| ABC Conference, concept of Allied War Aims |
4 |
| |
-1 Agreement, of 27 March 1941 |
58 |
| Accommodations for landing craft crews |
578-580 |
| ACCUMULATOR, briefly discussed |
484 |
| AEAF Command, and brief discussion |
455 |
| Air bombardment failure to materialize at OMAHA |
518 |
| Air Corridor, suggested by AEAF to Adm Ramsay |
388 |
| |
restricted air attack on enemy forces in area |
389 |
| Air Forces, AEF, available in UK for support of NEPTUNE |
289 |
| |
available airlift for airborne troops |
290 |
| Air-Navy coordination of bombardment |
458 |
| |
Broad outline of Joint Fire Plan |
459 |
| |
Air bombardment plan |
462 |
| |
AF delayed furnishing Navy with details on fighter protection,
routing, air bombardment program |
388 |
| |
Adm Ramsay agrees to restrict AA fire with certain provisions |
388 |
| |
AF being shot down over SWORD beach -- first mention |
388 |
| |
Operations outline plan for COSSAC |
120 |
| |
Target priority |
120 |
| |
Bombing of civilian population |
125 |
| |
Protection of Invasion Forces |
454 |
| |
Use of Allied fighters |
455 |
| |
Spot, brief description, organization, technique, etc. |
471 |
| |
Observation Post, Army |
473 |
| |
Strength in comparison, German and Russian |
37 |
| |
Available for operations against the NEPTUNE forces (German) |
454 |
| |
Analysis of the various beaches and ability for air support of troops |
257 |
| |
Support of NEPTUNE Forces |
454 |
| ALERT, Anti-human torpedo operation, Human torpedoes |
322 |
| Allied Air Offensive, carried out on D-day in two phases |
280 |
| |
and other air targets on D-day |
281 |
| American Planning Staff views presented to British COS 1942 |
11 |
| Ammunition, methods of supply |
473 |
| Amphibious Attack, method for NEPTUNE |
263 |
| |
Broad plan for initial campaign |
263 |
| ANCXF, discussion of command regarding Gen Devers suggestion
of two distinct Naval Commands in OVERLORD |
195 |
| |
Excerpt on status of ANCXF by Admiralty publication |
197 |
| |
Cominch defined operation control |
200 |
| |
Designation of Adm Ramsay as |
209 |
| |
Proposed division of responsibility among the major authorities |
213 |
| |
Forces under operational command during NEPTUNE |
217 |
| |
Matters of concern in concert with 21 Army Group |
228 |
| |
Estimation of German naval forces |
246 |
| |
Unacceptable recommendation from NCWTF for pre D-day bombardment of Cherbourg |
383 |
| |
Issued Op-Order 24 April |
384 |
| |
Method employed in writing orders |
385 |
| |
Freeze further alteration of orders |
386 |
| |
Accepts AF routing plan over beaches over NCWTF objections |
389 |
| |
Transport for Army Air Spotters, cubs, etc. |
389 |
| ANCXF, organized COTUG on 24 May to deal with tug problem |
391 |
| |
VIPs visiting |
391 |
| |
Signals H-hour for forces |
393 |
| |
Meetings held to examine weather forecasts |
393 |
| |
Signal for postponement promulgated 0515 |
395 |
| |
Forces allotted to CinC Plymouth for CORK |
418 |
| |
CinC Portsmouth responsible for operating forces on
western flank of SPOUT |
422 |
| |
Assigned screening responsibility to force commanders, Home
commands--convoys; force commanders--assault area |
425 |
| |
Retained direct control for minesweeping in ten initial channels |
435 |
| Anglo-American basic plan regarding relations |
344 |
| |
Adm Stark informs Cominch of support by British |
345 |
| |
Naval Operations discussed |
344 |
| ANVIL, Gen Eisenhower's report on |
102 |
| APPROACH, definition and brief discussion |
438 |
| |
Troubles of minesweepers |
440 |
| ARCADIA Conference, 3 broad strategic plans for conduct of War |
5 |
| |
Decision to concentrate on defeat of Germany |
9 |
| |
Main points to be emphasized by PM to Americans |
54 |
| Army Forces, AEF, operationally available land forces for NEPTUNE |
287 |
| |
Group D, military force assigned Von Rundstedt to defend West |
233 |
| Assault, situation at the end of the first 24 hours |
559 |
| |
and Follow-Up loaded and assembled (British) |
375 |
| |
Brief description of duties of various units during assault |
282 |
| |
Objectives once armies were ashore |
283 |
| Barbed wire, German use of, in defense |
238 |
| Barker, Brig Gen R.W., Head of U.S. Section of COSSAC |
87 |
| Batteries, location of enemy batteries |
468 |
| Beach Battalions, description of duties |
574 |
| |
Joint conferences regarding |
575 |
| Beaches, amount landed over beaches in the first 30 days |
573 |
| Beach Reconnaissance, brief description |
158 |
| BEAVER, Operation by force "U" 29-31 March |
364 |
| Bell, Commander T.I.S., Chief Principle Beachmaster in "S" |
557 |
| Bennett, RAdm A.G., "Advance Group Amphibious Forces LantFlt" |
339 |
| Bieri, RAdm, planning section ANCXF of SHAEF as Deputy CoS |
387 |
| BIGDRUM, Brief description |
147 |
| |
Composition of force |
319 |
| |
Responsibility of Naval Commander Force "U" |
