raids) and foraging for commodities—including food. (This was especially true in the depressed and blighted areas of the Tohoku; there, farmers actually had to buy rice on the black market. A local official said: "The only thing that prevented serious trouble was the fact that there was a war going on.") Two special reasons—shortage of fertilizer and weather (excessive rain) were important. Weather conditions were mentioned by farmers in about one-fifth of the cases.

Apparently, reasons related to the air attack counted more in extending the period of absence than in initiating it, for air reasons are given in higher proportion by those with 15 days or more of absence than by those with less than 15 days.

Morale and Absenteeism. Absenteeism is frequently used as a measure of worker morale, on the assumption that workers with low morale are more likely to absent themselves than are those with higher morale. But this is not to say that those who are absent necessarily have lower morale than others, particularly in the difficult days of 1945 in Japan. Such justifications for absence as sickness, the breakdown of the food distribution machinery, and the bombing of houses would, in many cases at least, bear no implications of purposeful shirking of duty. The conflict of loyalties to home and work bench were created by circumstances beyond the individual worker's control, and they must have been solved by many in terms of which appeared to them the greater immediate crisis. On the other hand, the availability of such good excuses might make it easier for the worker of low morale to rationalize his absence to himself or others.

The interviews provide some means of discovering the relationship between morale and absenteeism in Japan. There is evidence that the highest morale group had a significantly smaller extent and duration of absence than the other three morale groups. But, beyond this, the differences are not great.

TABLE 60.—Relation between morale and absenteeism¹

Morale Group	Never absent	Absent 1-14 days	Absent over 14 days	Total
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Highest morale	45	27	28	100
Higher morale	38	22	40	100
Lower morale	38	22	40	100
Lowest morale	35	23	42	100

¹ Measure used is the Morale Index (Appendix K).

Moreover, those with lowest morale (as measured here) tended to give air reasons more frequently as a cause of absence, particularly in the urban areas.

TABLE 61.—Morale and reasons for absence¹

Morale Group	Reasons for absence			
	Japan		Urban Japan	
	Air	Non-air	Air	Non-air
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Highest morale	20	80	30	70
Higher morale	29	71	32	68
Lower morale	24	76	35	65
Lowest morale	28	72	41	59

¹ Measure used is the Morale Index (Appendix K).

Of special interest is the relationship of criticism of home front leaders, and absenteeism. Whereas 57 percent of those who were not absentees criticized them, 63 percent of those absent less than two weeks did so, as did 70 percent of those absent over two weeks.¹⁶ Since home front leader criticism was so intimately related to the poor commodity situation, it is not surprising to find the following in an official government report (Chapter 3).

Owing to the food shortage, labor attendance had dropped from last year's 80 percent level to the 70 percent level today (Kyoto). There are bitter cries saying, "Give us food before planes!" (Lower class in Nagano). Together with the complaints which slip from the lips of the people are the criticisms of the private lives of the leaders (Toyama). There are voices which, more than complaining of the food shortages, express dissatisfaction at the existing inequalities (Sendai).

Summary: Work Behavior and Absenteeism. Despite rigorous manpower controls and heavy propaganda campaigns to keep workers at their jobs, about three in every five members of the Japanese labor force claimed to have been absent one or more days during the war months of 1945. Approximately two in every five workers claimed absence of more than 14 days during this period.

Considering the devastating bombing raids conducted over Japan during 1945 and the consequent damage to war factories and disruption to community life in general, it seems difficult to believe that work attendance did not drop farther than it did. This is partially explained by the strong control exercised by the government over labor and partially by the loyalty of the workers themselves. There was also the stern necessity of earning a living, especially in inflationary times. As pointed out by an official Japanese source (Domei) previously mentioned, absenteeism was greatest immediately following an air raid. However, the same source indicated that the drops in attendance were, in most cases, temporary, and normal conditions were almost restored after a few days.

Urban people were absent from work somewhat more than rural people. Manual workers had much the highest absenteeism rate. Farmers, white-collar workers, and the intelligentsia did not differ appreciably from one another in this regard. Among activities, there is remarkable comparability among the non-agricultural activities, and agriculture varies from them primarily in pattern of absence rather than in extent.

Sickness, weakness, and fatigue were by far the chief reasons for absenteeism for both urban and

rural Japan. However, air reasons, as a whole, play a larger role in the absenteeism of all urban occupational and activity groups than they do in the absenteeism of such rural groups. There also appears to be a relationship between air reasons and amount of absenteeism.

The members of the labor force with highest morale appear to have the least absenteeism, but for the rest of the labor force there appears to be no discernible relation between morale and absenteeism. However, those respondents who mentioned reasons related to the air attack as the causes of their absence from work tended to be more frequent among the lower morale groups.

Work Behavior and Work Capacity

Production depends not only on the physical presence of the worker at his job, but also on his willingness and ability to work. This latter matter is more difficult to determine, but in this section we shall examine the workers' own judgments of their work capacity, the opinions of Japanese leaders on the subject, and what records of production efficiency were available to the Morale Division.

Levels of Working Capacity in 1945. Interviewers asked each Japanese respondent, "How was your working capacity during this period (1945) as compared with other years?" and, "How were your working conditions during this period?"¹⁷ From the answers we learn whether personal work capacity was felt to be lower, the same, or higher, and the reasons for these judgments.

Of those giving rateable answers, about three out of four claimed that their working capacity had been lowered (Table 62).

A 30-year-old man who was a lathe operator in a Sakai airplane factory stated:

Our working capacity in the factory was about one-third of what it was before. People went to buy food, neglecting their work. Working hours were shortened due to air raids. We were working only two hours in the morning and two hours in the afternoon. Well-trained workers were drafted in the Army. All these factors affected our efficiency.

A 17-year-old girl who worked in a Taira war factory said:

We were working in two shifts. Naturally, machines worked overtime and there were troubles constantly. On top of this, American air raids continued day and night, which caused great fatigue to us workers. Because of the raids, we had to stop working and put all lights out before we ran for safety. It happened at night and in daylight. Due to the above-mentioned reasons, our working capacity decreased very much.

¹⁶ The question was: "In regard to the way your leaders took care of the home front welfare, what did you think of it during the war?"

¹⁷ These questions, particularly the former, were among the most difficult to communicate to the Japanese.

The work capacity of rural workers suffered at least as much as urban workers during this period. A 68-year-old farmer in Kure stated:

My will to work was strong, but due to rationing and food shortages, my capacity to work gradually decreased. Also air raids lessened my capacity because of the constant fear of being bombed.

TABLE 62.—*Work capacity during 1945 in comparison with previous years*

	All Japan	Urban areas	Rural areas
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Lower	77	74	77
Same	17	21	16
Higher	6	5	7
	100	100	100

The results by occupation and industry groups appear in Table 63. The differences are not strikingly large, but it is fairly safe to conclude that a higher proportion of the professionals, managers, and officials felt that their work capacity had been lowered than was the case in any other occupation group. As a well-educated executive described his work capacity:

After March of this year (1945) my working efficiency was almost zero because of the increased air raids and because the streetcars stopped almost every time there was an air raid. None of the office girls showed up when there was an air raid. The office morale was deteriorating. I couldn't get enough sleep, which gradually affected my work. We had to get up so many times during the night I was becoming nervous. We were all undernourished. Although I was worried about my family, I was so frustrated about the situation that I felt like joining the Army and at least get enough food for myself, although I was ashamed of the idea. We all were in a state of neurosis. We lacked supplies for the office. I felt all of us were tense, but we couldn't let ourselves go because we would go to pieces, since all our worries and weariness were held back by our mental power. We couldn't even relax. We managed to hold ourselves somehow. We had to force ourselves mentally and physically in order to keep ourselves going and in one piece.

The white-collar workers claimed the least frequent lowering of work capacity. Since the difference between the intelligentsia and the other occupational groups is due to the difference between judgments of "lower" or "same" work capacity, the factors of comprehension of the question and ability to make finer judgments may be involved. As the percentages stand, however, the intelligentsia and the farmers, who claimed the least absenteeism, claimed most frequently that their work capacity was lowered. This may be due simply to the greater difficulty that these groups would normally have in being absent from work, or the greater

difficulty of determining what constitutes absences for these groups. It should also be pointed out that these two groups, more than the other groups, would be doing work in 1945 comparable with previous years, thus making the comparison an easier matter.

TABLE 63.—*Work capacity during 1945 compared with previous years, by occupation and activity*

	Lower	Same	Higher	Total
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Occupation:				
Intelligentsia	85	7	8	100
Manual workers	77	15	8	100
White-collar	74	17	9	100
Farmers	80	14	6	100
Activity:				
War industry	81	13	6	100
Nonwar industry	76	15	9	100
Service activities	73	19	8	100
Agriculture	79	15	6	100

The working capacity of those in war industry and agriculture would appear to be lowered more than that of the service activities, and war industry would seem to have been harder hit than non-war industry. These results are consistent with the absenteeism data except for agriculture, which claimed relatively low absenteeism and a comparatively high degree of lowered work capacity. This, of course, mirrors the above occupational finding since farmers and agriculture are highly overlapping groups. The differences are, however, not very large.

The six percent who claim that their working capacity increased probably included many of the new workers in 1945 (students and women) who would have little or no basis for comparison with the past.

Work capacity apparently held up best for the young men (16-29 years) and women over 44 years of age (probably the most recent additions to the labor force). The men of all ages and the middle-aged women (30-44 years) are remarkably comparable in their feelings about their work capacity, although there is some slight evidence that, of these groups, the middle-aged men (who must have borne the brunt of the production job for 10 years) felt the least able to meet previous levels of work.

Reasons for Lowered Working Capacity. In the previous chapter, bombing experience was found to be somewhat related to lowered work capacity (Table 45). The reasons given by the respondents for their lowered capacity for work were quite numerous, but they can be roughly divided in two ways: air and non-air reasons, and subjective (or personal) and objective reasons. "Worry about

air raids" would be both an air reason and a subjective reason. "Work conditions in the plant," not directly related to a bombing attack, would be non-air and objective. For the purposes of this section, the reasons will be grouped in these ways.

TABLE 64.—Factors leading to altered work capacity

Subjective:	
	Percent
Lowered:	
Air reasons ¹	23
Non-air reasons ¹	22
No effect.....	39
Raised.....	16
	100
Objective:	
	Percent
Lowered:	
Air reasons ²	23
Air and non-air ²	25
Non-air reasons.....	30
No effect.....	17
Raised.....	5
	100

¹The "air reasons" are mainly general and anxieties engendered by the air attack. The "non-air reasons" include general worries about livelihood and family, constant work pressure, fatiguing work, dissatisfaction with personal work conditions—management, pay, etc.

²"Air reasons" include time spent in shelters and drills, transportation problems due to air raids, loss of sleep, damage to home and place of work, etc. "Non-air reasons" are mainly lack of supplies (43 percent), inadequate food, and long hours due to inadequate manpower; some of these conditions may have been indirectly caused by the air attack.

As stated by respondents, air reasons were generally about as important in lowering work capacity as non-air reasons, and objective reasons more important than subjective ones. However, people seem to have said they played a somewhat larger role in lowering work capacity than in creating absenteeism (Table 57).

The main difference between reasons given by urban and rural people lies in the objective group—urban people being more likely to claim such reasons as "damage to place of work," "transportation difficulties," "evacuation activities," etc., and rural persons more frequently mentioning "manpower shortage," "lack of supplies," etc.

An aircraft worker summarized his opinion thus:

I worked very hard, but one can't just remain calm and at ease with the constant air raids that threatened us. With each succeeding air raid we were more concerned about our lives; there was a noticeable drop in the presence of workers and naturally this lowered our capacity of production. Lack of food lowered our resistance for carrying on our work. The constant pushing we got from our supervisor didn't help our morale very much either. I think the majority of us were irked by the pressure on our back.

And a Tohoku farmer said:

Due to lack of foodstuffs, my physical strength seemed to have decreased by 10 percent. In addition, my son was

called to the colors. I had to make up for the shortage of manpower. I worked longer hours as compared with the prewar times. Moreover, I had to take my working hours for receiving distributed goods. As for the shortage of foodstuffs, we received only one-tenth of the quantity which we received in prewar times.

Morale and Work Capacity. In the case of absenteeism, there appeared to be a small but definite relationship to morale. Was this true of work capacity as well? The following table shows a fairly direct relation between morale as measured by the Morale Index and work capacity in 1945. The higher the morale, the smaller the proportion who claim lowered work capacity and the higher the proportion who claim the same or greater work capacity.

TABLE 65.—Morale and work capacity

Morale Group	Working capacity during 1945 as compared with other war years			
	Lower	Same	Higher	Total
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Highest morale.....	63	27	10	100
Higher morale.....	77	16	7	100
Lower morale.....	80	15	5	100
Lowest morale.....	84	12	4	100

The data for urban and rural areas show the same trend, although somewhat more pronounced in the case of the urban.¹⁸

TABLE 66.—Morale and lowered work capacity

Morale group	Proportion claiming lowered work capacity in 1945		
	All Japan	Urban	Rural
	Percent	Percent	Percent
Highest morale.....	63	59	64
Higher morale.....	77	72	78
Lower morale.....	80	79	80
Lowest morale.....	84	87	84

Summary: Work Behavior and Work Capacity. The work capacity of the Japanese labor force was considerably lower in 1945 than it had been in previous years. Seventy-seven percent of the workers themselves admit it, and the opinions of leaders and judgments of official analysts corroborate it. Thus, even though traditional and statutory controls held

¹⁸The head of the local agricultural society in a silk-producing rural region voiced a fairly common opinion of rural leaders:

"When the B-29s came over, the farmers couldn't work efficiently, although out in the fields. Working efficiency gradually decreased in comparison with normal years. People were instructed to hide in the nearby mulberry fields when planes appeared, but they all ran toward their homes instead. Sometimes we received alarms after planes appeared. People didn't comment but the feeling of being tired of the war became intense . . . especially after the August 14 raid experience (on Kofu and its environs). Simple-minded farmers don't know much until they experience something directly . . . People said that 'whether or not we surrender, the war has to be stopped—we have had enough.'"

the labor force remarkably well to their desks, benches, and assembly lines, they could not provide the ingredients of physical and mental well-being nor the materials of production necessary to maintain the work capacity of the nation.

This lowered work capacity was experienced by over 70 percent of all occupation and activity groups. The differences that appear are in the direction that was most damaging to the war effort, for the leaders suffered the greatest loss and the workers of factory and farm were next. Air reasons seem to have played a considerable part in lowering work capacity during 1945.

The lower the morale, the more 1945 work capacity appears to have lagged behind that of earlier years. This is true of both urban and rural groups, but particularly of the urban where the percentages of these claiming lowered work capacity are 59 percent for the highest morale group and 87 percent for the lowest.

Thus it would seem that bombing, low morale, and low working capacity were related factors in Japan in the closing months of the war.

Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter has been to investigate the effect of bombing on the morale of the Japanese labor force and the effect of this, in turn, on work behavior. None of these objects of our analysis are simple matters and none was operating on others in experimental isolation. The slow attrition of our raids on Japanese shipping, the tight commodity situation, the cumulative effect of a heavy-handed control of the labor force, general economic distress, and the mounting grimness of rapidly approaching enemy armies were contemporary and intertwined with bombing as deterrents of Japanese home front morale and efficiency.

Nevertheless, there is much evidence that bombing, by its devastating personal character, accelerated greatly the toll that other factors had begun to take. It worked not only on industrial organiza-

tion and the other objective components of efficiency, but it worked also on the minds of the workers.

This evidence comes both from the leaders and from the mass of the people. Air reasons were given by all segments of the labor force as an important basis for their rapidly developing doubts of victory and as the most important basis for the widespread belief in Japan's poor chance of victory toward the war's end. The people who were supposed to be prepared to face the enemy armies on their shores scurried for cover from enemy air action.

Air action was likewise given as an important basis for absenteeism. It constituted about one-third of the reasons given for absenteeism by urban workers. Moreover, there is reason to believe those who gave air action most credit for their absenteeism also had the lowest morale.

But a more impressive effect of bombing appears to have been on the capacity of the people to work. The workers would still go to work or could still be forced to go, but they could neither be utilized nor driven to produce as in previous years. Much of the reason for this drop in productive efficiency was associated with air activity by both the workers and their leaders. Moreover, the relation between low morale and lowered work capacity is striking, especially for urban people.

The situation accentuated by our military air strategy is significant for two other reasons: one; the effect reached into all segments of the economy in a remarkably consistent way, and the other; the small differentials were in a direction most crippling to the economy. The leaders appear to have been more affected than any other occupational segment of the population, and the next most affected groups were the workers in the factories and on the farm. It was over the minds of these groups that the battle of the Japanese home front was waged, and our air strategy appears to have gained, in some considerable measure, its objective.



"The government came to the conclusion—and it was the natural conclusion reached by the people, too—that all air-raid preparations were hopeless, and it was best to avoid injury and death by fleeing."

PROBLEMS OF EVACUATION

Previous chapters have analyzed certain of the effects of bombing upon the morale of the people of Japan, upon their thought and behavior. One of the most effective ways in which bombing affected morale was by means of the tremendous evacuation of populations which it forced. An estimated one-fourth of the urban population left their homes either due to fear of, or actual disaster caused by, the heavy bombing of their home cities. These unfortunates dispersed throughout the entire nation, simultaneously spreading news of Japan's weakness not only by their words, but also by their actions.

Not only was their own morale affected by their experiences, but they also carried with them the germs of "dangerous thoughts" with which to infect their hosts. Their departure from the great industrial centers served to disrupt still further the organized life of those communities, some already suffering the physical effects of bombing. Families were split, factories lost labor, official organizations were dissolved. Evacuation was an absolute necessity under the circumstances, but even at best, it was a palliative measure, incapable of doing more than postponing disaster. It was the most comprehensive, and hence the most effective, of the indirect ways in which bombing affected morale throughout the Japanese nation.

In the analysis of the effect of evacuation upon Japanese civilian morale, information was gathered from background reports and interviews, interrogations, documents, and the general morale questionnaire interviews. Certain additional questions concerned with evacuation were asked of evacuees, of those who had evacuated members of their families, and of natives of refuge areas. Comparisons have been made between the responses of evacuees and other urban people to numerous questions, in order to determine whether there was any difference in point of view. In this way the morale effects of evacuation upon the evacuees themselves, upon their relatives who remained in the cities, and upon their hosts, can be segregated from the effects of the war, or of bombing itself.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the Japanese experience with evacuation, itself a matter of interest, and to draw from this experience certain general conclusions on the conduct of evacuation, to these ends, there will be discussion of the

background of evacuation, the characteristics of evacuees, and the effects of evacuation on the evacuees themselves, the people left behind, and the people in reception areas (Appendix S). The effects of evacuation are treated in terms of morale and community life.

The Story of Evacuation

Summary. The Japanese government had been considering the problems of defense against air attack for a number of years before Pearl Harbor, but there is no evidence that the idea of evacuating large numbers of people from the cities occupied a prominent place in its plans in those early days. In the early months of the war with the United States, the probability of mass raids seemed remote, and the practicability of defense reasonable. Nevertheless, the highly inflammable nature of the congested cities was understood; and the idea gained ground that those who could not be expected to take active part in the defense would be better off elsewhere. The influx of war workers and the creation of fire-breaks, which began in 1943, both added to the congestion of the cities. Consequently, the government began to advocate departure of unessential people as a measure for strengthening the defense of cities.^{1 2}

When the raids began, defense needs became more and more urgent, and additional classes of individuals were urged to leave. It became apparent that defense was much more difficult than had been anticipated, and at last that it was quite impossible. The government eventually realized that wholesale departure was an immediate necessity, although perhaps only a palliative measure. So, although the early reason for evacuation was to aid the war effort, the final reason was to avoid disaster, which resulted from the breakdown of defense.³

¹ *Shuko* (organ of the Cabinet Board of Information), 22 December 1943: "Urban evacuation does not mean only fleeing and dispersion from the city, but means, rather, that every citizen must take an active part in the war effort and that the evacuation must be made an element which strengthens our fighting power. Evacuation is not just a flight from the cities, but is a positive contribution toward strengthening our fighting power."

² Deemed unessential were those who could not fight fire and those whose departure would not disrupt utilities, war production, and the distribution system. War workers were forbidden to evacuate except with their dispersed factories.

³ The official in charge of civilian defense studies in the police affairs bureau of the Home Ministry, stated that after the great 9-10 March raid on Tokyo,

"The government came to the conclusion—and it was the natural conclusion reached by the people, too—that all air raid preparations were hopeless and it was best to avoid injury and death by fleeing." He revealed that the government had issued similar orders to the prefectural heads and 'gave up completely any idea of air-raid preparation'."

Early Plans. The earliest plans for evacuation called for the departure of non-essential people from the Tokyo-Yokohama district, the Kobe-Osaka district, the Nagoya district and the North Kyushu district. Such people were eligible for government assistance in their evacuation, provided they really needed it or were the families of drafted men. Schools were to be evacuated by classes, but the pupils were not to be forced to go. However, the government proclaimed its right to order people out of certain areas. Provisions were made for providing special transportation if necessary. Evacuation guidance offices were set up, both in the areas listed above and in the regions to which it was expected evacuees would go. The police in the latter places were directed to list all the available housing, and to persuade the owners to rent.

The government publicized these plans and urged the evacuation of non-essential people, but at the same time continued to proclaim that Japan's cities would be perfectly protected. For a long time the city dwellers heard both stories concurrently. Since all the ties of family affection, and the inertia of the people as well, were better satisfied by listening to stories of protection, very few actually departed.

Selective Evacuation. Even those living in houses demolished to make fire lanes were not forcibly ejected from their cities, but some few people had left Tokyo, at any rate, by the end of 1943. More left during the following spring, but the school evacuation program had not yet been applied, and it was not until the early B-29 raids on Kyushu, in June 1944, that much was really accomplished. These raids, however, provided a strong impetus to those who had been considering evacuation. Schools were actually transferred to the countryside, special trains really ran, and thousands of people voluntarily went to visit their country cousins. July and August were busy months for evacuation officials. Although the trade slackened during the autumn, about two million persons are estimated by various official sources to have left the big industrial cities by October 1944.

Widespread Evacuation. About the time of the first B-29 raids on Tokyo, there was another upsurge of evacuation. The government redoubled its efforts to stimulate the departure of women with babies, invalids, and other types of people judged to be not only useless for, but harmful to defense against air

attack and not essential for war production.⁴

At first, the raids were on such a small scale that many still refused to believe the necessity of evacuation. As the raids continued, more people became aware of the importance of evacuation, and communities in prefectures adjacent to Tokyo and other big cities began to take in more evacuees. Some even went farther afield, for the most usual destination was the home of some relative or close friend in the country. Some people such as war workers and young and able-bodied men and women, were not allowed to evacuate, those who tried to do so being considered runaways who deserved a reprimand. Plans were drawn up for the evacuation of factories to the countryside, but very little was accomplished during the winter of 1944-45. The prudent began to leave, or to send their families away, in ever larger numbers. It would seem that (excluding school children) as many left during the winter months as in the entire previous year. *Wholesale Evacuation.* The first great fire raid on Tokyo in March 1945 changed all this abruptly. Hundreds of thousands began a desperate flight from that city, and the urban area raids on Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe, which followed, spread the contagion to those places as well. Up to this time only about 3 percent of all evacuees had been bombed out, but during March about 2 million people lost their homes and mass flights of the bombed-out began. Even those who left because of fear of bombing rather than actual disaster now knew, by experience, what they feared so greatly.

Although bombing was intermittent during the spring of 1945, evacuees continued to leave, and the government had to adopt emergency measures to assist a migration which it could not control. Emergency rations were issued even to those who had no certificates proving that their homes had burned. People were urged to leave if they had any place to go. The government no longer made any attempt at all to select refuge areas. New organizations were set up—at least on paper—to assist evacuees. Work on fire lanes was speeded up, even in smaller cities, and this added to the number of homeless.

At least a million people evacuated the cities in April, and as many more in May. By now incen-

⁴ Shuko stated on 29 November 1944:

"The government is making desperate attempts to make the people realize the necessity of rushing the evacuation of the young and the aged, pregnant women, etc. As you know the government is pressing people who are not much needed in the big cities to move to the country in household units. The program of evacuation has progressed well so far, but old people and children, pregnant women, the sick, etc. are still being requested to leave as soon as possible before the big raids come, so that when we do have a raid they will not be a burden. In this way, we can expect Tokyo and other big cities to perfect their air-raid preparedness."

diary attacks had begun to hit smaller cities; although departures from Tokyo declined, month by month, after March, more people left other cities. In each, the pattern was repeated: some left each place before it was raided, but the greater number waited until too late. Some who had fled from one city to another found themselves once more forced to pick up and move on; others who had returned to their homes were forced out again.

During the summer months, evacuation took place mostly from smaller cities and towns, now becoming targets. It spread all over the country. Scarcely a village could be found without some evacuees, and certainly no city from which none had fled. By the time of surrender, more than 8,500,000 people had evacuated their homes.⁵

The Evacuees

Who They Were. The respondents interviewed in Japan included a large number of adults who had evacuated their homes at some time during the war. Certain questions concerning evacuation experiences were asked during the interviews. It was thus possible to learn about the evacuee group which is discussed in this section of the report. Since no children were interviewed, little with regard to them is included.⁶ Since evacuees are urban in origin, most comparisons have been made with urban non-evacuees (generally called "urban people" in this chapter).

It was not just a cross section of the population, but a selected group, which left the cities. The selection was not particularly made upon the bases established by government order. In particular, old people were not evacuated; evacuees were younger than those who stayed in the cities.⁷ The wholesale evacuation of 1945 swamped government efforts to direct population movements, and those who left were those who could leave. Older people are not as mobile as younger folk. Women, even with all their family duties, seem to have been quite mobile, however, for a greater proportion of females was found among evacuees than among city people who did not leave. Family duties may be performed anywhere; men are geographically tied to

⁵ See USSBS Civilian Defense and Urban Areas Divisions' reports. The official figure of 8,500,000 evacuees, provided by the Home Affairs Ministry is very probably an underestimate. The Morale Division sample survey indicates a higher number of evacuees. Furthermore, intra-urban evacuation is probably not included in the Japanese data. For a discussion of Japanese official statistics, see Appendix J.

⁶ The general sample for the cross-section survey made provision for an adequately sized representative sample of adult evacuees. (Appendix I).

⁷ Twenty percent more evacuees than urban people were less than 45. Twice as many people over 65 remained in cities than evacuated. (The age distribution among evacuees is partly accounted for by the excess of women over men.)

jobs.⁸ Thus, it is not surprising to find that there were more housewives among the evacuee women, and that a smaller proportion of evacuees than non-evacuees were family heads.⁹

Despite a somewhat higher educational status, in at least one aspect of economic position the evacuee group appears to be slightly below the average.¹⁰ For example, about one-third fewer evacuees than urban people belong to families which owned either land or their own homes.¹¹

One fact stands out in examining evacuee fields of work—the proportion of war industry employees is greater among evacuees than among unevacuated city dwellers. Thirty-seven percent of the gainfully employed evacuees worked in war industry in contrast to 26 percent of the urban employed. This is in contradiction to government directives, and is another indication of the wholesale character of evacuation after the great fire raids began. These war workers did not go with their factories, according to their own testimony. Only 4 percent stated that they accompanied a plant evacuation. Despite the fact that some of them probably had no factories in which to work after heavy air raids it seems that war workers correctly recognized their homes and plants in the cities as targets of choice, and were particularly anxious to evacuate, even if their factories were relatively intact.

In summary, there is a tendency for the differences between evacuees and urban people to be those which are associated with less stability and shallower roots. Many workers in war industries were draftees from supposedly non-essential work, for instance, those who would not find work satisfaction in war plants and be eager to move. Evacuees seem to have been less fixed in place by property interests. Factors of age, sex, and family position indicate the same sort of thing.¹² In a small majority of cases, evacuees, whether found in urban or rural areas, were from families which evacuated

⁸ Sixty-eight percent of evacuees were women, as against 57 percent of urban non-evacuees.

⁹ One-third more family heads were to be found among urban non-evacuees than among evacuees.

¹⁰ Despite the fact that women in Japan as a rule have had less schooling than men, and that the evacuee group has an excess of women, it also contains a greater percentage of persons with at least some secondary education. The sex difference in education is less now than it was a generation ago, so that Japanese young women are much better educated than their mothers, whereas young men are only slightly better educated than their fathers. Age accentuates educational differences; it is because of their youth that evacuees, both men and women, are better educated than other urban people.

¹¹ Home or land ownership cannot be accepted as final indication of economic status; data on family income were not obtained. However, ownership is an aspect of economic position which makes for lack of mobility.

¹² Older people, more fixed in their habits, are likely to be less willing to pull up roots and move.

together. But many of those who were separated from other members of the household tended to be persons whose departure would least upset the structure of the family because of their status therein.¹³ Only in education are evacuees superior, and this seems to be due to their youth.

The implication is clear. Adult evacuees will tend to be the people who can most easily evacuate during wholesale, unplanned, large post-bombing evacuation. They have less to hold them personally in cities; they tend to be those who have most personal fear of bombing; but they will not necessarily be those who should evacuate from the viewpoint of national interest, war production, and the defense of cities.

Why They Evacuated. Although millions of people evacuated the cities of Japan, other millions remained behind. The previous section indicated some of the personal differences between evacuees and non-evacuees. It is important also to find out whether the experiences of these two groups differed.

On the whole, there can be no question but that evacuees really had better personal reasons to leave than non-evacuees. During their interviews, most of them gave adequate personal reasons for their departure, and it is interesting that the number of actual refugees, who stated that they had abandoned cities because the air attack left their homes destroyed or damaged (48 percent) is greater than those who evacuated because of an admitted fear of bombing (30 percent).¹⁴ The overwhelming majority in both groups say that they left their homes voluntarily.¹⁵ ¹⁶ As one bombed-out person succinctly put it: "Yes, I left voluntarily; I felt the danger. Besides, I had no home." It is not surprising that the proportion of homeless refugees was greater in cities than in the rural areas. Those who evacuated due to fear went more often to the countryside; more of those who were actually refugees tended to go to other cities (or move to a distant part of the same city, in relatively fewer cases). Very probably those who went to the country were the earliest to depart.¹⁷

There is an interesting pattern in the differential

¹³ A significantly higher proportion of evacuees, for example, came from family fringes—in-laws, relatives outside the immediate family, and non-related household members.

¹⁴ Some differences in attitudes and feelings existed between these refugees and genuine evacuees; these are discussed later.

¹⁵ The question was: "What bombing experiences did you have before you left?"

¹⁶ The question was: "What bombing experience have you personally had?"

¹⁷ Some differences in attitudes and feelings existed between these refugees and genuine evacuees; these are discussed later.

experience of evacuees and urban people with respect to air raids in general, and bombing in particular.¹⁸ ¹⁹ Not all people who experienced air raids were actually subjected to bombing. Some just saw airplanes overhead during an alert, some were machine-gunned, some were in parts of a city upon which no bombs fell. Evacuees said they experienced raids, in a greater number of cases than did urban people; but people in cities more often experienced repeated bombings close by.

TABLE 67.—*Differential raid experience of evacuees and urban people*

	Evacuees	Urban people
	Percent	Percent
No raid experience at all.....	10	24
One or more raids without bombing.....	8	7
Two or more raids without bombing.....	23	9
One bombing raid.....	41	33
Two or more bombing raids.....	18	27
	100	100

Several raids, or a single personal experience with bombings, tended to drive evacuees from a city rather effectively, if they were to go at all. There always remained a solid core of people in cities who just didn't leave; evacuees were of another type—and besides, they seem to have had especially good objective reasons for leaving.

It seems that evacuees were particularly unfortunate in their raid experience. A half again as many of them as of urban people said they had seen at least one of the great night fire raids which were carried out on an urban area target. Smaller proportions said they had lived through all other types of bombing. Such experience, particularly of an urban area attack, seems to have been an impelling factor in the decision to leave home.²⁰

Evacuees were also more intimately involved in raid results. Less than a third of them said they escaped damage to themselves, their homes, or their property, whereas nearly two-thirds of the urban people said they did not suffer. This difference is the most significant one between the two groups, giving ample reasons for evacuation. A majority of the evacuees suffered property or home damage, in contrast to a quarter of the remaining urban people. Injury does not seem to have been as im-

¹⁸ The question was: "What bombing experiences did you have before you left?"

¹⁹ The question was: "What bombing experience have you personally had?"

²⁰ Aside from evacuees in the hinterland of the atomic bombed cities, almost none had experienced either of the atomic bomb raids. Characteristically, evacuees from Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not go far.

TABLE 68.—*Bombing involvement*

	Evacuees	Urban people
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
No damage or injury	30	64
Property or home damage	55	24
Injury to self or family	3	6
Damage to property or home, and injury to self or family.	6	3
Death in the family	6	3
	100	100

elling a motive in evacuation as damage to property was. This is particularly interesting when we recall that evacuees were less apt to own either land or homes.

Some Special Characteristics of Evacuees. In order to provide a frame of reference for the discussion of the morale of the evacuee group, it is necessary to determine if any special personal traits could influence their behavior, attitudes, and opinions. Social position and air-raid experiences seem to have had some influence in causing a person to evacuate. Were there other factors, of a personal nature too?

Evacuees are very obviously more anxious to talk. For instance, for some 27 responses, such as those dealing with credibility of news, with reactions to the end of the war, and others, evacuees have been compared to urban and rural non-evacuees; and it was found that evacuees give a higher average of informative answers than other urban as well as rural people. Sometimes respondents gave more than one reason for attitudes or opinions. In comparisons of this nature, the evacuee group proved best at giving multiple reasons.

By what they said, they proved themselves to be more frightened, more worried, and perhaps to compensate for such qualities, sometimes verbally more defiant of threats, than the urban Japanese.²¹ This can be seen from a number of sources, such as their accounts of how they felt and acted during raids and during the war as a whole, and their conduct during their interviews. In speaking of responsibility for raids, an unusually large number blamed the United States.²² As one man said:

I think the responsibility lay in the hands of the Americans because they bombed the innocent people of Japan, while the Japanese forces never laid a hand on civilian populations.

Again, in speaking of American propaganda leaf-

²¹ Of course, as has just been shown, more evacuees were intimately involved in the damaging effects of bombings. This is something of a bias.

²² The question was: "When American planes bombed Japan on which side did you feel the responsibility lay?"

lets,²³ twice as many evacuees as urban people showed defiance, although few in either group expressed this attitude.

Yet in general, the evacuees admitted being frightened significantly more frequently than did the non-evacuated urban people. Of course, they had plenty of occasion for fear, but their greater fear came out not only in descriptions of their behavior during raids, but also in statements on anxiety responses on hearing of the atomic bomb. Even their reactions to the first United States planes over Japan shows this.²⁴ More confessed to fright, terror, or anxiety concerning future raids than did so among urban people. As one evacuee said:

One plane came over in April of 1942. We were all startled because we did not expect any American planes at that time. I did not see the plane because I stayed in the bomb-shelter a long time, even after the "all-clear" sounded. I was shaking all over.

During actual bombing raids, in the face of real danger, more evacuees ran to air-raid shelters than did urban people, while fewer claim to have fought fires.²⁵ In the words of one respondent:

The siren sounded, but we had had many false alarms. I was a warden, so I went out and saw the bombs dropped and flares all around. Then I ran and got my children. I went into the shelter and stayed for two hours. It was my first experience and I was scared. Then I realized how terrible bombings could be. Almost all of Sendai was burned.

This is perfectly consistent with the greater lack of adaptation, by evacuees, to continued raids.²⁶ A woman from Nagoya explained this quite simply:

As the raids continued I became much more afraid because I had seen too many casualties and the suffering the air raids brought. So instead of getting used to it, I became more afraid, always wondering if I'd be the next victim.

The anxiety of the evacuee group, suggested by their expectations when the first American planes came and their reactions on hearing of the atomic bomb, is allied both to their greater talkativeness and to their rather greater general propensity to worry.²⁷ More of them worried about their relatives, particularly in air raids of course, but also about those in the service. More of them worried about food. In their interviews, they constantly spoke of some misfortune as being the "last straw."

²³ The questions were: "Did you know about American propaganda leaflets which were dropped during the war? What were the leaflets about? What did you think of them?"

²⁴ The questions were: "What did you recall about the first time American planes flew over Japan? What did you think about it?"

²⁵ The questions were: "Can you tell me more about your (bombing) experience? Tell me what happened, what you did, how you felt."

²⁶ The question was: "Were you more afraid as the raids continued, or did you get used to them?"

²⁷ The question was: "What things worried you most during the war?"

A particularly thoroughgoing worrier is quoted below:

I was worried about my kids. Because we evacuated two kids I worried about their education . . . I had two younger kids that I worried about constantly. I also worried about bombings . . . I worried over trying not to scatter the family in evacuation.

Among bombed-out refugees, fewer deviations from the urban point of view were found than among those who evacuated due to fear of bombing, save for their greater relief at the end of the war and lesser confidence in Japan's spiritual strength.²⁸ The motivation for leaving town, among bombed-out refugees, was so immediate and practical that closer parallels to urban attitudes are to be expected. If evacuees as a group do appear to differ in some respects from urban people, one would expect those with the most immediate and practical reasons for evacuation to differ the least, and those who left because of fear of future danger to differ the most.

As a group, then, evacuees seem to be nervous and timid. They talked more, worried more, admitted physical fear more frequently. Perhaps they tried to make up for this by a touch of defiance. All of these characteristics are to be anticipated in a group with the experiences and the social composition of the evacuees, overweighted with females and younger sons, with more of the propertyless and the occupationally unrooted. Such people were the most likely to evacuate. But then, any person would be induced by simple reality to leave his home city, after being bombed out.

What Happened to Evacuees During Evacuation. From interviews with evacuees, considerable information has been derived concerning their experiences while being evacuated, and while in residence in their places of refuge. These experiences may well have been influential in molding their later attitudes and opinions. Since most of them left voluntarily, and only after extensive bombing had begun to disrupt the life of the country, it is not strange that a majority were not helped in any way by the government, although it did provide transportation for some.²⁹

In the words of a woman evacuated from Tokyo:

We got nothing. All on our own expense. Well, the government did pay the train fare for my parents because they had been burned out, but I had paid my own way before that.

²⁸ The questions were: "How did you feel when you heard that Japan had given up the war?" and "During the war, what did you think was Japan's greatest strength in waging the war?"

²⁹ The question was: "What arrangements were made for your trip and living facilities?"

TABLE 69.—Assistance given to evacuees by the government

	Evacuees interviewed in—			
	Atomic bombed areas	Urban areas	Rural areas	Total
No arrangements made by government agencies.	Percent 75	Percent 60	Percent 52	Percent 55
Rations furnished in part or whole.	7	7	3	5
Transportation furnished or cost defrayed in part or whole.	9	19	34	28
Cash sum given-----	5	8	10	10
Miscellaneous—such as transportation priorities, billeting, clothing.	4	9	7	7
No answer-----	5	3	0	1
	1105	1106	1106	1106

¹ Percentages total to more than 100 because some respondents said that they were assisted by the government in more than one way.

Transportation appears to have been given to more of those who evacuated to rural than to urban areas. This is probably because those interviewed in rural areas had come early, while those who went to other cities were more likely to be refugees. The contrast between the evidence from the people and the government rules concerning aid to evacuees is striking evidence of the breakdown of organizational efficiency. This is confirmed by the evidence of refugees in the atomic-bombed areas, where the breakdown was worst of all. Whatever mechanisms existed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki for facilitating evacuation were completely overwhelmed.

However, the implications of the general inadequacy of measures to assist evacuation go far beyond indication of government disorganization or lack of interest in the people. Government assistance in mass evacuation means some control of evacuation—a better control of who was to evacuate, and into what areas.

No matter when or whither evacuated, a majority left in family groups.³⁰ Even if all members of the family could not go at once, attempts were made to reunite the family as soon as possible, and even if the breadwinner had to stay behind, he sent all of his dependents away together in three-fourths of the cases.³¹ The tendency was for as many members of a family as possible to cling together under the stress of evacuation. Such behavior may well tend to maintain family morale, and so be socially

³⁰ The question was: "Did your entire household go with you?"

³¹ The question was: "Did your entire household go to the same place?"

beneficial, but at the same time its effects upon production must be unfortunate, since it drags the worker away from his job. But family unity in Japan is strong.

A majority of the evacuees found some disadvantages in their places of refuge:

TABLE 70¹

	<i>Percent</i>
Living conditions entirely disadvantageous.....	47
Some advantages but mainly disadvantages.....	19
Living conditions entirely advantageous.....	34

	100

¹ The question was: "How was your livelihood in the place to which you went?"

This was particularly true of those interviewed in the country. A greater proportion of those in the country had left before being bombed out, and so, perhaps, more of them did not feel as grateful for any living conditions as did refugees who often barely escaped with their lives. This is demonstrated in their attitude towards the food problem, which was the greatest single difficulty no matter where one went. The rural-urban difference in this one item alone is enough to account for the variations in satisfaction between the two groups of evacuees. But there is also a greater proportion of evacuees to rural than to urban areas who expressly state that the food supply was better than in their home communities. Thus, 48 percent of evacuees to rural areas mentioned food, whereas only 33 percent of evacuees to other urban areas did so. Fewer of them having the bitter troubles of the bombed-out to think about, possibly food was more on the minds of evacuees who went to rural areas, than of those who moved to other cities.

Other complaints of evacuees are relatively minor. A few found living arrangements hard, even fewer spoke of consumer-goods shortages or of black markets and inflation. Evacuees, being city people, noted changes in their circumstances far less often if they went to other cities than if they went to the country.

On the whole, evacuees tended to think of their experience as an unfortunate one from the viewpoint of livelihood. But in this respect, who in Japan could, with equanimity, contemplate his conditions of livelihood?

However, evacuees expressed satisfaction with their reception in refuge areas, in the overwhelming number of cases.

TABLE 71¹

34 percent said they were well-treated, living with relatives or friends.
 28 percent said they were well-treated, hosts and local people being helpful.
 20 percent made equivocal or non-committal statements.
 18 percent said they felt discriminated against as evacuees.

¹ The question was: "How were you treated in the place to which you were evacuated?"

Two contrasting statements illustrated evacuee sentiments. A girl, forced to evacuate twice by bombs, said:

We went to my father's place in Wakayamaken after our house was burned down. They treated us very kindly. They shared with us what they could spare.

Whereas another respondent said:

They were kind for the first few days just after our arrival, but as days passed on, we were treated as dependents and could not have a mind to stay long. Therefore, no sooner had I seen the news of permission for returning to the city, than I took my family back to Wakayama.

This general feeling of evacuees that they were welcomed, receives support from the testimony of those who were actual hosts, and put up evacuees in their homes.³² Five out of six hosts stated that there was no friction. Food shortage and overcrowding caused some friction, but other complaints expressed were very minor. About four-fifths of those who accommodated evacuees were related to them in one way or another, and they usually maintained that they got along together very well. This claim was not so frequently made by the hosts of non-relatives.³³ There is no certainty, however, that friction did not exist between the natives of a community and evacuees who were not relatives and did not live with them.

Indeed, there is plenty of evidence from background material that such friction did exist. A schoolmaster said:

Well, at first relationships were very cordial . . . But later there were fallings out. The food problems were the chief cause of this. There simply wasn't enough for everyone, and the people felt that additional mouths complicated the situation, while the evacuees felt that they had as much right as anyone to eat.

This statement is typical of one widespread point of view. A contrary one was expressed by a village mayor:

Evacuees . . . were accepted completely and treated like neighbors. They came mainly in family groups but all were accepted and treated alike. All got the same rations

³² The question was: "How did they and you get along?"

³³ Whereas 68 percent of those who put up non-relatives got along well with them, the figure is 82 percent for those who put up relatives.

as regular citizens . . . There have been no conflicts or quarrels between us.

It was found, however, that most non-official informants in the same village spoke like the schoolmaster quoted above. In general, the official point of view, as presented to the Survey directly, agrees more with the formal statements of respondents concerning evacuee reception, but the non-official and documentary evidence tends to show very considerable friction.

Whence, Whither and When They Evacuated. Among the six great cities of Japan, only Kyoto escaped devastation. Apparently the Japanese were reasonably confident that it would be spared, for very few indeed evacuated from that city. The other five large cities, in contrast, provided well over half of the evacuee group under discussion. In general, the number of evacuees was proportional to the relative population of the different cities, but it was to some degree affected by bomb load. Most urban Japanese have relatives and friends in the country, and the tendency was to seek them out no matter where they lived. So, evacuees spread to every corner of the home islands.

The concentration, however, was in the areas relatively close to the city evacuated. Rural rather than urban localities were sought as places of refuge by evacuees. Some had returned to their city homes before being interviewed, but enough remained so that 62 percent of the evacuees interviewed were found either in small towns or villages.

As would be anticipated from official statements, most of the evacuee respondents left their homes during 1945. The high point of evacuation was in March, the month of the first great fire raids. This is particularly true for Tokyo, from which city there was, thereafter, a constant decline in evacuation. The Osaka-Kobe region sent out many during that month also, but had a second rise in departures during June. The smaller cities did not begin to send out many people until July, nearly at the end of the war, since very few of them had been heavily bombed up to that time. In July it became clear that with the major cities mainly destroyed, it was now the turn of medium-sized and provincial cities.

Thus, it is plain that most of the evacuees interviewed had not left their homes until the threat of destruction was very close. More, in fact, say they were bombed-out refugees than say they were properly evacuated people. It is also plain that the ensuing wholesale flight from cities was not guided into selected evacuation areas, prepared for reception of evacuees. Rather the flow was guided by

the traditional ties of family and friendship, and the vagaries of transportation. Hence, despite the concentration of evacuees within their home regions, some carried the word of destruction from the air into remote rural areas; and within the areas of evacuee concentration, problems of living became multiplied.

Morale and the Evacuees

Hitherto, certain characteristics of evacuees and the evacuation have been presented. Some implications of the Japanese experience for any mass evacuation procedure have been indicated. In partial summary, we have seen that evacuees generally had good cause for flight, to escape bombing and to relieve their anxieties; we have seen that although from the viewpoint of livelihood the evacuees tended to have a hard time, their reception in refuge areas was good, and that they found safety.³⁴ We have also noted that evacuees tended to spread all over the islands—wherever they had rural or other urban roots, or connections to which they could obtain transportation. Now, from morale considerations, two major questions arise. First—what was the state of morale among evacuees at the time they evacuated? The sheer inconvenience of pulling up roots and moving, the conditions of anxiety surrounding evacuation, and whatever selective factors in the personality led to evacuation would lead to an assumption that evacuees must have been of particularly low morale at the time of evacuation. If this was so, the relatively uncontrolled dispersal of evacuees would spread morale infection and news of national weakness. Second—did evacuation, once accomplished, help raise morale, through good reception in safe host areas? These are the problems with which the following section will deal.

Introduction: Morale of Evacuees. Although a few of the differences in attitude between evacuees and other urban people may have existed long before the evacuation took place, there are a good many others which can much more logically be attributed to the effect of evacuation, or to those experiences which made evacuation a necessity. The variations in war attitudes, indicative of morale, between the evacuees and the urban people are rarely great, but they almost always exist, and they almost always show the evacuees, as a group, to be less satisfied with their life during the war and less confident of victory. This cannot be considered remarkable, considering the more than ordinary traumatic ex-

³⁴ Only 3 percent of the evacuees report having to evacuate more than once.

periences which so many of them had undergone. But in view of the evidence that evacuee morale was indeed extremely low at the time of evacuation, these relatively small post-evacuation differences would indicate that evacuation helped morale. However, the differences may have been minimized by the fact that morale generally fell to an extremely low point and that the sex composition of the evacuee group would bias it in favor of higher morale.

Morale among evacuees seems to have been worst at the time of evacuation: there is, at any rate, no indication of a continued decline after evacuees became settled in their places of refuge. There is every evidence from all sources that evacuee morale was singularly low at the time of evacuation, compared to non-evacuees. Even before evacuation, many of them had less confidence in victory than their neighbors. Doubtless this was one of the motives for evacuation among those who left before being bombed, for already by the end of 1944, a large number had doubts of victory. A baker who evacuated in January 1944 put it as follows:

I had doubts as the war kept on—I said that we didn't have the strength to win. The Americans kept advancing and we just kept backing up; and when I saw planes coming over, I said to the people, "If we could advance against their homeland, then we could win. But if they keep coming toward our homeland, how can we win? While in Nagasaki the police scolded me because I said such things. They said: 'Are you a Japanese or not?'"

The first three months of 1945 brought such doubts to many more, particularly in comparison with other urban people. This was a period when vast numbers began to evacuate, now not only from fear but from necessity.

Confidence in Victory. The reasons given by evacuees for their doubts of victory fit in with this timing: 42 percent gave air raids, compared to 33 percent of the urban non-evacuees. Air raids which cause one to leave home might be expected to make a person doubt victory. By the end of the war, only a very few more evacuees than urban people doubted victory, were certain of defeat, or were personally unwilling to go on with the war. But, at the time they fled the cities, a big majority of the evacuees later said, in one way or another, that they just didn't like the war at all.³⁵ Very few recall having continued to believe in victory despite their evacuation.³⁶ Evacuees seem to have felt that their

³⁵ The questions were: "As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?" and "When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?"

³⁶ Evacuees interviewed in rural areas expressed hatred of war much oftener than those interviewed in cities.

TABLE 72.—Evacuee attitudes toward war at the time of evacuation¹

	Percent
Wished war hadn't started; wished for early peace to end suffering; feared war; wished for peaceful world	28
Hated the war because of hardships of evacuation	21
Felt doubtful of victory or certain of defeat—war situation of Japan hopeless	10
Miscellaneous remarks indicating low confidence in victory	9
Confidence neither high nor low	8
Hope for victory or other optimistic attitudes, despite evacuation	6
No answer	18
	100

¹ The question was: "How did you feel about the war at the time you left?"

troubles were signs of misfortunes for Japan.

It is interesting to note that their feelings about evacuation itself do not indicate as low morale as their feelings about the war.³⁷ Many were unhappy about the disruption of family life, but almost as many felt safer at being away from their city homes. The feelings of evacuees concerning evacuation are classified as follows:

TABLE 73.—Feelings toward evacuation¹

COMPLAINTS	Percent
Personal reference:	
Felt generally unhappy and sad, dazed, and confused about evacuation	20
Depressed by disruption of family life	17
Miscellaneous—worried about safety of family left behind, felt futility and uselessness of evacuation, worried about future livelihood	7
Extra—personal reference: imposition on hosts, no household goods, etc.	10
General pessimism	15
OTHER FEELINGS	
Felt safer and less fearful	14
It couldn't be helped—it was war	10
Minor optimistic feelings—glad to be evacuated, relieved of worry, etc.	21
	114

¹ The table classifies responses, both complaining and non-complaining. A respondent could make both complaining and optimistic comments, or more than one comment of each kind. Thus percentages total more than 100. Twenty-six percent of the evacuees had no complaints: 46 percent reported no optimistic feelings at time of evacuation.

The general reaction to evacuation was a negative one, but not so forcefully so as the reaction against the war. Evacuees seem to have projected their

³⁷ The question was: "Can you explain to me in a few words how you felt about the evacuation?"

own troubles into an attitude toward the war itself.³⁸

Evacuation brought doubts to many: it brought certainty of no Japanese victory to some.³⁹ By the end of March 1945, a slightly greater proportion of evacuees than of urban people said they felt certain that Japan could not win, just as many felt doubts of victory. The decline in confidence continued throughout the spring. A well educated woman, evacuated during this period, said:

When Okinawa fell I felt we could not attain sure victory, though in my heart I was praying for victory.

Half of the evacuees, however, say that it was American air activity which made them certain Japan couldn't win. They credit the air attack with convincing them, in more cases than do urban people. Only a seventh as many speak of consumer shortages, whereas among urban people one-fourth as many blame shortages as blame air raids. This is of interest in showing how strongly, in a comparative sense, air raids had affected the viewpoint of the evacuees, who certainly suffered from shortages as much as any one else, if not more. Many, of course, had lost their home supplies and their ration cards.

In agreement with their somewhat earlier doubts and certainties about the outcome of the war, more evacuees reached a point of unwillingness at an early date than did other Japanese.⁴⁰ By June 1945, for every seven of the evacuee group who said they felt they could not go on with the war, there were five among urban people. By this time, of course, the great bulk of the evacuee population had already left their homes and their immediate troubles were those connected with resettlement rather than raids. Consequently they were not inconsistent in no longer giving air raids as their reasons for low morale answers to any greater extent than other urban people.

Thus far, the evidence seems to be that evacuee morale was extremely low at the time of evacuation. To the interview data presented in this report could be added the consistent weight of evidence from documentary sources and from well-informed observers. But the next question to be answered concerns post-evacuation morale. Did evacuation help morale? Table 74 summarizes

³⁸ Just as more evacuees in rural areas than in urban expressed hatred of war, so also many more complained of the disruption of family life. Both attitudes are likely to be closely related.

³⁹ Question: "When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?"

⁴⁰ The question was: "Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war?"

differences in morale attitudes between the evacuees and non-evacuee groups.

TABLE 74.—*Morale attitudes*¹

	Evacuees	Urban people	Rural people
	Percent	Percent	Percent
Social solidarity:			
Critical of war leaders ¹ . . .	41	37	35
Critical of home front leaders. ²	66	61	56
Less group cohesion ³	54	47	39
Inequality of suffering ⁴	47	42	38
Confidence in victory:			
Never doubted victory ⁵	10	14	11
Never certain that Japan could not win. ⁶	28	30	26
Never reached point of unwillingness to go on with war. ⁷	30	33	26

¹ The question was: "In regard to the way your leaders conducted the war, what did you think of it during the war?"

² The question was: "In regard to the way your leaders took care of the home front welfare, what did you think of it during the war?"

³ The question was: "Did the people's attitudes and conduct toward each other change during the war?"

⁴ The question was: "Did you think that all kinds of people in Japan suffered alike during the war?"

⁵ The question was: "As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?"

⁶ The question was: "When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?"

⁷ The question was: "Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war?"

It seems apparent that evacuees are generally of somewhat lower morale than either other urban or rural people. However, the differences are rather small. In view of the considerable low morale at the time of evacuation, one might suppose that evacuation helped morale. Another hypothesis, just as reasonable, would be that morale was generally so low by the end of the war that non-evacuees almost reached the low level previously attained by evacuees.

Confidence, at the time of evacuation, had reached a low point, but the relief from air raids probably was great enough to counteract other aspects of the situation which might tend to lower it. Now that so many of them felt personally safe, they could reassert themselves. There is evidence that many of them did so.

Many of them, for example, were now quite willing to express their feelings about the Americans who had bombed them out of their homes.⁴¹ Although they were questioned about this by Americans in uniform, nearly half, 48 percent, stated that their feelings were hatred, anger, fear, in comparison 42 percent of urban people. As a housewife said:

I hated them. After all, America is my enemy. I hate my sister if I fight with my sister.

Such a negative reaction to the enemy might be expected to keep up a "last-ditch defense" type of

⁴¹ The question was: "How did you feel about the Americans during the war?"

morale among evacuees, despite their earlier knowledge of its hopelessness.

In their reactions to the surrender announcement, evacuees in cities more frequently show hostility to the surrender than do other urban people, and those in the country show it more frequently than rural people, but generally the urban viewpoint was expressed.⁴² A housewife evacuated during the spring from Yokohama said:

I imagined that we would be killed when we surrendered so I was preparing to fight to the end even with a Lambo spear, and go down fighting.

This is a considerable recovery from their confessed feelings a few months before. Since the Confidence in Victory Index combines items extending over a period of months, it is inevitable that, in this index, the position of the evacuees is intermediate between the urban and the rural, and is not significantly different from either (Appendix L).

TABLE 75.—*Confidence in victory*

	Most confidence	Medium confidence	Least confidence
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Evacuees	20	31	49
Young evacuees	20	29	51
Female evacuees	21	30	49
Urban	23	31	46
Young urban	30	32	38
Female urban	26	33	41
Rural	17	34	49

¹ Actual evacuees, those who left cities through fear of anticipated bombing, showed less confidence in victory than those who left as refugees, after being bombed out. In the "least confidence" category are 56 percent of the former and 46 percent of the latter.

There is a notable difference between various sorts of evacuees in degree of confidence in victory. Some were more sensitive to the effects of evacuation than others. Young people and women of all ages, although relatively high in confidence if they remained in the cities, lost it, when evacuated, to a far greater extent than did middle-aged or older men. These are exactly the type of people who were most likely to evacuate; and it is interesting that they should be the ones whose confidence was most shaken by such an experience.

Reactions of Evacuees to Wartime Events—Social Solidarity. Turning back to events which took place during the war, we find that rather more evacuees than urban people claim to have been critical and skeptical. Again, as in the case of confidence in victory, the differences between the two groups are rarely great, but they are very consistent.

⁴² The question was: "How did you feel when you heard that Japan has given up the war?"

As we have seen from Table 74, evacuees were most likely to criticize both war leadership and home front leadership than other people. Criticism of the latter was so widespread among urban people that the evacuee excess is not very noticeable, but evacuees differ from rural people quite significantly.⁴³

Evacuees were slightly more sensitive to changes in group cohesion and tended, slightly more, to feel there was greater inequality of suffering within the country than did non-evacuees, whether urban or rural. The verbal symbols of patriotic unity and sacrifice still retained great value for about half of them (Table 74). The powerful effect of indoctrination of cultural tradition is evident.⁴⁴ Despite their low morale at the time of evacuation, and their unfortunate experience with the results of poor leadership, by the time they were interviewed, evacuees as a whole appear to have reverted pretty much to the attitudes held by urban people generally. Only in this way can one partly explain the difference between what they said about evacuation and what they said about Japanese society and its leaders. They could not forget their actual misfortunes, but many of them seem to have forgotten any lessons which they learned therefrom and to be unwilling, now, to generalize from their own personal experiences. The other possibility is that urban living experiences became so acute as to cause morale attitudes to drop to the levels previously reached by evacuees. Probably both influences were at work.

TABLE 76.—*Relation of home ownership to two social attitudes*

	Rich suffered less	Less unity
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Urban home owners	28	40
Urban non-home owners	28	48
Evacuee home owners	30	51
Evacuee non-home owners	35	56

These contrasting extents of reactions are symptomatic of the strains on social relations under the stress of evacuation.

Criticism of specific failures is far more widespread, however, among evacuees, rich and poor,

⁴³ Education appears to have a very noticeable effect in sensitizing people to the faults of their leaders, particularly if they evacuated. Evacuees of middle-school education criticized home front leadership in 10 per cent more cases than urban people of similar attainments. Such people as these, apparently, were ready to recognize poor leadership if it affected them personally, even though they would under normal circumstances remain more complacent. People of higher education criticized home front leadership in over 70 percent of cases whether evacuated or not.

⁴⁴ Property ownership was related to the value of these symbols to evacuees.

men and women, young and old, educated and uneducated. Few Japanese were satisfied with the air-raid protection provided them, for instance.⁴⁵ Of the evacuee group, 84 percent were definitely dissatisfied, compared to 78 percent of urban people. Specifically, criticism by evacuees was concentrated upon their dislike of the inadequacy of air-raid shelters. In the words of an evacuated businessman:

I thought that the shelters were there only for mental relief and that they were useless. It was just mostly a hole with some dirt over the top of it. People concentrated in them, and thus more people were killed. It was much better if the people did not enter them, but rather ran in the opposite direction when the bombs fell.

Since evacuees had so frequently experienced air raids, and usually with more devastating results than urban people generally, their attitude towards the truthfulness of Japanese newspaper and radio accounts thereof is of considerable interest. The level of belief was rather low in any case, by somewhat more so among evacuees. On a comparative basis, belief in Japanese news about air raids was as follows:⁴⁶

TABLE 77

	Evacuees	Urban	Rural
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Believed them.....	27	27	27
Disbelieved them.....	60	51	44
Didn't know—didn't read newspapers.....	7	11	18
No answer.....	6	11	11
	100	100	100

The authorities were concerned lest evacuees spread harmful stories and skepticism in remote areas; the contrast with rural belief is thus of interest. Nevertheless, both among urban people and evacuees, there remained a credulous core, despite their personal experiences.

However, more evacuees than urban people were quite willing to believe enemy announcements about future raids, although this was not true with regard to American propaganda in general.⁴⁷ Experience appears to have taught evacuees, in more instances than it did other Japanese, to discriminate between the credibility of various sources of information.

⁴⁵ The question was: "In your opinion, how well was your home town protected against air raids?"

⁴⁶ The question was: "During the war, what did you think about the way the newspapers and the radios described the air raids on Japan?"

⁴⁷ The questions were: "Did you ever hear about the Americans announcing that they were going to bomb cities before they actually did? What did you think about it?"

TABLE 78.—Of those who knew of American warning-to-cities propaganda:

58 percent of evacuees said they definitely believed, contrasted to 15 percent who said they disbelieved.
47 percent of urban people said they definitely believed, contrasted to 19 percent who said they disbelieved.
48 percent of rural people said they definitely believed, contrasted to 12 percent who said they disbelieved.

The greater number of rural people were not exposed to such warnings, but among those who were, many said that evacuees had spread the dangerous thoughts. The evacuees, of course, were those who were in a position to inform their rural neighbors.

Summary. In summary, the differences between evacuees and other urban people, although small in each single instance, are consistently indicative of lower morale. Thus, when attitudes towards a number of the components of morale are combined, as in the Morale Index, we find more evacuees having lower morale than is the case among other urban people. Measured in this way, in fact, evacuees' morale is even lower than that of rural people.

TABLE 79.—Comparative morale of evacuees and Non-evacuees¹

	Relatively lower morale	Relatively higher morale
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Evacuees.....	57	43
Urban people.....	49	51
Rural people.....	51	49

¹ Measure used is the Morale Index (Appendix K).

The over-all low morale of the evacuee group is even more striking in view of its age-sex composition (Appendix R). Women, although of higher morale than men, were much more sensitive to evacuation, whether they be young or old, and young people of either sex are sensitive. They tend in particular to go to the lowest, rather than simply to the low category in morale, in comparison with non-evacuated urban people of the same age and sex. Education also increased one's sensitivity to

TABLE 80

	Relatively lower morale	Relatively higher morale
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Young evacuees.....	58	42
Young urban.....	46	54
Female evacuees.....	54	46
Female urban.....	43	57
Least educated evacuees.....	46	54
Least educated urban.....	54	46
Highly educated evacuees.....	67	33
Highly educated urban.....	62	38
Evacuees from fear of bombing.....	59	41
Bombed-out refugees.....	55	45

the misfortunes of evacuation, for although the least educated among evacuees have better morale than the least educated who remained in the cities, those with ten or more years of schooling seem to have collapsed.

Thus, the groups which predominantly made up the evacuees were the most sensitive in morale to the effects of leaving their homes. Some of them, who left before bombing, appear to have already had a tendency towards discouragement and lack of faith. Others, better indoctrinated, began to lose faith as a result of their bombing and evacuation experiences. By the summer of 1945, although relieved at their escape from the destruction in the cities, and probably beginning to recover some of their spirit, they were a discouraged group, spread over almost the entire country, and capable of spreading their discouragement and creating new friction, despite any remaining adherence to the approved verbal symbols.

Effect of Evacuation Upon People of Refuge Areas

As previously stated, about 60 percent of all evacuees were interviewed in towns and villages, their places of refuge, despite the fact that many had already returned to their original homes—or what was left of them—after the end of the war. A much greater proportion than this 62 percent had found refuge in rural areas, but there could have been few places, even bombed cities, which did not receive a few. It is known that some had even taken refuge in Hiroshima, for instance.

The number of evacuees found in each entertaining household, rural or urban, was usually between three and four. It will be recalled, from the discussion above, that there was a strong tendency, among hosts in refuge areas, to put up relatives rather than strangers.

We do not know how rapidly the coming of evacuees affected the morale of a community, and since it was impossible to find any potential refuge area which had no evacuee living in it, any statistical statement of the effect of evacuation upon host communities becomes impossible for lack of a control group. From the study of a considerable amount of background material, however, it is easy to see that, as time went on, the evacuees produced a strong effect upon the morale of their hosts, and one which was not at all helpful to the conduct of the war by the Japanese government. The general discouragement and low morale of the evacuee at the time of evacuation was bound to be a source of infection for all the places in which they sought

refuge. Their leaving disrupted the cities, and their coming upset the countryside.

Behavior of Evacuees. In April 1945, Domei made a report on the behavior of evacuees in refuge areas. Telling of the attitude and conduct in one city, the report said:

Evacuees at first express their relief and gratitude at being able to remove their leggings and change to sleeping garments for the night, for the first time in a long while, but soon they complain about the shortage in rationed foodstuffs, hardly ever mentioning air raids again.

This may reflect an improvement in evacuee morale, but one scarcely helpful to the host community. According to the Domei report, many of them had left family members and appeared to be anxious to return to Tokyo where "food rations are abundant." Some of them commented that "if we are to die, it would be better if the whole family died together." These utterances and behavior "fully reveal the hardships and mental strain suffered by the evacuees, who are incapable of making a living in the new localities."

Most of the complaints made by the evacuees concerned priority in the distribution of rationed goods, and inefficiency in carrying out smooth payment of indemnity insurance. Confirming that many of them were upper or middle class people, Domei concluded:

We cannot ignore the fact that the wholesale evacuation of the wealthy and influential is needlessly arousing envy and creating restlessness among poorer (evacuees) who do not have relatives to whom they can go, as well as among those who are living at such low subsistence levels that they could not leave even though they desired to do so.

In sum, it is easy to see that the mere presence of evacuees was unsettling, but there were worse effects.

Rumors. Among such effects, the most serious was the spreading of damaging stories by evacuees from bombed cities. The stories these evacuees carried to all parts of the country pictured a gloomier situation than did the newspapers and radio. The local people, not knowing the true condition of the bombed areas, were naturally surprised, and the stories created considerable distrust in government leaders, in public information, and in the nation's defense system. Rumors are particularly effective in a state where the "legitimate" sources of information are known to be censored. They are usually the only possible sources of bad news, and even the strict indoctrination to which the Japanese had been subjected could not eliminate all doubts. There is much evidence to show that Japanese tend to be credulous rather than skeptical, but there is as

much which shows a strong cynical tendency among them. Along with their willingness to believe their rulers is a willingness to distrust anybody's motivation in speech, and a consequent willingness to believe other stories as well as the official ones.

Consequently, rumors flourish. This becomes more and more true in time of misfortune. All kinds of rumors were rampant throughout Japan in the closing months of the war. During the first phase of the war, when Japan was riding high on the crest of victories, rumors bordering on defeatism and pessimism were hardly heard, but towards the end of the second phase, which saw the rising tide of Allied offensive operations in the Pacific, and even more in the last phase of the war, defeatism and pessimistic feeling, fanned by rumors of military defeats, air-raid damage, etc, seriously crippled the general morale of the Japanese people.

The Domei report quoted above dealt not only with the behavior of evacuees, but also canvassed various types of rumors prevailing throughout the nation, attempting to determine the effect of rumors upon the country's morale. The report blamed the evacuees as a principal source of rumors. In accusing them of spreading "unfounded" rumors, Domei stated that since rigid newspaper and radio censorship was enforced by the government, people living in a distant village or city or even on the other side of a mountain, did not know what was happening elsewhere. The major way in which the populace obtained news was from the evacuees from areas where things were taking place. The types of rumors varied to some extent, but not strikingly, from one locality to another. Domei divided them into a number of categories, some examples of which follow:

On Damage:

Half of Tokyo was reduced to ashes.

Such famous buildings and places as the Mitsukoshi, Ginza, Nijubashi, and the Meiji Shrine, Yasukuni Shrine, etc, were destroyed.

Certain cities will be levelled in a certain number of months.

On disastrous conditions resulting from bombing:

A great hole was opened up in the ground and several hundred houses which stood around it were blown to bits.

The explosion of a bomb 360 feet away killed a person in a shelter, and the force of the explosion blew out a man's eyes from their sockets.

Arms and bodies which were blown up by bombs were hanging from telephone wires, while others were skewered by the branches of the trees along the streets.

Disposition of the dead:

Piles of corpses are loaded like tuna fish on two or three trucks.

The dead are dumped into one coffin and sent to the crematory, instead of being taken away individually. It is also said that when there is no hope for saving their lives, the seriously wounded, even though they are breathing, are dumped into the coffin by order of the Kempei and sent to the crematory.

Fear:

When the alert sounds in a certain city which has been under constant bombing attacks, most of the people flee to the mountains instead of taking refuge in their own dependable private shelters.

Many women are driven half-insane and cannot go about their work. They finally get to work only after they are subdued by the Kempei.

Hoarding:

A large quantity of sugar, oil, charcoal, and rice were found in the ruins of a certain home.

Aircraft production:

The aircraft assembly plant at Akashi was hit badly, and approximately 100 planes, which were ready for shipment to the Philippines, were completely destroyed.

Espionage Activities:

The Defense Corps in a certain company made a regulation offering 50 yen for each incendiary bomb extinguished, and for information concerning the person who sent signals by flashlight to the enemy planes.

Enemy strategy:

Since Osaka is the black market center, the enemy is attempting to foster it in order to upset the economic life of Japan. Consequently the enemy may employ discretion in his bombing against the city.

This report was made in April at a time when many places had not yet received evacuees. Later the situation became much worse. According to the police bureau of the Home Affairs Ministry in Tokyo:

There was a difference (between rumors in bombed and unbombed cities) up to 5 May 1945; but after that, because of evacuees going into the country and spreading rumors, there was no difference.

The Results of Speech and Action of Evacuees. Fear, arising from stories of evacuees, prompted many to evacuate their families or send away valuables and other household goods to safer places. Some examples: In Akita, where the bombs did not hit the city proper, the chief of police attributed one of the chief causes of evacuation to mounting fear among the people as they heard of bomb damage in neighboring prefectures or heard conditions described by evacuees from the central regions. According to this official, the air-defense regulations were strengthened, but due to fear of the accuracy of bombing and also the lack of friendly planes to

resist the challenge, the morale of the people was greatly lowered. A report on morale prepared by the officials of Itagi stated that stories proclaiming the uselessness of air-raid precautions, and the inevitability of destruction, spread by evacuees from Shimonoseki, Ube, and Tokuyama, made the local people extremely tense and fearful. The report further added that:

People began to take all their goods to the country, hindering movements of military supplies, even though the police forbade this.

In all areas which received evacuees, people tended at first to feel sorry for them and to help them. They contributed bedding, kitchen utensils, food, clothing and many other things, when the government asked for their cooperation. Vacant space was made available for living quarters, and the local people gave up their schools, temples, and other public buildings for occupation by the evacuees.

This cooperation by the local people, however, tended to cool down as the number of evacuees increased to such an extent that the local people were unable to meet their demands. The mayor of one country town, which had a population of 19,000 and which had received 5,400 evacuees, said:

The attitude toward evacuees changed after a while. They kept coming and coming, and it seemed that the flow would never stop.

The evacuees were given food through the local ration board, and this reduced the local supply. Complaints from local citizens increased, charging the evacuees with taking their food.

A psychiatrist said:

Conflicts between local residents and evacuees from Tokyo and other bombed areas were common because of the rice shortage . . . The evacuees came as war victims, feeling that they were fully entitled to consideration . . . The conflict took the form of unpleasantness and occurred largely among women.

Another reason for the subsequent cold attitude of the local inhabitants was certain irritating conduct of the evacuees. The evacuees, particularly the rich, are said to have lived rather leisurely and worn good clothes, creating envious and antagonistic feelings among the people. At a small town, to which almost 800 evacuees came, for example, the middle-class evacuees had "a lot of money" and tended to dress well and flashily. The local people resented their superior economic status and ostentatious display while the nation was suffering from a war.

In nearly all of the communities which received evacuees, the commonest complaint of the people was of the increased black market activities and the consequent rise in the price of commodities. The people blamed the black market upon evacuees who, they charged, being rich, were willing to pay high prices to obtain goods otherwise unavailable. The local inhabitants projected their woes upon the newcomers, whose demands seriously strained the already existing shortage of commodities. A former official of the special police testified:

During the last two years of the war, many factories evacuated to Utsunomiya. The Nakajima airplane factory came year before last, and that was the biggest. Many workers came from outside and created problems of overcrowding and shortages. In connection with evacuation problems, Utsunomiya was one of the places to which many people came, from the larger cities. I will try to explain to you how the general population here felt about them: In the first place, the evacuees all came from large cities and felt superior to the "yokels" in Utsunomiya. They wore fine clothes when they went out on the streets, they did not work in factories or take part in the neighborhood work details; they bought a great deal at the black market and this forced such prices up, and they ate what food there was available for all of us. They brought only money with them, and seemed to have come to Utsunomiya merely to have a good time.

In Taira, however, the people treated the evacuees pleasantly and the evacuees in this city were able to fit themselves well in the community life, according to the city's chief of the community affairs section. He said:

Taira people treated them kindly and fairly as they would anyone else. People evacuating here gladly shared their rationed goods, after the bombing here. Where I lived—though I don't know elsewhere—people didn't talk about such things!

Asked whether the Women's Association members took any interest in school children evacuated from cities, the local head in Yamagata replied:

Yes, that was one of our principal jobs. We became substitute mothers for them, washing their clothes and feeding them. I'm not sure, but think there were about 2,000 of them. We didn't care for this kind of work. It was a lot of trouble. We just did it because we felt sorry, not as a pleasure. Tokyo people had nothing new to tell us—they just brought their tales of horror and bombing. The members felt very sympathetic about it, but didn't think it helped very much to talk about it.

Obviously the only patriotic thing to do, on hearing such stories, was to forget them. But not all people, even unbombed people, could accomplish this feat. By the time the evacuees had recovered their equilibrium they had seriously unsettled that of the people of refuge areas, both by their behavior and their talk.

Conclusions

Evacuation from the cities of Japan was inevitable. Even had the bombing not succeeded in wiping out the homes of millions, a vast number of people would have had to leave. Since, in fact, great areas of the cities were laid waste, millions of refugees joined those who had previously departed.

But, inevitable or not, evacuation was a disaster comparable to the physical damage from bombing. Those whose morale was least stable were the most likely to evacuate, and the experiences of all evacuees were such as to lower morale. After they were resettled, it would seem that their spirit no longer declined: it may even have recovered a little. But by that time the damage had been done. Both by the stories they told and the way in which they acted, evacuees had a most unsettling effect upon the communities in which they sought refuge. They went everywhere, spreading news of disaster and eating into the meager resources of their hosts.

Meanwhile, as many persons of their families as remained behind suffered from loneliness and family disruption. In many respects, the industrial cities suffered from their absence as much as the rural areas did from their presence. Life in both types of community became more and more dislo-

ated as the evacuation grew from a selective, through a widespread, to a wholesale movement. Even had organizational efficiency remained at a high level, this vast migration would have been a calamity. But the very scope of the evacuation dissolved organization, already under heavy strain from the physical results of bombing. The combination was disastrous.⁴⁸

Evacuation, then, was bad for the morale of the evacuees, bad for the morale of their hosts, and bad for the morale of those whom they left behind. It materially disorganized the economy and the social life of the entire country. Yet it was unavoidable. No matter how bad the result of evacuation, millions of people were forced from their homes. Had they been physically restrained within the city limits, utter chaos would have resulted. Evacuation was a palliative, a last desperate measure to cope with a situation which could not be overcome. As such, it seems to have kept the social and economic situation within Japan from becoming even worse than it did, before the opportunity came for the government to solve its dilemma by surrender.

