Chapter II
Preliminary Poundings
10--18 February 1945

1. Carrier Wings over Japan1

During the last three days before Iwo D-day, every effort was intensified, the most intense being a series of carrier-borne air strikes over and around Tokyo. These were laid on not only as a diversion -- a shield, as it were, for Iwo Jima -- but to destroy enemy planes and reduce Japanese capability for launching air attacks.

Admiral Halsey had been eager to hit Japan since October, but the support of Task Force 38 was urgently needed in the Philippines; and by the time this opportunity came, in February 1945, Halsey was no longer in command. Third Fleet completed its Luzon missions in late January and made for Ulithi, where the new "backfield" was waiting to take over. At midnight 26 January, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance relieved Admiral William F. Halsey, and Third Fleet again became Fifth Fleet. At the same time, Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher relieved Vice Admiral John S. McCain as Commander Fast Carrier Force, and TF 38 became TF 58. As the carriers would not have to depart in support of Iwo until 10 February, their fagged-out sailors and airmen enjoyed a welcome two weeks of upkeep and rest, swimming, playing softball

--20--

and drinking beer on Mogmog. At the same time changes in the composition of Task Force 58 were made, partly owing to battle and storm damage to Franklin and Monterey, partly because new Essex-class carriers (Bennington, Randolph and Bunker Hill) joined the Fleet. And a new night-flying carrier group, TG 58.5, was formed around veterans Enterprise and Saratoga.

For the first carrier strike against the heart of Japan, Task Force 58 was organized as follows: --2

Fifth Fleet, Admiral Spruance in Indianapolis
TF 58, Vice Admiral Mitscher in Bunker Hill
  TG 58.1
Clark
TG 58.2
Davison
TG 58.3
F.C. Sherman
TG 58.4
Radford
TG 58.5
Gardner
CV Hornet
Wasp
Bennington
Lexington
Hancock
Essex
Bunker Hill
Yorktown
Randolph
Enterprise
Saratoga
CVL Belleau Wood San Jacinto Cowpens Langley
Cabot
 
BB Massachusetts
Indiana
Wisconsin
Missouri
S. Dakota
New Jersey
Washington
N. Carolina
 
CB     Alaska    
CA Vincennes
San Francisco
Indianapolis
Boston
 
Baltimore
CL Miami
San Juan
 
Pasadena
Wilkes Barre
Astoria
Santa Fe
Biloxi
San Diego
Flint
DD 15 DD 19 DD 14 DD 17 DD 12 DD

This first carrier strike against Japan proper since the Halsey-Doolittle raid of 1942 was regarded with some apprehension by Task Force 58, as almost half the air groups would be on their first combat mission. To meet expected counterattacks, especially those from the Kamikaze Corps, each air group on a big carrier now comprised at least 73 fighter planes (Corsairs and Hellcats), leaving only 30 units to be divided between dive- and torpedo-bombers.

Task Force 58 sortied from Ulithi 10 February and shaped a course eastward of the Marianas and Bonins. On the 12th, the air

--21--

groups rehearsed with the 3rd Marine Division on Tinian. Two days later the task force fueled at sea from one of Admiral Beary's replenishment groups. Everything possible was done to guard against detection. Measures included radio deception, scouting by Pacific Fleet submarines to dispose of any picket vessels there might be en route, scouting by B-29s and Navy Liberators from the Marianas to clear the air. On the 15th a scouting line of five destroyers ranged ahead of the carriers, and antisubmarine air patrol was set up. At 1900 a high-speed run-in began towards launching positions, where the carriers arrived at dawn 16 February. Thanks to these precautions, and to thick weather most of the way, they arrived undetected.

The launching position lay about 125 miles SE of Tokyo but only 60 miles off the coast of Honshu. Flying conditions were very bad -- ceiling of 4000 feet, broken clouds at 1000 feet, rain and snow squalls, NE wind force 6 to 7. But, having come so far for what Admiral Mitscher predicted would be "the greatest air victory of the war for carrier aviation",3 foul weather could not stop him. Heavy fighter sweeps were launched promptly on 16 February, to cover the airfields around Tokyo Bay.

Low overcast also hampered the Japanese, and the only offensive sweep to meet sizable opposition was the first from TG 58.2 over the Chiba Peninsula on the east side of Tokyo Bay. About 100 Japanese fighters attacked Admiral Davison's planes as they crossed the coast and about 40 of them were shot down. American pilots found the Japanese on the whole reluctant to engage; Admiral Mitscher had correctly told his pilots, "He is probably more afraid of you than you are of him". The fifth sweep, by TG 58.3 whose targets were to the westward, managed to find clear weather and had the honor to be the first Navy fighter planes to arrive over Tokyo. These initial sweeps, intended to clear the air of enemy fighters for bombing funs, found little opposition. Before returning

--22--


Carrier Operations in Support of Iwo Jima Campaign
10 February-10 March 1945

--23--

to their ships the planes swept across the designated airfields, strafing planes that they caught grounded. Succeeding sweeps by Hellcats and Corsairs kept these fields covered throughout the day.