484 |
| BODYGUARD, brief description with a list of "Stories" |
140 |
| |
Graph showing control of stories |
144 |
| |
Overall results of cover and deceptive operations in graph |
167 |
| BOLERO, Plans of Washington and London committees |
75 |
| |
Troop movements began under BOLERO July 1942 |
75 |
| |
Approved in April 1942 |
61 |
| |
Progress of shipping in table form |
77 |
| |
Duties charged with |
63 |
| Bombardment Force, number of ships forming |
316 |
| |
Objects of |
317 |
| |
Spotting performed by |
317 |
| |
Ships allocated for Bombardment forces |
317-320 |
| |
Navy-Air Coordination |
458 |
| Bombardment objectives |
458-459 |
| |
Principles of bombardment |
459 |
| |
Broad outline of Joint Fire Plan |
459 |
| |
Air Plan |
462 |
| |
Naval plan and objectives |
464 |
| |
Schedule of fire |
468 |
| |
Targets |
469 |
| BOMBARDON, brief description |
326 |
| Bomber Command (RAF) Operations night preceding D-day |
462 |
| BRAVADO, Plan for minelaying Kiel Canal |
413 |
| British Chiefs of Staff, objections to Gen Marshall's 1942 invasion plans |
12 |
| |
Four conditions to be met for a cross Channel attack |
29 |
| |
Strategy and concepts as the war progressed |
25 |
| |
Views on Mediterranean and North African possession |
15 |
| British Joint Planning Staff, set to work by PM
to implement the concepts of War Cabinet May 1940 |
51 |
| Brooke, Sir Alan, invited to inform Russia date of OVERLORD |
46 |
| Bryant, Adm, CTF 124.9 in Force "O" Texas flagship |
467 |
| |
Second in command to Adm Deyo in Bombardment of Cherbourg CTF 129 |
477 |
| BUCCANEER, Reduction of forces in favor of OVERLORD |
106 |
| BUCO, brief description of |
312 |
| |
Build Up Control Organization an inter-service body |
580 |
| Build-up, race depended upon three conditions |
29 |
| |
Primary naval duty of AEF was build up for battle of France |
563 |
| |
Problems of the build up summarized into 3 main tasks |
563 |
| |
Problems not noted or encountered in other amphibious operations |
565 |
| |
Dual control after D-day |
573 |
| |
For offensive land operations |
311 |
| |
Number of ships and craft in operation |
313 |
| |
Brief of plan |
311 |
| |
Methods of transport |
311 |
| |
Objectives sought in Build up plan |
285 |
| |
Facilities planned for Air Forces by certain dates |
285 |
| |
Sailing of all ships and craft were arranged for certain requirements |
286 |
| Bush, Captain, Commenting on crews of landing craft in "S" area |
556 |
| Captain (Patrols) delegated to screen Eastern Assault Area,
title given by NCETF |
426 |
| |
System of defense employed |
426 |
| Cargo-Vehicles, responsibility for loading between USA and USN |
563 |
| Casablanca Conference, British studies formed the basis for
policy on Cross Channel preparations |
79-81 |
| |
Strategy for 1943 |
20 |
| Casualties to naval personnel in Force "O" |
531 |
| |
Among Demolition Units |
531 |
| Chain of Command for the Assault Phase |
191 |
| |
Naval system of Command |
193 |
| |
Twelfth Fleet's position |
204 |
| Chief Naval Administrative Officer (Rivett-Carmac) dealt with
Shore Organization |
565 |
| Chief of Staff Review of situation found for facts (Nov 1943) |
39 |
| |
(British) recommendations on ANVIL and OVERLORD |
113 |
| Chief of Staff (American) point of view effect of Gen Montgomery's
change of OVERLORD Plan |
108 |
| |
Summary of European situation 1 Nov 1943 |
34 |
| Chronology, OVERLORD Naval Command |
222-226 |
| |
D-6 day to D-75, briefly discussed |
332 |
| Coastal Air Operations during the crossing and assault |
324 |
| Coastal Batteries, description of types used |
241 |
| |
Command (RAF) duties of command |
449 |
| |
Command organization |
450 |
| |
Composition of Coastal Command |
451 |
| |
Offensive against Norway based U-boats |
451 |
| |
Operations during invasion |
452 |
| |
Description of enemy's coastwise transport |
453 |
| COCKADE, brief description |
136 |
| Combined Chiefs of Staff, Overall strategy for 1943 |
20 |
| |
Agreement at Arcadia |
10 |
| |
First session January 1942 |
10 |
| |
Casablanca policy determined by two British studies |
79 |
| CinC Plymouth charged with sealing western approaches to Channel
to submarines |
418 |
| |
Organized sea barrier known as CORK |
418 |
| |
Forces allotted for CORK |
418 |
| |
Regarding telephone between Adm Moon and Adm Hall on postponement |
500 |
| Combined Commanders Committee |
52 |
| Cominch, ComNavEu requests base maintenance organization |
345 |
| |
Commo Edgar to Amphibious force |
358 |
| |
Designates Adm Moon to command new force of increased assault |
302 |
| ComLandCrabEu, Brief description |
346 |
| |
Adm Wilkes assigned to duty as |
347 |
| |
Facilities prepared -- types |
349 |
| |
List of bases provided by the British |
349 |
| |
Placing ships in force organization |
356 |
| |