⁴⁸ Appendix S discusses in detail some of the effects of evacuation on the communities left behind and on physical necessities and organizational efficiency in Japan.



"We kept thinking that Hiroshima would not be bombed at all."

* * *

"The bright day now reveals the frightful picture which last night's darkness had partly concealed. Where the city stood, everything—as far as the eye could reach—is a waste of ashes and ruin."

Chapter 8

EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBS ON MORALE

The well-publicized story of the atomic bomb's use and the speculation concerning the weapon's implications for future conflicts have raised to a high level of popular interest the question of just what it did to the fighting spirit of those against whom it was used. What were their reactions when the bombs were dropped? Did they hate the United States for employing the weapon and resolve to avenge the losses which had fallen upon them? Or did they clamor for surrender in order to avoid further suffering and devastation? Did the survivors feel there was any use in continuing the struggle? How did people outside the target areas feel when the events in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were announced?

Morale of Hiroshima and Nagasaki before the Atomic Bombings¹

All sources, including cross-section interviews, indicate that prior to the bombing the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki felt comparatively secure against the danger of serious raids. Nagasaki had undergone five relatively small raids in the previous year, and Hiroshima had gone almost untouched until the morning of 6 August 1945. In both cities many people felt that they would be spared destruction from the sky. The various rumors in circulation supporting this feeling covered a wide range of wishful thoughts. In both places, people said that they were not to be bombed because many Christians were concentrated there. One informant in Hiroshima reported:

We kept thinking that Hiroshima would not be bombed at all. There were rumors that some relative, perhaps the mother, of President Truman was here, and therefore Hiroshima was not to be bombed.

A doctor in Hiroshima said:

Before the bomb fell, day and night the B-29s were flying over Hiroshima, and it was odd to me that they did not drop bombs. The people in general did not believe that

¹ The total number of persons interviewed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki cities was 128. All figures for Hiroshima and Nagasaki cities in succeeding tables are based upon these interviews. In addition, 120 more persons in the immediately surrounding areas were also interviewed; some of these were evacuated survivors of the atomic bomb raids. In discussing the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki alone, the phrase "Hiroshima and Nagasaki cities" will be used. In discussing the cities plus the surrounding areas, the phrase "Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas" or "atomic-bombed areas" will be used.

Seventy percent of all respondents in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas state that they directly experienced the atomic bomb; the remaining 30 percent were intimately affected in one way or another by the bomb.

they would drop bombs, but intellectual people thought that the B-29s were flying over for a reason.

The mayor of Kabe township, almost 10 miles northeast of Hiroshima, reported that many people who had evacuated to Kabe returned to Hiroshima during the summer because of a rumor that the city was to be spared since Miyajima, one of the scenic spots of Japan, is on the outskirts of Hiroshima and the Americans would want to preserve it. Another citizen of Kabe reported:

The majority of the people said that since most of the Japanese nationals in America are from Hiroshima prefecture, they thought that the Hiroshima city area was not going to be bombed.

One counter-rumor, current in both cities, was that they were being saved for "something big." Yet, neither city had tasted heavy bombing, and there was no inordinate amount of insecurity about future raids.

To the people of both the target cities the atomic raids came as a surprise. In Hiroshima, no raid warning was received at the time of the bombing, although there had been one earlier that morning. People were going about their usual morning business. School children and men from the suburbs were engaged in finishing the task of constructing firebreaks in Hiroshima, as a defense against incendiaries. In Nagasaki most people were also going about their usual affairs, working in offices and factories and tending their homes. Although the raid on Hiroshima had taken place three days before and some of them knew that that city had been virtually wiped out, the fact that an atomic bomb was the weapon had not appeared in the papers until 8 August—the day before the Nagasaki bomb was dropped. Moreover, the news was confined to a bare announcement, with no elaboration to explain the implications of the weapon, so that most likely only the most sophisticated in Nagasaki were forewarned.

The confidence in victory, on the part of the people of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas and their personal willingness to go on with the war—two important morale components—was higher than that of the people in the rest of Japan before the atomic bombs were dropped. Table 81 presents the percentages of persons who said they had

doubts of victory, were certain that Japan could not win decisively, and who said they were personally unwilling to continue the war, before 1 July 1945 for the atom-bombed as compared with urban and rural areas of Japan.

TABLE 81¹

	Hiroshima-Nagasaki areas	Urban Japan	Rural Japan
Percent of persons who said they were doubtful of victory before 1 July 1945.	59	74	75
Percent of persons who said they were certain that Japan could not win before 1 July 1945.	31	47	48
Percent of persons expressing personal unwillingness to continue the war, before 1 July 1945.	12	34	33

¹ The data appearing in Table 81 are based on responses given to the questions, "As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?", "When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?" and "Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war?" For a discussion of these questions, see Chapter 3.

Prior to the dropping of the atomic bombs, then, the people of the atomic-bombed areas appear to have had fewer misgivings about the war than people in other cities, although there is a slight possibility that, in talking about their reactions, the atomic bomb so colored their memories as to make the months prior seem easy and without fear of disaster.²

The probably higher morale of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas is very likely related to the comparatively small amount of bombing experienced by these cities and their surrounding areas prior to the atom bombings.³ What happened to this morale on those fateful days in August 1945, when the United States Strategic Air Forces dropped the first atomic bombs on the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

Emotional Reactions to the Dropping of the Bombs

The primary reaction of the populace in the target areas to the bomb was fear—unqualified terror—

² Nevertheless, the evidence is that by the end of the war, morale in the atomic-bombed areas was not lower than in the rest of Japan, despite the larger morale drop after the atomic bombings. The indications this point to a previous state of relatively higher morale in the later atomic-bombed areas.

³ For example, the general air attack and military losses were given most often as reasons for doubts of victory. (These doubts occurred mainly prior to August 1945, and thus less than 1 percent mention the atomic bomb as a cause of doubts.) In urban and rural areas, more people mentioned the air attack than military losses. In the atomic-bombed areas, the reverse is true. Significantly fewer in these areas gave the air attack as a reason for doubts:

Furthermore, whereas 58 percent of urban people and 43 percent of rural people gave air raids and raid effects as their principal worry during the war, only 34 percent of respondents in the atomic-bombed areas did so.

strengthened by the sheer horror of the destruction and suffering witnessed and experienced by the survivors. The second most frequent reaction was that of admiration for the power and scientific skill which underlay the discovery and production of the bomb. Anger was the third most frequent reaction.⁴

TABLE 82.—*Doubts of Victory*

	Atomic-bombed areas	Urban areas	Rural areas
	Percent	Percent	Percent
Because of military losses-----	31	29	28
Because of the air attack-----	22	34	34

Community relief agencies in both cities were completely overwhelmed and the population was left in a complete state of helplessness immediately following the bombing.⁵ All previously prepared emergency organizations were utterly destroyed and spontaneous rescue efforts were almost non-existent.

The analysis of the specific emotional reactions to the bomb appears in Table 83.

TABLE 83.—*Reactions to atomic bombing of people in atomic-bombed areas*

	Percent
Fear—terror-----	47
Fear for own life-----	16
Admiration—impressed by bombs' physical power, by the scientific power behind the bomb-----	26
Jealousy—Why couldn't Japan make such a bomb? ..	3
Anger—bomb is cruel, inhuman, barbarous-----	17
Hate of U. S. specifically because of atom bomb use---	2
No reaction indicated-----	11

¹122

¹ The total percentage equals more than 100 because many respondents gave more than one answer.

Fear and Terror. There are some experiences which cannot be described by cold figures. A few representative excerpts from the descriptions of the victims of the bomb may serve to convey the violent emotional reaction to its impact.

A housewife in Hiroshima said:

My clothes were burned off and I received burns on my legs, arms and back. The skin was just hanging loose. The first thing I did was run in the air-raid shelter we had dug. I lay there exhausted for a while. Then I thought of my baby in the house and ran back for it. The whole house was knocked down and was burning. My mother and father came crawling out of the debris. Face and arms were just black. I heard the baby crying so I crawled in and dug it

⁴ The question asked was: "What did you think about the atomic bomb?"

⁵ For a full description, see USSBS report, *The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki*.

out from under the burning lumber. It was pretty badly burned. My mother carried it back to the shelter. Down by the river there were many people. Blood just dripping from their burns. Many of them were so badly burned that you could see the meat. Blood was just dripping from all parts of their bodies. By this time it was raining pretty badly. I went back in the air-raid shelter but just couldn't lie down or anything. Water poured into the shelter and I received water blisters as well as blisters from the burns.

A student who was about five miles from ground zero in Hiroshima reported:

Practically all the people who came to this section had no clothes on their bodies, for they were all burned. Their faces were all burned and the meat on their faces was hanging down, the lymph dripping all over their bodies. The womenfolks had no hair on their heads. Their hair was all burned. Some of the folks when they came seemed normal, but about one month later their hair all dropped off and they died . . . If you don't see it for yourself it can't be understood. The children two or three years of age were dead with the hair on their heads all falling off.

Father Siemes, a Jesuit missionary, gave a graphic description of the scene in Hiroshima a full day after the bombing:

The bright day now reveals the frightful picture which last night's darkness had partly concealed. Where the city stood, everything—as far as the eye could reach—is a waste of ashes and ruin. Only several skeletons of buildings remain. The banks of the river are covered with dead and wounded and the rising waters have here and there covered some of the corpses. On the broad street in the Hakashima district, naked, burned cadavers are particularly numerous. Among them are the wounded . . . a few have crawled under the burned out autos and trams. Frightfully injured forms beckon to us and then collapse. An old woman and a girl whom she is pulling along with her fall down at our feet. We place them on our cart and wheel them to the hospital at whose entrance a dressing station has been set up. Here the wounded lie on the hard floor, row on row . . . But we cannot move everybody who lies exposed in the sun. It would be endless and it is questionable whether those whom we can drag to the dressing station can come out alive, because, even here, nothing really effective can be done.

The following observations were offered by a Nagasaki woman:

People were running toward our place with terrible burns. (Tears in her eyes.) That night they slept on the road everywhere. Some collapsed during the day due to the effects of burns. People would stop by and ask for water, which was the most urgent need of these people. They were so upset that they couldn't think of food. It was a horrible sight—crying and screaming. I can't describe the burns (wiping her eyes) that were on these people, and the odor of burning flesh was in the air, and it was so awful you have to see it before you can actually describe it or even talk about it. It's hard to comprehend. Some father with his entire family dead would be yelling to die, so that he would not have to live alone.

The vice-mayor of Hera village, seven-and-a-half miles south of Hiroshima, said about the victims pouring into his village:

Everybody looked alike. The burns on the faces were horrible. They all looked like boiled lobsters. Most of the men were wearing battle caps so only parts of their faces were burned. Also, all around, the bare portions of the head looked like it was shaved. The eyes appeared as a mass of melted flesh. The lips were split and they looked like a mass of molten flesh. Only the nose appeared the same as before.

The sudden deaths produced by the bomb—days and even weeks after it was dropped—seem to have been particularly difficult to endure. The following are illustrative comments:

Like an explosive bomb . . . when it hits and you get killed, it's just your tough luck. The reason why I say I think it inhuman is that weeks or months later people die from it. Your hair starts to fall out, bruises and burns come out on your skin . . . That people die from it weeks later is very pitiful and sad.

One neighbor escaped death and came home. But after a week he died: If he were killed at the time of the bombing, we might have felt better.

There is considerable evidence to suggest that the duration of the fear reaction continued for many days after the bombing and interfered with the work of the survivors. The following excerpts from interviews clearly illustrate this reaction:

Whenever a plane was seen after that, people would rush into their shelters. They went in and out so much they did not have time to eat. They were so nervous they could not work.

I didn't venture out of the house for a week or so because we were told it was dangerous.

Respect for the Bombs and What They Represent. Approximately one-fourth of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki area respondents expressed admiration for the power and scientific knowledge behind the bomb (Table 83). This attitude probably reflects Japanese respect for technical achievement. Such admiration has grown even greater with the realization of the important factor which technical inferiority played in Japan's defeat. Moreover, there still exists a considerable remnant of the feudal attitude that "might makes right." One respondent, for example, when asked who was responsible for the war, stated that it was Japan's fault because she had lost but, if Japan had won, it would have been America's responsibility.

Hatred of Americans. Less than one-fifth of the respondents in Hiroshima and Nagasaki expressed hatred of the Americans for using the bomb.⁶ Typ-

⁶ (Table 83). This conclusion is borne out by the testimony of Father Siemes, an on-the-spot observer. He made special note of the small extent of hostility against America.

ical of the expressions among this group are the following:

They really despise the Americans for it; the people say that if there are such things as ghosts, why don't they haunt the Americans?

I only wonder why they did not let the people know of this bomb and give us a chance to give up before bombing us?

After the atomic bomb exploded, I felt that now I must go to work in a munitions plant . . . My sons told me that they wouldn't forget the atomic bomb even when they grew up.

I didn't know about the atomic bomb before. After the bomb dropped I thought it was terrible. I think that it was cruel to drop those in an area where ordinary people are living. I don't see why they didn't drop it on some army camps or something.

The proportion of respondents in the atomic-bombed areas who expressed hatred because of the atomic bomb is greater than the proportion in the rest of Japan who expressed hatred because of bombing in general (approximately 19 percent as compared with 9 percent). These figures probably underestimate the extent of hostility, for several reasons. No doubt one of the factors involved is that many Japanese, out of fear or politeness, did not reveal their feelings with complete candor to American interviewers.

It is also possible that people's subsequent attitudes served to color their reports of their experiences at the time of the bombing. The interviewing was conducted three months after the surrender, at a time when Japanese war leaders had become completely discredited and American prestige was very high. Many of the respondents, for example, were hoping that the Americans would supply them with food, so hostile attitudes expressed to American interviewers would be extremely inappropriate. There is evidence that the hostility was turned against their own government. In response to the question, "When the American planes bombed Japan, on which side did you feel the responsibility lay?" 35 percent of Hiroshima-Nagasaki area residents stated that it was Japan's fault. This percentage is much lower, however, than the percentage of people in rural and urban Japan who gave this same response (45 percent and 47 percent respectively).

A more basic factor is probably the general "c'est la guerre" attitude of the Japanese public, which had become long accustomed to calamity and deprivation. "Shikata-ga-nai" (it cannot be helped) is one of the most frequently used phrases in the Japanese language. The fatalistic meaning it conveys is probably an important explanation of the

relatively small amount of expressed hostility. A greater percentage of those in the Hiroshima-Nagasaki areas stated that they felt that neither side was responsible for the bombing of Japan—that it was the inevitable consequence of war—than respondents in the rest of rural and urban Japan. Twenty-nine percent of the former as compared with 16 percent and 21 percent, respectively, of the latter gave this response. The low prevalence of hostility in the Hiroshima-Nagasaki area must, then, be considered in part as a result of factors introduced by the interviewing situation (fear, politeness, retrospective distortion) but, in part, it must also be interpreted as a genuine expression of the sentiments of the Japanese people.

Effect of the Atomic Bombs on Morale in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki Areas

The emotional effect of the bomb, however, must be differentiated from its morale effect. The emotional effect was a specific response to a weapon. An emotional response to a weapon might be very intense and frightful, yet it might still leave morale relatively unaffected (Chapter 2). The effect of the atomic bomb on morale in the Hiroshima-Nagasaki areas will be discussed in the succeeding section.

The atomic bomb did not produce any different kind of morale effects than those produced by incendiary and high explosive bombs, as far as could be determined; nor, as has previously been mentioned in Chapter 3, was it the major factor leading to the destruction of the will to resist in all Japan. Ten percent of the Japanese people stated that they became certain that Japan could not win, and 10 percent said that they became unwilling to go on with the war, because of the atomic bomb. True, the atomic bombings had only a short time to affect confidence before the surrender, but even within the Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas, the proportions of the populations which stated that they reached a point of certainty that victory was impossible and unwillingness to go on with the war because of the atomic bombings were respectively 28 percent and 24 percent.

Furthermore, the morale of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki area's populations after the bomb was dropped did not fall below that of the rest of urban and rural Japan. Table 84 indicates the differences in confidence in victory and personal unwillingness to continue the war between the Hiroshima and

Nagasaki areas and the rest of urban and rural Japan.⁷

TABLE 84

	Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas	Rest of Japan
	Percent	Percent
Percent who said they never had doubts of victory-----	19	11
Percent who said they were never certain that Japan could not win-----	27	26
Percent who said they were never personally unwilling to continue the war-----	39	28

The difference in the "certainty" category is not statistically significant. However, the differences in the "doubts of victory" and the "personal unwillingness to continue the war" categories suggest that the percentage of people of high morale or at least confidence, after the bomb was dropped, was even greater than in the rest of Japan, although some of the atomic-bombed people may have so amalgamated the bombings and the surrender in their minds that they were thinking of their reactions up to the time of the bombings.

When Hiroshima and Nagasaki are compared with the remaining cities of Japan (arranged in order of bombing tonnage received and percent of destruction of built-up area), similar results are indicated.⁸ Hiroshima and Nagasaki are found to resemble the lightly bombed and unbombed cities in morale rather than the heavily bombed cities.

TABLE 85.—Relative morale of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and four groups of Japanese cities arranged in order of bomb tonnage dropped and percent of destruction¹

	Relatively low morale	Relatively high morale
	Percent	Percent
Heavily bombed cities, exclusive of Tokyo ² -----	56	44
Medium bombed cities, high percent of destruction-----	51	49
Medium bombed cities, low percent of destruction-----	46	54
Lightly bombed and unbombed cities-----	47	53
Hiroshima and Nagasaki-----	45	55

¹ Measure of morale used is the Morale Index (Appendix K). The two morale groups in this table each represent roughly half of the sample, when arranged in order of scores on the Morale Index.

² Morale scores for Tokyo are not presented here because it reacted quite differently than the rest of the heavily bombed cities in Japan. Reasons for this difference are discussed in Chapter 5.

The difference in morale between Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been measured by comparing the Mo-

⁷ The questions on which these data are based are given earlier in this chapter.

⁸ Comparisons are by urban bombing strata. (See Chapter 5 and Appendix M).

rale Index scores of people in each of the cities with the scores of people in each of some 60 cities and towns in which interviews were conducted in Japan. According to this comparison, Nagasaki ranked tenth highest in morale and Hiroshima ranked thirty-second highest in morale. When morale is measured by the criterion of certainty that Japan could not win, a similar relationship is demonstrated. Again, 34 percent of the population in Hiroshima city stated that they were certain of defeat because of the atomic bomb as compared to only 16 percent of the Nagasaki city population.

The greater height of Nagasaki's morale is probably the result of the fact that the Hiroshima bomb had a greater destructive effect against both the physical aspects of the city and its people.⁹ The importance of this factor is analysed in greater detail later in this report.

The Atomic Bomb as a Single Factor in Morale.

Though the atomic bomb itself did not decisively break the morale of either the Japanese population as a whole or the morale of the people in and near Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was the most important single factor in lowering the morale of the latter populations. In the rest of Japan, the atomic bomb was outranked by the general air attack and military losses in its effect on certainty that Japan could not achieve victory and unwillingness to go on with the war; in the atomic-bombed areas it was preeminent. The following data show the major reasons given by respondents:

TABLE 86¹

	Atomic-bombed areas	Rest of Japan
	Percent	Percent
Certain that Japan could not win:		
Because of atomic bomb-----	28	10
Because of military losses-----	23	21
Because of general air attack---	12	34
Personal unwillingness to go on with the war:		
Because of atomic bomb-----	24	9
Because of consumer deprivation-----	7	16
Because of military losses-----	6	6
Because of general air attack---	7	24

¹ Percentages are based on total sample in each area. The questions asked to elicit these data are given elsewhere in this chapter.

² Urban-rural differences in the rest of Japan are very small and statistically insignificant in regard to the subjects in this table.

Of those in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas who had reached the point of certainty that Japan could not achieve "sure victory," over 40 percent did so because of the atomic bomb. Similarly, among residents of these regions who reached the

⁹ For a detailed description of differential destructive effects in the two cities, see USSBS report, *The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki*.

point of personal unwillingness to continue the war, over 45 percent did so because of the atomic bomb. In the rest of Japan, groups of respondents with comparable attitudes approximated only 15 percent. The people spoke in the following terms:

If the enemy has this type of bomb, everyone is going to die and we wish the war would hurry and finish.

What would happen if it dropped all over Japan? If it were dropped on the four corners of Hiroshima, there would be no one left alive.

With all this tragedy around them, the people felt that we should stop this war. Since the bomb was so destructive, we had great doubts as to whether we could go on.

The timing of the points at which confidence in victory began to falter provides additional evidence for the predominant importance of the effect of the atomic bomb on morale in the target areas. It has been suggested that morale in the target cities and environs prior to 1 July 1945 was higher than morale in the remainder of Japan. An examination of confidence in victory after 1 July 1945 indicates that a greater percentage of respondents in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas said they reached these points during this time than was the case in other parts of Japan.¹⁰ Table 87 presents the data:

TABLE 87

	Hiroshima and Nagasaki Areas	Urban Japan	Rural Japan
	Percent	Percent	Percent
Percent who said they reached point of doubts of victory after 1 July 1945-----	19	10	10
Percent who said they reached point of certainty that Japan could not achieve victory after 1 July 1945-----	34	22	21
Percent who said they reached point of personal unwillingness to continue war after 1 July 1945-----	37	25	32

Since there are no known factors, other than the atomic bombs, which could have produced a greater decrease in confidence in victory in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas than in the rest of Japan after 1 July, it is reasonable to conclude that the atomic bomb was the important single factor in producing the decrease. The other data that have been previously presented support this conclusion.

This effect of the atomic bombings may have been reinforced by another factor. As shown in Chapter

¹⁰ It is to be noted that, even though the percent of persons who reached points of doubt, certainty, and unwillingness to continue the war after 1 July is greater for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas, the comparatively small number of cases who reached these points in Hiroshima and Nagasaki before 1 July still leaves the total number who reached these points in urban and rural Japan, during the war, equal to or greater than in the atomic-bombed areas.

These results do not of course, preclude the possibility that saturation attacks with incendiaries might have produced the same effects.

3, morale throughout Japan was sharply on the decline in the spring and summer of 1945, for a variety of causes. These causes continued to operate through July. Since the atomic-bombed areas had greater confidence before 1 July, it is possible that the biggest decline might have come in the last month of the war anyway, when morale crack-up reached highly serious proportions everywhere in Japan.

Morale Effects on Persons Bombed Physically. The most severe effects on morale were experienced by those who were physically affected by the bomb. A graduate of Neiji University, employed at the Newspaper office in Hiroshima, stated:

In Hiroshima, the main thought of the civilians was that they were fooled. Some felt that the atomic bomb was the end. Others felt we should go on regardless of the atomic bomb to the very finish. The people who actually experienced the bombing felt that it was hopeless to continue while people who did not have the experience wanted to carry on.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki respondents were divided into two groups on the basis of having been physically affected by the bomb. In the first group were placed all those who were knocked down, injured, or wounded in any way by the bomb. In the second were placed those who merely saw the effects of the bomb. The two groups were significantly different in respect to several indices of morale.¹¹

In a group of questions designed to measure confidence in victory, the physically affected group was much lower in morale than the unaffected group. Table 88 presents the percentages of each group which fell into high, medium, and low confidence-in-victory categories.¹²

TABLE 88

	Physically unaffected	Physically affected
	Percent	Percent
High confidence in victory-----	35	19
Medium confidence in victory-----	30	39
Low confidence in victory-----	35	42
	100	100

In the Morale Index, 31 percent of the physically-unaffected group fell into the highest of the four

¹¹ Physically affected and non-affected groups in Osaka and Toyama were also compared as to morale. No significant differences appeared. The differences in morale of physically affected and non-affected groups in the Hiroshima-Nagasaki areas are possibly the result of the more severe anti-personnel effects of an atomic bomb as compared to an incendiary bomb. In the rest of Japan, which experienced mainly incendiary attacks, bombs fell in a pattern all over a particular area. The bombs were thus possibly more equalized in their effects on the population of the area.

¹² The Confidences in Victory Index is a composite index comprised of three items: (a) doubts of victory; (b) certainty that Japan could not attain sure victory; and (c) personal unwillingness to continue the war (Appendix L).

morale index categories, while only 17 percent of the affected group fell into this category (Appendix K).

There were no significant differences between the two groups on the question, "During the war, what did you think of your leaders' conduct of the war?" On the other hand, an identically phrased question in regard to the way the leaders conducted the home front yielded significant differences. On the latter question, 64 percent of the physically-affected group were critical, as against only 51 percent of the unaffected group. The greater sensitivity of the home front question throws an interesting light on the manner in which morale deteriorated in Japan. Attitudes which were supported by strong abstract symbols—the Emperor, the spirit of Yamato Damishii, etc.—deteriorated least. On the other hand, a question which elicited attitudes based on an individual's concrete experiences was more liable to differentiate high and low morale groups.¹³

Effects of the Bomb on Japan as a Whole

Despite the quite natural interest in the effect of the atomic bomb on the confidence of the people in the target areas, of greater significance are the reactions of the Japanese people as a whole. The two raids were all-Japan events and were intended to be so. An important objective of the Allied Powers was to force a decision by breaking the Japanese people's will to resist and that of their leaders; the targets were not basically the people or the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Emotional Reactions. Virtually all the Japanese people had had a chance to react to the bomb by the time the interviewing was begun. Only 2 percent in the rural areas and 1 percent in the urban areas had not heard of the bomb by this time.

As in the areas directly affected by the bombing, fear and terror were the most common reactions reported upon hearing of the bombs and their effects.¹⁴ Of those interviewed, approximately 57 percent expressed this feeling, almost the same proportion as in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Over the islands as a whole, however, the proportion who expressed a personal fear of being killed was only half as great as those who had been more directly exposed to the

bomb's effects. In general, the terror feelings were much less intense than in the atomic-bombed areas.

A smaller percentage of people in Japan as a whole expressed feelings of anger or hatred at the use of the bomb (12 percent as against 19 percent in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas). Urban people, possibly because they had experienced the terrors of other kinds of bombings, acknowledge this feeling more frequently than those in rural sections (17 percent as against 11 percent). It is remarkable that those proportions should indicate such slight hostility, even considering the factors introduced by the interviewing situation.

As in the target cities, admiration for the power and scientific achievement represented by the bomb was the second most frequent response to the question, "What did you think of the atomic bomb?" Approximately one-fifth of the respondents in all Japan included this kind of statement among their comments—a smaller but probably not significantly smaller proportion than in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where first-hand knowledge of the bomb's effects existed.

Attitudes toward the War. The effect of the bomb on attitudes toward the war was much less marked in the rest of Japan than in the target areas. There are several possible explanations of this difference. First, the level of confidence was quite low in Japan well before the time of the atomic bombing. Under these circumstances, the announcement of a new and devastating weapon merely added to the already eloquent evidence of national weakness. In Japan as a whole, military losses and failures—such as those at Saipan, the Philippines, and Okinawa—were cited twice as frequently as the atomic bomb in inducing certainty of defeat. The general air attack was nearly three times as important in this respect. Consumer deprivations, such as food shortages, were also more important in bringing people to the point where they felt they could not go on with the war (Tables 2 and 4).

Effects on Morale Limited. Furthermore, there are indications that expressions of certainty of defeat and unwillingness to continue the war because of the atomic bomb varied inversely with the distance from the target cities. The cities in the Morale Division sample were arranged in four groups according to distance from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The results are presented in Table 89.

Thus we find a progressive decline in the proportion of the population who said they were certain Japan couldn't win and unwilling to continue the war because of the atomic bomb, as distance from

¹³ The OWI's analysis of morale of Japanese prisoners of war yielded a similar conclusion. Faith in the Emperor, Japan's mission in Asia, and government leaders remained strong, whereas faith in food, weapons, and the high command greatly deteriorated. (OWI Bureau of Overseas Intelligence, Foreign Morale Analysis Division, Semi-monthly Report No. 15, 1 January 1945.)

¹⁴ Since the interviewing was couched in terms of reaction to the atomic bomb upon first hearing of it, some of these reactions in other parts of Japan may have arisen after the war. In the Hiroshima-Nagasaki areas, the responses were operative before the surrender.

TABLE 89

Group of cities ¹	Percent of population certain Japan couldn't win because of the atomic bomb ²	Percent of population personally unwilling to continue the war because of the atomic bomb ³
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Hiroshima-Nagasaki cities.....	25	24
Cities nearest to target cities....	23	24
Cities near to target cities.....	15	12
Cities far from target cities.....	8	7
Cities farthest from target cities..	6	7

¹ The groups of cities were respectively within 60, 160, 500, and 810 miles of the target cities.

² The question asked was: "When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?"

³ The question asked was: "Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war?"

the target city increased. A substantial effect on the morale of the populace was confined mainly to the first group of cities, those within 60 miles of either of the target areas.

This result suggests an explanation for the problem of why the atomic bomb did not have a greater effect on morale. Psychological distance was widened by geographical distance and poor communication.

Indeed, almost no publicity was given to the bomb prior to the surrender. The policy of the military toward the release of information about the bomb is well illustrated by an excerpt from an interview with Sakomizu, chief cabinet secretary in the Suzuki government. Sakomizu stated:

I asked the Cabinet Board of Information to put all the information about the atomic bomb in the newspapers and on the radio in order to tell the people just how fearful it was. But the General Staff Information Office stopped it. They tried hard to emphasize that the people need not fear the atomic bomb if they were in shelters. I had much struggling with the Chief of Military Information. All the Cabinet Board of Information was finally allowed to say was that the atomic bomb had been used at Hiroshima. This item appeared in the morning papers of 8 August. Of course, all the intellectuals knew the meaning of the announcement because there had been so many stories and novels about atomic power. I wanted all the people to understand the meaning of the bomb, but it took a full day just to get a bare announcement released.

As a result, neither the people of the target cities nor the population outside of the target cities had knowledge of the military use of atomic energy. There is almost no evidence in interviews of any reorganization of thinking in terms of a new age of atomic power.

An important factor in producing deterioration of morale as a result of the atomic bomb was the physical effects of the bomb itself or the concrete appreciation of these physical effects. The data on differential effects on the morale of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and on the people within these areas

who were physically affected or non-affected by the bomb support this statement. Inasmuch as there were fewer people who knew about the physical effects of the bomb in the geographically more remote regions and almost no people who had previously experienced the physical effects of the bomb, the effect of the bomb on their morale was reduced.

Moreover, it is highly probable that the effect of the atomic bomb on the wartime morale of the Japanese people would have been far more extensive had sufficient time elapsed before the surrender to permit the spread of information to the geographically more remote regions of Japan.

While these considerations explain the minimal effect of the atomic bomb on the rest of Japan, they only partially explain the comparatively small effect on the morale of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The most probable explanation is that with the short time span between bombings and surrender, the emotional effects of the bomb to a considerable extent remained separate in the minds of the Japanese from their morale attitudes.

Furthermore, the History of warfare contains many accounts of groups of men whose morale did not break even when they became emotionally and physically exhausted as a result of the onslaught of the enemy. In the case of the Japanese, nurtured on a Spartan philosophy of endurance of suffering, this phenomenon is not particularly difficult to understand. It is possible, too, that the factor of time may be important here. The atomic bombings took place so very close to the surrender that a sufficient amount of time was not available in which to connect the catastrophe of the bomb with the conduct of the war. Some of the respondents may have answered questions about morale during the war solely on the basis of the period before the atomic bombings.

This hypothesis is supported by the evidence that, with respect to many of the morale factors measured by the Survey, the atomic-bomb target areas reacted in the same way as the unbombed and lightly bombed groups of cities. If this hypothesis is correct, it is possible that morale in the target areas was actually somewhat lower than the statistical data indicate. It is rather improbable, however, that the confusion of the atomic bombings with the surrender was sufficiently widespread to substantially modify the principal conclusions of this report.¹⁵

¹⁵ Indeed, data on response to the surrender announcement show no difference with respect to the way the target area greeted it, as distinct from the rest of Japan. (Based on the question: "How did you feel when you heard that Japan had given up the war?")

Effect of the Bomb on the Japanese Government

The atomic bomb had more effects on the thinking of government leaders than on the morale of the rank and file of civilians outside of the target cities. This was only secondarily a morale effect, however. It cannot even be said that it was the atomic bomb which convinced the leaders who effected the peace that surrender was necessary. The decision to seek ways and means to terminate the war, influenced in part by knowledge of the low state of popular morale, had been taken in May 1945 by the Supreme War Guidance Council (Senso Saiko Shido Kaigi).

As early as the spring of 1944, a group of former prime ministers and others close to the Emperor had been making efforts toward bringing the war to an end. This group, including such men as Admiral Okada, Admiral Yonai, Prince Konoye, and Marquis Kido, had been influential in effecting Tojo's resignation and in making Admiral Suzuki prime minister after the fall of the Koiso government. Even in the Suzuki cabinet, however, agreement was far from unanimous. The Navy Minister, Admiral Yonai, was sympathetic, but the War Minister, General Anami, usually represented the fight-to-the-end policy of the Army. In the Supreme War Guidance Council, a sort of inner cabinet, Anami's adherence to that line was further strengthened by the participation of the Army and Navy chiefs of staff, so that on the peace issue this organization was evenly divided, with these three opposing the prime minister, foreign minister, and Navy minister. At any time, the military (especially Army) dissatisfaction with the cabinet might have eventuated at least in its fall, and possibly in the "liquidation" of the anti-war members.

Thus, the problem facing the peace leaders in the government was to bring about a surrender despite the hesitation of the war minister and the opposition of the Army and Navy chiefs of staff. This had to be done, moreover, without precipitating countermeasures by the Army which would eliminate the entire peace group. This was accomplished ultimately by bringing the Emperor actively into the decision to accept the Potsdam terms. So long as the Emperor openly supported such a policy and could be represented to the country as doing so, the military, which had fostered and lived on the idea of complete obedience to the Emperor, could not effectively rebel.

A preliminary step in this direction had been taken at the Imperial conference on 26 June 1945. At this meeting, the Emperor, taking an active part

despite his custom to the contrary, stated that he desired the development of a plan to end the war, as well as one to defend the home islands. This was followed by a renewal of earlier efforts to get the Soviet Union to intercede with the United States, which was effectively answered by the Potsdam Declaration of 26 July and the Russian declaration of war on 9 August.

The atomic bombings considerably speeded up the political maneuverings toward surrender within the government.¹³ This in itself was partly a morale effect, since there is ample evidence that cabinet members were worried by the prospect of further atomic bombings, especially on the remains of Tokyo. Some indication of the great reaction to the atomic bombs is given by Sakomizu. He said:

On the 7th of August, early in the morning, about two o'clock, the bell rang beside my bed. It was Domei telling me that President Truman had announced that the atomic bomb had been used at Hiroshima. I already knew that the Hiroshima damage had been very severe and that it had been caused by just one airplane. Everyone said that America has used a new bomb, but they didn't think it was an atomic bomb because our scientists had told us that no country could finish the atomic bomb for use in this war. The military said that it was probably a four-ton bomb bursting in the air. They made their calculations but found that a four-ton bomb could not do that much damage. They suggested it might be a 100-ton bomb. After the announcement we sent some scientists to Hiroshima and they reported that it was a real atomic bomb.

When this news came in on the morning of the 7th I called the prime minister on the phone and reported the announcement. Everyone in the government and even the military knew that if the announcement were true, no country could carry on a war. Without the atomic bomb it would be impossible for any country to defend itself against a nation which had the weapon.

The chance had come to end the war. It was not necessary to blame the military side, the manufacturing people, or anyone else—just the atomic bomb. It was a good excuse.

Sakomizu was asked, "How long do you think the war would have continued if the atomic bomb had not been used?" He replied:

We had already asked the Russians to intercede, and we could expect that they would eventually give us some answer. If it had been unfavorable, there was just one way to bring peace and that was to broadcast directly to the United States. But it would have been difficult to find a good chance to do so. I think you can understand. Suzuki tried to find a chance to stop the war and the atomic bomb gave him that chance.

If the behavior of the militarists in government councils is adequate testimony, the bombs did not convince them that defense of the home islands was

¹³ For fuller detail on the maneuvers and considerations in the surrender, see USSBS report, *Japan's Struggle to End the War*.

impossible. The atomic bombs did permit the government to say however, that no Army without the weapon could possibly resist an enemy who had it, thus saving "face" for the Army leaders and not reflecting on the competence of Japanese industrialists or the valor of the Japanese soldier. In the Supreme War Guidance Council, voting still remained divided, with the war minister and the two chiefs of staff unwilling to accept unconditional surrender. There seems little doubt, however, that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki weakened their inclination to oppose the peace group.

The peace effort culminated in an Imperial conference held on the night of 9 August 1945 and continuing into the early hours of 10 August, for which the stage had been set by the atomic bomb and the Russian declaration of war. At this meeting the Emperor, again breaking his customary silence, stated specifically that he wanted acceptance of the Potsdam terms.

A quip was current in high government circles at this time that the atomic bomb was the real Kamikaze, since it saved Japan from further useless slaughter and destruction. It is apparent that in the atomic bomb the Japanese found the opportunity which they had been seeking, to break the existing deadlock within the government over acceptance of the Potsdam terms.

Summary

Predominant reactions to the bomb, both in the target cities and the rest of Japan, were, in order, (1) fear, (2) admiration for the scientific achievement of the bomb, and (3) anger. The latter reaction was elicited in only 12 percent of the cases.

The 12 percent figure for "anger" responses is probably an underestimation resulting from respondents' fear or politeness in the interviewing situation. The small amount of hostility is also

probably somewhat explicable in terms of the Japanese turning their hostility toward their own government and their general *Shikata-ga-nai* attitude.

Only one-fourth of those in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki areas stated that they had reached a point of certainty of defeat and complete war weariness because of the atomic bomb. At the conclusion of the war, the morale of the target populations remained at an equal or higher level than morale throughout the rest of Japan. The atomic bomb was, nevertheless, the most important single factor in lowering the morale of the population of the target areas.

Subsequent to the bombings, morale in Nagasaki remained higher than in Hiroshima. Probable reasons for this effect are the relatively greater casualties and physical damage suffered in Hiroshima. Morale of those physically affected by the bomb was lower than that of those physically unaffected.

The effect of the atomic bomb on morale throughout the rest of Japan varied inversely with distance from the target cities. A substantial amount of effect was confined to the group of cities within 40 miles of either of the target areas. Previous demoralizing experiences, lack of publicity, and consequent lack of knowledge of the implications of the military use of atomic energy were forces which served to minimize the bombs' effect on the rest of Japan. It is probable that the effect of the atom bomb on the morale of the Japanese people would have been far more extensive had sufficient time elapsed before the surrender to permit the spread of information to the geographically more remote regions of Japan.

Breaking the confidence of the civilian population, however, was only incidental to the more decisive consequences of the bombs' use in the political maneuverings to achieve peace which took place within the Japanese government.



It is characteristic of modern embattled nationalism to use the educational process as the basic instrument of indoctrination and control.

THE APPARATUS OF MORALE CONTROL

The state of popular morale, and the kinds and frequency of behavior reflecting lowered morale, result not only from the events of war itself but also from influences only indirectly associated with the fighting. Among these are: (1) the character of the police and penal methods of the country, (2) the vigor of such organizations as the churches and the schools in indoctrinating and reaffirming the values of the people or its ruling group, (3) the usefulness of political parties and similar organizations in promoting unity and attachment to common goals, and (4) the efficiency of official propaganda and censorship organizations through which information on the war effort is screened, and war spirit roused.

For most of these, particularly the police and propaganda activities, effectiveness requires some fairly accurate knowledge of the current state of popular morale and of the nature of the people's opinions concerning the government and the war. Without such knowledge, those in positions of political authority in any state cannot properly perform their functions.

The present chapter will outline the operation of such activities in Japan during the war, discuss the limitations under which they labored, and evaluate their effectiveness. A more detailed discussion of the content of propaganda in Japan may be found in the next chapter.

Educational Controls

It is characteristic of modern embattled nationalism to use the educational process as the basic instrument of indoctrination and control. This has been as clearly the case in modern Japan as it has been in Germany, at least since the Imperial rescript on education of 1890. And it is hardly surprising that this method was pushed to its extreme in the recent period, which saw the climb to power of a totalitarian-minded militarism.

The Japanese system of education was well adapted to the purpose. It had achieved a highly-integrated centralization within a state in which genuine political accountability to the people, such as there was, had declined to the vanishing point in the last decade before the war.

Some of its basic features follow:

Control over educational policy and administration was fully vested in the national Minister of Education, with direct control of higher education (colleges, normal schools, and universities) and supervision, through the prefectures, of the elementary, middle, and high schools. Prefectural educational officials were Home Affairs Ministry bureaucrats, usually young, who were thus attached to the police approach of their superiors and accessible to the demands of local nationalist zealots. This was coupled with government control of textbooks and other teaching materials as well as control of youth organizations and adult education. An organized inspectorate served as the arm of the ministry throughout the country, in general charge of controlling teaching methods and materials.

Such positive direction was significantly implemented by the ministry's power to investigate and suppress leftist or otherwise "dangerous thought" among students.

The uniformity of teachers' and students' indoctrination was further strengthened by the training monopoly of at least primary and middle-school teachers, enjoyed by the state normal schools under the direct administration of the ministry. This was a prime vehicle for the inculcation of militarism and formalism into education, especially since these normal school graduates expanded their political influence and acquired a vested interest in the filling of teaching positions, at the expense of middle school and university graduates.

Certain measures, taken in the most recent period, are suggestive of the progressive stress on indoctrination and regimentation through education. The growing influence of the Army upon education was duly symbolized by the appointment, in 1935, of General Sadao Araki as Minister of Education. In addition, the Army had a very effective weapon for controlling individual schools which was not unlike its means of controlling the cabinet. Since all students, in order to graduate, had to have certain military courses, a recalcitrant school could be eliminated effectively by the withdrawal of the military instructors, who remained under Army command, or it could be brought to heel by the threat of such action.

Since the early 1930's there had been continuous text revisions in which textbooks on citizenship received particular attention. In 1941 occurred another text replacement at the elementary level, while, at higher educational levels, efforts were made to revise the historical background of civic training. Programs for physical and military training were greatly expanded in all schools. They comprised both practical training and further ideological indoctrination toward the support of the military way of life (called "ethics" or "morale" in Japan). As in Nazi Germany, the number of school terms was reduced to speed up the manpower supply prior to the war. Special continuation schools, the so-called "youth schools," were established about 1938 for primary school graduates, so as to provide an instrument for continuing "moral" and military indoctrination.

In 1944, with the organization of the Dai Nippon Youth Corps, all youth organizations moved within the orbit of the Education minister, although somewhat later they were to be consolidated under the auspices of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. To complete the job, prior to the China war, a "dangerous thoughts" campaign was undertaken both among students and teachers, so that, in the words of one Education ministry official,

By the time the Greater East Asia war started, it was unnecessary to change many of them (the teachers); they were trained to teach the nationalistic way.

On the whole, this combination of guidance and pressure had the desired results. Despite some non-conformance and resistance on the part of certain higher educators and students, and a certain reluctance on the part of some Education ministry officials to yield to the more extreme demands of the military, there occurred a dramatic change in the attitude of students entering in the later 1930's, after the new teachings had become well entrenched. Liberal or international ideas, according to an American teacher in a Christian college, no longer interested the students as such ideas had interested their predecessors of the previous decade.

A student body thus indoctrinated, accessible as a group and full of youthful enthusiasm, could be expected to become more than just another cog in the war machine. In addition to their growing significance in supplying military manpower, students were drafted for war work of all kinds by a series of labor service measures. This labor service program was, in general, effective and successful.

By 1939, summertime agricultural work had become a basic educational policy. Directives issued

until 1943 show their assignment to such tasks as charcoal and fertilizer production, cultivation of castor oil plants, the gathering of acorns and wild hemp. Subsequently these activities were extended to the industrial field. Normally, students were to be employed only in their home communities and for limited periods. By January 1944, the original 30-day limit of labor service was raised to 120 and, a little later, even this limitation was discarded. After March 1944, full-fledged student labor conscription came into existence, with not only university student labor but also the upper grades of middle, higher, and technical schools (subsequently also elementary schools) subject to one year of service. By October 1944, almost two million students had been mobilized, well over half of them between 12 and 16 years of age. By March 1945, authorization was given to close temporarily all but the primary and certain technical schools, in order to release the students' energies more fully. The evidence indicates that this was actually done in a number of cases. The wartime education ordinance of 22 May 1945, finally established the student corps, which was presumably to serve in the actual defense of the homeland.

The students' response was characterized by devotion and enthusiasm.¹ Typical is the testimony of the principal of a boys' school:

They were more enthusiastic than other people . . . I think the students worked the most fiercely for the war . . .

Their enthusiasm was such that their morale, on the whole, outlasted that of other groups. This applied primarily to the students at the lower levels of the school system. In colleges, universities, and higher vocational schools there were some signs of student apathy and scepticism. A similar difference could be detected between teachers at the lower and higher levels.

As a whole, educational control and direction during the war fulfilled the expectation of the Japanese leadership. The impact of the air raids and of the war experience, on the other hand, developed certain significant flaws in the carefully raised structure.

While the student workers partly fulfilled their mission of not only contributing to industrial production but also to industrial morale, there were symptoms of growing friction between students and regular workers. As one labor leader and organizer put it bluntly:

I can say that our old-time laborer hated the student

¹ Table 53 indicates that students tended to be the most enthusiastic supporters of the war.

laborers and vice-versa . . . the students, being fanatics, did not understand the workers' problems. They worked harder than the regular laborer. They felt that the problems of the laboring man and their solution were not necessary.

The progressive loss of schooling due to the various measures of mobilization became a matter of growing concern to education officials and schoolmen. There were even indications that the students themselves, particularly the older group, began to chafe under the curtailment of their education. The Vice-Minister of Welfare observed that this sense of missing out on their studies affected them so that they—

really hated war. In the factories, if they grumbled or played around, the Kempei were there to check up on them. . .

Finally, the direct effect of air raids, as well as the attendant mass or individual evacuation, produced a far-reaching disruption and dislocation among the youth of the country. The number of schools alone reported as destroyed or damaged is given as 4,097, which includes 1,549 primary schools, 1,537 youth schools, 832 middle schools, 62 normal schools, 81 colleges and technical schools, and 20 universities. Evacuation not only severed the students from their normal home and school environments, it also, to some extent, disturbed social controls. Organized group evacuation was, in this respect, the more satisfactory arrangement.

As in Germany, this shake-up of the established pattern and the disorganization of the educational machine finally led to a noticeable increase in juvenile misconduct, ranging from disciplinary problems in the schools to juvenile delinquency. Public prosecutors in Kyoto described the situation as follows:

The proportion of juveniles to others involved in theft cases grew steadily during the whole course of the war . . . As Kyoto was unbombed, there was no such great outbreak of pilfering for food and clothing as took place in bombed cities. The greatest increase in juvenile cases came with the growth of inflation and black market prices . . . There were also increased numbers of cases involving student fights with other workers in plants, plant fights of all kinds, and even some increase in cases of fraud in dealings among juveniles.

Religion in the Pattern of Control

Religion as an instrument of social control was formalized and exploited with great deliberateness. State Shinto was, because of the guarantee of private religious freedom in the constitution, legally defined not as a religion, but was simply designated as a body of beliefs and national practices univers-

ally adhered to by the Japanese people.² Thus it was possible for the State to demand adherence by all Japanese to such basic tenets as Emperor-worship and blind obedience to the interests of the state, both convenient moral justifications of peacetime and wartime expansion.

Shinto indoctrination, prior to and during the war, was carried out through all available media, among which the schools were doubtless the most useful and penetrating. The impact of its teachings was enhanced by nation-wide observance of ceremonials—shrine worship, holiday observances, pilgrimages, and personal ritual actions.

In a very real sense, all so-called "sectarian religions," partly because of their doctrines, partly because of their very undisciplined multiplicity, constituted a real or potential threat to the efficacy of the established control pattern. Consequently, all established religions were closely supervised and, as far as possible, organized and even consolidated for such purposes. During the 1930's, both Christians and Buddhists had shown, for obvious reasons, an inconvenient tendency to interfere with the universal acceptance of State Shinto, as for centuries they had been resisting the compulsions of political authority.

The law to regulate religious bodies of April 1940, while it ostensibly put the Shinto, Buddhist, and Christian "sects" on an equal footing, enabled the authorities to concern themselves not only with questions of organization and property, but also with the qualifications of the clergy, as well as the details of creeds, liturgy, and rites. In November of that year, virtually all Protestant churches were united in the United Church of Christ (or Christian Federation) in Japan. This body, the Kyodan, together with the Roman Catholic church in Japan, formed the Christian Council of Japan. Of somewhat later origin and rather questionable significance were the East Asia Religious League (with Shinto, Buddhist, Moslem, and Christian sections) and the East Asia Development Council of Religion, which had its first general conference in Tokyo on 21 October 1943. These bodies were clearly designed to harness all religious groups behind the general effort of the Greater East Asia war.

² Shinto—the way of the Gods—has three more-or-less distinct forms in Japan. State Shinto was the form adopted after the Meiji restoration to promote national unity and political control; all Japanese subjects were required to subscribe to it, since it was technically not a religion. Sect Shinto refers to the acknowledgedly religious Shinto sects, generally founded by individual religious leaders; sect members form a definite and exclusive church. There are also local and unorganized Shinto beliefs and practices. See John F. Embree: *The Japanese Nation*, 1945—pages 164-197.

During the war much was done to promote popular devotion to the national cult. A document, prepared on the cabinet level, highlights this policy.³

Elevate religious feelings toward the national policy which was inherited from the ancestors and bring out the glory of the concert between the ruling and the ruled.

The public's response was doubtless, in part, a spontaneous answer to wartime emotional needs. There was a definite rise in the people's participation in official Shinto rites and observances in the earlier phase of the war. This fell off as the war progressed, especially in the last year, although individual supplication for divine intervention to ward off disaster continued among the people. This may account for the unexpected and embarrassing popular lethargy in the face of air-raid damages sustained by such holy places as the Ise shrine, the Imperial palace, and the Meiji shrine.

Wartime policy toward the "sects" acknowledged that fundamentally most of them were capable and willing to help preserve the Japanese way of life. A combination of measures "guided" them so as to restrain their particular predilections, "to safeguard national spiritual discipline," and to insure that they made desirable positive contributions to the war effort. Christian, Buddhist, and even Shinto educational activities were curtailed, for the most part as a by-product of the war mobilization effort in the school system. As one Buddhist priest put it:

They (the authorities) did not want any teachings in Japan which might detract youth from the single-minded determination to die gloriously for their Emperor.

Priests of all creeds were conscripted, both for military and labor service. Shinto activities were encouraged at the expense of its rivals. In a good many instances, attendance at Shinto ceremonies was made compulsory, although enforcement was increasingly difficult. On occasion, such ceremonies were made to replace others, in the case of the Shin-funeral of a Buddhist aviator killed at Pearl Harbor, for instance.

In general, as we know from the testimony of a long series of special higher police reports, all religious groups were under continuous strict surveillance to assure their conformity to the government-approved or tolerated pattern. Christian pacifist teachings and Christian denial of the Emperor's divinity were just as objectionable as Buddhist principles of non-violence. Under more or less direct pressure, the church leadership usually

showed the required conformity. One church official commented: "Orders are orders and the people had nothing to say about it." It is evident that this control did not succeed wholly in preventing or weeding out all undesirable aberrations on the part of Christians, Buddhists, or even sect Shintoists during the war. Some concrete examples of such resistance will be given in the discussion of subversive activities (Appendix T).

In addition to the drafting of priests and even group participation in labor service (with a priest and members of his congregation working together), there were other attempts to mobilize the church resources. They participated to some extent, though probably not as a major influence, in "moral training" for war workers, in welfare units and in propagandistic efforts, as indicated by the series of directives issued to the Christian Federation by the government from January to December 1944.

The establishment of the all-embracing Wartime Religious Patriotic Association in December 1944, under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, was expected to be the climax of such promotional efforts. In the words of a directive of 4 December 1944, it was to "inaugurate a strong and fresh religious education movement" among the three principal religious groups. A government report of July 1945, however, commented with refreshing directness that its influence was one of "bureaucratic formality."

In the period of intensified air raids, the government did not, apparently, look to the churches for large-scale relief or welfare activities. Neither Catholic Archbishop Doi of Tokyo nor the Rev. Tomita, head of the (Protestant) Christian Federation, had received special instructions with regard to bombing. Temples, however, were used as places of shelter for the bombed-out and others, and the churches were asked to provide both leadership and shelter in the process of evacuation.

There is no indication, however, that religion served as an active morale builder during this final crisis. Yet it was doubtless regarded a useful contribution to the national propaganda effort when a former general secretary of the Japanese YMCA published an article on the Tokyo raids, which he concluded as follows:

Dr. Toyohiko Kagawa, famous Christian preacher of Japan and the most passionate lover of humanity, is most indignant, because America, who speaks of Christian morality, is today sending warplanes to those very areas where she sent her missionaries to preach the Gospel and to slaughter those very "sons of God" who her missionaries baptized. Her bombers are attacking our schools, temples, shrines, and

³ *Public Opinion Guidance Policies for the Decisive Battle*, 6 October 1944.

churches. Can you call this in accord with Christian principles? To conclude in Dr. Kagawa's words: "The second World War in the Orient is again inflecting upon Christ the agony which he suffered on the Cross."

The Organization of Propaganda: The Cabinet Board of Information

Educational and religious indoctrination, much as it accomplished, could not, by itself, be expected to carry the nation safely through the strains of a protracted major crisis. While Japanese strategy and politics did not involve major concern for promotional propaganda, the need of coordinated government announcements led in Japan to the establishment of a single top-ranking propaganda and information agency. It was known as the Board of Information, which superseded a rudimentary parent agency in 1940. It was then organized, in the words of its vice-president:

. . . because the Army, Navy, Home, and Foreign Ministers each had their own information agencies which clashed greatly. I think that it was felt that if these agencies were assembled into one group, they would not fight among themselves. But each of these agencies retained their own information bureaus on a smaller scale.

An effort was made to organize the agency so as to assure the fullest possible coordination of the several interested departments. The board was assisted by a deliberative chamber (composed of representatives of the War, Navy, Home, and Communications Ministries and the foreign office, as well as of top agency officials) which was to formulate policy for the guidance of the Board divisions and to coordinate their activities. It had been set up to remedy an awkward situation which had arisen with the withdrawal of Army and Navy press staffs from the board in May 1942, perhaps due to the usual friction between Army and Navy personnel.

The administrative burden itself was carried by several staff divisions, of which the first handled (in different sections) propaganda planning and non-military, as well as non-operational military, information. The second division "guided" the press, news services, radio, and motion pictures, etc., developed a publication policy, issued various publications itself, and finally was charged with censorship policy. The last division was entrusted with oversea propaganda.

It was decisive for the actual functioning of this organization that each division was actually controlled by representatives of some other agency. At the beginning of the war, e. g., when there had been five administrative divisions, the first was apparently dominated by the Navy, the second by the

Army, the third by the foreign office, the fourth by the Home Ministry, and the fifth by the Minister of Communications. Almost inevitably such a precarious "balance of power," which was usually tipped by the Army, resulted in rivalry and friction.

This organization was manifestly not as clear-cut or comprehensive in action as a description of its organization suggests. External and internal pressures necessitated several reorganizations, a phenomenon not unknown in other wartime administrations. There was much jockeying for power among the several agency representatives, which often overshadowed the achievement of the board's objectives. In some respects, even its formal functions overlapped with other agencies. For example, both the board and the Home Ministry were charged with censorship duties, although the former's jurisdiction was confined to military and general war secrets, while the latter pertained to tranquillity and morale. In actual practice, there was a personal union between the two, as the Home Ministry's section head was responsible for both phases of the work. Actually, the constituent agencies of the board never gave up their own information operations, so that conflict and duplication were rampant, especially because of the military services' assertive habits. As a result, the deliberative chamber was a failure. It could not settle the political rivalries which were the basis of its impotence.

Policy formulation, partly because the board lacked the status of, say, Dr. Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment, was a cumbersome process. Top policy theoretically was determined by the Inner Cabinet, other measures by the Cabinet, less important ones were submitted for Cabinet approval by the deliberative chamber, and the remainder were decided by the board itself. In fact, the board or the ministries set most such policies themselves, as until the end of the war the Cabinet was little interested in propaganda.

Censorship was exercised primarily as a post-publication matter. It was strengthened by the fact that the Army and Navy required the newspapers to print whatever they released, exactly as the services gave it to them. The service or board censors took action if any alteration occurred. Such was the rivalry between the services, however, that occasionally the Army censors would punish an editor for printing a "Navy handout" and vice versa. In at least one instance an editor told interrogators that this system resulted in carrying two mutually inconsistent stories on the front page on a single day, one from the Navy and one from the Army.

The control of public opinion was for the most part effected through the established media of communication and through some special board publications. The distribution of information most commonly took the form of "handouts" to the various publications and was facilitated by a close association with Domei. One informant has stated the situation as follows:

Domei was more-or-less attached to the Board of Information. The Board of Information set up the basic policy and then the various ministries wrote up their own handouts. The ministries had both verbal and written announcements. Editorials were only controlled by censorship. In some cases the press had direct instructions from the military public relations offices even to the extent that they were told what type of headlines and how much to write. The Army was strongest in this regard. However, when the Army and Navy were incorporated into the Board of Information, almost all directives came from there.

This technique was somewhat complicated by the fact that some government agencies retained their own information sections which operated, as in the cases of the Army and Navy, with only slight reference to the board's over-all policy.

Even under the most expert leadership and under generally favorable circumstances, the operations of an agency constituted as was the Board of Information would have suffered from certain basic handicaps and difficulties.

The board did not have sufficient status. Most of the time it had no voice in the policy-making groups of the Cabinet or Inner Cabinet. In consequence, it could not force propaganda considerations into the determination of high policy, and it had no control over Imperial Headquarters assignments, which it had simply to accept, along with the statements of Army and Navy information groups. It was its thankless task to attempt to make them appear consistent. This deficiency was pointed up by the Sawada report to Premier Suzuki on the board, which said that:

The position of the chief of the Board of Information should be tied in directly with the pivotal offices of the Supreme Command and national affairs. The chief should, in name and fact, take the position of a vice-minister before the people.

There were continuous internal rifts and struggles far exceeding in significance the departmental rivalries with which we are familiar at home. It was primarily a matter of the continuous power game of various ruling factions, including the Army and Navy. Although all interested agencies were represented, according to the former vice-president, Hisatomi, only the Army, Navy, and Home Minis-

ter had any real power. The cleavage was, in fact, between what a Navy information official described as the Army's "land thoughts" and the Navy's "sea thoughts." This consisted partly in the discrepancy between the Navy's emphasis on the fight for the strategic islands and the Army's preoccupation with the so-called "decisive battle of the homeland," which enabled it to play down the losses of the strategic island bases.

This discrepancy had political rivalry between the services at its foundation. To save face and not reveal to an "outside agency" the extent of their weakness, the services individually gave the board false estimates of the chances of their holding an attacked position, on the basis of which the board took an extended propaganda position from which it was eventually forced to retire ignominiously. This may have been the source of the series of "decisive" battles which were fought from Leyte to Okinawa.

As a result of such disunity, the propaganda and information policy was bound to suffer. This was illustrated by Akabane, president of the board:

Imperial Headquarters made announcements about the war and this was out of the province of the Board of Information. We transmitted these announcements as true. But sometimes these announcements were not true and the Board of Information had to counsel the people. This was very embarrassing. The Army and Navy would make no excuse.

It appears that, because of the structural weaknesses of the board, it was not adequately staffed. No particular qualifications were demanded for its personnel. An important Army press officer indicated part of the reason for this by saying, that, since

there were no persons in the Inner Cabinet competent to handle propaganda matters . . . they did not feel that they were very necessary.

The result of this and of the rivalries noted above was, as indicated by a participant:

Good people were not sent to the Board of Information, and the structure was extremely poor. This condition got better in the final stages when the Board of Information head was, at the same time, Minister without Portfolio and could speak up in the cabinet meetings.

The lack of good personnel was enhanced by considerable turnover and a surprising dearth of written directives. The obvious consequence was a lack of continuity in the handling of propaganda and news.

Ultimately, these problems were probably due to the fact that there was no recognition of the importance of proper public opinion control or propaganda in government circles. One official said:

Our propaganda in general was poor. The superior officers did not regard it as of any great importance.

Official informants indicated their attitudes by saying people had the outlook of a "frog in the well," or that they "had no knowledge of the outer world," "simply went along like sheep, listening to what their leaders told them." The trouble was that, on the whole, these leaders coupled a static underestimation of their people with an inadequate knowledge or understanding of public opinion. They were reasonably successful, however, with what one of them described as his most essential propaganda problem: to make the Japanese people hate the Americans.

The tremendous strain of a losing war enhanced these shortcomings. The declining morale was not sufficiently bolstered by superior propaganda measures, which could ultimately have been derived only from the closest mutual understanding of government and people—or from evident success.

The Imperial Rule Assistance Association And Political Control

Other contemporary dictatorships have grasped and developed totalitarian controls with the aid of highly disciplined political mass organizations. This was not true of the Japanese military's climb to power. It could exploit the factional breakdown of political parties and the opportunism and complacency of the most powerful social groups in a traditionalist, semi-feudal society. When Prince Konoye became premier in June 1937, he could maintain his position only by repeated concessions to the Army, which culminated in the abolition of all political parties for the purpose of achieving military control, in accordance with Fascist models. Some new political organization had to be created in order to fill the vacuum. This was the origin of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA).

The IRAA was supposed to become not only an all-inclusive national movement, rallying the nation in an all-out effort; it was also to include a "society," composed of men of prominence, who were to manage the "movement," and even a "club" of Diet members which was to represent all former factions and presumably integrate them with the new political spirit. Konoye seems to have regarded the whole principally as a device to control and manage the institutions of "constitutional" government which he did not seek to abolish in form. It was of fundamental importance that Konoye, unlike Hitler and Mussolini, did not establish the IRAA as the highly personal organization of the one ir-

placeable leader. The premier was the chief of IRAA, but upon his retirement both the leader and the directorate were to change. It was to guide and direct the people from above, not to impart dynamic revolutionary impulses to the government itself, although it had been conceived of, originally, as a two-way channel. Moreover, unlike the Fascist parties, lacking their relatively large membership, it was from the outset made dependent on outright government appropriations.

A member of the Home Affairs Ministry's police bureau characterized the system in these terms:

As you know, Prince Konoye had a very indecisive character and so the IRAA was very indecisive, with no definite policies or objectives . . . The leaders were constantly changing and they never settled down to serious action.

Under these circumstances the IRAA received some rough handling at the hands of its parliamentary opponents in the early period. They even succeeded, at least temporarily, in halving the budget in the spring of 1941. Konoye, with the aid of the Army and Navy—who ordered reservists to join—rode out the storm and attempted to popularize the IRAA by widening the base. The establishment of a central cooperative council, topping a pyramid of subsidiary councils ultimately based on the neighborhood associations (*tonari-gumi*), was such a move in the search for a general membership of all Japanese.

Tojo's premiership marked the militant stage of the IRAA's development. All the directors had resigned after the fall of Konoye, and their successors were informed by Tojo that the Japanese government was

ready to shoulder the task of establishing the projected Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere on the basis of lofty ideals that will enable all nations to have their proper place in a movement designed to establish the solidarity of all races.

To activate the organization, Tojo initiated several significant changes. IRAA became responsible for the control of economic affairs; a youth corps was formed; a special new body for political action was launched, the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (IRAPS); finally there was the establishment of the Greater East Asia Association. The economic council which was to take charge of economic controls apparently never amounted to much. It was abolished after one year.

The youth corps was, on the contrary, the most successful venture of IRAA and acquired more nearly the characteristics of an ardent Nazi organization than any other. It came, in fact, to rival in

importance the parent IRAA. Konoye already had sought to enlist young men. His nuclear committee, after having gathered 300,000 members, ranging in age from 21 to 45, was now reorganized as the IRA Youth Corps to which later on a mature men's group and one for boys was added. The organization was dominated by the militant young officers who had served their political apprenticeship in the 1930's. (One of these, Col. Kingoro Hashimoto, the officer responsible for the shelling of the "Ladybird" and for the "Panay" incident, became vice-president and chief of its central headquarters.) The youth corps was not only displaying vigorous activity in Japan, but became active in Japanese propaganda efforts to develop solidarity within the East Asia sphere of operations.

The foundation of the IRA Political Society might be regarded as a redundant gesture. Was it not IRAA's function to direct the nation's political life? It had certainly made an impressive start when the Diet in 1941 gave its consent to the principle of IRAA recommendation of candidates for the forthcoming campaign. As a result, about 80 percent (381 out of 466) of the Diet membership was elected in 1942 on the basis of such recommendation. The IRAPS was founded to complete these controls, by directing and controlling Diet sessions and local elections, and thus perpetuating the "recommending" process used in 1942.

Although it assumed almost complete mastery of the House of Representatives, its grip on the House of Peers was far from complete. Tojo's verbose attempts to clarify the difference between the two organizations are not very revealing. Essentially, the IRAPS—a guild of legislators—was to serve the purpose of practical political management, while IRAA—a guild of politicians—was apparently more in the nature of a general coordination and propaganda agency. Thus the distinction was perhaps more one of position than of function.

The founding of the Greater East Asia Development League, in March 1941, was an example of such coordination; it amalgamated no fewer than 53 groups already working in this field. The members took an oath to eliminate "the root of evil in Greater East Asia—the whites." As other groups sprang up, they were also brought under the management of IRAA, in charge of General Matsui.

As has already been explained, the attempt had been made to popularize and strengthen the IRAA by harnessing into it the neighborhood associations which constituted the smallest popular nucleus in the scale of Japanese community organizations.

These groups, ancient remnants of Japanese social organization, had been officially reactivated, in 1938 or 1939, originally for rationing purposes, soon for a variety of other wartime needs. Since they handled essentials of livelihood and had a long tradition of mutual aid, they embraced every family in the nation. On the average, they comprised 8 to 10 families. They held monthly meetings, attended by one representative family member, normally the head of the household. The leaders were elected by mutual agreement. The government required all decisions to be unanimous, with the result that they often rested in the hands of the leaders. These leaders met periodically and had liaison with municipal and prefectural agencies.

In 1943 it was decided to use this convenient organization as the ultimate outlet for IRAA propaganda of "spiritual indoctrination and cooperation." The trouble was that these tonari-gumi and chonai-kai leaders already had their hands full looking after the material interests of their fellows. According to informants, they were already swamped with directions which they had to make applicable to their localities, and which they tried to enforce. They hardly listened to the propaganda they were expected to transmit to their people.

From all that can be learned, their effectiveness was not very impressive in this respect. Nor could they be expected to pass very candid or helpful information up the line on local opinion. Not many people were anything but circumspect, even among neighbors, and the leadership was busy with other things. Japanese political habits did not provide for an upward flow of opinion, and the channels were so glutted with directives from above that any effort in the opposite direction was futile.

Soon after Tojo's fall in July 1944, the IRAA was beginning to deteriorate. This was partly due to the new premier's criticism and to resignations among top officials of all groups. Although some efforts at reorganization were made, especially with respect to the IRAPS (Admiral Kobayashi, its head, became a cabinet member), the disintegration could not be halted. In the spring of 1945, IRAA died a natural death, and IRAPS was rechristened the Japan Political Party, which did not materially change its condition. It is clear that this was the result of certain organic shortcomings, although the war situation doubtless was another effective cause.

The basic trouble had, of course, been the lack of truly popular support. It was, as one informant said, "a dragon's head with a snake's body." An

other informant put it succinctly:

By and large, the IRAA was simply an organization to do the lower echelon work for the Konoye government.

This was also the role it played in subsequent governments. There was, furthermore, a good deal of internal conflict. The factions and feuds among the old parties which IRAA was supposed to eliminate, reappeared in its midst. There was, for instance, bitter rivalry between the IRAPS and the Youth Corps. Because of this lack of internal unity, of effective methods of organization and of an initial popular base, the IRAA never succeeded in establishing itself as a truly compelling political organization, except among the well-conditioned young.

The Problem of Subversion and Opposition⁴

Despite such "guidance" efforts, and despite the traditional social discipline of Japanese life, the authorities had, throughout the war, reason to fear "lack of discipline" and manifestations of disaffection. It is clear, of course, that in a tight political system such as this, the slightest deviation from the officially approved pattern of conduct, the slightest show of group or individual independence was bound to have attributed to it, from our point of view, a vastly exaggerated importance. Such were, however, the standards of conduct within Japan.

It is, therefore, quite realistic to examine such activities within this frame of reference. We therefore call "subversion" all unorganized acts which were inimical to the regime and, from its point of view, of essentially political significance, whether or not they were "politically" motivated. The term "opposition" should be confined, on the other hand, to organized political activities which were directed against the regime in any or all its aspects. Admittedly, the line cannot always be clearly drawn.

The authorities anticipated difficulties from virtually all quarters. Naturally they were most concerned with Communists and other leftists. But, as Home Affairs Ministry documents have shown us, they also were apprehensive of the radicalism of ultra-nationalists and the stirrings among managerial, professional, and parliamentary circles as well as among workers, farmers, religious groups, and the Korean minority.

To what extent were the fears of the authorities borne out by the actual occurrence of oppositional

⁴ The term "Communist" is used in the following analysis because it was the one applied by the Japanese authorities. To them it meant anyone who opposed the Tenno (Emperor) system or advocated modifications in capitalism, thus becoming synonymous with radicalism or even liberalism in almost any form.

and subversive activities? There is a substantial body of evidence to suggest that a rising curve of such activities accompanied the falling morale curve in the course of the war.⁵

There are indications of the existence, throughout the war, of fairly coherent organization, at least among party Communists, so that it is permissible to speak of a loosely organized Communist underground opposition which may at times have been directed from some center, and which probably managed to establish, from time to time, direct or indirect contact with Soviet Russia, and with Chinese Communists. Police intelligence documents in Morale Division files indicate that the membership of such groups was predominantly made up of intellectuals and professionals (with a sprinkling of industrial workers) who succeeded in camouflaging their activities with such skill that, in some instances, they were in a position to exploit important sources of confidential information for their purposes. Perhaps the most ironical known case is that of the Hosoda group, one of whose members had already secured an appointment as Foreign Office courier to the Soviet Union in March 1943, when the police caught up with him. Although the actual number of persons involved in such activities can never have been very large, they were not negligible; 1,170 persons were arrested on such grounds from 1941 through the end of 1943, and the number of "incidents" in which they participated showed a steady rise throughout that period.

Subversive activities occurred among all groups. Individuals from business, managerial, professional, official, and parliamentary groups, in keeping with their relatively lower morale record, would vent their spleen by "letting off steam" against the government. Boasting better means of information than the average man, often with a superior understanding of the enemy's war potential, they were among the first to realize how the war went. Thus early in 1944, the director of a chamber of commerce dared to contend that "everybody is sick and tired of the war."

Strangely enough, there were even black sheep among the ultra-nationalists, whose views on the China Incident, on Russia, and even on wartime restraints, which might hamper them, would diverge from the government's. The well-known right-wing politician, Seijo Nakano, who dared to criticize some of the Tojo government's measures, pro-

⁵ The following is confined to a summary statement, which is a condensation of the more elaborate discussion in Appendix T.

tested against police repression by his "suicide" in 1943. There were others, more obscure, who became guilty of some show of disaffection because they assumed they had a monopoly on patriotic zeal and were therefore free to dissent or work for "reform." That some of these manifestations took the form of sectarian Shinto or Buddhist doctrines made them even more suspect, since "spiritual" discipline was of the essence.

Christians were under particular suspicion and, while the established ecclesiastic authorities, in general, conformed to the prevailing social and political pressures, there were always some individuals, laymen and clerics, and occasional sectarian groups, unwisely demonstrating that they were less concerned with this world than with the next. It was offensive that, as one police report issued in the summer of 1945 put it,

a good number of them believe in an extreme form of international peace, the principles of humanity, etc., and that they spread anti-war ideas. Also some of the sects are actively opposing the principles of our national government under the guise of their mistaken interpretation of God and life after death.

The common man in town and country was similarly represented. It did not require Communist or Socialist agitation to show his mounting living problems to many a small craftsman or industrial worker. There was little sabotage, but a considerable amount of deliberate slow-down and open violence in factories, perhaps for primarily economic purposes, but also in response to the heavy hand of authoritarianism. Toward the end, an official report referred to the rise of "distrust of the military and . . . antimilitaristic feelings" which prompted complaints like this:

The Army claims that the factory workers are responsible for the lack of planes. Whose responsibility is it that nothing is being done about the enemy planes harrassing the home seas? Tojo began this war. What is he doing now?

Farmers were traditionally restless and chafing under the inequalities of the established tenancy system. During the war, rigid quotas were prescribed for farm produce. Such demands met with a good deal of passive resistance which, in connection with a long series of farm tenancy disputes, led the authorities to the following unusually cautious observation in April 1945:

It is hard to draw an immediate conclusion and say that these things also have their roots in a background of subversive thought, but the germination of an impending class struggle is a real matter for anxiety.

Actually, the evidence indicates that much of this behavior sprang fundamentally from the privations suffered by the civilian population rather than from ideological convictions. Hungry people raid a food storehouse because they are hungry, and not because they wish to sabotage the government or undermine the existing economy. The important point is, however, that the police, almost without exception, looked upon such behavior as subversion stemming from ideological heterodoxy and not the simple reaction to distress, which it usually was.

It goes without saying that the widely despised and antagonized Koreans contributed their share to subversive conduct.

Such subversive conduct assumed various forms. It ranged from overt criticism and denunciation of the authorities and the ruling classes, to the spreading of rumors, to the forbidden listening-in on enemy broadcasts and the perusal of enemy leaflets. We cannot do more than offer some conclusions on these points for which the evidence is presented elsewhere in this report.

After 1943 there was a notable increase in the number of persons apprehended for expressions of disrespect to the authorities, to the military and the upper classes, coupled with a growing volume of antiwar talk. The particular malignance of such violations was emphasized in a police statement (on the period from September 1943 to February 1944) which pointed out that never before had there been so many *lèse-majesté* cases. How much of this was due to a growing severity on the part of the prosecutors and courts it is difficult to estimate.

Rumors were one of the major sources of concern. Rumor-mongering in a dictatorship is, of course, both the common man's expression of anxiety and his substitute for news. On both counts, it acquires considerable political significance in this system. The available evidence shows that the aggressiveness of circulated rumors, and apparently also their volume, increased as the deterioration of the war situation became apparent to the average man. The share of the Koreans, scapegoats of Japanese society, in this form of misconduct was considerable.

