Chapter III
D-day at Iwo Jima1
19 February 1945

Sunrise 0641
Sunset  1725

1. Pre-landing Bombardment

D-day, observed Admiral Turner, opened with weather ideal for an amphibious landing -- he had never seen it so good at Guadalcanal, the Gilberts, the Marshalls or Saipan. A light northerly wind floated fleecy clouds lazily over the island. A calm sea raised no surf on the beaches -- a wonderful break for the assault, as beach gradients were so steep that even a low surf would embarrass landing craft. The island, wrote John P. Marquand, "never looked more aesthetically ugly than on D-day morning, or more completely Japanese. . . . It also had the minute, fussy compactness of those miniature Japanese gardens. Its stones and rocks were like those contorted, wind-scoured, water-worn boulders which the Japanese love to collect as landscape decorations. 'I hope to God', a wounded Marine said later, 'that we don't have to go on any more of those screwy island!'"2 One more, Marine -- the even screwier Okinawa -- and the war would be almost over.

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Shortly after daylight 19 February there opened the heaviest pre-H-hour bombardment of World War II. Ships taking part were those of Task Force 54,3 together with North Carolina, Washington, Indianapolis, Santa Fe and Biloxi lent by Task Force 58. This made a grand total of seven battleships, four heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and (during the last half hour) ten destroyers.

It began at 0640, two hours and twenty minutes before H-hour. Off the eastern shore were stationed North Carolina and San Francisco, whose assigned targets were in the bulbous part of the island. A line of four battleships and four cruisers, with eight destroyers between them, covered the southeastern coast from off the quarry overlooking the northermost beach, to a point south of Mount Suribachi. Two battleships, five cruisers and one destroyer took care of the western beaches. Targets selected for this phase of bombardment were on and flanking the landing beaches, both airfields and the lower slopes of Suribachi. For the first 85 minutes fire was deliberate: 75 rounds each for the battleships, 100 rounds each for the heavy cruisers. At 0803 gunfire was lifted to permit air strikes to be made by planes from Task Groups 58.2 and 58.3.

These fast carrier groups were operating about 65 miles northwest of Iwo Jima, under the tactical command or Rear Admiral Frederick C. Sherman. At 0805 and 0815 their rockets, bombs, and napalm struck targets on the eastern slope of Suribachi, on high ground north of the landing beaches, and on the airfield in the center of the island. At 0825 the bombardment ships resumed with vastly increased tempo. For the next half hour shells literally rained on Iwo. Battleships fired 155 rounds each, the cruisers 150 rounds each, and the ten destroyers 500 rounds each.


Boat Waves Forming

Beginning at 0850 naval gunfire was adjusted, in a complicated and nicely timed pattern, so that the carrier planes could strafe the beaches during the last seven minutes before H-hour.

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It is impossible to asses the effect of this tremendous concentration of air bombing and gunfire, as distinct from what had been done on the three previous days. Undoubtedly a number of gun positions were damaged, but the Japanese garrison cozily sat it out in their deep underground shelters.

At one minute short of H-hour naval gunfire shifted to targets about 200 yards inland, at 0902 it moved another 200 yards inland and thereafter formed a modified rolling barrage ahead of the troops, constantly adjusted to conform to their actual rate of advance. This barrage was fired by the secondary batteries of the heavy ships, to each of which was assigned a shore fire control party with the troops. S.f.c.p. had the privilege of cutting in to request a special shoot on some just-discovered target before the scheduled fire of its ship was completed.4

2. H-hour, 0900

Admiral Turner ordered "Land the Landing Force" at 0645. It was obvious that 0900 (H-hour) could easily be met. Iwo was shrouded in the dust and smoke created by the bombardment, but weather conditions were almost perfect. The operation looked like a pushover. Optimists predicted that the island would be secured in four days.


H-hour, D-day

The assault troops were transported and landed by TF 53, the Attack Force, commanded by Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill. The

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5th Marine Division was embarked in the 22 transports of Commodore John B. McGovern's transport group; the 4th Marine Division in the 24 transports of Commodore Henry C. Flanagan's transport group. The first five assault waves were landed from LVTs,5 which, with their troops, were embarked in LSTs of Captain Wilkie H. Brereton's Tractor Group.