Responsible for executing maintenance. List of units
assigned for task |
367 |
| |
Task to be performed |
346 |
| |
Establishment of |
346 |
| |
Assigned task of staging and mounting the operation of
Western Task Force by CTF 122 |
380 |
| ComNavEu, earmarked bases in England |
344 |
| |
Obtained basic plan for Anglo-American relations |
344 |
| |
Requested Cominch supply base maintenance organization |
345 |
| |
Organization and action |
338 |
| ComSenFor, to take over HQ and Communication established ashore
when situation warranted withdrawal of NCWTF |
579 |
| ComGen ETOUSA, charged with |
76 |
| CTG 122.4 delegated command and responsibility for area screen
by NCWTF (Capt. Harry Sanders, USS Frankford) |
428 |
| CTF 122 assigned to CTF 127 task of staging and mounting operations
of Western Task Force |
380 |
| |
CTF 127 Assigned task of staging and mounting the operation of
Western Task Force |
380 |
| |
CTF 129 25 June Adm Deyo made Com bombardment group for Cherbourg |
477 |
| |
Composition of TF 129 |
477 |
| Control vessel, used in marking beaches |
501 |
| |
Mistook Raz de la Percee for Pointe du Hoc |
542 |
| Convoy, British method of sending |
402 |
| |
American method of sending |
402 |
| |
Method of Landing |
403 |
| |
General plan for routing |
405 |
| |
General description of the convoys |
410 |
| |
"O" crossing channel |
516 |
| COPPERHEAD, description of |
148 |
| CORK Sea barrier to western channel approaches. Organized by
CinC Plymouth |
418 |
| |
Composition of forces |
418 |
| |
General disposition of forces D-day eve |
419 |
| |
No known losses to U-boats in first 2 months of operation |
421 |
| |
Brief description of |
324 |
| |
Air barrier by Coastal Command |
452 |
| CORNCOBS, briefly discussed |
326 |
| |
First convoys to sail for assault area |
392 |
| |
Diverted to Poole on postponement |
396 |
| Corry, USS, sunk by mine at UTAH 6 June |
504 |
| COSSAC, briefly described |
1 |
| |
Forming of, and selection of British officer in charge |
82 |
| |
Functions and organization |
83 |
| |
Directive ordering submission of first plan by 1 Aug |
86 |
| |
Representatives on COSSAC staff |
86 |
| |
U.S. Naval section by names |
88 |
| |
Forces available at original planning, ground, air ships |
90-93 |
| |
Survey of German disposition for defense of the French coast |
94 |
| |
Selection of assault beaches |
95 |
| |
Three conditions to be met for success of OVERLORD in 1944 |
97 |
| |
British views of Plan at QUADRANT |
98 |
| |
American views of Plan at QUADRANT |
98 |
| |
Recommendations for land command |
181 |
| |
Measures requiring immediate action if OVERLORD in May 1944 |
100 |
| |
In regards to lift |
100 |
| |
Committee gathering information on enemy radar stations |
479 |
| |
Calculations for reasonable prospect of success |
134 |
| |
Plan for keeping German forces in Normandy below set maximum |
134 |
| COTUG, Organized on 24 May dealt with NEPTUNE Tug problem |
390 |
| Cover and Deception, briefly discussed |
137-153 |
| |
Graph showing control of "Stories" |
144 |
| Covering forces for channel crossing |
319 |
| Cross Channel Operation, responsibility for planning |
21 |
| |
First plan devised by Paget, Douglas and Mountbatten |
173 |
| CRUICKSHANK, briefly described and discussed |
62 |
| Dan Buoys and their use in the invasion |
440 |
| |
Layers attached to FMS flotillas |
313 |
| d'Argenlieu, Adm, question of French command |
387 |
| Darthema, HMS, towed sub X-20 back to Portsmouth from Assault Area |
550 |
| D-day, original May date selected for three primary reasons |
273 |
| |
H-hour signaled by SCAEF on 23 May by special code |
392 |
| |
ANCXF announces force's H-hours |
393 |
| |
Basic H-hour for ETF and WTF 0645-0610 |
393 |
| |
New schedule for five H-hours |
397 |
| |
Rescheduled for June |
273 |
| |
Selection of H-hour |
274 |
| |
Tidal conditions desired by Army, Navy |
274-276 |
| |
Possible D-day and H-hour combinations |
275 |
| DD Tanks, late landing not serious |
503 |
| |
In order of landing at OMAHA |
518 |
| |
Effective firing in "S" area |
554 |
| |
Adm Hall comments on Secret weapons being no secret |
543 |
| |
Great value at SWORD and UTAH |
544 |
| |
Got quickly knocked out at OMAHA |
544 |
| |
Disposition on landing on various beaches |
544 |
| |
RAdm Talbot comments |
554 |
| Deception means employed to lead enemy to belief that
invasion was imminent |
159 |
| |
Means used to keep operations secret |
160 |
| Defense of Assault Area, briefly discussed |
320 |
| |
Forces available |
321 |
| Delivery of Army units on the Far Shore |
402 |
| Demolition Unit to hit the beaches with earliest waves |
501 |
| |
Adm Hall states 41% casualties |
520 |
| |
Casualties |
531 |
| Destroyers based and attached to Home Commands |
320 |
| DeWitt, Gen, briefly mentioned regarding FUSAG |
154 |
| Deyo, Adm, CTG 125.8 in Force "U" in Tuscaloosa |