"Black Listening" and the illicit perusal of enemy leaflets will be dealt with more elaborately in the general discussion of propaganda. In this connection it is sufficient to state that, because of the confiscation of suitable receiving equipment and the effective use of jamming, there was very little listening to short-wave broadcasts of American origin. For the most part, such violations were confined to persons of higher social status who enjoyed a meas-

ure of immunity. When American-sponsored long-wave broadcasts from Saipan became available in the last few months of the war, they do not seem to have been listened to very widely. The deterioration of listening apparatus, effective jamming, fear of detection and indoctrination may be accountable for this.

In contrast to this, the reading and circulating of American leaflets played a rather impressive role, especially in the final war period.

The Doolittle raid had made Japanese police authorities somewhat fearful of the morale effects of further air raids. This first denting of Japan's vaunted invulnerability had at the time evoked a few disquieting responses, such as a Tokyo woman's widely discussed expression of pity when she learned of the captured American aviators' execution (known as the "Pitiful Incident").

It is quite apparent that such official anxieties, which expressed themselves in orders for more elaborate controls, were to be subsequently justified, not only with regard to general morale, but also the incidence of subversive activities in particular. The shock of the intensified raids of 1945 was an eye-opener: it revealing the discrepancies between the actual facts of war and official assertions, it elicited a new crop of subversive manifestations which added to the already brewing ferment.

The consequences may be thus summarized:

1. Despite vigorous control measures, the incidence of both overt subversion and rumor-mongering showed a distinct increase after March 1945. According to one Special Higher Police report of July 1945:

Recent rumors, scribblings and (other) manifestations are numerically increasing . . . They say that the Japanese war leaders, or the leading circles, are responsible for the decisive battle against Japan proper, for intensified air raids, shortage of foodstuff, acute inflation, etc., all of which have made people's lives hard. This indignation against the ruling class was shown in criticisms of military strategy and misrepresentation of the attitude of military circles. Others speak ill of government measures and government communiques. They explicitly assume a hostile attitude toward the government circles. Some others dare to speak of class antagonism.

2. Subversive acts of this type changed not only in quantity but in quality. Overt criticism became more aggressive and the air-raid experience colored the content of criticism and recrimination. According to one informant, who was prominently connected with the Home Affairs Ministry's peace preservation section, there had been some criticism of the military prior to the air raids, but

. . . with the outbreak of the bombings, the people stated that the military were no good at all and that Japan's military strength was weak.

3. Rumor-mongering now was not only an expression of demoralization; it effectively contributed to the demoralization of people who had hitherto not been directly affected. That evacuees from bombed areas played an important role as "carriers" is evident. One paper carried this frank statement:

All sorts of rumors which defy ordinary common sense like "today Yamada was bombed" or "handbills say that Shinjuku and Yotsuya were bombed" were dominating people's minds, instigating riots among the masses which are susceptible to warning.

Rumors and recrimination regarding a scapegoat minority, such as the Koreans, rose especially sharply. They would, for instance, claim, in the words of one police report, "that the Koreans aided and abetted enemy strategy and that they fled in the face of enemy action." (This is a familiar reaction recalling the anti-Korean riots following the Tokyo earthquake of 1923.) Rumors among the Koreans, in turn, expressed the heightened confidence of the persecuted and their hope for a speedy delivery from oppression. According to the same report, they gloated, for instance:

Even now, the majority of pilots in the planes which raided North Kyushu a few days ago were Koreans.

The ensuing tensions between majority and minority inevitably imposed additional burdens upon the control authorities.

The general evidence suggest that, even in the face of intensive indoctrination, directive controls and social pressures, there was a growing fringe of articulate disaffection. A resort to repression was the unavoidable answer of the authoritarian police state at war.

Policing Japanese Morale

Repression of the scope which was regarded as necessary by the Japanese authorities required large-scale organization. It was, however, in keeping with the dynamic of Japan's political forces that political police operations were "Janus-faced." There were, in fact, two separate police organizations, one looking to the military for its authority, the other to the civil establishment.

Civil Police. The Home Affairs Ministry, acting as the nominal head of the civil police hierarchy, controlled its elaborate network through the high-ranking chief of the ministry's police bureau. This in turn supervised the prefectural police chiefs through the prefectural governors, themselves rank-

ing officials directly appointed and controlled by the Home Ministry.

The police bureau consisted of the following six sections: peace preservation, whose head was a "second class" official; police affairs, crime prevention, foreign affairs, economic control and archives, all of which were headed by "third class" officials. Functionally, all police work in Japan was under the following categories: administrative, which comprised activities promoting the general welfare, such as health and traffic regulations; judicial, which was concerned with activities whereby criminals are brought to trial; and peace preservation, which was charged with removing obstructions to public welfare.

So-called "Thought Control" was another function which was carried on under the auspices of the peace preservation section and through its agents, the Special Higher Police.

An enumeration of the subsections of the ministry's peace preservation section throws some light on the nature of its activities: the first was charged with the enforcement of peace preservation laws; the second with the surveillance of nationalist and general political movements; the third with that of labor, farmer, and general public opinion; the fourth with surveillance of Koreans in Japan, and the fifth with religious movements. In general, the prefectural police authorities were the responsible field agents for matters pertaining to "thought control." Any local police would operate under their direction for such purposes.

This organization had all the appearance of a highly centralized police apparatus, which, in general outline, is reminiscent of the French system, but which, in spirit, was under the influence of a feudal past and an authoritarian present.

Military Police. Japan's military police (or *gendarmarie*), the *kempei-tai*, was, despite the rather sweeping character of its activities, just what its name suggests. It was a branch of the Japanese Army, in close operational contact with the Japanese Navy, which lacked a corresponding force of its own. In this capacity, the military police enjoyed complete autonomy, with each military police officer reporting only to the next higher echelon within his organization. The commanding general of the military police was responsible only to the Minister of War and the Imperial General Staff, which in itself indicates considerable standing. Its status enhanced by its broad jurisdiction, and as far as the average man was concerned, the military police represented, within the civilian horizon, the

pervasive power of the ruling military caste. The scope of jurisdiction actually exercised, and the degree of Army ascendancy over the civil government authority were closely linked. The *kempei-tai's* influence was felt most sharply while Tojo was in power.

Military police informants in general stoutly contended that it was merely the province of the military police to maintain military order and discipline. According to the *Kempei's* broadest directive, their duty was "to protect the existence and interests of the nation." This broad assignment was subdivided by the organization into the functions of military police, including the activities ordinarily associated with such an establishment (troop discipline, military courtesy, etc.); military administrative police and judicial police. The scope of the latter two exceeded that of any conventional military police elsewhere. The military policemen on "administrative" duty were to deal with the prevention of misconduct of "all military and quasi-military personnel." Since they operated on the assumption that, during the war, virtually all Japanese adult citizens were, in some fashion, engaged in the task of national defense, they justified their assumption of jurisdiction over a variety of civilians on the ground that they were "quasi-military" personnel.

While judicial police duties related to the actual investigation and apprehension of offenders, a report by the *Kempei* general staff elaborately explained:

Naturally greater importance was given to the military administrative police which was to prevent servicemen and service civilians from erring, and lesser importance to the judicial police which had for its object the detection of offenses. The main purpose of the military police was to preserve the services in a spiritually healthy condition.

This notion of "prevention" led to rather uninhibited police practices which, while they contributed to the sinister reputation of the *Kempei* among the general population, also constituted no small deterrent to those who might have otherwise risked the paternal solicitude of the military police.

Under a broad interpretation of such powers, the actual wartime functions of the military police comprised, in addition to the definitely military one, the following:

- (1) Counterespionage and countersabotage;
- (2) Collection of home front intelligence, the trend of civilian thought, rumor, and speech;
- (3) The suppression of "dangerous" speech and writings;

(4) The enforcement of factory law and arbitration of labor disputes (where government orders were involved);

(5) The regulation of civilian travel;

(6) The enforcement of wage control orders in industry;

(7) Cooperation with the Munitions Ministry in an effort to increase production of war materials.

In general, it is probably true that, while the military police were involved in a variety of controls over the civilian population, the "thought controls" or political police functions did not constitute their primary mission. Their role in this connection assumed exaggerated proportions in the people's mind largely because of their reputation for ubiquity, aggressiveness, and brutality.

"*Thought Control.*" The sweeping character of those peculiarly political police controls known in Japan as "speech and thought control" was determined by a number of circumstances. The Tokugawa period already had fully developed this device. A tradition of respect for the basic personal liberties had never taken root. On the contrary, Japanese feudal tradition had inculcated the belief that absolute and unrestrained power is essential to public authority. While Meiji constitutionalism had never truly attempted to supersede this tradition except in a very limited fashion, the new military authoritarianism had undertaken to elaborate the powers and objectives of repression in a series of formal enactments, the first of which was the peace preservation law of 1925 (revised as Law No. 54, promulgated 8 March 1941) which provided the death penalty and varying terms of penal servitude for those acting as organizers, members, officers or supporters of organizations with the objective of "changing the national policy," and many related offenses. This was a revision along stricter lines of the peace preservation law of 1899. It was notable for the vagueness of some of its provisions defining punishable acts, for the severity of punishment, and for the harshness of its procedures, which not only permitted fairly arbitrary detention before the trial, but also elaborate "corrective measures."

This statute was supplemented by a long series of other enactments and special clauses, such as the law for the temporary control of public discussion, publications, gatherings, associations, etc., enacted at the outbreak of the war, which justified one Japanese official in saying that it "was so broad that no matter what was said, it was an offense."

The general objective of political police controls,

which governed the actions of both civil and military police, may then be fairly summed up as the prevention and repression of any conduct which, in the view of the authorities, manifested an indiscipline suggestive of subversion or opposition. Both "informal" and formal measures were resorted to. The civil police, which presumably carried the major share of the work even during the war, would, after investigation, administer warnings and threats to the average rumor-monger. Only the more serious cases would ordinarily be brought to trial. As one official said:

Owing to the strengthening of thought and opinion control regulations, I would say that almost any opinion could be interpreted in a suspicious manner and the Home Ministry only tried to touch on the worst cases. The step taken when we thought it was a bad case was just ordinary arrest. Trial in a civil court would follow.

There is reason to believe that "warnings," if administered by the military police, were much more likely to involve third-degree methods than in the case of the civil police, which boasted of its paternalistic integrity. But no doubt there was little assurance in either case, although persons of social standing could expect consideration, especially at the hands of the civil police.

Domestic Intelligence. Repression and prevention required the development of a domestic intelligence system in the case of both organizations. As one member of the police affairs bureau in the Home Ministry described this objective:

The function of the bureau was not so much the guiding of public opinion as the control of the public opinion of those deemed inimical to national interests.

The civil police were enabled to keep their fingers on the public pulse, in part, by virtue of the fact that all societies had to register with them, and that political meetings were, of course, subject to their approval. As has already been stated, they also had censorship functions which provided them with comprehensive information on book and periodical publications. This was further extended, in a different direction, by their supervision of commercial entertainment. Systematic reporting was handled by the various subsections of the peace preservation section which would analyze reports from the prefectures on their special field of interest. These analyses were compiled in the monthly (police) reports, which, in turn, were distributed to the field agencies for their information and guidance. From time to time, special reports were prepared by the subsections for the section chief, on questions such as labor, the Korean problem, etc.

The gathering of basic information, which in the field was in the hands of the special police, was described by one of the Ministry's officials as follows:

We relied on . . . reports from the police in execution of their duties, that is, of course, reports of a criminal nature, and the rest were from reports of inspection of public places—rest rooms, barbershops, bars, or even from listening to conversations in the street . . . In small places most of the reports regarding thought came from the special police in that (special police) division, but in larger places there would be a special department . . . They (the reports) came in through the prefectures . . . The prefectural authorities gave their own viewpoints and these entered into the reports to some extent. Other than that, they used reports from the police regarding discussion groups, speeches, and meetings of the people. Books and periodicals were also sent to us for examination, also because of the limited education of the ordinary policeman.

Clearly there was no attempt here at a truly objective surveying of opinions and attitudes. The Japanese authorities placed full reliance on the well-known traditional police methods which meant that their findings depended, in large measure, on a combination of many uncontrolled subjective factors. This is not to suggest that the analysis and interpretation of such materials on the ministerial level was not occasionally shrewd and sophisticated.

One of the men connected with this work evidently possessed a good deal of insight which is reflected in his reports. He, for instance, far from having a blind fear of the revolutionary agitators, knew well enough that people's receptivity to "subversive influences" depended in large measure on their social and economic health. He would, therefore, suggest remedial action instead of mere repression—without, of course, possessing the influence to bring it about.

The available evidence on the corresponding activities of the military police is far slighter. That this function was regarded as basic also in this organization can be seen from the following rules in the military police manual:

The military police will collect and examine basic intelligence concerning changes in the general situation, the trend of public opinion, and the actual situation within and outside the Army.

To make possible the collection of intelligence, the military police unit commander will organize listening posts, establish liaison points, construct intelligence nets, and strive to widen and sharpen the degree of his contact with society. The intelligence net will exist separately and secretly.

There is reason to believe that their intelligence operations were somewhat less ambitious than were those of the civil police, however, even though their agents were the ones most hated and feared, even among highly placed persons.

It stands to reason that both agencies sought to tap outside information channels for such purposes. The available evidence indicates that only very partial success was obtained in enlisting the aid of the neighborhood associations, for instance, even though the authorities apparently were careful never to formalize this connection.

Utilization of Intelligence. The question remains whether elaborate information of this nature, which (even with all its limitations) was most important for the ruling group, was fully utilized within the government. Statements of Morale Division's chief informants in the Home Affairs Ministry suggest that the tensions, fears, and conflicts, which dominated interdepartmental relations, resulted in severe restrictions upon the use of these reports. One of them stated, for instance:

Although I myself, thought that the report was important and that something should be done about it, the pressure from the military was strong, and they did not think it necessary to take up such matters.

I think the reason the reports were not given to the Army and Navy and government in the earliest days of the war was because they treated mostly on what the people thought about the war. The people did not seem to have much confidence in victory, and if such reports were sent from my office to the armed forces and the government, the people to read them would only become angered by them.

Another informant added:

These reports were not much used at all. We took the attitude of sometimes protecting people. If we gave information to the Board of Information the news would leak out to the Army. If the Army would get in touch with the Home Ministry it would take action; but the Army would leave us out and get in touch with the original source through the military police. This would place the Home Ministry in a difficult position . . . The reports . . . (mainly concerned) . . . with internal economic problems . . . were given to ministries such as Commerce and Industry and Agriculture. When it came to giving these reports to the Army and Navy . . . we did not like to.

Thus it is quite problematical to what extent the Japanese policy makers were normally in possession of the most comprehensive and integrated domestic intelligence gathered in Japan during the war. There is, moreover, ample evidence to indicate that officials on that level did not want such information because they did not place importance on popular attitudes as an element in policy making. The suggested reason for this serious handicap touches on a difficulty within the police system which has already been mentioned.

Conflicts Between Police Systems. Both the civil and the military police, in practice, claimed fairly complete control over civilian political and social

attitudes. The inevitable result was rivalry and conflict, in which the military police showed the greater strength during the military clique's ascendancy. As one prefectural police director explained:

The Kempei were more and more taking over our duties and we didn't like it . . . They troubled us by moving in on us, but in war the military is strong.

This situation resulted in resentment on the part of the civil police and sneering derision on the part of the military police, who regarded themselves as more efficient, and not subject to the local pressures which were said to affect the civil police. Said one Kempei officer:

Local police could not handle prominent individuals in a given community because they controlled the money out of which they were paid. Consequently, they could only effectively handle cases involving small people.

On the whole it was probably true that Home Affairs Ministry procedures were more bureaucratic and tended to slow up the operations of the civil police, while their rivals had more local discretion and might reap the fruits of their greater aggressiveness. In part, this stemmed from the fact that the Home Ministry usually constituted the patronage and vote-getting machines for the dominant political group. All in all, there was insufficient coordination between the two. As one informant put it:

There was some understanding arrived at by higher quarters as to the division of labor, but in the lower echelons there was constant friction, and the military police gradually came to oppress the ordinary police. As a matter of practice, the heads of these higher police spent more time figuring out how to get along with the military police than in their actual work.

It recalls similar tensions, in the Nazi dictatorship, between the Gestapo and the detective force, and between the Gestapo and the security service (Sicherheitsdienst). This friction did not contribute to the effectiveness of the police controls, even though it does not seem to have impaired them seriously.

Effects of the War on Police. What effect did the war have on the operations of the control system?

As in all countries, the impact of wartime regulations and restrictions caused a considerable strain on the available government services. This would be especially true for police organizations with administrative and control duties on the scale developed in Japan. It was true for police organizations with administrative and control duties on the scale developed in Japan. It was true for police work in general and obviously for "thought control" in

particular. The duties of surveillance were on the increase, as popular morale visibly deteriorated. From the chief of the Kyoto (prefectural) peace preservation section we hear, for instance, that:

As the war progressed we got quite a few more reports from civilians, informers, neighbors, and employers of persons speaking subversively, spreading disaffection or rumors of defeat, and all these cases had to be investigated.

How well were the police able to cope with the problem? There was first the question of manpower. For the civil police, we have a variety of local reports which show a substantial drop in personnel. While these figures apply to local departments, similar losses, mostly due to the draft, were incurred on the prefectural and ministerial levels as well, if due allowance is made for the possible difference in age groups. Efforts were made to counteract this shrinkage by employment of auxiliary policemen, whose qualifications cannot very well have measured up to the requirements of the special police.

The military police, on the contrary, not only maintained but greatly increased its strength in this period, a phenomenon which is doubtless related to its assumption of wider powers. In 1937, the military police force in Japan comprised 1,400 officers and men; by 1944 it had swollen to 9,000 and, by the war's end, to 24,000. While this last increase is especially revealing, it is clear that the military police never constituted a really large police organization.

Size, of course, was not the only factor in the effectiveness of either the civil or military police. As long as they were sufficiently large to take action at various places and times, their summary and brutal action easily created an atmosphere of ubiquity and threat which was quite as effective as if it had been real. The influence of both organizations rested in large measure on psychological factors which had sufficient basis in fact and experience.

The civil police's wartime decline in personnel was accompanied by other signs of deterioration which are not nearly so clear for their military rivals. The local police forces, which, after all, were deeply involved in the spade work of the special higher police, lost face. They were accused of corruption and racketeering in connection with activities in rationing and black market control. Numerous compromising stories made the rounds.

Under the circumstances it is not surprising that one of the Home Affairs Ministry officials, attached to the peace preservation section, emphasized that "the intellectual level of the special police was very

low," while an undated Home Affairs Ministry directive (presumably issued in 1942 or 1943) also refers to the "gradual increase in poorer police officer material." The need for more and improved training to be administered to the special higher police was recognized as urgent, and the quoted directive proceeded to outline a suggestive "in-service training" program which emphasized the need for a full grasp of ideological trends, a better understanding of social conditions, and for improved methods of fact and information gathering. The reports were to "carry the true voice of the people . . . and give a clear understanding of the conditions existing in the daily life of the people . . ." The special higher police were to be in effect, as efficient a political police agency as Germany or Soviet Russia had developed as part of their revolutionary drives. It does not seem that this ambition was accomplished.

Conclusion: Policing Japanese Morale. This sketch of Japan's police controls in operation suggests the following conclusions:

1. The police establishment, which rested on two independent and poorly coordinated agencies, owed much of its effectiveness to settled habits of conformity and deference to established authority.

2. It operated in an aura of fear which was sufficiently awe-inspiring to cover up obvious inadequacies of operation; even if military police and civil police would clash, both of them continued to be feared, though perhaps not respected.

3. Despite the severity of restrictions and the known police resort to brutality, especially on the part of the military police, the Japanese system does not appear as vicious or penetrating as that of Nazi Germany. There is no indication of the use of concentration camps for Japanese nationals. On the other hand, many political "offenders" would be sent home after having received "paternal" police warnings. The number of actual "incidents" must have greatly surpassed those which were brought to book.

4. While police intelligence reached a respectable level, it was neither gathered through modern objective methods nor was it sufficiently heeded by the policy makers, who might otherwise have taken warning from the reports which should have reached them.

5. While the war brought about some deterioration in the police network, especially on the side of the civil police, the joint efforts of the two police agencies sufficed to prop a society, which had never

been free, or widely regarded regimentation as repugnant, to the end.

Conclusion: The Apparatus of Morale Control

All of the Japanese agencies for the reporting and control of opinion and morale suffered from certain basic limitations which restricted their value. In the first place, the governmental system traditionally did not provide for the continuous reflection of public opinion in public policy. Secondly, the factional character of politics within the ruling group obstructed the development of integrated and coordinated treatment of popular morale, especially during the last year of the war. Finally, no controls could indefinitely keep from the people the fact that Japan was on the defensive and was losing.

Because of Japan's political habits, the interest in morale information at the top of the hierarchy was extremely limited, and what data there were on the subject only rarely reached the higher councils. Lacking the channels of communication between rulers and ruled which would be considered normal in a democratic and reasonably representative governmental system, the Japanese government, like other dictatorships, had developed a means of internal intelligence which was primarily in the hands of the police—both civil and military. Such intelligence was not gathered by modern, objective methods; instead reliance was placed on the impressionistic techniques of the spy and the informer. It was a far cry from those governments which have supplemented their traditional methods with even more sensitive and reliable devices for measuring opinion. Moreover, intelligence channels were designed and utilized, not for positive political purposes, but as the basis for a system of directive and repressive controls which were to keep the people "in line." This aspect also had its roots deep in the past, the main outlines of the system dating back at least as far as the Tokugawa shogunate.

It is apparent that the most successful of the agencies discussed in these pages were those which were least dependent upon unity of the factions at the apex of the government, or which dealt with objectives couched in broad, ambiguous terms. Thus, the educational system, especially at the lower levels, effectively indoctrinated the young in such things as the Yamato spirit, loyalty to family, the Samurai tradition, the mythical "history" of Japan, and the Emperor system. The religious institutions, especially State Shinto, were used with similar effectiveness, although some of them did little more than appear to conform to government

directives. The police systems, which had their roots deep in the Japanese past, kept both subversion and opposition at a relatively harmless level, although the quality of information reported was poor and the frequency of jurisdictional difficulties indicate the extent to which they were affected by differences within the ruling class.

This situation meant, however, that all of these institutions were successful only as long as their work remained in traditional or general grooves. Situations requiring novel treatment or decisions between highly specific alternatives, either of which would require adjustment among the competing factions, could not be left to such devices. Under such circumstances they either were ineffectual or became the instrument of one segment of the ruling coalition, as in the case of the Kempeï.

The IRAA and the Cabinet Board of Information were both novel devices. The activities of both were controversial in the sense that any significant actions taken by them had implications for the relative prestige and influence of various sections of the

coalition. Both reflected a system of entrenched rivalries which they could not overcome and of which they could not be independent. The Board of Information was a superficial compromise between these factions which was either dominated by the military or rendered impotent by the simple device of circumvention. The amorphous IRAA was the result of an effort to impose unity upon the same or similar cliques. It never had a mass basis and never fused its elements. No better illustration of its futility is needed than the post-war reappearance of most of the political groups it was designed to eliminate.

This system of information and control worked well as long as the military effort was successful and the battles took place at some distance from the homeland. The restrictive agencies, in fact, were highly effective until the very end. By and large, however, as defeats and destruction from the air required definite action whose meaning would be explicit, the widening splits within the ruling group revealed the system's bankruptcy.



Reading the *Tokyo Mainichi*: "The newspapers and radio reported that our losses (from bombing) were small, but from observation it was apparent that they were not."

CONTROL OF MORALE BY PROPAGANDA

What the Japanese people were told, both by their own government and by their enemies, was among the important factors determining the strength of their confidence and the extent of their willingness to continue their contributions to the war effort. Governmental indoctrination was not a new thing in Japan, of course. As has been pointed out in previous pages, all possible means had been used for decades to mold the basic attitudes of the Japanese people in conformity with the wishes of the ruling group. During hostilities, those controls were strengthened. In the case of propaganda this meant that the official information policies completely dominated all organized channels of communication. The latter were, with the exception of rumor, direct experience, and American psychological warfare, the only source of information concerning the war for the Japanese people.

It is important to know, therefore, what the Japanese people were told by their own government and how they reacted to that information. How effective were our various efforts in psychological warfare? Did our leaflets have any influence? What did the Japanese do to counter our propaganda? Were they successful?

Japanese Propaganda on the Home Front

Something of the complexities and weaknesses of the Japanese propaganda machine have been previously discussed. No attempt will be made here to make a definitive or exhaustive study of the Japanese output. Only a general picture can be drawn at this point, relying on the reports and analyses of American radio monitors, in addition to Japanese information. For convenience the story will be presented topically.

Military Defeats Minimized. The stream of victories in the early months of the Pacific war presented the propagandists with a problem not of sustaining confidence but of putting a brake on the enthusiasm of the people, who were "drunk with victories." A deliberate effort was made along these lines. Nevertheless, the facts of the battle of Midway, June 1942, were never given to the people. The Guadalcanal debacle, moreover, was not treated as a defeat, nor even as "kotai" or "taikyaku" (re-

treat), but as a change of front "tenshin." The rank and file of civilians thus got the impression that it was another skillful and successful tactical operation.

As the American forces extended their control over the central and western Pacific, the early island conquests were treated as small and insignificant bits of land which had served their usefulness in providing time for the strengthening of the impenetrable Japanese inner defenses. As late as March 1944, bravado was unchecked. A broadcast of 19 March 1944 told the people that:

When Nimitz shouts about advancing from the Central Pacific to the China continent, he sees in his path the Japanese fleet. And when MacArthur shouts about the capture of the Philippines, it is our Army force . . . which he sees in his dreams . . . If the supply of our mighty invincible Army and Navy is perfect, the destruction of the United States will be an insignificant problem.

The fall of Saipan presented a more difficult problem, since more people understood its significance than understood the meaning of the Solomons battles. Propaganda emphasized heavy fighting and American admissions of severe losses. It was not until 18 July, nine days after the island was secure, that the resigning premier, Tojo, revealed that:

Although a great blow had been inflicted upon the enemy by the gallant and courageous efforts of the officers and men of the Imperial forces on the Marianas Islands since 11 June, Saipan Island has finally fallen into the enemy's hands.

People were told that they must "give more and more of their blood to the battle," that "our Army is intact." A fairly grim note was struck in the propaganda meetings on the Saipan situation which were held in all towns and villages; speakers were instructed to "impress upon the minds of the people that the war situation has reached a critical stage," that they must "fight to the last" with a "burning hatred of the arrogant enemy," that "the mainland is about to become a theater of war" in which "victory or defeat depends on the strength or weakness of their will." Speakers were also cautioned, in discussing "any matter connected with Saipan," to "keep within the scope of the information released by the Imperial Headquarters."

¹ This procedure, directed consciously or unconsciously toward the same morale ends, was utilized by Allied information sources during the war. For example, certain of the Russian retreats, and British retreats in the Libyan campaign, were made to sound like strategic withdrawals.

After the fall of Saipan, Japanese propaganda pursued a disorganized line. It alternated, in a confused fashion, between alleged successes and "scare" stories depicting a desperate situation. Usually, the material was presented in the context of getting the people to put forth more effort for the war.

By the fall of 1944 the succession of defeats had produced a rank crop of rumors which government spokesmen had to meet more or less directly. In a broadcast on 19 September 1944, General Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, chief of the IRAA Youth Corps admitted that "quite a few" people were war weary and presented a "sound" way to reply to rumors in the following terms:

Why of course our fleet is still intact! It is watching gloatingly for the opportunity to strike. Besides, warships are not the deciding factor in the present naval warfare, anymore. It is the planes that do the decisive battle. So, if we manufacture enough planes, we have all the chance in the world to beat the enemy. Since the authorities are telling us not to worry, we can rest assured in that respect. The government admits that there are quite a few planes that are useless, but when you say half of them are useless, that is absurd.

Where victories did not exist at this time, they were effectively manufactured. The American carrier strikes at Formosa, 12-14 October, preparatory to the Leyte invasion, were wildly hailed as a major Japanese victory. Vivid descriptions were made of how, after the raid, "a crushed American fleet fled in confusion." The people were led to believe that another threat to the homeland and to the China campaign had been beaten off, leaving the enemy in a battered and weakened condition. Such a report even was made by Premier Koiso to the Emperor, who regarded the occasion as of sufficient importance for the issue of an Imperial rescript. The battle of Leyte Gulf a few days later was treated in the same vein: another great victory was brought about by "the close teamwork between our air force, surface units, and underseas craft;" despite the "annihilating blows at Formosa the enemy made no changes in his strategical plans," as a result of which "the Imperial fleet, which patiently held back its desire to engage in battle . . . has finally been given the chance to manifest its power."

Leyte itself was presented as "tennosen," a legendary Japanese battle, of Waterloo proportions. But after lengthy descriptions of local successes there, the government finally stated quietly that the island had been occupied.

Toward the end of 1944, as military actions were coming closer to the home islands, home front prop-

aganda showed signs of greater realism, though not necessarily complete accuracy. Speeches at the turn of the year admitted that "regrettable as it is, our war results were not the best during the past year," but still insisted that "the turning point has come already." The kamikase actions were exploited to the full in propaganda, carrying the moral that the home front should emulate such heroism.

The fighting on Luzon was reported with much idle boasting, rationalization, and vagueness, and every attempt was made to obscure both the extent and implications of the defeat there. Worry over the Luzon front was frequently criticized, the fall of Manila was regarded as of no significance, and the whole Luzon campaign was presented as a "protracted bleeding operation" against the Americans.

The landings on Iwo were handled fairly realistically from the start. The home audience was given a constant stream of stories of bravery and hardships calculated to inspire the listeners. While the fighting was not looked upon with confidence, it was not until 3 March 1945 that successful American occupation was suggested. Announcements, on 21 March, of Iwo's fall were accompanied by numerous pep talks and appeals for unity, which made the people conscious of the situation created by the island's loss.

The Okinawa invasion was treated in what had by then become a standard pattern. Okinawa was again "tennosan;" it was Japan's "divine opportunity" to inflict a telling defeat on the United States. People were urged to greater efforts with statements that "The battle of the Ryukyus is one upon which our life or death is staked;" the "destiny of the nation" rests upon the outcome of these battles. These comments were tempered with stories of the "terrible" price exacted of the American forces by the kamikaze attacks, calling the waters around the Ryukyus a "graveyard for American ships" and a "hell ocean for enemy America." A broadcast of 10 April 1945 warned people not to expect the Americans to withdraw despite "great losses," since:

Now that the enemy has . . . committed his entire strength in the Okinawa battle, he cannot pull out . . . He must continue to make frantic efforts and pour in more and more reinforcements.

The propaganda repeatedly held that the Okinawa invasion sprang from American desires to end the war quickly, originating in American weakness and lack of strong moral conviction about its war aims. This was an invitation to the Japanese to prolong the hostilities in order to gain victory.

The kamikaze "successes" were worked overtime to create the myth of air victories over Allied surface vessels. By 10 May 1945 (the invasion began on 1 April) Japanese propagandists had "sunk" 282 American warships by the kamikaze weapon and had "damaged" 233 more. Among the "sunk" were 15 carriers, 14 battleships, and 46 cruisers. Despite these extravagant claims, the civilian population was warned not to "mix the war results with the general way the war is going." A broadcast of 11 May warned them that "we know that the gigantic war strength of the enemy is replacing his losses" and reminded them of the Philippines, where they had "severely damaged the enemy but were unable to check" his advance. By early May, therefore, there were indications that the population was being prepared for the usual announcement of loss. There was a sharp drop in the emphasis on the strategic importance of the Ryukyus, an increase in stories of enemy reinforcements, and even various admissions of Allied air superiority, which were significant in view of the earlier statements that air supremacy was the key to ultimate victory.

Beginning in late 1944, but increasingly after the fall of Iwo and the launching of the area bombing raids, the people were prepared for an invasion. The general lines taken here were that the game was being played according to Japanese strategy, and that the invasion would fail if the people were determined. On Army Day, 10 March 1945, War Minister Sugiyama said, "The enemy invasion of our homeland is imminent," and General Mateumara, Chief of the Army press section of Imperial Headquarters, said, "we must anticipate the battle of decision to be fought on our homeland." He praised the Japanese "bleeding tactics" in the Philippines and stated that an invasion would be met by "our crack defenders, who . . . are ready to become literally human bullets." People were told that even if Okinawa fell, the situation was still favorable because Japan's supply lines were being shortened. The line was stressed that success awaited the strategy of "enticing" the enemy within the inner defense lines and annihilating him there. Japan might be losing territory, but America would never take great casualties without giving up, even if its forces should gain ground. The crowning absurdity of this program was the Army-inspired idea of having the civilian population trained in the use of bamboo spears, with which they would help repel the invader.

Propaganda Response to the Air Raids. Air raids were not a problem to the Tokyo propagandists for

some months. The possibility of raids was used to stimulate the inadequate efforts at civilian defense, and the Doolittle raid of April 1942 was so used. Even the first B-29 raids on Kyushu in July 1944, from China bases, were treated largely in this way and the losses were treated as negligible. Bravado was not diminished by the raids on Tokyo in late November and early December. The Americans' targets, of course, were hospitals and schools, but the damage was described as "slight." The defenses of the capital were proved the best in the world, and the people, who were complimented on their raid conduct, were told to accept this challenge and redouble their production efforts. Raids were part of the war of nerves, and though the raids became "more intense," they "must definitely not make you fed-up or make you quit." Propagandists constantly repeated the warning that the main purpose of air raids was "nerve warfare," and urged people to resist the attack on their morale.

When the area raids began, it was impossible to ignore the damage completely. After the March 9-10 raid on Tokyo, the prime minister's message called on the people to "refresh your inspiration as well as strengthen your absolute conviction in our ultimate victory," and, attempting to deflect hostility away from the government, described the anger he felt as he stood "in the midst of ruin and destruction." Much was made, after this and later raids, of the large numbers of B-29s allegedly shot down by the defenders, attempting to prove that "the enemy is receiving a fatal blow in each raid over the homeland." By the latter part of March there was no further talk of "air-raid defenses remaining completely undisturbed." Central Army Headquarters even said that "owing to the new United States tactics" they would have to "restudy the air-defense structure." Occasionally damage was reported as "not small" or "considerable."

Unity was sought by telling the people that the raids had only served to steel their fighting spirit through anger and the desire for revenge.

Victims have attained the mental stature of our Special Attack Corps. As the war increases in violence, others will also learn more about the state of mind of our fighting men. Then will the efforts of the nation's hundred million become truly unified.

Much was made also of the activities of the government and the Emperor in relief measures for the victims.

By the end of the war, treatment of the raids had become a standard matter of minimizing damage

maximizing destruction of the attacking planes, and talk of a vague day of retribution when the "opportune moment" arrives.²

Developing Hatred of the United States. Every warring nation attempts to whip up hatred of the enemy both among its soldiers and on the home front. The Japanese went to great lengths in this respect.

As military reverses increased and the prospect of invasion became more likely, our monitors observed an effort on the part of the Japanese propagandists to whip up hatred of the Americans by talking about our brutality and our desire to enslave or wipe out the Japanese nation. One such effort was the printing of a picture of American girl holding the skull of a Japanese soldier, which she had been sent as a souvenir. Statements of prominent Americans were quoted or manufactured to further this campaign. Toward the end, a particular point was made of what would happen should the Americans ever succeed in landing in Japan:

All the women would be raped and the men sent to America to become slaves.

The end of the war in Europe presented Tokyo propagandists with something of a problem. They succeeded in fitting the event into their current campaign for a "last-ditch" stand by picturing vividly the suffering and humiliation of the Germans. They gave many reasons for the German downfall, mostly characteristics of the German people which the Japanese allegedly did not share. Air raids, as a force in the German surrender, were significantly omitted. Instead, major emphasis was placed on the idea that the Germans failed because they were foolish victims of our propaganda. The terrible consequences to the personal and national life of the Japanese, should America win, we re-emphasized. The fate of Germany was starkly drawn, and the people were exhorted to put renewed effort into winning the war.

Treatment of Home Front Problems. The food problem was with the government from the beginning. Even the Tojo cabinet recognized its importance. Propaganda for increased food production was steady throughout the war, although handling of this theme was no more accurate than the reporting of military events. A food official said in a radio address in November 1943:

No matter how many years the war may last, if we have food we can carry on bravely . . . We must be prepared for coming hardships and must thus grow good crops. The

² The propaganda technique of finding some good in evil, and emphasizing it, is common to many nations in equivalent situations to Japan's at this time. The technique is designed to steel morale. Thus, British and German propaganda, in the early and in the late days of the war, respectively, followed this line at home.

people not directly concerned with food production must help the farmers.

As the war continued, the food situation became increasingly severe, a fact which could not be entirely ignored. In the last months of the war there was considerable newspaper criticism of the government for not taking the people into their confidence on the food matter. The radio made much of farms in burned-out areas, the virtues of substitute foods, and the growing of foods in such public places as the Meiji shrine and the Ueno zoo in Tokyo. A broadcast of 21 May 1945 reports the cabinet as feeling the food problem called for "no optimism" and for stronger police measures concerning stealing and the black market. On 5 July the Minister of Agriculture, in a lengthy radio address, tried to show the food shortage as a war result and not as official bungling. He urged the people to carry on despite a diet which:

cannot be said to be enough in calories . . . By covering up the fact that you are hungry, you are a Samurai.

Propaganda about Propaganda Policy. As war reverses continued and the inadequacies of the home front propaganda were revealed to the observant, propaganda about the government's propaganda became necessary. After the fall of Tojo, every cabinet change or shake-up was followed by a proclamation of an outspoken information policy. The reasons for the failure of these aspirations have been indicated previously. In September of 1944, Tachibana Ogata, president of the Board of Information, announced support of "free speech in regard to the promotion of war strength . . . The government will march forward with the policy of enlightenment of public opinion." Again in April, the previous promise having borne little fruit, Hiroshi Shimomura, new president of the board, said:

Henceforth the people will be given facts as facts, resolutely and bluntly. Moreover, my policy will be to lend an ear to the voice of the people. The people must have implicit confidence in the information and propaganda offered by the government.

Summary. Japanese Propaganda on the Home Front. Even so superficial a sketch of Japanese home front propaganda as this reveals that it suffered from numerous shortcomings. In part this was a reflection of the inevitable weaknesses of defensive propaganda. The people at home in Japan were treated to an exaggerated string of isolated victories. When victories did not develop in the large, they were compensated for by local successes. Still, they experienced the loss of a series of campaigns which were initially described as decisive. Under air

raids they were told "watered-down" stories of damages, were told to hold up to the courage of those at the front, and were even told that their home front resistance was telling on the enemy. At the same time, the severity of military losses, air raids, and shortages was sufficiently apparent so that the seriousness of Japan's plight had to be hinted at and occasionally admitted. To check their possible weariness under this load, they were treated increasingly to the horrors of what would happen to them in the event the Americans took the home islands. Finally, because discrepancies appeared between the facts of experience and those of propaganda, they were repeatedly, though not heavily, exposed to pious assertions of the honesty or impending accuracy of the propaganda pronouncements. How did the Japanese people react to these outpourings?

Reactions to Home Front Propaganda

The Morale Division collected a considerable amount of evidence on the attitudes of the Japanese to their own propaganda. The most complete and most revealing information is that dealing with the treatment of the air raids. The nation-wide sample was asked the question, "During the war, what did you think about the way the newspapers and the radios described the air raids on Japan?" A tabulation of the replies follows:

TABLE 90.—*Reactions to the Japanese propaganda treatment of air raids*

	Percent
Disbelieved truthfulness of reports—raids more severe than reported.....	40
Believed them true at first, disbelieved later.....	9
Believed them to be true.....	27
Didn't know; didn't read newspapers.....	14
No answer.....	10

	100

Thus, by the end of the war nearly one-half the population said they did not believe the official reports of the air raids during the war. Or, to put it another way, not more than 51 percent of the population accepted the official line, even assuming that all those who could not read the papers or did not have access to the radio held the approved attitudes, which is unlikely.

Illustrations of the forms which this skepticism took are to be found in the interviews and documents. A clerk in Osaka said:

The newspapers and radio reported that our losses were small but from observation it was apparent that they were not.

A newspaper editor in Nagasaki told interrogators:

People began to write anonymous letters to the papers to ask why the truth about such and such a raid was not told. We got thousands of them.

A report prepared in April 1945 by the local reporters for Domei bears out the same points:

If the statement, "losses negligible," is to be issued on the heels of every raid, the people will fall into the habit of making their own interpretations. It is said that this tendency is to be found even among the students of the national elementary schools. Interpreting "some" as meaning "considerably great" and "negligible" as meaning "considerable," general opinion never accepts the Imperial Headquarters announcements at face value.

The same report mentioned the following specific complaint:

The preponderance of opinion holds that the words "blind bombing" are not appropriate. In reality, the bombs are hitting targets with considerable accuracy, which is not blind bombing.

Nor was the response to more subtle treatment any better. An official of the Cabinet Board of Information made the following observation on the policy adopted after the partial burning of the Ise shrine:

It was concluded that nothing would be better than to await the spontaneous outburst of the people's ire against the enemy . . . Contrary to expectations, however, the people in general . . . remained indifferent.

The evidence suggests that this was the response given to most of the propaganda efforts, especially toward the end. An official in Kano said of the victory prayer meetings ordered to be held at the Shinto shrines in every town and village:

At first most of the citizens came, but during the last year, popular interest in these ordered meetings fell away. There was no lag of interest in individual prayers at shrines. People went to pray that individual draftees would return safely.

Success of Military Propaganda. The greatest difficulty the Japanese propagandist faced was bound up in what an official of the propaganda agency called "the thankless job of putting out propaganda which was not backed up by power." This was increasingly the situation, apparently, with respect to military campaigns, although in the earlier phases the government had the advantage of talking about far-away and little-known places, on which the possibility of checking official information was slight. A former vice-chief of the Board of Information told interrogators that the early propaganda about consolidating the "inner line" of defense was doubted by the "intelligent people," although the "common people still had faith." A professor at a Tokyo university said:

I know they didn't bring out 50 percent of the things that happened. Most of the good news only was given. They never mentioned any of our losses, so it was obvious that they were hiding many things.

While the campaigns were going on at some distance from the homeland, however, the information policy concerning them was remarkably successful. Battles in far-away places which had little meaning to the bulk of the population could be treated in any way convenient to the propagandists, without more than a small segment of the people realizing the truth. Evidence in support of this conclusion is afforded by the sample interviews, which indicate that up to July 1944, only about one-tenth of the civilian population had begun to have doubts that Japan would win. By the end of 1944, however, when Saipan, Guam, and Leyte had been lost and the raids on the home islands had begun, about one-third entertained such doubts.

As the battles neared the home islands, "change-of-front" explanations could not be used. Battles had to be treated as important because a sizable section of the population could see that they were, but this appears to have been overdone in the "Tennosan" line. As the president of the Nippon Times put it: "People here began to say, 'How many "Tennosan" are there?'"

But approach of the battles toward Japan was not the only problem. Stories from returning servicemen frequently gave a picture of military events which was seriously at variance with the official line, and letters from the front had a similar influence.

The mayor of Isahaya for example, told interrogators:

What the soldiers wrote home was believed and had great effect. The Navy had too many victories in the newspapers and people knew it couldn't all be so. Sailors also sent home contradictions.

The desperate propaganda of the last days seems to have backfired in some instances. Both officials of the Board of Information and newspapermen told interrogators that the "bamboo spear" idea, which was sponsored by Imperial Headquarters, failed miserably. With American mechanized might dramatically symbolized by the B-29's, for all to see, this appeal not only appeared ridiculous, but also revealed Japanese weakness to even the simplest observer.

The bankruptcy of Japanese military propaganda is summed up in the comment of an official in Yutaka mura:

If you compared both sides of the issue, no matter how

hard you tried to rely on our military, it was impossible not to experience uneasiness.

Propaganda against Americans. In the case of the "hate-fear" propaganda against the United States, greater success was achieved for the same reason that the general military propaganda was apparently more successful than that concerning air raids: relatively few people were in a position to check on the accuracy of the statements. Propaganda was essential to overcome the initially weak antagonism against America, at the time of Pearl Harbor.

The cross-section sample of Japanese were asked, "How did you feel about the Americans during the war?" As indicated in an earlier chapter of this report, about half the civilian population frankly admitted that they hated and feared the Americans during the war (Chapter 3).

Undoubtedly, owing to the limitations of the interview situation, the indicated proportion of people showing some form of fear-hatred toward the United States is a minimum estimate. Fear or politeness would have led a considerable number of people to give a noncommittal answer, or none at all. Similarly, the small proportion who said they had no ill feeling represents a maximum figure. Even with these qualifications, of course, the proportions are not an exact measure of propaganda effect, since many other influences determined attitudes toward the United States. They do constitute a negative check, since they indicate that the objective was in large measure achieved.

A few quotations from interviews will indicate the reactions of some of those accepting the propaganda line during the war. A housewife in Hagi said:

I felt that the Americans did not have to be so cruel. I thought them bad. In the newspaper—or was it a rumor—It was said that American tractors were used to run over Japanese prisoners and kill them by running over them. I felt that such tactics were barbarous . . . During the war I felt the newspaper and radio were telling us the complete truth.

A village woman stated:

I was fearful and hateful of America. I felt America had been belittling us because we are so small and of a different race. So I like to show them what we can do in modern war, which all white people are so proud of. I am sorry I am saying this, but this was my true feeling.

Conclusions: Reactions to Home Front Propaganda. It seems quite clear that Japanese propaganda was not successful in turning defeats convincingly into an appearance of victory, at least for a sizable proportion of the population. This is in fact an almost impossible task for any propagandist. While the

Japanese did not achieve the impossible, they did employ their hate propaganda against the United States with telling effect, so that even if people became discouraged about the war, they might carry on, to the last gasp, out of fear of the consequences of invasion and occupation. Where propaganda failed, it did so because of two factors: (1) The experience of the people did not square with the reports, as in the case of air-raid damage; and (2) the propaganda was internally inconsistent, as in the case of the repeated "Tennosan" battles. Even the most stupid could realize that you can lose only a certain number of "decisive" battles without losing a war.

American Propaganda Against Japan

Many of the Japanese were exposed to other propaganda than that from the Japanese radio, newspapers, and other official sources. Considerable American effort was put into propaganda to Japan, by radio—at first via short-wave from San Francisco and Hawaii and later via medium-wave from Saipan—and by leaflets. The success of these efforts would be reflected in weakened effectiveness of the official propaganda agencies and lowered will to resist. How successful were those efforts?

American Broadcast. Japanese civilians were asked, "During the war did you ever hear about any anti-Japanese radio broadcasts? What did you think of them? What did you hear about them? A tabulation of the replies indicates that over 90 percent of the population had no contact with the American broadcasts. Not more than 7 percent can be said to have been indirectly affected by them, and only 2 percent said that they had personally heard them.

TABLE 91.—*Exposure in American radio propaganda*

	Percent ^t
Never heard about broadcasts	91
Heard about broadcasts, but did not remember contents	3
Heard about broadcasts and remembered contents	2
Heard the broadcasts himself	2
No answer	2
	100

There are a number of explanations for this poor showing. In the first place, it was a serious and punishable offense to listen to enemy broadcasts. Secondly, most short-wave receivers were confiscated or sealed immediately after Pearl Harbor. Thirdly, civilian radios deteriorated and could not be repaired or replaced during the war, as no manufacture of parts for that purpose was carried on.

Fourthly, the government added to the difficulties of reception by fairly effective jamming of most programs. As one chief of police said, in talking of the Saipan radio,

It was heard here mostly at night. It would start out like this: "New Japanese broadcasts from Saipan," and when they got that far the Japanese broadcasting station would start to jam it, so jamming would prevent listening to the real program.

Some officials admitted that there was some listening. For example a Kempei captain said:

There was no great effect felt from American . . . short-wave broadcasts because . . . listening to such was prohibited. Some localities could hear the Saipan propaganda broadcasts due to favorable geographic conditions . . . The short-wave broadcasts told them they didn't have any Navy. They began to wonder if that was true.

An official of the Board of Information said:

The government was unable to suppress some listening to foreign broadcasts.

Those who did listen to the broadcasts were disposed to believe them, as the following quotations from interviews suggest:

An automobile mechanic in Osaka had this interesting account:

I heard them at Nishina-gun in a country home. We made a shelter under the house and often listened to the foreign broadcasts. We destroyed it as soon as the war ended. They told us of our war results and said, "This is the situation, so why don't you surrender?" To some extent I believed what they said and what our radio said and putting these two together and dividing it by half, that I thought was our result. But since the Solomons naval battle I started to believe more in America's broadcasts and went more often to the country house to listen in.

A clerk in Kano said:

Yes, I heard two or three broadcasts. They just told us about the attacks and occupation of certain places, around November and December of 1944. I thought if that were the case our chances of winning the war were pretty slim.

It may well be asked, in view of the small number of listeners, whether those who listened did not augment the audience by spreading rumors based on the American radio. Table 91 answers the question insofar as it concerns rumors directly identified with the radio. Testimony of an official of the Home Ministry's police bureau, who studied rumors during the war, indicated that there were "practically no instances" of rumors which stemmed from our radio. The government made its own use of the information, of course, usually by distortion. For example a Japanese government radio monitor stated to Morale Division interrogators that when

a news item came in to the effect that about five people had been killed by Japanese balloons in the Pacific Northwest, Domei released it as the killing of 500.

Use of Radio. While the radio had almost no effect on the rank and file of the population, the same is not entirely true of the small group of government and military officials, newspaper men, and the like in the large cities. One means of access to the material for this group was, of course, direct short-wave listening. Probably more important, however, were the leaks which occurred through the official Japanese monitoring operations and the news services, which multiplied by the spreading of such items by word of mouth within the group.

Monitoring operations were maintained by the foreign office, the Army and Navy Ministries, and Domei, the latter dealing almost entirely in Morse transmission. The most extensive set-up was in the foreign office, which issued regular digests of the radio news. Sixty to eighty copies of these were prepared and sent to various government offices and higher officials. Interestingly enough, all of the monitored transmissions from the United States were those in English, as the monitors felt that this was a faster means of getting the news. Some American broadcasts were so effectively jammed that even the official monitors had difficulty in receiving them. Various officials admitted the extent of leaks from these sources.

Other short-wave receivers existed also. The vice-chief of the Cabinet Board of Information told interrogators that while most of the 500 short-wave sets found in 1942 were "sealed . . . there were some left in the possession of persons who, by reason of their business, had reason to keep them." An important comment on the whole situation was given by a Kempei lieutenant colonel:

I never heard them (the broadcasts) myself, but I do know that some of the newspapers in Tokyo operated receivers (Asahi and Mainichi at least). We were told to leave them alone . . . It was pretty common knowledge around Tokyo that San Francisco broadcast from 7 to 11 PM, Tokyo time. When I was in Hokkaido in March 1945, there was a good deal of comment about the Saipan broadcasts . . . I believe they had a considerable effect. Most of the high-ranking government and military leaders listened every day, but the common people had no sets. Even so, a little of the information was bound to leak down to them. Most all Army officers of field grade rank and above knew about the broadcasts.

These leaks occurred despite elaborate precautions against reporting the radio material. An editorial writer for the Nippon Times said:

Some had access, like myself, to the monitoring reports. They were pretty careful of them, but of course the news leaked out about the shortcomings of the military.

An official of the police bureau admitted that he had access to the monitored reports and that in general he believed them, especially "When no announcements were made by the Japanese" about the Okinawa fighting. He also stated that while there were:

virtually no instances of foreign-inspired rumors among the common people . . . , in some cases there were rumors, mainly from famous or important people. They spoke to the police confidentially, and the police deduced that they had been listening to foreign news.

Thus, to the extent that our radio was supposed to influence the rank and file of the population in Japan, it was a complete failure. To the extent, however, that it was aimed at what the Japanese call the "intelligentsia," it was more nearly successful.³ It probably helped to strengthen the doubts and worries which better education and access to other kinds of information generated, and it may have contributed to the higher leadership's willingness to surrender.

American Leaflets. Both the American Army and Navy air forces made a considerable effort to get to the Japanese with various kinds of leaflets, designed to undermine their morale. At least 33 of the 43 major places included in the cross-section sample had had leaflets dropped on them at least once. These leaflets clearly had a much more extensive audience than did the radio. Nearly half (49 percent) of the population as a whole were sufficiently exposed to them, directly or by report, to remember something about their contents, and another 29 percent had had contact with them in these ways but did not recall what was in them. These estimates of exposure are certainly minimal, since a higher proportion of people recalled contents when asked about the specific leaflets announcing future raids (Table 97).

As might be expected, both exposure and recall were more frequent in the urban areas than in the rural. There was almost as high a proportion of urban people who saw them (26 percent) as of rural people who heard about them (27 percent).

³ As a matter of fact, in at least one instance, it appears to have had an annoying indirect effect, according to an army officer who was also an official of the Board of Information:

"As it was not possible to prevent the broadcasts made over the same wavelength as that on which our air defense transmissions were made, it became necessary to change the wave lengths for the air defense purposes frequently, which proved detrimental to their effectiveness."

The medium-wave broadcasts from Saipan, even if not generally received, had the authorities worried, according to the testimony of two informed high officials. In any case, it kept the Japanese busy jamming.

TABLE 92.—*Exposure to American propaganda leaflets*¹

	<i>Percent</i>
Heard of them only and remembered contents.....	30
Saw them and remembered contents.....	19
Heard of them, but did not recall contents.....	27
Saw them, but did not recall contents.....	2
Never heard of them or saw them.....	20
No answer.....	2
	100

¹ The questions were: "Did you know about American propaganda leaflets which were dropped during the war?" "What were the leaflets about?" and "What did you think of them?"

About 10 percent of those who saw them could not remember the contents, while almost half of those who only heard about them could not remember their contents, suggesting that direct contact was particularly important for effect. At the same time, the evidence from all sources indicates that "word of mouth" was by all odds the most important means of spreading the contents of the leaflets.

Of the people who were exposed to the leaflets and remembered something of the contents, which kinds were most frequently remembered? No very detailed statistical information on specific leaflets is available, but the general types are as follows:

TABLE 93

	<i>Percent</i>
The announcements of cities to be raided were most frequently remembered.....	30
General warnings to surrender came next.....	24
Condemnations of the militarists and officials were recalled much less frequently.....	11
as were promises of good treatment upon Japan's surrender.....	11
and threats of annihilation if Japan did not surrender.....	20

¹ These will be discussed in detail in a later section.

² In the Hiroshima-Nagasaki areas, this percent was 20, almost equal to the frequency of remembering announcements of future raids (24 percent). This was probably due to the dropping of the atomic bomb leaflet on the areas after the atom bomb raids. This leaflet made such a threat.

Mentioned by less than 5 percent were such items as: lack of food and supplies in Japan; promises to end militarist domination; inferiority of Japanese military equipment, industry, and defenses.

What were the reactions to these leaflets? Were they believed or were they dismissed as sheer propaganda?

The table below gives an indication of the general effect among those who recalled something of their contents.

TABLE 94.—*Reactions to leaflets*

	<i>Percent</i>
Believed them outright.....	32
Qualified belief (including those who disbelieved at first but later changed opinion).....	24
Disbelieved them.....	33
No answer.....	11
	100

While about as many disbelieved them as believed them outright, a substantial proportion expressed some qualified form of belief, making a total of over half who believed them to some degree. Only 3 percent of these who had knowledge of the leaflets said their reaction was belief, but also determination to fight on.

Examples of the reactions to the leaflets are readily available from interviews. These almost uniformly suggest that the early leaflet efforts were partly unsuccessful, because they were poorly adapted to the target. The chief of the Home Affairs Ministry's police bureau told interrogators:

At first they (the leaflets) were expected, and they were heavily discounted. They were quite poor and inappropriate at first. They were met by a considerable ignorance of real conditions on the part of the Japanese people. Soon, however, quality and choice of subject matter improved and . . . they met better acceptance . . . This was especially true from June 1945 on.

This official commented that the counterfeit ten-yen note, with an account of inflated prices printed on one side, was "particularly effective:"

In fact, this sort of note made quite a commotion in Japanese financial circles, because they feared that it would be followed by notes perfectly counterfeited, which would ruin Japanese finances and money.

A former vice-chief of the Cabinet Board of Information gives a similar picture:

In the early days they (the leaflets) had no effect. Confidence was high and the government had prepared people for them and anticipated them; people expected them. Furthermore, the first American pamphlets were quite ineffective by reason of the obsolete matter they contained, much of it referring to historical times . . . Many of them were simply attempts to intimidate through the use of symbols and as such were just laughed at. The ones that had an effect were factual ones comparing the strength in material and productivity of America and Japan.

A Nagasaki newspaper editor commented:

Some of it was pretty clever; most of it was quite bad. The best appeal was one which was based on a Japanese classic story which is much beloved by common people,

about a cat who assumed human features and was finally detected.

The kind of embarrassment caused by the leaflets is amusingly illustrated by the following account of an official of the peace preservation section of Home Ministry's police bureau:

On one occasion I went to Yamanashi prefecture to give a lecture to the police on American leaflets. This was one of the first prefectures in which American propaganda was dropped. I took with me a leaflet telling about the Imperial fleet losses and the war situation. I started to lecture about it and said that this was enemy propaganda and a lot of lies. When I began to read the material, the reaction of the audience was that this (leaflet) was probably true. This was embarrassing, because if the policemen felt that way, I believe the public believed it to an even greater extent.

An unexpected effect of the leaflets is indicated by the comment of a woman aircraft worker in Yokohama:

Mother said America must have all the raw material in the world. When I showed it (a leaflet) to her she said, "Look at the nice paper they use in spreading these leaflets."

Who were the believers and the disbelievers? Did they constitute special groups in other respects? What observations can be made on the reasons why people tended to believe? Was it strictly a matter of persuasion by the contents of the leaflets?

Belief Frequent. People of all ages and both sexes, looking only at those who said they remembered something of the leaflets' contents, tended to accept the message. The strongest disbelievers, however, were young women in the rural areas and young people generally in the cities. There was a slight tendency for older people to believe more frequently than younger.

Generally speaking, in both urban and rural areas, the believers tended to be people with less education than the disbelievers, although those with more education were more likely to have some knowledge of the contents of the leaflets (66 percent of the highest as against 25 percent in the lowest educational group). Among those who had some knowledge of the leaflets' contents, 41 percent of those with five or fewer years of education believed the leaflets outright and only 18 percent of them disbelieved, while only 28 percent of those with twelve or more years of education believed the leaflets outright and 39 percent disbelieved them.

This distribution raises a question, since generally those with the most education tended to have the lowest morale (Appendix R). It is likely that the nature of the leaflet propaganda was not convincing to the better educated, who may have had stronger reasons for doubting victory. Moreover, among

the less well educated, the familiar "sacredness" of the printed word very likely had a good deal to do with acceptance of the message.

Among people who had knowledge of the contents of leaflets, the various measures of bombing experience indicate that bombing had little to do with acceptance of the leaflets. Although the pattern is blurred, those in the heavily bombed urban areas were somewhat more likely to believe than those in cities which had less or no bombing. For instance, among those who had some knowledge of the leaflets' contents: 36 percent in heavily bombed large cities believed the leaflets, while only 27 percent in the smaller cities where destruction was low, believed them. The people of Tokyo reacted more like the people of the smaller cities than like those in the other large urban places which were devastated by the raids (Chapter 5).

The apparently small influence of bombing on belief in leaflets raises a general point which, with one or two exceptions, is true of all the measures which can be applied to the population—namely, that the most important factor influencing belief was whether or not people had knowledge of the leaflets' contents. Those who had some knowledge tended to believe, regardless of other factors.

This is illustrated by examination of one of the bombing measures.

TABLE 95.—Number of raids experienced and belief in leaflets

Raids experienced	Belief	Qualified belief	Disbelief	No knowledge of contents	No answer	Total
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
None.....	11	8	10	66	5	100
1-10.....	21	16	22	35	6	100
Over 10....	20	17	19	37	7	100

If those with no knowledge of the contents are eliminated from the calculations, all differences of any significance disappear. For example, the percentage believing becomes identical in all three groups (32 percent). This is the case in both urban and rural areas. Lack of knowledge of contents cannot, however, be interpreted simply as lack of exposure to leaflets, since it also includes those who saw or heard about them but could not recall anything about their contents. This forgetting may easily be a function of morale, since those who were fairly confident of Japan's position might not have been sufficiently impressed to remember, while those who were depressed would remember the contents which supported their existing tendencies. It seems important, therefore, to see how belief occurred among people with various levels of morale.

Among the measures of morale, that of certainty that Japan could not win "sure victory" is illustrative of the general pattern. Those who were never certain of this situation were most likely to disbelieve the leaflets. Among those who had knowledge of the contents of the leaflets, 46 percent of those who said they never were certain, disbelieved the leaflets, but only 27 percent of those who were certain disbelieved them. At the same time, it is worth noting that 21 percent of those who were never certain expressed unqualified belief in the leaflets and another 25 percent expressed qualified belief, a total equal to the proportion who disbelieved.

More of those who believed the leaflets felt that Japan was to blame for the bombing (59 percent). Only 49 percent of the disbelievers blamed Japan, although this was a larger proportion than the proportion of those who blamed America (13 percent).

Those who were critical of their leaders' conduct of the war were rather more likely to believe the leaflets than those who were not critical; 38 percent of those who were critical believed the leaflets, while only 29 percent of those who were not critical believed them. Similarly, in urban areas, those who were critical of leaders' conduct of the home front were rather more likely to believe. (The trend was the same among rural people, although the differences are not significant.) In urban areas, 33 percent of those who were critical believed the leaflets, while only 26 percent of those who were not critical believed them. In both of the latter cases there may be a casual relationship involved, since one of the major purposes of our leaflet propaganda was to undermine the population's confidence in military and civilian leadership.

Belief in leaflets is closely related to various measures of morale, which are summarized in the Morale Index (Appendix K). Those with high morale, among the people who knew of leaflets, were less likely to believe the leaflets than those with lower morale.

TABLE 96.—*Belief among people of various levels of morale*¹

	Belief	Qualified belief	Disbelief	No answer	Total
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Highest morale...	18	24	47	11	100
Higher moral....	27	29	35	9	100
Lower morale....	37	22	30	11	100
Lowest morale...	41	25	22	12	100

¹ Includes only those with some knowledge of leaflet contents.

In every morale group excepting the highest, those with some degree of belief (outright or quali-

fied) outnumbered the disbelievers. It should be pointed out that those with high morale were less likely to have knowledge of the leaflets' contents than those with low morale (51 percent in the high morale group had no knowledge of contents as against 48 percent in the second highest, 46 percent in the third, and 36 percent in the lowest group). The fact that morale is related to belief in leaflets, modifies in some measure the importance of exposure, although it does not by any means eliminate it.

The question which then occurs is whether low morale made people believe or the leaflets lowered morale. This is one of those questions which it is extremely difficult to answer conclusively, and it is complicated particularly by the fact that the leaflet campaign occurred simultaneously with a composite of military, bombing, and heightened food difficulties, which also influenced morale. One measure, however, is to see when the believers first were certain that Japan could not win the victory.

Among those who had knowledge of the leaflets' contents; 27 percent of those who believed the leaflets, but only 21 percent of those who did not believe, were certain by the end of March 1945, that Japan could not win. By 1 July 1945, 54 percent of those who believed the leaflets, but only 41 percent of those who disbelieved, were certain that Japan could not win.

It is clear that believers became certain earlier than the disbelievers. It is likely that in a significant proportion of the cases, those who believed the leaflets were persons whose morale was already low. This does not mean that this was so in all or in most cases, since the differences between believers and disbelievers increase through time, and since bombing experience only slightly differentiates between two groups.

Summary: American Propaganda against Japan. It is clear that the leaflets had a large measure of success, both in securing an audience and in convincing it. Over half the population was reached by them, and nearly half remembered something about their contents three months after the surrender. Of those who remembered something, well over half expressed belief. Belief was strikingly uniform throughout the population, but it tended to occur more frequently among the older and less well educated. Probably the most important factor in determining belief was simply exposure, as bombing experience was only slightly related. There is also evidence to indicate that, while the leaflets undoubtedly lowered morale, in at least a share of

the cases those who believed the leaflets were already low in morale.

Announcements of Future Raids

One of the most spectacular moves in psychological warfare was the United States Strategic Air Forces' announcement to the Japanese people of three series of cities that it promised to destroy (four or more cities in each series) "in the next few days." By this warning to evacuate, the power of the American air arm and the contempt in which it held the Japanese defenders were convincingly demonstrated. On 27 July 1945, 60,000 leaflets were dropped on each of 11 cities; on 1 August the same number were dropped on another set of 11; and on 4 August 720,000 leaflets warned a third list of 12 cities. Some leaflets with these lists on them were dropped on other cities, of course, and the warnings were also carried on our radio. Six of the warned cities were points in the cross-section sample.

Both because of the intrinsic significance of this propaganda effort and because it was an example of the general campaign, special questions concerning the announcements were asked of all respondents: "Did you ever hear about the Americans announcing they were going to bomb cities before they actually did? What did you think about it?" The general effectiveness of the leaflets bearing these announcements has been suggested above. What proportion of the population was actually reached by the warning? Were the warnings believed? What other reactions did the people have?

TABLE 97.—*Exposure to announcements of future raids*

	Percent
Informed of the announcements (various means)-----	59
No exposure-----	37
Don't know; no answer-----	4
	100

Exposure was more general among urban people (66 percent) than among rural people (55 percent). The proportion who said they were informed about the announcements is higher than the percentage who said they remembered something of the contents of leaflets in general. The explanation for this is partly that the announcements were also carried on the radio. People recalled raid announcements when asked the specific question while they did not remember contents when confronted with the earlier, more general query about leaflets.

The replies indicating how they had been informed of the announcements bear out the conclusions arrived at in discussion of leaflets in general. The largest group were exposed by the "word of

mouth" reports of relatives and friends. The next most important means was the leaflets and the third, of almost negligible significance, was the radio.

Almost two-thirds of the exposed population expressed belief to some degree. More people in rural areas specifically stated disbelief than in urban areas (19 percent as against 12 percent), undoubtedly because the former had less reason to know the power of the B-29's. Among those who were exposed to the announcements, 61 percent said that they believed them, 14 percent indicated disbelief, and for 25 percent no rating on belief was possible. The most important reason given for believing the announcements was that when the bombing was actually carried out in some of the cities listed, disbelief in or uncertainty of the truth of the announcements was dissipated. No better illustration could be found of the high propaganda value of the device. As might be expected, the only important reason given for disbelief was the feeling that the announcements were just rumor or propaganda. *Evacuation of Warned Towns.* When reactions other than belief are examined, it appears that the most common feeling was fright or terror. Defeatism because of America's power was also common. Relatively few stated specifically that they got out of town, but somewhat larger proportions said they made orderly preparations to evacuate or expressed approval of the warnings because they gave civilians time to evacuate (one of the major points on the leaflets). In view of the small representation of warned towns in the sample taken, it is probable that evacuation was much more common in those places than would be indicated by the proportions in the general sample. Simple amazement was a fairly common reaction, and a few expressed mortification that Japan was unable to repel the attacks despite the warning, or stated that they were relieved that their towns were not listed.

A female school teacher in Nagaoka told interviewers:

I believed the Americans were honest and good people in letting us know in advance of impending raids. They even notified us of this raid in Nagaoka, but because the news was restricted by the government, not many people knew. I heard, so I moved and three days later they raided Nagaoka.

A factory worker in Akita gave a similar story:

I felt that America's character appeared. They were not barbarians. They gave us notice. They said to evacuate.

An unusual story was told by the manager of the largest plant in Nagaoka:

The leaflets had a great effect on the morale of the people. They figured that if the enemy could announce a raid before

hand, the enemy was superior. When I read the leaflets telling that we were going to be bombed, I moved my essential machinery out of the factory. The removal of essential machinery caused production to drop by one-third.

A double effect of the raid announcements, in inducing evacuation and producing belief in all our propaganda, once the raids actually occurred as announced, is illustrated by the comment of an official of the Tokyo metropolitan government:

Since they found that Allied air-raid warnings could be depended upon, people started to believe any kind of propaganda, and, proportionately, their desire to continue the war was rapidly deteriorating.

Those Who Believed. Who were the believers? Were they a uniform section of the population? What reasons led them to believe? Do they differ from those believing leaflets in general?

Age seems to have had little to do with belief in the announcements, if the non-exposed are excluded, although there was a tendency for the younger people to be less believing. (In rural areas the older people were more skeptical.) Sex apparently made some difference, as men in every age group were more likely to believe than women. Young women again were the most likely disbelievers.

Unlike leaflets in general, belief in raid announcements shows almost no relationship with education, if only those who were exposed and those who answered the question are considered.

As might be expected, belief in raid announcements was more affected by bombing experience than belief in leaflets in general. Among those exposed to the announcements, 33 percent of those who had experienced no raids believed, while 38 percent of those who had experienced one to ten raids believed. Forty-four percent of those who had experienced more than ten raids believed.

Also predictable was the fact that people in the smaller and more lightly bombed cities were somewhat more likely to believe (37 percent) than those in the heavily bombed places (31 percent). The latter were those who found the names of their cities on the leaflets and who had come to expect that they were "next" anyhow, since almost all the larger places had already been destroyed. Evacuees to rural areas were the group most likely (45 percent) to credit the truth of the announcements.

Somewhat more important than bombing experience, however, was exposure. It was more significant than age, sex, or education. Moreover, as indicated in Table 98, if the effect upon belief of the number of raids experienced is calculated with inclusion of those not exposed, the differences shown

are much increased, and the pattern is blurred, since disbelief also increases with bombing experience. The figures become meaningful if the non-exposed group is excluded, which indicates the importance of exposure as a controlling factor.

TABLE 98.—*Belief in announcements and number of raids experienced*

Raids experienced	Belief	Uncertain	Disbelief	Not exposed	No answer	Total
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
0-----	17	12	6	49	16	100
1-10-----	24	16	9	36	15	100
Over 10-----	30	14	10	32	14	100

What about morale and belief? Is the same pattern true for the raid announcements as for leaflets in general? Among the specific measures of morale, the data certainly that Japan could not win victory indicate that the people who were never certain were much less likely to believe than those who were certain. Those who believed were more likely to blame Japan for the bombing (63 percent) than the disbelievers (57 percent). In the general Morale Index, those with higher morale were more likely to disbelieve than those with lower morale, as the following tabulation shows:

TABLE 99.—*Morale and belief in raid announcements*

	Belief	Uncertain	Disbelief	Not exposed	No answer	Total
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Highest morale---	18	13	12	46	11	100
Higher morale---	20	14	8	43	15	100
Lower morale---	25	15	8	39	13	100
Lowest morale---	29	13	6	31	21	100

Omission of the non-exposed group decreases the differences only slightly.

On the possible morale-depressing effects of the raid announcements the evidence is no more clear than in the case of leaflets. Those who believed the announcements tended to be persons whose morale had declined earlier, as indicated by the timing of certainty that Japan could not win sure victory.

TABLE 100.—*Timing of certainty that Japan couldn't win (cumulative) and belief in raid announcements*

Of those who indicated—	The following percentages were certain by—			
	March 1945	June 1945	15 August 1945	No answer or never certain
Belief-----	<i>Percent</i> 24	<i>Percent</i> 54	<i>Percent</i> 71	<i>Percent</i> 29
Uncertain-----	19	47	67	33
Disbelief-----	18	38	60	40

It is clear that a sizable proportion of those who believed the leaflets must have been persons whose morale was already fairly low, although this does not mean that the announcements did not affect morale. In fact, the frequency with which the announcements were remembered and the comments from documentary sources indicate that morale was materially affected by the prior announcement device.

Summary: Announcements of Future Raids. It is apparent that the raid announcements were highly successful. They reached a large proportion of the population and had the desired effects in a significant proportion of cases: getting people to evacuate the cities named and depressing morale. While there were differences between the believers and disbelievers, the most significant factor in inducing belief was simply the matter of whether or not people were exposed to the announcement. In this connection, the significance of rumor channels for spreading our propaganda message is strikingly clear, as is the unimportance of the radio and the relatively greater effect of leaflets.

Those who had experienced raids were more likely to believe than those who had not, although people in cities of the type on the lists—the small, unbombed places—were somewhat more likely to believe than those in the large cities which had already been badly bombed. Finally, while people whose morale was already low were more likely to believe than those with higher morale, the effect of the announcements in reducing the will to resist should not be minimized. They were one of the most spectacular efforts of the war.

Japanese Efforts to Counter American Propaganda

A government which mistrusts its own people will worry as much about enemy propaganda as about freedom of speech at home. The Japanese government was no exception. It made every conceivable effort to prevent the effectiveness of our psychological warfare, excepting of course, the effort to change some of the conditions which made that success possible.

The most successful counter-effort has already been mentioned in discussing the radio, i. e., jamming. The effectiveness of this effort, particularly among the rank and file, is evidenced by the figures on the proportion of the population which heard our broadcasts. There is some evidence, however, that the government was not quite sure that it had been successful in jamming. Thus a home broadcast of 6 April 1945 stated:

With the intent of stirring up confusion on the home front of Japan, the enemy has set up a broadcasting station on Saipan, and they are desperately sending Japanese-language programs, in an attempt to address the general public of Japan. To cope with this the . . . authorities have adopted carefully prepared countermeasures . . . However, should such demagogic propaganda come into the general public's understanding, the best thing for them to do is not to listen to it . . . Should there be anyone who listens to such a broadcast, contrary to our expectations, he must naturally be subjected to questioning. So we wish everyone to be cautious.

Of course, listening to enemy broadcasts was punishable in Japan throughout the war. A similar and very strong effort was made against the leaflets, by requiring people to turn them in to the police without reading them. It is apparent that this was not very effective as a check on leaflet propaganda. Some officials interviewed stoutly held to the line that all people complied with this regulation at once—anything else was unthinkable—so the leaflets failed. More candid informants indicate the contrary. A portion of the Sawada Commission report to the Suzuki government, based on a study of propaganda agencies in June 1945, stated:

This commission feels especially that it is not only important to collect the enemy propaganda leaflets from the skies, but we must take immediate measures to control this propaganda.

The head of the Home Ministry's police bureau told interrogators:

The police estimate that at first 70 to 80 percent of the leaflets were turned in. Toward the end, they estimate, the number turned in did not top 50 percent of those dropped.

Just how the police were able to estimate the proportion turned in is a little uncertain, but their estimates illustrate the point.

Another device used against the leaflets, apparently on official orders, was the spread of rumors that they were "bobby traps." Informants report having heard that fountain pens had been dropped in one locality and that children who picked them up had been injured, that there was poison on the leaflets, or that they exploded if they were picked up.

Counter-propaganda per se was an obvious device. The anti-American propaganda discussed above certainly had this as one object. Another approach which was heavily used during the last year of the war was to assert that war was a thing of the spirit and that those who kept their spirit high were helping to win—"Don't lose the battle of thoughts." There were repeated warnings against our propaganda during the last few months, assert-

ing that it was the cause of all the difficulties suffered by the German and Italian peoples.

As the evidence in the foregoing pages indicates, none of these devices could prevent the spread and acceptance of our message, helped as it was by the events known to the Japanese people and by the shortcomings of their own propaganda. When it became successful, it required modification of the Japanese information policy. A prominent newspaper man, head of the Jiji News Agency stated:

Because of the American pamphlets, the Japanese government had to open up a little bit on its news releases.