The shore from the base of Mount Suribachi to the high broken ground 3500 yards northeastward had been divided on maps gridded for the assault into seven beaches, each 500 yards long, indicated by colors: one GREEN, two RED, two YELLOW, and two BLUE. The northeastern part of BLUE 2 had been developed by the Japanese into a small boat harbor, which the Marines called the East Boat Basin. Their scheme of maneuver was relatively simple: -- the 5th Division to land on the GREEN and RED beaches and drive across the island, a part to capture or isolate Mount Suribachi, the rest to deploy northward and advance up the island parallel to the 4th Division. The 4th would land on Beaches YELLOW 1 and 2 and BLUE 1 and drive inland to No. 1 airfield and to the north to protect their right flank.

In the midst of the thunder of bombardment the amphibious forces calmly took their positions. By 0730 the control parties had established line of departure 4000 yards off the beaches. LSTs of the tractor groups took station at the 5500-yard line, dropped ramps and began to discharge LVTs filled with troops, "like all the cats in the world having kittens", as John P. Marquand remarked. It was now time for the newest type of boat, the Landing Craft Support Craft, Large -- designated LCS(L) -- to do its stuff. Twelve of these 160-foot craft, each capable of firing a salvo of 120 4.5-inch rockets, and bristling with 40-mm and 20-mm and 50-caliber machine guns as well, were present. They headed for the beach at 0740, line abreast, launched their rockets aimed at positions 20 to 60 yards behind the beaches, turned 90 degrees to parallel the shore,

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firing everything they had, ceased fire at 0854, and withdrew to the line of departure just as the final air strike came in.6

At 0830 the first assault wave, consisting of 68 LVT(A), the amphtrac tanks, left the line of departure. It hit the beach almost precisely at H-hour, 0900. Within the next twenty-three minutes the remaining assault waves landed on schedule, and at 0944 twelve LSM, carrying medium tanks, beached.

Up to the point of actually touching land, this operation went off like a parade. Then trouble started. The LVT(A)s found their way blocked by the first terrace, which rose to as high as fifteen feet. The volcanic ash and cinders afforded poor traction, and as the men of the first wave left their vehicles on the run, they were slowed down to a walk. A few amphtracs reached the first terrace through breaches blasted by naval gunfire; some backed into the water and fired their turrets at inland targets; but many bogged down on the beach.

For a few minutes everywhere, and at some spots for as much as half an hour, only scattered small-arm, mortar and artillery fire fell along the beaches. Then both the volume and the accuracy of enemy resistance, mainly mortar fire, increased heavily. A situation developed somewhat similar to he one on Omaha Beach, Normandy, on 6 June 1944, with the important difference that here there was not even a sea wall for protection to the troops, who found it virtually impossible to advance in the face of withering fire. Enemy reaction developed earliest in the 4th Division sector. Colonel Walter Wensinger's 23rd Marine Regiment landed on Beaches YELLOW; Colonel John R. Lanigan's 25th Marine Regiment on BLUE 1. The Japanese had excellent observation posts on high ground north of these beaches. Four of the tank-carrying LSM which beached at 0944 were hit by mortar shells and suffered extensive damage.

General Kuribayashi's static defense now began to show itself.


Fourth Marine Division Moving up the Beach

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During the naval bombardment his troops retired deep into the ground and waited. As soon as gunfire lifted, they returned to their covered and protected positions and opened up on the advancing Marines. Their cleverly constructed pillboxes and larger gun and mortar positions could not be knocked out except by direct hit. Some of them, the "flush deckers", were built underground with only the firing slit uncovered, and the entire installation concealed from the view of ships or approaching troops by a sand bank. These were almost impossible to spot until they opened up. Gunports for the mortars were often only a couple of feet wide. Only a soldier on the spot could knock out positions such as these, with rifle fire, hand grenades, flame-throwers and demolitions. Aerial bombing, naval gunfire and artillery could contribute little to relieve this situation, which became hideously obvious within an hour of the landings.

As the Marines piled ashore they inched forward and took what shelter they could on the terraces, holding some momentum even though slowed to a crawl. On the left flank, the 5th Marine Division was going into action for the first time. On the extreme left, the 28th Marine Regiment (Colonel Harry B. Liversedge) landed two battalions in column on Beach GREEN while the 27th Regiment landed on RED 1 and 2. Opposition here was somewhat lighter than the 4th Division encountered, and heavy enemy fire developed more slowly, but within twenty minutes well-directed, accurate artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire began falling all along the 5th Division beaches. On the left, the 1st Battalion, 28th Marines, was to drive straight across the island at its narrowest point -- 700 yards wide -- while the 2nd Battalion, landing after the first, was to turn left towards Mount Suribachi. The 27th Marines had the job of driving straight inland and linking up with the 4th Division on their right. Having a little more breathing time than their comrades on the right flank, the 5th Division had a chance to get organized and start moving inland. Progress was slow owing to soft footing, heavy enemy fire, and occasional land mines, but never completely halted.