467 |
| |
Designated CTF 129 on 25 June for bombardment of Cherbourg |
477 |
| Dill, Field Marshal Sir John, Outlined British views concerning
size of the forces which the U.S. should send to Europe |
56 |
| Diversions by navy discussed |
483 |
| DIXIE Line, briefly described |
428 |
| Doctrine for Unity of Command |
177-179 |
| |
Admiral King's view in this regard |
179 |
| |
Naval system of command |
193 |
| Douglas-Pennant, Commo, Com Force "G" |
374 |
| |
Bombardment Force "G", flag in Bulolo |
346 |
| DOWNSTREAM, briefly discussed |
152 |
| DUCK operation held 31 Dec 1943-2 Jan 1944 |
361 |
| Eastern Task Force casualties |
537 |
| EBP 1, loading and routing (1st Build-up) |
401 |
| ECT 2, loading and routing (1st Build-up British) |
401 |
| Eisenhower, Gen D.D., Directive regarding SAC |
187 |
| |
Chain of Command |
189 |
| |
Outstanding problems facing him on assumption of SAC |
190 |
| |
Commenting on Force "U" assault |
506 |
| |
Presents invasion draft to Marshall 3-12-42 |
60 |
| |
Arrives in London with Clark, Arnold, Adm Towers to discuss
BOLERO 25 May 1942 |
63 |
| |
Describes operations SLEDGEHAMMER |
70 |
| |
Reason for increase to 5 divisions for assault |
111 |
| |
View on OVERLORD |
116 |
| |
Agreements with British COS |
118 |
| |
Became ETOUSA 24 Jun 1942, Jul 1942 Supreme Allied Commander |
175 |
| |
Commenting on invasion surprise |
490 |
| |
Comments on British success at Orne and Caen area |
559 |
| |
Describes American operations |
561 |
| Eleventh Amphibious Force, establishment |
343 |
| |
Size of force upon assumption of command by Hall |
355 |
| |
Placing ships in position in force organization |
356 |
| |
Organized to meet special requirements |
359 |
| |
Forces in Eleventh Amphibs |
363 |
| |
Force Responsibilities |
207 |
| Enemy reactions to assault forces |
382-383 |
| |
Reasons for failure of more effective reaction |
383 |
| ENTHRONE Operations for laying sonic under water buoys |
439 |
| Escort Force for convoys |
432 |
| EUREKA Conference military conclusions |
46 |
| |
Three courses of action for future developments |
47 |
| |
Three pre-eminent facts in the European military situation |
47 |
| Exercises for amphibious training |
360 |
| |
Experiments and trails made during exercises |
361 |
| FABIUS last full scale rehearsals before NEPTUNE 3-6 May |
365 |
| |
Adm Hall executes force "O" under FABIUS |
366 |
| Far Shore establishment in three phases |
566 |
| |
As soon as beaches secure control goes to FOBAA and FOWEST |
566 |
| |
Basic tasks during three phases |
567 |
| |
Development charged to Task Force Commander |
567 |
| |
British Area |
567-570 |
| |
American Area |
570-572 |
| Ferry forces composing ferry phase of Build-up operations |
312 |
| |
Control, briefly described |
576 |
| |
Officers responsible for control of crews |
579 |
| |
Temporary disablement of 70% by near disastrous storm |
573 |
| Fifteenth Army defense area |
233 |
| Fighter protection for NEPTUNE forces |
455 |
| |
During the crossing and assault |
324 |
| First Army composition |
233,
359 |
| |
Locations for formations in England |
360 |
| Follow-up forces loading and assembly |
305 |
| |
Program of assault |
308 |
| |
Approach and time table |
308 |
| FOBAA (Rear Adm J.W. Rivett-Carmac), responsibilities of |
568 |
| Force "B" follow up loading and routing |
401 |
| |
"G" composition |
270,
546 |
| |
Loading and routing |
400 |
| |
Commanded by Commo Douglas-Pennant |
374 |
| |
Brief discussion on training period |
374 |
| Force "J" composition |
548 |
| |
Loading and routing of convoy |
400 |
| |
Error in movement along route |
407 |
| |
Brief description of its content |
270 |
| |
Brief history of Force "J" |
372 |
| |
Capt Hughes-Hallett commanding |
372 |
| |
Adm Vian Commanding, Nov 43 |
372 |
| |
Commo Oliver relieves Vian |
372 |
| |
Loaded and routed via |
400 |
| Force "L" loading and routing |
401 |
| Force "O" loading and routing |
400 |
| |
Tail of Convoy O.2 drifts from route in crossing |
408 |
| Force "V" |
153 |
| Force "U" loading and routing |
400 |
| |
Tail of convoy U.2 drifts from route in crossing |
405 |
| |
Lands between 1,000 and 1,500 yards south of intended point |
409 |
| |
Primary and secondary control vessels became casualties |
409 |
| FORTITUDE, briefly discussed |
146,
151 |
| FORTITUDE NORTH, briefly discussed |
147 |
| FORTITUDE SOUTH, briefly discussed |
147 |
| FOX operation by amphibs in which APAs were first used |
364 |
| Free French landed in assault with Commandoes |
556 |
| French ships to be used in invasion |
387 |
| FUSAG under command of Eisenhower |
157 |
| |
Mythical force |
159 |
| Gerhardt, Maj Gen commander of 29th Inf Div of 5th Army |
362 |
| German Air Forces, affected after Italian surrender |
27 |
| |
Forces available for air operations against NEPTUNE |
454 |
| |