Conclusions: Control of Morale by Propaganda

A large measure of the fear with which the effects of propaganda (upon other people) are popularly regarded is due to the assumption usually implicit, that propaganda is an independent influence. Nowhere is the falsity of this fear more clearly demonstrated than in wartime Japan, whether one looks at the Japanese propaganda or at our own. Propaganda cannot change known events completely, and experience which leads a person's attitudes strongly in one direction will not be offset by authoritative assertions to the contrary. If propaganda is to make people believe lies, it must have a monopoly on the release of facts, as well as tell people the lies they want to hear.

Thus, propaganda may be skillful, but unsuccessful, and it may be successful though unskillful. Japanese propaganda in Japan failed for two reasons: it was unskillful in numerous particulars, and it was fatally handicapped by the effect of events which could not be kept from its audience. This is the affliction of all defensive propaganda. Claims of the invulnerability of the homeland, and the characterization of a series of campaigns as "decisive," before they were won, were unskillful propaganda. Especially, the latter was a mistake which revealed the truth even to the more ignorant. (It illustrates, incidentally, the importance for morale of basing war propaganda strategy on a realistic appraisal of the military situation.)

Nevertheless, Japanese propaganda about military events was reasonably successful until it was


contradicted by events. The retreat in the Solomons could be pictured as a mere change of front, since it occurred far away, in a place whose strategic meaning was hidden from all but the most sophisticated, even though reports from the soldiers at the front might have indicated the truth. But as Saipan, Guam, Leyte, Luzon, Iwo, and Okinawa fell—places increasingly meaningful to most of the Japanese population—no amount of propaganda to the contrary could convince all the population that Japan was going to win the war.

Propaganda about Americans, however, a people really little known to most Japanese, largely succeeded just because of that fact. Few Japanese had any basis for doubting that we were brutal and barbarous. Though the "line" backfired after the surrender, when the Japanese found that Americans were decent people, it was successful while the war was on.

American propaganda to Japan was successful for just the reason that the Japanese effort failed. It was able to take advantage of a series of events which were known to the Japanese people and which their government could not effectively deny. There is evidence that it was unskillful in various particulars, but this factor made little difference in the long run. Where our propaganda got to its audience, it was successful.

The radio did not get a mass audience, but only a small and rather select one. It failed to achieve mass objectives, assuming that that was its purpose, to the extent that it was deliberately aimed at the small group of intellectuals, business men, government officials, and military people near the top of Japanese society. It was both skillful and successful, over a wide segment of this group.

On the other hand, the leaflets were a success, and it can be asserted with reason that our propaganda was not highly effective until the leaflets could be employed. They helped separate some citizens from their leaders, and generally capitalized effectively upon military and home front situations which were known to the people, and from which only a moral needed to be drawn.



“Thinking about the world situation and the internal Japanese situation, to continue the war means nothing but the destruction of the whole nation.”

Chapter II

THE ROLE OF MORALE IN JAPAN'S SURRENDER

As has been mentioned previously in this report, by May 1945 Japan had begun to move deliberately toward surrender (Chapter 8). In mid-April, Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki had been named premier, and had been given definite instructions "to bring the war to a conclusion as quickly as possible." A report on Japan's fighting capabilities as of early June, prepared by Suzuki's chief cabinet secretary, Hisatsune Sakomizu, arrayed the grim complex of forces which were recognized by a goodly part of the ruling group and which were forcing them to sue for peace.

In introducing this discussion of the surrender, it is important to have some idea of the picture presented to the government. Sakomizu's report, called "A Survey of National Resources as of 1-10 June 1945," stated in part:

A. General

The ominous turn of the war, coupled with the increasing tempo of the air raids, is bringing about great disruption of land and sea communications and essential war production. The food situation has worsened. It has become increasingly difficult to meet the requirements of total war. Moreover, it has become necessary to pay careful attention to the trends in public sentiment.

B. National Trends in General

Morale is high, but there is dissatisfaction with the present regime. Criticism of the government and the military are increasing. The people are losing confidence in their leaders and the gloomy omen of deterioration in public morale is present. The spirit of public sacrifice is lagging and among leading intellectuals there are some who advocate peace negotiations as a way out.¹

C. Manpower

1. As compared with material resources, there is a relative surplus of manpower, but there is no efficient exploitation of it . . . On the other hand, the case of military mobilization does not permit optimism.

2. The physical standard (of health) and the birth rate of the people are on the down grade.

The report went into the great difficulties of production and land and water communications. It treated the severe shortages of material resources—steel, coal, industrial salts, oil, and the deficit in "modern weapons, with aircraft as a nucleus." It

¹ This statement is typical of official Japanese statements on morale and other subjects. No one would dare to admit openly, and generally, that things were as bad as they were. However, in the detail of reports, the intended impression would be conveyed. Sakomizu's own testimony to Morale Division interrogators was that he took a dim view indeed of public morale.

paid its respects to the effectiveness of the air and sea blockades, and the destruction brought by the air raids. The report went on to say:

F. National Living Conditions

1. *Foodstuffs:* The food situation has grown worse and a crisis will be reached at the end of this year. The people will have to get along on an absolute minimum of rice and salt required for subsistence, considering . . . the appearance of starvation conditions in the isolated sections of the nation. It is apparent that the food situation will become further aggravated this year.

2. *Living Conditions:* From now on prices will rise sharply, bringing on inflation which will seriously undermine the wartime economy.

These manifold evidences of the effectiveness of the American attack and Japan's weaknesses existed concurrently. To parcel out the influence of any single factor on the surrender is not possible. This chapter will attempt some evaluation of the relation of public opinion and popular morale in the surrender process in Japan. To do so, it will go into the nature of the political machinery through which the pressures of adversity had to operate, and the successive stages of development of the surrender process.²

The Politics of Surrender

How is a country brought to the point of surrender?

War has no inexplicable biological life cycle. It has no mysterious "course" to run once it has been started. Its duration will always depend on the fortunes and sinews of war, on the machines, men, and institutions of the antagonists.

The final defeat of a nation at war may come about in at least two ways. In the first place, a country may be suddenly invaded and occupied by the forces of another, as were the Low Countries in 1940. Defeat is then not in part a function of internal politics. It is not debated and accepted. There are no alternatives.

On the other hand, at some point during the struggle, say after a key battle, a nation (or its leaders) may find that ultimate defeat is inevitable, but that it retains the capacity to prolong the war for a considerable period. In such cases, the timing

² See USSBS report, *Japan's Struggle to End the War*, and report of the Overall Economic Effects Division, USSBS.

of surrender is largely determined by the internal political situation, and the pressures of the battlefield upon it. Surrender may be long delayed, or may occur immediately, depending upon events and circumstances between the time when a substantial portion of the ruling group recognizes the inevitability of defeat, and the time that recognition is expressed in surrender. Among the circumstances are those associated with popular morale.

For example, if the population has been effectively sealed off (either through control of information or through ignorance, or both) from the facts or the implications of past defeats, morale may be too high to permit surrender immediately, even though the government may be convinced of impending defeat. It may have to delay action until the general public can be led to see the situation in a similar light.

Again, if the government has been tardy in recognizing impending defeat or in effecting necessary political realignments preliminary to surrender, morale may become so low as to force surrender suddenly. In this case, defeat may involve the abdication or overthrow of the government, with a substitute group, closer to public feeling, actually arranging the surrender.

Finally, the time lag will be lengthened or shortened, according to the degree to which public opinion can influence political decisions. In a country like the United States, where there are strong and well-established means of expressing public attitudes in political councils, periods of decision are generally shorter, both because opinion may force a speed-up and because political leaders can be more or less confident that they know what public attitudes are. On the other hand, if public opinion has not been so institutionalized, if it plays an essentially secondary role in the formation of government policy, the final act of surrender may be considerably delayed.

The primary feature of the Japanese decision to surrender was that it was finally arrived at, though with some delay, after it was recognized that Japan's strategic position was hopeless, but before invasion. Not all elements in the governing group publicly recognized this fact, nor did they need to, so long as the peace faction within the oligarchy was strong enough to dominate.

What factors caused the formation of a peace group? How did it rise to dominance? Why did the surrender come precisely when it did? What was the relation of public morale to the patterns of political decision?

No one familiar with Japan need have been astonished at the length of time required to arrive at the decision to surrender. The wartime importance of public morale and related matters to the Japanese government must be viewed in the light of the extent to which public opinion and public participation had been built into the political institutions and practices of Japan in the years before the war. These forms had their roots deep in the past. They derive in large measure from the fact that the Japanese nation emerged late and rapidly out of a feudal system and, after years of threatened reduction to a colonial status, at an even later date became one of the great powers in world politics. This circumstance produced two general conditions limiting the role of public opinion. First, although feudalism was destroyed, its demise was not followed by the extensive development of political freedoms. These were either entirely absent or held to an absolute minimum. Political liberalism, in such forms as were established by the constitution granted by the Emperor in 1889, made its slight gains only through a process of partial concession reminiscent of, and partly patterned after, the Germany of Bismarck. Secondly, the core of state activity continued to be the national bureaucracy, whose powers and prerogatives were almost entirely beyond reach of such popular controls, e. g., the Diet, as were established by the constitution. Even in financial matters, the Diet could usually do little more than delay the appropriations requested by the bureaucracy.

Thus the government of Japan was solidly above the currents of public opinion, habitually ignoring them until they reached such proportions that concessions were inevitable. As the mayor of a small locality in Japan put it:

The leaders are a class apart from the people. Thus, in Japan the nation moves on two different levels at one time.

Although the agencies of the political leadership were always alerted to possible subversion or disaffection, the rulers apparently consciously or unconsciously assumed that long indoctrination in the cultural values of obedience and disciplined behavior was so successful that popular support could be regarded as axiomatic. To be sure, now and then the people needed spurring, but for the more serious matters, in cases where indoctrination was unsuccessful or a failure to isolate people from "foreign" ideas existed, the police and propaganda apparatuses were available.

The Cabinet, moreover, frequently made important decisions without even permitting public debate in the Diet.³ The government was essentially one in which actions on all national matters came from the top down. This was the dominant characteristic, despite some more liberal practices. Manhood suffrage in elections for the Diet and the prefectural assemblies was not without significance, although the ineffectiveness of these agencies in the general political context, particularly during the war, severely limited its importance. It is significant that both male suffrage and the first very severe "dangerous thoughts" law were adopted in the same year, 1925. Newspaper criticism, which had some importance in the years before 1937, became almost completely impotent in the face of government censorship and control.

This persistent domination and paternalism in Japanese politics occasionally produced violent reaction. Groups with a grievance which they could not express through the established channels of government organized for more direct means of demanding a hearing. Moreover, the superficial character of Japanese representative institutions and their attendant ineffectiveness made them liable to widespread abuse. Consequently impatience with "democratic" processes developed. These factors combined, in the 1930's, with the development of the "young officers" clique, to discredit representative devices and pave the way for their virtual elimination.

The wartime political pattern followed essentially the same lines, with differences in degree, as the war progressed. The practice was at its extreme under the Tojo government, when, as a former official of the Tojo Cabinet planning board put it, the prime minister, "especially, would not listen to anything about the sentiment of the people." One major reason for this was that Japanese strategic assumptions about the war did not require any unusual concern for public morale. A long debilitating war was not contemplated. Rather, the plan was based on the expectation that Germany would shortly defeat the Soviet Union, that Great Britain would, therefore, be doomed, and that under these circumstances the United States, after a few defeats like that at Pearl Harbor, would be willing to accept a negotiated settlement. As Tojo's chief Cabinet secretary told Morale Division interrogators:

There was never any thought, of course, of gaining a

³ Within the governing group, as will be more fully discussed in this chapter, informal and formal pressures by the military, the great families, and other cliques led to the formation of a consensus which governed policy, and was transmitted downward.

decisive victory over America, that is, of landing on the American continent and bringing America to her knees . . .

Because the war was to be short—6 months to 2 years—with limited commitments, the demands upon the Japanese population were not to be severe enough to require unusual attention to morale.

Under these circumstances, the only orderly way in which public opinion could be expressed was through the actions of one or more of the politically important segments of the ruling class. These were in no very direct sense dependent upon public opinion, but, where the interests of such a segment happened to coincide with popular feeling, public opinion could be relied upon and used by them in the factional struggle. What were these factions? How did they operate?

Japanese Government A Coalition of Competing Factions

The government of Japan was an oligarchy, a coalition of factions of the ruling class. While these factions were not continuously at odds, the coalitions were always somewhat unstable, and real rivalry existed within some of them. No brief statement of what these factions were can be quite satisfactory, as the pattern is confused by a number of factors, not the least of which was the extent to which the membership of certain of them overlapped. Despite these limitations, however, five fairly clearly differentiated groups can be listed.

The Army. The Army's political roots and prestige go back centuries, into the feudal period. The soldier has always been an important political force and while, during the Meiji period, as a former premier told interrogators, "the power of the military seemed to have decreased, we cannot say that there was any period in Japan's history when the military were out . . ." In recent decades the military, and particularly the Army, used its constitutional position of being responsible only to the Emperor to dissolve cabinets, to control their composition and policies by the withdrawal or threat to withdraw war or Navy ministers from the Cabinet, and to carry out programs independent of or even inconsistent with those of civilian leaders, for example, the foreign minister. Since 1930 the Army, spurred by the "young officers" who exercised wide influence by persuasion and more violent methods, and pushed by the fanatic elements in local military organizations such as the Kwantung Army, became the source of most of the expansionist efforts in Japan. The fact that an important segment of the Japanese Army's officer group was drawn from poor rural

families made them receptive to views hostile to the monopolist and exploitative economic system of the country. Hence, the presence of "radicals" within the "young officers" ranks. Moreover, the Army had something of a mass base, not only within its own organization, but also through its control of the schools and its extensive reservist and related organizations. To the extent, therefore, that Japan had any institution corresponding to the Nazi fanatics in Germany, the Army may well be described as that body.

The Navy. While "the military" is a collective term appropriate for some purposes in Japan, it is necessary to distinguish the Army from the Navy politically. Rivalry existed between the services, as in other countries, but the fight for prestige had reached incredible limits in Japan. Prince Higashi-Kuni told interrogators, for example, that the Navy never made known to the Army, officially, the extent of the defeat at Midway. Generally the Navy, with its more extensive contacts in the Western hemisphere, was more cautious and more conservative than the Army. After 1930 its political influence was seriously overshadowed by the Army, and while its leadership was less fanatic than the Army's, its younger officers had been influenced considerably by their Army colleagues. The result was that the Navy was in effect led by the Army. Thus, Admiral Takagi of the naval general staff told interviewers that while Navy leadership opposed the war, they were not strong enough to overcome the Army insistence. (This was, of course, helped by the desperate position the international oil embargo of 1941 forced on the Navy.) Moreover, Admiral Toyoda, Navy chief of staff under the Suzuki government, indicated that the recapture of Navy prestige was one of the reasons for the hazardous fleet engagement off Leyte in October 1944.

The Zaibatsu. The big industrial and commercial combines, Zaibatsu, have been closely associated with Japanese expansionism from the beginning. They were fostered in the Meiji era as one means of providing Japan with the necessities for protection against encroachment by the colonial powers. The control of raw materials and markets outside Japan was a major interest of this group and indeed, almost a necessary one for their prosperity. They occasionally clashed with the Army, especially the collectivist elements in it, over exploitation of occupied territory and control of the domestic economy. However, if they opposed war with the United States, they did little about it and more or less ac-

quiesced to the war as being in their interests. Here, a distinction should be made between the "old Zaibatsu" and the "new" who, like the Nakajima interests, were a product of the expansion of war industry and were hence more zealous in support of Army plans. Both groups, primarily the elder, had close familial connections with the military, the court, and the professional politicians. The "new Zaibatsu," because they were parvenus, did not have the aristocratic social and political position of the "old" and thus were largely satellites of the Army extremists.

Aristocrats and Elder Statesmen. This group overlaps those already mentioned, but can be differentiated in some respects. It was a small but powerful group, made up of privy councillors, former premiers, high officials of the state, interested in conserving and protecting the "status quo" but operating almost entirely in a negative or restraining way. Marquis Kido, Baron Suzuki, Baron Hiranuma, and Admiral Okada are good examples of its membership.

Bureaucrats and Professional Politicians. These are less important than the others for present purposes, but they occasionally became important. The politicians were anxious to protect certain exploitative privileges accruing to them. The bureaucrats were important because of their semi-independent position, plus their wide discretionary powers

The Process of Political Decision

Many of these factions were centered in various governmental bodies, including not only the War and Navy Ministries and the military staffs, but also the Privy Council, various cabinet ministries (in particular the Home Ministry), and the Imperial Household Ministry. This fact, plus the continuing rivalries among the groups, meant that political policy was set through a curious process of bargaining, which involved an almost perpetual forming and reforming of coalitions within the oligarchy. The process required a careful consultation of all factions and unanimity among leaders before the government could take a major policy step. (This applies to the Cabinet but less to the military services, which, as noted, frequently operated as they pleased while retaining a check on the civilians.) When unanimity could not be achieved and opposition grew threatening, the coalition had to be reshuffled, and even Army-led coalitions were occasionally forced into changes of personnel or policy by this means.

These groups, through the political institutions they controlled, assumed collective responsibility for the actions of the government. Such responsibility, of course, was taken in the name of the Emperor, although it was the result of manipulations among the factions. Control of the Emperor was, therefore, an important stake in the rivalry. At least since 1931 the military, particularly the Army, exercised almost complete control through this symbol, whose impartiality, wisdom, humanity, and demi-divinity were thoroughly impressed on the population through elaborate indoctrination. He was the unifying and stabilizing symbol which covered the strife among the factions. Finally, it should be noted that the Cabinet, which was, in a sense, the focus of this strife, was not necessarily representative of the segments of the Diet. The War and Navy ministers were, of course, selected by the services. The selection of the remaining members did not need to have any relation to the complexion of the legislature.

Selection of the prime minister emerged from maneuvers carried on in circles close to the court. In recent years the central figure in these negotiations was the Lord Privy Seal, Marquis Kido, who based his recommendations to the Emperor upon consultations with members of the various factions and upon assessment and adjustment of their demands and relative strengths. The remaining ministers were selected by the prime minister with due regard for the same considerations. The Cabinet was, in effect, responsible first to the Emperor and next to the legislature, not to the people.

These were the processes and elements through which popular opinion might be "represented" in the councils of government. What means had the participants to know the state of public morale?

Morale Information Available to the Coalitions. As is pointed out elsewhere in this report, the devices available to the government for studying and measuring public opinion were few and inadequate (Chapter 9). The traditional policy of repression of dissident opinion, the almost complete absence of skilled personnel to analyze morale trends, and the risks involved, even for officials, in collecting or using such information, all combined to assign such functions to a minor role. Such information as was available was little used, although there was an increase of interest within the successive war cabinets. There is evidence, for example, that the reports of the peace preservation section of the Home Affairs Ministry's police bureau received almost no circulation in the government until the last

months of the war, for fear the unpleasant items they contained would evoke hostile action from the zealots.

The Tojo government relied for such information as it required primarily upon the Kempei reports, as did the Koiso cabinet. Under Suzuki the Home Ministry's reports were also used, and two new devices were employed. A Cabinet advisors' commission, the Sawada Commission, was appointed by Suzuki in June 1945, to study the state of public morale and to suggest changes in policy. The methods and influence of this commission are of little importance, but the interest represented by its establishment is. Also, in April 1945, the government had Domei gather reports on morale through its local agents throughout Japan.⁴ These changes indicated increased concern for morale, but they brought little improvement in the adequacy of information available.

The consequences of this inadequacy are not astonishing. When cases of strikes or subversion came to the attention of the government or when the newspapers cautiously criticized the government, it was impossible to know the extent or intensity of the attitudes they represented, with any degree of accuracy. The result was that they were interpreted according to the wishes or fears of the official hearing about them. Thus it was possible for Baron Hiranuma to feel that "the general population was not aware of the war situation" until after the surrender; and for Prince Konoye to fear the possibility of a Communist revolution. Few observers were as sophisticated as an official of the Home Ministry, who commented to interrogators:

These various antimilitary and antiwar feelings came, not so much from an ideological basis, but from the hearts of the people.

These were the limitations upon public opinion as a force in Japanese politics.

The Role of Morale in War and Surrender

Supremacy of the Army, 1941-44. General Tojo's assumption of the premiership in October 1941 meant the complete dominance of the extremist Army faction and its satellites among the Zaibatsu, the Navy, and elsewhere. Neither the accepted practice nor, as has been seen, the basic strategy of the ensuing war, led this group to any concern for public opinion, except in the repressive sense. Even home front propaganda was a minor matter with which the Cabinet did not particularly concern itself. The only exception was that complaints about food were considered seriously; even the Tojo group

⁴ The Morale Division has copies of the Domei and Sawada reports in its files.

felt required to give these continuing attentions. As the war dragged on, however, beyond the point of settlement expected in the original plans, some of those in the government began to feel the need for more adequate information on public opinion. Tojo's chief Cabinet secretary, asked whether he had ever suggested this need to the prime minister, stated:

Yes, I frequently spoke of such a thing, but I made no positive suggestions or concrete proposals for it. I think now, as I look back on it, that it was unfortunate that something was not done along that line.

Perhaps one reason for this concern was the increasing criticism of Tojo from within the ruling class. This became important in the spring of 1944, as a consequence of Japan's losses up to that time, the frantic efforts to increase arms production, and Tojo's personal assumption of three major cabinet portfolios in addition to that of premier. This opposition, if it can be called such, was not entirely unified. A part of it came from zealots who thought that dropping Tojo would encourage more effective prosecution of the war. The more significant groups were those who saw in Tojo the obstacle to immediate unconditional surrender. The principal center for these two was the group of former prime ministers (Jushin), particularly such persons as Admiral Okada, Prince Konoye, and Admiral Yonai, the latter a sort of focus of the opposition. When criticism from this group became strong, Tojo hoped to strengthen his coalition by attempting to bring Admiral Yonai into the Cabinet. His refusal, backed by the other Jushin, and the fall of Saipan were the fatal blows to the first war government.

The significant thing about these moves is that they were almost completely independent of public opinion. As previous chapters have indicated, few of the rank and file had become dubious about victory this early. Rather, the group drew their conclusions from "inside" knowledge of the state of Japan's military fortunes. For example, in March 1944 Yonai had received a confidential report from Rear Admiral Takagi, attached to Naval General Headquarters, on studies of Japan's war position which Takagi had made between September 1943 and February 1944. Based on estimates of political, economic, and military conditions, his conclusion was that an immediate compromise peace was in order. Thus the basis for the opposition was not popular feeling, but the conviction of a few, many of whom had not been confident of the war's success from the beginning, that the war could not be won and a settlement should be made before disaster.

The Koiso Interregnum, July 1944-April 1945. The objectives of the Koiso Cabinet were for a time ambiguous. Because General Koiso had been privately critical of Tojo, the peace group hoped that he would take the necessary steps toward a negotiated peace and there is evidence that he received a vague admonition in this vein from the Emperor when he was designated. These hopes were soon dashed, as the cabinet early decided to continue the war with additional vigor. The forces which had ousted Tojo were unified in opposition to him, but, as indicated above, not on the policy which his successor should follow. This determination of the government demonstrated the continued strength of the intransigents in the coalition, the Army and its immediate satellites, who still had not lost the confidence of a seriously large proportion of the population. It imposed on the peace group the necessity of another period of conspiracy and maneuver.

While the peace faction had not been completely successful in the new government, they were well represented in it by Admiral Yonai as Navy minister and deputy prime minister. They continued their efforts to increase their strength within the coalition and without, using persuasively the increasingly threatening military defeats and what they took to be the changes in popular feeling. In September 1944, Yonai directed Admiral Takagi to resume secretly his studies on ways to end the war, on which he was to report to Yonai and the vice-minister, Vice-Admiral Inouye.

Such questions as the following were central to Takagi's studies: How to get the Army to agree to ending the war; issues involved in probable surrender terms; the problem of public opinion and its acceptance of peace; means of reaching the Emperor in order to work through him toward the desired end. Takagi's comments about the role of public opinion in their plans is illuminating:

It was my conclusion that the only way to reach the opinions of the people would be through the Emperor. On this point Japan is much different from America, where it might be possible to prepare public opinion.

In other words, he felt the necessity for preparing the people to accept surrender, but, concluding that the means toward this end were blocked by the still powerful war group, he counted on persuading the Emperor and using his position to ensure conformity with the decision once it was taken.

In carrying on their activities, Yonai, Takagi, and Inouye kept in close touch with members of the peace group outside the government, the principal members of which have been previously named. In

addition, in order to reach the Emperor, they had to win over some of his intimate advisers, primarily Marquis Kido (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal), a pivotal influence in the selection of prime ministers, and Marquis Matsudaira (Secretary to the Lord Privy Seal). That they were successful is indicated by the fact that in February 1945, the Emperor called in various members of the Jushin to advise him on the state of the war.

While these activities had to be carried on in secret and the Army retained most of its power in the government, the policies of the Koiso cabinet were not a completely unchanged continuation of those of its predecessor. A professor at Tokyo Imperial University described something of the change:

Public opinion became gradually stronger, in a cynical sort of way. The tendency of the papers manifested this after the fall of the Tojo government. Public opinion began to come to the surface. There was really a great change between the Tojo and Koiso governments. Men began to criticize and to speak out against Tojo.

Some alteration is also indicated by the Cabinet's taking a somewhat greater interest in propaganda, evidenced by the inclusion in the Cabinet of the president of the Board of Information as a minister without portfolio, and by propaganda directives of the period. Another development of significance was the establishment, in August 1944, of the Supreme War Guidance Council (Senso Saiko Shido Kaigi), a sort of inner cabinet whose regular members were the prime minister, the foreign minister, the War and Navy ministers, and the two chiefs of staff. While the Council apparently dealt with governmental rather than military operational problems, it became the prime source for the initiation of major policy. For present purposes it can be viewed as a device of the peace group for effecting a measure of control over the military, and as a means of forcing upon the attention of the principal military leaders the home front problems which had been highly persuasive in convincing the peace group of the desirability of surrender. Admiral Yonai implicitly supported this view when he said:

I believe that any misunderstanding regarding the nature of the Senso Saiko Shido Kaigi will be removed if you will look upon it as a liaison organ between the military and the Cabinet.

By the early spring of 1945 the peace group had considerably broadened its influence. Further elements of the naval command had been won over, the closest advisers of the Emperor had been influenced, and access had been gained to the Emperor himself. Secrecy was still important, how-

ever, as the Army radicals and the lower echelons of the Navy were still strong in their refusal to admit the bankruptcy of their policies, preferring bitter-end resistance to the political liquidation which would inevitably follow capitulation.

Suzuki's "Counter-Coup," April-August 1945. The resignation of the Koiso government and the appointment of Admiral Suzuki as prime minister following the invasion of Okinawa in April 1945, marked the rise to a position of dominance, though not by any means complete control, by the peace faction. Suzuki was picked, according to Marquis Kido, because Japan's situation called for a man who could think fundamentally, had deep convictions, and great personal courage. As Suzuki himself put it:

I would not say that you could call me a liberal necessarily . . . ,but I was well known for being opposed to any war against the United States.

The new prime minister knew his assignment:

At the time I became premier, I did not receive any direct order from the Emperor, but I understood clearly from what the Emperor said to me at that time . . . that it was the Emperor's desire for me to make every effort to bring the war to a conclusion as quickly as possible.

He thus became the spearhead of the peace effort.

The important thing to note about this group of peacemakers is that there was nothing essentially democratic about their behavior. Although popular morale had declined sharply under the military defeats and air raids of the preceding months, they were not acting in direct response to it. On the contrary, their efforts were definitely and literally conservative. They represented a privileged class of the population who saw in the continuation of hostilities a threat of destruction of their status and privileges. In the first place, because of the military situation, they feared that carrying on to the point of invasion and the final battles would result in the disintegration and disappearance of the system through which they profited, as it had in Germany. Secondly, because of what they thought they saw in the state of popular morale, they were in some cases afraid that the disintegration might come in the form of revolution before or simultaneously with the invasion. It was in these ways that popular morale was influential. Their own morale had, of course, deteriorated long since.

This position is abundantly clear from their own statements. Perhaps the most frank is that of Prince Konoye, who said of the peace group, of which he was a member:

They were afraid if the war were to continue the country would be defeated and that would result in the downfall of

the ruling classes—the upper classes—and a state of communism would result.

Through the circumlocutions of Marquis Kido the same attitude appears:

The destruction of the cities and the consequent loss of homes and the increase of casualties and shortages of food would have produced a situation of an intensity which would have been most difficult to handle.

Admiral Takagi said that the group feared that

. . . such a development would . . . threaten the 2,000 or 3,000 years of Japan's existence in history; and it would break up the country to the same degree in which Germany had been broken as a result of her policy.

Evidence indicates that the Emperor himself shared these fears. According to Suzuki's chief Cabinet secretary, the Emperor, in the fateful meeting of 9–10 August at which it was decided to accept the Potsdam Declaration, made the following statements in expressing his wishes:

When I think about my obedient soldiers abroad and of those who died or were wounded in battle, about those who have lost their property or lives by bombing in the homeland; when I think of all those sacrifices, I cannot help but feel sad. I decided that this war should be stopped, however, in spite of this sentiment and for more important considerations.

These "more important considerations" were:

Thinking about the world situation and the internal Japanese situation, to continue the war means nothing but the destruction of the whole nation.

The peace faction, it is quite clear, did not simply want peace for humanitarian reasons. They wanted a particular kind of surrender; there were definite conditions to their interest in unconditional surrender. The minimum condition was that the "national polity," that is, the Emperor system, should remain, with the implied hope that most of the structure of privileges would remain with it. Both segments of the Supreme War Guidance Council were agreed on this, to use that body as illustrative of the basic patterns. Outside the Council the group held the same attitude. Thus, Admiral Takagi stated that "Japan should end the war on condition that the Japanese national polity would be preserved." The attitude is implied in Prince Konoye's statement that they "were prepared to make any sacrifice—give anything (in the surrender negotiations)—so long as they could preserve the country and save face." While the prime minister, the foreign minister, and the Navy minister required no further condition for surrender, the other three members of the Council—War Minister Anami and the Army and Navy chiefs of staff—went much farther in setting conditions. They added three: That the Allied forces should not oc-

cupy the homeland; that the Japanese government should repatriate and disarm its own forces; and that the Japanese should prosecute war criminals themselves. Thus the loyalties of these three were not only to class, but to the military caste itself, as these face-saving conditions indicate. They were even willing to risk losing entirely the opportunity to surrender without an invasion if these conditions were not granted, and they persisted in this opinion until the Emperor, on 9–10 August, himself resolved the Council's deadlock in favor of the more limited demand.

The outer limits of risk for the peacemakers were not set, however, by the extensive demands represented on the Supreme War Guidance Council. Out of fear of the military extremists, the peace maneuvers still had to be carried on in an atmosphere bordering on the conspiratorial. This meant that the general public could not be appealed to or used directly, as Suzuki himself recognized:

I was naturally in a very difficult position because, on the one hand I had to carry out to the best of my ability the mission given me by the Emperor to arrange for a conclusion of the war; whereas if anyone heard of this, I would naturally have been attacked and probably killed by people opposed to such a policy. So that, on the one hand, I had to advocate an increase in the war effort and determination to fight on, whereas, through diplomatic channels and any means available, I had to try to negotiate with other countries to stop the war.

Within the Cabinet itself the War minister, General Anami, on his own initiative or pressed by his military aides, could have wrecked the government, exposed the peace faction to violence, and even opened the way to an army coup d'etat simply by resigning. While the general views of Anami and the two chiefs of staff must have been known to Suzuki, the precise extent of the concessions the peace group was willing to make could not be disclosed openly in the Council or Cabinet at an early date, for fear of precipitating such a crisis. Thus, while ambiguous discussions concerning surrender were held as early as the first week of May, and it was decided to try to enlist Russia as a mediator, an exact definition of minimum terms was not debated. As late as 26 June Suzuki is quoted as saying, after a Council meeting in the presence of the Emperor at which the Tenno stated his desire that a plan be made to end the war.

Today the Emperor said what everyone has wanted to say but yet was afraid to say.

It was for this reason that, at every point where a more definite move was made toward surrender, Suzuki and his close advisers either attempted to

assure themselves that Anami was with them or arranged that the decision should come directly from the Emperor in audience. It was fear also of the military hot-heads that made it impossible to propagandize the people, and necessary to have the final decision on surrender clearly and unmistakably announced by the Emperor himself. Ample justification for this caution is to be seen in the events which occurred on the eve of the Emperor's 15 August broadcast—the attack upon the prime minister's life, the violation of the Imperial household by a part of the Tokyo garrison seeking to destroy the transcript of the Emperor's speech, and the distribution from Army aircraft of leaflets denouncing the surrender rescript as false.

From the very beginning of Suzuki's premiership, the peace group continued its efforts to widen its influence within the ruling class. The industrialists, especially the older Zaibatsu whose interests lay less with the Army, presented no difficulty. In the words of Admiral Takagi, "The biggest problem was that of winning over the Army to the danger of a revolution." His group apparently was able to convince a number of Army men in the War Ministry, but the intransigent wing was never sufficiently weakened to allow these attitudes to come out into the open. Even more than the opposition in the Cabinet, the die-hard Army and Navy zealots could see that any surrender meant their political eclipse, and class interest, outside of this had little persuasive value. A major reason for the greater sympathy of the higher Navy officers for the class fears of the peace faction was that a much higher proportion of the Navy officers than of the Army were drawn from upper-class and aristocratic families. Army officers came much more frequently from the poorer farm families.

At the same time Suzuki had to learn as much as he could about the state of public morale. There were two reasons for this. In the first place, there was the question whether the people were sufficiently prepared for surrender to accept the decision of the government. Would they support a coup d'état by the Army die-hards, if such should be attempted? Or would a surrender announcement by the Emperor be sufficient to keep them in line? In the second place, there was the question whether the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that there might be open resistance to the government before the surrender, or a general collapse which would wipe out the oligarchical privileges as effectively as a fight to the end. As has been noted above, the reports of the Home Ministry's

police bureau, the facilities of Domei, and a group of Cabinet advisers were all used to this end. Whether he knew it or not, the prime minister had one great advantage in following the tortuous path between these two alternative situations. As previous chapters of this report have shown, those components of morale which we have designated confidence in victory were lower than the ones associated with social solidarity. In other words, the morale change with which he had to deal was one in which a cessation of hostilities would be welcomed and attitudes toward the military were not friendly, but not one which foreshadowed imminent revolt.

Consideration of public morale is highlighted in the document prepared by Sakomizu for discussion by the Council in the presence of the Emperor on 8 June, quoted in part in the beginning of this chapter. The peace faction realized that the people had experienced sufficient of the war to give them more than an inkling of the general state of affairs.

It seems likely, moreover, that the stubborn objections of the military intransigents, both within and outside the Council, were somewhat weakened by their knowledge of the state of morale. There is a fair amount of evidence for this. With the alternative to surrender being a final battle on the homeland, in which the chips would be down and every factor would be important, they may well have been worried at the prospect of inadequate support from the civilian population.

The dropping of the atomic bomb, as explained more completely in Chapter 8, the failure of negotiations with Russia, and the Potsdam Declaration gave the peace faction its best opportunity to terminate hostilities. Seizing this opportunity was made the more urgent by knowledge of popular morale. It is not appropriate here to detail the complicated maneuvers involved in the denouement. It is sufficient to state, through Premier Suzuki, that

When the Emperor took his active role in politics at the end of the war, it was because the premier . . . had been able to lead the government up to a point where it could be left to the Emperor to make the decision; in other words, I had prepared the way.

In all this, the position of the war minister, General Anami, is supremely interesting. It is regrettable that his suicide occurred before the interrogators who came with the occupation could question him. In a sense, he seems to have epitomized the conflicts within the oligarchy. While he knew the direction being taken by the government, he

did not disclose its intentions to the Army staff, but took full personal responsibility for his own actions. At the same time, his loyalty to the career Army and his knowledge of the widespread desire therein for continuation of the war, produced an inner conflict which was partly expressed in his advocacy of conditions to the surrender. When he was effectively estopped from following his Army loyalties by the explicit decision of the Emperor, he could not face the disgrace which the inevitable dissolution of the Army would bring. He knew that the war must end and showed supreme courage in not breaking the Cabinet, but his countenancing the government's decision must have seemed to him a betrayal of his brothers in arms.

Conclusions

It is apparent from the above account that, even in Japan, which was characterized by the ruthless suppression of dissidence and the social pressure for conformity which has come to be designated the totalitarian state, popular morale was important. This was the case despite the fact that traditionally, in Japan, public opinion was as frequently ignored as it was feared. Popular morale was important as long as the government was not monolithic and unitary. Although acquiescence in the military adventure was fairly uniform in the early days of the war, there were fissures within the governing group which gradually widened as reverses occurred, locking the groups in a political struggle over the question of ending or continuing the war. Unity in the government group was not sufficient to prevent the emergence of a faction who had more to lose by continuing the war than by surrender. It rarely is, in any nation. Popular morale was involved in this struggle in two ways. In the first place, as it approached disintegration, the state of morale was seen as an internal threat to the oligarchy. It was

feared, and in this sense it forced the hand of the peace group.⁵ In the second place, the low state of morale was counted upon by the peace faction as insurance against public support of a coup d'etat by the die-hards, should that be contemplated or attempted.

On the basis of both the Japanese and German experience, it is reasonable to assert that, in any government, civilian morale will be a major component of victory in total war. In a government like that of the United States, where public opinion can be expressed through established and important institutional channels, its importance will be greater because its influence will, obviously, be felt more quickly. But, since modern war implies direct civilian experience with a portion of the actual fighting, at least through bombing, the difference is one merely of degree.

The general importance of morale in modern war is, then, in large measure a function of popular involvement in the war. This is the case both in the sense that such warfare requires maximum productive effort from the entire population and in the sense that the civilian population, for that reason, has become a target for air weapons. If there is ever a future war, an atomic war, it is almost certain that such involvement would be increased rather than diminished. For the future, therefore, warfare would require, if anything, increased concern for civilian morale—if there is to be even the slimmest hope that the social fabric will withstand the shocks and tensions such warfare would entail.

⁵ General Takashima, when asked by the Survey as to his reaction to the Imperial rescript, stated that surrender had become unavoidable; the Army even should it repel invasion, could no longer protect the people from extermination. While the new-found solicitude of top-level militarists is rather touching, perhaps an element of concern for the people did influence the rulers in the decision to cease fighting. The weight of the evidence, however, suggests that leaders of the peace faction realized that the people could not be expected to give full confidence and loyalty to rulers who did not or could not protect them.



"As Japanese, we must have the Emperor . . . The Emperor always thinks of us. If he had known the truth, he would have stopped the war earlier."



"I consider that we are facing starvation because we lost the war; my children, however, did not lose any war, and they are too young to understand."

Chapter 12

AFTERMATH OF THE WAR

The war left Japan with its cities laid waste, its industrial system disorganized, and its merchant fleet almost obliterated. Millions of Japanese were unemployed, underfed, homeless. Countless others were casualties from bombing or had been displaced in evacuation. The nation as a whole had suffered the extreme hardships of the war and tasted the bitterness of defeat. It had been disillusioned about its leaders and left uncertain about its own future. Finally, it had witnessed the assumption of control of the country by a foreign occupation Army.

These catastrophes of the nation profoundly shook its attitudes, but the fundamental aspects of Japanese culture were not destroyed. The Japanese people, after the end of the war, were still Japanese in their values and viewpoints, and it is within this framework that their reactions to post-war developments took place.

The objective of this chapter is to investigate the attitudes, perhaps the morale, of the Japanese during the period between the surrender in August 1945, and the end of Morale Division's interviewing in December 1945. However, to speak of "morale" in a period of peace requires some redefinition of terms. While the equivalent of morale in a period of reconstruction differs somewhat from wartime morale, there is a common core of meaning—the readiness and willingness of a group of people to work together and follow leadership toward common goals. The goals may change from victory over an enemy, for example, to the attainment of a higher or more decent standard of living. The degree of mobilization of the population may change, the leadership group may change, and the nature of the sacrifices expected may be different, but a rough equivalent to working morale may be said to exist to some degree.

In the period of time to which this analysis has reference, however, the situation was one in which "morale" as such was almost nonexistent in Japan—not in the sense that people were personally miserable and unhappy, although many of them in fact were, but in the sense that recognized common goals and accredited common leadership were lacking. The cement that held the nation together during the war had lost its grip, and the people, in many places, became a disorganized mass, split among

themselves, seeking individual solutions to their desperate personal problems, and conscious only of the immediate, day-to-day task of staying alive.

A study of the attitudes of the Japanese people during that period toward issues of the present and future may provide some guide to the long-term psychological effects of bombardment, the direction which future attitudinal developments may take, and some of the difficulties with which our occupation forces may in time have to contend.¹

Attitudes of the Post-Surrender Period

Despite the fact that the great majority of the people were aware prior to August 1945 that Japan was losing the war, and a majority were certain by then that Japan could not win, their predominant reaction to the Emperor's announcement of surrender was one of sorrow, misery, surprise, and disillusionment (Chapter 3).

TABLE 10.—*Immediate reaction to the surrender*¹

	<i>Percent</i>
Regret, misery, disappointment.....	30
Surprise, shock, bewilderment.....	23
Feeling of relief or happiness that war was over and sufferings at an end.....	22
Anxiety, worry about treatment under occupation....	13
Disillusionment, bitterness, sense of futility; had sacrificed to win, all in vain.....	13
Shame followed by relief; acceptance with regret; expected it but felt it a blot on national record.....	10
Expected it, knew it was coming; resignation.....	4
Worry about Emperor; shame for Emperor; sorrow for him.....	4
No answer or miscellaneous reactions.....	6

	2125

¹ The question was: "How did you feel when you heard that Japan had given up the war?"

² Since some people indicated more than one reaction, the percentages total more than 100.

Even though most of the Japanese expected that they could not win, it was very difficult for a Japanese to admit to himself that his nation had definitely lost. Tradition, security, and the attitudes inculcated by long indoctrination received severe

¹ It is important to insert a caution at this point. The Morale Division was commissioned to study the effects of strategic bombing on the morale of the wartime civilian population of Japan. Thus, all persons who had served in the Army during the period of the Greater East Asia war were excluded from the sample. In the following pages when the phrase, "the Japanese people" is used, it will be understood to exclude a vigorous, young, male segment of the nation.

blows, and individuals' feelings were in a turmoil. Typical reactions were the following:

My feelings are indescribable in words. Japan had never before lost a war, and the thought that Japan was defeated completely was worse than finding out that you, yourself, were dead.

I felt limp like a busted toy balloon.

* * * * *

I was greatly disappointed and wasn't able to do any work. I heard the Emperor's proclamation at noon but it wasn't clear, so I did not know definitely until that afternoon.

(Respondent cried at this point, while continuing her narrative.) My daughter and I heard this later report together. We were shocked. We cried for a long time. I crawled into bed with a headache and stayed there all the rest of the day. We had worked hard, refrained from buying what we wanted, given up many things, all because I believed we would win. Then came the letdown. I cannot find words to express myself, for the thought of winning was uppermost in my mind all the time; then, to have lost the war was the biggest disappointment in my life.

Even on the last day of surrender, many people were still hoping for some last minute "Divine Wind" to save the day. The following are typical comments:

I was greatly surprised. I felt just like one feels when a sick friend suddenly dies, even though one knew his case was hopeless.

* * * * *

Like the rest of my neighbors, I was surprised to hear that Japan surrendered. In my neighborhood, there was much talk (before Japan's surrender) that Japan would win the last five minutes before defeat. This belief was current throughout my neighborhood until the Emperor announced our surrender.

* * * * *

I thought the Imperial rescript would tell the people to fight more; we were all surprised. I know a lot of districts where radio reception was poor and people thought the Emperor was urging them on. These places sent men to Tokyo to find out the facts. When the men came back they wanted to send another man to see a member of the Imperial family to verify the rescript.

A Japanese psychiatrist characterized the reaction of the people in the following fashion:

They lost their grip on reality and in many cases became quite apathetic. They were dazed and this feeling has persisted up to the present.

The minority who felt relief or happiness immediately upon hearing that the war was over spoke in the following terms:

I was glad and quite relieved. I felt with the war's end my soldier son would be able to return home and things wouldn't be so difficult.

* * * * *

I thought: Well, at last we can relax and take it easy, for there are no more raids or bombings. I was hoping that

this day would hurry and come. I thought this way because we were suffering so badly, and that if this war would have lasted another month or so, we would all be killed ourselves.

Since the people had not been mentally prepared for the surrender, many misinterpreted the Imperial surrender rescript. Some people thought that the Emperor "ended the war" rather than that Japan had been defeated. As the occupation began, Japanese leaders realized or were made to realize that they would have to correct this impression. A member of the Diet, speaking to his constituents soon after the surrender, said:

What people call the "ending of the war" is unwillingness to admit defeat. But actually, it is a fact that we were entirely defeated. The most important thing is that we should recognize our defeat and we should always keep this fact in our mind. It is a great mistake to think that the ending of the war came via the atomic bombing, via the participation of Russia in the war, or by the Imperial rescript. It was because defeated Japan could not have continued this war any more. Japan was completely defeated. Therefore, I want to tell you the true facts and wish to present them for your special consideration.

By the time that the interviews were conducted (three months after the war), most Japanese had come to realize that Japan had been defeated.

People were asked: "In general, how are things going with you now," and "Do you feel better or worse off now than you were during the war?" Some said they were better off, others said they were worse off, but almost all agreed that conditions were pretty bad. Their answers appear in the following table.

TABLE 102.—*State of satisfaction November-December 1945*

	<i>Percent</i>
Better off than during war, but conditions bad.....	54
Better off than during war, conditions fairly satisfactory.....	18
Worse off than during war, conditions bad.....	17
Same as during war, conditions bad.....	10
Uncertain.....	1

100

The end of the war eliminated the threat of further raids, which was a grim consolation. However, the hardships wrought by the blockade, the disorganization of war, and the previous bombing continued, and, especially in the case of food, the problems became more intense after the war was over.²

² The food problem seems to have been the major preoccupation of most respondents. Morale Division interviewers sometimes found it very difficult to get respondents to talk about anything but food throughout the entire interview.

The reasons for dissatisfaction cited by the Japanese are presented in the table below.

TABLE 103.—*Specific reasons for dissatisfaction*

	Percent
Food inadequate.....	85
Other commodities inadequate.....	38
Inflation and black market ¹	29
Unemployment, inadequate wages, bad business.....	17
Bad morale as result of defeat.....	3
Miscellaneous; (e. g., lack of fertilizer for farmers)....	13
No answer.....	1
	2186

¹ Forty-five percent of urban people complained of inflation and black markets rural people generally had more access to food.

² Percentages add to more than 100 because most people named more than one reason for dissatisfaction.

It is a significant commentary on postwar attitudes that nearly all reasons given for dissatisfaction were specific complaints related to the standard of living of the individual and his immediate family. The fear of starvation in Japan blanketed the country in the first months of the occupation, and thrust into the background all other considerations.

Relief From the Air Attack. When people talked about the satisfying aspects of their situation after the war, they mentioned mostly the simple fact that the air raids had stopped. Again, the comments were centered on personal, rather than social needs.

TABLE 104.—*Major reasons for postwar satisfaction*¹

	Percent
Cessation of air raids.....	43
No more anxieties.....	11
Food conditions better now than during war.....	9
Personal freedom now.....	9

¹ Table adds to less than 100 percent because only the four most frequently cited reasons are presented. The rest of the respondents gave a large variety of reasons—e. g., peace is good, general hardships of war have ceased, no more fear for relatives in armed forces, occupation troops behave well, and so on; no one reason, of these, was given by more than a small percentage of people.

Those who were most likely to say they felt relieved because of the cessation of air raids were people who had experienced air raids during the war. Indeed, the extent to which air raids had terrorized all the people of Japan is graphically shown by the fact that even among those who had never experienced a raid, one out of three gave the removal of the air threat as a reason for satisfaction.

TABLE 105.—*Postwar satisfaction related to raid experiences*

Number of air raids experienced	Percent of each group citing "cessation of air raids" as reason for satisfaction
None.....	33
1-10.....	48
Over 10.....	52

Though people who had directly experienced the air attack during the war naturally felt more relieved because of the cessation of bombing, the people who had presumably worried about the air raids tended to view post-surrender conditions more pessimistically than did other people. Fifty-five percent of those who have cessation of air raids as a reason for postwar satisfaction felt that postwar conditions were better than during the war, but still bad. On the other hand, only 43 percent of those who gave other reasons for satisfaction felt that way. Presumably, those who had reason to be glad the air raids stopped felt that conditions after the surrender were better than during the war because of their release from fear; on the other hand, they felt that postwar conditions were bad, because they were the same group of people who tended to have suffered most from the bombings. *Wartime Morale and Postwar Satisfaction.* There is a significant relation between morale during the war and postwar attitudes. More people of lower morale during the war tended to feel that post-war conditions were better than those of higher wartime morale. The data are presented below:

TABLE 106.—*Morale and postwar satisfaction*¹

	Lowest morale	Lower morale	Higher morale	Highest morale
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Conditions better after than during the war	80	74	70	66
Conditions same after as during the war...	6	9	13	19
Conditions worse after than during the war	14	17	17	15
	100	100	100	100

¹ Measure of morale is Morale Index (Appendix K). The questions were the same as those used throughout this section of the chapter: "In general, how are things going with you now?", and "Do you feel better or worse off now than you were during the war?"

It is apparent from Tables 103 and 104 that attitudes of the postwar period were related directly to experiences and morale of the war period.

The more highly educated people were more likely to feel that post surrender conditions were better than were the less educated people. Comparing the two extreme educational groups, 13 percent of those with under 5 years of education as compared with 25 percent of people with over twelve years of education felt that "conditions for me are satisfactory, and better than during the war." Conversely, 17 percent of people with under 5 years of education and 11 percent of people with over 12 years of education felt that conditions were worse than during the war.

Several factors produced this difference in reaction. The more highly educated classes had supported the war to a lesser extent than the uneducated classes. During the war, they felt and feared surveillance by the military and civil police more acutely. After the surrender, the chances of police hounding were reduced. Finally, the educated classes are usually of the higher socio-economic class and were thus less concerned about the basic problems of food and commodity shortages.

The young are rather similar to the educated in their evaluation of postwar conditions. Twenty-two percent of people from 16 to 29 years of age, as compared to 15 percent of people from 45 to 70 years old, felt that conditions after the war were satisfactorily better than during the war.³ Two possible factors, among others, may account for this result.

First, inasmuch as the sample of people interviewed excludes former members of the armed forces, the young people interviewed were mostly women. The new freedom which the occupation introduced to women may not have been lost upon them. Secondly, it is possible that in Japan, as in many other sections of the world, the youth are more adaptable and optimistic than the aged. The two interpretations are not incompatible and might both determine the observed difference.

Attitudes Toward the Future

Pessimism. Three months after the surrender, 53 percent of the Japanese people gave pessimistic answers to the question: "Now that the war is over, how do you think you and your family will fare in the next two or three years?" Only 25 percent reported fair satisfaction with their prospects.⁴ It is apparent, again, that the majority of the Japanese people were exceedingly depressed in the post-surrender period. Typical responses were: "Things are so bad, I can't think of the future," "We have no plan," "We are living from day to day." This restriction of time perspective is not surprising in view of the suffering and destruction caused by the war. A characteristic statement is the following:

I am very pessimistic about the future. I am terribly worried about what will happen this winter. The biggest problem in Japan can be answered in one word, "rice." Around March, all the dried and canned vegetables will be gone. With no store of rice, we can look forward to nothing but starvation. As you know, a hungry man cannot be optimistic. Our mainstay of food is rice, and if there is a

full bowl of rice and the other little things that go with it, one somehow obtains. I consider that we are facing starvation because we lost the war; my children, however, did not lose any war, and they are too young to understand.

The description of the political attitudes of the Japanese people is a delicate task. The previous sections have indicated that, in a certain sense, most Japanese did not have political opinions. The people were concerned with the immediate problems of subsistence and had neither the training nor the inclination for national political participation. In order to derive some knowledge of the nature of Japanese political opinion and perspective for the future, however vaguely formulated they might prove to be, respondents were asked the question, "In your opinion, what changes should occur in Japan in the future?" The responses to this question appear in Table 107.

TABLE 107.—*Suggested changes for Japan*¹

	<i>Percent</i>
Change Japan into a peaceful nation; abolish rule by militarists and military ideas	22
Make Japan more democratic	20
Make Japan like the United States	5
Increase freedom for women	2
Tell the people the truth—no more propaganda by government	1
Weaken power of landlords or monopolists, wipe out class differences	7
Japan should be as it was before the war	5
Miscellaneous	22
No answer—"Those things are too high for me—don't know"	22
	²106

¹ It is to be emphasized that the responses which appear in Table 107 were all freely volunteered. Respondents were not directly asked, "Do you approve or disapprove of democracy, or the Japanese militarists?" This method would naturally have loaded the dice in favor of an answer supporting democracy.

² Percentages total more than 100 because some people had more than one suggestion for changes.

Ideas about political reforms appear to be unformulated, and there seems to be no clear movement in any single political direction. The most frequent suggestion was to change Japan into a peaceful nation and to abolish rule by militarists and military ideas, clearly mirroring the great disillusion with militarism which appeared all over Japan after the surrender. A middle-aged citizen of Akita commented:

I hope the government will change (improve). The war was not born out of the total will of the people. They were oppressed by the police and the military. The people had to fight. They were really dissatisfied. I felt so deep in my heart. The people were oppressed by tyrannical rule and were crying because of the war. I was opposed to the war. The war was an act of violence. It was a war of aggres-

³ Of course, the younger people are better educated (Appendix R).

⁴ The rest were neither optimistic nor pessimistic (12 percent), or hadn't formed an attitude (10 percent).

sion. It brought disorder to the world's peace, and brought troubles to the other people of the world.

The second most frequently expressed response is "make Japan more democratic." This does not mean that there was a strong, well-organized demand for the actual institution of democracy in Japan by the United States in the post-surrender period, but a feeling that some change was needed.

Though the Japanese people, three months after the war, overwhelmingly favored a form of government called democracy, it must be recognized that very few Japanese had much of a notion of what democracy actually is. Japan had experienced a government dominated by political parties in the 1920's, but the Japanese party system had been hopelessly corrupt, and the rank and file had very little control. Democratic practices never penetrated to basic Japanese institutions such as the school—and still more important, the family. When decisions were made they were very often handed down by superior authority. The situation is well described by a former chief secretary of the Privy Council and Cabinet minister. He stated:

We had unity but not cooperation. The reason is that the people depend too much on authority. If things don't go well, then they criticize very strongly. The absence of democracy was probably the weakest point. There was cooperation between superiors and subordinates, which was excellent, but the cooperation among subordinates on the same level was very bad. It may be the Oriental way, but the Japanese people were sick of war in their hearts, and the real patriots would not think of war again. Even small children should be educated in the democratic way, to cooperate at subordinate levels. People don't have their own opinions. They move to the right or to the left, according to the tendency of the moment.

Notwithstanding the preoccupation of the Japanese with personal rather than political problems and the vague nature of their desires for political change, those desires nevertheless did, to some extent, exist. Many were disillusioned and generally discontented; their dissatisfaction had not, in most cases, crystallized into demands for specific reforms. But there was a pervasive willingness to be led, a readiness for change, backed up by a considerable pressure of unrest. The situation at the time interviewing was conducted was unsettled, but full of potentialities.

Some were looking toward the United States for leadership, and used the word "democracy" freely, as this 37-year-old housewife:

I am wishing that Japan's position in the world will not become any worse than this, and that Japan will become a democratic nation under the guidance of the United States.

Others, considerably fewer in number, looked toward Russia. A 45-year-old Tokyo worker said:

The classes that hold power over us should be done away with. I hear that Stalin's wages are very low like a common worker's. And it should become like that in order to do away with black markets. The people's wishes should be obeyed. I am opposed to free markets entirely, because then money will buy anything and the rich, only, will be well off. Everyone should have more equalized incomes so that all will benefit. That is free enterprise with equalized incomes. We should keep the rationing system and try to equalize incomes by following the Communist or Socialist programs. I don't want the Communists to remove the Emperor if he does not interfere with anything. Just a matter of deep-seated feeling—primarily emotional. If he doesn't interfere, why not leave him alone? It is a matter of traditional feeling—like the father in a family. We would feel that we had lost the head of a family. It's not a practical reason, just emotional. If his power is decreased there will be no danger. As Stalin said when the English Communists had asked for the abolition of monarchs but had admitted that the king was not obstructing their movement—"If the king does not obstruct, then why not leave him alone?"

But whatever the variation in individual viewpoints, one fact was manifest: leadership was needed, in the form of an ideology, a symbol, a program, a set of national goals. And in the eddying political waters, one constant remained, the Emperor. His importance as the hub, the single fixed point around which the nation clustered, in the early months of the occupation, could not be overestimated.

Attitudes Toward the Emperor

In the immediate post-surrender period, loyalty to the Emperor remained remarkably strong. In replying to the questions, "In your opinion, what changes should occur in Japan in the future?", and "What about the Emperor?" only 3 percent of the Japanese definitely answered that the Emperor should be discarded, 4 percent said they didn't care. The interviews indicate conclusively that the Japanese people, as of December 1945, overwhelmingly desired the retention of the Emperor.

TABLE 108.—*Attitude toward the Emperor*

	<i>Percent</i>
Retain him.....	62
"I feel sorry for the Emperor".....	7
No judgment made.....	10
Refused or were unable to discuss such "high" matters.....	2
"I don't care what happens to him".....	4
Drop him.....	3
No answer.....	12
	100

The deeply emotional, almost mystical attitude the Japanese held toward their Emperor is attested by their behavior when asked about the Emperor

in the course of the interviewing. Many respondents paused, hesitated, and expressed their opinions only after considerable urging. One young girl broke down completely when asked about the Emperor. She cried openly and was unable to continue with the interview. Many Japanese are imbued with deep feelings of reverence towards the Emperor and regard him as almost divine.⁵

He is viewed by this large group of respondents as "the father to the Japanese race," which is conceived of as an extended family. An electrical engineer, graduate of Tokyo university and superintendent of a large military searchlight factory during the war, said:

The Americans feel that the Japanese Imperial family is the same as European royalty. The Japanese Imperial family has been continuous for 2,600 years. Although I admit the Japanese race is a mixed race, we feel we are of the same race as the Emperor. So many millions of Japanese people descend from the Imperial family. I, myself, come from the Genji family. All of us Japanese are related to the Emperor by blood. The conclusion is that the Imperial family is not seen by us as a family of power but it is the main house of the people. The Japanese think of the Imperial family as their own family. Taking away the Imperial family is like cutting the roots off a tree.

Some Japanese, of course, looked upon the Emperor not only with deep emotion but also with canny understanding that he was the main prop of the system of privileges from which they benefited, and they therefore felt he ought to be retained. Another group volunteered the reason that he should be retained because "he alone can make for stability." A government official commented:

In Japan the tenno (Emperor) system is closely connected with Japanese characteristics and desire for order. Until now this side of the Tenno system has been very much neglected because discussion of it was prohibited. If the Emperor were done away with, a Japanese republic might easily fall into anarchy or into dictatorship of the Latin-American variety.

The great majority spoke in favor of keeping the Emperor purely out of feelings of a close personal bond with him. His action in issuing the surrender proclamation appears to have strengthened rather than weakened his popularity among the people. Many people were grateful for his intervention. A 19-year-old girl said:

As Japanese, we must have the Emperor. We had bad leaders who fooled the Emperor, as they fooled us. I doubt whether the Emperor knew the truth of what was going on. The Emperor always thinks of us. If he had known the truth, he would have stopped the war much earlier.

⁵ When "the Emperor" is mentioned in this section of the report, the reference is to the "Imperial institution," not to Hirohito, the man. He just happens to be occupying the status of Emperor. The man is emotionally regarded only insofar as he represents the institution.

A Tokyo insurance salesman expressed similar views:

I don't think that he (the Emperor) should incur the blame and wrath for the war, as the military really dictated the war, although they always used the Emperor as a spokesman.

Role of the Emperor. The American decision to use the Emperor as an instrument for effecting the surrender appears definitely to have shortened the war, saved lives, and facilitated the occupation of Japan. Many Japanese stated that if it had not been for the command of the Emperor, they would not have laid down their arms. A typical statement is that of a physician:

Were it not for the Emperor, our recent "unconditional surrender" could not have been effected so smoothly and the American people could not have had a bloodless occupation.

From the Japanese viewpoint, the decision to retain and use the Emperor was also a useful and humanitarian act. At a time of tremendous social upheaval and personal distress, the Emperor was not only a symbol of national stability; he was also a source of spiritual and emotional comfort to millions of individuals.

He did not, however, fill the vacuum of political and intellectual leadership which existed. Other political and military leaders of the country had abdicated or been driven out, but he remained a passive figure in these respects. The initial phases of the American occupation must be interpreted in this context of widespread economic and social disorganization, vacant posts of leadership, and the continued existence of national spiritual symbols.

Japanese Reaction to the Occupation

The initial reactions of the Japanese to the occupation were overwhelmingly favorable. Respondents were asked the question, "In regard to the policies taken by the occupation troops' headquarters, how do you feel things are working out?"⁶ Responses appear in Table 109.

TABLE 109.—*Reactions to the occupation*

	<i>Percent</i>
Satisfaction	70
Qualified satisfaction	6
No satisfaction, no dissatisfaction; mere acceptance as cost of defeat	4
Don't know	14
Dissatisfaction	1
No answer	5

100

⁶ The question was phrased in terms of occupation policy to get at the extent, if any, of awareness of policy. It was expected that most of the responses would not be in those terms.

Answers to the question asked were generally not in terms of occupation policies so much as occupation troop behavior. Japanese propagandists had led the people to expect fearful brutalities from the Americans in case of defeat, so the first reaction of the Japanese when the brutalities did not occur was one of great relief.⁷ Their feelings are illustrated by the following excerpts from interviews:

I was amazed at the good conduct of the occupational troops. We were warned that they were savages, but when I compared them with the Japanese troops, I believe ours are more savage than they.

* * * * *

At first I was very frightened. I was told men and women would be killed and that women would be raped, so I was very much afraid. When the Americans did come I was relieved that they were not as they had been rumored to be.

* * * * *

I thought we would be killed by the occupation troops when they came in. I was ready to kill my wife and children before they could. But now I realize how misled we were.

The behavior of the American troops was particularly important in influencing Japanese attitudes toward the occupation at the beginning, inasmuch as most Japanese had little knowledge of general American occupation policy. Only 23 percent volunteered any comment on general policies and a much smaller percentage of these had any extensive knowledge of this policy. Typical comments are the following:

I don't know anything in regard to the policy of the occupation army. However, I feel very much at ease because Americans are kind and thoughtful people. One day I was pulling a cargo wagon on the narrow street when an American truck from the opposite side came. They stopped the truck and lifted my small wagon to the other side of their truck. Smiling, they said goodbye to me and left. Tears came to my eyes. Yes, they are very much human, aren't they? It was funny, but I started to pull my wagon with strength that I did not experience before.

* * * * *

I don't know much about the American Army headquarters policies, but I am favorably impressed by the American soldiers, and even children are delighted with them. However, as I am not accustomed to seeing foreigners, I still feel a little afraid of them. That is because the former propaganda against the Americans was most injurious; we were told that they were devils.

A type of behavior which is commonplace to many Americans—giving one's seat to a woman, for example,—was noted by the Japanese. In

fact, courtesy of all kinds was greatly appreciated. Typical comments are the following:

I think American soldiers are kind. During rain, American vehicles try not to splash mud on the pedestrians and I appreciate this.

* * * * *

I think American soldiers are very kind and on the street they are very courteous.

Other types of behavior of American troops impressed the Japanese favorably. The views of the mayor of one of the small towns in which interviews were conducted by Morale Division are relevant:

We are very much impressed by the group you represent. We have noticed that everyone in the community feels that you have been very kind. When they were first approached, they were a bit afraid, despite your reassurances, but it is the talk of the town how kindly they were treated. Your men asked them to sit near the stove, gave them blankets to keep warm, fed their babies, and did everything to make them comfortable. Also, we were so surprised that your officers and enlisted men live and eat together, and that the officers treat the enlisted men kindly and as equals. This would never happen in Japan. We were especially impressed that Dr. X, the head of the project, would come to this small community and would be kind enough to call on us. Nothing like this would have happened in a Japanese enterprise. It is this kindness and equality that we must have and that we admire so much.

It may seem strange to many Americans that the Japanese comment so favorably about a conquering army that a few months before had been their avowed enemies. First, fear of reprisal and traditional Japanese politeness may account in part for this reaction. There is evidence to suggest, however, that a good part of the reaction is genuine. There is the previously described factor, that the occupation was far better than expected. Second, the Japanese had become completely disillusioned with their military leaders. More people said that during the war they did not have confidence in their leaders' conduct of the war than said they had such confidence; after the surrender, dissatisfaction with military leaders became even more widespread (Chapter 3). Removal of power from the militarists was the recommendation volunteered most frequently by respondents in answer to the question, "In your opinion, what changes should occur in Japan in the future?"

A third determining factor is more hypothetical but important enough to state. This factor involves the Japanese tendency to adapt themselves quickly to new situations. This phenomenon was first noted by Americans in the rapid change of attitude of Japanese prisoners during the war, who, when they were captured, very often volunteered an

⁷ The question was asked: "During the war, what did you think would be in store for you and your family, if Japan lost the war?" Two-thirds of the respondents said they expected such things as brutality, enslavement, tyranny, starvation, subservience. The rest were uncertain, only 4 percent saying they expected any sort of decent treatment.

unexpected amount of intelligence about their own forces. In the prisoner of war situation, of course, other factors were involved—e. g., inadequate security training, but the factor of rapid change of attitude in a new situation was probably important.

Lastly, the Japanese feudal attitude of submission to the conqueror undoubtedly plays an important role in determining the cooperative attitude toward the occupation. A Hiroshima physician stated:

For a month or two before the surrender, the general opinion of the Japanese was that we could not go on as we were. Now we feel that we cannot compete with America's power and scientific knowledge. Now we feel that we have had enough of suffering and we want a life of happiness, and want to avoid war as much as possible. It is the proper thing for the man of might to be on top, so the people are thinking of the future and about how to live comfortably and are quite at ease. That is why everything has gone smoothly up to now and it will continue to do so.

The physician in this connection also comments about the possibilities of Japanese revenge:

Practically everybody had the same opinion. I believe that the usual Japanese way of thinking in a situation like this would be in terms of revenge. But the Japanese have noticed a big difference between the power of America and that of Japan.

Q. What has that to do with the desire for revenge?

A. When the war ended, more than ever before, we could see America's power and that of Japan, and so the idea of revenge had to be given up.

Q. You mean it was impractical?

A. I mean it was impossible. So we have thrown away all idea of revenge. The people came to the conclusion that the war was a foolish war, after it ended. The people clearly understood now that the officials were mistaken. At present, the people are very bitter toward the officials.

In conclusion, a note of caution must be added in interpreting the Japanese attitude toward the occupation. The very forces which produced a favorable attitude toward the occupation, a few months after the surrender, can, under the proper circumstances, reverse this attitude.

The surprise effect of the kind behavior of American occupation troops can wear off. Lack of courtesy could produce much hostility. The sudden changes in attitude toward Americans, which occurred in August-September 1945, are not incompatible with a rapid change in the direction of antagonism towards Americans. Finally, and extremely important, the feudal attitude of submission toward the conquerors carries with it, in the minds of a good many Japanese, the expectation that the victorious lord will take care of his vassal. It was quite clear that a goodly segment of the people did not yet look to their own govern-

ment for leadership and a solution of their problems, but to occupation headquarters.

This reflects a feature of postwar Japan probably more basic than any so far cited. To understand Japanese reactions in early 1946, one must remember the highly intensive and destructive nature of the war's physical and political-ideological attacks. In Japan, as in Germany, this left deficit and disorganization in economic resources, and an almost complete political disorientation. Old frames of reference in political life became less significant than the demands of the Americans. The Japanese could look only to the conqueror, to the United States, as a relatively rich and economically intact nation, and as a nation pledged to bring a new democratic concept of government to those once under the totalitarian yoke, for aid in the resolution of its problems. Its own leadership and resources were far too depleted and destroyed. On its side, concerned with stability in the postwar world, and the restoration of order, the conqueror has little logical alternative than to provide assistance to the former enemy.

This raises the question of how the occupation forces can help to maintain order and keep the peace in Japan. It is not the purpose of this report to launch into a general discussion of the course which future American occupation policy should follow. The data gathered by the Survey, however, place in relief a crucial problem.

The study has indicated that the basic concern of the Japanese people is with problems of subsistence.

Much lip service is paid to democracy, but the concept of democracy is still vague, and the Japanese have developed little real democratic leadership to cope adequately with their own problems. They have reacted to the occupation remarkably well, but they also expect the Americans to provide leadership and solve their critical subsistence problem. For the immediate future, whether or not America can or will provide the Japanese with adequate food will depend on our other commitments and must be decided by the policy makers charged with that function. It suffices to indicate here that if America does not solve this problem, an orderly, peaceful development of Japan will be extremely difficult to achieve.

The same interpretation is applicable to the long range future of Japan. The Japanese people must be given the chance to experience the rewards of peace—an adequate standard of living. Available scientific information suggests that aggressiveness is not carried in the genes. Satisfied people are not

quarrelsome people. The point is pertinent to Japan as well as to other nations.

Summary and Conclusions

During the first few months of the Japanese occupation, the living conditions of the people were extremely difficult, and a swing of reaction against the military leaders of the country had taken place. Other leadership had not established itself in the field of political affairs, although discontent was general and leadership was needed. The Emperor, in this period of spiritual and emotional distress, filled only part of the need; Americans were expected, by many, to provide the rest. Initial reactions to the Americans were favorable, but they were based largely on the observed behavior of the troops, not on a knowledge of American policies.

Study has indicated that the basic concern of the Japanese people at the time of interviewing was with problems of subsistence. The concept of de-

mocracy was still vague and the Japanese had by no means shaken off the effects of decades of life under authoritarian rule. If the problem of improving the standard of living in Japan is not solved, there is bound to follow a wave of bitterness and resentment against the Americans. There was a tendency, already noticeable in the early months of the occupation, for the Japanese not only to accept the dictates of the conquerors willingly, but also to shift responsibility for the physical welfare of the nation to them. There will doubtless be blame placed upon the conquerors if this imputed responsibility is not clearly shifted or directly met.

The difficulty is thus a double one. That the subsistence problem be solved is imperative. But the choice of means to accomplish this end must be governed by a regard for the fact that unless the Japanese are guided in the direction of self-help, we may produce a dependency, not a democracy, in Japan.







Appendix A

METHODS

Field Procedures

There were 10 Morale Division interviewing field teams, with an average of 9 interviewers per team, which covered 60 sample points between 10 November and 29 December 1945. These were preceded by 4 sampling teams, which drew the local sample for interviewing.¹

Respondents selected by the samplers were contacted by Japanese-speaking Caucasian officers (assistant research leaders), usually aided by municipal or rationing officials (Appendix E). The former were selected for this duty partly because it was felt that, at first contact, Japanese ancestry personnel in American uniforms might arouse suspicion of Kempei or civil police trickery. The local aides were very cooperative, and essential in locating respondents; they had charge of the Japanese lists from which the local sample of respondents was drawn, knew the people and the areas.

An appointment for interview at some later time would be made. The respondent, upon arriving, would present the pass card given him by the assistant research leader. The card contained a number which permitted an age-sex check to help assure that the correct person had come to be interviewed.

The respondents were greeted and conducted to the interviewing booth or room by the assigned interviewer. The interviewers were all of Japanese ancestry. About one-third were expert American civilians, and two-thirds were carefully selected officers and enlisted men.

Interviewing procedures in general were those developed by the Division of Program Surveys, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture, as adapted to meet Japanese conditions. A sound recording was made in about 1 out of 7 interviews. These recordings may be found in Morale Division files.

The research aspects of each team's operations were directed by its research leader, a trained social scientist, who was either a military man or a civilian. He supervised the quality of interviews, ran re-training sessions, and saw that sampling rules were adhered to. He also collected background data, conducted special interviews, and gathered

pertinent documents, when available.² Research leaders participated in pre-testing research procedures and examined materials before field work began. The pretest period served as a training period for all personnel.

Field teams were serviced by personnel under an Army officer. The latter saw to messing, billeting, transportation, security, and local military liaison, assisted by Army, Navy, and Marine enlisted men.

Analysis

Completed cross-section interviews were received in Tokyo from the field via a courier system, micro-filmed, and dispatched to the United States. There a code was prepared to categorize the responses suggested by the interviews.³ The actual coding operation was performed at Swarthmore College, under the supervision of experienced technical personnel. Statistical data were obtained by machine tabulation techniques. Interpretations of data by analysts were reviewed by the analysis staff as a whole.

Problems

There are a number of questions which legitimately arise in connection with any study of this type, and this study in particular.

(1) *Bias.* Analysis personnel were from the beginning consciously aware of the danger of two biases—exaggeration of the importance of the declining morale in the defeat of Japan, and exaggeration of the role of the air attack in depressing morale. In the latter cases, the bias was actually toward avoiding any special pleading for the effectiveness of airpower. The conclusion as to the prime effect of the air attack on morale was reached, almost reluctantly, from the weight of the evidence and the analysts' own experiences in Japan. How far bias has been avoided in assessing the role of morale must be left to the reader.

(2) *Did the respondents aim to please?* The chances are that they did. However in the great majority of questions there was no answer which could be said to be more pleasing to the Americans

¹ Appendix I contains the sample description.

² While interviewing teams operated in the field, a special branch in Tokyo, attached to Morale Division Headquarters, gathered information at the national level.

³ The code is too extensive to be included among these appendices; it may be found in Morale Division files.

than any other answer. Furthermore, the interviewing was not conducted in a context of bombing. Every attempt was made to conceal from the respondents, even before interviewing, the idea that bombing effects were being studied. Questions about bombing appeared only toward the end of the interview.

(3) *Retrospection.* Most of the questions concerned feelings and experiences at a minimum two and a half months past. Interviewers were fairly carefully trained to be certain that correct time context was maintained, but in a study of this kind a certain amount of retrospective distortion cannot be avoided.

(4) *Wording of questions.* Since those mainly in charge of research preparations knew no Japanese, the translation of ideas and phraseology into Japanese equivalents became a problem. The procedure evolved was first to have a translation into colloquial Japanese made by an analyst who was of Japanese ancestry, who had studied and lived in Japan for several years, and who, during the war, had monitored the Japanese radio for the United States government. His translation was then retranslated back into English by language personnel who were competently bilingual. In this way the translation was matched with the original English language and concepts. Further revisions were suggested by language personnel based on their experiences during pre-test interviews with respond-

ents. The language of the questions, as they appear in English in this report, may seem stilted, as it attempts to reproduce the Japanese as literally as possible.