Fifth Marine Division Advancing near Mount Suribachi, D-day

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3. Build-up and Support

As the volume of enemy fire on the advancing Marines increased, the gunfire of supporting ships off shore stepped up. Prior to noon, most of the gunfire ships were busy delivering a rolling barrage with 5-inch shell. Fortunately, it had been arranged to repeat a scheduled shoot if progress ashore turned out to be slower than anticipated. This was done frequently. In addition, ships were instructed, whenever they observed fire coming from an enemy position, to lay on main batteries immediately and shoot it out. Other gun or mortar positions were spotted by planes, which called up ships' gunfire. The spotting was good and the shooting silenced many enemy positions, but they refused to stay silenced. A direct hit was the only certain way to silence a gun for good.

In no previous operation in the Pacific had naval gunfire support been so effective as at Iwo Jima. This was due in great measure to Lieutenant Colonel D.M. Weller USMC, V 'Phib Corps naval gunfire officer, who helped V 'Phib staff prepare the naval gunfire plan and had been beside Admiral Blandy during the preliminary bombardment. Santa Fe was the star of the fire support cruisers. She laid almost continuous 5-inch and 6-inch shell fire within 200 yards of the BLT on the left flank of the 5th Division, with the result that hardly a shot was fired by the enemy from the base of Mount Suribachi, which commanded their line of advance. Battleship Nevada became the sweetheart of the Marine Corps. Her skipper, Captain J.L. ("Pop") Grosskopf, an old gunnery officer and a ruthless driver, had set out to make his battleship the best fire support ship in the Fleet, and did. Nevada, when firing her assigned rolling barrage about 0925, found that her secondary battery could not penetrate a concrete blockhouse and turned over the job to her main battery. This damaged a hitherto undisclosed blockhouse behind Beach RED 1, blasting away its sand cover and leaving it naked and exposed. At 1100 this blockhouse gain became troublesome; the battleship then used armor-piercing shells, which took the position

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completely apart. At 1512 Nevada observed a gun firing from a cave in the high broken ground east of the beaches. Using direct fire, she shot two rounds of 14-inch, scoring a direct hit in the mouth of the cave, blowing out the side of the cliff and completely destroying the gun. One could see it drooping over the cliff edge "like a half-extracted tooth handing on a man's jaw."7

An excellent illustration of the high state of training and versatility that existed in the Pacific Fleet at this stage of the war is shown by the experience of West Virginia, Captain Herbert V. Wiley. After outstanding performances at Leyte Gulf and Lingayen, she arrived at Ulithi 16 February to replenish from Service Squadron 10. At 0300 next morning Captain Wiley received orders from Admiral Nimitz to proceed immediately to Iwo Jima at best speed. Completing replenishment shortly after daylight, she began the 900-mile run to Iwo. At 1045 D-day, she arrived in the bombardment area, reported to Admiral Rodgers, received copies of all orders, charts, gridded maps, and an assigned firing position. Less than two hours after her arrival she was shooting at targets near Mount Suribachi.

A shore fire control party was assigned to each Marine battalion that landed. These parties suffered many casualties from enemy fire and lost much equipment but established communications with their assigned ships unusually early.

The Marines inched their way inland from the beaches preceded by heavy and continuous naval gunfire. At 1035 a small party of the 5th Division succeeded in making its way across the narrowest part of the island to the western beaches. But no continuous line of communications could be established as the troops which followed were forced to mop up Japanese positions that had inadvertently been bypassed; the defenders had held fire until they could shoot at the rear of the assault echelon.

Tanks began landing in the 5th Division sector at 0930. After considerable difficulty getting off the beaches they moved inland to support the troops. Some were disabled by land mines, but all became

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high priority targets for the enemy's antitank weapons and many were knocked out. In the final analysis it was the flame-thrower teams, riflemen with hand grenades, and engineers with demolition charges, blowing up pillboxes or sealing off cave entrances, that secured ground.

On the right of the 5th Division sector, resistance was heavy and progress was slow; yet, by 1130, RCT 28 was on and across the southern end of No. 1 airfield and, by 1500, RCT 27 had reached the cliffs overlooking the western beaches. Mount Suribachi was now cut off from the rest of the island's defenses.