Reaction to the landing |
457 |
| |
Brief compilation of air available |
250 |
| |
Estimated maximum scale |
251 |
| |
Defenses consisted of tunnels, etc. at OMAHA |
523 |
| |
Defense plan, briefly discussed |
234 |
| |
System of coast defenses based on three principles |
253 |
| |
Allied plan to overcome German defense system |
253 |
| |
Gridded batteries |
458 |
| |
Fighter forces required for invasion in Caen area |
128 |
| |
Necessary air situation prior to assault |
129 |
| |
Reduction of fighter forces by bomber offensive |
130-132 |
| |
Fleet, briefly discussed |
154 |
| |
Fleet stationed in Norwegian waters |
416 |
| |
Reasons for fleet inactivity |
417 |
| |
Estimated forces in Biscay area |
418 |
| |
Operations by German destroyers 6-9 June |
420 |
| |
COSSAC survey of disposition of forces for defense of French coast |
94 |
| |
Effect of a strong Italian campaign on forces |
44 |
| |
Relative strength in 1944, reasons for opinion |
80 |
| |
List of major naval vessels |
246 |
| |
ANCXF appraisal of enemy vessels |
246 |
| |
Disposition between Bight and Bay of Biscay |
248 |
| |
Forces available to attack NEPTUNE |
410 |
| |
Allied naval plan to defend against enemy threat |
411 |
| |
Forces disposed in southern reaches of the North Sea |
421 |
| |
Extent of activity in Dover Straits |
422 |
| |
Forces within Channel |
422 |
| |
Plans for U-boat employment |
451 |
| |
Destroyers trying to attack invasion forces |
453 |
| |
Naval losses on D-day |
563 |
| |
Strength of Axis fleets |
38 |
| |
Troop dispositions |
243 |
| |
Four general types of coastal divisions |
244 |
| |
Troops replacing Italians in event of surrender |
27 |
| Ghormley, VAdm R.L., Special Naval Observer |
338 |
| |
Designated ComNavEu 17 Mar 1942 |
339 |
| Group U.2.A ordered back on postponement |
499,
396 |
| Germany, predominant Axis power, declaration of |
1 |
| Glennon, USS, struck a mine and sank 8 June 1944 |
443,
504 |
| GLIMMER, briefly described |
147 |
| |
Composition |
319 |
| |
Under responsibility of VAdm Dover |
483 |
| GOOSEBERRIES, brief description |
326 |
| GRAFFHAM, briefly described |
147 |
| Group "J" composition |
548 |
| Group "S" composition |
554 |
| HADRIAN, briefly discussed |
62 |
| Haida, HMS, engaged with HMS Hurron in operation GLIMMER |
484 |
| Hall, RAdm J.L. Com11th Fleet |
343 |
| |
Duty prior to 11th Fleet assignment |
343 |
| |
Size of force upon assuming command |
355 |
| |
Executes operation FABIUS Force "O" |
360 |
| |
Commenting on beach obstacles |
491 |
| |
Presented to the King of England |
391 |
| |
Comments on DD tanks |
543 |
| |
Describes the OMAHA assault |
507 |
| |
Commenting on transport area |
517 |
| |
Commenting in regards to obstacles |
519 |
| |
Commenting on landing |
532 |
| |
Telephone conversation regarding postponement |
500 |
| Hards, description of |
352 |
| |
Specially constructed in several ports |
352 |
| H-hour tidal conditions needed by Army and Navy |
274-276 |
| |
Possible D-day and H-hour combinations |
275 |
| |
Benefits of the selected H-hour |
282 |
| Home fleet forces assigned to protection of NEPTUNE forces |
416 |
| Hopkins, Mr. Harry accompanied Marshall to England with plan |
60 |
| Hot Bunk System used in accommodating crews of landing craft |
579 |
| Housing for personnel ashore in England |
350 |
| Hurd Deep, briefly discussed |
419 |
| Hurron, HMS, along with HMS Haida engaged in operation GLIMMER |
484 |
| Human Torpedoes used in July |
427 |
| Huse, Commander J.O., PhibsEu |
340 |
|
| Maintenance, list of units responsible under Comlandcrabeu |
367 |
| |
Work accomplished on various craft |
364 |
| |
Salvage units operating in U.S. sector |
330 |
| MAPLE, briefly described |
412 |
| |
Forces involved |
412 |
| |
6,850 mines laid during operation and location |
415 |
| |
MTB-203 sunk in operation and casualties |
415 |
| Marshall, Gen, opinion of British general policy in Mediterranean and N. Africa |
17 |
| |
Views on Washington Conference |
64 |
| |
Allied operations in European theater |
23 |
| |
Visit to England, 1942 |
11 |
| |
Oppositions regarding future operations |
22 |
| |
Agrees on Ike's invasion plan, goes with Hopkins to England |
60 |
| |
Describes results of Conference in London in 1942 |
62 |
| |
Recommendation on OVERLORD and ANVIL |
113 |
| |
Feelings in regards to ANVIL and OVERLORD |
113 |
| |
American Planning Staff added to Combined Com Staff |
174 |
| |
Asks for U.S. SAC at Quebec Conference |
182 |
| |
Views on overall SAC with subordinate SAC Med, SAC OVERLORD |
183 |
| |
British view on his SAC proposal |
184 |
| Maynard, Capt, Commander of APAs of Force "U" |
364 |
| McNair, Gen, briefly mentioned in connection with FUSAG |
159 |
| Mediterranean operations being considered, forwarded to Stalin by Roosevelt |
42 |
| |
British COS view in regards to operation in Mediterranean |
31 |
| |
British view that action should be directed in 1943 |
27 |
| |
British COS views regarding Allied possession of Africa |
15 |
| Merchant service in Build-up operations |
311 |
| |
Forces composing Merchant phase of Build-up |
311 |
| |
Shipping and losses shown in table by periods |
38 |
| |
Progress of BOLERO shipping shown in table form |
77 |
| Meredith, USS, struck a mine and sank 8 June |
443,
509 |
| Messing facilities for landing craft crews, shore parties |
580 |
| MESSPOT, briefly described |
151 |
| Military forces deployed by U.S. in two theatres |
9 |
| Minelaying object |
322 |
| |
Forces taking part |
322 |
| |
Operation |
323 |
| |
By aircraft |
325 |
| |
By Germans prior to D-day |
383 |
| |
First steps of operation CORK |
419 |
| |
Operation MAPLE |
412 |
| |
Forces employed in operation MAPLE |
412 |
| |
More objects of minelaying |
413 |
| |
BRAVADO was for Kiel and approaches |
413 |
| |
Six phases of minelaying plan up to and beyond D-day |
413 |
| |
Enemy's minelaying counter-attack |
443 |
| |
Ships sunk by mines |
443 |
| |
Enemy's use of unsweepable mines |
443 |
| |
Number and location of mines laid in MAPLE |
415 |
| |
Enemy mine situation within NEPTUNE waters |
433 |
| |
Five general steps for dealing with mines in NEPTUNE area |
434 |
| Mines used in German defense |
238 |
| |
Unsweepable mines, briefly described |
443 |
| |
Steps taken to counter unsweepable mines |
443 |
| |
Ships lost to and enemy mines accounted for |
446 |
| |
Greatest enemy of Force "U": |
504 |
| Minesweeping, dealt with in five general steps in NEPTUNE |
434 |
| |
Home CinCs responsible for minesweeping |
435 |
| |
Arrangements in assault area |
435 |
| |
ANCXF retained direct control in the initial ten channels |
435 |
| |
Total strength of Allied minesweepers engaged in assault |
436 |
| |
Briefly, the activity of sweepers during operation approach |
439 |
| |
Tasks after sweeping channels and areas |
441 |
| |
Inshore waters |
442 |
| |
Operations at Cherbourg |
444 |
| Montgomery, Gen Sir Bernard L, Revision of OVERLORD Plan |
108 |
| |
U.S. point of view of net effects of this change |
108 |
| Moon, RAdm Don P, designated to command new force |
362 |
| |
Adm at end of Jan 1944 |
363 |
| |
Approximate number of ships under his command |
494 |
| |
Telephone conversation with Adm Hall re postponement |
500 |
| |
Commenting on enemy gunfire |
504 |
| |
Trouble with acoustic mines |
505 |
| Mooring facilities had to be prepared at following ports |
353 |
| Morale failing in Germany |
127 |
| |
Discussed in report of JIC of 18 May 1944 |
131 |
| Morgan, Lt Gen Frederick E, Plans for Cross Channel Attack |
52 |
| |
Initial work on ROUNDUP |
52 |
| |
Reasons for selection as head of COSSAC |
82 |
| Mountbatten, Lord Louis, consulted on Cross Channel Attack Plans |
52 |
| |
Assisted in devising first plan with Paget and Douglas |
173 |
| MOVCO, briefly discussed |
313,
232 |
| |
Responsibility of USA and USN under |
376 |
| MTB-203 sunk night of 18/19 May in MAPLE operation |
415 |
| MULBERRIES, description |
326,
328 |
| |
First mentioned |
231 |
| |
Difference between A and B type |
327 |
| |
Difficulty encountered after construction faulty rigging |
387 |
| |
Parking problems |
390 |
| |
Tug shortages |
390 |
| Murdaugh Monarch (HMS Cable Layer) fired on by Plunkett 13 June |
430 |
| MUSKRAT, briefly described |
364 |
| Naval Bases and training areas selected early by ComNavEu |
344 |
| Naval Bombardment objectives |
464 |
| |
Composition of forces |
464 |
| |
Final allocation of ships |
466 |
| |
Results of bombardment |
474 |
| |
Excerpt from German military Journal |
475 |
| |
Bombardment of Cherbourg |
478 |
| |
Bombardment of enemy radar stations and networks |
480 |
| Naval Forces, AEF, taking part in NEPTUNE |
291-293 |
| Naval Operational command chain diagramed |
218 |
| |
After assault phase |
220 |
| |
Chronology of various steps in the evolution of OVERLORD Naval Command |
222 |
| Navigation system for location swept channels |
405 |
| |
Electronic navigational aids employed QH and QM |
406 |
| |
Deviations in error along routes |
406 |
| |
MLs designated navigational leaders |
408 |
| |
Aids for locating channels |
439 |
| |
PCs and SCs used as markers by US forces, MLs and DDs by British |
409 |
| Naval Combat Demolition Units, briefly discussed |
271 |
| NCWTF Recommendations to ANCXF D-day bombardment of Cherbourg |
382 |
| |
Doesn't accept Air Force routing plan over beaches |
389 |
| NEPTUNE, description of |
1 |
| |
Objective |
301 |
| |
Naval object |
301 |
| |
Broad Plan of Attack |
301 |
| |
Command |
302 |
| |
Forces taking part |
303 |
| |
D-day, H-hour |
303 |
| |
Loading and assembly of forces for follow-up |
305 |
| |
Attached forces |
306 |
| |
Merchant vessels |
307 |
| |
Reasons for success |
487 |