(5) *Interviewing.* The problem of securing trained, highly intelligent, fluently bilingual interviewers was great. Only very few met the ideal qualifications. All interviewers were given a three-day series of lectures, listened to and criticized recorded interviews, and held at least two practice interviews before going out into the field. The practice interviews were carefully criticized by trained supervisors. Many interviews were recorded on film and played back to the interviewer. Research leaders were instructed to hold retraining sessions and to examine all interview reports critically for signs of poor technique. They could not do so directly by auditing interviews, since most knew no Japanese. Two training supervisors visited almost all teams once, to keep up the level of interviewing. Thus, as far as training goes, the interviewers were adequate, but hardly well-trained to an expert level.

Language difficulties were also severe, but generally the interviewers spoke acceptable Japanese. Nevertheless, this handicap, added to the fact that interview reports had to be in English for coding, created a problem of translation. Thus, some distortion of both questions and responses was introduced.

Appendix B

MAIN INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Kono goro, iroiro no ten ni tsuite seikatsu jōtai wa dō desuka?
In general, how are things going with you now?
2. Subete ni oite senjichū yori ima no hō ga anata ni totte ii to omoimasuka? Soretomo warui to omoimasuka?
Do you feel you are better or worse off now than you were during the war?
3. Senjichū anata ni totte donna koto ga shimpai no genin ni natte imashitaka? (Hoka ni donna shimpai ga arimashitaka?)
What things worried you most during the war? Any other worries?
4. Kotoshi no hajimekara sensō ga owaru made, donna shigoto wo sarete imashitaka?
What sort of work were you doing, from the beginning of 1945 to the end of the war?
5. Sono tōji no anata no shigoto no nōritsu wa mae to kurabete donna deshitaka?
How was your working capacity during this period as compared with other years?
ASK QUESTION 6 ONLY OF THOSE GAINFULLY EMPLOYED.¹
6. Shigoto no jōtai wa donna deshitaka?
How were your working conditions during this period?
ASK QUESTION 7 ONLY OF THOSE GAINFULLY EMPLOYED.
7. Tada ima, showa nijūnen no hajime kara sensō no owari made no anata no shigoto no koto ni tsuite hanashi wo shite ita nodesu ga, kimatta yasumi wo nozoite ikunichi gurai yasumare mashitaka?
Now, we were talking a little while ago about what you were doing from January 1945 to the end of the war. How many working days were you absent from your work during this period?
ASK QUESTION 8 ONLY OF THOSE GAINFULLY EMPLOYED WHO MISSED WORK DAYS IN 1945.
8. Donna wake de yasumareta nodesu?
What prevented you from going to work on those days?
9. Sensō ni taisuru Nippon no ichiban no tsuyom wa nan deshita to senjichū omoimashitaka?
During the war, what did you think was Japan's greatest strength in waging the war?
10. Ichiban no yowami wa nan deshita to senjichū omoimashitaka?
During the war, what did you think Japan's greatest weakness was?
11. Ue no hito
Shidosha no sensō ni taishite no yarikata wo senjichū dō omotte oraremashitaka?
In regard to the way your leaders conducted the war, what did you think of it during the war?
12. Ue no hito shidosha ga jūgo no kokumin seikatsu ni taishite no yarikata wo senjichū do omotte oraremashitaka?
In regard to the way your leaders took care of the home front welfare, what did you think of it during the war?
13. Sensō ni natte kara, seifu ga kawaru tabigoto ni donna kimoichi ga sono toki shimashitaka?
How did you feel about the changes in government during the war, at the time the changes occurred?
14. Sensōchū otagai no furumai ya taido ga kawatte ikimashitaka?
Did the people's attitudes and conduct toward each other change during the war?
15. Nipponjū no hito ga ichiyō ni sensō de kuru-shinde ita to omotte imashitaka?
Did you think that all kinds of people in Japan suffered alike in the war?
16. Sensō ga susumu ni tsurete, katsu mikomi ga nakunatta no dewa naikato utagai hajimerareta koto ga arimahitaka?
As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?
17. Nippon ni kachime ga naito hakkiri omouyō ni narareta no wa itsugoro kara deshitaka?
When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?
18. Shūsen-zen kore ijō sensō wo tsuzukete iku koto wa totemo dekinai daro to motta koto ga arimashitaka?
Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war?

¹ By "gainfully employed" we mean all those who worked for a living—who received earnings as employees, professional fees, or profits as active employers. This includes practically everyone except those who were exclusively housewives, students, or were retired.

19. Nippon ga kōfuku shita koto wo kīta toki, donna kimochi ga shimashitaka?
How did you feel when you heard that Japan had given up the war?
20. Shinjichū-gun shireibu ga totte iru hōshin ni tsuite, anata wa dō omotte oraremasuka?
In regard to the policies taken by occupation-troop headquarters, how do you feel things are working out?
21. Sensō mo yatto sunda wake desu ga, korekara ni-sannen no aida anata no kazoku no hitotachi wa donna kurashi wo sareru to omoimasuka?
Now that the war is over, how do you think you and your family will fare in the next 2 or 3 years?
22. Anata no kangae dewa kore kara saki Nippon wa donna fū ni kawaranakereba naranai to omowaremasuka?
In your opinion, what changes should occur in Japan in the future?
- 22a. Tenno-heika wo dō omowaremasuka?
What about the Emperor?
23. Moshi haisen shitara, donna kekka ni naru darō ka to senjichū ni omowaremashitaka?
During the war, what did you think would be in store for you and your family, if Japan lost the war?
24. Senjichū ni Amerika ga otoshita senden bira no koto wo shitte imashitaka?
24a. Sono bira no naiyō wa donna koto ga kaite arimashitaka?
24b. Sore ni tsuite dō omoware mashitaka?
Did you know about American propaganda leaflets which were dropped during the war?
(a) What were the leaflets about?
(b) What did you think of it (them)?
25. Senjichū, han-nichi no rajio hōsō ni tsuite kiitakoto ga arimashitaka?
25a. Donna koto wo kigaremashitaka?
25b. Sore ni tsuite dō omowaremashitaka?
During the war, did you ever hear about any anti-Japanese radio broadcasts?
(a) What did you hear?
(b) What did you think about it?
26. Senjichū anata no machi wa bagugeki sareru to yoki sarete imashitaka? Soretomo bakugeki wa manugareru to omotte oraremashitaka?
During the war, did you think that your home town would be bombed? Or did you think it would be spared?
ASK QUESTION 27 ONLY OF THOSE WHO DID NOT BELIEVE THEIR HOME
- TOWN WOULD BE BOMBED, IN REPLY TO QUESTION 26.
27. Senjichū Nippon wa bakugeki sareru to yoki sarete imashitaka? Soretomo bakugeki wa manugareru to omotte oraremashitaka?
During the war, did you think that Japan would be bombed or did you think it would be spared?
28. Amerika ga Nippon wo kūshūshita toki, sono sekini wa dochira no hō ni atta to omowaremashitaka?
When the American planes bombed Japan, on which side did you feel the responsibility lay?
29. Senjichū, Amerikajin no kotowo dō omotte oraremashitaka?
How did you feel about the Americans, during the war?
30. Senjichū, shinbun rajio ga kūshū no moyō wo, donna fūni tsutaeta to omoimashitaka?
During the war, what did you think about the way the newspapers and the radios described the air raids on Japan?
31. Amerika ga aru machi wo kūshū suru mae ni, kūshū wo suruzo to yokokushita no wo kiki-mashitaka? (Sore ni tsuite dō omowaremashitaka?)
Did you ever hear about the Americans announcing they were going to bomb cities before they actually did? (What did you think about it?)
32. Amerika no hikōki ga hajimete hondo e yatte kita toki no koto ni tsuite, donna koto wo omoidasaremasuka?
What do you recall about the first time American planes flew over Japan? (What did you think about it?)
33. Anata no mirareta tokoro dewa, anata no machi no bōkū setsubi wa dō datta to omowaremasuka?
In your opinion, how well was your home town protected against air raids?
34. Genshibakudan ni tsuite dō omowaremashitaka?
What did you think about the atomic bomb?
- QUESTIONS 36 TO 41 ARE TO BE ASKED ONLY IF RESPONDENT LIVED IN A BOMBED AREA DURING A BOMBING PERIOD.
35. Jissai ni kūshū ni awareta koto ga arimashitaka?
What bombing experiences have you personally had?

36. Sono koto wo motto kuwashiku hanashite kudasaimasenka? (Donna guai deshitaka? Anata wa do saremashita? Donna kimochi deshita?)
Can you tell me more about your experiences? (Tell me what happened, what you did, how you felt?)
37. Mottomo osoroshii to omowareta no wa yoru no kūshū deshitaka, hiru no kūshū deshitaka? What kind of bombing do you think is worse—day or night?
38. Shōidan to bakuhatsudan to dochira ga osoroshi katta desuka?
What kind of bomb do you think is worse—incendiary or explosive?
39. Kūshū ga tabikasanaru ni tsurete, osoroshisa ga masumasu tsuyoku narimashitaka? Soretomo narete kimashitaka?
Were you more and more afraid as the raids continued, or did you get used to them?
40. Kūshū ga atta ato no zengosaku (tatoeba tokubetsu no setsubi ya kyusai nado) wa donna mono deshitaka?
How good were the special measures and welfare services after the raids?
41. Kūshū ni yotte yakidasarenakatta hito wa, risaisha e taishite dono teido no enjo wo shimashitaka?
How much help did the people who were not bombed give to those who were?

Appendix C

EVACUATION SCHEDULE

DETERMINE IF RESPONDENT FALLS INTO GROUP A, B, OR C, AND THEN ASK THE APPROPRIATE SET OF QUESTIONS.

(The groups of questions are arranged in order of priority for use. Thus, if a respondent falls into both Group A and Group C, use the Group A set of questions.)

A. Respondent evacuated from one community (shi, machi, or mura) to another because of bombing or the threat of it.

B. Respondent's household evacuated because of bombing or the threat of it, but respondent remained behind.

C. Respondent and household had no evacuation experience, but lived in a community into which evacuees came.

(Note: It should be clearly understood that the appropriate group of questions should be used for all respondents who fall into any one of the three above categories. A person may have been unbombed—yet, he may have very well had evacuation experiences, because he left voluntarily or under orders, in anticipation of bombing.)

IN ALL INSTANCES WHERE THE EVACUATION SCHEDULE IS NOT USED AFTER EITHER QUESTION 35 OR QUESTION 41 IN THE MAIN SCHEDULE, THE INTERVIEWER MUST SPECIFICALLY STATE THAT IT IS NOT BEING USED, AND WHY IT IS NOT BEING USED.

GROUP A

1. Anata wa dō yū wake de _____ wo sokai shimashitaka?
Why did you leave (*name of community*)?
2. Sokai no sai, sensō ni taishite donna kanji wo omochi deshitaka?
How did you feel about the war at the time you left?
3. Sokai-zen kūshū ni awaremashitaka?
What bombing experiences did you have before you left?
4. Anata wa jihatsuteki ni _____ wo sokai shimashitaka? Soretomo kyōseiteki ni sokai saserare mashitaka?
Did you leave (*name of community*) voluntarily, or were you forced to go away?

5. Ryokō toka seikatsu setsubi ni taishite, seifu wa donna bengi wo ataete kuremashitaka?
What arrangements were made for your trip and living facilities?
6. Kazoku zentai ga anata to issho ni sokai shimashitaka?
Did your entire household go with you?
7. Sokai saki no seikatsu jōtai wa donna guai deshitaka?
How was your livelihood in the place to which you went?
8. Hinan sokai ni kansuru kansō wo goku kantan ni hanashite itadakemasenka?
Could you explain to me in a few words how you felt about the evacuation?
9. Sokai saki no hitotachi kara anata wa donna taigū wo ukemashitaka?
How were you treated in the place to which you were evacuated?

GROUP B

1. Kazoku no hitotachi wa _____ wo dō yū wake do sokai shimashitaka?
Why did members of your household leave (*name of community*)?
2. Kazoku no hitotachi ga sokai sareta sai, anata wa sensō ni taishite donna kanji wo omochi deshitaka?
How did you feel about the war at the time that members of your household left?
3. Kazoku no hitotachi wa sokai sareru mae made ni kūshū ni awaremashitaka?
What bombing experiences did you have before the members of your household left?
4. Kazoku no hitotachi wa jihatsuteki ni _____ wo sokai shimashitaka? Soretomo kyōseiteki ni sokai saserare mashitaka?
Did the members of your household leave (*name of community*) voluntarily, or, were they forced to go?
5. Kazoku no hitotachi no ryokō toka seikatsu setsubi ni taishite, seifu wa donna bengi wo ataete kuremashitaka?
What arrangements were made for the trip of the members of your household and their living facilities?

6. Kazoku zentai ga onaji tochi ni ikaremashitaka?
Did your entire household go to the same place?
7. Sokai saki no kazoku no seikatsu jōtai wa dō deshitaka?
How was your household's livelihood in the place(s) to which they went?
8. Kazoku no hinan sokai ni kansuru anata no kansō wo goku kantan ni hanashite itadake-masenka?
Could you explain to me in a few words how you felt about the evacuation of your household?
9. Sokai saki no hitotachi kara anata no kazoku wa donna taigū wo ukemashitaka?
How were the members of your household treated in the place to which they were evacuated?

GROUP C

1. _____ e tasū aruhiwa shōsū no hinanmin ga sokai shimashitaka?

- Were many or few persons evacuated to (*name of community*)?
2. Hinansha ga kuru mae made wa anata wa sensō ni taishite donna kanji wo omoehi deshitaka?
How did you feel about the war before the evacuees came?
 3. Anata no uchi ni hinansha ga sunde imashitaka?
Did you have any evacuees living with you?
(IF RESPONDENT HAD EVACUEES LIVING WITH HIM, ASK QUESTION 4. IF NOT, SKIP TO QUESTION 5.)
 4. Anatagata to hinanshatachi to no aida wa dō deshitaka?
How did they and you get along?
 5. Daitai dō yū yōna hitobito ga kono tochi e sockaishite kimashitaka?
What kind of people, on the whole, came into this region?

Appendix D

MORALE DIVISION INTERVIEWING AND QUESTION-BY-QUESTION OBJECTIVES

(A Memorandum to Interviewers and Research Leaders)

I. GENERAL

The Morale Division, through the use of its prescribed questionnaires and interviewing techniques, expects full, clear, undistorted, and relatively free expressions of attitudes from its respondents. In many respects, the questions furnish the topics for the respondent to discuss; the art of the interviewer is in drawing the respondent out, and keeping him to the point of the question without introducing matters biasing his response. The interview session belongs to the respondent. In cases where the interviewer projects himself into the situation by doing more than 10 percent of the talking, the purpose of the interview is lost. The interviewer's job is to facilitate the respondent's talking—it is not an opportunity for the interviewer to express himself.

To accomplish these purposes, there are several requisites:

A. Good initial structuring: Getting the respondent to be at ease, partly by showing that you, yourself, are friendly and at ease, and partly by verbal reassurances—you are grateful for their coming, you are interested in the wartime and present conditions of the people of Japan, anything they say will neither be linked to their names nor used by anyone in Japan, there are some simple questions in whose answers the Americans are interested. He should be told why he is being interviewed, how he happened to be selected, and what is expected of him. From this point there should be a smooth transition into the first question. Meanwhile, the respondent has had a chance to accustom himself to the room and to the interviewer.

1. The introductory structuring formula, found useful on the pre-test, is as follows:

I am Mr. (name of interviewer), representing the American government. We are much interested in the wartime experiences (or conditions) and present conditions of the Japanese people. In this connection we are interviewing people of various classes, ages, and occupations, both men and women. We would be grateful, therefore, if you would answer a few questions. Please be assured that what you say here will be used only by the American authorities and will be released to no Japanese person.

WATAKUSHI WA BEIKOKU TŌKYOKU WO DAIRI SHITE ORU TO IŪ MONO DE ARIMASU. WAREWARE WA NIPPON KOKUMIN NO SENJICHŪ NO

KEIKEN NARABI NI GENZAI NO JOTAI NI TSUITE FUKAI KYŌMI O MOTTE ORIMASU. MIGI NI KANREN SHITE, WATAKUSHI DOMO WA KAKUSHU KAIKYŪ, NENREI, SHOKUGYŌ NO DANSHI, GOFUJIN GATA NO IKEN WO UKAGATTE ORIMASU. DE, ARIMASU KARA, WATAKUSHI NO SHITSUMON NI OKOTAE WO NEGAEREBBA SAIWAI DESU. ANATA NO OKOTAE WA, BEIKOKU TŌKYOKU NO SANKO NO TAME DE ARIMASU. NIPPONJIN NI WA ZETTAI NI SHIRASEMASEN KARA, KESSHITE GOSHIMPAI NI OYOBI MASEN.

B. Restructuring as necessary at various times during the interview.

1. Sometimes the respondent is so busy getting used to the interviewer and the novel situation that he does not heed the introductory statements; sometimes they are forgotten. In these cases, a paraphrase of the introductory statement is worth repeating.

2. Another form of restructuring—that is, orienting the respondent to the situation about to come up in the interview, involves verbal transitions between sections of the main interview schedule (for example, going from the questions on leaflet and radio propaganda to the questions on bombing), between the main schedule and the evacuation schedule, and orientation to the gathering of material for the factual data sheet. These transitional statements by the interviewer get the respondent “set” for what is to come, and facilitate his thinking.

C. Keeping the focus of the respondent's conversation and thought on the phases of the question which has been asked. The objectives of the questions are explicitly stated in this memorandum; the necessary instructions, based on pre-test experience with responses to the questionnaires are also included. The respondent may wander away from the whole point of the question, or neglect some important phase of it.

1. Repeating the question may help to ensure that material bearing on the objectives is discussed. In Question 28, if the respondent does not discuss the subject in terms of “responsibility,” but merely describes his personal responses to bombing, the interviewer can say—“Yes, that's interesting, but —,” and repeat the question.

2. Keep in mind the following phases of any question, and try to lead the respondent to answer in the terms called for by using simple statements:

a. *Who*. If the question asks something about how the respondent himself felt, and he replies in terms of how "people" felt or how the Japanese government tried to get people to feel, say something like "How did *you personally* feel?"

Who. If it is not clear about whom the respondent is speaking, the reference may be clarified by asking "What do you mean by _____?"

b. *What*. Be sure the respondent is talking on the *subject* of a question; if he seems to be off the point, bring the question back into focus by repeating the part of the question he missed. For example, in Question 5, if he talks about working *conditions*, say—"But how about *your personal ability* to do work?" Another example—in reply to Question 40, respondent may talk about ARP—yet the objective is to get at responses covering post-raid services to the individual. In that case, the distinction must be made for the respondent by the interviewer.

What. Be sure that the subject under discussion is clear in the interview write-up, as the interviewer has clarified it in the interview itself.

c. *When*. Time reference is especially important in Morale Division's interview schedules. We are asking about attitudes *during the war*, and also, in other questions, attitudes *at present*. *It is essential that the respondent be made to understand the time reference of a question*. In the case of "during the war" questions, the words "during the war" must be emphasized; if the respondent speaks in terms of his present responses, say—"and how did you feel about it *during the war*?"

d. *Why*. Very important in our studies are the *reasons* for the person's attitude which the person himself gives. *A statement of attitude, without the interviewer asking for reasons, is an inadequate interview result*. Always ask "What makes you feel that way?" or "Why do you feel that way?" under every question which calls for an attitude or opinion to be expressed.

3. In short, the interview schedules are *not* designed to get responses in terms of "Yes" or "No," or a simple factual statement from the respondent. We want, *for every question*:

a. *Attitudes and opinions*—how the person responded to the facts, how he feels or felt about them.

b. *Reasons* for his attitudes, feelings and opinions. Why the respondent feels or thinks as he does.

c. *Proper time perspective*—if the question calls for what respondent thought of something *during the war*, an answer in terms of the present represents failure of the interviewer to make the time reference clear to the interviewee. Only by complete adherence to these points will the questions draw material pertaining to the *objectives* of any question.

D. It is the established policy that only *non-directive probes*, as explained in the interviewer training sessions be used, unless specified in the questionnaire. Routinely, it will probably be necessary to use one or two such probes to help the respondent give *full attitudes and reasons*. The way to ensure that the replies the interviewer gets bear on the objectives of a question is by making sure the respondent understands what is being asked for (technique suggested in C, above), and gets the stimulation to encourage him to speak fully.

E. The results of good interviewing technique are lost if *interview write-ups* are not full and *complete*. During the interview, the interviewer must *constantly* make notes to be later used for a complete and *accurate* write-up; record what the respondent says, or the gist of it, *as he says it*. To prevent memory distorting what the respondent says, the interview should be written up, *in ink* (for microfilming) as soon after the interview as possible, in a clear hand.

II. MAIN INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

A. Structure of the Schedule.

The schedule is designed to open with questions easy to answer, requiring little thought, and helping the respondent adjust to the novel situation in which he finds himself. Thereafter, follow a series of general questions in the area of morale. *Note that in the prescribed introductory structuring, and up to Question 26, not a word about bombing occurs. The interviewer should never use the words "bombing" or "air raid" or similar terms unless the respondent himself brings them up*. In this way, up until Question 26, if bombing has affected the person's morale or living circumstances in any manner, he is given a chance to say so spontaneously, without distortion of his feelings by the interviewer. *The interviewer, however, must be alert to record and get full material on all spontaneous mention of bombing, before Question 26*.

B. Question-by-Question Objectives.¹

¹ EDITOR'S NOTE.—In the original memorandum distributed to research personnel there followed, at this point, detailed instructions on the use and aims of interview questions. The instructions summarized pretest experiences.

Appendix E

MANUAL FOR CONTACTS WITH RESPONDENTS

Procedure for contact men engaged in locating, contacting, making appointments with, rounding up, and delivering respondents from sample lists to scheduled interview with research leaders and interviewers. Procedures outlined below are to be construed as instructions binding upon military officers in charge, research leaders, and assistant research leaders.

General

It is the responsibility of the assistant to the research leader to locate, contact, and arrange to deliver the respondents (persons to be interviewed with the scheduled Morale Division questionnaires) to the place where interviews are carried out. In general, *the day before* the interview takes place, the respondents of a local sample are to be located, the forthcoming interview explained to them, and an appointment made for meeting them and transporting them to the place of interview the following day, either at 8:00 o'clock or at 1:00 o'clock. (In some cities where transportation is available, and the headquarters of the Morale Division team are easy to locate, the respondents will not be furnished transportation, but will be expected to present themselves at the appointed time and place. The research leader will make these decisions as to whether transportation is to be furnished.) It is the responsibility of the assistant research leader to see that such contact with and delivery of the respondents is carried out smoothly, quickly, and without mistakes of identity or substitutions of individuals, and in such a way as to make the best possible preparation of the respondent for the interview.

It is the responsibility of the research leader, on the other hand, to name the specific persons on the sample lists to be contacted, to schedule the times of their appointments for interviews, and to hold the assistant research leader to the procedure of contacting which will yield the best interview results. (The research leader is authorized to make all decisions in these matters, on the spot, including any variation in procedure which he feels is necessary under local conditions.) It is likewise the research leader's responsibility to get, through the military officer in charge, the necessary trans-

port, vehicles, and accompaniment the assistant research leader may need in his work.

Consequently this manual has been prepared to assist both the assistant to the research leader and the research leader in the discharge of the function of contacting respondents from the samples. Both mechanical points and psychological ones are necessarily to be covered, and a form of procedure and a set of introductory phrases and formulas of explanation, necessary to assuring a uniform preparation of the minds of respondents, and to give them uniform expectations of the interview they are to go through, is provided. The procedures and formulas are to be used as given and are to be followed as closely as local circumstances permit. If deviations are necessary because of peculiar local circumstances, then it is the responsibility of the assistant research leader in charge to report such necessary deviations and to clear them with the research leader in order that their bearing on the sample and on the interviews can be assessed. It is the responsibility of the research leader to reconcile such variations with scientific validity in sampling and interviewing method.

Locating Individuals (of the Samples to Serve as Respondents)

The individuals on the sample lists who are to serve as respondents in the interviews scheduled for a particular day, having been chosen for him by the research leader, it will be the mission of the assistant research leader to find such individuals a day ahead, contact them, explain the forthcoming interview, and make an appointment to pick them up and deliver them for interviewing, or to inform them where they are to report.

Locating such individuals requires working from the sample list from which they were chosen (Sample Lists 1, 2, 2R, 3, 3A, or 4). First step is to find the source of the sample. Usually the sample is a police list, and its source is the chief of police of the local government. In some cases, however, other sources will have been used to make up the sample, such as ration boards, neighborhood associations, etc. In each case, locate the source, its specific address or location, and the person or official with whom the sample was drawn up. Proceed then

from the source, as a central point, and go successively to each smaller local subdivision of a city (*shi*) or rural district (*machi* or *mura*), making use of the local police or other authority used in the sampling, until the particular residential areas of the persons to be contacted for the next day is reached.

In general, it is important from the beginning to establish good contacts with the Japanese local police from the chief down to the lowest ranking officer. It is very necessary to get the cooperation of the lowest ranking police officer, the officer on duty at the nearest police box in the residential area where the respondents are located and to use him in finding them and in making contact with them. In using him it is well to remember to go through channels, to begin at the top of the local echelons of police authority, and to go on down, taking an officer from the central station along to make contact with the officer on duty in the residential area. Courtesy and formality in this procedure is worth the time it may take, and hurry or shortcutting may have a damaging effect on the preparation of the respondents, on their understanding of what you require of them, and on the understanding and cooperation of the police. Consequently part of standard procedure will be a formula of introduction and explanation to be used with the police and with other local authorities you may need in locating respondents.

In addition, a few guiding remarks are mentioned here, to help explain the special difficulties of finding places, addresses, streets, or buildings in Japanese cities and towns. Japanese addresses are not street addresses but numbered locations within wards or sections of a city or wards and hamlets of an incorporated rural district (*machi*) or village (*mura*). In particular, too, Japanese police precinct numbering of houses is not necessarily the same as postal address numbering.

The Japanese police often carry a house number which is assigned arbitrarily within a precinct according to its location upon established police beats. Some of the house numbers recorded in the sample lists of individuals may be such numbers. They can be found only by locating the precinct and then taking the local policeman along. In smaller places, and perhaps even in cities, however, postal addresses may be used even by the police.

Postal addresses must be understood, as in many cases they will be indispensable to locating respondents. Postal addresses are not street numbers but locations within wards (*ku*) or sections (*machi*) of a city or within sections (*ku*) of a rural district (*machi*

also) or incorporated village (*mura*). In a city they are often called *machi ban go* (or section house number). Street numbers are not used, because streets ordinarily do not have names. Naturally they are exceptions. Some big arterial avenues and long streets (*ō-dōri*) have names, as do some national highways in rural areas (*koku-dō*). More often, however, streets are themselves numbered consecutively from some boundary or other arbitrary starting point within a ward or section of a city, as Akasaka-ku, #10 Chō-me (Akasaka ward, No. 10 street).

Postal address house numbers are locations within wards and sections and they are assigned in the order in which the houses were built, or got building permits, or the land on which they stand was subdivided from an original larger property, or by some other semi-arbitrary system. They are *seldom if ever consecutive*.

Nevertheless nearly every dwelling has a long board sign on it with the ward (*ku*) or smaller section (*machi*) (in cities) or the *mura* (in the country) name on it and the house number. Numbers of the same number block are usually either contiguous or somewhere in the vicinity. The way to find them is to ask locally.

Asking locally (in the absence of an accompanying policeman) is simple enough. At the most prominent local street intersection or cross roads, the local police box (known as *kōban*) can easily be found. The policeman on the beat (*jansa*, or in address *omawari-san*) is usually to be found there or not far off. Usual locating procedure will be to reach him through the precinct station above him, where a local officer can be counted on to take a contact man to the police box. From the police box, the policeman on the beat can be counted to take one to the individual house and should be used to do so in making contacts with respondents.

If by any chance one is unaccompanied by the police, however, it is well to know something of further steps in locating an individual house:

The police keep a map or blueprint of the local beats usually hung on an inside wall of the *koban*. As these wall maps follow our conventions it is often possible to consult them. The boundaries of wards or sections for which local houses are numbered are shown and within them house numbers (at least in unbombed areas) appear at their respective locations. Care should be taken to map out a route through alleys and back streets to the number wished, as any particular house may be reachable only through a most tortuous course. Once the

general location of the numbered house is established, local people can direct one to it.

Use of the Policeman in Contacting Respondents. In locating and contacting individuals for a day's interviewing, it will be very necessary not only to use the police, including the policeman on the beat, in locating the section or precinct, the house, and the person sought, but also to use them in making actual contact with that person. The policeman may be instrumental in explaining the purpose of the interview, in allaying the fears the respondent may have, and in making the appointment for the following day. The policeman is to be used for these purposes where necessary or where he volunteers, but he is *not* to be relied on to do so. It will be necessary for the contact man to speak to the respondent in person, to make the explanations in person, and to make the appointment for the interview in person, in face to face conversation. The contact man is responsible not only for rounding up the respondent for interview, but also for preparing his understanding and expectation of the interview in as thorough, consistent, and gracious a manner as possible.

Nevertheless, since policemen are to be used to facilitate location and contact, it is necessary that the contact man introduce himself to the police officials and to the local policemen on the beat who accompany him to the respondents in such a way

The formula is this:

(English)

I am the American (Army or Navy, rank and name _____.)

I have come from Tokyo with Dr. (name), _____ who represents the American authorities who are cooperating with MacArthur's Supreme Headquarters. Dr. _____ is an advisor to the American government.

The American government is interested in the wartime experiences of the Japanese people.

We would therefore like to interview a number of people chosen at random from various classes, ages, occupations, both men and women. We have set up an office at _____ for the purpose, and your help is requested in summoning the persons selected.

In case the sample team has already established contact with an official, the formula should be expanded to say: We are choosing the persons we want to interview from the sample worked up with your help by (*sampler*).

The formula may of course be elaborated upon if further explanation is asked for. But, in that

as to explain the interview and its purpose to them. The contact man is responsible for getting reasonable understanding and cooperation from the police, for care that the police do not use methods which might distort the respondents expectations of the interview, for taking care that he and the police get the maximum amount of cooperation from respondents with the minimum amount of fear, misunderstanding, and distortion in the expectations of the respondents.

To introduce himself and the interview to the police, therefore, the contact man should use a formula of explanation that combines authority enough to assure compliance on the part of the police and attendance upon the part of the respondent, with a uniform and accurate description of the interview. It should be remembered that the explanation that the contact man gives the policeman is as important a precondition to the interview as is the explanation he gives the respondent. The policeman should be encouraged to use the formula himself when he opens contact with the respondent.

Such a formula has been agreed upon, tested, and adopted as standard procedure. It should be used. It is offered, of course, as an opening explanation, to be expanded and elaborated as need requires. Any variations in its use should be reported to the research leader and agreed upon with him.

(Japanese)

Watakushi wa Beikoku no _____ to iū mono

desu. Makāsa sōshireibu to kyōryoku shite oru Beikoku tōkyokusha wo daihyō shite oru _____ hakase to issho ni Tōkyō kara mairimashita. _____ hakase wa Beikoku seifu no komon de arimasu.

Beikoku tokyokusha wa Nippon kokumin no senjichu jijō (jōtai, keiken) ni tsuite fukai kyōmi wo motte imasu. So de arimasu kara wareware go Nipponchū arayuru kaikyū, arayuru shokugyō, arayuru nenrei, otoko mo onna mo sūnin menkai shitai desu.

Watakushidomo no jimusho sunawachi menkai no basho wa _____ desu.

Erabareta hititachi wo yobidashitai no desu ga, makoto ni osore irimasu ga go-enjō wo negaimasu.

event, the points to elaborate are the nature of sampling, the fact that the interviews are to be carried out all over Japan among all sorts of persons, that people have been picked by a random and scientific process, and the the United States authorities have sent academic or scientific experts to carry the study out. Points especially to be avoided are (1)

further specification of the kind of experiences or conditions to be asked about, and (2) use of the interviews. Try to avoid any implication that the respondents can expect help as a result of the interviews, or that the interview deals with present rather than past conditions, or that living conditions are our primary interest. Especially important is avoiding any reference or implication of either BOMBING or MORALE. If one is asked specifically to name the kind of experiences or conditions the interview deals with, or the field of experiences or conditions the interview deals with, or the field of expertness in which the research leaders are distinguished, then and then only can one specify wartime living conditions. It is important to the interview to fix the time as *wartime*, not *present*.

In addition, the police used should be instructed not to visit, bother, or further instruct the contacted persons, once contact and appointments have been made.

*Variations: Using Other Local Help.*¹ In some cases it may be advisable to seek help in locating, contacting, and explaining to and making appointments with respondents, from local persons other than the police, both in the central source of the sample of an area and in the immediate neighborhood of respondents.

Local school teachers in particular might prove useful in accompanying the assistant research leader in contact work, or could be used to further interpreting, we hope, where dialect is a problem. They might assist, if necessary, the military officer in charge, in making contacts himself, if it becomes necessary to delegate some of the assistant research leader's work to him.

All decisions as to such variations of the standard procedure of using the police are to be made only by the research leader. He must take care to control their use in the interests of the validity of the sample and the effectiveness of the interviews. Any local circumstances making such variations necessary should be reported to him immediately upon discovery.

The Contact with Respondents

In actual contact with respondents, the assistant research leader has the responsibilities of (1) making sure of the identity of the individual of the day's sample, (2) checking his name off the sample list, (3) giving into his keeping the pass card admitting him to interview, (4) explaining and thus "struc-

turing" the interview for the respondent, (5) building up the first rapport with him, (6) making an appointment for time, place, and means of transportation for the interview of the next day, and (7) reporting any unusual circumstances in the contacts he makes. Coming with the police, the assistant research leader has the further responsibility of making sure the police introduction and police explanation of his presence and the interview merely facilitate, do not impede or distort the execution of his mission. In particular he should take care against relying upon the policeman to do the job for him. The job is his, and it is important that he establish rapport and understanding with the respondent directly himself. In that particular he is to be careful to avoid hurry, rush, or preemptory tactics. He has authority to bring these people in by any means, and should use it if necessary. But he should remember that it is his job to establish the first rapport between the interviewers and the respondents, and that he should expend as much tact and time upon the last respondent as upon the first. The more he can do with the respondent in fostering understanding and rapport, the easier and quicker will be the job of the interviewers the next day.

Taking up the responsibilities of actual contact with the individuals of a day's sample, one by one, they are:

Making Sure of the Individual's Identity. There can be no substitutions. Bring in everyone of the sample without fail. Only if an individual cannot be found, if no way exists for getting word to him of an appointment, if the individual has *bona fide* and utterly inescapable reasons for not coming, or if the individual is clearly ineligible for interviewing in the sample, can the contact man skip him and go on to the next person on the list. Bring recalcitrants in by whatever means. Do not skip them. Do not accept substitutes, even members of the same family, sex, age, occupation, neighborhood, etc. Do not accept substitutions, and take care that they are not taken into the group delivered for the next day's interview. Make it clear to both the policeman and the respondents that sampling permits of not substitution. Get temporary absentees as described later on. Skip only permanent absentees or ineligible; and go on to the next selected individual. Report the skipping to the research leader. Ineligibles are those who (1) were soldiers or sailors since 1941; (2) are over 71 or under 17, Japanese age; (3) are deaf, seriously ill, demented, or otherwise unfit for interview; (4) institutionalized persons, in jail, etc. Since inelig-

¹ EDITOR'S NOTE.—Developments after this manual was written made use of police in contact work very rare. Most of the contact assistance came from rationing officials and from municipal officers.

bles of categories 1 or 2 may be hard to detect, be sure to check age and military status where necessary.

Once contacted, identified, and given an appointment, check the time, date, and other circumstances of the appointment upon the sample list from which the individual came. A pass card carrying the sample number and numbered for each respondent of the sample list is to be left with the resident as memorandum for the morrow's interview and as a check item in matching sample lists and completed interviews later. The pass cards will be described below. Pass card numbers and check-off of sample list must agree.

Explaining and "Structuring" the Interview. Just as with the police, the contact man must explain the purpose of the interview to the respondent in such a way as (1) to assure he comes in for interview (2) has the same understanding and expectations of it as others. It is important that his explanation be given in person, in face to face contact, and with tact, ease, and sufficient time and effort

English

I am the American (Army or Navy, rank and name). I have come from Tokyo with Dr. (name) who represents the American authorities who are cooperating with MacArthur's Supreme Headquarters. Dr. (name) is an advisor to the American government.

The American government is interested in the wartime experiences of the Japanese people. We want to learn of them from a number of people chosen at random from various classes, occupations, and ages, both men and women, from all the parts of Japan. We have set up an office at _____ for the purpose of interviewing these people, and we wish therefore to have you come to our office for an interview.

The interview will take about two hours. It is not a severe examination but merely an inquiry into your experiences. Since that is so you need have no anxiety.

We shall come for you and take you to our office (by means available) at (time and place). Please be ready for us. After the interview is over, you will be free to come home (and we will provide available transportation).

In cases where transport is not provided, and respondents come by their own means to the place of interview a variation may be used here urging

to assure understanding and attempt to build some rapport. In addition, of course, the contact man must be certain the respondent knows and understands his appointment: when, where, and by what means he will be delivered or is to come for interviewing on the following day.

A formula for this explanation has been worked up, and is to be used as a standard for contact. The same formula will appear on a pass card to be left with the respondent as a memorandum of his appointment and a means of identification at his interview. But the formula and all other explanation must be used by word of mouth and in direct contact with the respondent before the pass card is presented. Contact men must not rely upon the pass card to do their job for them. It is to be left with the respondent upon the contact man's leaving him. It carries a duplication of the explanation by word of mouth, only in order to serve as a reminder for the respondent and to insure respondents of the same locality get a common, standard version (in writing) of the purpose of the interview.

Japanese

Watakushi wa Beikoku no -----

to iū mono desu. Makāsa sōshireibu to kyōryoku shite oru Beikoku tōkyokusha wo daihyō shite oru ----- hakase to issho ni Tokyo kara mairimashita. ----- hakase wa Beikoku seifu no komon de arimasu.

Beikoku tōkyokusha wa Nippon kokumin no senjichū jijō (jōtai, keiken) ni tsuite fukai kyōmi wo motte imasu. Sō de arimasu kara wareware go Nipponchū arayuru kaikyū, arayuru shokugyō, arayuru nenrei, otoko mo onna mo sunin menkai shitai desu.

Sō de arimasu kara anata wa wareware no jimusho e kite moritai no desu. Jimusho wa ----- desu. Menkai wa yaku nijikan kakarimasu. Kore wa genjū na torishirabe de wa arimasen. Gojibun no jijō (jōtai) no koto dake okikitai no desu. Sō desu kara nanimo shimoai ga irimasen etc. dōzo go-anshin nasai.

promptitude and making sure of the respondents' understanding of the location and means of getting to the place of interview.

The formula is to be expanded or simplified to reach the understanding of the respondent, as long as no distortion results. It may be necessary to explain or allay fears further. In that case, the police can be asked to help, or can be asked to come with the respondents in delivering them next day (if it seems that course would be reassuring). It could well be stressed that others of the neighborhood will come to the interview and that the respondent will not be alone. No implication that the interview is optional or other than obligatory should be allowed to creep into the conversation. On the other hand, obvious shuffling of appointments, say from morning to afternoon, can be made where they are clearly needed.

The pass card is not to be left with respondent until after explanation is complete, and appointment is made.

The Pass Card. Upon leaving the respondent the contact man is to leave in his hands a pass card prepared ahead of time, a supply of which he is to get from the research leader at the time of selecting the day's individuals to be contacted. The pass card takes this form:

USA

APPOINTMENT FOR INTERVIEW

Present this card for an interview

dealing with wartime experiences of the Japanese people at-----

at-----o'clock

on-----month-----day-----year

Sample List----- R. number-----

The pass card should be filled out with sample list and R number by the contact man before starting on a day's contacts. It should be checked against the sample list at the time identification of the respondent is made. Place of appointment should be written out ahead of time, but time, day, and month should be filled out, if possible, in the presence of the respondent. The respondent should be instructed that he is to keep the card overnight as a reminder and to bring it with him to the interview and is there to turn it over to the person who interviews him. Try to give out the card casually and not to excite awe of it, but make sure its purpose is understood.

The card is naturally in Japanese, and the assistant research leader will fill it out in Japanese (except for sample list and R number), but it should be the responsibility of the research leader to see that the card is used as prescribed and to see that it fills its purpose.

Temporary Absentees. A frequent variation in procedure in locating, contacting, explaining to, and making appointments with individuals of a day's sample will be necessary where an individual selected from a sample list for location and contact is temporarily absent. If he is clearly so far away as to be impossible to bring in to interview, he must be skipped, without substitution, but if he is temporarily absent, then a variation of contact procedure can be used:

Through the accompanying policeman or neighbors, locate a member of his household or an immediate neighbor who is certain of seeing him before the time scheduled for his round up and delivery to the interviewers. Give the same explanation, with the same care, to that household member or immediate neighbor, make sure of understanding of the time and place of appointment, and leave the pass card, filled out properly, to be delivered to the absentee upon his return. Once again, however, do not rely on the pass card, but try to establish understanding and rapport through the household member or neighbor by personal conversation.

Make sure, also, that the respondent will have time between his receipt of the pass card and his round-up to get some story of the contact man's visit before he is actually rounded-up the next day. At the same time, do not permit substitution.

Check-off at Time of Issue of Pass Card. Upon leaving the respondent, as has been said, it is the responsibility of the contact man to leave behind a pass card, with appointment filled out, and to check off the name of the respondent upon the sample list, in such a manner that the pass card of respondent and the record of check off upon the sample list agree, and can be matched later on.

In this check-off process there are two subsidiary responsibilities of importance:

(1) One is to record, of course, the time, date, and means of conveyance agreed upon with the respondent for use in the round-up next day.

(2) Another is to include in the check-off and the record of the appointment a brief note of the *Respondent's Reaction to Contact*.

Notes on Contact Reactions. At the check off of an appointment on the sample list, after issue of a pass card to a respondent, notes should be made, keyed by the sample list number and by R number already used on the individual's pass card, giving any unusual circumstances of a respondent's reaction to the contact just made.

It is vital to the results of the survey to note and report any unusual circumstances of the contacts

and to key them to sample lists and individual respondents. Turn such notes into the research leader at once.

Round-Up and Delivery

It is the responsibility of the assistant research leader to arrange that he or the military officer in charge, with vehicles, keep the appointments made when contacting individuals of the selected sample. Similarly, the research leader has the responsibility of providing interviewers to take the appointed interview quickly and as and when appointed.

Round-up and delivery of the respondents should conform to the necessities of transport, travel, and locality in the sampled area, but care should be taken not to violate the local custom or the convenience of the respondents unnecessarily. It may often be possible to expedite round-up by asking respondents of a day's round-up to assemble at some key central place well known to them, like a corner *police box*. Advice can be sought on the matter from the police assisting in the round-up. The research leader and officer in charge will together arrange a waiting room and other place of

reception for respondents and delivery will be made to that room, where interviewers and respondents can be paired off quickly, promptly, and without fuss.

Any further explanation or conversation dealing with the interview during round-up and delivery should follow the lines already laid down. It should be kept in mind that the contact man's responsibility for preconditioning the interview extends through the whole period from contact to the final delivery to interviewers. The assistant research leaders are also to be alert for any events or discussion during round-up and delivery which might prejudice interview or sample and to report the same to the research leader.

Further, it is to be understood that the general responsibility of surveyance of location and contact and of the actual methods of round-up, delivery, and the fulfillment of respondents' appointment for interview, including in particular the use of the vehicles in the charge of the military officer for rounding up respondents, comes under the authority of the research leader.

Appendix F

INSTRUCTIONS FOR BACKGROUND REPORT

The Background Report is an essential part of the Survey; unless it is carefully done, much of the interviewing materials will fail to yield their full significance. Research Leaders should start the process of obtaining these data upon arriving at the sampling point.

Part J of the report in Japanese should be left with appropriate respondents after they have been briefed. The respondent should look through the report and have a chance to ask questions while the Research Leader or his representative is there. It should then be impressed on him that he must *at once* set about obtaining the necessary data from official files. If he protests that for some items no data exist, find out whether data do not exist upon which to base an official estimate. Thus it is obviously impossible for the Japanese to know the tonnage of bombs dropped, but it is believed that they have some estimates. Even if these estimates prove "wild," they may be a useful index to morale. Part JE is an English translation of Part J.

SPECIFIC DIRECTIONS FOR PART J

Before leaving the report for the respondent,

1. In space (a) write in the name of the area (shi, machi, or mura) to be covered by the report.

2. In space (b) write in the year and the first full month *preceding* the first bombing attack in the area in question (excluding the Doolittle raid). Thus if the first bombing attack in the area was December 10, 1944, have your interpreter write November, 1944, in Japanese.

If the area in question was not bombed, write in the name of the month preceding the month in which bombs fell *in the nearest bombed area*. In Part II state concisely but fully the data upon which you based this important reference date.

3. Fill in the name and address of the research leader to whom the report form is to be returned in space (k).

4. Where it is clear that a respondent should not attempt to fill in part of the schedule, cross that part off heavily, e. g. if the area was unbombed, the whole of I and II should be crossed off.

PART O

This part of the background report is to be obtained by oral interviews. More than one interview is usually needed to check against the written questionnaire. The numbering of Part O corresponds with, and in places extends the numbering of Part J. Always question the official responsible *after* you have the written report. In general others should also be interviewed after the written data have been secured.

1. BOMBING DATA

These data may be obtained from the police. Of course no inquiry on this point is to be made in unbombed areas.

Ascertain how the respondent (R) made up the report and how reliable he believes it to be.

2. BOMB DAMAGE

These data will probably fall within the province of the municipal authorities, but others (including the police) should be questioned. This is a very important section.

The data on State Railways will probably have to be obtained from the railway authorities and it may be impossible to get them for an area exactly corresponding with the area for which the report is being made. The objective is a picture of the gradual deterioration of facilities in the area. If the railway report covers a slightly larger or smaller area no harm is done *unless the amount of bombing varies*.

If records have been destroyed, get estimates but first be sure records do not exist.

In addition, get data on:

E. *Reconstruction Activities*: (1) Was there any *major* reconstruction between bombings? Was it by direction of any governmental agency? Was it subsidized? Explore reconstruction policies with respect to factories, homes, etc.

(2) What was the nature of the *temporary* rebuilding? What sort of facilities were provided? How adequate? Explore fully. Section E should be covered in several interviews, including interviews with heads of neighborhood associations.

3. ARP

Inquire on this in both bombed and unbombed areas.

A. *Demolition*. Be sure that demolition of partly destroyed houses or walls which have become hazardous is *not* included. We want here only preventive measures taken to construct fire lanes.

B. *Air-Raid Shelters*. Inquire from various R's as to the responsibility for inadequacies.

C. *Warning System*. Inquire as to policy changes. For example, warnings may at first have been too far ahead and needlessly alarmed people when the raid veered off to another target. Or too much time may have been taken from work or sleep. Be careful not to ask directive questions along the above lines but try to get R's understanding of policies.

D. *Flak*. This was the Army's responsibility (In port areas, the Navy's.) Get civilian authorities' judgments as to adequacy. Did the policy change? Did civilian authorities try to get more protection from Army?

E. *Post-raid Care*. This was the responsibility of municipal authorities. Others should be questioned. Inquire as to complaints.

4. DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOR

Be sure to get nonpolice comments on this topic.

5. ESCAPE BEHAVIOR

We ask for definite data on suicide, drunkenness, and drug addiction.

In addition, if you find an appropriate R (an intelligent educator, physician, etc.) inquire as to changes in religious practices, magic, new sects or "prophets" and the like. Inquire also as to hospitalization for psychosis and neuroses. If possible get statistics.

6. ENTERTAINMENT

This may prove an important section. Question freely.

7. EVACUATION

Attempt to ascertain the reliability of evacuation statistics. Explore fully the question of the proportion of evacuation initiated by the government and by the people. Was there any resistance to evacuation attempts by the government? (Pay special attention to evacuation of family groups and children.) If so, why, by whom, when, what happened? Get information on question of subsidies for evacuees. Were they in fact paid?

8. WAR PARTICIPATION BY CIVILIANS

This was not structured in Japan as it was in the West. Try to find out just what did happen. What outlets were provided for youth, women, men not

directly in the war effort? How effective were their efforts? Did they serve morale purposes? Beware of directive questioning but get objective descriptions. A start may be made with the neighborhood associations. Secure data, if possible, on:

A. Number of participants.

B. Kinds of people participating (old, young; men, women; educated, uneducated, etc.).

C. Kinds of activities, i. e., ARP activities, relief and charitable organizations, etc.

D. Interest in work on part of participants as indicated by attendance, etc. Any changes as war progressed?

E. Effectiveness of activities.

9. SHELTER BEHAVIOR

A. *Panics in and at shelters*. Get full details. When? Why? Effects? Include under *shelter* any effort directly to escape (e. g. a panic at a bridge).

B. General comportment: grumbling, quarreling, patient endurance, sex advances.

10. CHILDREN

What *special* provisions for the education, shelter, feeding, recreation of children *who were not evacuated*? What happened when schools were bombed out? Were schools open throughout the war? Any increase in juvenile delinquency? Get statistics if possible.

11. POLICE MEASURES CONNECTED WITH BOMBING

Get the chief of police to *describe* all special measures in his area. (Don't speak of "special police measures" as "special police" means the secret police.)

A. Was there an increase in the police force? Decrease? Why? Were supplementary or part-time police appointed?

B. What changes were there in the nature of police activity? When? How? Why? (Try not to suggest what kind of changes you are looking for but if necessary ask: Did the police have new duties?)

C. Were *new* restrictions imposed on movement of individuals, telephone communications, etc.? What? When? Why? Was this by local order or were instructions received from above?

D. Was there a change in the penalties for infraction of laws and regulations? More or less severe? When did change come? Why? What was the effect?

12. SUBVERSIVE BEHAVIOR

This must be thoroughly explored. Do not remain satisfied with a simple answer that there was none. Tactful but not leading inquiry may bring facts to light, even from the police chief.

A. Rumors. Who? When? What was said? What action was taken? What changes as bombing proceeded?

B. Demonstrations against war. We are interested in group phenomena here but if we ask about "organized" demonstrations we shall be told there were none. Get the number in the groups involved. When? How it was dealt with

C. Sabotage. Extent of damage. Who was involved? When? What was done about it?

D. Political Underground Activities.

13. WORK BEHAVIOR

Choose the most important industry, plant, or business establishment in the city (preferably an enterprise connected with the war) and obtain the following data:

A. Changes in working hours.

B. Absenteeism—Trend (dates, extent, causes, measures taken to combat, how affected by air raids, etc.).

C. Productivity of worker (discuss in detail).

D. Sickness rates.

E. Accident rates.

Appendix G

BACKGROUND REPORT

This report is to cover _____ shi
 _____ machi (a)
 _____ mura
 Names and titles of persons actually supplying
 information.

_____ Name and title of official responsible for returning
 report

_____ Date of submitting report

You are ordered to fill in the following report from *official* records. Where you do not have the official records write "No Records" in the appropriate spaces and indicate where the records may be secured.

You need make no statement in the spaces which are crossed off.

If sufficient space is not allowed for replies on this form, use a continuation sheet, numbering items to correspond with the numbers on the form.

Where monthly statistics are called for, you are to furnish them for the period beginning——and extending to August 15, 1945.

Give all numerical answers in *arabic figures*. Where an answer in words is called for, reply in English if you can. (When the exact English term is in doubt, add the Japanese word in parenthesis.) If no one capable of answering in English is available to you, answer in Japanese.

It is required of you that this report be filled in as soon as possible. As soon as it is ready, you should communicate with _____

at _____
 He will make an appointment for you to discuss this report in person.

The following data pertains to the above-mentioned city, town, or village.

I. BOMBING DATA

A. Bomb Attacks

For each attack give the date in Arabic numerals.

In column (a) if the attack was by day, mark X under the word *Day*; if by night, mark the X under the word *Night*.

In column (b) if the attack was high level, mark X under *High*; if the attack was low level, mark X under *Low*.

In column (c) if the attack was mostly by high explosive bombs, mark X under *Explosive*; if the attack was mostly by incendiary bombs, mark X under *Incendiary*; if the attack was about equally high explosive and incendiary, mark X under both *Explosive* and *Incendiary*.

In column (d) write the estimated total weight in metric tons of the bombs dropped.

In column (e) write the length of time the bombers were over the area.

Use column (f) for any comments. *If no alarm was given for a particular raid, be sure to mark "No Alarm" in this column.*

¹ Form J E duplicates Form J, the equivalent in Japanese.

Date	a		b		c		d	e	f
	Day	Night	High	Low	Explosive	Incendiary	Tons	Minutes	Comment

B. Machine gun attacks		C. Alarms without attacks		
Date	Comment	Date	Day	Night

II. BOMB DAMAGE

A. Damage to Buildings

In the table below record the total amount of damage to buildings resulting from aerial bombardments in this district. State the number and the percentage (%) of buildings of each type listed which were (a) undamaged; (b) damaged but usable; and (c) damaged and unusable.

“Business places” refers to wholesale and retail stores and office buildings.

“Industrial plants” refers to factories.

“Domiciles” refers to all houses and apartment buildings used as living quarters.

“Cultural and entertainment” buildings refers to libraries, museums, schools, theaters, auditoria, etc.

“Government” and municipal buildings refers to post offices, police headquarters, tax office, prefectural buildings, city, town and village buildings and all the buildings housing governmental administrative personnel.

“Shrines” refers to all Buddhist, Shinto, or Christian religious edifices.

Business places		Industrial plants		Domiciles		Cultural and entertainment bldgs.		Govt. bldgs.		Shrines	
No. Bldgs.	Percent	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.
Undamaged											
Damaged but usable											
Damaged unusable											
Total											

NOTE.—The percentage of undamaged buildings plus the percentage of damaged but usable buildings plus the percentage of damaged and unusable buildings should in all cases equal 100 percent.

If a building was damaged more than once, record only the most severe damage.

B. Damage to Public Utilities

1. *Transportation.* Report about changes in the state of transportation during the bombing period.

A separate report should be made for busses, tram lines, subways, and the State Railways lines *for this area only.* The report may be made in either of the two ways shown below: (a) By the total number of paying passengers carried monthly, or (b) By the total number of hours public vehicles were

in service monthly during the report period. One bus operating one hour counts as one bus hour. Report the total number of bus-hours per month. Similarly one tram car operating one hour counts as one tram-car-hour. One subway car (not the whole train) operating one hour is one subway-car-hour; one state railway passenger car operating one hour is one railway-car-hour.

If your report is in terms of passengers carried, write (a) before the figures; if the report is in terms of vehicle hours, write (b) before the figures.

Month	Bus (a) or (b)	Trams (a) or (b)	Subway (a) or (b)	State Rlw. (a) or (b)	Comment

State the average capacity of the public transportation vehicles—include seated and standing passengers.

One bus One subway car.....
 One tramcar One State Rlw. car.....

2. *Electricity.* Record for each month of the period the total number of kwh consumed by (a) homes; (b) commercial and industrial users.

Calendar month	Total KWH consumed by homes	Total KWH consumed by industrial and commercial
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----

3. *Gas.* Record for each month of the period the total number of cubic meters of gas consumed by (a) homes; (b) commercial and industrial users.

Calendar month	No. of meters consumed by homes	No. of meters consumed by Ind. & Com.
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----

4. *Water.* In the appropriate spaces below, record the extent of damage to municipal water systems in the following manner: Record for each month the total number of liters of water distributed to (a) private consumers and (b) commercial and industrial users.

Calendar month	Total no. of liters of water distributed to public consumers	Total no. of liters of water distributed to industrial users
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----

C. *Casualties*

Record in the appropriate spaces below the total number of civilians severely wounded as a result of bombing and the total number of civilians killed as a result of bombing in this area. By the term "severely wounded" is meant cases requiring hospitalization or confinement to bed at home.

Total no. severely wounded	Total number killed
-----	-----
-----	-----
-----	-----
-----	-----
-----	-----

D. *Effects to Living Quarters*

Record below the number and percentage of the

total civilian population *in this district* bombed out of their normal living quarters *temporarily* and the number and percentage of the total civilian population bombed out of normal living quarters *permanently*. By "temporarily" we mean cases where the home is unusable but repairable. By "permanently" we mean unrepairable damage.

Bombed out temporarily		Bombed out permanently	
Number	-----	Number	-----
Percent	-----	Percent	-----

III. AIR-RAID DEFENSE

A. *Demolition of Houses to Provide Firebreaks*

1. Total number of houses so destroyed -----
2. Number of people living in such houses -----
3. Provisions for rehousing (Describe below briefly)

4. Provisions for compensation: (Describe briefly below)

B. *Air-Raid Shelters*

1. Indicate the percentage of population who could be accommodated by:

Percent Oct 1944 Percent April 1945

- Public Shelters -----
- Factory Shelters -----
- Private Home or -----
- Apartment Shelters -----

The percentage is to be calculated against the total number for whom the shelters were built.

2. Rating of Adequacy of Public Shelters:

	Satisfactory or unsatisfactory	Comments
(a) Capacity -----	-----	-----
(b) Ventilation -----	-----	-----
(c) Cleanliness -----	-----	-----
(d) Sleeping Facilities -----	-----	-----
(e) Safety-degree of Protection Offered -----	-----	-----
(f) Accessibility to Public -----	-----	-----

C. *Warning system*

1. First general public alert.

(a) How great was the interval between the sounding of this alert and the time when the raid was expected ----- in the case of a day attack? Minutes -----

(b) How great was the interval between the sounding of this alert and the time when the raid

was expected in the case of a night attack?
 Minutes

(c) Was the time usually sufficient to permit most of the people to prepare for the attack? Explain.

(d) Did this interval change during the war? When? How? Why?

2. The immediate warning.

(a) How great was the interval between the sounding of this alert and the time when the raid was expected in the case of a day attack? Minutes

(b) How great was the interval between the sounding of this alert and the time when the raid was expected in the case of a night attack? Minutes

(c) Did this interval change during the war? When? How? Why?

D. *Post-Raid Care*

1. *Billeting.*

Describe, briefly, the provisions made for emergency post-raid billeting.

Were billeting facilities adequate or inadequate in number and quality? Explain.

What percent of the bombed-out people were housed in:

- Emergency Barracks
 - Temples & Schools
 - Air-Raid Shelters
 - Private Homes
 - Left Town
 - Other
- Total 100 percent

2. *Feeding.*

Describe, briefly, the measures taken for emergency post-raid feeding.

Were the provisions adequate or inadequate in quantity and quality?

Were there any extra rations provided?

Who were responsible for emergency feeding?

IV. BEHAVIOR DISTURBING PUBLIC ORDER

A. *Looting*

Looting is here defined as the theft of articles from living quarters, offices, stores, industrial plants, and bomb shelters during and after a bombing attack.

Record the number of arrests and number of convictions in court for looting per month.

Calendar month	Number of arrests for looting	Number of court convictions
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----

B. *Black Market Practices*

Black market practice is here defined as the illegal practice of the selling and buying of supplies and rationed materials above the officially set ceiling prices as well as in amounts greater than the allotted quantities.

Record the number of arrests and the number of convictions for black market practices per month.

Calendar month	Number of arrests	Number of convictions
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----

C. *Hoarding*

Hoarding is to be classified in two different categories, that is, the one type of hoarding designated as "Producer Hoarding" means the holding of supplies and food by producers and merchants in quantities exceeding the quota permitted (by law).

The second type of hoarding defined as "Consumer Hoarding" means the illegal purchases and hoarding of merchandise and food supplies by the general public in anticipation of future shortages.

Record the number of arrests and convictions for hoarding per month differentiating between the two classes described above.

Month	Producer hoarding		Consumer hoarding	
	Arrests	Convictions	Arrests	Convictions
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

D. *Crime*

Record below crime statistics, month by month. Statistics for crimes against property (thefts, arson, etc.), crimes against persons (assault, murder, etc.),

and sex crimes (rape, etc.) are to be recorded separately in the appropriate spaces.

Month	Crimes against property		Crimes against persons		Sex crimes	
	Arrests	Con- victions	Arrests	Con- victions	Arrests	Con- victions

V. SUICIDE AND DRUGS

Record the number of suicides, the number of arrests and convictions in courts for drunken disorderliness, and for habitual use of narcotic drugs, month by month.

Month	Number of suicides	Drunken disorderliness		Drug addiction	
		Arrests	Con- victions	Arrests	Con- victions

VI. ENTERTAINMENT

Estimate the average monthly attendance for the six months' period preceding the first bombing attack and the average for the last *three* months before the surrender.

	Average per month for 6 months before bombing	Average per month for last 3 months of war
Plays	-----	-----
Sports	-----	-----
Prostitution (licensed)	-----	-----
Movie houses	-----	-----
The number of persons who invited geisha girls	-----	-----

VII. EVACUATION

Give below the number of evacuees per month from this area (excluding those within the same to, shi, machi, mura).

Month	Number of Evacuees
-----	-----
-----	-----
-----	-----
-----	-----
-----	-----

State the proportion of these evacuations which were initiated by the government -----
 State proportion which were initiated by the people themselves -----
 Describe below the kinds of people who were evacuated.

Appendix H

SPECIAL REPORT

Definition

Each special report will consist of the result of the interviewing of a Japanese who occupied a position that gave him access to particularly valuable sources of information concerning changes in civilian morale during the war.

Objectives

The general aims of the special reports are the same as those which underlie the cross-section survey. The orientation in regard to the respondent, however, is somewhat different and this in turn affects the immediate objectives to be kept in mind during the interview. In the cross-section survey we are primarily interested in the individual respondent's experiences and attitudes and not in his general views regarding morale. In the special reports, on the other hand, *we are primarily interested in the general knowledge which the respondent possesses concerning wartime civilian morale, the various things which caused it to change (including bombing) and the nature of those changes.* We are also interested in his interpretations and opinions. Of secondary importance though still of concern are his personal experiences, his own wartime morale, and his own responses to bombing.

In short, instead of being regarded as a member of a sample, he is to be considered as a qualified informant.

It is hoped that the special reports will yield data of interest from a number of different points of view. They will supplement and mutually check with the results of the cross-section survey. They will furnish leads which will be important in analysis. Information will be secured on the range of different attitudes and intentions of various types of Japanese leaders; there will be indications of the relations between cliques and of "behind the scenes" maneuvers. Interesting discrepancies may come to light between what the leaders thought and what the people thought, as revealed in the cross-section survey. *It is particularly hoped that documents will be secured on civilian morale which were compiled during the War. Special interviewees should also be encouraged to prepare written reports after the interview.*

One of the most important forces contributing to the deterioration of morale is usually a break-down of organizational efficiency of the society in the prosecution of the war. For example, as the working capacity of a factory declines, reorganization is likely to be piled on reorganization. This has two types of results: (1) the reorganizations are not effective and increase confusion, (2) people interpret reorganization as an indication that conditions are serious and consequently become more uneasy.

Some data on this may emerge in the cross-section survey, but the causes and nature of leadership disorganization and the efforts at compensation should be revealed in the special reports. In the final overall analysis, we may also find out whether the Japanese leadership correctly assessed wartime civilian morale, by contrasting the special reports with the main survey results.

In regard to the secondary objectives of the morale survey (current political and economic attitudes) the special reports should yield information concerning the aspirations of the leading classes and the fears they have of the appearance of new types of leadership and leadership groups.

Finally, it is desired to secure information on techniques employed for the maintenance and control of morale, especially under bombing conditions. Most of this data can only be obtained from persons formerly in authority. It will be important to discover to what extent the authorities had confidence in the people and to what extent they feared them. The war no doubt forced the leaders to take measures which they knew would be unpopular and it will be of interest to discover how they handled such situations.

Choice of Respondents

In selecting respondents for the special reports, it is necessary to choose (1) persons who actually have information about morale and (2) persons with different opportunities for observing changes in morale and with different affiliations and loyalties. The type of person to be chosen may differ from locality to locality and it is not to be expected that the best

informants about morale will necessarily come from any one class of officials or local personages.

Inquiries have been made in Tokyo at the police bureau in the Home Affairs Ministry and at the Cabinet Board of Information. As a result, the police chiefs in each region to which survey teams will go and the governors of the respective kens will be notified that certain types of information will be desired in special interviews and it is expected that they, or persons they will delegate, will be prepared to give the team leader what he desires. Copies of the letters sent out regarding this matter will be given the team leaders before they depart. They will also be provided with the names of unofficial persons who may be in a position to give important information, such as university professors and doctors.

It may well be argued that giving the local officials forewarning of what is desired may give them an opportunity to prepare idealized, or otherwise false, reports on conditions. This is true enough, and the procedure is not ideal, but the experience in Tokyo shows that so many top officials have been changed since the war period that they actually do not have the data and must collect them from various subordinates and persons formerly in official positions. If we had time, we should do this ourselves, but under present circumstances it is impossible as a general practice. However, we should take occasion to make checks by going to some of the original sources and by collecting all the documents possible that were written during the war for official use.

A general list of the types of persons from whom information for the special reports may be obtained is as follows:

1. Prefectural governors, mayors, or other regional chiefs of local government,
2. Local Diet members,
3. Police chiefs,
4. School officials and teachers,
5. Newspaper editors, and reporters,
6. Local health authorities and doctors,
7. Priests of sects locally influential,
8. ARP leaders, tonari gumi leaders,
9. The regional administrative officials,
10. Prominent people now out of office.

In addition, the local American commander should be asked for his opinion regarding the most reliable Japanese to contact and question in regard to documents that have bearing on morale. There are indications that in many areas he may prove to have valuable information and to be most cooperative. In cases where the local commander has froz-

en documents and deems it inadvisable to release them, secure identifying data regarding the documents so that they may be obtained through proper channels in Tokyo.

The Interview

The interviews for the special reports must be flexible and adjustable to the various types of respondents selected and must permit free association and the development of interesting leads. At the same time, however, it is essential that, with economy of time, all the basic aims of the survey and all questions dependent on those aims be covered.

Before the interview, the interrogator and his interpreter should discuss the respondent on the basis of data available concerning his background and come to some general conclusions regarding how best to approach him and what questions should receive the most emphasis.

In some cases it will be best for the respondent to come to the research leader's office and in others for the research leader to visit the respondent. The decision in this matter which must be made in each case will depend on such matters as distance, transportation, convenience of interviewing in the research leader's office, and the social position of the respondent.

In notifying the respondent the same precautions should be observed to avoid fear as have been adopted in connection with the statistical survey. Since most of the respondents for the special reports will be people of some consequence, the message regarding the interview should be conveyed personally by a member of USSBS, preferably an officer or a civilian but *not* by the research leader himself. It should be politely worded, although with no implication that response is optional. Something of this sort might be said:

I am X.....representing Z.....(research leader) of the U. S. Government. Z.....'s duties require that he make certain studies regarding living conditions in Japan. He knows that you are a person well qualified to help him and he wishes you to come and see him (or he wishes to come and see you) at(place) on.....(time).

In the case of police chiefs, mayors, and governors, who have presumably received the letter announcing in advance the arrival of the research leader, reference should be made to the fact his name will have been mentioned in the letter. (The informant has been told by the letter to have well-qualified people on tap for interviewing, and to have reports and documents prepared for the research leader.)

The respondent should be greeted in a friendly fashion. Where possible, the chairs should be arranged so that interrogator, interpreter, and respondent sit as if on three sides of a triangle facing inward. Thus each individual will be at an angle to the other two and the inquisitorial atmosphere produced by a face to face interview will be avoided.

The interview may be opened with an explanation of the following order:

We are interested in future good relations between the United States and Japan. As you know, good relations depend on good understanding. It is my task to learn as much as I can about living conditions and morale among the Japanese people, especially during the war. I have asked you to come and see me (or, I have come to visit you) because I know that you are exceedingly well informed and that you held (are holding)-----position. I am sure that you can be of great assistance. Any information you give will be used by U. S. and not communicated to any Japanese.

If the respondent has been selected on the suggestion of one of his friends and in a complimentary manner, mention of this should be made in the introductory statement.

From this point on, the interview may be developed in accordance with the questions to which answers are desired. It should flow freely and follow the respondent's train of thought with the minimum of interruption from the interrogator. However, all the topics listed below must be covered. Interpreters are to be cautioned to ask no questions of their own except that a word or term be explained or repeated, and they should allow only a few sentences to be uttered between translations.

During the interview, the interrogator should make as nearly verbatim as possible recording of both questions and answers. The time required for interpretation will make this possible without slowing down the interview. If the recording is clear enough to make rewriting by the interrogator unnecessary an enormous amount of time will be saved. If wide margins are employed, notes can be added immediately after the interview on the basis of observations and suggestions made by the interpreter. Both during and after the interview, emotional responses to particular questions should be recorded. Comments and interpretations from the interrogator or interpreter should be marked by brackets and initialed.

In cases where a mechanical recording is desired, full notes of the interview should be made just as if no such record were being made. This is necessary in order to have material available in Tokyo

for use prior to transcription of the mechanical recording (which will probably not be done until it reaches Washington due to shortage of typists) and secondly, to insure a yield from the interview in case the recording is defective.

The topics to be treated are in outline as given below. The order presented may prove helpful in developing the interview, at least in the beginning, but it should not be followed in such a manner as to interfere with the spontaneity of the respondent.

1. The influence of the war on the livelihood of the people.

This is a good general subject with which to begin. Information is desired regarding food, clothing, shelter, fuel, health, and working conditions, how these varied among different kinds of people, and the direct or indirect influence of bombing.

(*Caution.* Throughout, in seeking information regarding attitudes of different groups and classes, delay as long as possible suggesting such groups but instead, try to find what categories the respondent himself uses. In short, begin with "saliency" questions.)

2. The particular aspects of the war which produced the most marked changes in livelihood.

Information is desired as to what caused the most outstanding changes in livelihood, whether bombing, transportation difficulties, shipping shortages, lack of manpower, poor administration, etc.

(*Caution.* Throughout, in asking about causative forces, avoid suggesting specific forces until after full opportunity has been given the respondent to suggest the items he thinks significant. This is again, a question of beginning with "saliency" questions.)

3. The various ways in which the morale of the people was most adversely affected.

The first questions on this topic should be of a general character that will permit the respondent to reveal his own concept of morale and which items were important in its maintenance and deterioration. Discuss with the interpreter the Japanese words (there are 10 or more) which he uses to translate the idea of "morale" and enter those on the record. Thus far in the special interviews the replies indicate that morale is considered equivalent to "confidence in winning the war" and to a general state of optimism or pessimism. It is obvious this is not the equivalent of the definition adopted for use in this survey, namely "the capacity of the Japanese to pull together consistently and persistently in prosecuting the war." The respondent should be pressed to describe the nature of the changes he

mentions, how they worked out among different kinds of people, what caused them to happen, and how bombing figured in the picture. Wherever possible get approximate or actual dates. If any of the following topics are not spontaneously mentioned, or sufficiently described, the respondent should be questioned closely in regard to them.

a. Confidence in winning the war—Attitude toward American war potential. At what time, under what circumstances, and in what way did this change? Were there differences among different types of people? What was the respondent's own experience in this matter and what was that of other leaders of whom he has knowledge?

b. Confidence in the purpose of the war—What did the Japanese people think the war was about, what were the differences in different classes, the differences among the leaders, how did these change as the war went along, and what caused them to change? What was the respondent's own experience in this regard?

c. Confidence in leadership—The attitudes of different kinds of Japanese toward all the various types of leaders from the Emperor down. How did these change during the war and why? What were the attitudes of different types of leaders toward each other? What were the respondent's attitudes and how did these change? If the respondent is disposed to discuss it, the subject of the Emperor should be thoroughly explored.

d. The people's confidence in each other, group solidarity—the attitudes of the different groups within each social class toward each other and how it changed. Any evidence of scape-goating? What of Koreans, Chinese, and other minorities? Relations of different regions to each other, such as urban and rural, bombed and unbombed, evacuees and residents of areas of which evacuees came. Relations between civilians and military. Did all classes suffer alike in the war or did some have it easier than others?

e. Group cooperation and organization—were there any changes in organization and efficiency for the prosecution of the war as time went on? If so, of what sort and when did the changes occur? What have been the effects of women's participation in war work? How did the traditional Japanese method of arriving at decisions by group discussion work out in the emergency situations of the war and what, if any, changes occurred? Are any new groups emerging, and if they are, of what character are they? What has been the effect of the destruction of records? If the respondent mentions inefficient

reorganizations and the passage of too many and too confusing laws as a source of morale deterioration, get him to specify a number of instances in detail and give the time at which such dislocations became serious.

f. The emotional status of the people (the physical status has been covered under 1 and 2)—What emotional changes took place among the people during the war, what differences among different kinds of people, what caused these and how did these affect morale? Were there changes toward aggression, panic or apathy and indifference? Any increased religious activity and if so, of what sort? What were the states of mind of the leaders in this regard? (Later, in asking the respondent to give his own experiences of the war, be alert to pick up information as to how he, himself, stood in these matters.)

g. Confidence in orientation—faith in the news and information supplied by Japanese authorities and the influence of Allied propaganda. How much did the people know of what was going on? How much were different kinds of Japanese interested in war events and the actions and changes in the government? How much did they discuss what was going on? How much did the Japanese leaders know about the actions of each other and different branches of the government at home and abroad during the war?

4. Sources of informant's information on morale data.

Question in detail to determine the informant's sources of information, whether general impressions or based on special reports or some of both. Get as many accurate details as possible. Find out if documents exist and where they may be obtained.

It has been found in Tokyo that useful information can be secured with considerable economy of time by asking the informant to prepare a report on some of the questions discussed in the interview. This gives the respondent time to procure data on subjects about which he is vague and can form the basis for discussion in succeeding interviews. These reports can be collected or received at a later time, but respondent should be given a polite deadline.

5. Morale control measures.

What measures both overt and covert were used by the Japanese to maintain morale? Which were the most successful and why, which were the least successful and why? What special measures were used in connection with bombings?

6. Current social and psychological state of the Japanese.

Review the principal points made by the respondent in regard to wartime morale and check for his opinion in regard to the current situation.

7. Future trend in morale.

What does the respondent think will be the principal changes in Japanese morale and attitudes in the future? What changes does he think *ought* to occur? What is the relationship between these matters and economic and political conditions? Does he show evidence of fear, confidence, or contempt for any segments of the population? Does he think there is any possibility of civil war? What about communism? What should be the position of the Emperor in the future? His political power? Religious leadership?

8. Biographical data regarding respondent.

Secure data on age, sex, marital status, education, religion, social position, political affiliation, and degree of contact with Western culture. Obtain a chronological account of his work and his experiences during the war. This should provide a basis for judging the biases and affiliations of the respondent and also his own attitudes in regard to the topics covered under 3 above.

The Report

The verbatim record of the interview together with the marginal notes will constitute the main body of the report. Time of starting and time of stopping should be noted and if several interviews are held with one person, they should be added in

chronological order with the dates and time recorded. (It is better to have several long interviews with one good respondent than one interview with several less informed ones.) The pages should be numbered consecutively. All persons present during the interview should be noted.