Admiral Mitscher, fearing that more targets would be weathered in during the afternoon, ordered bombing attacks against aircraft frame and engine plants in the Tokyo area at 1130, earlier than he intended. The first was directed against the Ota and Koizumi plants northwest of Tokyo. The Ota plant, previously damaged by B-29s, was almost completely destroyed in this and the next attack on 25 February, when Koizumi was first hit, as the aviators were unable to find it on the 16th.4 Many planes that could not get through to their assigned target expended their bombs on airfields.

During the afternoon three Japanese picket boats that had evaded detection in the thick weather were spotted by destroyer Haynsworth and promptly sunk.5 At sunset, after the daytime fighters had been recovered, TG 58.5 launched a sweep of night fighters to cover the enemy airfields at dusk. The task force was not disturbed during the night.

Before dawn 17 February, TG 58.5 sent off planes in search of shipping, and at dawn the other groups launched fighter sweeps. These were followed by bombing strikes on the Musashimo, Tama and Tachikawa plants near Tokyo. At about 1115, with weather growing steadily worse, Admiral Mitscher canceled further strikes. After recovering planes the task force retired towards Iwo Jima.

The results of these first carrier strikes at the heart of Japan were substantial but not spectacular. In addition to damaging aircraft frame and engine plants, a number of ships and small craft were attacked and sunk in Tokyo Bay, the biggest prize being Yamashiro

--24--

Maru of 10,600 tons. Best results were obtained against enemy aircraft, although the temperature was so low that a considerable number of our aircraft guns froze. TTF 58 claimed 341 enemy planes shot down in the air and 190 destroyed on the ground, but this cannot be checked from enemy sources. Our losses were 60 planes in combat and 28 operationally out of 738 sorties which engaged the enemy, and a grand total of 2761 sorties, which included those for C.A.P.6

During the night of 17-18 February, en route to Iwo Jima, destroyers Barton, Ingraham and Moale destroyed three small Japanese picket boats. Dortch encountered a fourth, a PC type which fought back with 3-inch guns and killed three of the destroyer's sailors. This target was finally rammed and sunk by Waldron.

In passing Chichi and Haha Jima, Admiral Radford's TG 58.4 launched fighter sweeps and strikes which destroyed several small craft and cratered the airfield on Chichi Jima. During the afternoon of 18 February TGs 58.2 and 58.3 took stations west of Iwo Jima for direct support of the landings next day and the other three task groups made rendezvous with oilers south of that island.

2. Two Days' Pounding, 16-17 February7
Sunrise 16 February 0644
Sunset   17 February 1720

For the first time in a Central Pacific amphibious operation all pre-landing activities at the objective were under an amphibious group command, Rear Admiral William H.P. Blandy.8 "Spike"

--25--

Blandy was the sanguine Celtic type, with a humorous Irish mouth overhung by a large red nose. His quick mind, grasp of essentials and driving energy had served the Navy well during the first two years of the war, as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, especially in developing, adapting and manufacturing the Swedish Bofors and the Swiss Oerlikon as the indispensable 40-mm and 20-mm antiaircraft weapons. That signal service, though deeply appreciated throughout the Fleet, exposed him to good-natured gibes whenever a gun jammed or a shell failed to explode, which he accepted with good humor. He had taken part in the Kwajalein operation, commanded an amphibious group at Saipan, and now had the assignment to command and coordinate all pre-landing activities.

Directly under Admiral Blandy were an air support control unit commanded by Captain Elton C. Parker, a support carrier group of a dozen CVEs under Rear Admiral Calvin T. Durgin, minecraft under Rear Admiral Alexander Sharp, underwater demolition teams under Captain Byron H. Hanlon, and three groups of LIC(L) gunboats, mortar boats and rocket support boats under Command Michael J. Malanaphy. The Gunfire and Covering Force (TF 54), consisting of six battleships, four heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and 16 destroyers under Rear Admiral Bertram J. Rodgers,9 also came under Admiral Blandy until D-day.