| |
General scheme of movements briefly discussed |
400 |
| |
Losses by U-boat |
421 |
| Nineteenth Army located in Mediterranean and Italian front |
233 |
| Nitro, USS, Ammunition carrier |
473 |
| Obstacles, submerged and dry responsibility divided USA and USN |
231 |
| |
Subjected to drenching fire |
469 |
| |
Adm Hall commenting on |
491 |
| |
OMAHA obstacles more numerous than intelligence reported |
511 |
| |
Encountered in "S" area |
555 |
| |
Craft driven at full speed through these waters |
555 |
| |
Adm Hall commenting on, in OMAHA area |
519 |
| Oliver, Commo G.N., Commanding Force "J" |
372 |
| OMAHA, Assault on Beach |
518 |
| |
Air bombardment failed to materialize |
518 |
| |
Considered landing part of Force "O" through "G" beaches |
522 |
| |
Enemy use of tunnels |
523 |
| |
Channel crossing |
507 |
| |
Described by Adm Hall |
507 |
| |
Major units of assault |
508 |
| |
Plan for assault |
511 |
| |
Bombardment force "C" |
513 |
| |
Assembled at five ports |
514 |
| Orders defined, (Op-Orders, ON_ONAD_ONCO) |
384 |
| |
Methods of writing employed by ANCXF |
385 |
| |
Freeze put on altering orders |
386 |
| Osprey, USS, First casualty of operation |
438 |
| OVERLORD, briefly described |
1 |
| |
Start of actual operation |
7 |
| |
Termination of operation |
7 |
| |
First decision to launch |
33 |
| |
President and PM had three decisions in regards to OVERLORD |
44 |
| |
Finally approved |
30 |
| |
EUREKA decision to launch during May 1944 |
47 |
| |
COSSAC agrees provided conditions met |
97 |
| |
Adm King allots necessary lift for five division assault |
119 |
| PARADISE, briefly described |
148 |
| Paratroop reinforcements in British sector |
557 |
| Passage, as defined for this operation |
437 |
| |
Troubles of the minesweepers |
440 |
| Patrols for Operation CORK |
420 |
| |
Along convoy lanes |
422 |
| |
Disposed in Channel |
423 |
| |
System of defense in Eastern and Western Areas |
426,
428 |
| Patton, Gen George S., briefly mentioned |
159 |
| PC-1176 as Control Vessel |
502 |
| PC-1261 struck mine in Cardonet minefield |
501 |
| Personnel, responsibility for loading between USA and USN |
377 |
| PHOENIX, brief description |
326 |
| Plunkett fires on HMS Murdaugh Monarch |
430 |
| PLUTO, briefly described |
329 |
| POINTBLANK Air bombardment of Seine Bay |
462 |
| Port defense by Germans |
240 |
| Postponement of D-day |
276 |
| Preparatory phase of landing |
281 |
| Pre-War Policy, unilateral statement of |
4 |
| Provisional Engineer Special Brigade, overall command of Shore Party |
571 |
| |
One brigade supported each division, one naval beach battalion to each brigade |
574 |
| |
Joint conferences |
575 |
| Radar stations in chain along English Channel |
423 |
| |
Counter-measures to prevent Germans locating Allied vessels |
468,
479 |
| |
German radar capabilities |
479 |
| |
Naval responsibilities in regards to destroying German radar |
479 |
| Radio deceptive methods |
162 |
| RCM Plan, Joint Army-Navy, evolved in 1943 |
479 |
| Ramsay, VAdm Sir Bertram, consulted in Cross Channel Plans |
52 |
| |
Reasons for selection as ANCXF |
211 |
| |
Estimate of reaction to NEPTUNE |
249 |
| |
Commenting on reasons for success of Operation NEPTUNE |
487 |
| |
Description of effect of surprise |
488 |
| |
Commenting on needs of a shallow draft tug for clearing beaches |
556 |
| |
Summarized events of D-day |
562 |
| |
Agreed to restict naval AA fire with certain provisions |
388 |
| |
In regards to Tug shortage |
390 |
| |
Decision in regards to D-day and H-hour |
392 |
| |
Assumed operational control of forces, 1200 1 June |
394 |
| |
Summarizes situation on eve of 4 June |
397 |
| |
Comments on lowering positions |
516 |
| |
Commenting generally on use of Rangers |
528 |
| Rangers, capture Isles de St. Marcouf |
502 |
| |
Landings on OMAHA |
512 |
| |
Attacking Pointe du Hoc |
526 |
| |
Late in hitting target of Pointe du Hoc |
526 |
| |
Admy Ramsay comments -- More Rangers and Comandoes than targets |
528 |
| RANKIN, briefly discussed, also cases A-B-C |
83-84 |
| Recovery and Repair of equipment and vessels |
581-582 |
| Responsibililty between Army and Navy (Kirk-Bradley Agreement) |
230 |
| Results of cover and deceptive operations |
166-169 |
| Rich, USS, struck and sunk by a mine 8 June |
443,
504 |
| Rivett-Carmac, RAdm, Chief Naval Administrative Officer |
565 |
| |
Developed organization for Far Shore |
567 |
| |
FOBAA |
568 |
| Rockets used by enemy |
524 |
| ROUNDUP, central concept provides for two phases |
65 |
| |
General outline of plan |
67 |
| |
Brief discussion |
63 |
| |
Full-scale invasion of France in 1943, planned in May 1942 |
62 |
| |
Provisional assessment of Naval Implications of ROUNDUP |
193 |
| Routing Plan, in general for NEPTUNE |
405 |
| |
Mistakes along channels to beaches |
406 |
| ROYAL FLUSH, briefly described |
148 |
| Royal Navy preparations |
371 |
| SAC, reason for appointing American commander |
175 |
| |
General Marshall asks for US SAC at Quebec Conference |
182 |
| |
Views on overall SAC with subordinate SAC MED, SAC OVERLORD, etc. |
183 |
| |
British views |
184 |
| |
Chain of Command |
189 |
| Saunders, Capt, delegated as CTF 122.4 |
428 |
| Salvage, maintenance and repair briefly described |
577,
578 |
| Saterlee, USS, comment on Rangers need for gunfire at Ponte du Hoc |
526 |
| SCAEF, signalled decision for D-day on 23 May by special code |
392 |
| |
Decided to postpone operation |
395 |
| |
Proceeds with operation on 6 June |
397 |
| Schnorkel-type subs used during invasion |
452 |
| Screening, assigned to force commanders |
425 |
| |
Home commands screened convoys, force commanders areas |
425 |
| |
Forces employed for screening by WTF |
428 |
| |
System of Defense in Eastern and Western Area |
426-428 |
| Scylla, HMS, flagship of Adm Vian |
541 |
| Security methods employed |
386 |
| |
Crossword puzzle |
387 |
| Seventh Army responsible for Western Channel and Brittany coast |
233 |
| Shipping (British), major uses of British shipping |
73 |
| |
Moving U.S. requirements |
74 |
| Ships, position in force organization |
356 |
| |
Hit in bombardment of Cherbourg |
478 |
| |
Sunk in Force "U" |
505 |
| |
Sunk in Force "O" |
530 |
| |
Sunk in Eastern Task Force |
537 |
| Shore Fire Control Parties, description, techniques, etc. |
470 |
| Shore Parties, in U.S. area |
571 |
| |
Joint Conferences |
575 |
| Ships allocated for bombardment |
318 |
| |
Major units of Force "U" |
494 |
| Shuttle forces of the Build-up operation |
311 |
| |
CCS agreement to bombing |
126 |
| |
Control briefly discussed |
581 |
| Sicily would save two million tons of shipping a year |
27 |
| SICKLE, description, Gen Eaker's plan |
124 |
| Signal stations operating in JUNO sector early |
552 |
| SKYE, brief description |
147 |
| Slapton Sands, approved base for American exercises |
351 |
| |
Exercises held |
364 |
| SLEDGEHAMMER, described |
13,
14,
61 |
| |
As Eisenhower describes it |
70 |
| Slips had to be built at ports to increase facilities |
354 |
| SPENAVO defined |
338 |
| Spotting for bombardment forces |
317 |
| |
Transport for Army spotting planes |
389 |
| |
Types of spotting used |
469 |
| SPOUT, brief description and location |
410 |
| Staging and Mounting task assigned to CTF 127 by CTF 122 |
380 |
| Stalin expresses views at Moscow |
42-43 |
| Stark, Adm, questioned Dill about size of US force needed in England |
56 |
| |
Informs Cominch of British support for AEF |
345 |
| STARKIE described |
136 |
| Strategic objectives of the Soviets |
41 |
| St. Marcouf captured by Rangers |
502 |
| Submarines used by British in Invasion |
395,
96,
408,
542,
550 |
| Sullivan, Commo, Salvage Organization at Cherbourg |
446 |
| Sunk by mines, etc. |
443 |
| Supporting Air Operations, forces available |
323 |
| |
Naval Operations, number of ships and craft in the Build-up |
313 |
| Svenner, H.Nor, M.S., sunk in SWORD area |
553 |
| SWORD Beach marked by submarines |
408 |
| Talbot, RAdm A.G., Com Force "S", flag in HMS Largs |
557 |
| |
Comments on DD tanks |
554 |
| |
Lands to see how assault landing progresses |
557 |
| |
Comments on torpedo attack |
537,
540 |
| Target priorities fixed 6 May 1943 |
131 |
| |
Bombardment |
469 |
| Task Force 122, Adm Kirk's establishment of this force |
204 |
| |
Reports as U.S. Naval Task Force Commander |
212 |
| |
Disolved and reverted to Com12thFlt |
225 |
| TAXABLE described |
147 |
| |
Composition of forces |
319 |
| |
Under responsibility of VAdm Dover |
484 |
| Texas, USS, comment on Rangers need for gunfire on Pointe du Hoc |
526 |
| Task Group 124.9, Bombardment Group of Force "O" |
467 |
| Task Group 125.8, Bombardment Group of Force "U" |
467 |
| Tide, USS, sunk by mine at UTAH |
443,
504 |
| TIGER, Force "U" operation |
365 |
| |
E-boats attack during operation |
365 |
| TINDEL described |
136 |
| TITANIC described (4 phases) |
147 |
| TORCH, opposed invasion |
62 |
| |
Decision to launch made in November 1942 |
39 |
| Torpedo attack on Force "S" |
537 |
| TORRENT, described |
135 |
| Training deceptions in connection with FORTITUDE |
157 |
| Transport methods for build up of assault |
311 |
| |
Brief description of Ferry Control |
576 |
| TROUTFLY, briefly described |
148 |
| Tug problem in connection with MULBERRIES |
390 |
| |
COTUG organized to deal with problems |
390 |
| TURCO explained |
580,
312.
232 |
| Turkey, effect of entry upon Germany in war |
45 |
| |
EUREKA view on bringing into war |
47 |
| Twelfth Fleet assigned 11th Amphib Force in toto |
203 |
| |
Organizing Task Force 122 |
207 |
| |
Duties |
207 |
| |
Responsible for TF 122 |
341 |
| |
Assignment of vessels to force organization |
356 |