In addition to the verbatim report, there should be, for each interview, a summary digest of the contents. The digest should give, in the interrogator's own words, a summary of the topics discussed, the period of time covered and the principal facts, conclusions, and opinions given by the respondent. The digest should also summarize the emotions the respondent displayed during the course of the interview and any significant areas of apparent ignorance, interest, or hesitation. It should, in addition, draw attention to any important or novel variations from the facts, attitudes, or knowledge expected of the respondent. As part of preparing the summary digest, the interrogator should review the interview with the interpreter to clear up obscure points with him and discuss implications and interpretations of particular statements. (This summary will later be deposited with G-2.)

Give an estimate of reliability of informant on a three-point scale such as:

- a. Very reliable
- b. More or less reliable
- c. Probably unreliable

Where possible the particular data that is most doubtful should be indicated.

DESIGN OF THE SAMPLE SURVEY TO MEASURE THE EFFECTS OF BOMBING
ON JAPANESE MORALE

The sample survey in Japan was designed as a cross section of the Japanese civilian population between the ages of 16 and 70. Persons who had served in the armed forces at any time since 7 December 1941 (Pearl Harbor) were excluded. Koreans were also excluded from the general study, but special samples were drawn for them in selected areas.

The sampling plan adopted was formulated to provide the maximum possible reliability of results, while operating within specified administrative limitations. It was designated to permit completion of all interviewing within eight weeks by eight teams with an average of eight interviewers per team, on the assumption that two interviews could be completed per day per interviewer. Actually, ten teams were used for seven weeks. A major consideration in the design was to provide for minimizing the amount of travel by interviewing teams, and efficient allocation of the sample with a view to administrative overhead. Thus, because of difficulties of travel and other administrative reasons, interviewing was limited to the population residing in Honshu and western Kyushu; this population comprises 62 million (86 percent) of the 72 million total civilian population of Japan (Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku, and Hokkaido), and received nearly all of the bombing.

An additional objective was to provide separate information for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were subjected to the atomic bomb.

1. *General Features of the Sample Design*—The sampling plan consisted of two major parts. The first was the designation of a set of representative primary areas within which the persons to be interviewed were to be selected. The second was the process of subsampling within the selected areas. The primary areas were shi (cities) and, for rural areas, gun (geographical units roughly corresponding to counties in the U. S.).

Spreading the sample over a large number of areas is essential to achieving the objective of the greatest possible amount of information from the sample. Consequently, the maximum number of primary areas was designated for sampling that could be used consistent with the administrative and time restrictions. The first step in designating the sample of primary areas was to group them into strata or classes, such that the areas included within

each class were as homogeneous as possible with respect to the principal variables being measured, and as heterogeneous as possible between strata. Preliminary classification of each primary area into strata was carried through in the United States prior to beginning work in Japan. The preliminary classification of each primary area was reviewed in Japan on the basis of special and more recent data available there. The number of shi or gun to be included in a single primary stratum was determined by the principle that the aggregate population of each stratum should be approximately the same. The equalization of population was carried out separately for strata of shi and for strata of gun. Forty-three strata were set up: 29 strata of shi, 12 strata of gun, and two special strata for Hiroshima and Nagasaki (List 1). The next step, after the primary areas were grouped into strata, was to select one shi or gun from each stratum for inclusion in the sample. A method of chance selection was used for designating the sample areas, but was applied in such a way that the probability of a particular area being selected was proportionate to the estimated population of the area. For this purpose, estimates of population, as of October 1945, were constructed for each shi and gun (List 2). The expected total number of interviews to be obtained was then allocated among the strata according to their aggregate populations. The expected number of interviews for each stratum, together with the estimated population of the primary area, determined the sampling ratio to be used in subsampling within the selected areas.

This general approach has a number of advantages. It is known from recent sampling theory that, for a given number of primary areas in the sample, it will maximize the reliability of results for most items to be measured. Further, it enhances the precision of comparisons between strata and groups of strata. An additional advantage arises from the selection of about the same size of sample in each of the selected areas (to the extent that the sizes of strata are equalized in terms of aggregate populations): There need not be extensive travel to an area for only a few cases, nor a long period of work required in any particular area which might introduce a reaction in the interviewing due to an advance conditioning of the population. The technique of assigning sampling ratios

for subsampling the selected primary areas instead of a fixed quota of interviews to be obtained, permits the sample accurately to reflect migration of the population. Increases or decreases in the population of selected areas are shown in the deviation of the number of interviews actually obtained from the number expected according to some previously known estimated population. Thus, biases due to unknown over-representation or under-representation of particular strata are avoided. This would not be possible if fixed quotas of interviews were used.

Finally, the sample design has the extremely important property of making possible estimates of the reliability of the results from an analysis of the results themselves. In this way the precision of any estimates constructed on the basis of the sample, and the significance of differences between various groups in the sample, may be evaluated.

2. *Urban-Rural Differentiation*—In designating the primary areas to be included in the sample, the population was first divided into two major classes representing a basic cultural distinction:

a. Population in organized shi (cities).

b. Population outside of shi (rural areas).

Places recognized as organized shi for sampling purposes were those in existence in 1940, with the addition of five of the shi organized between 1940 and 1944.

Although the cities constitute only about a third of the total population of Japan, the sampling ratio for cities was set at approximately eight times the ratio used for rural areas.¹ The desirability of taking a higher ratio in cities than in rural areas arises because the cities have experienced all degrees of bombing, while the rural areas were almost entirely unbombed. Since the primary purpose is to study the effects of bombing, the over-sampling of cities is desirable. However, a moderate sample from rural areas was necessary both to obtain a sample of evacuees, and to ascertain the effect of bombing, evacuation, rumor, etc., on the attitudes of the rural population. Special provision was made to insure good representation of evacuees in rural areas.

The description given below of the stratification criteria introduced for grouping shi and rural areas will indicate the factors considered to be important in relation to measurement of the effect of bombing on morale, and will also indicate about how much of a sample will be available for certain classes of the population for which comparisons will be de-

sired. However, the criteria used in stratifying do not fix those that can be used in the analysis. It may be remarked that investigations indicate that after one or two important variables have been employed, the criteria for grouping the primary areas into strata are not as important in determining reliability of results as is commonly assumed. For most of the characteristics to be measured, the gain in precision to be expected from the use of additional stratification will not be very sensitive to moderate variations in the modes of stratification chosen.

3. *Stratification and Sampling of Cities*—The stratification of the shi was carried out along the following general lines:

a. Each of the six largest cities of Japan—Tokyo, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, and Kyoto—is of sufficient size to be entitled to representation in the sample, and therefore each constituted a separate stratum. Each of these was heavily bombed except Kyoto, which received only a very small weight of bombs, and that apparently as a target of opportunity.

b. There are four major industrial areas within Japan—the Tokyo-Yokohama area, the Nagoya area, the Osaka-Kobe area, and the Yawata area. The first three of these large industrial areas contain five of the six largest cities. Each of these metropolitan areas includes a number of shi, and it was assumed that if a particular shi was in one of these major industrial areas that relation would have a greater effect on attitudes and bombing reactions than would the size (total population) of the individual city. Therefore, all shi were first classified as either inside or outside one of the four areas. The boundaries of the industrial areas were fixed more or less arbitrarily, but were decided upon in discussion with persons familiar with the areas. In general, the rough criterion was used that those shi included in the industrial area were to be within a half hour's commuting distance from the central city. This kind of criterion, which depends upon both distance and travel facilities, seemed to be the one that affected communication and interchange of attitudes of the population.

The cities within each of the four industrial areas were subdivided into central city or cities (those with over 900,000 population), and smaller cities. The smaller cities within an area were then grouped into one or two groups, depending on bombing experience. In some instances separate groups for heavily bombed and relatively unbombed cities were possible, and in other instances there were only bombed cities within the area. The Yawata

¹ Tokyo shi was sampled in only half the ratio of other shi, as a larger ratio for it would have been less efficient.

area contains no large central city.

e. In addition to the strata established within the four large industrial areas, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were set up as separate strata because of their special experience with the atomic bomb. Certain rural areas immediately adjacent to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were likely to have received heavy migration from them as a result of the atomic bomb explosions, were also included in these two special bombing strata.

d. The remaining shi of the country (i. e., those not included among the six largest, or in one of the four large industrial areas, or in the two special atomic bomb strata) were divided into groups based on bombing experience. Within each of these groups the shi were further divided according to population (primarily whether over 100,000 or under), although in a few instances size distinctions were not possible. Region in which a shi was located was regarded as a less important distinction to observe than bombing experience and size of city. This distinction was sacrificed before size. Bombing experience was always observed. Bombing experience was determined by giving regard to total tonnage dropped, percent of the city destroyed, and number of raids. Data for this purpose were obtained from reports of the Seventh and Twentieth Air Forces, the U. S. Navy, and from "Air Raid Damage to Major Cities in Japan," a report submitted by the Japanese government at the surrender negotiations in Manila. For the unbombed cities, most of which were small, it was possible to distinguish some strata according to the rate of population increase during the 1930-1940 decade. It was anticipated that rate of population increase might be indicative of whether or not the city was heavily industrialized, and also might have some relationship to culture patterns of the city and reaction to bombing.

The cities classified as "bombed" or "heavily bombed" were those that received approximately 500 or more tons of urban bombing. Substantial proportions of most of these cities were destroyed. The statistics on percent destroyed based on U. S. Army Air Forces' photographs were fairly well confirmed by Japanese reports, submitted during the surrender negotiations, and were further checked in Japan. The distinction between bombed and heavily bombed in general meant over half destroyed or less than half destroyed, although the distinction could not always be observed. All of the cities in the "bombed" class were at least 20 percent destroyed.

Further description of the stratification of cities can be best obtained from the designations of the strata listed at the end of this memorandum (List 3). The aggregate population in the shi strata in almost all cases, was between 300 and 600 thousand. It should be noted that strata boundaries indicated were not always rigidly adhered to and exceptions were made as seemed appropriate. For example, although large cities were considered to be those over 100,000 population, some exceptions were made for cities near the line. This was done in order to have roughly equal total populations in the various strata and at the same time to achieve reasonable homogeneity within strata. This and other decisions or assumptions stated in connection with the stratification in no way cause any bias in the sample—whether the assumptions stated actually hold or not.

e. One shi from each stratum was then designated for inclusion in the sample, in such a way that its chance of being selected was proportionate to its estimated population.

4. *Stratification and Sampling of Rural Areas*—The rural areas were grouped into strata with aggregate populations of 2 to 4 millions, as follows:

a. The rural areas immediately adjacent to the Tokyo-Yokohama, the Nagoya, and the Osaka-Kobe industrial areas were identified, and a rural stratum made up surrounding each of these areas.

b. For the remaining rural areas in each ken (prefecture), each gun was classified by population density—population per square mile. Those gun having densities of less than 140 persons per square mile were eliminated and allowed no chance of being sampled because they are predominantly the most mountainous areas, and more difficult to get to. The elimination of this group of gun, with an aggregate population of about 1,200,000, can have but little effect on the sample estimates. Similarly eliminated were all gun other than those on the two main islands effecting an additional exclusion of about 700,000 persons.

The remaining gun within each prefecture were classified as having more or less than 500 persons per square mile. The denser gun ordinarily contain more unorganized cities and a smaller proportion of the population engaged in agriculture.

c. Further classification of rural areas was then made by giving attention to broad regions (List 4), and the extent to which the cities in the prefecture were bombed.

d. In designating the rural areas for inclusion in the sample, one gun was drawn from each stratum

with probability of selection proportionate to its estimated population. The machi (towns) and mura (villages) in the selected gun were then grouped according to location into combinations containing at least one machi and one mura, with roughly the same relative division of population between machi and mura in each combination. One combination was then sampled from each gun with probability of selection proportionate to its aggregate population, and, when necessary, one machi and one mura were chosen from the combination with the same method of selection. This technique insured representation of both rural farm and rural nonfarm population while minimizing the amount of travel required of the interviewing teams. An example showing how this process was carried out for one of the sample gun is given in List 5.

5. *Sampling Within Selected Primary Areas*—It was anticipated that some of the sampling within selected areas would be done by the sampling group before interviewing began, with most of the within sampling being carried out by the interviewing teams, after they arrived in the survey areas, in accordance with instructions prepared by the sampling group. This did not turn out to be feasible because of the heavy load on the interviewing teams, and because it was more efficient to have the sample ready for interviewing when the survey team arrived. Thus, all of the sampling within primary areas was accomplished by specially trained teams of sampling personnel who visited each sample point. The average length of time between the visit of the sampling team and that of the survey team was 18 days for both cities and rural areas. The median time-lag was 16 and 15 days, respectively. Special precautions were observed by the sampling teams to avoid disclosing the nature of the study and so perhaps inadvertently pre-conditioning the population. Steps were also taken to avoid losses to the sample due to moving of persons designated for interview between the visits of the two teams.

The first step in drawing the sample in a selected primary area, was to locate an adequate list of the population. Lists used for this purpose included the schedules of 1 November 1945 Japanese census (when available), rationing lists, and neighborhood association lists. Local police population registers were found to be too far out-of-date to be useful. If the list of persons or households available did not appear, upon checking, to be complete and up-to-date, steps were taken to obtain a sample of the omissions, either from new applications for ration

books or by having the local Japanese officials check a sample of households, or by some other technique appropriate for the class of persons omitted. Checking was accomplished in two ways: (i) by picking a few names at random from the lists and then going out to verify whether the persons were still residents of the place; and (ii) by selecting a few households at random from a few districts, making a list of their members, and then comparing these lists with the official listings for those households. The first procedure was a rough check on how many persons still carried on the official lists had moved; the second gave an indication of how up-to-date the lists were with respect to persons or households who had moved in, and how complete with respect to established households that might have had changes in memberships. This type of checking was particularly important because of the large movements of population in Japan under pressure of the bombing. Some idea of the magnitude of these shifts may be gained from the following comparison for the areas included in the cross-section study:

	Population (in thousands)	
	In shi	In rural areas
As of 22 February 1944 Japanese national census: Pre-bombing-----	25,434	33,917
As of the 1 November 1945 Japanese national census: Post-bombing----	16,347	40,643

The population of shi decreased 36 percent under bombing, while the rural areas experienced a gain of 20 percent. These changes took place mainly during 1945 after our bombing of Japan from the Marianas began.

A list was considered to be incomplete if the probable omissions appeared, upon field checking and questioning of the Japanese local officials, to be as little as 3 percent of the population of the area. Supplementation was used in 12 of the 31 shi, and in 7 of the 12 rural areas. In 24 of the 43 points, individuals were sampled at random from the census records—arranged by district in the shi or rural area (machi or mura). Preliminary samples were made in nine places by taking every tenth family from the original list. The final list was obtained by designating every tenth individual in the selected families. In 10 areas the records were decentralized in a large number of districts, and a sample of districts—arranged by location in the area and amount of bomb damage—was drawn first, from which the final selection of individuals

was made. Special provision was made for large dormitories, institutions, and other unusual "households" so as to improve the sampling for them without introducing biases at the same time. In each place a list of individuals designated for interviewing was prepared for the survey team, containing each person's name in both Hepburn Romaji and Kanji, his sex, age, and address. In all rural places (machi or mura), persons who had moved to that place within the preceding 10 months were considered fairly likely to be evacuees from bombed areas, and were sampled in twice the ratio of older residents. This device was used to insure more adequate representation of evacuees and migrants since the sampling ratio for rural areas was fairly small.

It might appear to have been valuable to classify the population of each sample place according to various factors related to the morale variables to be measured, and then to have drawn the subsample for interview proportionately from each class. However, tests made of the gain in reliability of results due to such devices compared to the technique of random sampling actually used indicated that, while they are not to be disregarded if available without work, their influence is too infinitesimal to warrant the expenditure of time and effort that could be directed to more crucial factors (e. g., completeness of the population listings).

6. *Operation of the Sample*—Instructions to the survey team leaders and to the "contact men" who made the appointments for interviews were emphatic on one point, namely that there could be no substitutions made for persons designated on the sampling lists. The only persons excepted from interview were those who:

- i. were in the armed forces after 7 December 1941;
- ii. were under 16 or over 70 years of age;
- iii. were deaf or dumb, seriously ill, demented, or otherwise unfit for interview in the judgment of the survey team leader;
- iv. were institutionalized, in jail, etc.

In the case of persons temporarily away from the sample place, every attempt was to be made to reach them during the period in which the survey team was at the sample place. For persons who had moved during the period from when the sample was drawn to when the survey team arrived at the sample point, every attempt was to be made to trace their new address and reach them through other survey teams if possible. These provisions were important in trying to protect the study from biases arising due to selective losses, although inter-

view of migrants who were traced was possible only in a small number of cases.

Of the total of 4,075 persons designated by the sampling teams, 3,135 were interviewed, 735 of the difference represented "legitimate" non-interviews, and 205 were missed by interview teams. The complete percentage break-down is given in the following table:²

	In shi	In rural areas	In atomic bomb areas	Total
Percent of total who were interviewed.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Percent of total who should have been interviewed but were not.....	76.4	80.7	68.3	76.9
Percent of total who were designated but were ineligible.....	5.0	4.3	7.4	5.0
Ineligible by reason:	18.6	15.0	24.3	18.1
Were in the armed forces after 7 December 1941	10.2	10.1	9.9	10.1
Were unfit for medical reasons.....	2.1	2.5	3.9	2.4
Were not residents at time sample was drawn although their names appeared on official lists.....	5.5	2.1	9.7	4.9
Miscellaneous reasons.....	0.8	0.3	0.8	0.7

The principal reason for loss of persons who should have been interviewed was moving of respondents between the visit of the sampling team and that of the survey team, either from one address in the sample place to another or entirely out of the sample place. Another reason was inability to trace some respondents because of covering-up by relatives due to fear. The major reason for "legitimate" loss, other than veteran status, was the listing of persons carried on the official registers although they had in fact moved prior to the date of sampling. In a few instances, where rationing lists were used, some of the names were entirely fictitious. The tremendous population movements referred to above, combined with heavy migration following the declaration of peace created problems in sampling and reaching persons for interview that were not entirely solved—although the resulting losses were kept within fairly small bounds.

There were no substitutions, i. e., interview of persons not designated in place of persons on the sample lists, in any cases.

² Of the 4,075 persons designated for interviews, 2,523 were in shi, 1,189 in rural areas, and 363 in areas hit by atomic bombs. These totals do not include a small number of Koreans sampled.

The summary is subject to small errors since reports from the interview team leaders on disposition of the sample were incomplete for about 3 percent of the persons designated. It was possible to fill in these gaps in most cases by checking back through the local authorities after the interviewing had been completed.

Appendix J

ESTIMATES OF CASUALTIES AND HOMES DESTROYED

The following estimates of casualties among the wartime Japanese civilian population have been prepared:

1. Total number of persons injured: 1,300,000. This estimate is based on the reports of the individual respondents about themselves, and is subject to a maximum sampling error of about 30 percent.

2. Total number of persons killed: 900,000. This estimate is based on reports from heads of households about members of their households. From one point of view it may be expected to be low by an unknown amount, due to the impossibility of obtaining a report in the cases where an entire household was killed and to the exclusion of households whose head was not eligible for interview. Comparison with estimates from households where the report was made by the spouse of the head indicates that the second factor is negligible. The estimate is subject to a sampling error of unknown amount.

The estimate of total number of homes damaged by bombing is 2,300,000. This estimate is based on reports from heads of households, and is subject to the same reservations as the estimate of number of persons killed. It represents 21 percent of the number of homes in the sample. Of the total number of households affected, 74 percent moved permanently, 4 percent moved temporarily, 6 percent continued to live on the same site in an improvised shelter, and 16 percent continued to live in their damaged homes.

Preparation of Estimates from the Sample

In preparing estimates from the sample, the totals for each sample area were first adjusted for respondents who ought to have been interviewed but were not. This was accomplished for each shi, machi and mura separately, by random substitution of completed interviews for missing ones. Thus, some of the interviews were given duplicate weight. This process may have introduced a bias into the sample estimates, but since the number of interviews for which such substitution was made was only about 5 percent of the total number, and since overestimates and underestimates tend to cancel each other, the bias cannot be large.

All strata of shi were sampled in the same overall ratio, and a similar procedure was used for the

special atomic-bomb area strata. The rural areas were sampled with another uniform ratio, with the exception that one-half this ratio was used in sampling certain specified classes of the population in rural areas. To place the entire rural sample on a uniform basis, the punched cards for those returns sampled with half the ratio of the others were duplicated, to give the effect of one uniform ratio throughout all rural areas.

Hence, after the substitution procedure, the adjusted totals for each place were combined to make up three totals: urban, rural, and atomic-bombed areas, according to place of interview. These were then multiplied by the reciprocal of the ratios with which they had been sampled, combined, and reduced to the percentages or averages which are presented in the various tables and analyses of the Morale Division report.

Comparison With Other Estimates

The report of the USSBS Medical Division estimates civilian bombing casualties for all Japan as 332,931 dead and 472,694 injured, a total of 805,625 casualties. The sources were mainly official Japanese reports, with some corrections, and the report stated "that a broad margin of error probably exists in the information obtained."

Medical Division experts, well acquainted with modern techniques of vital statistics study and reporting, termed Japanese methods and lack of interest in this field "rather shocking." In comparison with the situation in Germany, their report said,

The contrasting paucity of information relative to air-raid casualties was almost unbelievable. Detailed investigation in the various ministries of the Imperial government and in several of the larger medical colleges failed to reveal any studies with the exception of those related to the atomic bombings . . . (and) most of the studies of these effects were done after the end of the war and much of it under the direction of American scientists.

Furthermore, they pointed out, the confusion during and immediately after bombing, and the destruction of records, handicapped the collection of accurate data severely, no matter how good or bad the techniques were.

The basic data were supplied the Medical Division by the Home Affairs Ministry. The ministry's data for the six large cities—Tokyo, Yokohama,

Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, and Sendai—were checked against the reports of casualties in those cities supplied by the prefectures or metropolitan areas, all of which report and are responsible to the ministry. In the matter of deaths, the estimates for two of the cities are identical, for two more very close. For Kobe, the local health officials estimated 23 percent more deaths than the Home Affairs Ministry; for Osaka, the estimated 27 percent fewer deaths.

In the matter of injuries, the discrepancy between the ministry and its local agents, from whom it supposedly derived its data, is even greater. The Medical Division report stated that:

For Tokyo, the prefectural health division total is more than twice the Ministry of Home Affairs' total, and for Kobe it is five times the total reported by the ministry. For both these cities the totals of injuries reported by the Ministry of Home Affairs also are considerably less than the totals of deaths shown in the same report for these cities, which suggests under-reporting of the injury totals in the Ministry of Home Affairs report. For the six cities the prefectural health division reports on injuries represents an increase of 81 percent over the corresponding totals reported by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

In the cases of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Medical Division investigators carefully gathered data on the spot, and estimated that their own figures for dead and injured were more reliable than the official figures, and were about twice as large.

The Medical Division corrected the basic data supplied by the Home Affairs Ministry by means of the reports from local officials in the six large cities, and its own estimates in the atomic-bombed cities. But the upshot is that any data from official Japanese sources is of questionable value; there are conflicts within the Japanese reports, and between Japanese reports and the superior techniques used by the Survey.

Morale Division gathered background data from official sources, in some 60 widely separated areas of Japan. Its own experiences make it highly suspicious of Japanese data-gathering and reporting methods. There is a great variation in care, accuracy, and method from city to city; the exact nature of the data to be gathered, and the standards to be used are often fuzzy in the minds of the officials charged with gathering them—even for everyday, usual data. Toward the end of the war, rapid changes in officials brought new men to perform unaccustomed tasks. Requests for information on a new topic, such as air-raid casualties, would char-

acteristically bring confusion in terms. And, it was not at all uncommon for local officials, when faced with a Home Affairs Ministry request for data not easily available, or novel, or immediately required, to sit down in their offices, cerebrated, talk to a few people who might have some idea of conditions, and come forth with a mystic datum. Above all, if the information required would put a bad complexion on things, an underestimate was called for. These conditions were commonly experienced by the Morale Division research leaders, trained social scientists, in working with local officials, to a greater or lesser extent. More sophisticated Japanese, and even some local officials themselves, reported these conditions.

These considerations must be kept in mind in comparing data derived from a sample survey and data based mainly on reports of central or local Japanese officials. As far as the sample survey data are concerned, Morale Division sampling planners, experts from the Bureau of the Census, place confidence in the sample and in the estimates derived. What does need exploring are the interview conditions under which the data were obtained, and possibly different criteria used in the interviews from those used by officials. For example, in a number of cases, Morale Division collected casualty data from local officials, who depended primarily upon hospitalization figures for injuries estimates. In the interviews with sample respondents, non-hospitalized injuries are also reported, for members of the household. Some of these injuries might not be considered sufficiently major to come under the purview of officials. Again, although the term "household," and its Japanese equivalent as used in interviews, has a relatively precise meaning to most Japanese, this may have been confused by some, although interviewers were instructed to gather this material in detail, and by relationship to the respondent. Another variable in the interview was the possibility that individual Japanese, after the war, exaggerated to gain sympathy, whereas officials, in wartime, would underplay "bad" data.

All in all, it is possible that the Morale Division casualty estimates are rather high; they are subject to a sizable sampling error. Nevertheless, it is felt that they provide a closer approximation to the facts than data mainly derived from Japanese official sources.

LIST 1.—LIST OF STRATA AND SAMPLE AREAS

Code	Area	Ken	Code	Area	Ken
YA	Shimonoseki	Yamaguchi	Sp N	Nagasaki	Nagasaki
YB	Kokura	Fukuoka		Nagasaki Shi	
NC	Nagoya	Aichi		Mogi Machi	
ND	Gifu	Gifu		Tokitsu Mura	
OE	Osaka	Osaka Fu		Yamada Mura	
OF	Kobe	Hyogo	RA Miyako Gun	Toyotsu Mura Yuku-	
OG	Toyonaka	Osaka Fu		hashi Machi	Fukuoka
OH	Sakai	Osaka Fu	RB Chiisagata		
TI	Tokyo	Tokyo To	Gun:	Nagakubufuru Machi	Nagano
TJ	Yokohama	Kanagawa		Shiokawa Mura	
TL	Funabashi	Chiba	RC Tsuno Gun	Kano Machi	Yamaguchi
KM	Kyoto	Kyoto Fu		Kodo Mura	
N	Fukuoka	Fukuoka	RD Shizuki Gun	Nishi-Ebara Machi	Okayama
O	Kure	Hiroshima		Neiji Mura	
P	Sendai	Miyagi	RE Nakakoma		
Q	Wakayama	Wakayama	Gun	Yutaka Mura	Yamanashi
R	Toyama	Toyama	RF Kazuno Gun	Oyu Machi	Akita
T	Ogaki	Gifu		Shibahira Mura	
V	Utsunomiya	Tochigi	RG Isawa	Mizuzawa Machi	Iwate
W	Nagaoka	Niigata		Anetai Mura	
AL	Yatsushiro	Kumamoto	RH Sambu Gun	Shirasato Machi	Chiba
BL	Hagi	Yamaguchi		Fukuoka Mura	
CL	Mihara	Hiroshima	RI Aso Gun	Tanuma Machi	Tochigi
DL	Kawagoe	Saitama		Akima Mura	
EL	Yamagata	Yamagata	RJ Kitaadachi		
FL	Akita	Akita	Gun	Fukiage Machi	Saitama
GL	Isahaya	Nagasaki		Mida (Minoda) Mura	
HI	Taira	Fukushima	RK Higashi		
IL	Yokosuka	Kanagawa	Kasugai Gun	Moriyama Machi	Aichi
Sp H	Hiroshima	Hiroshima		Asaki Mura	
	Hiroshima Shi		RL Minami		
	Kabe Machi		Kawachi Gun	Nagano Machi	Osaka Fu
	Hera Mura			Mikkaichi Mura	
	Tomo Mura				

LIST 2—ESTIMATED POPULATIONS, CENSUS POPULATIONS, AND SAMPLING RATIOS
(Population in Thousands)

Code	Area	Ken	Estimated stratum	October 1945 sample area	Census stratum	November 1945 sample area	Census stratum	February 1944 sample area	Take in r
YA	Shimonoseki	Yamaguchi	535	190	401	156	595	207	1,390
YB	Kokura	Fukuoka	347	170	257	132	365	192	1,910
NC	Nagoya	Aichi	900	900	598	598	1,349	1,349	3,900
ND	Gifu	Gifu	325	90	401	143	305	80	1,080
OE	Osaka	Osaka Fu	1,600	1,600	1,103	1,103	2,843	2,843	3,900
OF	Kobe	Hyogo	600	600	379	379	919	919	3,900
OG	Toyonaka	Osaka Fu	359	40	390	44	396	44	430
OH	Sakai	Osaka Fu	577	180	489	168	735	221	1,220
TI	Tokyo	Tokyo To	3,000	3,000	2,777	2,777	6,578	6,578	7,800
TJ	Yokohama	Kanagawa	1,000	750	805	625	1,416	1,035	2,920
TL	Funabashi	Chiba	479	80	413	68	391	61	650
KM	Kyoto	Kyoto Fu	1,100	1,100	866	866	965	965	3,900
N	Fukuoka	Fukuoka	520	300	400	252	591	326	2,250
O	Kure	Hiroshima	690	250	544	152	855	339	1,410
P	Sendai	Miyagi	320	230	295	238	364	264	2,800
Q	Wakayama	Wakayama	320	150	322	147	472	206	1,830
R	Toyama	Toyama	460	80	450	101	677	161	680
T	Ogaki	Gifu	317	51	360	51	429	57	630
V	Utsunomiya	Tochigi	418	70	477	81	520	91	650
W	Nagaoka	Niigata	333	50	388	38	510	67	590
A1	Yatsushiro	Kumamoto	275	39	265	41	263	39	550
B1	Hagi	Yamaguchi	538	34	554	38	452	31	250
C1	Mihara	Hiroshima	443	52	347	43	384	42	460
D1	Kawagoe	Saitama	627	48	587	47	531	39	300
E1	Yamagata	Yamagata	494	99	447	90	397	79	780
F1	Akita	Akita	393	109	375	101	346	98	1,080
G1	Isahaya	Nagasaki	719	51	659	55	605	48	280
H1	Taira	Fukushima	525	35	420	28	475	29	260
I1	Yokosuka	Kanagawa	712	300	578	202	706	334	1,640
Sd.H	Hiroshima	Hiroshima	150	150	137	137	344	344	
Sp.N	Nagasaki	Nagasaki	160	160	143	143	253	253	
RA	Miyako Gun:								
	Yukuhashi Machi	Fukuoka	3,676	13.7	3,771	14.2	3,511	13.3	350
	Toyotsu Mura			3.7		4.8		3.6	50
RB	Chiisagata Gun:								
	Nagakubyfuru Machi	Nagano	3,620	3.2	3,779	3.6	3,043	2.6	220
	Shiokawa Mura			3.9		4.4		3.1	40
RC	Tsuno Gun:								
	Kano Machi	Yamaguchi	2,974	5.0	2,881	6.8	2,480	5.5	110
	Kodo Mura			3.2		2.5		2.0	60
RD	Shizuki Gun:								
	Nishi-Ebara Machi	Okayama	2,867	4.6	2,580	4.9	2,416	3.7	90
	Meiji Mura			3.0		3.0		2.4	90
RE	Nakakoma Gun:								
	Yutaka Mura	Yamanashi	4,164	5.3	4,859	5.8	3,197	3.8	40
RF	Kazuno Gun:								
	Oyu Machi	Akita	3,010	7.4	3,198	9.1	2,531	6.6	140
	Shibahira Mura			5.6		5.6		5.0	140
RG	Isawa Gun:								
	Mizuzawa Machi	Iwate	3,152	16.8	3,241	17.9	2,668	14.2	370
	Anetai Mura			3.1		3.5		2.8	60
RH	Sambu Gun:								
	Shirasato Machi	Chiba	5,015	9.8	4,451	9.0	4,019	7.5	160
	Fukuoka Mura			4.4		4.1		3.4	50
RI	Aso Gun:								
	Tanuma Machi	Tochigi	4,263	17.7	3,718	17.9	3,358	13.1	280
	Akami Mura			10.7		10.6		7.9	150
RJ	Kitaadachi Gun:								
	Fukiage Machi	Saitama	2,592	5.2	2,555	5.8	2,222	4.3	110
	Mida Mura			3.5		3.9		2.8	110
RK	Higashi Kasugai Gun:								
	Moriyama Machi	Aichi	2,931	32.7	2,865	24.2	2,359	28.4	460
	Asahi Mura			9.8		10.7		8.5	460
RL	Minami Kawachi Gun:								
	Nagano Machi	Osaka Fu	2,293	10.3	2,745	16.8	2,113	11.9	370
	Mikkaichi Mura			3.1		4.9		3.6	70

*Note to list 2 on following page.

NOTE TO LIST 2

Estimates of population, as of October 1945, for each shi and gun were based on the Japanese national census of 22 February 1944, with adjustments calculated from the following sources:

1. Report of the National Registration of Wage Earners, 1 November 1944 and 1 May 1945, from the Ministry of Welfare. Totals for ken (prefecture) and certain shi.

2. Number of registrants for the rice-soybean-sweet-potato ration card, May 1944 and March 1945, prepared on request by the Agricultural Ministry. Totals for ken only.

3. Number of movement certificates issued by local police in each ken giving permission to move, and number of movement certificates presented to local police by persons newly arrived, collected on request by the Home Ministry for the periods January-October 1944 and January 1944-August 1945. Totals for those ken that sent in reports.

4. Estimates from the U. S. Army Air Forces of percent of each target city destroyed, plus Japanese reports on amount of damage and number of persons made homeless.

The reporting of the data in (1) and (2) was fairly complete, but unfortunately they referred to dates prior to heavy American bombing of Japan and the consequent large population movements. The data of (3) were extremely sketchy, and moreover a great deal of the migration took place without the legality of movement certificates. However, used in combination, these four sets of data made possible estimates of population with considerable improvement over the February 1944 census.

LIST 3.—DESCRIPTION OF STRATA

Description *Code designation*

I. Large Industrial Areas:	
A. Yawata metropolitan district:	
1. Bombed cities.....	YA
2. Unbombed or lightly bombed cities.....	YB
B. Nagoya metropolitan district:	
1. Nagoya.....	NC
2. Other bombed cities.....	ND
C. Osaka metropolitan district:	
1. Osaka.....	OE
2. Kobe.....	OF
3. Other heavily bombed cities.....	OG
4. Unbombed or lightly bombed cities.....	OH
D. Tokyo metropolitan district:	
1. Tokyo.....	TI
2. Other heavily bombed cities.....	TJ
3. Unbombed or lightly bombed cities.....	TL
II. Kyoto.....	
KM	
III. Other cities:	
A. Cities of over 100,000 population, with urban bombing of approximately 500 tons or more:	
1. Over 200,000 population, Region I.....	N
2. 100-200,000 population, under 50 percent destroyed, Regions I and II.....	O
3. Over 50 percent destroyed, Region III.....	Q
4. Cities in Region III.....	R
5. Cities in Region IV.....	P
B. Cities of less than 100,000 population with urban bombing of approximately 500 tons or more:	
1. Cities in Regions I, II, III, approximately 50 percent or more destroyed.....	T
2. Cities in Regions III and IV over 50 percent destroyed.....	W
3. Cities in Region III less than 50 percent destroyed.....	V
C. Cities of over 100,000 population unbombed or lightly bombed (all regions).....	
II	

LIST 3.—DESCRIPTION OF STRATA

Description *Code designation*

D. Cities of less than 100,000 population lightly bombed:	
1. Some light urban or heavy precision bombing (all regions).....	HI
2. Some precision bombing (all regions).....	GI
E. Small cities (under 100,000) unbombed:	
1. Region I.....	AI
2. Region II, low rate of population increase.....	BI
3. Region II and III, high population increase.....	CI
4. Region III, low population increase.....	DI
5. Region IV, low population increase.....	EI
6. Region IV, high population increase.....	FI
F. Special:	
1. Nagasaki (and adjacent rural area).....	Sp N
2. Hiroshima (and adjacent rural area).....	Sp H
IV. Rural areas:	
A. Rural areas surrounding industrial areas:	
1. Tokyo metropolitan district.....	RJ
2. Nagoya metropolitan district.....	RK
3. Osaka metropolitan district.....	RL
B. Region I.....	
RA	
C. Other rural, population density over 500 persons per square mile:	
1. Region II.....	RD
2. Regions III and IV, Pacific Coast Area (high manufacturing).....	RH
3. Regions III and IV, Northern and Japan Sea Area.....	RI
D. Other rural, density under 500 per square mile:	
1. Regions II and III, unbombed ken.....	RB
2. Region II, bombed ken.....	RC
3. Region III, bombed ken.....	RE
4. Region IV, unbombed ken.....	RF
5. Region IV, bombed ken.....	RG

LIST 4.—REGIONAL GROUPS

<i>Region:</i>	<i>Ken (Prefecture)¹</i>
I.....	Fukuoka Kumamoto Nagasaki Saga
II.....	Hiroshima..... Osaka Fu Hyogo..... Shimane Kyoto Fu..... Tottori Nara..... Wakayama Okayama..... Yamaguchi
III.....	Aichi..... Saitama Chiba..... Shiga Fukai..... Shikawa Gifu..... Shizuoka Gumma..... Tochigi Ibaraki..... Tokyo To Kanagawa..... Toyama Mie..... Yamanashi Nagano
IV.....	Akita..... Miyagi Aomori..... Niigata Fukushima..... Yamagata Iwate

¹ No ken was split between two regional groups.

LIST 5.—ILLUSTRATION OF SAMPLING IN RURAL AREAS—STRATUM RC

SAMPLE GUN: TSUNO GUN, YAMAGUCHI KEN

Com- bination	Places	Popu- lation	Cumu- lative popu- lation	Cumulative Mura population
No. 1.	Kano Machi ¹	5,461	19,490	2,015
	Yuno Mura	2,015		
	Kodo Mura ¹	2,014		
No. 2.	Fukugawa Machi	9,490	20,790	4,029
	Heta Mura	6,437		
	Yaji Mura	2,787		
No. 3.	Kushigahama Machi	11,300	35,038	
	Otsushima Mura	9,303		
	Nakasu Mura	2,445		
No. 4.	Tonda Machi	14,248	59,901	
	Sugane Mura	15,159		
	Susuma Mura	3,920		
	Nagaho Mura	2,656		
	Yonehawa Mura	1,262		
		1,866		
	24,863			

¹ The total population of the gun being 59,901, a number between 1 and 59,901 was first selected from a table of random numbers to designate the sample combination. The number chosen was 8,762, so the combination No. 1 was drawn. Kano Machi was the only machi in the combination and hence it automatically became the sample machi. To select a mura a number between 1 and 4,029 (the total mura population of Combination No. 1) was taken from a table of random numbers. That number was 2,656, designating Kodo Mura as the sample mura.

The device of giving each combination a number of chances of selection corresponding to its population, by assigning a block of numbers to it, each number with an equal chance of being drawn from the table of random numbers, is what is meant by sampling with probability of selection proportionate to size.

LIST 6.—LIST OF CITIES (SHI) SHOWING STRATUM TO WHICH ASSIGNED

Shi	Ken	Region	Stratum
Hiroshima	Hiroshima	II	Sp H
Hitachi	Ibaraki	III	W
Ichikawa	Chiba	III	TL
Ichinomiya	Aichi	III	ND
Iida	Nagano	III	D1
Iisuka	Fukuoka	I	A1
Ikoda	Osaka Fu	II	OG
Isahaya	Nagasaki	I	G1
Iseaki	Gumma	III	V
Ishinomaki	Miyagi	IV	G1
Iwahuni	Yamaguchi	II	H1
Kainan	Wakayama	II	B1
Kaizuka ¹	Osaka Fu	II	OG
Kamaishi	Iwate	IV	H1
Kamakura	Kanagawa	III	C1
Kanazawa	Ishikawa	III	II
Karatsu	Saga	I	A1
Kashiwazaki	Niigata	IV	E1
Kawagoe	Saitama	III	D1
Kawaguchi	Saitama	III	TL
Kawasaki	Kanagawa	III	TJ
Kiryu	Gumma	III	GL
Kishiwada	Osaka Fu	II	OG
Kobe	Hyogo	II	OF
Kofu	Yamanashi	III	W
Kokura	Fukuoka	I	YB
Koriyama	Fukushima	IV	H1
Kumagaya	Saitama	III	V
Kumamoto	Kumamoto	I	O
Kurasniki	Okayama	II	B1
Kure	Hiroshima	II	O
Kurume	Fukuoka	I	H1
Kuwana	Mie	III	ND
Kyoto	Kyoto Fu	II	KM
Maebashi	Gumma	III	V
Maizuru	Kyoto Fu	III	(²)
Matsue	Shimane	II	B1
Matsumoto	Nagano	III	B1
Matsuzaka	Mie	III	H1
Mihara	Hiroshima	II	C1
Mito	Ibaraki	III	W
Mogi	Fukuoka	I	YA
Morioka	Iwate	IV	F1
Nagano	Nagano	III	E1
Nagaoka	Niigata	IV	W
Nagasaki ¹	Nagasaki	I	Sp N
Nagoya	Aichi	III	NC
Nanao	Ishikawa	III	D1
Nara	Nara	II	G1
Niigata	Niigata	IV	H1
Nishinomiya	Hyogo	II	OH
Nogata	Fukuoka	I	A1
Noshiro	Akita	IV	F1
Numazu	Shizuoka	III	W
Ogaki	Gifu	III	T
Okasaki	Aichi	III	ND
Okaya	Nagano	III	E1
Okayama	Okayama	II	Q
Omiya ¹	Saitama	III	TL
Omuta	Fukuoka	I	O
Onomichi	Hiroshima	II	B1
Osaka	Osaka Fu	II	OE
Otau	Shiga	III	D1
Saga	Saga	I	H1
Sakai	Osaka Fu	II	OH
Sakata	Yamagata	IV	G1
Sanjo	Niigata	IV	F1
Sasebo	Nagasaki	I	N
Sendai	Miyagi	IV	P
Seto	Aichi	III	D1
Shikama	Hyogo	II	C1
Shimabara	Nagasaki	I	A1

¹ Denotes a city not in existence in 1940.

² Combined with Higashimaizuru.

LIST 6.—LIST OF CITIES (SHI) SHOWING STRATUM TO WHICH ASSIGNED

Shi	Ken	Region	Stratum
Akashi	Hyogo	II	OH
Akita	Akita	IV	F1
Amagasaki	Hyogo	II	OH
Aomori	Aomori	IV	P
Ashikaga	Tochigi	III	D1
Ashiya ¹	Hyogo	II	OH
Atami	Shizuoka	III	C1
Bofu	Yamaguchi	II	G1
Chiba	Chiba	III	V
Choshi	Chiba	III	V
Fujisawa	Kanagawa	III	G1
Fukuchiyama	Kyoto Fu	II	B1
Fukui	Fukui	III	T
Fukuoka	Fukuoka	I	N
Fukushima	Fukushima	IV	E1
Fukuyama	Hiroshima	II	T
Funabashi	Chiba	III	TL
Fuse	Osaka Fu	II	OG
Gifu	Gifu	III	ND
Hachinche	Aomori	IV	G1
Hachioji	Tokyo To	III	W
Hagi	Yamaguchi	II	B1
Hamamatsu	Shizuoka	III	R
Handa	Aichi	III	D1
Higashimaizuru	Kyoto Fu	II	C1
Hikone	Shiga	III	D1
Himeji	Hyogo	II	Q
Hiratsuka	Kanagawa	III	W
Hirosaki	Aomori	IV	F1

¹ Denotes a city not in existence in 1940.

LIST 6.—LIST OF CITIES (SHI) SHOWING
STRATUM TO WHICH ASSIGNED

Shi	Ken	Region	Stratum
Shimizu	Shizuoka	III	V
Shimomatsu	Yamaguchi	II	C1
Shimonoseki	Yamaguchi	II	YA
Shingu	Wakayama	II	B1
Shizuoka	Shizuoka	III	R
Suita	Osaka Fu	II	OG
Sumoto	Hyogo	II	B1
Tachikawa ³	Tokyo To	III	H1
Tagawa ³	Fukuoka	I	A1
Taira	Fukushima	IV	B1
Tajimi	Gifu	III	C1
Takada	Niigata	IV	E1
Takaoka	Toyama	III	D1
Takaseki	Gumma	III	G1
Takayama	Gifu	III	G1
Tamano	Okayama	II	C1
Tateyama	Chiba	III	H1
Tobata	Fukuoka	I	YB
Tochigi	Tochigi	III	D1
Tokuyama	Yamaguchi	II	T
Tokyo	Tokyo To	III	TI
Tottori	Tottori	II	B1
Toyama	Toyama	III	R

LIST 6.—LIST OF CITIES (SHI) SHOWING
STRATUM TO WHICH ASSIGNED

Shi	Ken	Region	Stratum
Toyahashi	Aichi	III	R
Toyonaka	Osaka Fu	II	CG
Tsu	Mie	III	T
Tsuruga	Fukui	III	T
Tsuroka	Yamagata	IV	E1
Tsuyama	Okayama	II	B1
Ube	Yamaguchi	II	O
Ueta	Nagano	III	D1
Ujiyamada	Mie	III	T
Urawa	Saitama	III	TL
Utsunomiya	Tochigi	III	V
Wakamatsu	Fukuoka	I	YB
Wakamatsu	Fukushima	IV	E1
Wakayama	Wakayama	II	Q
Yamagata	Yamagata	IV	E1
Yamaguchi	Yamaguchi	II	B1
Yatsushiro	Kumamoto	I	A1
Yawata	Fukuoka	I	YA
Yokkaichi	Mie	III	ND
Yokohama	Kanagawa	III	TJ
Yokosuka	Kanagawa	III	I1
Yonago	Tottori	II	G1
Yonezawa	Yamagata	IV	E1

³ Denotes a city not in existence in 1940.

Appendix K

THE MORALE INDEX

In the development of an over-all measure of morale, "The Morale Index," a relatively crude and simplified form of the internal consistency method, was applied. The details of the procedure are described below.

A. Selections of Trial Columns

Four members of the analysis staff independently selected the columns, from the Main Interview Schedule Code, which they considered *a priori* of possible significance for a Morale Index. These four independent selections were then reviewed and all columns upon which the majority of the judges were in agreement were retained for inclusion in a Trial Morale Index, i. e., the index to be subjected to statistical analysis.

The columns included in the Trial Index and the significant positive and negative items in each column are listed in Table A.^{1,2}

B. Application of Trial Morale Index

163 interviews, selected at random from the total

¹ In selecting the columns to be included in the Trial Index, only those columns which were the codes for questions not dealing directly with bombing were considered. This procedure was followed to prevent a spurious correlation between the Index and bombing variables. In the case of the columns for non-bombing questions, bombing-response items which were judged symptomatic of level of morale were accepted only in those columns in which there were alternative non-bombing response items. Both bombed and unbombed respondents were thus free to express their war morale in terms of their significant life experiences. The exclusion of all bombing-response items would, in effect, have tended to prevent bombed respondents from entering into the Index. This point is mentioned because of possible criticism to the effect that a spurious correlation between the Morale Index and bombing factors will result from the acceptance of bombing response items. The decision to permit a credit of +1 or -1 only per column invalidates this criticism.

² The final code book for the Main Interview Schedule should be consulted to determine the questions for each of the selected columns. It is available in Morale Division files.

Table A

Column	Positive items	Negative items
20	1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9	8
21	9	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
22	4, 6	1, 2, 3
23	4, 5	1, 2, 3
24	1, 6	2, 3, 4, 5, 7
25		1, 2, 3, 4, 5
26	5	1, 2
27	2, 8	3, 4, 5, 7
28	x	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
29	7, 8	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
30	x	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
31	7, 8	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
32	x	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
33	8	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
34	1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7	8, 9, 0
45	5	1, 4, 7, 8
47	2	3, 4, 5, 6, 7
48	2, 3, 4, 5	8
49	1, 2, 3	4, 5

number of interviews, were hand scored with the Trial Index.³ The 29 lowest scores, ranging from -7 to -14, and the highest scores, ranging from +3 to +10, were chosen to form two extreme comparison groups to test the discriminatory capacity of the columns in the index.

C. Item Analysis

The responses per columns of each of the 29 high and the 29 low cases in the extreme comparison groups were tabulated for 19 columns in the trial index. The results for the high group are given in Table B; for the low group, in Table C.

³ In scoring the coded interviews, only one credit (+1 or -1) was permitted per column in an attempt to minimize the influence of variability in interviewer skill and in articulateness of respondents upon the Morale Index score. The final score was the algebraic sum of the positive and negative column scores.

TABLE B.—Number of positive, no response, and negative responses per column, for the 29 highest cases in distribution

	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	45	47	48	49
+21		5	16	11	8	0	4	21	20	4	23	4	21	3	23	5	5	13	8
N. R.	8	12	11	16	20	17	18	1	4	24	2	24	3	25	4	22	19	16	20
-0		12	2	2	2	12	7	7	5	1	4	1	5	1	2	2	5	0	1

TABLE C.—Number of positive, no response, and negative responses per column for the 29 lowest cases in distribution

	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	45	47	48	49
+16		0	1	4	0	0	1	6	0	1	0	7	3	2	9	1	2	10	4
N. R.	7	10	8	4	15	10	6	3	3	8	2	1	5	15	5	17	10	13	19
-6		19	20	21	14	19	22	20	26	20	27	22	21	12	16	11	17	6	6

A rough measure of the discriminatory power of a column may be secured by obtaining the difference between congruent responses (+ in the high group; - in the low group) and non-congruent re-

sponses (- in the high group; + in the low group). The larger the congruent minus non-congruent response difference, the greater the discriminatory capacity of a column.

TABLE D.—Summary of analysis of discriminatory capacity of columns

Item	High cases		Low cases		Total	
	Congruent minus noncongruent	Number response	Congruent minus noncongruent	Number response	Congruent minus noncongruent	Number response
20 and 21 ¹					15	29
22	14	11	19	8	33	19
23	9	16	17	4	26	20
24	6	20	14	15	20	35
25 ²					7	
26	-3	18	21	6	18	24
27	14	1	14	3	28	4
28	15	4	26	3	41	7
29	3	24	19	8	22	32
30	19	2	27	2	46	4
31	3	24	15	1	18	25
32	16	3	18	5	24	8
33	2	25	10	15	12	40
34	21	4	7	5	28	9
45	3	22	10	17	13	39
47	0	19	15	10	15	29
48	13	16	-4	13	9	29
49	7	20	2	19	9	39

¹ Column 20 and 21 must be considered as a single column in this analysis because of the nature of questions 9 and 10.

² Because there are no positive items in Column 25, the discriminatory capacity of the column was estimated by obtaining the difference between the number of negative responses (congruent) for the 29 low cases and the number of negative responses (non-congruent) for the 29 high cases.

Inspection of Table D reveals that 7 columns, viz., 30, 28, 32, 22, 27, 34, and 23 stand out as the most efficient. The remaining columns either lacked a high degree of discriminatory capacity or yielded to few significant responses to justify inclusion in a final index. The questions for the 7 most discriminating columns and the significant positive and negative items in each column are given in Note 1.

An index based on the 7 columns listed above was used in scoring 218 interviews. The distribution obtained is shown in Note 2. The range from +7 to -7 is adequate for purposes of analysis and the form of the distribution (skewed toward the negative end of the scale) conform to expectations about the nature of morale in a defeated people. Preliminary work with the validity of the index was encouraging. It is concluded that the results with the index appear to justify its use in analysis.

Directions for coding the index are furnished in Note 3.

NOTE 1.—ITEMS INCLUDED IN MORALE INDEX

Col. 22:

Q. 11: In regard to the way your leaders conducted the war, what did you think of it during the war?

Positive items:

4. Believed in leaders.
6. Didn't question leadership because of full faith and placed trust in them, not people's

concern, no way of influencing them so didn't think about it, etc.

Negative items:

1. Critical of leaders—private interest in war, told lies about war.
2. Critical of leaders as result of air raids.
3. Critical of leaders as result of other factors.

Col. 23:

Q. 12: In regard to the way your leaders took care of the home front welfare what did you think of it during the war?

Positive items:

4. Leaders did their best under the circumstances.
5. Didn't question leadership—placed full confidence and trust in them, etc.

Negative items:

1. Critical—leaders not interested in common people's welfare (as indicated by complaints about treatment at hands of leaders, etc.).
2. Critical—because of inequality of treatment of classes.
3. Critical—as a result of other factors.

Col. 27:

Q. 15: Did you think that all kinds of people in Japan suffered alike in the war?

Positive items:

2. All people suffered equally, no further comment.
8. Respondent suffered less.

Negative items:

3. All people did not suffer equally; i. e., rich suffered less or not at all.
4. All people did not suffer equally; officials, military suffered less or not at all.
5. All people did not suffer equally; i. e., farmers suffered less.
7. All people did not suffer equally; city people suffered less (only when respondent is a farmer).

Col. 28:

Q. 16: As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?

Positive items:

- x. No doubts — never doubted Japan's victory.

Negative items:

1. Doubts as a result of military losses.
2. Doubts as a result of knowledge of shortcomings of war material.

3. Doubts as a result of consumer shortages.
4. Doubts as a result of air raids producing belief that war potential was impaired.
5. Doubts as a result of American air activity over Japan in general.
6. Doubts as a result of air raids on home town.
7. Doubts as a result of belief of greater strength of enemy.
8. Always doubted that Japan would win.
0. Doubts—miscellaneous and unspecified or coded 9 or 0 in Col. 29.

Col. 30:

Q. 17: When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?

Positive items: -

- x. Never felt certain of defeat (never felt certain until Emperor's announcement).

Negative items:

1. Certainty as a result of military losses.
2. Certainty as a result of initial opposition to war.
3. Certainty as a result of knowledge of shortages of war materials.
4. Certainty as a result of consumer shortages.
5. Certainty as a result of air raids producing belief that war potential was impaired.
6. Certainty as a result of American air activity over Japan in general.
7. Certainty as a result of air raids and inability of Japanese to halt raids or retaliate with raids and planes.
8. Certainty as a result of air raids on home town.
9. Certainty as result of atomic bomb raid.
0. Certainty as result of miscellaneous factors or coded 9 or 10 in Col. 31.

Col. 32:

Q. 18: Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war?

Positive items:

- x. Never reached such a point.

Negative items:

1. Yes, as a result of military losses.
2. Yes, reached point as a result of initial opposition to war.
3. Yes, as a result of knowledge of shortages of war material.
4. Yes, as a result of *consumer* deprivation—shortages of food, home front difficulties.
5. Yes, as a result of air raids producing belief that war potential was impaired.
6. Yes, as a result of raids producing personal suffering—bombed out, fatigue, loss of sleep, personal or familial injury or losses or anxiety.
8. Yes, as a result of atomic bomb raids.
9. Yes—no reason specified.
0. Yes, miscellaneous reasons.

Col. 34:

Q. 19: How did you feel when you heard that Japan had given up the war?

Positive items:

1. Surprise, stunned, sudden; puzzled feeling implying *no* expectation that defeat was near.
2. Regret, misery, disappointment at surrender.
3. Blames self for loss.
5. Disillusionment, mad, bitterness, confusion, futility, had sacrificed to win, all in vain, futility of our suffering, how could we have lost when sacrificed this much, leaders said we'd win and we lost.
6. Worry about Emperor—shamed for the Emperor, sorry for him.
7. Feeling of personal shame, mortification.

Negative items:

8. Surprised feeling, personally *expected* defeat, but thought government would fight to the last—coerce individuals, etc.
9. Feelings of relief or happiness that war was over—suffering at an end, etc. Should have been sooner.
0. Expected it—knew it was coming, resigned.

Appendix L

THE CONFIDENCE IN VICTORY INDEX

A second "morale" index composed of three columns: 28, 30, and 32, was developed to form a homogeneous measure of Confidence in Victory, an important component of war morale (Appendix L). This index has been called the C. V. Index. Coding instructions used follow.

CODING INSTRUCTIONS

C. V. INDEX

Determine the number of significant positive and negative items in each of the three columns listed in Table A. Secure the algebraic sum of the significant positive and negative items. Determine the category number for the C. V. Index according to Table B. Enter this category number in Col. 73 of Card 1 and in Col. 69 of Card 2.

NOTE.—Allow but one credit (plus 1 or minus 1) for each column. Thus, two or more negative items in any given column equals negative 1 only;

two or more positive items in any given column equals positive 1 only. If, in a multiple coded column, the respondent gives both positive and negative item responses, sum algebraically to determine the singleth credit allowed per column.

TABLE A.—*Significant C. V. index items*

Card 1	Positive items	Negative items
Column 28	X	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 0
Column 30	X	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 0
Column 32	X	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 0

TABLE B.

Conversion table for translating final algebraic C. V. index scores into category numbers

Algebraic scores	Category No.
-2, -3	1
-1, 0, plus 1	2
Plus 2 or 3	3

Appendix M

THE URBAN BOMBING STRATA

City	Pre-bombing (1944) population ¹	Total tonnage bombs dropped ²	Percentage of built-up area destroyed ³	Percentage of homes destroyed ⁴
Stratum No. 1:				
Nagoya	1,349,225	14,689	31.2	58.07
Osaka	2,842,954	11,217	26.0	66.60
Kobe	919,141	6,174	56.0	71.70
Stratum No. 2:				
Tokyo	6,577,620	16,561	50.8	57.44
Stratum No. 3:				
Toyama	163,581	1,492	99.5	59.99
Gifu	175,655	898	74.0	49.12
Nagaoka	67,139	929	65.5	77.00
Wakayama	205,505	928	52.5	32.33
Sakai	220,814	779	44.0	50.52
Yokohama	1,034,740	2,605	44.0	
Stratum No. 4:				
Kure	339,278	3,820	40.0	41.40
Ogaki	56,990	664	40.0	32.00
Shimonoski	207,142	839	36.0	15.91
Utsunomiya	90,778	847	34.2	52.86
Sendai	223,630	1,047	27.0	22.40
Fukuoka	325,925	1,526	21.5	19.80
Stratum No. 5:				
Kokura	192,368	(⁵)	(⁵)	1.19
Toyonaka	43,985	(⁵)	(⁵)	8.64
Funabashi	60,762	(⁵)	(⁵)	0.02
Yoto	965,399	14	(⁵)	0.29
Yatsushiro	38,649	49	(⁵)	0.46
Hagi	30,960	(⁵)	(⁵)	(⁵)
Mihara	42,052	(⁵)	(⁵)	(⁵)
Kawagoe	38,873	(⁵)	(⁵)	(⁵)
Yamagata	79,206	(⁵)	(⁵)	(⁵)
Akita	97,875	(⁵)	(⁵)	(⁵)
Isahaya	47,643	6	(⁵)	(⁵)
Taira	28,756	43	(⁵)	12.40
Yokosuka	333,505	238	(⁵)	0.22
Atom bombed cities:				
Hiroshima	343,034	733	68.5	96.91
Nagasaki	272,312	7395	43.9	35.02

of the residents of the various strata. This comes from the interviews with Japanese civilians, rather than from official sources, and is based on their answers to questions designed to bring out their bombing experiences. It includes: number of air raids experienced, personal bombing experience, times bombs fell on respondents' neighborhood, home damage by bombing, property damage by bombing, and an index of bombing involvement. This information is given, in the tables which follow, without comment other than a description of the particular bombing indicator under consideration.

TABLE A.—Number of air raids experienced¹

Bombing strata	None	1-10	11-30
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1. Large cities, heavily bombed, high destruction	19	68	13
2. Tokyo	4	69	27
3. Smaller cities, heavily bombed, high destruction	17	70	13
4. Smaller cities, heavily bombed, light destruction	11	72	17
5. Lightly bombed and unbombed cities	42	44	14
6. Rural communities	43	37	20
7. Urban evacuees	11	63	26

¹ Air raids experienced include all cases in which planes were overhead and alerts were sounded whether or not bombs were actually dropped.

TABLE B.—Personal bombing experience¹

Bombing strata	None	Bombed once	Bombed more than once
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1. Large cities, heavily bombed, high destruction	25	32	43
2. Tokyo	20	38	42
3. Smaller cities, heavily bombed, high destruction	30	43	27
4. Smaller cities, heavily bombed, light destruction	28	45	27
5. Lightly bombed and unbombed cities	67	19	14
6. Rural communities	84	9	7
7. Urban evacuees	33	44	23

¹ Personal bombing experience means that bombs actually fell in close proximity to the respondent regardless of where he might have been at the time.

¹ Figures are from official Japanese census, 1944.
² Figures are from *All USAAF and US Navy Report 5-B*.
³ Figures are from *A Brief Summary of B-29 Strategic Air Operations, 5 June 1944 to 14 Aug. 1945*.
⁴ Figures are from background reports of USSBS Morale Division which were prepared from official records by the city officials of the sample points included in the survey.
⁵ Not available.
⁶ No damage.
⁷ Plus an atom bomb.

Bombing Experience of the Residents of Various Bombing Strata

In the preceding pages the cities comprising the various bombing strata are indicated along with certain pertinent information regarding their size, the tonnage of bombs dropped, the percentage of built-up areas destroyed, and the percentage of homes destroyed. In this section of Appendix M information is presented on the bombing experience

TABLE C.—*Times bombs fell in respondents' neighborhood*¹

Bombing strata	None	Once	More than once
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1. Large cities, heavily bombed, high destruction-----	16	28	56
2. Tokyo-----	14	33	53
3. Smaller cities, heavily bombed, high destruction-----	29	37	34
4. Smaller cities, heavily bombed, light destruction-----	28	42	30
5. Lightly bombed and unbombed cities---	70	16	14
6. Rural communities---	84	9	7
7. Urban evacuees-----	33	35	32

¹ Bombs fell on respondents' neighborhood refers to the respondents' residential neighborhood and has no reference to whether or not he was present at the time.

TABLE D.—*Home damaged by bombing*¹

Bombing strata	Undamaged	Damaged
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1. Large cities, heavily bombed, high destruction-----	52	48
2. Tokyo-----	48	52
3. Smaller cities, heavily bombed, high destruction-----	51	49
4. Smaller cities, heavily bombed, light destruction-----	69	31
5. Lightly bombed and unbombed cities-----	86	14
6. Rural communities-----	97	3
7. Urban evacuees-----	46	54

¹ Home damaged by bombing refers to the house in which respondent lived at time of bombing regardless of whether or not he owned it.

TABLE E.—*Property damaged by bombing*¹

Bombing strata	None	Some	Severe
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1. Large cities, heavily bombed, high destruction-----	47	14	39
2. Tokyo-----	45	11	44
3. Smaller cities, heavily bombed, high destruction-----	49	5	46
4. Smaller cities, heavily bombed, light destruction-----	64	13	23
5. Lightly bombed and unbombed cities---	85	5	10
6. Rural communities---	97	1	2
7. Urban evacuees-----	42	8	50

¹ Property damaged by bombing refers to the respondent's personal property regardless of its nature or where it was when damaged.

TABLE F.—*Bombing involvement*¹

Bombing strata	Not involved	Involved
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
1. Large cities, heavily bombed, high destruction-----	41	59
2. Tokyo-----	38	62
3. Smaller cities, heavily bombed, high destruction-----	43	57
4. Smaller cities, heavily bombed, light destruction-----	55	45
5. Lightly bombed and unbombed cities-----	75	25
6. Rural communities-----	87	13
7. Urban evacuees-----	36	64

¹ Bombing involvement includes any of the following: home damage, property damage, injury to self or kin, and death of kin as a result of bombing.

Appendix N

SAMPLE INTERVIEW

Personal Data:

Man, born in 1900. Widower with children.
Primary school principal. Fourteen years' education.

Buddhist, Nichiren sect.

Son of farmer. Lives in village, Chiba ken.
Unbombed himself, but experienced about 30 air raids.

Interviewed 24 December 1945.

Responses:

Q. In general, how are things going with you now?

A. I am leading the life of a salaried man. My father is a farmer. I'm a principal of a national school, but I can't get along myself on my salary. Prices are high, so with just my salary it is difficult to get along. Rice is being sent out, but since my father is a farmer, I am not troubled as regards food. I'm living with my father, and at my age I am still being taken care of by my father.

Q. Do you feel you are better or worse off now than you were during the war?

A. It's better on the whole. Life is beginning to be more cheerful. During the war, my personal freedom was constricted. I wondered whether the war could possibly be won. I didn't know what would happen to the nation. After the end of the war, I began to have hope for my future. I have begun to take a deep interest in the future of the nation, for it will be rebuilt and become a nation of peace.

Q. What things worried you most during the war?

A. Although it may sound contradictory, I was always a pessimistic critic. I used to argue with my fellow teachers, and they used to label me as a pessimistic disputant. I used to say, "Isn't Japan far behind America in science?" I would take a pessimistic view of the war. I worried most about whether we could win. Although there was talk of a "united nation," people used to say that there was no better time to make money than during a war, and many people strove to make money. (Pause) The pupils of the national schools really worked hard, however. Whatever may be said of the rest of society, the pupils of the national schools really worked hard. I would relay the orders from above to them. (Any other worries?) The air raids. My school was hit. The school was com-

pletely burned out and it was necessary to divide the school and continue in seven different places. From the standpoint of my work, I worried very much about the pupils . . . how to send them to a place of safety.

Q. What sort of work were you doing, from the beginning of 1945 to the end of the war?

A. A wartime Educational Ordinance was passed. Education was a matter of form only. I was guiding the children in increasing food production.

Q. How was your working capacity during this period as compared with other years?

A. Ordinarily I had 20 teachers at my school, 8 men and 12 women. In May the men were taken away and I and another man were the only two men teachers. The rest were women without experience. I had to do everything. I had my own work and besides had to look after other affairs. I had no chance to rest. When I came home, I was all fatigued.

Q. How were your working conditions during this period?

A. My work was to take care of the children. That was my work. Therefore from January through March, I was following the textbooks and teaching the children, but from May, almost every day I led the children out into the fields and led them in increasing food production.

Q. Now, we were talking a little while ago about what you were doing from January 1945 to the end of the war. How many working days were you absent from your work during this period?

A. You mean absence from work? About four days.

Q. What prevented you from going to work on those days?

A. My wife's father died. That's why I rested.

Q. During the war, what did you think was Japan's greatest strength in waging the war?

A. I thought it was the Yamato Spirit, the spirit of following the Emperor. A while ago I said that I held pessimistic views, but I didn't think that Japan would lose the war. First, I thought of Japan as capable of certain victory, and of being indomitable. Second, I thought the war was a war of righteousness. This was a war for Greater East Asia co-prosperity. I thought that we might not

win, but I didn't think we would lose. The Gumbatsu, I realize now, told us many things, but I thought: "Right will bring certain victory." I thought that is why the Kamikaze Corps was growing. I, myself, intended to become part of the Kamikaze Corps. I thought everybody would become like them.

Q. During the war, what did you think Japan's greatest weakness was?

A. I thought it was the fact that the level of science and technology was low. As regards natural resources, I knew that America was first in the world. She had self-sufficiency and self-support in natural resources. Therefore, in the field of munitions production, America could manufacture warships, guns, and planes. In the case of military men individually, too, Americans, I knew, were able to handle autos and planes as easily as we handle bicycles. I heard that Americans could pilot a plane with only one month's training, whereas Japanese required one and a half years' training. That was Japan's weakness, I felt. (Pause) Before the war we used to consider imported goods as being cheap and good; and they were. When foreign-made goods were compared with Japan-made goods, I could tell this. (Pause) Another thing was this: From olden times Japan has been called a land of plenty as regards food. I thought that as regards food, at least, there was no worry. But towards the end of the war, the food situation became pressing. Even in food we weren't self-sufficient, let alone not being self-sufficient in natural resources.

Q. In regard to the way your leaders conducted the war, what did you think of it during the war?

A. I thought that the military men were interfering too much in government in all respects. They touched even foreign relations. Another thing I felt dissatisfied with was the upper government officials. They were too dictatorial and too oppressive. When we of the same group got together we frequently expressed our dissatisfaction and talked of unfairness. In my own case there was the chief of the educational section of the prefectural branch office. To me, a specialist in education, he would complain that increased production was insufficient. I was dissatisfied with this. Then, too, I was dissatisfied with the fact that the government orders were late. In the case of farm products, the orders were late. We would get orders on the method of harvesting when the products were already harvested. People behind desks who didn't know the conditions on the spot would issue these

orders. I worried about the country's future if we had national leaders like these people. The nation's leaders didn't go around. They were merely experts with education but they didn't know local conditions. For example, there was no gasoline so they told us to gather pine roots. Next they told us to gather pine nuts. But the time to collect pine pitch is in June or July. The orders came in August or September.

Q. In regard to the way your leaders took care of the home front welfare, what did you think of it during the war?

A. As I mentioned previously, they acted without knowing the actual conditions. The rationing system didn't work smoothly. I sympathized a little, of course, with the leaders, because our country had no previous experience with rationing. (Pause) Another point I was dissatisfied with was the question of why the leaders didn't wipe out black market transactions. Whereas people who got sea products or made manufactured goods could engage in black market transactions, people on a salary could not. I thought this was unfair. I wondered why the black market couldn't be wiped out entirely as it was in Germany.

Q. How did you feel about the changes in government during the war, at the time the changes occurred?

A. I thought the war was gradually becoming disadvantageous to us. The Tojo Cabinet resigned at the time of Saipan and the Koiso Cabinet changed at the time of Okinawa. I thought the war was going along all right as long as Tojo was in.

Q. Did the people's attitudes and conduct toward each other change during the war?

A. It changed considerably. (How?) I think there was a tendency for people to become selfish, gradually. This paralleled the shortage of goods. When paper money began to be used more, I was particularly surprised by primary school pupils starting to gamble. Middle school students would hide and not go to school. They said, "I'm doing work just like a laborer,"—for they were engaged in increasing food production—and they stayed away from school. People were swayed by the principle of making money.

Q. Did you think that all kinds of people in Japan suffered alike in the war?

A. I thought that some people rejoiced because they were able to profit from the black market. Some people even said: "Honorable Mr. Chiang Kai Shek." (How was that again?) Well, because the war became protracted because of Chiang Kai

Shek, they used to say: "Honorable Mr. Chiang Kai Shek." People operating munitions factories were particularly pleased with the war continuing. But not so with us salaried people.

Q. As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?

A. Yes. The time I thought it was most dangerous for Japan was at the time of Saipan. I thought so even more deeply at the time Okinawa fell.

Q. When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?

A. At the time Okinawa fell. After Saipan fell, the B-29s began to come and destroy the munitions factories and the large cities. By the time Okinawa fell, the Philippines had already been taken and our communications with the south had been severed. With Okinawa taken, I thought that there would be a landing from Okinawa on the coast. But on the other hand, Imperial Headquarters sent out newspaper reporters, I think they were, to the country areas to talk to school principals. (When was that?) At the end of July. We gathered at Togane machi. They explained that although Okinawa had been lost, there would be a "decisive battle on the homeland." They said that the High Command, after the campaign on Okinawa, had gained confidence that in the "decisive battle on the mainland," we would win. I thought that perhaps we might at that.

Q. Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war?

A. I thought I, myself, could get along all right. My father was a farmer. I had food. I didn't have a stock of goods but I had old clothes. I had a house, so I didn't worry on that score. I didn't have much, but I thought I would not have to bear with inconveniences.

Q. How did you feel when you heard that Japan had given up the war?

A. For a time I was flabbergasted. As I mentioned previously, I felt on the one hand that we wouldn't lose, and on the other hand I felt that we might. When I heard about the unconditional surrender, I was flabbergasted. In other words, I thought that a compromise peace could be effected.

Q. In regard to the policies taken by occupation-troop headquarters, how do you feel things are working out?

A. I worried a great deal when I heard that the occupation forces would occupy Japan. I had heard stories about mistreatment by people who

had experienced occupation in China. At present, I think that guidance toward peace is being given us. The Gumbatsu had been done away with. (Pause) I felt grateful that the vestiges of Japan's feudal era, and the high-handedness of the upper class people are gradually being attended to. You needn't write this, but I have noticed that there are a great many experts attached to GHQ. For instance, I have heard the policies regarding what to take out of the school textbooks, and I felt that much thought is being given to Japan's national spirit so that she can get along in the future. (Pause) Before you go further, I would like to ask you something. How about communism in America? (What do you mean?) Is communism encouraged in America? (I wouldn't say encouraged.) Is it suppressed? (No, it isn't suppressed.) I don't feel very much admiration for the way GHQ is encouraging communism in Japan. People in prison were set free.

Q. Now that the war is over, how do you think you and your family will fare in the next 2 or 3 years?

A. I think there will be greater difficulties, rather than ease. I don't think the present food situation will be alleviated. Then there is a tendency toward inflation. I think we will face hardships regarding prices. Next as regards clothing, cotton is very scarce. Farmers are most troubled by lack of clothing. Although I know that eventually there will be imports allowed, I believe they will be in exchange for other things in connection with reparations, and clothing will not come around and be available to us. The children are to be pitied the most. They have no clothing. As regards shelter, the house has to be repaired but workmen demand high wages. Besides, now is (required) one sho of rice for so much of this or that.

Q. In your opinion, what changes should occur in Japan in the future?

A. As long as there has been a disarming, there is no other choice but to become a peaceful nation. Since the Meiji restoration, we have considered the nation first. The individual was made to sacrifice himself for the nation. This was the strength of preparing for war. Now, military preparations have been abolished. There is no other course but to develop a civilized nation. Whereas, I think the individual must not be made a tool for the elevation of the nation, I think we must make individuals better individuals. Do this first and then attend to the nation. We must make individuals of high culture and warm moral principles. Then we will be regarded by the world in that light. The Jap-

anese will be termed a great race of people. Japan will be considered a peaceful nation. I really feel deep in my heart that this is the way Japan can contribute to the world's culture.

Q. What about the Emperor?

A. I am an absolute supporter of the Emperor. The Emperor is the personification of ethics and morality. In a republican country the president is one of us. I couldn't bow my head and really respect such a person. But I don't respect the Emperor. I suppose you are also asking about the Emperor system, as this touches on the Emperor system, doesn't it? (Yes) I think it is a good system. Looking back, I realize that the Imperial Rule Assistance Association took advantage of the Emperor. The Tojo Gumbatsu used the Emperor system to their advantage. Tojo changed the role of the IRAA. It would have been all right if he had merely supported the Emperor. But he took control. If we could have a system or organ to cut off such men as Tojo, who grabbed control, that would be fine. This defect should be fixed. (Pause) Tojo was certainly contemptible, now that I look back.

Q. During the war, what did you think would be in store for you and your family, if Japan lost the war?

A. I thought that the Japanese race would be wiped out. Unconditional surrender was something beyond my imagination. I thought that we would truly fight on to the last man. Also, I heard that Americans were brutal. I heard that they ran over and killed the sick and wounded with tractors. I thought this was the truth.

Q. Did you know about American propaganda leaflets which were dropped during the war? What were the leaflets about? What did you think of it (them)?

A. I saw only two or three.

I don't remember exactly but . . . there was one that said that America was not such a fearful country, that she built such a thing as the St. Luke's Hospital when Japan was in need. (Any others?) The Saipan News (Saipan Jiho). I saw a newspaper called the Saipan News.