The 4th Division on the right found the going very tough indeed. RCT 23, on the left flank, had gained only 500 yards by noon; it reached the edge of No. 1 airfield by 1405 but was unable to cross it or gain more ground. Tanks which landed in support at 1000 were slow in surmounting the beaches and some were knocked out by land mines. LSM-216 beached four times under fire before she could find firm enough footing for her tanks to roll off.8 RCT 25, on the right, attacked in two directions, inland towards the airfield and north against high broken ground. Here they were much distressed by fire coming from pillboxes located in the cliffs of the old quarry above East Boat Basin. To eliminate them, a new kind of spotting was tried. LCS(L)-51 moved in to 650 yards off the boat basin and spotted for cruiser Vicksburg, gunfire support for that sector. Lieutenant J.J. Sweeney USMC, embarked in the LCS, directed her tracer fire to the hot spots, and the cruiser, following the tracers with her 6-inch guns, smashed them. This went on from 0910 to 1030. The LCS, followed by four more of the same class, fired both guns and rockets at spots indicated by troops ashore, and helped to break up a counterattack. During the afternoon these big support craft teamed up with destroyers to silence other positions. They thrust close inshore, drew enemy fire to themselves and replied with tracers which gave the destroyers their cue.

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The 1st Battalion of RCT 25, assigned to the inland thrust, had made only 600 yards by 1130. The 3rd Battalion, with the northerly assignment, was pinned down almost from the start and casualties ran high, especially among officers, Enemy fire aimed at supporting tanks also fell among the troops, adding to their misery. Not until 1400 was Colonel Lanigan ready to launch a concerted attack to the north, and by late afternoon his battalion had reached only the first ridge behind East Boat Basin.

In the meantime a chaotic condition was developing on the beaches, under fire throughout the day. At about 1100 the northerly wind veered to SE, which made the beaches a lee shore; but "hot cargo" -- such as ammunition, rations, water and high priority equipment -- had to be landed. Most of the movement to the beaches had been by amphtracs, which brought in supplies that were manhandled by shore and beach parties and stacked up on the beaches. Some LVTs, however, carried supplies to forward troops and others returned to their parent LSTs for more high priority cargo. At about noon regimental commanders began calling for their reserve battalions to land, and during the afternoon the division commanders committed their reserve regiments. These reserves were sent ashore from their transports by conventional landing craft, LCVP and LCM. The beaches were so steep that when these craft touched down they found it very difficult to hold on. Rising surf broke over their sterns, and the backwash of rollers flowed over the downed ramp into the bow and flooded a boat so that it could not retract. A current which set parallel to the beach also caused many to broach, and others were hit and damaged by enemy mortar fire. As a result of this cumulative damage, the beach was so littered with wrecked boats by nightfall that it was difficult to find a spot to land. Available salvage equipment was inadequate, and with heaped-up supplies also clogging the beach a very serious situation developed. It is a tribute to the shore and beach parties, who worked throughout the day under enemy fire without flinching, and the UDTs who also turned to, that the increasing number of troops ashore did not run out of ammunition and supplies.

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Approximately 30,000 troops were landed on 19 February. There were 2420 casualties, including 519 killed or missing in action; and 47 more died of their wounds. The beachhead established fell far behind the planned phase line. From East Boat Basin it extended inland, to and along the southeast edge of No. 1 airfield, across its southwestern end to he west beaches, returning to the east beaches along the northern base of Suribachi. The beachhead was only about 4000 yards long, 700 yards deep in the north and 1100 yards in the south, but it already contained six infantry regiments, as many artillery battalions and two tank battalions.

4. Air Operations

Admiral Durgin's escort carriers continued to supply observation and spotting planes, photographic flights, C.A.P. over the target, antisubmarine patrol, and strike missions for direct support of troops ashore. The VOF were especially useful in locating targets and spotting fall of shot for ships' gunners. Lieutenant Commander George Philip, skipper of destroyer Twiggs, recorded that this type had had a doubtful reception in the Pacific; but "his performance of a few minutes sold him. Work with the VOF was one of the highlights of the operation".

Of the fast carrier groups, TG 58.2 (Davison) and 58.3 (Sherman) operated about 65 miles northwest of Iwo Jima while TG 58.1 and TG 58.4 fueled and replenished off shore. After the prelanding strikes on the beaches, Hancock and Lexington sent fighter sweeps of twelve planes each against Chichi Jima and Haha Jima to destroy grounded planes and small craft. It proved to be an expensive mission. Five planes were lost operationally and a torpedo bomber was shot down by antiaircraft fire. During the afternoon Admiral Sherman sent some of his planes to report to Advance Commander Support Aircraft is Estes. This group made bombing, rocketing and strafing runs on designated targets on the hump of Iwo Jima that were not accessible to naval gunfire.

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Since enemy planes could easily fly from Japan down the line of the Bonins to bomb ships at the beachhead, dawn and dusk air attacks were anticipated. The first of these came in at 1900 D-day; but, sighting two fast carrier groups en route, decided to make them the target. Over a period of two and a half hours an estimated 12 to 15 planes harassed TGs 58.2 and 58.3. Both task group commanders used radical maneuvers, cloud cover and smoke to conceal their ships' wakes and evade the attackers, and only two direct contacts were made. "Mighty Mo", the battleship Missouri, drew here first blood of the war by shooting down an enemy plane at a range of 9800 yards at 1953, and a second which approached nearer was splashed by the combined antiaircraft fire of several ships.

Task Group 58.5, the night carrier group, operated northwest of Iwo Jima and provided dusk C.A.P. over the island, night fighter cover, and night observers for naval gunfire.

The carrier planes inflicted very little direct damage. The performance of napalm or gasoline jelly bombs, which were expected to burn off camouflage and suck the oxygen out of dugouts, was disappointing, and a large percentage of them were duds.9 Quarter-ton bombs were too small to smash Japanese installations. The principal contribution of carrier planes to the Iwo landings on D-day was to provide C.A.P. over the amphibious forces, which, in view of the fact that not one enemy air attack approached them, was hardly needed. But this was good practice for the Okinawa operation, where C.A.P. was desperately needed.

Darkness finally closed D-day, a day such as Iwo had never seen since it arose a hissing volcano from the ocean. The Marines dug themselves in where night overtook them. Gunfire support ships moved out to night withdrawal areas, leaving on Santa Fe and ten destroyers to supply star shell illumination and harassing fire on enemy positions. The Japanese tried a few infiltrations during the night, and on the west coast their feeble attempt at a counterlanding was wiped out by alert Marines. But the expected big counterattack never came off; banzai charges were no part of General

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Kuribayashi's plan. He intended to conserve his man power, knowing that American sea and air power had closed all hope of reinforcement, and that it was hopeless to try to drive the Marines into the sea. But he intended to fight for every yard of ground, and did.

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Footnotes

1. CTF 51 (Vice Admiral Turner) Action Report; Action Reports mentioned in Chap. II, note 1 above; and those of Com Transgrp B (Commo. H.C. Flanagan); Com Transgrp A (Commo. J.B. McGovern), and C.G.'s V Phib Corps (Maj. Gen. Harry Schmidt USMC), 4th Marine Div. (Maj. Gen. Clifton B.B. Cates), 5th Marine Div. (Maj. Gen. Keller E. Rockey); Bartley Iwo Jima; Carl W. Proehl Fourth Marine Division in World War II (1946); Howard W. Conner The Spearhead (5th Marine Division) 1950; Robert Sherrod On to Westward, War in the Central Pacific (1945). The Navy has two excellent movies taken during the action, MN-5562 "Naval Guns at Iwo" and MN-5124 "To the Shore of Iwo Jima."

2. "Iwo Jima before H-hour" Harper's (May 1945) p. 499.

3. Less New York. Chester, while approaching her firing station, was struck a glancing blow by Estes, but carried out her assigned bombardment.

4. Comparative ammunition expenditure in D-day bombardments at Iwo Jima 19 Feb. and Okinawa 1 April 1945: --

No. Rounds 16-inch 14-inch 12-inch 8-inch 6-inch 5-inch
Okinawa 475 1325 175 2100 3000 36,260
Iwo Jima 1950 1500 400 1700 2000 31,000

Adm. Turner's Report for the two operations. See Col. Donald C. Weller USMC, "Salvo-Splash!" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings LXXX (1954) 1018-1021, for technical aspects of the naval bombardment.

5. The Marines' LVT amphibians again proved themselves at Iwo. Their low speed was no handicap since the equally slow LVT(A)s spearheaded the landings. But the LVTs could land their troops and supplies on dry land despite surf, steep beaches and soft sand.

6. Lt. Cdr. H.D. Chickering USNR Action Report of LCS(L)-51 and letter of 4 Mar. 1945; Bartley p. 49. The LCI gunboats were to have gone in with the LCS(L) but were too badly shot up on D-day minus 2 to participate.

7. Col. R.D. Heinl USMC, letter to writer 4 Dec. 1959.

8. The "high degree of coverage and tenacity shown by these ships in beaching  . . . and landing this vital equipment in the face of the heaviest mortar and artillery fire yet seen" was praised in the 4th Division Report. Bartley Iwo Jima pp. 60n, 62n.

9. CTF 51 (Vice Adm. Turner) Report p. (V) (E) 6.



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