Task Force 54, as finally constituted, included Idaho and Tennessee, freshly returned from overhaul at West Coast navy yards; Nevada, Texas and Arkansas, veterans of Operations OVERLORD and DRAGOON, which reached the Pacific in November; and 30-year-old New York, taking part in an amphibious operation for the first

--26--

time since TORCH in 1942. Heavy cruisers Chester, Pensacola, Salt Lake City and Tuscaloosa (also a European veteran) and the new light cruiser Vicksburg, with assigned destroyers, completed the gunfire support force. Admiral Spruance's flagship Indianapolis, together with battleships North Carolina and Washington, would join on February 19, D-day.

The combined task forces under Admiral Blandy arrived off Iwo Jima at 0600 February 16. The destroyers and APDs formed a screen seaward of the bombardment ships, and the escort carriers, operating about 50 miles south of the island, provided combat air and antisubmarine patrols. Embarked in Wake Island was VOC-1, a group of pilots trained as gunfire spotters, flying fighter planes designated VOFs. This unit, now making its debut in the Pacific, had performed the same function successfully in Operation DRAGOON in 1944.10 The weather at the target was poor. A low ceiling and intermittent rain squalls hampered the spotters. A sweep against airfield and shipping at Chichi Jima launched at 0643 was unable to get through.11 Minesweeping off Iwo began at 0645 and the bombardment at 0707, but ten minutes later Admiral Blandy ordered the ships to fire only when efficient air spot was available so as not to waste ammunition.

Iwo Jima was subjected to bombardment throughout the day whenever spotting planes could observe the fall of shot. The highlight occurred at 1413 when an OS2U from Pensacola, piloted by Lieutenant (jg) D.W. Gandy USNR, first reported a Zeke on his tail; then that he was going after him; and, a split second later, "I got him, I got him!" It was amazing for a slow, flimsy Kingfisher to get a Zeke, but apparently this one did; the victim was sighted falling in flames. Shortly after, the UDT "frogmen", when setting up a navigational light on Higashi Rock a mile and a half east of the island, were fired on from Iwo Jima by small-caliber weapons. Pensacola noticed this and opened up on the weapons with her 5-inch guns, and within five minutes had silenced the enemy fire.

--27--

By 1800 the day's work was finished, and the results were disappointing. As Admiral Rodgers reported, "Little damage was apparent."

D-day minus 2, 17 February, gave a different story. The weather improved, with good visibility. On the day's program were fighter sweeps against Chichi Jima, minesweeping, and beach reconnaissance by UDTs, closely supported by the heavy ships, destroyers and LCI gunboats. Sandwiched between these activities was a bombing by B-24s at 1330.

Bombardment ships were in position off Iwo by 0700. Minesweeping began promptly and at 0803 the heavy vessels were ordered to close the beaches for destructive bombardment. Pensacola observed the sweepers being fired on, laid her secondary battery on the firing positions and silenced them within five minutes. But coastal batteries in the northeastern part of Iwo had their revenge. Pensacola around 0935 received six hits from 4.7- or 6-inch shells that wrecked her C.I.C., set fire to a plane on her starboard catapult, punctured her hull on the starboard side forward, killed 17 men and wounded 98. She withdrew temporarily to fight fires and treat casualties, but later returned to station and concluded her mission.

By 0911 Idaho, Nevada and Tennessee were 3000 yards off the beaches sending heavy direct fire at assigned targets. At 1025 Admiral Blandy ordered them to retire in order to clear the UDT operations, set for 1100. By that time the minesweepers were clear, having swept up to 750 yards of the shore in precise formation, banging away with their own weapons and occasionally coming under fire from the island.

So far, everything had gone almost "according to plan", but the attempt of the LCI(G) flotilla to cover UDT reconnaissance provoked an unexpected reply from the enemy. The four UDTs were embarked in destroyer transports Bull, Bates, Barr and Blessman. Seven destroyers provided cover at the 3000-yard line where the APDs launched their LCP(R)s carrying the swimmers. As the landing craft headed for the 500-yard line, where the swimmers

