CHAPTER XI

OCEAN WARFARE

1st August - 31st December, 1942

 


FOOTNOTES

1. See Vol. I, pp. 505 and 547.
2. See pp. 256-257.
3. See Map 25.
4. The Sea Transport Officer at Durban sent a signal on the 28th of August saying that the Pasteur would sail from that port on the 30th for Rio de Janeiro, whence she was routed to Halifax. As the Berlin message to the Stier mentions Cape Town instead of Durban as the departure port, it seems unlikely that the enemy intercepted this message. His intelligence was, possibly, derived from careless talk about shipping movements, of which there was a good deal in South African ports at this time. At 22 knots the Pasteur could very well have reached the position in which the raider believed she had sighted her on the 4th of September.
5. See Morison, Vol. I, pp. 398-9. There is a considerable discrepancy, both as regards the time and the position of this epic encounter, between Professor Morison's account, which appears to be mainly derived from the reports of the Hopkins' survivors, and the War Diary of the Stier. The former says the enemy was sighted at noon, in 28° 08' South and 20° 01' West. The latter gives the start of the battle as 8:55 a.m. and the sinking of the Stier as taking place at 11:59 a.m. It is not known whether the discrepancy in times can be accounted for entirely by differences in the Zone Times kept by the two sides. As regards position it seems likely that the German one is the more accurate, observing that they saved most of their records and instruments, while the Hopkins' crew lost all theirs.
6. See p. 178.
7. See Map 25.
8. See Vol. I, pp. 284-286, 383-384 and Appendix M.
9. See pp. 178-179.
10. See pp. 269-271.
11. See Map 25.
12. See p. 276.
13. See p. 179.
14. See pp. 149-161.
15. See Map 25.
16. See Vol. I, pp. 470, 479-480, 542 and 546.
17. See p. 97.
18. See pp. 184-185.
19. See pp. 25-32.
20. See pp. 184-185.
21. See Map 25.
22. See pp. 184-185.
23. The Japanese account says that the Ondina hit the first raider, but the Bengal's report is emphatic that it was her own gunfire which did the damage.
24. Able Seaman H. Hammond was a Royal Australian Naval Reserve rating.
25. See Vol. I, pp. 21-22 and 140-141.
26. See pp. 182-184.
27. See Appendix N. In addition to the blockade runners the tanker Charlotte Schliemann, which had been acting as a supply ship for raiders and U-boats (see pp. 178-179) also reached Japan at this time.
28. See p. 269.
29. See Vol. I, p. 467.
30. The damaged ships were the Alabama, Tannenfels, Dresden and Portland. See Bruce Lockhart The Marines Were There, pp. 80-84 (Putnam, 1950) for a full account of this attack.


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