I half believed and half doubted. I believed the Japanese reports and announcements and yet I wondered if the other side's were true. When Japan had the advantage in the war, I believed our side, and when I thought it was becoming a disadvantage, I thought actual news was told.

Q. During the war, did you ever hear about any

anti-Japanese radio broadcasts? What did you hear? What did you think about it?

A. No. (Did you ever hear any stories about them from someone else?) Yes.

I don't remember. But I heard something about a broadcast from Saipan. (Do you remember anything about it?) No.

It was the same as the case with the propaganda leaflets. When I heard about them when Japan was at an advantage, I thought they were for the purpose of causing disturbance of the people's thoughts. When Japan was at a disadvantage, I thought actual news was told.

Q. During the war, did you think that your home town would be bombed or did you think it would be spared?

A. Before it was bombed, I thought it would not be bombed. (Why?) Until Saipan was taken, I didn't think we would be bombed. But when Saipan became a base, I thought bombing would come next. And it became a fact on March 10. My school was hit on that date.

Q. When the American planes bombed Japan, on which side did you feel the responsibility lay?

A. I thought it was concomitant of war. I didn't think of responsibility. I thought it was war and would follow war.

Q. How did you feel about the Americans, during the war?

A. I thought they were a race that was very strong in cruelty. As I mentioned previously, they ran over the sick and wounded. Also, I had heard that Americans were brutal because they took lunches to view lynchings at which whites poured gasoline over Negroes who had attacked white women. I thought they were strong in individualism. I thought at the beginning of the war that Americans were weak in war, as they were weak in their concept of nationalism.

Q. During the war, what did you think about the way the newspapers and the radios described the air raids on Japan?

A. I thought the truth was being announced. I thought that the Americans followed the principles of concealment and of announcing in piecemeal fashion. That is what we were told anyhow.

Q. Did you ever hear about the Americans announcing they were going to bomb cities before they actually did?

A. Yes, I heard that leaflets were dropped. (What did you think about it?) I was surprised that what was announced was done as announced. (What do you mean?) I was surprised at the strength shown

in bombing where Japan had built strong defenses. I thought it was a reckless way of bombing.

Q. What do you recall about the first time American planes flew over Japan?

A. I think it was on April 18, 1942. (Tell me more.) They flew low over my school and went on to Tokyo. (How did you feel?) I felt that they managed well to get in where Japan's defense net was well put up.

Q. In your opinion, how well was your home town protected against air raids?

A. It didn't amount to anything. I guess one can say there wasn't any, be it air-raid shelters or what. Holes were dug, that was all. The defense corps stood around in small numbers. As for military weapons, we had bamboo spears. We were instructed to use bamboo spears in case parachute troops landed. It was truly comical. We had absolutely nothing in the way of weapons. This is as regards this village. My school at Noruhoma was hit on March 10. So we built a fine air-raid shelter. I guess it was the most advanced of air-raid shelters in the village.

Q. What did you think about the atomic bomb?

A. I thought the war was lost. I think that

with the atomic bomb there will be no more wars. Naturally, it will not be Americans alone which will have the atomic bomb. If it is used, the world will be destroyed. I think, therefore, that war will have lost its meaning, and true peace will come.

Q. What bombing experiences have you personally had?

A. Yes, frequently.

Q. Can you tell me more about your experiences? (Tell me what happened, what you did, how you felt.)

A. From April there were air raids daily. I lived almost entirely in air-raid shelters. In accordance with the air-raid alert or air-raid alarm, I sent the children home. I went into the air-raid shelter and made preparation for incendiary bombs. There were no pumps to speak of. We made fire beaters of rope. I know it sounds funny. Japanese planes which were flying until then would disappear when the American planes appeared. And after the American planes went away, the Japanese planes appeared. And after the American planes went out later, people from Imperial Headquarters explained that this was to conserve planes for the "decisive battle on the homeland."

Appendix O

SAMPLE INTERVIEW

Personal Data

Woman, born in 1914.

Married—housewife. Husband, small factory owner.

Evacuated from Osaka to small near-by village, in anticipation of bombing—March 1944.

Interviewed 11 December 1945.

Responses

Q. In general, how are things going with you now?

A. After the war ended, things seem to have become more difficult for we didn't have enough rice. We have more children than the other families so this makes the situation more difficult. My husband takes lunch to work so this adds to the complication of trying to feed 4 children, myself, and my husband. Two of my elder children are going to school and are at the stage where they eat a lot.

Q. Do you feel you are better or worse off now than you were during the war?

A. It is better now but I feel that there ought to be some way of improving our lot. I was asked by my neighbors to come here and plead to you about trying to get a little more rice. During the war we had to undergo quite a bit of hardship, for we had to run in the bomb-shelter every time we had an air raid (with a child on my back). Thinking of winning this war, we worked hard and found some way of lasting up to now, but all the time our health was getting poorer. I'm sure the leaders of our country did not have to eat black rice nor go without charcoal so the rest of the people should not have undergone such hardship.

Q. What things worried you most during the war?

A. I was worried over the possibility of my husband's being drafted into the Army. If he had gone I don't know what I could have done because we have 4 children to take care of. I've seen many unfortunate families and I often times wondered if the same fate might not be right ahead of us. This was a terrifying thought. I began to think to myself why, why do we have to keep on fighting? As I look at the newspapers, I begin to realize the only reason why the leaders of our country started this war was to fatten their own purses.

Q. What sort of work were you doing, from the beginning of 1945 to the end of the war?

A. I was a housewife, taking care of my children and trying to find sufficient food for them. This was an all-day job, for I had to run here and there, trying to get a little food together. I had to go outside and buy food; this usually took all day. Going to the country and buying food is known as "kaidachi." The people in the city usually go out in the country about once a week and buy as much food as they can carry on their backs and come home.

Q. How was your working capacity during this period as compared with other years?

A. This year we had to undergo lots of air-raid alerts so we were unable to do very much. Evertime an air-raid alert sounded, the children came home from school so I had to prepare a little food and run out to the paddies because there were no adequate bomb shelters. I'm having great difficulty trying to keep my children clothed because I can't buy any clothing, my children are wearing the clothes that we wore. I've had to remake them but they don't last long because they are old to begin with. I can purchase some at the black market but they are too expensive. If it was only for myself we could buy a little, but since I have to buy for 4 others besides myself, it's impossible.

Q. During the war, what did you think Japan's greatest strength was?

A. I thought the Japanese people as a whole were filled with the great spirit to fight and die for the country. This spirit is known as the spirit of the Samurai. This is something that we are taught since we are kids—to have love for your country and Emperor.

Q. During the war, what did you think Japan's greatest weakness was?

A. Our air force; every time we had an air raid I began to wonder what happened to our air force because none of them rose to meet the enemy. Our ships were nowhere in sight. We were always told the time wasn't ripe to strike, so we waited. All the time we kept wishing they would strike soon.

Q. In regard to the way your leaders conducted the war, what did you think of it during the war?

A. We were mad all the time because somehow

we were being oppressed all the time, while the next-door people who were the police chief's family lived a life of luxury. I pitied the poor soldiers who died believing they were fighting for right and the preservation of Japan. The people who worked hard and tried to live rightly suffered the most. All the people that I knew hated our leaders and were disgusted with them. My husband was called into the police headquarters for minor offenses and pushed around here and there. It was really shameful.

Q. In regard to the way your leaders took care of the home front welfare, what did you think of it during the war?

A. Our leaders told us to work hard, cultivate every bit of land and grow as much as we could. The foods that were grown were taken away for rationing purposes; these were usually gobbled up by the upper class people. The farmers that did have enough hung on to them and sold them at black market prices. Those that did have time and money were able to live fairly well because it seems you can always buy the things you want if you are at the right place with money. All the small people who went out to buy rice in the country or who received some from their families in the country, had to be on guard all the time, for the police hung around the stations and caught all those who tried to bring rice into the city. I began to wonder if the police only caught the small-time operators and let the big ones go. Often times when we ladies got together we used to talk about Tojo and his cohorts, wondering what kind of clothes they wore and what kind of food they ate. We were darn sure it wasn't the kind that we ate.

Q. How did you feel about the changes in government during the war, at the time the changes occurred?

A. As the Cabinet changed I knew something was wrong and I felt quite uneasy. The Cabinet would not have changed if things were going according to plans. At the time when Tojo quit, his weaknesses were being pointed out by the people. They all expected him to die but he kept on living.

Q. Did the people's attitudes and conduct toward each other change during the war?

A. Yes, people seemed to have lost their kindness. I felt that people became more divided and did not care for the next man. This was caused by the lack of food. The comradely feeling was gone. The people have suffered greatly so I feel that it will take quite some time before the people will forget the horrors of the war.

Q. Did you think that all kinds of people in Japan suffered alike in the war?

A. No, there are many who suffered and many who profited greatly. We lost our factory in Osaka so this made our predicament very bad. I feel that those who lost their homes through bombing suffered the most. I feel that the local police forces in every city and community seemed to have fattened their purses at the expense of the smaller people by taking away their food. This is not only my feeling but the general feeling of all the people in Japan. The officers in the Army made money also. They had a very easy life, filled with parties and good food.

Q. As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?

A. Around 13 March when Osaka was bombed, and when Kobe, Sakai, and Wakayama were bombed. During this period the people in general began to feel uneasy; however, no one dared to voice this feeling because we were afraid of the police. My husband lost his little factory at this time and my sisters lost their entire possessions during this raid.

Q. When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?

A. No Japanese airplanes rose to meet the B-29s so I knew we had no chance of winning. Even at this time, a corner of me still had a little hope that something might come up at the final moment to turn the tide in our favor. I had this feeling because this was our country and we had never lost a war.

Q. Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war?

A. Yes, when they started to send out the Kamikaze Corps to fight off the enemy. When they used the Kamikaze Corps, I knew it was the last desperate effort on our part to ward off the enemy. Our warships were nowhere in sight. Around this time (April, May, and June) the rationing of rice decreased and we had to go hungry many times. On these occasions, when we were hungry, I had this feeling of giving up most of all.

Q. How did you feel when you heard that Japan had given up the war?

A. I worried greatly over the treatment we would receive at the hands of the Americans. I read that the German people did not have enough water so they were sucking on the pipes trying to get a drop of water. I thought we would all be in the same condition as the Germans.

Q. In regard to the policies taken by occupation-troop headquarters, how do you feel things are working out?

A. I have read in the papers that MacArthur is trying to import food and is trying to improve the lot of the people so I'm very grateful. To have this opportunity to talk to representatives of the occupation forces is something that has made me very happy. There were some soldiers stationed in our school close by and everyone of them was a gentleman and was very kind and generous.

Q. Now that the war is over, how do you think you and your family will fare in the next 2 or 3 years?

A. If this condition prevails we will come to our end, for my husband is not working at the present moment. The little money that we did save is fast disappearing and there seem to be no prospects of a job for my husband. The future to me is very dark and terrifying. The rich folks I'm sure can go on indefinitely but people like us, who have very little money will have to have help of some sort soon. We can manage to get along another year but, beyond that, the years look very dark.

Q. In your opinion, what changes should occur in Japan in the future?

A. I don't know much about the policies of the government but I would like to see the poor people given fair and equal treatment. If we can get a little more rice I'm sure the black market will disappear. Fruit and vegetables have been knocked off the rationing but since they are so expensive, it's impossible to buy them. Our life is so filled with trying to get enough food for the day that it makes thinking about any other thing almost impossible. Up to now we have never tried to farm so we are having a difficult time trying to grow a few things.

Q. What about the Emperor?

A. We have had him all this time and were brought up with the idea of revering and loving him, but when I think of the great powers he possesses, and the willingness of his subjects to obey him, he could have prevented this war if he wanted to. On the other hand, I feel sorrow for him because he has to be partly blamed for the loss of this war which is a mark on the history of Japan.

Q. During the war, what did you think would be in store for you and your family, if Japan lost the war?

A. We were told that we would be treated like slaves if we lost—so "fight and work hard—we must win this war, no matter what happens." I half

believed and half disbelieved what I read and heard, but there was no other source for me to rely on for information.

Q. Did you know about American propaganda leaflets which were dropped during the war? What were the leaflets about? What did you think of it (them)?

A. Yes, I heard that the leaflets wanted to know whether we had evacuated to the country. I also heard that such and such a place was going to be bombed. I did believe the leaflets, however, and I was afraid they were going to bomb the country villages once they got them filled. Even the common people like us marveled at the accuracy of the B-29s; they seemed to have hit all the big factories.

Q. During the war did you think that your home town would be bombed or did you think it would be spared?

A. We were afraid of being bombed so we moved out of Osaka city into Nagano. Every day I saw planes flying overhead. I thought they might drop a bomb because they flew so low over us. However I did hear that Americans were loathe to waste their ammunition on an inconsequential target, but I was still scared and ran out into the rice fields each time.

Q. When the American planes bombed Japan, on which side did you feel the responsibility lay?

A. Since we were at war I felt that it was natural that we should be bombed. I'm sure we would have bombed the U. S. if we had had an opportunity.

Q. How did you feel about the Americans, during the war?

A. We were told that Americans were very savage-like and everything American was abolished. They cut out teaching English at schools and barred anything that was made in America. Before the war we all thought American goods were far better than Japanese goods so we were greatly distressed to hear this. I personally did not think too much about the various things that were said about the Americans because I heard before the war that they were a very democratic and peaceful people.

Q. During the war, what did you think about the way the newspapers and the radios described the air raids on Japan?

A. During the bombing I thought that the newspapers tried their best to publish the truth. However, I did hear from several people that they were trying to minimize the truth. However, I did not believe so at that time.

Q. What do you recall about the first time American planes flew over Japan?

A. It was in April of 1942. That day we were on a picnic at a shrine, so I remember it quite clearly. That day, when I came home from the picnic, I heard that a plane flew past Osaka and dropped a bomb on Kobe. Up until then we were told that no enemy plane would be able to fly over Japan so when I heard of this plane disappearing after it dropped its bomb I grew quite uneasy. I began to wonder what was going to happen to Osaka if 100 planes came over. We were told to practice extinguishing incendiary flames with bucket relays. When I think about this I feel like a fool. After the first plane came over Kobe they were very strict about lights. When an air raid sounded, wardens checked all the lights saying if one tiny light showed, the whole community would be bombed. I believed all this and put out all the lights and tried to obey everything that was told to us. My husband

had to stop working to practice putting out fires. He was disgusted but all the neighbors did it so he had to do it so people wouldn't talk about him.

Q. In your opinion, how well was your home town protected against air raids?

A. After we left Osaka I heard that they tried to improve the bomb shelters; however, while we were there they did not have any bomb shelter that was worth entering. We were told to make bomb shelters with the available materials but they were very scant. I also heard that many people had died in home shelters so I was wary of them.

Q. What did you think about the atomic bomb?

A. I was scared of the atomic bomb and yet I admired the Americans for being able to create such a thing. I also thought Japan was indeed a foolish country to have waged a war against such a country.

Appendix P

SAMPLE INTERVIEW

Personal Data

Housewife, 65 years old.

Four years of schooling.

Religion—Sect Shinto.

Interviewed in suburb of Nagasaki, 16 November 1945.

Responses

Q. In general, how are things going with you now?

A. The problem that is uppermost in my mind is the food situation, but as my husband and I are old we don't need too much—the rationing is pretty slim but we are both around 70 years old so we haven't much more time to live. We have a niece living with us that adds to our comfort—I worry about my husband because he is partially invalid. I'm relieved the air raids are over; that was a strain on my nerves—especially trying to help my husband down to the shelters.

Q. Do you feel you are better or worse off now than you were during the war?

A. I feel pretty good now. (Why?) Well, the raids are over for one thing and my husband will become better, I hope. During the night when it rains it's bad for him to be in the shelter. We haven't really too much to worry about. We've lived a full life so it doesn't matter what happens to us now—I'm not as bad off as those with 2 or 3 children that have to worry about the food rationing.

Q. What things worried you most during the war?

A. My worry was for my husband. It was 3 years ago when he was attacked with paralysis and now one side of his body is lightly paralyzed. When there were air raids I had to carry him down to the shelters—sometimes when the raids were too often I used to cover him up with quilts and go to the shelter. Then I worried the most 'cause I was afraid he would be hurt from some debris or bomb.

Q. What sort of work were you doing, from the beginning of 1945 to the end of the war?

A. I was a housewife—I'm old now so I can't go out to work—my husband works in the post office and my niece works in a factory which helps us to get along.

Q. How was your working capacity during this period as compared with other years?

A. There was no change in my capacity. I did

the same old housework—and my health was good so I tried to run the house as before—the only difference was the lack of food that cut down the meals.

Q. During the war, what did you think was Japan's greatest strength in waging the war?

A. I thought that our spirit, which was to fight to the end, was our strength. The soldier will also fight to the end and the people will back him to the limit. Also, I heard constantly on the radio that our Air Force and Navy was stronger than America's and I believed that—we also brought out all our idols to pray to them for strength to wage war against America.

Q. During the war, what did you think Japan's greatest weakness was?

A. I always thought we didn't have any—I was convinced that we would win the war because I knew our spirit and the power of our Army could beat America—I always heard this over the radio.

Q. In regard to the way your leaders conducted the war, what did you think of it during the war?

A. I had confidence in our leaders as they were chosen by the Emperor and I am not going to say whether the leaders were wrong or not—they did their best and if they made some mistakes, I believe everyone does once in a while. At the time I believed every word they said. I felt we were winning to the last day of surrender—I listened to the radio nearly every day and I was convinced that they were doing their best.

Q. In regard to the way your leaders took care of the home front welfare, what did you think of it during the war?

A. At times I hoped for more services and welfare; it wasn't too much but the leaders were handicapped because they didn't have the material to aid the people. The rationing was a little hectic and also I suppose the leaders with money bought food from the black market—but also others did too.

Q. How did you feel about the changes in government during the war, at the time the changes occurred?

A. I always hoped that the government wouldn't change, especially when the war was going on. I thought that it was foolish to change at such a cru-

cial time—at times I thought it was due to the inefficiency of some of the leaders that caused the change, but I felt that it must be for the benefit of Japan that they chose another leader to lead us. New Plans would be announced over the radio after each change and I felt that each change would make Japan a greater fighting power.

Q. Did the people's attitudes and conduct toward each other change during the war?

A. Of course they would change—everyone became a little tense with nervousness. Each one was worrying about food and how to feed the family. I guess it was natural for them to worry about themselves, but we also tried to aid the war by obeying the rules.

Q. Did you think that all kinds of people in Japan suffered alike in the war?

A. I don't believe everyone suffered alike—the farmers and those above the common people had more to eat—the upper class could buy in the black market while those without money had to depend entirely upon rationing—people with children suffered the most.

Q. As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?

A. I had some doubts every time we were raided. I always thought if airplanes could fly over Japan we would have to fight hard—so when I heard about the Doolittle planes over Tokyo, I thought for a moment that we might lose if we didn't work and fight hard.

Q. When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?

A. I was only certain when the war ended—I was not sure until it ended. I listened to the radio and it seemed as if we were doing all right—of course if it wasn't for the atomic bomb the government would not have surrendered.

Q. Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war?

A. No. I felt downhearted and scared every time the planes came over, but I never thought I would quit fighting or praying for victory.

Q. How did you feel when you heard that Japan had given up the war?

A. Downhearted—but the soldiers suffered more than I did—they were the ones doing the actual battle. That night, after the announcement of surrender by the Emperor, the soldiers rode up and down the street yelling that there was no surrender and that we must fight on—but I had heard the radio and it was spoken by the Emperor, so I knew

that we had really surrendered. Then I felt that if we were to surrender now, why not before the atomic bomb? That was horrible—it would have saved thousands of lives if we had surrendered before that bomb fell, but then I didn't believe that we were actually losing until the announcement of surrender.

Q. In regard to the policies taken by occupation-troop headquarters, how do you feel things are working out?

A. They are working out much better than I thought. I was afraid at first of their treatment of us, but they are kind to children and cause no trouble among the people. I hear over the radio about the way MacArthur is running Tokyo but I don't think too much about it because it hasn't hit us yet—I hope they'll do something about the food situation.

Q. Now that the war is over, how do you think you and your family will fare in the next 2 or 3 years?

A. It will be bad for the whole country—to us, well we will manage—but Nagasaki was hit twice by typhoons which ruined our crops—my husband and I are old, so we won't live too many years but I know that next year will be a slim year.

Q. In your opinion, what changes should occur in Japan in the future?

A. That I can't say—I can't think that deeply. There should be changes I guess, but I don't know what.

Q. What about the Emperor?

A. He should be kept for the sake of the people—he was never wrong—he was the one who ended the war—I believe no one should touch our Emperor.

Q. During the war what did you think would be in store for you and your family, if Japan lost the war?

A. I always thought we would win but after the surrender rumors began to fly that the Americans would enslave the women and shame them and all the young girls left for some place also. But in a week they returned and I heard they felt foolish upon returning. I thought the older people like my husband and I would be killed. The radio and newspaper told us so, also the neighbors were all talking.

Q. Did you know about American propaganda leaflets which were dropped during the war? What were the leaflets about? What did you think of it (them)?

A. Never saw one—never picked one up—I heard that if Japan didn't surrender she would be buried to the ground—that's what one person told me was written on a leaflet. I thought it was just the usual rumor and didn't pay any attention to it.

Q. During the war, did you ever hear about any anti-Japanese radio broadcasts?

A. I did not hear any anti-Japanese radio broadcasts. I never heard it talked about by the neighbors either.

Q. During the war, did you think that your home town would be bombed or did you think it would be spared?

A. I thought it would be spared. I thought that our community would not be bombed because it is far from military points but it still scared us to see planes overhead.

Q. During the war, did you think that Japan would be bombed or did you think it would be spared?

A. First I thought it would be spared because I felt that America was far away and also we had a strong air force that could manage to protect us. When I heard about Tokyo, then I knew Nagasaki might be bombed, but I kept hoping it wouldn't be.

Q. When the American planes bombed Japan, on which side did you feel the responsibility lay?

A. I believe the responsibility lies with the Americans—war is war and soldiers must fight soldiers but to kill innocent children and people is bad—why, over at my sister's place in Yamanishi machi, they bombed all the residential districts and completely neglected the military points which were on the other side of the tracks—that is inhuman. Also the use of the atomic bomb was inhuman—all those lovely girls being cremated by the use of such a bomb!

Q. How did you feel about the Americans, during the war?

A. I thought they were inhuman—when they were killed, I was happy; when any of our soldiers were killed, I cried. At Okinawa my husband's two brothers died. They told me that Americans were savages, just wanting to kill and kill.

Q. During the war, what did you think about the way the newspapers and the radios described the air raids on Japan?

A. They reported fairly well. Of course sometimes I felt that it was colored because they said no planes were lost but I knew that some must have been lost in the battle.

Q. Did you ever hear about the Americans an-

nouncing they were going to bomb cities before they actually did? What did you think about it?

A. No I never heard about it. I never heard anyone talk about it.

Q. What do you recall about the first time American planes flew over Japan? What did you think about it?

A. It was the Tokyo raid by Doolittle—I felt a little doubtful whether we might win or lose this war. I felt that if they could bomb Tokyo they could bomb Kyushu easier. I was mad at first to hear some people were killed, but I was worried and mad that they didn't stop them from bombing Tokyo.

Q. In your opinion, how well was your home town protected against air raids?

A. Not good—I guess we were off from the city so we didn't need too much, but the shelters were only made from dirt and also there were no guns around us.

Q. What did you think about the atomic bomb?

A. It was horrible. I saw a bright light and then windows smashed and everything began to fly around. It was around 11:00 AM. My husband was standing outside and I was bathing him when it happened. He was all naked and we were astounded because just the flash and then the flying debris. My husband was cut on the face and head by flying glass, but I was fortunate.

Q. What bombing experiences have you personally had?

A. Only the atomic bomb's concussion—no other experiences in actual bombing—the atomic bomb was terrible—the people were burned and the town was burning after the flash—people were running toward our place with terrible burns (tears in her eyes). That night they slept on the roads everywhere—some collapsed during the day due to the effect of burns. People would stop by and ask for water which was the most urgent need of these people. They were so upset that they couldn't think of food. It was a horrible night—crying and screaming. I can't describe the burns (wiping her eyes) that were on these people and the odor of burning flesh was in the air. It was so awful you have to see it before you can actually describe or even talk about it—it's hard to comprehend. Some father, with his entire family dead, would be yelling to die so that he would not have to live alone.

Q. What kind of bombing do you think is worse—day or night?

A. Night bombing is worse than day. In the summer months the planes would come over around

11:00 PM and in the winter around 10:00 PM. Nights we lost sleep—and running around in the dark was horrible—especially hard for my husband.

Q. What kind of bomb do you think is worse—incendiary or explosive?

A. An incendiary can be extinguished, while the explosives can kill one easily. That explosive type is the most dangerous.

Q. Were you more and more afraid as the raids continued, or did you get used to them?

A. I got used to them. At first we used to get all excited and start running at the first warning, but afterwards we kept in the house until the last warning because we gradually could time the planes.

Q. How good were the special measures and welfare services after the raids?

A. We had good services for those bombed, in the school house; also for the injured we had certain things that aided them, such as medicine and bandages, and food for the children. The temple was used for children who lost their parents. We cared for them there until relations could come and get them.

Q. How much help did the people who were not bombed give to those who were?

A. People gave clothing but couldn't give goods because of the shortage—also from the country they gave a little food—helped out as best as they could. Some, of course, were shrewd but the majority did all they could to ease their worries and care for the sufferers.

Appendix Q

SAMPLE INTERVIEW

Personal Data

Man, 25 years old, single.

Welder in aircraft parts plant.

Interviewed in Osaka, 20 November 1945.

Responses

Q. In general, how are things going with you now?

A. I'm living with my Dad in the basement of a building. Just the basement is left; the rest of the building was burnt down in the air raids of August. Dad is paying the rent monthly by giving the landlord 10 cigarettes out of his rationed amount (90 cigarettes per month). Mom took my three younger brothers to evacuate in the country (Hyogo prefecture) and I miss her very much. Not knowing how to economize on household expenses, Dad and I are having a pretty tough time to make ends meet. I wish mother was back here to see and take care of us. Water seeps into the basement after a rain and rises sometimes to about a foot and half. It's very damp and filthy there and I know it's not good for our health, but we can't do anything about it cause we have no place to go, and in the first place we don't have the money to move.

Q. Do you feel you are better or worse off now than you were during the war?

A. I think it's worse off now. During the war, we had a somewhat easier time to make our living. Our rice ration amount was 2 go, 3 shaku instead of the present 2 go, 1 shaku and we were able to get more fresh vegetables too. I haven't tasted vegetables for about 4 months now. People whose houses were not bombed don't know the real feelings of us who lost everything in the air raids. They look upon us like we are beggars or bums and I don't know why. I feel very small.

Q. What things worried you most during the war?

A. What worried me most were the continuous air raids. After all, I like to live and it is natural that I didn't want to be killed by the bombings.

Q. What sort of work were you doing, from the beginning of 1945 to the end of the war?

A. I'm a welder at Hisaeda Bros. Aeronautical and Industrial Company, manufacturers of aeroplane parts and accessories. Products were delivered to Kawakami Aircraft Company. I worked from 7:30 AM to 6 PM making 1.50 yen.

Q. How was your working capacity during this period as compared with other years?

A. It was getting lower each day due to lack of food. We've tried to increase the efficiency by working every day but we couldn't keep it up. Our resistance couldn't keep it up. Our resistance couldn't stand the pace.

Q. How were your working conditions during this period?

A. The ventilating system of our plant was very poor and the heat was unbearable during summer. Things were dirty and unsanitary and I noticed myself that I was getting weaker. I think the productive capacity was at its lowest during this period. Employees would take days off to go out in the country to buy food from the farmers.

Q. Now, we were talking, a little while ago, about what you were doing from January 1945 to the end of the war. How many working days were you absent from your work during this period?

A. I was absent for about two weeks. Our home was burned down twice by air raids.

Q. During the war, what did you think was Japan's greatest strength in waging the war?

A. I learned through the press, radio and the president of our company that we had the unique and incomparable Kamikaze Corps. They were harrassing the enemy very much.

Q. During the war, what did you think Japan's greatest weakness was?

A. Black market racketeering. I should say that 7 out of 10 persons were unpatriotic and were dealing more or less behind our backs. It was disgusting.

Q. In regard to the way your leaders conducted the war, what did you think of it during the war?

A. I thought they were doing all right because we were told that battle after battle was won by our armed forces, especially the Navy.

Q. In regard to the way your leaders took care of the home front welfare, what did you think of it during the war?

A. I didn't think that they were doing a good job. Seeing the merchants and policemen not suffering of food shortages, I thought there must be some surplus somewhere and was wondering why we couldn't get our share too. Furthermore, the

authorities didn't take good care of air raid sufferers.

Q. How did you feel about the changes in government during the war, at the time the changes occurred?

A. I thought that the changes of government meant that some members of the Cabinet couldn't stand firmly on their feet against stress or stick to their opinions and policy. Frequent changes meant that we didn't have some one who could be trusted by everyone. In another word, the failure of Japan.

Q. Did the people's attitudes and conduct toward each other change during the war?

A. Stealing and robberies became numerous. Clerks in the bank became arrogant and unkind. I've noticed more among the women. I don't know why. Streetcar operators (women) would cuss up and down to old men or women and sometimes it made me so mad that I felt like punching her nose.

Q. Did you think that all kinds of people in Japan suffered alike in the war?

A. I've seen directors of companies and government officials so drunk that they could hardly walk and I knew that they were leading a life of luxury. A guy couldn't get drunk unless he had enough to eat, I think. Merchants usually have something in their hands to barter with, but not us. All we had to do is to say to ourselves that it couldn't be helped cause we weren't born rich or well-to-do.

Q. As the war wore on, did you ever begin to have doubts that Japan would win?

A. When black markets started to flourish, and still noticing the diminishing efficiency in production, I started to doubt Japan's victory.

Q. When did you first feel certain that Japan could not attain sure victory?

A. When the B-29s would come over our city boldly, by the hundreds in daytime, and would not meet any opposition, I knew then that we were sunk.

Q. Did you at any time during the war come to a point where you felt you could not go on with the war?

A. People used to say "The hundred million would prefer defeat to dishonor," or "shoot the works," but I doubt if half of the people were thinking that way. In my opinion I can't die in honor unless my stomach is full.

Q. How did you feel when you heard that Japan had given up the war?

A. I learned the news by reading the paper that night of August 15th. I felt miserable and wretched because what I did and endured these long years

of sacrificing burst like a bubble. I couldn't sleep that night. I was broken hearted, and still I couldn't cry.

Q. In regard to the policies taken by occupation-troop headquarters, how do you feel things are working out?

A. Things are working out all right so far. It is rumored that MacArthur is trying to help the air-raid sufferers by giving them food and clothing in Tokyo. I believe he understands our situation more than some of our own people. He should be here in Japan for some time to give his help in rebuilding our country because I doubt if there is any one among our present leaders who possesses as much ability as he does.

Q. Now that the war is over, how do you think you and your family will fare in the next 2 or 3 years?

A. If this black market keeps on going wide open and these inflated prices are not curbed, I know my family's savings will be exhausted in the very near future and we will die of hunger sooner or later.

Q. In your opinion, what changes should occur in Japan in the future?

A. We should forget that we had a war once with America. Promote and encourage importing and exporting.

Q. What about the Emperor?

A. He should be left on the throne. He is a living god to me sometimes, and I like to think that he is a human as we are sometimes. It puzzles me so much that I can't make up my mind which to believe—god or human. Maybe we have thought him a god too much.

Q. During the war, what did you think would be in store for you and your family, if Japan lost the war?

A. We were told by the radio and press that males—from babies to 65 years old—would be murdered, and all the women and girls would be molested. I believed it.

Q. Did you know about American propaganda leaflets which were dropped during the war? What were the leaflets about? What did you think of it (them)?

A. The president of our company found one and showed it to us. The flowery city of Kyoto will be left last. I didn't think that we would lose this war so I didn't pay any attention to the remarks in the leaflets.

Q. During the war, did you ever hear about any anti-Japanese radio broadcasts?

A. No—none at all.

Q. During the war did you think that your home town would be bombed or did you think it would be spared?

A. Yes, Osaka is one of the six largest cities in Japan and also is the industrial center of Japan. We had numerous war plants here.

Q. When the American planes bombed Japan, on which side did you feel the responsibility lay?

A. On Japan—because Japan didn't have the power to defend herself.

Q. How did you feel about the Americans during the war?

A. Cold-blooded, inhuman fiends!

Q. During the war, what did you think about the way the newspapers and the radios described the air raids on Japan?

A. They were reporting things too vaguely and ambiguously to suit me. I believed that the extent of damages announced by the radio and press was minimized just not to weaken the people's minds.

Q. Did you ever hear about the Americans announcing they were going to bomb cities before they actually did? What did you think about it?

A. A scout plane would fly over a city warning when American bombers would raid next by dropping leaflets and at the same time taking pictures, and sure enough on that day, they'd come in large formation. When I saw this—what could I do but believe?

Q. What do you recall about the first time American planes flew over Japan?

A. When I learned through the press that the first American planes flew over Tokyo very low and machine-gunned several hundred public school children, it made me boiling mad. I was very glad to hear that one of the planes was knocked down.

Q. In your opinion, how well was your home town protected against air raids?

A. It is like a toy. I feel very foolish to think that I've spent considerable time in air-training (practice bucket-relaying). Most of our air-raid wardens weren't there when actual bombings occurred. Can't blame them, because it's too terrifying to be in the midst of it.

Q. What did you think about the atomic bomb?

A. Even a small explosive can do a lot of damage. When I learned that a single bomb has a destructive power equivalent to 2,000–50,000 bombs, it made me shudder with fear. On the other hand, I realized how far back we were behind in science to keep

up with the rest of the world.

Q. What bombing experiences have you personally had?

A. About 20 to 30 times the surroundings of our factory were raided. Our home was burnt down first by an incendiary bomb. After moving to another place, the same thing happened and I was forced to move where I'm living now. Mother took my three younger brothers and evacuated into the country after the second one.

Q. Can you tell about your experiences? (Tell me what happened, what you did, how you felt.)

A. It sounded like a heavy shower pouring down. I ran into the shelter and stayed in there. I found out that my home was just a ball of fire when I came out. The sky was full of black smoke and it was like a dark night. I moved into a shack which was saved from burning and we had to borrow even chopsticks from the neighbors, as all our belongings were gone. I was awake all night, feeling miserable and lonesome.

Q. What kind of bombing do you think is worse—day or night?

A. Night air raids. American planes, especially the B-29s, usually drop an illuminating bomb which breaks into 5 streams of bright purple-bluish light, giving the bombardier the chance to drop explosives. The humming sound of explosives coming down is something indescribable.

Q. What kind of bomb do you think is worse—incendiary or explosive?

A. Explosives. The concussion of an explosive alone can kill a person. Internal injuries cause death.

Q. Were you more and more afraid as the raids continued, or did you get used to them?

A. About every 3 days, American planes would raid us and we got used to it—but still, I didn't feel so good to know that one of these days, I'm going to be counted as one of their victims.

Q. How good were the special measures and welfare services after the raids?

A. We were sent to a school temporarily for shelter and lived there for 10 days. A bag of dried bread or one rice-ball was given to us, per person per day. No clothes or quilts were provided.

Q. How much help did the people who were not bombed give to those who were?

A. All they said was "We are sorry for your misfortunes" and we didn't receive any help from anyone, anywhere.

Appendix R

PATTERNS OF CLEAVAGE

Japanese propaganda, indoctrination, and thought control acted more strongly upon some elements of society than upon others. Which group was most affected depended upon the morale component under consideration, but there is evidence that, in general, the younger, the more ignorant, and the female segments tended to have greater confidence in victory than the more mature, the more educated, or the men. Indeed, these latter elements even lost confidence in victory earlier.²

As far as the social solidarity aspect of morale goes, however, while more dissension is evident among the more educated and men—in line with their lower confidence in victory—the younger people also display relatively weaker social cohesion.

Confidence in victory

NEVER DOUBTED THAT JAPAN WOULD WIN

Age	Men Percent	Women Percent	Education (years)	Percent
16-29	11	15	0-5	13
30-44	3	15	6	13
45-70	10	11	7-8	13
			9-11	9
			Over 12	

NEVER CERTAIN THAT JAPAN COULD NOT WIN

Age	Men Percent	Women Percent	Education (years)	Percent
16-29	32	34	0-5	20
30-44	19	29	6	29
45-70	18	24	7-8	28
			9-11	29
			Over 12	20

¹ For the questions on which the data of this appendix are based, see Chapter 3.

² Approximately twice as many men over thirty years of age as under thirty had doubts of victory by June 1944 and were certain that Japan couldn't win by March 1945. The same ratio tends to hold true when comparing the most with the least educated, and men with women.

Social Solidarity

CRITICAL OF HOME FRONT LEADERSHIP

Age	Men Percent	Women Percent	Education (years)	Percent
16-29	72	57	0-5	46
30-44	76	58	6	56
45-70	65	44	7-8	66
			9-11	62
			Over 12	77

CRITICAL OF WAR LEADERSHIP

Age	Men Percent	Women Percent	Education (years)	Percent
16-29	43	33	0-5	24
30-44	49	32	6	30
45-70	40	24	7-8	38
			9-11	39
			Over 12	61

LESS GROUP UNITY

Age	Men Percent	Women Percent	Education (years)	Percent
16-29	54	49	0-5	26
30-44	54	44	6	36
45-70	41	26	7-8	46
			9-11	56
			Over 12	68

INEQUALITY OF SUFFERING

Age	Men Percent	Women Percent	Education (years)	Percent
16-29	48	47	0-5	24
30-44	50	40	6	33
45-70	40	25	7-8	42
			9-11	57
			Over 12	62

The popular stereotype of the meek submissiveness of the young daughter of the household and of women generally is not reflected by the testimony they gave in response to the question: "How did you feel about the Americans, during the war?"

Negative reactions to Americans during war

Age	Men Percent	Women Percent	Education (years)	Percent
16-29	37	55	0-5	24
30-44	29	42	6	38
45-70	26	33	7-8	40
			9-11	50
			Over 12	40

The mature men (30-44 years) and the well-educated seem to have been especially affected by military losses:

Proportions who became certain Japan couldn't win because of military losses

Age	Men Percent	Women Percent	Education (years)	Percent
16-29	23	15	0-5	11
30-44	28	16	6	14
45-70	18	10	7-8	18
			9-11	22
			Over 12	27

They apparently had the background to interpret far-off defeats, whereas more of the old, the ignorant, and the women needed a cascade of fire bombs to awaken them. The Kempei and special higher police were well advised to have watched particularly the morale of the highly educated.

The significance of an individual's own interest—of his stake in society—has been discussed in Chapter 6; when it was indicated that fewer of the intelligentsia than of other occupational groups say

that they were willing to quit the war. The same holds true for the relatively well-educated who, of course, tend to be coordinate with the intelligentsia. Although they appear least confident of victory, least trustful of leadership and of their fellows, they also seem least willing to give up. This clearly appears to be a function of the status that goes with education, and not age or sex.³

Never reached a point of unwillingness to go on with the war

Age	Men Percent	Women Percent	Education (years)	Percent
16-29-----	31	35	0- 5	20
30-44-----	23	28	6	23
45-70-----	26	24	7- 8	30
			9-11	35
			Over 12	42

The discrepancy between generally lower morale and lack of confidence and yet more extensive willingness to go on with the war is only superficially paradoxical, when the economic position of the more highly educated is considered. In Japan, as elsewhere in the world, the number of years of schooling is closely related to economic and occupational status. While the impact of the events and experiences of the war was greatest on those with the greatest access to information and capacity for interpretation, yet these same people, who reacted most negatively to Americans, had the most to lose by surrender—prestige, position, and power. At the same time economic conditions, so crucial in an individual's willingness to give up, hit them less. More than five times as many of the most poorly educated as of the best educated said that consumer shortages brought them to the point of unwillingness to go on with the war, for example.

Even before the aerial bombardment, the war had put intense pressure upon the social structure of Japan. With the destruction and dislocation resulting from bombing, the patterns of cleavage in that society began to appear. In accordance with their training and their interest, people's ideas and

³ Comparisons of intelligentsia and highly educated people with other groups must take into account their greater verbal articulateness. The "upper" educational and occupational groups gave the least "Don't know" and "No answer" responses. The differences for "No answer" were lower than for "Don't know". In the latter case, the median difference between the "Upper" groups and the groups giving the greatest porportion of "Don't know" responses in each cross-tabulation was 5 percent.

attitudes began to grow apart.

The men differed from the women.

The young differed from the old.

The educated differed from the uneducated.

The rich differed from the poor.

Naturally these cleavages were not complete: there were always some illiterates who agreed with university graduates; alignments varied from one problem to another. But the general effect of the war, as it attained its climax, was to widen the gaps between social groups in Japan. In the words of a business man:

The war in fact, like all wars, was a world of many wars in itself. It was not only a war between East and West and a war against the Western powers, but it was particularly a struggle within Japan, between the Army and the civilians such as the business community, between the liberals and the nonwesternized people, between young and old, and between persons, for example, with some education and those with none.

The educated lost faith in everything. No amount of propaganda syrup could take the brown taste of cynicism from their mouths. In overwhelming numbers they rejected the patriotic pap laddled out by government. Japanese home front propaganda efforts sustained the morale of the ignorant for a long time and women remained loyal to the proper ideology as befit their place. But events spoke louder than words.

Age, Sex, Education. The data so far presented contain enough disparity on critical points between age, sex, and educational groupings to indicate that the three variables show a considerable extent of independent effect. The following table presents their relationship, in the sample.

Age, sex and education of sample subjects

Education	16—29 years		30—44 years		45—70 years	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
0-5 years	3	3	9	11	37	61
6 years---	8	16	23	33	17	15
7-8 years	43	33	45	30	29	14
9-11 years	34	42	13	22	10	7
Over 12 years	12	6	10	4	7	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Appendix S

EVACUATION AND COMMUNITY LIFE

Effects of Evacuation upon Family Members Left Behind

Evacuation of millions cannot occur without producing effects upon other than the actual participants. Although Chapter 7 indicated that the majority of respondents left by complete families, if one adds to the adult evacuees the huge numbers of children who were sent away in groups, probably only about half the evacuation was by complete families. A great many families lost one or more members through evacuation, and among respondents in urban areas there were between 10 and 15 percent who had remained behind while some or all other family members left.

These latter people were asked to answer a special set of questions concerning evacuation and they have, furthermore, been compared with the general urban population on a number of points.

Unlike evacuees, they were predominantly male; the percentage falling into the middle-aged classification is also far greater. Furthermore, a greater proportion are married: undoubtedly this is because of their higher age. In education, this selected group is superior to the remaining urban people. This may well be due to their male predominance. Such, in brief, is the major composition of the group; middle-aged married men, reasonably well educated. It was mainly a group of family heads who sent their families away, the complement to the evacuee group.

In almost half of all cases, they sent their families away because of fear of possible bombing of their community, but a sixth did so because their houses had already been destroyed or damaged by bombing.¹ A rather special group, accounting for more than a fourth, is made up of those whose children had left because their schools were evacuated to the country.

Two-thirds said that the evacuated members of their households left voluntarily.² It was not necessarily the bombings experienced by these families before evacuation which persuaded them to leave. About half of the respondents had had no experi-

ence with actual bombing before they sent their families away³

Comparative bombing experience of those who evacuated themselves and those who sent their families away¹

	Evacuees	Sent family away
	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Percent</i>
No bombing experience.....	41	51
One raid only.....	31	16
More than one raid.....	18	19
Experienced raids, number unspecified.....	9	9
No answer.....	1	5
	100	100

¹ This table refers only to experience before evacuation.

Evacuees who left in complete family groups seem to have been ready to leave after undergoing just one raid, though they usually waited that long (Chapter 7). Those who sent their household members away, however, more often than not did not wait for the first bombing to take place. As a typical father said:

Yes, they left voluntarily. My children were young, so my wife and I decided that she and they would evacuate together.

The proportion of evacuees who left because their houses had been destroyed is three times as great as the proportion of those remaining behind who sent away family members (48 percent as against 16 percent). This indicates fear of the future, rather than actual disaster, as the motive for splitting up one's family, on the part of the greater number who remained behind. If they did wait, however, one bombing was usually not enough: those who had experienced two raids are more numerous than those who had experienced one. There appear to be two types among those who sent their families away: a large, prudent group, and a smaller, but very stubborn one. Those who were not at first afraid for their families needed at least two narrow escapes from disaster before they were willing to take action. One such father was described by his evacuee daughter:

At first it was not so frightening, but from November the raids increased and incendiaries and explosive bombs began dropping. I felt that we had to evacuate, but my father was

¹ The question was: "Why did members of your family leave (name of community)?"

² The question was: "Did the members of your household leave voluntarily or were they forced to go?"

³ The question was: "What bombing experience did you have before the members of your household left?"

stubborn and said that whether we evacuated or not, we would eventually be either killed or burned out. He said that it was not good to evacuate.

She finally left in March.

Usually all the members of the household were sent away to the same place.⁴ Aside from those who sent away only one person—usually a school child—less than an eighth sent family members to different places, and a third of these were reunited before the end of the war. The feeling was very strong that the family must be kept together as much as possible. Since the composition of the group under discussion is so strongly male, middle-aged, and married, we can only conclude that those whom they sent away were usually their wives and children, with an occasional parent; this also agrees with the composition of the evacuee group itself.

There is considerable agreement between evacuees themselves, and their family members left behind, in the specification of complaints with regard to the living conditions in refuge areas.⁵ One third of each group complained of food shortages or poor rationing, for instance. However, on the whole, the number of complaints by those left behind tends to be smaller than by evacuees; and they cite advantages more frequently. In some cases, parents were careful to see that there should be no cause for complaint. One father told interviewers:

Since we brought gifts to the place where our daughters were staying, and since we took turns taking food, they did not suffer unduly from lack of food and attention.

But such prudence was uncommon: most people in cities did not know too much about how their evacuated families were getting along, and it seems plausible to suppose that evacuees attempted to avoid writing unhappy letters to the folks back home. Some lack of detailed knowledge about conditions in refuge areas by those at home is indicated by their ideas about the treatment of evacuees in such places.⁶ However, the great majority said that the reception of their evacuated family members was good in confirmation of the statements of evacuees themselves. The proportionate distribution of cheerful and gloomy reactions is almost identical among those who went and those who stayed home.

Dependence upon family ties is confessed by people who evacuated their families much more fre-

⁴ The question was: "Did your entire household go to the same place?" (Chapter 7).

⁵ The question was: "How was your household's livelihood in the place in which they went?"

⁶ The question was: "How were the members of your household treated in the place to which they were evacuated?"

quently than by evacuees: almost twice as many of them confessed to depression caused by the disruption in family ties, and in addition many worried about the health and safety of those from whom they were separated.⁷ But, on the whole, those who stayed behind were less frequently depressed and more often relieved, than were evacuees. The major reason for this was that it relieved their anxiety about the safety of family members; almost one-third spoke of this as a worthwhile result of evacuation, although only one-seventh of the evacuees themselves said that they deemed their refuge areas an advantage, at the time of evacuation. So relief from worry counterbalanced depression because of family disruption.

Reactions to evacuation of those who evacuated family members¹
Percent

Gloomy-reactions:	
Depressed by disruption of family life	30
Worried about health or safety of evacuees	11
Other gloomy reactions	22
Other reactions:	
Relieved from worry about family safety	30
Resigned and ambivalent reactions—it was war	17
Other optimistic reactions—assured safety of family heirs, better livelihood in evacuation area, etc.	17
	127

¹ The question was: "Could you explain to me in a few words how you felt about the evacuation of your household?"

However, realization of the necessity, or even of the benefits, of evacuation for one's family does not imply high morale, and feelings about the war of those left behind show this.⁸ According to one mother:

I thought that the reason my loving son had to evacuate was because the government started a useless war, and I felt rather dissatisfied.

In comments on this subject, the family members, left behind, are in close agreement with the evacuees themselves, although a slightly smaller number expressed hatred of the war, or the wish it hadn't begun. War began to seem pretty futile to them.⁹

There were some very practical results of this family disruption. It led, among other things, to an increase in absenteeism. Those who sent their families to the country or to another city were gain-

⁷ The question was: "Could you explain to me in a few words how you felt about the evacuation of your household?"

⁸ The question was: "How did you feel about the war at the time that members of your family left?"

⁹ In reporting about reactions at the time of their family's evacuation, about 10 percent report some confidence in victory, and about 13 percent more made neutral statements. Thus the bulk reported such feelings as hatred of war, certainty of defeat, etc.

fully employed in a much higher proportion than were other urban respondents (75 percent as against 57 percent). Of those who were so employed, fewer (7 percent less) claim never to have been absent from work than among other urban workers, while a similarly larger percentage admit that they took off 15 days or more.¹⁰ Such an excess in absenteeism need not be attributed to lack of patriotism, but simply to the added difficulties of living and the attraction of a visit to one's family in the country competing with the urge to work. As a metal worker said: "I took off ten days for my family evacuation . . ." But the effect upon production would be the same, whatever the motive for absenteeism. Activities of this sort were particularly noticeable in large cities like Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, etc. One of the Domei reports, quoted in Chapter 7, lists among others—such as traffic troubles, lack of sleep, interruption of electricity, injuries, and damages—evacuation as the cause of decline in attendance and production rates following air attacks.

Subjective factors—worry, defeatism, etc.—lowered the working capacity of those who had sent members of their families away, by their own statement, in a greater number of cases than among other urban people.^{11 12} The admitted depression resulting from sending away one's family seems to have contributed its effects upon working capacity as well as days spent at work. In the words of one:

Every air-raid warning upset me so that the efficiency of my work decreased. I would worry about my (evacuated) children, about bombing, and as the warnings increased, it became more and more disturbing.

Nor was this the only way in which their attitude was not helpful to the Japanese war effort. Criticism of home-front leadership, for example, and skepticism concerning group cohesion, are voiced by a greater proportion of those who had evacuated family members than by other urban non-evacuees, or even by evacuees themselves.

Evacuation of one's family apparently is every bit as likely to shake a man's faith in these two vital aspects of social relations as one's own evacuation. To be sure middle-aged men, the particular group which is most over-represented among those who sent their households to the country, are

¹⁰ The question was: "Now, we were talking a little while ago about what you were doing from January 1945 to the end of the war. How many working days were you absent from your work during that period?"

¹¹ The question was: "How was your working capacity during this period (1945) as compared with other years?"

¹² For every three gainfully employed urban persons who reported that subjective factors lowered their work capacity, there were four of those whose families had evacuated.

Attitudes toward home-front leadership and group cohesion of evacuees, of those who sent away families, and of other urban people

	Urban	Evacuees	Sent family away
	Percent	Percent	Percent
Critical of home front leadership ¹	61	65	69
Less group cohesion and unity ²	47	54	56

¹ The question was: "In regard to the way your leaders took care of the home front welfare, what did you think of it during the war?"

² The question was: "Did the people's attitude and conduct toward each other change during the war?"

among the most critical of home-front leadership and low in faith in the group. The opinions expressed by our respondents may then be a function of their age-sex composition: or the criticism by middle-aged urban men may be partly due to the fact that so many of them evacuated their families.

Those who sent their families out of the city believed in the equality of suffering of all Japanese slightly more frequently than those who did not, and considerably more often than among evacuees.¹³ From their accounts of their feelings about evacuation, and from their age-sex composition, one might suppose that the contrary would have been the case. Possibly this statement was made as a reaffirmation of faith after the criticism which they had indulged in during the series of questions previous to this.

In their reaction to the end of the war, fewer of those who sent relatives away than of other urban nonevacuees show strong morale.¹⁴ It is, of course, what one would anticipate among those who had shown how reluctantly, and under what stress, they had parted from their families. Relief at the possibility of reunion is to be expected, and perhaps especially among a group whose confidence in victory, as shown by the Confidence in Victory Index, is so low (Appendix L). In this index, those who had sent their families away showed less confidence than other urban nonevacuees, or even than evacuees themselves. Middle-aged men, as a rule,

Confidence in victory of those who evacuated members of their families, compared to that of other groups

	Urban	Evacuees	Sent family away	Middle-aged urban men
	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
High confidence	23	20	20	16
Medium confidence	31	31	26	27
Low confidence	46	49	54	57

¹³ The question was: "Did you think that all kinds of people in Japan suffered alike during the war?"

¹⁴ The question was: "How did you feel when you heard that Japan has given up the war?"

however, appear to have even less confidence than the group who evacuated their families. The responsibility of caring for a family, whether evacuated or not, seems to be enough to lower confidence in victory.

In general, morale, as measured by the Morale Index, of those whose families evacuated are lower than urban or even than rural people, but not so low as are evacuees. This may in part be due to their age-sex composition, for middle-aged men in cities generally tend to have very low morale, just as they have little confidence in victory. The breadwinners, with reason, tend to be professional pessimists.

Morale index of those who sent families away

	Urban	Evacuees	Sent family away	Middle-aged urban men
Relatively higher morale-----	51	43	46	34
Relatively lower morale-----	49	57	54	62

Sending one's family away was bad enough, but sending one's children was even worse.¹⁵ Sending either appears to have had very deleterious effects upon morale, which are more noticeable in confessed behavior than in speaking of symbols or ideas which have value for a well indoctrinated Japanese. This is of course typical of the decline in Japanese morale in general. Despite a continued use of the same words with almost as great frequency, people's behavior became such as to make more difficult the prolongation of the war.

More General Effects upon the Partly Deserted Cities

This decline in morale, as evidenced by behavior, was bound to have its effect upon the communities left by evacuees. The families which they left behind comprised a large proportion of the remaining population, probably up to a fifth. And the departure of the evacuees had already created a large gap in the labor and defense forces. During the first and second phases of evacuation, the communities from which evacuees came did not suffer noticeable. This was because the evacuation of city residents was confined to those who were designated as unimportant to the city defense. Evacuation was carried out in order to strengthen the city defenses against air attack, and the first groups involved in the evacuation order were elementary

school children, pregnant women, the aged, and the invalids. From the standpoint of utility and defense, the evacuation of these people could not have had any direct effect on the community, even though it had its discouraging effects upon families left behind.

In the last phase of the evacuation, particularly after 10 March 1945, the evacuation created, immediately, serious problems in production and labor. As bombed-out victims were allowed to evacuate, many thousands of factory workers left the cities and their jobs when the fires wiped out the residential areas.

In the essential factories in cities surrounding Kobe, such as Amagasaki, Nishinomiya, and Akashi, the attendance rate of the workers commuting from Kobe dropped enormously due to evacuation, fear of air raids, and the disruption of transportation, according to the local police chief. The chief of police in Akita ken in his report stated that:

After the actual air raid on Akita ken, the working spirit of the employees in industrial plants was lost because of their concentration on preparing for their family evacuation and the disposition of their household goods.

The intensification of evacuation also created a shortage in labor in other fields. In Kobe, for example, there were 5,500 port stevedores before the first large air raid, but immediately before the end of the war, that number was reduced to 2,500; the number of carpenters fell from 1,800 to 598; laborers from 4,500 to 2,175; and other types of workers fell in similar proportions. Similar trends were found in other bombed cities.

The evacuation, in the last phase, crippled what was left of the means to combat the fires caused by incendiary bombs. When the government gave up a serious attempt to fight raids after March 1945, the reason lay in the fact that with the wholesale evacuation of hundreds of thousands of citizens who lost their homes in the fire, the fire-fighting organizations, formal and informal, such as the Tonari-Gumi, had become completely disrupted. Aside from the regular fire departments, the Tonari-Gumi were about the only effective units in the city defenses. Now, due to the evacuation of so many members from each unit, they lost their effectiveness completely.

Evacuation, then, had not only direct morale effects upon the families of evacuees, but, by the time it reached wholesale proportions, immediate and practical effects upon entire communities. Not only were family ties severed, so also work relationships and the official chain of command. The de-

¹⁵ Based on a special analysis of those whose children evacuated but who themselves remained in cities.

parture of so many people, although in all probability the only solution in the face of the destruction of housing facilities, was one which could only postpone, not prevent, the final dissolution of community life. There was not only an immediate and direct morale depressing effect, but a material disruption which led, in its turn, to other morale depressing conditions. This effect of evacuation is further discussed in the following section.

Evacuation Effects on Organizational Efficiency And Physical Necessities

Transportation. Since bombing attacks, up till the end of the war, had not been directed specifically at railroads in Japan, land transportation within the country remained in operating condition. Because of the vigorous and effective attack upon shipping and harbors, however, the burden placed upon railroads had become heavy by the spring of 1945. During the preceding year, over 2,000,000 people had left the great cities without causing any undue dislocations, although a great many special trains had to be run, and numerous evacuees spoke of having had to wait hours at stations in order to board trains, or of having to stand for hundreds of miles after getting aboard. A woman respondent evacuated Tokyo in "fear of further bombing," and went to Akita. Describing her feelings at the time of evacuation, she said:

I was feeling very miserable as I was waiting to board the train. I had my belongings with me. I worked all day long to pack things, and then in order to board the night train at ten, I went to the station at nine in the morning. I had to stand in line all that time. I couldn't leave the place for fear of losing my belongings. The train was crowded, and I had a hard time trying to get in. I stood all the way to Akita; I couldn't even move.

Experiences like these did not encourage anyone to evacuate unless there was a serious necessity to do so; but, on the other hand, they did not put a stop to evacuation; most evacuees simply did not travel very far from their cities of origin.

The mass flight to the country which began after the first March raid on Tokyo, however, presented a problem of a different order to the authorities. It became impossible for all the refugees to leave the great cities by train, and hundreds of thousands left on foot, carrying what they could, or pushing carts loaded with whatever belongings they had left. Fortunately for the evacuees, the transportation system radiating out from Tokyo is excellent, and many were able to evacuate by trolley car to near-by towns and villages. Those who sought haven in more distant places, because of the presence there of some friend or relative, were numerous

enough, however, to swamp the railway system. Not only passenger trains but even freight trains were diverted for the exclusive use of those fleeing the cities. But millions were so anxious to leave the cities that they endured any hardship to escape. As one Japanese said:

It was like going to one's death riding on the crowded train. But as long as I was going to die anyway, I wanted to be with my mother when the time came. I felt as though I wasn't alive anymore.

The demand for transportation workers increased, while the efficiency of those already employed in the business declined. Under such pressure, their discipline seems to have relaxed, for the Transportation Ministry had to remind them of their duties, of the importance of politeness and cleanliness. The physical effects upon the trains of overuse and overcrowding seem to have been very bad, too, bringing the railway system just that much closer to collapse. Perhaps the greatest difficulty was the tendency of people—quite naturally—to leave in waves, rather than in a constant stream. After each great fire raid, thousands, not only of the homeless but also of the fearful, crowded into the railway stations. It meant a practical ban on traveling, except for the refugees, for a period of some days after each raid. The government continued to struggle to restore order to the evacuation system, but the fact that utter chaos did not occur is the only sign of any success in its efforts. Even that was a noteworthy achievement.

Housing. It is impossible to shift almost a quarter of the urban population to new localities without causing a strain upon housing facilities. Inns, abandoned business quarters, schools, and temples were made available to evacuees in very many places. Sometimes new houses, or at least barracks, were erected. This, however, was much easier to do in the case of people who came in groups, such as students, than when individual families or parts thereof came flooding into the countryside. In some cases vacant homes were found: evacuees from Tokyo to Yamagata, for instance, sometimes occupied quarters vacated by evacuees from Yamagata. There were many more cases, however, of rooms vacated by the departure of a war worker or a soldier, and into such cramped quarters millions of evacuees had to move. Perhaps 80 percent of them eventually found refuge with friends and relatives, according to information obtained in the sample interviews, but the rest moved into the homes of strangers.

There was already a housing shortage in Japan.

The war made materials and labor scarce, so that even repairs were difficult to obtain. Japanese housing is not of a lasting type, although under normal conditions it is easy, quick and cheap to construct, so this difficulty added to the problem. In the words of a village mayor:

Particularly since last autumn, due to the bombing of cities, houses were burned and caused a housing shortage. In addition, bombed-out victims came from the cities, and evacuees relocated in succession to the countryside, and it was a problem to clothe and feed these people.

And a policeman said:

Evacuated people congested the housing where they went and caused unfriendly relations. The people and the newspapers began accusing the government of failing to provide proper housing for evacuated people although urging them to evacuate. Some complained to members of the government.

Japanese homes tend to be rather small, and members of the household live very close and with practically no provision for privacy. This is taken for granted, but at the same time, and quite possibly as a logical corollary, the household as an organized group attempts to maintain its corporate privacy against all outsiders. The invasion of this privacy by people not of the immediate household, which must necessarily have taken place when evacuees moved into one's home, might be expected to provoke friction, even though the government, through the police, gave guidance to the hosts as to what their attitude should be. Of those hosts who answered the question "How did you and they get along?", 81 percent in the rural areas answered that there was no friction and that they got along together smoothly and cooperatively. In cities, the percentage giving this answer was 88 percent. Very possibly, hosts and guests did get along well. But it is also more polite and more loyal to one's country's efforts to disclaim any friction with guests.

In Japan, housing facilities are ordinarily very simple. Neither central heating nor plumbing is anticipated, while beds, chairs, and such furniture are non-existent. Consequently all sorts of structures can be used for housing with a facility altogether lacking in the United States. However, the size of the evacuated population and the extent of destruction of houses were both so much greater than had been anticipated by the government that a very dangerous position was reached by the summer of 1945. Few had, as yet, been forced to live with no shelter of any kind at all, but the degree to which bombing destruction was reaching out into smaller and more remote localities indicated a really catastrophic shortage very soon.

Rationing System. The problems of rationing and distribution of food in Japan as a whole have been discussed previously in the report. It will be recalled that in 1937, when the so-called China Incident broke out, items in the food supply such as rice, barley, vegetables, etc., were considered sufficient to meet the nation's demand. In the following years, however, Japan began to feel some difficulties, as more and more food from the homeland was demanded by the Army. In 1941 the food situation worsened, especially after the outbreak of war in the Pacific. Systematic rationing of rice and wheat by now existed, and as the war continued, other foods were added to the list.

When the government ordered the evacuation of cities, one of the major problems facing the nation was how to feed the refugees. Fortunately for the government, many of the evacuees went to live with their relatives and friends in different cities or in rural communities, and did not create problems at the start. In the beginning, various rural areas receiving the evacuees were reported to have happily shared their rationed food with the evacuees, but this was only temporary in many instances. Soon there were indications that the local people were resentful toward the evacuees for consuming their share of food. The change in attitude was found in nearly all the communities which received a large number of evacuees. This came about as a result of shortages in foodstuffs and as more and more evacuees came. It resulted in much ill-feeling between the local people and the evacuees.

Among evacuees who went to the countryside, 37 percent expressed their dissatisfaction with the food distribution or rationing system, while of those in the urban areas, 27 percent were dissatisfied. That evacuees who went to the rural areas were more dissatisfied with the rationing system than those in the urban area can probably be explained by the fact that in the city, organizations such as the food distributing agency (*shokuryo eidan*) and *tonarigumi*, primarily organized for the rationing and distribution of food, were more highly integrated and well operated than in the country. Another reason may be psychological; that is, the evacuees may have been led to believe that the rural area had more food available than the city. Consequently, when they did not get what they anticipated, disappointment colored the attitude of the evacuees. This dissatisfaction, however, does not necessarily mean that the countryside had less food than the city.

In order to be eligible for rationing cards, individuals who moved from one place to another were

supposed to obtain a transfer ticket from the authorities of their old home, and produce it at their new place of residence. It had to be checked before rations could be issued to them. Of course, with the disruption and destruction caused by bombing and evacuation, this became impossible, and evacuees simply had to be issued new ration cards without this check upon their bona fides. This, in some cases, led to the invention of imaginary family members who existed only for rationing

purposes. In any case it was just one more loophole in the system, and provided still further encouragement to the black market. There was a widespread belief among people in all refuge areas that evacuees had more money than natives and that they caused inflation and bought freely in the black market. To some extent, this was probably true; in any case, it still further undermined confidence and so struck one more blow to the morale of the Japanese people.

SUBVERSION AND OPPOSITION IN WARTIME JAPAN¹

In a totalitarian regime like Japan's very few dissenting elements could be expected to escape the watchful eye of the control organizations. None could expect tolerance. For these reasons, it has been fairly generally assumed that virtually no subversive or oppositional activities occurred.

This assumption has been further strengthened by fairly common Japanese testimony. When the mayor of Hagi mentioned passive resistance to the government's scrap and economy drives, since 1944, he was asked what form such resistance took. His surprising reply was: "Well, it (resistance) never actually happened, so we don't know." To the further question whether there were any indications of organized resistance, he added: "No, it never reached that point . . . The police and military police had a net spread out and if there was any tendency of this kind they would have pulled the people in . . ."²

The majority of Japanese did not know of such activities, so that even the most candid had little or nothing to report. The police authorities themselves would not ordinarily make revelations which might cast aspersions on their "professional competence" as controllers. Generally, any such admission might appear as a loss of face, because it would suggest lack of discipline in a nation given to the maintenance of at least the appearance of the strictest social and national conformity.

Nevertheless, even the rather limited documentary records available to Morale Division suggest that this deeply-entrenched police state did not succeed in preventing the spread of subversive and even of oppositional activities during the war period.³

Anticipated Sources of Subversion

The whole thought control system was implicitly based upon the anticipation of certain kinds of dis-

¹ "Subversion," as the term will be used here, denotes unorganized acts inimical to the regime and essentially of political significance, whether or not they have a political motivation. The term "opposition" on the other hand, will be confined to organized political activities which are directed against the regime in any or all respects.

² Two high officials of the Tokyo metropolitan police were asked to discuss organized antiwar activities. They were amused and laughed. One said:

"There were none—none at all. We did not allow any. Anything was strictly nipped in the bud. Nothing organized at all . . . If it were not for police action, there might have been demonstrations."

³ Documents cited in this appendix may be found in Morale Division files.

sent and subversion. While this possibly produced a certain myopia on the part of the police bureaucracy, its general view of the social sources of non-conformity is nonetheless of interest since it was grounded on experience and, above all, reflected the government's conception of the nature and importance of the "internal enemy."

A fairly clear pattern of potentially "trouble-making" social groups and cliques emerges from some of the police directives of the early war period. The selection of these groups was based on accumulated police experience in "guidance" and provide a fairly practical frame of reference for subversive activities of all kinds.

Communists and Other Radical Leftists. The "Summary of Emergency Measures for the Maintenance of Public Order," issued on the eve of the war, lists under the heading, "Communist Movements," "Communists, Social Democrats, Anarchists, etc., or those who have a previous record as such."⁴ It directs their classification into three groups, of which the first is an automatic, the second an optional arrest category, and the third reserved for special surveillance. Special attention, moreover, is directed to left-wing students and other left-wingers, especially those employed in industrial enterprises in general and war industries in particular.

It was expected that Communist activity would be designed to "disrupt" the prosecution of the war and change it into a civil war. This objective the Communists would seek to achieve by the use of spies, by instigating subversion in the masses, and by means of sabotage in war production.⁵ Moreover, as more Korean and Chinese laborers were brought into the country to step up war production, ". . . the infiltration of Japanese, Communist and Independence elements, by gradually insinuating themselves into various legitimate fields and by taking advantage of the dissatisfaction and discontent of the working masses, will strive to arouse antiwar and antimilitary sentiments . . . and thus gain their subversive ends in one stroke. This is a matter which requires the utmost vigilance. Also some circles of the reform camp are cooperating consciously or unconsciously with the left-wing

⁴ Chief of Police Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, 31 July 1941.

⁵ *Secret Meeting of Police Chiefs, Peace Preservation Section, Home Affairs Ministry*, April 1943.

groups or are carrying out strenuous activities to educate the working classes to socialist or caste ideas . . . To be watched especially closely is the infiltration of left-wing elements . . . disguised as other groups."⁶ Police authorities, then, anticipated organized Communist action, propaganda and infiltration methods, and, last but not least, the harnessing of minority and social discontent to stimulate general subversion.

Ultra-Nationalist Groups and Patriotic Societies. On the other hand, extreme Nationalists also were to be kept under close surveillance. In this case the authorities were especially concerned with their agitation on issues of foreign policy: ". . . their contentions concerning foreign policies shall be investigated secretly in advance . . . Unless they submit to admonition, the leading members shall be placed under arrest and urged to reform . . ."⁷ Another directive said: "The principal purpose of guidance controls over nationalist movements is to direct them along the same path as our national wartime policies and to see to it that they are strong and clean movements which will serve to heighten the people's morale. Lately, however, an attitude of criticism toward senior officials of the government . . . and higher government circles has been growing . . ."⁸ Generally speaking, any groups attributing special patriotic merit to their particular deviant views were to be regarded as potentially subversive; more specifically, the Home Ministry's preoccupation with their foreign policy line was focused on their frequently unorthodox views on Russian and even German relations, which might produce acute embarrassment to a government engaged in a complicated international power game.

Managerial, Business, and Professional Circles. The highly suspect "individualist" leanings of these people were expected to lead them into evil ways. Thus, the higher police authorities pointed out to regional officials in 1941 that the following persons merited especially careful attention:⁹

Those holding to extreme free and individualistic ideas¹⁰ politics, and finance shall be investigated in advance.

All activities in political movements for those mentioned in the paragraph above shall be stopped after the emergency condition develops. Moreover, when such activity is regarded as detrimental to a harmonious public opinion, the participants must be cautioned or warned. If the warning is not obeyed, the violator shall be placed under restriction.

⁶ Bureau of police affairs, 13 January 1943, *Outline of Peace Preservation Measures*.

⁷ *Summary of Emergency Measures*, 31 July 1941.

⁸ *Outline of Peace Preservation Measures*, 13 January 1943.

⁹ *Summary of Emergency Measures for the Maintenance of Public Order*, 31 July 1941.

The same concern is shown in a Kempei report of 1942 which doubtless reflects the particular curiosity of the armed services about the attitudes of those commonly regarded as their opposite numbers in domestic politics:¹⁰

In general, most of the people of the ruling class recognize their responsible position and show a cooperative attitude toward the government's policies for the successful conclusion of the war. But in their activities they have shown comparatively negative desires and remained unconcerned spectators toward the present situation. It is evident that, in comparison with the average Japanese people, they show less interest toward the war effort and still maintain a certain amount of democratic and individualistic ideologies. Therefore, a thorough investigation and study of this matter is necessary for the prosecution of a (proper guidance policy.)

And again in 1943, the police are admonished:

Close watch as well as undercover investigation should be maintained with regard to persons in the political, financial and newspaper fields who have ordinarily held to extreme liberal, individualist, or pacifist sentiments.¹¹

Middle and Lower Classes. In addition to these sources of potential infection, there were, quite generally, the urban and rural middle and lower classes, ranging from craftsmen and little business men to farmers, tenant farmers, and workers, who were regarded as susceptible to dangerous influences. The directive of 31 July 1941 stated the problem in fairly concrete language:

Regardless of any reasons whatsoever, all labor and finance disputes shall be prohibited; however, any matter which can reasonably cause disputes shall be secretly investigated and settlement shall be made in advance of an incident.

Attention must be devoted to the trend of the general public, especially persons engaged in medium and small business and industry. The public shall be made to realize the importance of the domestic and foreign crisis and, at the same time, a plan should be made to listen to the feelings of various groups and communicate them to higher authorities. Consequently, efforts should be made to prevent outbreaks of any disputes which result from grievances.

Again, in 1943, under the heading "Several Economic Matters Relating to Laborers, Farmers, etc.," careful scrutiny of these groups was urged upon police authorities "because of the mounting dissatisfaction and discontent of the people in connection with their daily economic needs . . ." Special emphasis was laid not only on the prevention of labor and tenancy disputes, but also on the necessity of maintaining close surveillance over the activities of former members and officers of disbanded labor and farm organizations so that the authorities might obtain "a clear grasp of the undercurrents . . . in the people's way of thinking."

¹⁰ *Recent Trend of Thought Among Intelligentsia and Leaders*, 22 December 1942.

¹¹ *Outline of Peace Preservation Measures*, Bureau of police affairs, 13 January 1943.

The fears were based on the reasonable conclusion that these particular groups were in ferment largely because of unsolved social and economic problems which were barely covered up by a coercive national discipline. Wartime complications could make the strain excessive, and the resultant subversive activities might well spill over from this source into the general population. The above-quoted directive of 1943 very clearly expresses this line of official anxiety:

In order to maintain a high rate of production in essential goods, it has been absolutely necessary to mobilize domestic materials and to relocate enterprises in strategic areas. As a natural consequence this has resulted in the increase of persons forced to relinquish their business occupations and offices in the field of small and medium enterprises and industrial concerns as well as in peacetime production. This has not only brought a considerable change in our vocational set-up, but it has also created many difficulties in the lives of the people by making the supply of consumer goods undependable, and sky-rocketing the cost of commodities. All people, including the workers and farmers, are greatly affected. As the war situation develops, should wrong measures be taken, there is the danger that the dissatisfaction and discontent of the people will be aggravated. This will create antagonism between the different classes and give rise to various social movements (heresies). From this standpoint, greater vigilance has been necessary in peace preservation matters during the latter half of the year than was required in the first six months.

Religious Groups. Beyond these social and political sources of subversion, the authorities were concerned with the membership of certain religious groups as potential and actual trouble-makers.

To begin with, this was inspired by a strong distrust of the Christian churches in Japan, particularly because of their traditional western sympathies and affiliations. The pre-Pearl Harbor 1941 directive provides for the arrest or surveillance of persons connected with previous "religious incidents" and of "others who require official attention and belong to an Allied nation's or Christian organization, to antimilitary, pacifist, or other religious organizations or fraternities which may conduct unusual activities related to missionaries of an Allied nation." By 1943 the interest had become more comprehensive; it now extended to certain Shinto and Buddhist sectarians. The directive of January 1943 complains that "extreme materialism and . . . excessive spiritualism" exist side by side, and that "Pagan ideas are also rampant which claim to clarify the national structure . . ."

Among certain intellectual groups mystical pagan ideas are being propagated on the pretext of clarifying the national structure. These ideas contradict our history and classics and have the contrary effect of generating notions which

confound our national history. In extreme cases, there is a tendency toward an unpleasant criticism of shrines and the Imperial line.

Even zealotry among the native cults was viewed with alarm, for it might serve as a cloak to more sinister and direct subversion.

The "Korean Peril." No enumeration of these control targets would be complete without a reference to the "Korean peril." In the early directives it ranked second only to the Communists, and was given fairly elaborate treatment. A classification of resident Koreans—analogous to that made of Communists and leftists—and rigid surveillance, especially of Korean laborers and students, was ordered. To facilitate this surveillance, travel by Koreans to and within Japan was to be placed under special restrictions.

The directive of January 1943 is more elaborate and draws attention to the growth of the autonomy movement among Koreans. It is a notable expression of official anxiety and of a policy of repression derived from it.

The character of Koreans is marked by their vengefulness and their toadyism, i. e., their worship of the powerful. Therefore, for the sake of maintaining peace and order in the future, special heed must be given to the fact that their ideological activities will, in all likelihood, be transferred to movements for their independence, and the fact that there is danger that they may carry out subversive practices. They may be aroused to a sense of dependence on America and Britain and be taken in by the schemes and plots of the discontented element. In view of this fact, thorough controls and leadership are necessary in regard to these peninsular people.

Of course, vigilance and undercover investigation of the Koreans who are in Japan for the purpose of study or investigation of Japanese-Korean relations should be intensified, particularly in regard to students and the members of the educated class. Persons who may be suspected of being in Japan for the purpose other than study should be watched particularly in regard to subversive activities.

In view of the fact that demands for independence are beginning to be voiced in some Korean circles in connection with the return of the governments in the southern regions to their peoples, strict watch must be maintained over the actions of the Koreans in general.

Since anti-Korean sentiments apparently were widespread among the general population (so that, on occasion, the authorities intervened to conciliate and pacify), such a policy could presumably count on rather wide popular support.

Evidences of Subversion and Opposition in Japanese Society

According to Morale Division sources of information, there actually was sufficient subversive and even oppositional activity to explain the authori-

ties' constantly renewed drive for increasing wartime vigilance, in a regime which was built on the expectation of unquestioning loyalty to policies handed down from on high.

Communist Opposition. There has been general reluctance to assume the existence of any organized opposition among the Japanese people during the war. Nonetheless, there is some documentary evidence to suggest the persistence, during the war, of an organized Communist movement (or movements) which deserves the name of an underground opposition even though, in all probability, it remained numerically extremely insignificant. While one must allow for something of a "Red scare" on the part of the authorities, police documents are plausible enough in outlining, in a series of detailed case reports, a pattern of activity which is familiar from other areas.¹²

Police intelligence summaries, undated in some cases, but ranging from 1941 to 1945, report a series of partly interlocking "incidents" and cases which point to unremitting underground activity of Communists and Socialists. A "Summary of Recent Communist Activities" gives some data on the number of arrests connected with such incidents:^{13, 14}

Year	Number of incidents	Number of persons arrested
1941-----	115	884
1942-----	83	317
1943 (as of November)-----	98	269

With reference to the 1941 data, it is explained that 42 "incidents" and 215 individual arrests out of the totals were the result of "emergency measures," that is, they must have been preventive roundups in accordance with the regulations of the Home Ministry police directive of 31 July 1941, which has been cited above. If this is taken into account, the "incidents" seem to indicate an ex-

¹² An extract from the notebook of a Communist organizer reflects the systematic effort to lay a careful groundwork for Communist penetration (Note 1).

¹³ Undated, but probably issued in December 1943, or early 1944, by the peace preservation section of the police bureau, Home Affairs Ministry.

¹⁴ When it comes to the interpretation of the actual number of arrests and cases, as they are tabulated above, it is necessary to bear in mind that the police authorities, certainly during the war, made no effort to distinguish between Communists and Socialists. This was quite clearly stated by one of the most capable police bureau informants:

("Red thoughts") legally . . . are thoughts contrary to the peace preservation law. Originally they were just communism. During the war this meaning was broadened to include socialism, social democracy, and even liberalism.

Q. What do you think is the difference between Communism and Socialism?

A. The police made no distinction. They considered any infringement of the peace preservation law as communism, especially if it advocated the abolition of private property . . . Anything which advocates the abolition of capitalism would mean the abolition of the Emperor, and that is communism.

pansion of activities as the war developed. While analogous figures are not available for the subsequent period, police bureau reports of August 1944 and reports for the second quarter of 1945 continue the record of such activities into the air-raid period.

Notable among the listed incidents is one involving "A Preparatory Committee for the Reactivation of the Japanese Communist Party" which involved the arrest of about 100 persons between 1940 and 1941. It extended into the railroad system and to shipyards in the Tokyo Yokohama area, and, above all, involved an alleged representative of the Comintern, Yonosuke Kobayashi. Under the jurisdiction of the Tokyo metropolitan police, for example, there was an espionage incident, designated as the "Zorge" affair, which occurred in 1941-42, an alleged Chinese Communist Party spy ring incident in 1942, another cell conspiracy (Advancement Party "incident," 1943) disguised as a literature group in an important factory, and many others.

Kanagawa prefecture, which includes Yokohama, apparently was a particularly significant center for such efforts. One, referred to as "the American Communist party member incident," involved a student who, after his release from detention for political activity at Keio University, had gone to the United States and joined the American Communist party, where he allegedly had played a leading role among Japanese-Americans. He returned to Japan early in 1941, supposedly to secure information on Japanese conditions for the American Communist party. He subsequently obtained employment in what appears to have been a semi-official research agency, the World Economic Research Society, but was arrested in 1942.¹⁵ Threads were reported to have led from here to two other incidents involving the "Political Economic Research Society" and the "Soviet Affairs Research Association," both apparently camouflaged study groups of persons with Communist affiliations or sympathies. What made these groups and organizations especially significant was that their membership was partly made up of professional, government, and industrial employees who had access to important (top secret) documentary material which they exploited for the circulation of alarmist statements on the impending collapse of the Japanese economy.

Linked to the Political Economic Research Society there was another group (with overlapping

¹⁵ This incident is very fully described, under the title *Investigation of Left-wing Incident in Kawagawa Prefecture* in a document presumably issued in 1943.

personnel) described as the Hosoda Group, headed by Karoku Hosokawa, whose membership included some journalists and an official of the Manchurian Railway's Tokyo branch office. The investigation of this group disclosed that it attempted to make connection with the Russian Communist party through the aid of one member who had already secured an appointment as foreign office courier to the Soviet Union. When about to depart, in March 1943 (?), he was arrested. Another associate, a Korean by the name of Yoshio Shino, was to be liaison agent with the Chinese Communist party. He had gone as far as the Mongolian border, but likewise failed in his mission. However, it was contended that one Toichi Nawa, instructor at Osaka Commercial University, had been able to maintain connection with the Chinese Communist party and was able to pass on information to them.

Further affairs were reported from Kyoto and Hokkaido (with ramifications to Niigata, Ibaragi, Miyagi, Akita, Tottori, and other prefectures) so that, early in 1944, the following conclusions did not seem unwarranted to the "thought police":

A trend requiring special attention:

Through the so-called "People's Front" tactics, movements utilizing legal grounds or disguises are becoming more and more conspicuous.

As a peculiar movement during the war for the purpose of changing the trend "from war to revolution", "defeat of the government," and "protection by Soviet Russia" have increased as a defeatist maneuver (spying, idealistic schemes, production interference in essential industries).

A reactivation effort to revive the Communist party, the core of the movement, is just as active as it has been in the past.

The relationship between the movement and the Chinese Communist party has become very intimate, and since the dissolution of the Comintern, there is a feeling that the central committee of the Japanese Communist party is relieved of much worries.

Most of the recent incidents involve persons with past records in related incidents.

The recent rapid changes in social condition have been fully utilized as an opportunity for the Communist movement.

The findings of the monthly special police report for August 1944 (Peace preservation section, police bureau, Home Ministry) are essentially a variation of the same theme:

The following has come to light:

That present-day Communists have eagerly sought to secure liaison overseas; and to that end, they have either utilized governmental and official setups, or have engaged in espionage activities, perpetrating the most recalcitrant stratagems by means of wiles and ruses, which does not allow a moment's relaxation of vigilance during wartime;

That they are planning persistently for the reestablishment of the Japanese Communist party;

That they are plotting with extreme finesse, wile, and subtlety for propagandizing left-wing thoughts or for championing the cause of Soviet Russia, by utilizing legal media such as publications and investigations; and

That Communists, who worked in essential industries, obtained vital secrets at their places of work and mutually exchanged information to take an objective view of the circumstances for left-winged analysis, determining the respective roles to be played once Japan was crushed in battle—graphically depicting the perils of the most ingenious yet persistent present-day Communist movement.

No comparable activities of socialist groups are recorded in the available documents. Whether this is due to the absence of such organized activities on their part or to the police practice of labeling them "Communist" indiscriminately it is impossible to say on the basis of evidence in our possession.

Subversion among Intelligentsia. Aside from the Communists, none of the other sources of subversion anticipated in the early police directives, with the possible exception of the Koreans, appear to have developed anything like an organized oppositional group. Nevertheless, some subversive activity was clearly the outgrowth of special group attitudes and group interests.

Members of business, management, professional, and even parliamentary circles, while they hardly took the lead, were certainly among those whose discontent with the leadership became quite articulate. Communists and others with dissenting ideologies did not have to learn the lessons of the war in order to become subversive. On the other hand, in this group (which often could avail itself of superior sources of information), the evident failure of the government's conduct of the war undermined the discipline they were expected to maintain. The summary of the interrogation of an influential Osaka businessman points up their behavior very clearly:

Of course, the bigger businessmen had private channels of communication through which information was passed from the military, particularly via persons with connections in the munitions industry, who knew the state of the military's needs. It soon became apparent from them that there was no prospect of victory and that, from Guadalcanal on, a series of defeats had set in. With the defeat at Midway, it became apparent to those in the know that victory was no longer a possibility . . . None of this was actually stated or learned in any way except through rumors among persons in business circles. It was never expressed publicly, of course, and anyone who would have expressed doubts of that sort would have been in considerable danger of visits from the police and the Kempei. He (informant) himself was known to have liberal views, and there were many of the bigger or middle-sized business men with a superior knowledge of the West who had the same private thoughts. It was impossible, even in Japan, where control is tightest, to suppress that

sort of thing entirely, and there was considerable talk and discussion of defeats in private conversation among business men, in clubs, and so on. None of this, however, seeped out to other people, and such matters were never discussed with office employees or others.

A Tokyo metropolitan police board report at the beginning of 1944, despite its euphemistic language, confirms this picture of demoralization in speaking of the "financial world" where some cannot "shake off their degeneration and have assumed the attitude of being spectators of war."¹⁶ This report describes the effect of such attitudes on public thought as considerable.

Despite all caution and secretiveness, individual subversive statements find their way into police reports. A 1944 higher police report cites the director of a chamber of commerce and industry:

In this present-day world of ours, there isn't a single satisfactory thing to be found. This cannot be mentioned in a loud voice—but everybody is sick and tired of the war.

A member of the Diet was quoted, in the same document, as saying:

Among the members of the Diet, one can see now and then a member who holds an antiwar ideology. Nobody likes wars; hence, even though a person happens to be a member of the Diet, he is no exception.

A prefectural assemblyman put it even more bluntly:

The higher-ups think nothing of their subordinate officers and men dying in battle, thinking only of their own glory. If this war were truly for world brotherhood, then I wouldn't mind it; somehow, it strikes me as leading to a wretched dog's death.

It is not without significance for later developments that the Doolittle raid on Tokyo, in April 1942, set off one of the more sweeping indictments to come from a spokesman of this elite, an unnamed member of the Diet:

Despite the military's boast that not a single enemy plane shall penetrate the air above the mainland, on April 18 of this year Tokyo was air-raided. The military is assuming an air of nonchalance. Of course, it may have been unavoidable; but with due reverence to His Majesty, to have permitted the enemy to penetrate the air over the Imperial palace and not to have a soul willing to shoulder the responsibility—such is the case. Hence, the people will not heed the cries for air-defense preparations. After all, a human moves only with spirit and caution.

Black market activities are rampant on a nationwide scope; and there is nothing that can be done about it. Now, if the Agriculture and Forestry Minister or the Commerce and Industry Minister were to take responsibility, and commit *hara-kiri*, then the nation-wide black marketing may come to a halt.

It is the responsibility of the leaders that the nation has reached its present deplorable state of demoralization. In extreme cases, conditions are such that a certain person connected with vocational training is boasting that he has already amassed a neat fortune, simply from gifts and presents!

"*Excessive Patriotism.*" Apparently ultra-nationalists, in certain instances, produced the type of embarrassment which the authorities had been expecting from these quarters. It was possible, according to a keen Home Ministry informant, to distinguish two definite patterns of behavior among them. There were on the one hand, "structural rightists," who were thinking in terms of organized group action along Fascist or Nazi lines. Some of these, opposing Britain and the United States, favored closer ties with the Soviets, while others violently opposed any such alignment. Men like Kingoro and Seijo Nakano represented such thinking. Activities of such groups might be classed as oppositional if one could determine to what extent such leaders had any real organization behind them.

The other pattern, characterized as "nonstructural rightism" was made up of aggressive nationalists, all of them violently anti-Communist, who sought to achieve "national reform" by assassination and other methods of individual terror.

One interesting illustration of such subversive tendencies can be found in a 1942 report which shows how the "thought police" dealt with a certain (and apparently not very important) periodical known as *The New Leader*. Several articles, which had to be censored or suppressed between 1941 and 1942, had attacked the government for being pervaded with "Marxist materialism" and for not bringing the "China Incident" to a conciliatory conclusion while carrying on its "Holy War" against the Western powers in the spirit of true Nipponism. These relatively insignificant pinpricks from the extreme right wing were significant only because they coupled vague attacks upon the "spirit" of the government with a very concrete criticism of its foreign policy.¹⁷

A similarly subversive policy was expounded before a wider public by the above-mentioned Seino Nakano, president of the Toho-Kai political party. On the one hand, Nakano opposed, in speech and in print, the extremely effective legislative throttling of all dissenting opinion by Tojo's speech, press, and assembly temporary control act of December 1941, and later apparently went so far as to plot Tojo's overthrow in the fall of 1943. Nakano was

¹⁶ *Recent State of Affairs*, 22 April 1944, covering January through March.

¹⁷ *The New Leader, Survey of the Disposition of the Case*, 16 January 1942.

a known opponent of the China war (being apparently an advocate of peaceful penetration by expending money rather than men) and had, according to recent revelations, favored a termination of the Pacific war after the fall of Singapore, when Japan held all the trumps. Despite his parliamentary immunity, he was finally placed under detention, first by the Tokyo metropolitan police, then by the Kempei-Tai, while the public prosecutor refused to indict him. After having been put under considerable pressure, he was released for a short Diet session in September. Before he could be rearrested, he committed suicide as a gesture of protest against the Tojo system of repression, in September of that year.

As a further illustration, there was the case of the head of the "Reform party," Tatsuo Amano, a political rightist and nationalist who presumed to challenge the Tojo regime because of its special wartime criminal law amendment of March 1943. He and some others were arrested for interfering with the government's policy. A Home Ministry document of the middle of 1943 interprets this incident as follows:

There will never be any satisfaction within the reform camp with the unrevised passage of the said law. They are thinking such thoughts as: "The war penal code does not protect the body of the nation. It is merely a fortress to defend the government. It is the type of thing that was done under the Shogunate." Consequently they thought that they would use this law as a means for attack against the government at every favorable opportunity in the future. Actually, however, after the law was put into effect, some of them became prudent and others of the radical party gradually took on an attitude of aloofness to the law. The problem at present is the trial which will be held soon for violation of the emergency law concerning publication of opinions and holding meetings, committed by the well-known Amano, Tatsuo, who violently criticized this law in the *Cosmopolitan News* and in the *Restoration Bulletin*. In this matter, it appears that Amano is preparing, by means of the trials, to make an inside expose of the forces maintaining the status quo, and we must give thought to whether this may not be a stimulus to the general reform element.

Persons such as these, by virtue of their higher social status and manifold political connections, dared to attempt a direct challenge, at least in this phase of the war. Others, without such protection, for the most part would not raise their voices above a whisper until they became desperate.

Religious Subversion. One type of religious subversion seems occasionally to have been connected with nationalist attitudes. Whether it often engendered activities which were significantly subversive by Western standards is hard to say; we merely know that the authorities became visibly

agitated over a number of cases of sectarianism.¹⁸

The table of contents of one report refers to a whole series of cases and investigations involving (in addition to Christians) both Shintoists and Buddhists. Among the former, several incidents are characterized as lese-majeste violations. A general "thought police" survey, probably published in 1944, refers to the rise of "disquieting religious movements which are professing to be in accordance with the national polity." It goes on to say, with the usual circumlocution:

As a result of recent internal and external changes, the average man's interest in the classical literature of Japan has gradually increased; and even though this interest has brought him into religious practices, it has also given rise suddenly to a number of groups professing the "way of God" and the national polity, and thereby making disturbing inroads into the religious field. Among the followers of such movements, propaganda is spread purporting to demonstrate the absolute validity of various old writings whose authenticity is doubtful. Not only do they confuse Japanese history and ignore the classics, but they are also impious in speech and disrespectful to the Imperial household and the Shinto shrines. Moreover, pretending to obey the divine will and commandments, they are advocating radical governmental reforms. Furthermore, they are speaking crudely in an attempt to confuse people's hearts concerning present day affairs.

It may be well to cite an actual example. The members of a certain group (The Imperial System World Political Research Society) support and spread as the ultimate truth the so-called Takeuchi Classics and their divine interpretation . . . they spread a doctrine of the Imperial lineage as noted in that book, and by its interpretation cause confusion as to the order of the throne. They explain that there is a spiritual in contrast to an unbroken blood lineage and thereby confuse and impair the sanctity of the Imperial household . . . they are continually so conducting themselves as to upset and agitate the people's traditional beliefs . . . It appears very much as though they are planning a coup d'etat under divine authority by taking advantage of social unrest and confusion.

It may be well to quote . . . "We will by divine authority and wish take over from the Emperor the keys which open the doors to heaven. We have the mission of ruling the peoples of the world . . . The world is in a terrible mess. Neither Tojo nor Konoye are in the least capable of dealing with it. They have no conception of the Almighty and are misguiding the government . . . On the third of March there will be a big air raid on the Capital. Raids will continue after that until Tokyo becomes a field of flames. In the midst of the debacle the Emperor will flee at one o'clock to . . . and will set up a new capital in . . . The control of the present grave crisis is entirely out of the hands of the common man. Let all holy men who follow the ways of God assemble on the holy ground at . . . mountain, let them bind themselves together and establish a truly theocratic government."

¹⁸ *Religious Movements, December 1944 to June 1945*, manuscript for monthly special police report.

It is unknown how serious or widespread such subversion was. Presumably it was confined to scattered instances. Even where it might have lacked the direct political connotations which are apparent in the cited example, no government so closely identified with a state religion could afford to indulge dissenters and sectarians. Finally the cited examples suggest that the anticipation of some final catastrophe was associated with the hovering threat of air raids, at least in some minds.

In addition to some Shinto and Buddhist subversive activity, there were disquieting undercurrents among the Christians, which are reminiscent (on a very modest scale) of Christian dissent in Nazi Germany.

Christians generally, let alone non-Japanese Christians, were regarded with considerable distrust by the authorities and actively opposed and threatened by certain "patriotic" ultra-nationalists. A 1945 "thought police" report under the heading "Christianity Eradication Movement of Rightist Organizations and Ministers' Responses," mentioned one such anti-Christian group effort which was inspired, late in 1944, by Yukihiro Yamachita, editor of a secret organization's magazine *Tensho Gokoku* in Yokohama. He sponsored a "Kanagawa Prefecture Renovation Special Assault Corps" which was to be regarded "from the point of removing an obstacle to the prosecution of the war."

The "Open Letter to Christians" which was circulated by this group is rather remarkable evidence of the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda among some Japanese nationalists. It begins:

That originally Christianity is a bad offshoot of Judaism which under the influence of Jewish thought has been made a tool for the intrigue of far-reaching world conquest by Jews whose object is to make all people on earth internationalists by paralyzing their racial consciousness, since they feel that religion has no boundaries, is clear according to historical evidence. Today even England and America are in reality Jewish puppet countries. This may be the reason that the Greater East Asia war is called "Jewish-Japanese war" from another angle.

Small wonder that, under such circumstances, Christian churches endeavored to make it very clear, not only that Christianity "originated from the denial and rejection of Judaism" but that it was the "sole purpose" of the United Churches of Christ in Japan "to serve our country in this time of emergency."¹⁹

Despite understandable professions of loyalty,

¹⁹ Statement in reply to the "open letter", by K. Kawamata, superintendent of the Kanagawa district of the United Churches of Christ in Japan.

there obviously were a substantial number of Christians, clergy and laymen alike, whose religious conscience led them into conflict with the claims of Japanese totalitarianism and its ideology. The report on religious movements (December 1944 to June 1945) lists under Christianity such items as:

Arrests of Japanese Catholic priests for *lèse-majesté* and violation of the emergency speech, publication, assembly, and organization control laws.

Arrests of Christians for antiwar speech and conduct.

Arrest of Christians for *lèse-majesté* from war-weariness.

Arrest of Christians for *lèse-majesté* and antiwar movements.

Investigation of Catholic priests, etc, violating the peace preservation law.

Disposition of Christians' antiwar speech incident.

Appeal and trial of speech violation cases of Christian ministers.

Recent trends of Christians requiring vigilance.

Special trends of Christians in Gifu prefecture.

Anti-war communications recognized as acts of Christians.

Factory workers' denunciation of Christian school workers.

Protective custody of members of the lighthouse society.

The "thought police," in the previously mentioned memorandum on religious movements, sum up the situation as follows:

For some time now measures have been taken to prohibit gatherings of three churches: the former Japan Holiness church, the former Purification church, and the Oriental Evangelist and Purification church. They have subsequently caused some trouble by their lack of cooperation . . . in connection with their control and dissolution. The body of the dogma of these three churches . . . is in opposition to the national polity of our country . . . they are extremely recalcitrant and rebellious, as is demonstrated by their impairing the sanctity of the shrines, and they are continually ranting about the Jewish nationalist movement . . . The Lighthouse Society and certain non-denominational Christian groups are also . . . quite similar to the above.

In regard to the actions of the 2,000 Christian churches and their 300,000-odd believers, it is apparent that a good number of them believe in an extreme form of international peace, the principles of humanity, etc., and that they spread anti-war ideas. Also some of the sects are actively opposing the principles of our national government under the guise of their mistaken interpretation of God and life after death. The report goes on to cite apocalyptic statements such as:

The time will soon come when all national countries will

disappear from the face of the earth. It is written thus in the Bible.

On another occasion, incidents are reported from the prefectures of Aomori, Gifu, and Mie, which involve,

defeatist speech and action, defending the United States based on Anglo-American worship on the part of the Christians; (in Ehime prefecture a priest of the Shinshu Sect preached to the naive farmers: "Attend temple ceremonies even if you have to neglect farming." As a result, a major impediment against the production of wheat, essential during wartime, was created.)

In areas under police jurisdiction there were incidents such as the following:

Christians, saying that the present grave crisis confronting the nation can never be solved unless the administration leaders responsible for the reins of government listened to the words of God's people and governed in accordance with God's holy will. Furthermore, they blindly consider themselves as God's stewards and, demanding an interview with Premier Koiso, attempted to present him with written advice. There have been other cases in the light of which continuous vigilance is necessary.

In a few known instances stubborn Christian believers seem to have taken a fairly radical stand in translating their faith into action. A November 1944 monthly special police report tells of the investigation of an anonymous letter incident in Kyoto Fu in the course of which a Christian who had seemingly become the victim of still other social heresies, one Keitaro Izumi, was arrested:

He was sent to the prison for *lèse-majesté*, and for the violation of the national defense peace preservation law, and also on suspicion of murder. As a result of the investigation, it was found that Izumi harbored class ideas, and being influenced by the Christian teachers, he had ideas of extreme pacifism and America worship. In order to have America win this Greater East Asia war, Izumi instigated the outbreak of food riots, factory strikes, and other acts to hinder the consummation of the war; and through anonymous letters and distribution of defeatist pamphlets, he also planned to interfere with the diplomatic relations between Japan and Germany so as to force our country to stand alone, and thus make the consummation of the war impossible. Besides, he was found to have planned the murder of a German resident.

It is clear why the police were disturbed. In the midst of one of the most homogeneous societies of our time, the Christians remained an alien and ill-fitting element. In order to survive, the organized churches proclaimed and doubtless practiced loyalty. But among some earnest and some naive believers, faith failed to make the required compromises. There are some indications that despite their numerical insignificance, such men did play a role as sources of infection in the body politic when circumstances had made others susceptible.

Farmers. Japanese farmers as a group were predominantly conservative and patriotic. In general they were disposed to accept governmental policy and direction in peace as in war. As one village agricultural official said, with some exaggeration:

Because the controls are more tenuous and subtle . . . farmers do not give much thought to government, politics, and such things. They just do their job and as long as they survive they don't complain much.

On the other hand, these farmers were also individualists with a traditional resentment against the inequities of the established tenancy system. This had resulted, over the years, in much restlessness and even in chronic rioting, especially in the poorer parts of the country.

During the war the government established rigid quotas for the delivery of farm produce in which it probably did not take the poorer farmers' problems sufficiently into account. These government exactions met with a good deal of passive resistance. Added to the substantial incidence of tenancy disputes, this was a source of continued worry for the authorities. In effect, ferment among the farmers stemmed from two sources. On the one hand there were grievances and accusations which were related to the established system and to new government demands, and, on the other hand, there were subversive and probably organized efforts to make political capital out of these tensions.

In a monthly special police report for August 1944 may be found a representative example of observations on the rural situation:

In view of the important nature of increasing food production the government has been planning . . . utilizing every available means; The majority of the farmers have cooperated with government, pouring body and soul into the undertaking, and have been marching onward to the goal. However, this year's rice crop was cursed by blight and drought . . . and apprehension prevailed among the farmers . . . it cannot be denied that they harbored defeatist thought. Hence they have displayed a negative attitude to the filling of the wheat production quota.

Where such activity began to become really troublesome, the authorities apparently interpreted them as subversive and punished the perpetrators accordingly. In Kyoto, it was learned from a group of public prosecutors that there were only 5 reported cases of antiwar talk and antiwar demonstrations in 1943. By 1944 the number had risen to 30; for that part of 1945 for which the record was still maintained, the number was 45. One of the prosecutors, Hoshino, remembered that these court cases chiefly involved farmers:

¹ These farmers became anti-war for economic reasons—the price of goods, the demands of government for collec-

tion,—and many of them resisted it. Such resistance was construed as antiwar activity. About two-thirds of the cases were such cases of resistance to the collection of quotas, and thus came from economic causes, but the rest of them arose out of accusations about the circulation of antiwar rumors.

It is not without interest to note that a survey of lèse-majesté, anti-war, and anti-military activities made by the peace preservation section sometime in 1944 shows that about 30 percent of persons reported as accused of lèse-majesté behavior were classified as farmers. While this obviously does not warrant any major conclusions, it does suggest that undercurrents among farmers were not negligible.

It is far more difficult to obtain a reasonably clear impression of deliberate oppositional efforts which were made among the farm population. On the one hand there were nationalist endeavors essentially espousing the cause of the war, and goading the farmer to increased productivity. Among them one can find the so-called Agriculture-First movement which, despite its patriotism, aroused police suspicions. On the other hand there was an unmistakable sequence of efforts which bear the trace of communist or socialist indoctrination.

One case report which involves a group in Hokkaido is representative of many others in this field:²⁰

The said person took cognizance that the increasing expediency of the various wartime agricultural measures will bring forth inevitably the semi-feudal nature of Japan's farming and will reveal its contradictory aspects in the face of the farming population: An approach must be made to stir up these people to feel conscious of agrarian revolution and he intervened in the movement for the establishment of the Empire Farming Village. He had been advocating: (1) an exploration and research movement; (2) a mutual enlightenment movement; (3) the development of contributive writings. The program calls for the gradual planning of a group organization of fellow thinkers, and, at the same time, concentrates on defenses against the repeated arrests of comrades since last year, and meetings for mutual discussion. Moreover, this incident has considerable likelihood of further development and it appears likely that a number of prominent left-wing agricultural leaders, economists, and officials connected with farm administration will be apprehended.

Workers. As in the case of the farmers, subversive activities among factory workers constituted primarily a response to the pressures which lay upon them, rather than flowing from ideological sources. The heavy hand of government was felt especially strongly by industrial labor. The national total mobilization law, originally promulgated in 1938 and revised several times, was a most inclusive labor

law which gave sweeping powers to government over all phases of manpower and labor relations. There was also the citizens labor pass law of 1941, an attempt to freeze workers in their jobs, and a variety of other measures which completely restricted labor's organized activity without providing it with any reasonable outlet for its grievances. Needless to say, industrial labor, especially when engaged in war industries, was under particularly severe discipline which was usually enforced by the military police. The deterioration of living conditions, with widely resented inequities of distribution, completed the rather unhappy pattern of the workingman's existence.

The combination of such pressures, in addition to the general wartime propaganda, was superficially effective so that, for instance, there was a notable decline in labor disputes since 1937, certainly down to 1942, when a relatively insignificant rise became evident. That the underlying tensions were strong, however, is borne out by the fact that the same period shows a steady rise in cases of mass riots among workers and, since 1943, a distinct increase of sabotage cases.²¹

On the whole, these developments suggest more social and economic grievances than politically motivated subversion. However, in view of the crucial role which any such activities played within the framework of the Japanese war organization, the dividing line, from the Japanese point of view, certainly was none too sharp. The government report cited above illustrates, moreover, how these attitudes of industrial protest necessarily led to political ferment:

With the sudden development in the war situation, anxiety among the workers for the outcome of the war gradually increased and feelings of pessimism and defeatism deepened. On the one hand, distrust of the military and the rise of antimilitaristic feelings could be seen here and there. Spirit, in general, deteriorated . . . The tendency toward despair deepened . . . The following are illustrations of the prominent nature of these tendencies: "Although they are our enemy, the propaganda leaflets are said to contain sensible comments. We can only wonder for what purpose we are fighting this war." "The big cities are one by one being turned to ashes. Can we in spite of this win against a materially superior America? We should stop our stubbornness and face facts." "The Army claims that the factory workers are responsible for lack of planes. Whose responsibility is it that nothing is being done about the enemy planes harassing the home seas? Tojo began this war. What is he doing now?" "Whether it be victory or defeat, it is not possible for us laborers to suffer any more. I don't care what

²⁰ Investigation report of Shoze Otani, first chief of the East Asia Agricultural Research Laboratory (Hokkaido), undated.

²¹ For statistics and general comment, see document entitled *Recent Labor Situations*, Home Affairs Ministry, August, 1945.

happens, because it'll only be the higher class which will suffer if we lose."

It has already been explained that workers' unions had been banned. Yet it appears that the older industrial workers, a good many of whom had formerly been organized, had never been really swept off their feet by the government propaganda, even though they had not dared open resistance.²² Some efforts at communist and probably also socialist propaganda among the factory workers persisted. Illustrative cases were reported, for instance, by the Home Ministry peace preservation section in April 1943, involving sabotage efforts in a factory in the greater Tokyo area, which were traced back to the activities of a small communist group. A similar incident, with a similar background, was reported from the vicinity of Yamada. The tactics involved were stated by one Communist who was arrested in Kyoto:

In the organizing of such a movement we should remember that the laborers always have a feeling of labor discrimination and that, consequently, whenever a crisis arises they tend to be anti-capitalistic. By taking advantage of this attitude, converting them to communism is very easy. Under the deceptive title of Fascism, endeavor to convert the laborers in essential industry to anti-capitalism.²³

Farmers and workers alike caused the government growing difficulty in maintaining rigid discipline by their subversive conduct. For the most part their refractory behavior did not indicate a primarily political motivation. Their social inferiority, coupled with growing wartime burdens, however, made them also potentially more receptive to subversive politics.

Korean Activities. Despite their continuous vigilance, the authorities were apparently not inclined to accuse the Koreans indiscriminately of "bad" conduct. The majority of the Koreans, who were fully aware of their underprivileged and precarious position in the community, appear to have conformed to the standards of conduct which the authorities exacted. The police records show a number of statements to this effect. For instance, an undated document (probably late 1944) "On the Control and Supervision of Koreans," stated that:

The majority of Koreans . . . are gradually accepting

²² One of the older labor leaders, Kanju Kato, confirmed this in an interrogation.

²³ See also *Secret Meeting of Police Department Chiefs, Peace Preservation Section, Chiefs' Lecture Materials*, April 1943, and *Proceedings of Investigation of Mitsuo Hasegawa, A Factory Worker in Iwaragi Prefecture*, August 1944, whose violation included the scribbling of the following slogan:

*Work, work our fellow warriors
Your toil and sweat will give
The Order of the Golden Kite
To our commander.*

the actuality of Japanese-Korean harmony, and in the matter of increasing the production potential and in bearing arms they are doing conspicuously well.

However, as the war situation deteriorated, the more active members of the Korean community could not help gathering courage and indulging in activities detrimental to the war effort. It is clear that the most conspicuous element was easily the student group, among whom acts of sabotage, rumor-mongering, and attempts at nationalist organization were first observed; many of them, given the "opportunity" to enter special volunteer Army service under a regulation of October 1943, apparently were not too enthusiastic "to fulfill their duty to their sovereign and country together with the Japanese students." It is probable that Korean labor was stirred up largely from this source, so that it began to show its latent attitudes more openly. Japanese dislike and fear of the Koreans, which rose with the difficulties of the situation, further added to the development of subversive activities. The following statements reflect the developing Korean outlook:

If it is impossible for us to escape conscription . . . we should take steps to enlighten those who follow in our footsteps, and do everything in our power to foster the idea of independence in their minds. Should we find ourselves in combat we should endeavor to help the enemy by escaping to his lines or by giving him information. Seeking his aid, we should strive to attain our goal of independence.

Two Korean students, who were manual laborers in the daytime, were arrested for expressing the following sentiments between April and June of 1944:

The restrictions surrounding our entry into the schools are designed to check the growth of an intellectual class among our people. The unification of Korea and Japan is proclaimed only for the Koreans and it is not practised in Japan. It is just an expedient to compel our participation in the war effort. The Japanese place heavier duties and burdens upon us but do not increase our rights or benefits. They forbid us to use Korean and force us to speak Japanese . . . We have no right to vote, yet conscription is compulsory.

Under such circumstances it is clear why the surveillance over the Koreans did not relax until the end.

Types and Incidence of Subversion

An attempt has been made, in the preceding discussion, to associate subversive activities with particular social or political group attitudes, as far as the available evidence permits. Because of the nature of the materials it will hardly be possible to treat them separately.

Overt Criticism and Denunciation. The most obvious manifestation of subversion, of which samples have already been given in the text, was overt criticism and denunciation of public policies, of the upper classes, or of others considered responsible, and, ultimately, of the authorities themselves.

It is quite clear that, with a people like the Japanese, suffering indignation, despair, or disgust first had to reach considerable proportions before such manifestations could begin to play an appreciable role. It is equally clear that, like morale in general, such a condition varied with individuals, social and occupational groups, and localities. Our materials, however, are not sufficiently continuous or extensive to permit any significant conclusions on such points. It is evident, however, from several sources, that the successive losses of Guadalcanal (early 1943), Saipan (July, 1944), Leyte (by the end of 1944), the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa (in 1945) were all important stages of demoralization, even before the impact of strategic bombing. A Domei report of April 1945 using local data up to 28 February (that is, before the beginning of large-scale city raids) in effect describes as the major morale phenomenon the emergence of "those who are war-weary as a result of their own hopelessness."²⁴ It lists, in the following order, these major factors of demoralization:

(1) Disappointment over the war situation—the series of setbacks since Guadalcanal.

(2) Food and commodity shortages.

(3) Dissatisfaction with wartime government controls (red tape, administrative mismanagement, increasing aversion for the police).

All these elements were reflected in the critical or aggressive statements of the malcontents.

A Kyoto newspaperman reports that letters to his paper, of which there were about 200 a day, became increasingly "revealing" as the war progressed. Most of these letters contained complaints about particular government officials and measures. In the early war period, many were laudatory and self-congratulatory in tone, but this gradually gave way to overt criticism of government policies. Toward the end, while the letters displayed little confidence, they still did not contain, as is readily understandable, comments on the general war situation. Grievances about rationing predominated. There was

²⁴ *Survey Data on Regional Conditions*, 25 April 1945; see also document entitled *The Trend of Public Thought after the Loss of Okinawa*, and the explanations of K. Masuhara of the Tokyo metropolitan board:

"The number of individuals speaking up against the war increased sharply after Saipan. All classes had a few objectors. The gendarmes took care of most of it."

much denouncing of officials and the military for their alleged failure to share the people's hardships, and even direct citing of certain officials for frequenting black market restaurants, and squandering food. Since the editors were guided by a list of 300 specific prohibitions concerning such mail, they never were able to publish any of it. This local example is suggestive because it indicates how much of a risk such letter-writers were willing to assume. More sweeping sentiments or arguments the average man would naturally be reluctant to commit to paper.

A morale report of the Tokyo metropolitan police, dated 22 April 1944, refers to a notable increase in cases involving "disrespectful and seditious speech and action" which it connects with "the tightening of the situation":

Period	Number of cases	Percent increase	Cases resulting in arrest	Percent increase
October–December, 1943	17		2	
January–March, 1944	22	28.5	4	100

It goes on to comment:

As ever, the cases involve disrespect (to the authorities), anti-war, antimilitary, and antigovernment utterances and attacks on the upper classes. Recently, however, anti-war sentiment based on accusations that the military enjoy undue advantages in view of the general food and commodity shortages, is gradually increasing and this is noted with obvious concern.

Two outstanding cases are the mailing to elder statesmen . . . of seditious documents concerning the change in the cabinet membership and the consolidation of the military establishment . . . and the seditious scribbling on the main gate nameplate of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

Other reports of this period, particularly those from censorship authorities, give concrete illustrations of such utterances. There are stories about policemen, which assail their corruption and illegal privileges. One of the letterwriters, for example, said:

Life in Tokyo is certainly tragic. If we were to have an air raid at this time, everything would be a mess. Although we outwardly clamor for the destruction of America and Great Britain, inwardly we have the feeling of war-weariness.

Another:

No complaints would be uttered, if the minimum standard of living were guaranteed. We do not complain about food inadequacy, but we greatly resent the inequalities . . . it is downright infuriating to see the police and military officers entrusted with rationing, getting the best of every thing and living free from all wants at times like these.

Naturally this type of grudge led to broader accusations:

The situation outside is critical, but our internal state of affairs is a mess. Administrators . . . deal in government black markets with money obtained from desperate citizens. And all this under the pretext of advancing the prosecution of the war. Government morals have utterly deteriorated . . . Our uninspired government steadily makes the crisis more serious. Japan today is like the Kaiser's Reich.

A "Summary of Recent Affairs involving Lèse-Majesté, Antiwar, Antimilitary, and Disorderly Behavior," probably compiled in the spring of 1944 by the peace preservation section, begins:

The recent tendencies of disorderly and antimilitary behavior as revealed in anonymous letters and scribbles during the six months from September of last year to February of this year, are becoming definitely more serious.

It states that the following cases are reported as "serious" and "malignant" by local authorities:

SEPTEMBER 1943—FEBRUARY 1944

	Cases	Arrests
Lèse-majesté	48	38
Antiwar and antimilitary	32	12
Other disorderly matters	23	7
	103	57

FEBRUARY 1943—AUGUST 1943

	Cases	Arrests
Lèse-majesté	39	22
Antiwar and antimilitary	30	5
Other disorderly matters	61	11
	130	38

The peace preservation section took a serious view of the comparison, even though the total cases had actually decreased. It was troubled by the fact that lèse-majesté cases were increasing to a new high and that a general intensification of antiwar sentiments existed.²⁵ The violations indicated that people were claiming:

The responsibility of the war leaders and, indirectly, that of the Emperor for the present war situation . . . there are many cases which advocate the class struggle by extreme expressions of resentment against capitalists and managers of munitions factories, contending that this "Holy War" is a private war of the militarists and capitalists.

Workers and farmers as well as business men, leaders, local politicians, and intellectuals were involved in such violations.

Numerous examples are given in this document which are significant for the short temper of the disillusioned. One farmer of Saitama had said:

In my estimate, Chiang Kai-shek is the greatest man in the world. Compared to him, the Japanese Emperor is doing nothing, just depending upon his ministers. He is just like a stick which stands up only because it is supported by other sticks. Everybody can do his job if he is supported by his subjects. Anyway, he is not so great.

Then there was the anonymous letter, written in the 1 January 1944 issue of the newspaper *Mainichi*, which contained the Emperor's portrait:

I'd like to see the Emperor's face when he becomes a prisoner of the American Army. The fate of warlike Japan will suffer positively by this visitation. Therefore, Japan should shake hands immediately with America and England and save the people from this cruel war. Then, we don't need to send our sons, husbands, and fathers to the war fronts. Also we don't need to worry any more about air attacks and we can eat to our hearts' content. When Japan surrenders, we don't know where the Emperor will exile himself. Maybe Hsinking? Nanking? or Berlin? You cannot imagine how many disabled soldiers it took to create three field marshals, Terauchi, Sugirjawa, and Nagano. When we think of it, war is really an unpleasant thing. Hideki Tojo is Kiyomori Taira!

Rumors. As in Germany, the Japanese authorities throughout the war period were deeply concerned with the control and repression of rumors. Again, as in the German case, this turned out to be a task of Sisyphus.

"The important point in the guidance of public opinion," says an outline of peace preservation measures, "is to create confidence so that the people will put their trust in the government and not be misled by rumors. The critical and suspicious attitude toward the leadership, especially, must be swept away." And again, in another "guidance and control" document:

Rumors during wartime have a great effect on the problems of maintaining peace and order and, what with the war developments having reached the present stage, it must be conceded that rumors will increase in the future. Every effort should be made to discover rumors as quickly as possible to prevent their spread and to strike at their source in order to carry out the task of rumor control effectively.

This memorandum warned the authorities not to be lax, even in the case of rumors of "a vague or uncertain nature"; to take especially strict measures against "harmful rumors and those which will have a serious effect"; to dispose quickly of arrest cases in order to increase the effectiveness of their action; to watch out for occurrences which might give rise to rumors and take precautionary action in such cases; and to prevent rumors by "guidance" and by keeping "the public informed as to actual conditions within the widest possible scope." It was, of course, precisely the lack of truthful or adequate information which made for the progressive growth

²⁵ It should be emphasized again that to receive these classifications the cases had to be regarded as quite serious.

of rumor-mongering. The same systemic causes led to the same results in both Germany and Japan.

The nature of rumors circulating in the beginning of 1943 is evidence of it. A "thought police" report enumerates the following types of rumors "which should be dealt with vigorously": rumors indicating lack of faith in the national debt; lack of faith in savings; fears inducing hoarding; anti-government rumors; rumors expressing anxiety over the war; indications of doubt or disbelief in military and government communiques; rumors concerning anti-war plots, etc.²⁶ It is of interest that this memorandum, while urging vigorous measures, directs

that punishment should be meted out only in 10 out of every 100 cases.²⁷

In Sendai, for instance, it was stated that, while rumors were current throughout the war, they were only spread among trusted friends because of the effectiveness of police vigilance. Local police records revealed a steady increase of rumor-mongering, in terms of cases brought to court, but a distinct decline in the last year as can be seen from the following table:

²⁷ Local accounts also suggest a relative lenience in this field. Thus the Wakayama police department reports that, when rumors became really "wild" in the later stages of the war.

"The authorities had the policy to punish only those who circulated rumors which would confuse the people or were extremely malicious, letting others go with warnings only. Therefore, there were relatively few offenders who were convicted."

²⁶ *Matters Concerning Control of Unfounded Rumors*, 15 January 1943.

SENDAI: RUMOR CASES

Classification	1942		1943		1944		1945		Total	
	Cases	Defendants	Cases	Defendants	Cases	Defendants	Cases	Defendants	Cases	Defendants
Relative to military.....			4	4	2	3	3	3	9	10
Economic.....	1	1	4	3	15	15			20	19
Air raids.....	1	1	2	3			1	1	4	5
Government foreign policy.....					1	1	2	2	3	3
Others.....	2	2	1	3	1	1	2	2	6	8
Total ¹	4	4	11	13	19	20	8	8	42	45

¹ Only court cases.

The police of Sendai very plausibly suggest that the low number of cases for 1945 (which should, of course, be increased by about 25 percent) was due to a failure of the police to bring offenders to book, or to people's apathy, rather than to an actual decline of such rumor-mongering. In all probability, the former was the case.

Similarly, other cities reported the striking progress of rumor-mongering as the war situation deteriorated. These rumors exaggerated unfavorable battle results, very naturally offered explanations of government changes, of the enemy's superiority, and of other vital wartime phenomena.

Tokyo police records indicate the following overall picture for police cases involving rumors:

Year	Total cases
1941.....	250
1942.....	500
1943.....	650
1944.....	480
1945.....	140

A special Tokyo metropolitan police board report of 1944 gives useful additional information. While the number of cases declined in comparison with the summer of 1943, the cases were described as "more malicious" and, it was feared that "many had gone

undiscovered." The dispositions in the following table, while not entirely clear, shows that, accordingly, stiffer measures were being taken, at least until 1944:

	Disposition of cases		
	Sent to (police) bureau	Detained or fined	Reprimanded
Oct. to Dec. 1943.....	6	4	133
Jan. to Mar. 1944.....	25	14	94
July 1944 to Apr. 1945 ¹	33	17	201

¹ These last figures are taken from the Tokyo background report.

The general discussion in this report may be taken as representative of many before the critical air-raid period:

Among such rumors, those concerning economic problems occupy top rank, followed by those concerning the military, and this truly reflects the impact of war on the mind of the masses. Economic rumors concern hoarding, black market dealings, suicides of whole families because of the rice shortage, uncertainty of bank deposits. Military rumors deal with Imperial headquarters communiques, leaks of military secrets, and a German-Russian armistice. Others involve evacuation, conscription, and cabinet changes... The fact that the rumor mongers belong, on the whole, to the lower classes and especially among women and persons in financial distress, seems to indicate the hardships of their

daily life . . . out of 71 cases of economic rumor control, 44 were comments on the actions of officers in charge, accusing them of hoarding and black market activities.

Rumor-mongering quite evidently constituted an especially widespread and popular form of subversion. Such subversive activity, which was probably devoid of political motivation in most cases, did have genuine political significance in a system which regarded disciplined opinion and dependence on standardized sources of information as vital to its existence and the effective prosecution of the war. The available evidence is sufficient to show that the aggressiveness of circulated rumors and probably also their volume increased as the deterioration of the war situation became apparent to the average man.

*Black Listening and Enemy Leaflets.*²⁵ Unlike the German case, illicit listening to enemy radio broadcasts appears to have played no appreciable role as an aspect of subversive activity in Japan.

When the police chiefs were questioned on this point they stated that, since short-wave listening was barred, all such sets had been taken in by the police. Our Saipan radio, operating long-wave, while audible in some localities, was as a rule effectively jammed by Japanese stations. The same informants asserted that, under the circumstances, it had no effect on "ordinary citizens." One added: "One or two people may have heard the program, but very few."

The same point was made by a Christian minister in Kyoto:

Since all the short-wave sets in Japan were confiscated by the government and the former possessors severely punished, the Japanese people had no way to hear broadcasts from America. I believe only a few officials had sets powerful enough to get the broadcasts from overseas.

An important businessman brought out that in such matters social differences played a definite role:

There was very little reception of Allied propaganda, and if a few of the people I knew had private short-wave radios with which to pick up news from Allied sources, they took great pains to hide the fact, as it was a dangerous thing. On the other hand, they were generally immune from investigation for their private views and private feelings in the matter, since their position in the community was so high.

Much the same impression may be gathered from other sources. And it is of considerable interest that there is no mention of such violations in available police records.

The following conclusions seem warranted:

1. There was very little listening to short-wave

²⁵ This subject is discussed more fully, from the point of view of propaganda and counterpropaganda, in Chapter 10.

broadcasts of Allied origin, because suitable receiving equipment had been confiscated.

2. It is likely that violations of this type were confined largely to those of higher social status who enjoyed some measure of immunity.

3. When Allied long-wave broadcasts became available after the fall of Saipan—this was practical only during the last half-year of the war—they do not seem to have penetrated very widely; partly, this may have been due to the effective jamming; partly, indoctrination may still have been effective enough to handicap such activities. Finally, it must not be overlooked that, while radio sets were presumably more widely available than anywhere in Asia, they were far less so than in the United States or in central and western Europe.

It could be expected that, under the circumstances, the circulation of propaganda leaflets of American origin might play a more important role. According to some testimony, such leaflets were, in the earlier period, casually read and delivered to the authorities, without making any particular impression because their propagandistic efforts could not prevail while the average man's morale lasted. A municipal official, however, relates the following episode:

I saw some of the leaflets. I was head of the Keibodan in our section of Kawagoe and one of the members had a leaflet which he showed to us. I don't know exactly where he got it because, as far as I know, none fell in Kawagoe itself. This pamphlet had a B-29 imposed over a map of Japan and then some small Japanese planes which looked sparrows. Everyone in the neighborhood saw it; because it was forbidden to see it, everyone wanted to see it. I think most of us saw the truth of the pamphlet. I remember one more, which was on rice rationing. It showed a table of how much rice we got before the war started and then how it gradually decreased until the present ration. We thought then that America must have very good information about Japan, and that they must be studying Japan very thoroughly. I know that all the Keibodan members were worried about how America got so much information.

The subversive reading and circulating of leaflets was apparently more widespread than "black listening". Its incidence may be closely connected with the development of rumor-mongering in the final phase of the war.

Air Raids and Subversive Activity

Ever since the Doolittle raid, the Japanese authorities had been apprehensive of the morale effects of aerial attack. The police could not be too sure of universally "correct" reactions by the people. After some of the American pilots had been captured and executed, a certain woman in Tokyo

was reported to have said: "What a pity." She was arrested as unpatriotic and given disciplinary punishment. It is not without significance that this incident became known throughout Japan as the "pitiful incident." Special instructions were issued for the more efficient prevention and control of possible air-raid-engendered subversion. The Doolittle raid occurred on 18 April 1942. On the next day the chief of the police section in the Home Ministry police bureau issued telegraphic instructions to the directors of all prefectural police bureaus.²⁹ While the public was commended for its calmness during that attack, it was urged that "opinions shall be cooperative and constructive, rely on announcements by the authorities; they must not be influenced by rumors circulated by the rank and file." The directive calls for especially rigid control of those who "criticize air-defense measures taken by the authorities, spread dissenting gossip, invite disunity . . . or undermine the public confidence." Those who exaggerated damages, indulged in guesswork about enemy plane bases, or urged severed relations with the Soviet Union were regarded as similarly in need of restraint. Another memorandum went out in May 1942, this time from the police bureau's foreign affairs section which imposed special restraints on the movements of foreigners during and after air raids.

The same well-founded concern is expressed in later statements. In the beginning of 1943, the central police authorities warn:

Although the air raids by enemy planes against our mainland have ceased with the one carried out in April of last year, we have received reports that the enemy has been establishing bases in the Aleutians and on the China mainland recently; therefore, frequent enemy raids on Japan proper are to be expected in the course of the war. Anticipating the worst conditions because of our inexperience with large scale air raids and our incomplete defenses, we fear that this may result in confusion and disorder everywhere.

What such confusion and disorder might involve is elaborated in a later (although undated) special police memorandum where special attention is drawn to demoralization among the "intellectual class":

As there is great danger that this will handicap the prosecution of the war, it has become imperative that public opinion not in accord with the demands of the war be more strictly controlled. Furthermore, in this connection there is special need for swift, timely, and thorough coordination (of such controls) in the areas and prefectures which are subject to air raids.

²⁹ *Instructions concerning the Control and Guidance of Opinion after Air Attacks*, 10 April 1942.

That these control efforts no longer enlisted any enthusiastic response in the spring of 1945 is illustrated by the symbolic tale of a Nagasaki professor of English, according to whose testimony the majority of his students already regarded the war as lost by the close of 1944. Morale further declined when the area raids had got underway:

Of course, if one talked about it too openly, he would be taken in by the Kempei-Tai or "thought control" police.

Q. Were there many who did?

A. Quite a few . . . It was forbidden to express doubt that Japan would win. The government said that the spirit was mightier than material resources. But a garbage collector spoke up and said he thought the contrary was true. He was arrested, severely lectured, and threatened.

The subversive reaction of the Nagasaki garbage collector was apparently not uncommon. The April 1945 regional survey by Domei emphasized that bombing experience had toughened only the particularly vigorous, especially among the young, while most others were in despair: "These sentiments," it adds, "are found among the women, the aged, and the wealthy . . ." This rough social diagnosis might be supplemented with one supplied by a Kempei officer:

The upper-class people were very selfish, and the lower-class people just wanted to eat. The Japanese middle class was very large. It was destroyed by fire and they became lower-class people, so both the upper and lower classes began to desire the end of the war. They became antigovernment.

Impossibility of Concealment. In Japan, as in Germany, the large-scale air raids demonstrated to all who had eyes to see, the crass disparity between the facts of war and official assertions and assertiveness. The resultant shock produced new subversive manifestations in addition to the earlier expressions of hostility and disaffection.

Overt expressions of subversion were markedly on the increase. A special police report of March 1945 recorded a decrease in the over-all figures for violations. It emphasized, however, an increase in songs and poems of an antiwar nature, and disorderly and uncooperative attitudes among the students and children in middle schools and in the primary schools of certain districts. One anonymous letter which had been addressed to the Minister of War Production lashes out at special Imperial privilege in a period of distress:

It is not an emergency requirement to build, under brutal air attacks, a special station for the Imperial visit . . . at the Hamamachida station. How can it dispose of the swords of misfortune which are now falling down on the heads of the nation?

The same report cites an incident involving a Tokyo employee of the Nippon Rubber Company

who, in February, was holding forth to her friends in the following vein:

Japan is imperialistic, Russia is communistic. Therefore, Soviet Russia will not easily help Japan under her present constitution. If Japan wants her help, Japan must turn communist. In that case, there will be the problem of the Imperial system. The Emperor will not be recognized in a communist society. He will be exiled or murdered . . . There are no distinctions between us. The Emperor is as human as we are.

The culprit is described as belonging to a cell with connections both in industry and academic circles ("left-wing elements of Tayama College").

By July, the special higher police reported a noticeable increase of overt subversive acts.³⁰ After summing up the growing demoralization among the various social groups, it continued:

This trend of thought is best seen in recent rumors, scribbings, and other manifestations which are numerically increasing. We have to pay attention to this trend. They say that the Japanese war leaders, or the leading circles, are responsible for the decisive battle against Japan proper, for intensified air raids, shortage of foodstuffs, acute inflation, etc., all of which have made people's lives hard. This indignation against the ruling class was shown in criticisms of military strategy and misrepresentations of the . . . attitude of military circles. Others speak ill of government measures and government communiques. They explicitly assume a hostile attitude toward government circles. Some others dare to speak of class antagonism.

A "thought police" report of July 1945 notes the progressive, year-by-year growth of the incidence of wall scribbings, letters to editors, songs, poems, etc., of an antiwar and antimilitary character. In terms of cases actually prosecuted before the courts, the picture given was as follows:

<i>Period</i>	<i>Total cases</i>
April 1942—April 1943	173
April 1943—April 1944	237
April 1944—April 1945	325

One official of the special higher police explained in this connection that, until April 1945,

people had only spoken of these feelings. Then they appeared in writing in latrines, in songs, poems, posters, etc. The propaganda itself had taken concrete form. It shifted from the rumor phase to the written phase.

Many average people apparently had become willing to take greater risks.

Air-Raid Rumors. The impact of the air raids upon rumor-mongering is even more clearly apparent from the documentary record. Such rumors (according to a July 1945 peace preservation section "Report on Rumors") had begun to exhibit a strik-

ing loss of faith in victory and growing anti-war sentiment after Leyte and the inception of the air offensive. This had been especially clear after the big Tokyo raids of 9-10 March 1945; it was reflected in the Tokyo record of 111 rumor cases presented to the prosecutor's office in April (as contrasted with a 1944 monthly average of 85 cases). Of these cases, 49 expressed an individual loss of faith and distaste for war, 18 concerned air raids, 14 military affairs, 9 the rift between the military and the people, 8 spy activities, 8 food problems, and 5 other matters. Those involving loss of faith in victory (44 percent) and the rift between the military and the people (8 percent), totalled over half of the cases which were submitted for prosecution for that period in Tokyo.

A marked growth in rumor activity was reported especially from coastal areas which feared invasion by enemy forces. Thus, Ibaraki prefecture had a total of 184 cases for that month, out of which 63 percent could be classified as antiwar and anti-military rumors.

Certain types of rumors mirrored the special attitudes and anxieties engendered by the great air offensive. Among these the following might be singled out: (1) Rumored reports of vast raid damages; thus we hear from the police chief of Huogo prefecture that since June 1944, after strategic bombing had started, there had been primarily exaggerated accounts relative to air-raid damages. There are many similar statements to this effect. (2) There were certain "protective" rumors; thus informants told of a rumor in Kokura that America would probably not bomb the Yawata Steel Works, because it produced more than half of Japan's war-time requirements which America would prefer to utilize herself after the war. Another was that people wearing "morning coats" would not be attacked for they would be considered American-style gentlemen, and there was a time when such a suit was worth more than 2,000 yen. It was also rumored that it was safer to be near American prisoner-of-war camps as there was less possibility of such places being bombed. There were also the possibilities of magic protection. Thus some said that to eat leeks made people immune to bomb hits, while others held that to bury sacred bamboo three feet under the ground by the southern part of one's house would keep the bombs away. A Tokyo refugee brought an excellent magical recipe for bomb protection to the unbombed town of Kano: a pickled onion which symbolized a bomb, placed on top of a bowl of red rice, was a proven means of protection.

³⁰ *The Trend of Public Thought after the loss of Okinawa*, 10 July 1945.

(3) Another type of rumor, suggesting a rational explanation for the enemy's terrifying aerial superiority, involved a flare-up of spy stories. The police chief of Kumamoto prefecture mentioned rumors that enemy planes were being signalled by someone, and a peace preservation section official stated that one of these rumors was especially widely circulated throughout the nation to the effect that, at the time of an air raid, there was someone in Ueno station who was flashing a flashlight toward the sky. A certain stationmaster was then reported to have been tried and promptly executed by the military police, together with three members of the station staff. Their heads were displayed in Tennoji park in Osaka.

These rumors reflect the whole range of people's anxieties and emotions during the impact of truly catastrophic events upon their personal lives.

Since adequate or truthful information about conditions in the bombed areas was normally lacking, rumors and exaggerated reports became an inevitable substitute. The Domei "Survey Data on Regional Conditions" conveys this very clearly:

The exaggerated accounts told by the sufferers, added to their own speculations, have made people in the outlying areas believe that the attacks are "terrible beyond imagination," and left the strong impression that there is "no way to combat air-raid disasters." (Akita) Or: The witnessing of an actual attack suddenly intensified the feeling of fear and anxiety. The faint-hearted, gathering all their belongings, started an exodus to the rural areas. A word of rumor multiplied ten-thousand-fold and spread like wildfire.

From metropolitan Tokyo it is reported that, during this period, rumors concerning the extent of damage, spies, etc., were rampant. The police chief of Hagi graphically described what happened in that locality:

At the end of May (1945) . . . the big cities had been bombed . . . As soon as the large cities were bombed, the people who had been taking it easy . . . realized that planes could raid Hagi . . . the people's trust in the Army began to weaken. After the bombing of Shimonoseki, Ube, and Tokuyama, the people who were bombed out started to come to their relatives in this town. They said that no matter how good shelters were, they were of no use . . . We could not control what they said.

From other places, typical statements were in this vein:

Especially when enemy bombings were greatly stepped up early this year and the war situation grew far worse, rumors about air-raid damages and our final defeat became numerous.

The rumor situation became so threatening that the newspapers were apparently permitted or even encouraged by the censorship to make explicit ref-

erences to the situation. Thus one paper, Yomiuri Hoeli, complained on 19 March 1945:

All sorts of rumors which defy ordinary sense, like: "today, Yamada was bombed" or "handbills say that Shinjuku and Yotsuya were bombed", were dominating the people's minds, instigating riots among the masses which were susceptible to warnings.

The situation was summarized by the Tokyo Asahi Shimbun on 17 March:

Such rumors invisibly eat up the people's energy because they are spread in workshops, in streets, and among neighbors.

The special case of the Koreans in connection with rumors is instructive. One undated report, presumably prepared in the spring of 1945, related that after one great air raid, rumors among Japanese concerning the Koreans increased twofold as compared with the day prior to the attack, while rumors among the Koreans increased approximately two and one-half times. Specifically the police found that:

1. Japanese stories concerning the lack of principles among the Koreans and their economic crimes decreased, while those relative to air raids tripled. These rumors stated that the Koreans aided and abetted enemy strategy and that they fled in the face of enemy action.

2. Since Okinawa and the intensification of the air war, "there has been a tendency among mainland Japanese to harbor suspicion of the Koreans."

3. Rumors among Koreans concerning raids had increased about twofold, "those speaking of fleeing or returning to Korea as an escape measure, threefold, those stating a desire to aid the enemy or to flee from the scene of action, fivefold."

Concrete illustrations of such Korean rumors are not lacking. A document dating from the end of 1944 or the beginning of 1945 mentioned one to the effect that Korean immigrants in the United States have formed a volunteer Army and are advancing on Japan:

Even now, the majority of the pilots in the planes which raided North Kyushu a few days ago were Koreans.

One Korean woman originated a widely-circulated rumor that, should enemy paratroopers come, they might kill the Japanese but would probably spare the Koreans.

Such and similar Korean rumor and gossip-mongering became significant, not only in conjunction with their inferior status in the community, but more particularly because the same documents suggest a considerable increase in their efforts at organizing nationalist resistance groups.

American Leaflets. The available materials do not contain relevant information on the incidence of black listening. The growing importance of the dissemination of American leaflets may be briefly illustrated. In Kyoto, 60 to 70 percent of the handbills scattered as late as April 1945 were found and handed over to the police, with allegedly little response from the citizens. In May, it is said,

no important response was expressed among the citizens, but we cannot deny that they gradually began to tell . . . giving rise to suspicion of Imperial headquarters communique.

In June, the leaflet warnings of air raids on other cities apparently led to rumors about impending attacks on several cities and widespread panic. A very similar story is told for Tokyo where it is alleged that the majority of people, as late as May and June, dismissed the leaflets as American propaganda and ignored their contents:

However, with the intensification of air raids and the fall of Okinawa into American hands, the number of Japanese who felt uneasiness for the future of the war had increased. Under these circumstances, many of them came to examine the contents of scattered bills more closely and finally, with increasing doubt in Japanese victory, accepted the truth of their contents.

Summary. There is no evidence which would suggest any notable developments of organized oppositional activities in this period, other than possibly among the Koreans. The following tentative conclusions on the connection between air raids and subversive activities suggest themselves:

1. Despite more vigorous control measures, the incidence of both overt subversion and rumor-mongering showed a distinct increase after March 1945. This can be safely asserted, since the available police statistics, after all, merely refer to actual "cases" which, even in Japan, in critical and confused times, would constitute a less than normal proportion of such "misconduct."

2. Subversive acts of this type changed not only in quantity but in quality. Overt criticism became more aggressive and the air-raid experience colored the content of criticism and recrimination.

3. Rumor-mongering, in this situation, was not only an expression of demoralization but it contributed to the demoralization of those who had hitherto not been directly affected. This was especially clear in the case of evacuees from bombed urban areas who entered unbombed areas.

4. Rumors and recriminations regarding a scapegoat minority group such as the Koreans rose especially sharply. Korean rumors, in turn, expressed

the heightened confidence of the persecuted and their expectation of speedy delivery. The increase of tension between Koreans and Japanese imposed an additional burden on the control authorities.

Conclusions

From the evidence it appears that there was a rather surprising amount of subversive and even some oppositional activity in wartime Japan, enough to warrant the visibly growing concern on the part of the authorities.

It must be borne in mind that the evidence used here stems exclusively from secret and confidential Japanese sources which deal, for the most part, with these activities in terms of cases which have been brought to book. Two considerations must be made in evaluating these data. In the first place, Japanese police practice suggests that a substantial amount of subversive activity which was considered to be of merely local significance went unrecorded. In the second place, the habit of displaying at least an external conformity and of exercising the utmost restraint no doubt meant that a certain amount of such activity remained undiscovered. On both grounds it can be seen that the incidence of subversion was considerably greater than is demonstrated by the record in Morale Division's possession.

It is fairly clear that most of these manifestations were unrelated to direct ideological causes. For the most part subversion was a more-or-less spontaneous reaction of the people to the stresses and strains of wartime deprivations and sufferings, which they increasingly ascribed to concrete economic, social, and ultimately political deficiencies at home. The Japanese authorities were usually inclined to exaggerate the ideological aspects of subversion, although there were a few notably realistic exceptions among them:

The above-described verbal outbursts are not the organized expression of the people. In probing deeply into these verbal outbursts and actions, the following factors bear watching. One is that these speeches and actions are embedded in leftist thinking and, from one point of view, they are the popularization of the leftist movement. Another point is that many of the reasons are rooted deeply in the living conditions of the people. In other words, these thoughts and actions do not arise ideologically but . . . from concrete reactions to living conditions. They have the characteristic of being a common reaction and of being easily transmitted to others. Thus, depending on the outcome of events, they have the dangerous characteristic of becoming speedily popularized. This tendency . . . will make further headway as the war becomes more critical for Japan, and especially when the air raids are intensified.

For these reasons, and as exceptional Japanese

police officials recognized relatively early, the coming of the great raids, which enormously intensified the pressures upon the people, induced a consider-

able increase of wartime subversive activity. There is no indication that organized oppositional activity was especially activated during this crisis period.

PORTION OF TOYOJIRO ITO'S NOTEBOOK

(A portion of a notebook on Toyojiro Ito's guidance of a left-wing organization, the so-called Tokyo Electric Group. Recorded 6 September 1943. Ito was formerly affiliated with Zenko All-Japan Co-operative Movement.)

The Tokyo Electric Group began its organization at the time of the previous incident (Preparatory Society for the United Reconstruction and Nationwide Unity, with Masaru Yuga as the central figure; arrested June 28, 1940) and after I was arrested, Abe was placed at the center of the organization. I believe it was around June of 1941 that I learned this when I met Shimpei Shimajiri soon after I had been released. I subsequently met Abe, Kodama, Uyeda, etc., and learned the general situation. At about 6 PM in the middle of January 1942 (was then working as a laborer for the Sumidagawa supply warehouse of the Accountants Bureau, Department of Railways) I had dinner at the Echigoya restaurant . . . (on Ozukahara boulevard behind the Tokyo Electric Plant No. 1) with Abe whom I met that day. We then went to the "Milk Hall" at the South Senzumi streetcar terminal to talk.

At this time Abe told me of recent factory developments after which he asked: "Japan has finally begun a real war against the United States and Great Britain, but what do you predict will be the final outcome; what are your views?" I replied: "The war of today is very complicated. At the time of the Sino-Japanese war, the Chinese, with the Communists at the core, fought against the Japanese militaristic aggression. This was clearly a war of liberation and a revolutionary war. However, in the case of Britain and the United States versus Japan, it is a so-called imperialistic war. Therefore whether Britain and the United States win, or whether Japan wins, it is a matter of gain only to the bourgeoisie, and the proletariat merely make the sacrifice." Then Abe cross-examined me thus: "If, however, the war is lost, there can't be a revolution or anything?" I said, "Listen well. This is how it'll all turn out. We have now engaged ourselves in battle with big capitalistic nations, such as Britain and the United States, as opponents. This war will inevitably be long and drawn-out. Because of this, there will be great human and material exhaustion, and as a result, the internal pres-

ures will increase tremendously; war weariness among the people will spread. Sooner or later, this will turn into a distinct antiwar cry which will rouse itself into a clamor. The various antigovernment parties and the Socialists and Communists, who were hitherto suppressed, will probably join the people's cry and rise midst their demands and slogans. The Liberals from the Liberal standpoint; the Social Democrats from the Social Democrats' standpoint . . . And our international experience to date has taught us that these have some sort of connection with Anglo-American imperialistic bourgeoisie. However, we can never be saved through them. The liberation of the proletariat is only possible at the hands of the proletariat themselves.

"For this purpose we must ever be prepared. Therefore, regardless of whether it be at times of peace or war, we must have some sort of organization.

"In other words, the shape and form does not matter. For example, it may be a literary circle or a baseball team. These should be organized and developed, and preparation for the future is absolutely essential. The government's attitude of today, it is true, is strict. However, there cannot be another time when revolutionary action will be as vital as it is today."

Abe had been listening quietly. Then he inquired, half to himself, "Since I am an intellectual, I wonder if I lack revolutionary ability and power in some respect?"

I immediately replied, "No, that is not true. We can see from international and historical experience that the intelligentsia have played a vital part in the different stages of development in revolutions. The proletariat are not very conscious of themselves at first. They are awakened by the propaganda and education at the hands of the intelligentsia. A revolution cannot be successfully effected by the intelligentsia alone. Neither is it possible for the proletariat to do it by themselves. Marx, Engels, Lenin—all belonged to the intelligentsia and, through the education and guidance from such men, the proletariat are able to take more interest in themselves and finally come to seek the path to self-liberation. In the present revolutionary war

of the Chinese people, the intelligentsia of China are carrying out important roles. Thus, the intellectuals cannot be called powerless and incapable; rather, they have great responsibilities.

“As for you, Mr. Abe, you can begin from your little workshop, the Tokyo Electric. You can utilize such a cultural circle, and through it you can educate the laborers, develop superior laborers and,

with these men as foundation, go on to form an organization. Then you can spread out by wards, then later by cities, and on to the entire nation. Thus, you will carry out your great role. The education and guidance at the Tokyo Electric is, at the present moment, the duty entrusted to you.” So I encouraged Mr. Abe.

SUBVERSIVE LETTERS

(Tokyo metropolitan police on 8 June 1945 learned that mimeographed letters entitled "To the Law-abiding People" had been mailed to elder statesmen and others. On 15 June, 14 copies of the same letter were found hanging in a public telephone booth in Surugadai, Kanda ward. On 26 July 1945 police obtained mimeographed letters entitled "Congratulations upon the Formation of the Koiso-Yonai Cabinet and a Proposal" which had been mailed to Cabinet members and others. While these cases were being secretly investigated, the same kind of mimeographed letters were uncovered in Kumamoto prefecture. A certain Tanaka, a sweeper, said he had discovered about 15 copies of the letters under a seat in a third-class car while he was cleaning Train 31 which had come from Tokyo. Under questioning, Tanaka admitted he had actually found 200 copies, which he pasted on his sliding screens. The letters are reproduced below.)

TO THE LAW-ABIDING PEOPLE

Think honestly about the present situation. Do you think we can win the war? What do you mean by "victory"? Do you think the enemy would give up admitting he cannot win from the Japanese? Do you think might is right? Think it over! Use common sense: Men will submit to reason, but not to force.

This war was originally started by a group which had ambitions to reform society without a correct perception of the world situation. Our enemy is not America or England. This group is our real enemy. The Communists are the enemy. What do you think of this reckless war and the befuddled administration at home? Taking advantage of this confusion, evil-minded government and police officials are constantly oppressing the law-abiding people by looting food and other commodities, or by intimidating them publicly, hiding behind the cloak of their authority. Under the administration of these public enemies, young men are sent to the battlefields from which they will never come back. And parents and wives and children will be left to starve in the name of rationing. Unless we do something about it, our soldiers will be killed in action and the people at home by bombs or starvation.

Do not let them deceive you any longer! Take off your Army uniforms, come home and work on your jobs. Restore constitutional politics and build a peace-loving nation. To accomplish that, the soldiers should kill all the radical elements with their arms. Destroy Tojo and the other high officials and get rid of the total mobilization law. The people are not the underlings of the military men and the government officials. Rather, the soldiers and officials are their employees whose duty it is to protect them. Destroy those with devouring ambition who hide behind the Emperor's cloak. Restore the parliamentary government which Emperor Meiji had established. Then this war will end automatically and peace will come again.

If you keep on fighting with an illusion that America and England are the enemies, everything will be lost and the Japanese race will destroy itself. Furthermore, if Soviet Russia and America occupy Japan, we will be placed in a worse condition than now. While we still have the power, we should form a peace cabinet and banish from Japan those Germans who lured Japan into this disaster. Destroy the pro-Russian elements. Make peace with the United States, Great Britain, and Australia, join the Religious World League, and establish a sound world. To do that, you must kill all the present high officials and form a cabinet with former industrialists who have seen hardships. Re-educate those headlong writers and scholars and Shinto priests. The students should do away with military training and concentrate on their studies.

The soldiers should return to their homes and work hard on their jobs.

Abolish the controlled economy and restore the free economy.

To: My Dear People on Earth.

From: Your Ancestor in the Ground.

**CONGRATULATIONS UPON THE
FORMATION OF THE KOISO-YONAI
CABINET AND A PROPOSAL**

The downfall of the Tojo cabinet which had deceived the Emperor and placed the people in the inferno of starvation had been expected anxiously by the awakened people. From ancient times, God has never allowed any conspirator who ignored justice to succeed. The premier who ruined a nation

and placed the people in an inferno of starvation should not be treated as an ex-official. Is it not a shame that while the ruling class does as it pleases, the people are arrested by police for going out to lay in food? Those people who belong to that class should all be condemned to capital punishment. See their ultimate objective, which was to become another Hitler or Stalin. By arresting all of this group in a body, expose their intrigue to the people. Find out the fact that these radical elements had stolen the Imperial rescript by intimidating the elder statesmen. (Also find out the fact that they had seduced Prince Tokamatu at "Tonbo," a waiting-house in Tsukiji, after holding some 60 councils in the Imperial presence.)

There is no definite object in this war. This war has been started by the Communists who incited the military with the objective to revolutionize the world. Having been exhilarated by the "new world order" or "new world structure," which is just a dream, this group is called the military who, ignorant of the realities of the world, tried to go back to absolutism by ignoring constitutional government.

If you participate in politics without knowing intrigue, you will never succeed. The real enemy are these reformists, and not America and England. In fact, these countries are the benefactors who brought civilization and culture to us. Unless politics is based on the spirit of punishing vice and rewarding virtue, it cannot accomplish anything. Destroy the evil-minded people in our country and apologize to the world. Then, realizing the fact that there are some people among the Japanese who

have common sense, the world may forgive us and bring peace again. On the other hand, if you continue to fight with the illusion that we can defeat America and England, Japan will come to ruin. Even if we were able to crush the enemy by one blow when the enemy nears our shore, unless we bomb Australia and America with about 10,000 planes, destroying their war industries, and demilitarize the enemy by landing at least 500,000 troops in Australia and more than a million in the United States, we cannot win final victory. Just how many thousands of ships over 1,000 tons are needed for the above operations can be easily calculated by military specialists. If we continue to fight until that time, our domestic horrors will be worse than hell.

I herewith wish to propose that the best thing for our country right now is to conclude peace terms with the enemy by announcing to the world that this war had been started by the revolutionists, while we still have some national strength left in order to avert such a disaster.

It is a way to serve God, to judge ourselves rather than to be judged by the enemy. That is, it is the judgment of Heaven. If the present cabinet is unable to do that much, it is the enemy of our race, and the curse on its members will be kept on their posterity. Whether to leave a good name or a bad name for posterity is up to you.

JULY 25, 1944.

To: Ministers of the Cabinet and the Elder Statesmen.

From: Your Ancestor in the Ground.

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

LIST OF REPORTS

The following is a bibliography of reports resulting from the Survey's studies of the European and Pacific wars. Those reports marked with an asterisk (*) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents at the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.

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- 10 Föcke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany
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- 25 Luftschiffbau, Zeppelin G m b H, Friedrichshafen on Bodensee, Germany
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