--28--

would make the plunge, they were followed by seven LCI gunboats under Lieutenant Commander Williard V. Nash USNR, firing 20-mm and 40-mm guns at the beaches and preparing to launch 4.5-inch rockets. Soon after these gunboats passed the 1500-yard line, mortar shells began falling among them; and a little later, as they were beginning to launch rockets, they came under intense fire from the flanks of the beaches. A heavy battery casemated at the foot of Mount Suribachi joined in with mortars, automatic weapons and small arms, all aimed at the swimmers and LCI(G)s, but the heaviest fire came from a hitherto unrevealed battery in the high ground just north of the beaches. As Admiral Rodgers reported, "These batteries had remained concealed through over two months of softening preparation. ... Because of their peculiar nature they could be neutralized only by point-blank fire." Around 1100 the seven LCI(G)s, advancing in line abreast, began to take hits, but pressed on to support the swimmers until forced out by damage and casualties. Others dashed in to replace them, to be hit in turn, time after time. "LCI(G)-471, -438, -441 and several others, although hit several times, gallantly returned to the fray after retiring just long enough to extinguish their fires and plug holes in the hull."12 LCI(G)-474, after closing destroyer Capps, had to be abandoned and went down. LCI(G)-409, after going in twice and sustaining 60 per cent casualties, closed Terror, removed wounded, and took on board officers and men to help damage control. In all, 12 LCI(G)s took part and all were hit, but they stuck to it until the swimmers were recovered and clear. Everyone who watched these vessels was inspired by their courage and persistence.

John P. Marquand, the novelist, who was gathering material in Tennessee, thus describes LCI(G)-466 coming alongside: "There was blood on the main deck, making widening pools as she rolled in the sluggish sea. A dead man on a gun platform was covered by a blanket. The decks were littered with wounded. They were being strapped on wire stretchers and passed up to us over the side. . . .

--29--

The commanding officer was tall, bare-headed and blond, and he looked very young. . . . There was a call from our bridge, 'Can you proceed under your own power?' . . . 'We can't proceed anywhere for three days,' the C.O. said. They had passed up the wounded -- seventeen of them -- and then they passed up five stretchers with the dead. . . ."13

Forty-four men in all were killed or missing and 152 wounded.

Heavy support for the gunboats quickly developed. Nevada, being close inshore (Captain H.L. Grosskopf having turned a Nelsonian blind eye to Admiral Blandy's order to withdraw), was in the right position to silence the battery to the north, and concentrated on it for two hours. Captain Hanlon, in general charge of the reconnaissance, asked for an air strike at the base of Mount Suribachi and for the heavy ships to increase their rate of fire on known targets. At 1121, destroyer Leutze was hit, severely injuring the C.O., Commander B.A. Robbins, and 33 others, besides seven killed or missing.

By 1240 all swimmers but one had been recovered. The "frogmen" found no obstacles at the beaches and were able to produce accurate gradient maps of the approaches.

With every one of the eleven remaining LCI(G)s damaged, none were available for the afternoon reconnaissance of the western beaches. Hanlon asked for smoke planes, for the destroyers to fire white phosphorus shells, and for close gunfire support from heavy ships and destroyers. Blandy accordingly directed Tennessee, Arkansas, Texas and Tuscaloosa to cover the reconnaissance in that order, from south to north. Thus assisted, the UDTs made their reconnaissance and were back in their ships by 1755, with no casualties.

3. D-day minus 1, 18 February

Since the last two days of bombardment blasted away camouflage from batteries not previously known to exist, the island's defenses

--30--

were for the first time properly revealed; and formidable they were indeed. Fortunately for us, the support of UDTs with LCI(G)s had convinced General Kuribayashi that the main landing had started, and to repel it he unmasked batteries that would have caused very heavy casualties on D-day had they not been discovered two days before. This was the only serious mistake made by the Japanese general in his defensive tactics, which won the rueful admiration of his enemies.

These revelations on 17 February brought about a quick revision of the bombardment pattern for D-day minus 1, 18 February. Orders were issued to concentrate on the immediate vicinity and flanks of the eastern beaches, and for heavy ships to close to 2500 yards or less and deliver concentrated direct fire on all targets. At 0745 February 18 Admiral Rodgers ordered his gunfire ships to "close beach and get going." Each had her assigned target aiming to destroy as many as possible in the landing area and the nearby ground commanding the beaches. Bombardment ships delivered direct fire all day long. Both Tennessee and Idaho demolished their targets, literally blasting blockhouses and pillboxes out of the ground. The results of the bombardment, which ceased at 1821, were very gratifying. It was worth more than all the previous "softenings" by air bombing and naval gunfire, and was largely responsible for the assault teams' being able to touch down on D-day with few casualties. The sacrifice of brave sailors in the LCI gunboats was well rewarded.

A small enemy air raid developed about 2130 as the amphibious groups were retiring for the night. Destroyer minesweeper Gamble was hit by two 250-pound bombs amidships, one of which exploded in the after fireroom, causing extensive damage, and glowing two holes near the keel. Five men were killed or missing and nine wounded. Hamilton stood by to assist and remove casualties and Dorsey took Gamble in tow until she could be turned over to a salvage tug. Blessman, making 20 knots to close Admiral Rodger's group, and carrying a UDT unit, was hit in the forward fireroom and troop spaces by a bomb dropped from a plane which approached

--31--

from astern. She suffered extensive damage, lost 42 men killed or missing and 29 wounded.

Admiral Turner arrived off Iwo Jima at 0600 February 19 with the main body of the expeditionary force and assumed the duties of CTF 52, relieving Admiral Blandy, whose conduct during those three critical days had been characterized by keen intelligence in the face of unexpected situations.

February 18 (D-day minus 1) was Sunday. The chaplain on one of the transports had printed on cards, and distributed to each Marine, the words of Sir Jacob Astley's famous prayer before the Battle of Edgehill, in 1642: --

This well fitted the mood of United States Marines three centuries later.

--32--

Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (1) * Next Chapter (3)

Footnotes

1. Action Report of Com Fifth Fleet (Admiral Spruance) 14 June, CTF 58 (Vice Adm. Mitscher) for 10 Feb.-4 Mar. 1945, 13 Mar., and of his task group commanders for the same period: CTG 58.1 (Rear Adm. Clark) 15 Mar.; CTG 58.2 (Rear Adm. Davison) 12 Mar.; CTG 58.3 (Rear Adm. F.C. Sherman) 28 Mar.; CTG 58.4 (Rear Adm. Radford) 1 Mar.; CTG 58.5 (the night carrier group, Rear Adm. Gardner) 12 Mar.

2. See Appendix I for complete task organization and C.O.'s.

3. CTF 58 Action Report, Encl. C, the Admiral's "Air Combat Notes for Pilots" posted in every ready room. For anyone wishing to know fighter-plane tactics at this stage of the war, this is an excellent source; so large a proportion of the VF pilots had had no combat experience that Mitscher took nothing for granted.

4. USSBS "Report on Nakajima Aircraft Ltd." (June 1946) which does not distinguish between damage inflicted by the different attacks.

5. Haynsworth recovered several survivors, who were transferred to Essex and placed in the brig under Marine guard. The prisoners became objects of considerable interest to me carrier's crew, who clustered around the cell doors, plied the prisoners with candy bars and cigarettes, and gave them their first lessons in Navy English. Thus, when Admiral Sherman came below to take a look at them, he was startled by the Japanese politely folding arms across stomach, bowing from the waist, and remarking what they had been told was the proper greeting to a flag officer, "F--- you, Joe!"

6. Vice Adm. Mitscher Action Report; cf. Comairpac "Analysis of Air Operations, Tokyo Carrier Strikes, Feb. 1945", 28 Apr.

7. CTF 51 (Vice Adm. Turner) "Report on the Capture of Iwo Jima" 19 May 1945; CTF 52 (Rear Adm. Blandy) Action Report 22 Feb.; CTF 54 (Rear Adm. Rodgers) Action Report 10 Mar.; CTG 52.2 (Rear Adm. Durgin) Action Report 21 Apr.; CTG 52.3 (Com Minecraft, Rear Adm. Alexander Sharp) Report on Minesweeping Operations 6 Mar. 1945.

8. Born N.Y.C. 1890, honor man of Class of 1913 Naval Academy, service in Florida during Vera Cruz landing and World War I; specialized in ordnance engineering and developed formulas used for gun manufacture by autofrettage, asst. fire control officer New Mexico 1921, exec, Vega 1922, duty ashore at Cavite; squadron gunnery and torpedo officer for destroyers Asiatic Fleet in Stewart 1923; duty in Buord 1924; gunnery officer New Mexico 1927, and staff gunnery officer West Virginia 1929; U.S. Naval Mission to Brazil 1931; C.O. Simson 1933; Comdesdiv 10, 1935; C.O. Utah 1938; Chief of Buord 1941-1943; Com 'Phib Group 1 at Kwajalein, Marianas and Peleliu; after Iwo Jima commanded the assault on Kerama Retto. Com Cruisers and Destroyers Pacific Fleet July 1945 and Com Joint Army-Navy TF 1 in the Bikini atomic tests. Cinclant Feb. 1947, retired 1950, died 12 Jan. 1954.

9. For brief biographies of Admirals Rodgers and Durgin see Vol. XI 237 and 279.

10. See Vol. XI 280.

11. CTG 52.2 (Rear Adm. Durgin) Action Report.

12. CTU 52.5.1 (Com LCI(G) Flot. 3, Cdr. M.J. Malanaphy) Action Report 24 Feb. 1945.

13. Harper's (May 1945) pp. 497-498.

14. H.M. Smith Coral and Brass p. 254; but "Howlin' Mad" named the wrong author and garbled the prayer.



Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation