Chapter IV
The Conquest of Iwo Jima
19 February-16 March 1945

1. The Struggle Ashore, 20-21 February1

Robert Sherrod, the veteran correspondent who had come ashore on the afternoon of D-day and spent the night in a foxhole, picked his way forward early next morning among corpses. "Whether the dead were Japs or Americans," he recorded, "they had died with the greatest possible violence. Nowhere in the Pacific war had I seen such badly mangled bodies. Many were cut squarely in half. legs and arms lay 50 feet away from any body. In one spot on the sand, far from the nearest cluster of dead, I saw a string of guts 15 feet long. Only legs were easy to identify; they were Japanese if wrapped in khaki puttees, American if covered by canvas leggings. The smell of burning flesh was heavy . . ."2

The reduction and capture of Iwo Jima is a story of yard-by-yard advance against a tough, resourceful enemy who allowed no let-up, and who so used his terrain as to exact the maximum price in blood. The Marines, advancing in the open with little natural shelter, had to fight their way against an enemy burrowed underground and protected from everything but a direct hit. It was a costly and exhausting grind, calling for higher qualities of courage, initiative and persistence than a campaign full of charges, countercharges and spectacular incidents that raise men's morale. It was

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like being under the lash of a relentless desert storm, from which there was no shelter, day or night; but this storm lasted six weeks and rained steel, not sand. General Holland Smith said that "Iwo Jima was the most savage and the most costly battle in the history of the Marine Corps." And Admiral Nimitz observed that on Iwo "uncommon valor was a common virtue."3

Supporting the Marines, and a factor that may have tipped the balance, was the impact of naval gunfire support and naval aircraft, whose shells, bombs and strafing wore the enemy down. No eight square miles in all World War II received such a sustained and heavy pounding by these means as did Iwo Jima. General Kuribayashi admitted the value of it. In a message to Tokyo at the height of the battle, he said: "I am not afraid of the fighting power of only three American Marine divisions if there is no bombardment from aircraft and warships. That is the only reason why we have to face such miserable situations."4

A pattern for the island campaign was promptly cut out. For daytime direct support, each Marine battalion had attached to it one or more destroyers with a liaison officer on board, and a Navy shore fire control party stayed with it ashore. At daybreak the heavy support ships closed the island to fire a preliminary bombardment on targets selected by divisional and regimental commanders the evening before. On the morning of 20 February (D-day plus 1), four battleships, three cruisers and an LCI mortar unit performed this service, each ship plastering her assigned targets for 50 minutes from 0740. After the Marines jumped off, the ships stood by for deep support on targets designated by the s.f.c.p.'s or by spotting planes. That afternoon Washington (Captain Roscoe F. Good) received a report from divisional headquarters of a strong point of enemy resistance near the southern end of airfield No. 2. And it was even stronger than we suspected. The Japanese had constructed more than 300 pillboxes, gun emplacements and traps in a space

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of 500 by 1000 yards. The air spotter, sent to investigate, reported many caves dug into a cliff and facing the Marines' front lines. He directed the battleship's main battery to one end of the cliff, then spotted three 16-inch salvos directly into its face at 50-yard intervals. These shells so ate into the cliff as to start landslides which sealed off most of the cave mouths. Washington was on the firing line with both main and secondary batteries for ten hours and twenty minutes on 20 February. Nobody could convince the Marines that battleships were obsolete!

Caves and excavated holes in the ground were the key to Iwo's defenses. On the extreme left, Colonel Liversedge's 28th RCT closed in on Mount Suribachi, supported by destroyer Mannert L. Abele and light minelayer Thomas E. Fraser. The latter, after illuminating the eastern slopes during the night, between 0715 and 1130 delivered preparatory and neutralization fire on the mountain's base from a point 1500 yards from the beach; then shifted fire to caves and other targets of opportunity on the slopes of the volcano. When relieved by here sister ship Henry A. Wiley at 1448 she had fired 775 rounds of 5-inch shell. Off the western slope of Suribachi, Abele supported the 3rd Battalion in a similar pattern, expending 971 rounds of 5-inch and 172 rounds of star shell. At 0830 RCT 28 jumped off to the assault. Only 50 to 70 yards were gained in the forenoon against well-placed, camouflaged pillboxes and caves, many of which were so close to the front lines that supporting weapons could not be used. When the tanks (delayed by lack of fuel) finally came forward at 1100, better progress was made; but RCT 28 gained only 200 yards that day towards the lower slopes of Suribachi.

The story was much the same on the right flank of the beachhead. Preceded by intense naval, air and artillery bombardment, the Marines jumped off at 0830 but found tough going from the start. On the extreme right the 4th Division was up against the first main line of Japanese defense and made slight progress. On the west coast the 5th Division did somewhat better; but the troops, mostly in the open, suffered heavy casualties from well-placed artillery and mortar

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barrages. By the end of D-day plus 1 the Marines occupied a line across the island that included No. 1 airfield. Now they were facing the main enemy line of defense in the higher, broken ground of the bulbous part of the island.

About noon 20 February occurred a change in the weather that hampered both air operations and unloading supplies. The wind veered from SSE to WSW and built up to 20 knots. At 1545 a sharp cold front passed over the island and the wind shifted to NNE, raising a heavy sea which added confusion to the already chaotic condition on the beaches. They became cluttered with wrecked boats and vehicles. The high surf, an insufficient supply of Marston mat to cover the soft ash, lost equipment, casualties, enemy artillery and mortar fire, all contributed to the horrible brew of congestion and confusion. As soon as the beach party pulled one wreck out of the way another landing craft came in and broached. Conditions would have been even worse but for the energy and skill of Admiral Hill's beach part commander, Captain Carl E. Anderson USNR. "Squeaky", as he was nicknamed from his high-pitched voice, commandeered men, bulldozers and weasels. Amphtracs and dukws justified themselves by rolling over the steep, soft beaches, carrying supplies to their destination without manhandling.5

In addition to morning and afternoon sweeps against Haha and Chichi Jima, aircraft from Task Force 58 and the escort carriers flew 545 sorties in 27 missions on 20 February, expending over 116 tons of bombs and 1331 rockets.

During the night of 20-21 February a destroyer was assigned to each battalion and a cruiser to each division ashore, for illumination and night harassing fire. The remaining ships withdrew to night operating areas and returned at dawn.

February 21 broke with showers and an 18- to 20-knot NE

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wind which continued to kick up choppy seas and heavy surf. At 0740 a heavy bombardment by naval gunfire and corps artillery opened in preparation for the Marines' jump-off at 0810. This was to be the daily pattern for the next three reeks. RCT 28 reached the base of Suribachi and some advance was made all along the line to the north of No. 1 airfield. Progress was painfully slow, as the Marines had to inch their way along, destroying pillboxes and sealing cave and tunnel entrances. Any position that was bypassed or missed was sure to come to life and start shooting again. Advance for the day was measured in yards and at the end of it No. 2 airfield was still in enemy hands.

Salvage work among the wrecked craft, vehicles and tanks on the beaches was hampered by the weather. Surf and sea conditions were such that unloading was limited to the big beaching craft and LSMs. During the day another RCT of the 3rd Marine Division, in floating reserve off the island, was landed and assigned to the hard-pressed 4th Division.

The Tokyo "Home and Empire" broadcast at the end of this day indicates that the enemy propaganda service was becoming really mad with Kelly Turner. The following is a partial translation: --

According to reports issued by the enemy, the man who commands the enemy American amphibious forces which effected landings on our Iwo Island is Vice Admiral Richmond Turner. He is the right-hand man to Commander in Chief Spruance of the enemy Fifth Fleet. He is the man who can be termed a devil man, being responsible for the killing of countless numbers of our own younger and elder brothers on the various islands throughout the central Pacific area. Turner's career in war against our own men began with the operations on the island of Guadalcanal.

This man Turner is called and known as the "Alligator" in the American Navy. He is associated with this name because his work is very similar to hat of an alligator, which lives both on land and in the water. Also the true nature of an alligator is than once he bits into something he will not let go. Turner's nature is also like this.

Spruance, with a powerful offensive spirit and Turner, with excellent determinative power, have led their men to a point where they are

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indeed close to the mainland, but they find themselves in a dilemma, as they are unable either to advance or retreat.

This man Turner, who has been responsible for the death of so many of our precious men, shall not return home alive -- he must not, and will not. This is one of the many things we can do to rest at east the many souls of those who have paid the supreme sacrifice.6

Nevertheless, "Alligator" Turner (the Japanese evidently got the name from the shoulder patch of the V 'Phib Corps) not only returned alive, but at the time we go to press (1960) is still very much alive.

2. Carrier Strikes and Air Support, 21 February-1 March7

On 21 February Task Groups 58.2 and 58.3 operated about 70 WNW of Iwo, providing C.A.P. and launching several bombing strikes. Admirals Sherman and Davison also sent a strafing sweep against Chichi Jima to interdict the airfield so it would not be used for staging. During the night of 20-21 February about 13 raids with a total of 18 to 20 planes came in on the task group. Several planes pressed in near enough to be fired upon; two were shot down. No damage was inflicted on the ships. The pattern of these attacks on Sherman's and Davison's groups reminded sailors of similar raids off the Gilbert Islands in November 1943, years and years ago as it seemed. But of very different design were the attacks on Saratoga that same evening by kamikazes from Hatori airbase near Yokosuka, which staged through Hachijo Jima in the Northern Bonins.

On the morning of 21 February Saratoga (Captain Lucian A. Meobus) and three destroyers were detached from TG 58.5 in order to provide C.A.P. the following night over the amphibious forces off Iwo Jima. Unfortunately the rest of the night carrier group, Enterprise with three cruisers and seven destroyers, was retained

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by Admiral Mitscher for night C.A.P. over TF 58; this gave old "Sara" too little protection. At 1628 that day, when she had just reached her operating area 35 miles NW of Iwo with most of her planes on board, bogeys were reported 75 miles out. These were evaluated by the air support commander as "friendly". Six fighters of Saratoga's C.A.P. were nevertheless vectored out to inspect the suspicious characters, and at 1650 came a "Tally-ho!" from a pilot, followed by the word "Splashed two Zekes." The sky was overcast and ceiling down to 3500 feet, favoring air attack. Saratoga went to general quarters, commenced catapulting night fighters at maximum speed, and sent them out in all directions. At 1659 here antiaircraft guns opened fire on six planes bursting out of the clouds. The first two, already blazing from hits, struck the water and bounced into the carrier's starboard side at the waterline, hurling their bombs inside the ship, where they exploded. "Sara" had just completed launching 15 planes when she received these hits, and had two standby fighters on the catapults when she received a bomb from a third aircraft which exploded on the anchor windlass. This knocked out a good section of the flight deck forward. The fourth attacker splashed; the fifth made a flat turning dive, crashed the port catapult and exploded. The sixth, also in flames, crashed an airplane crane on the starboard side; parts of it landed on No. 1 gun gallery and the rest went overboard. All this happened within three minutes, 1700-1703 February 21.

Saratoga's power plant was hardly touched, and she built up speed to 25 knots while fighting fires. The blaze on the hangar deck was brought under control by 1830; the fire in wing tank control twelve minutes later. But the flight deck was in no condition to recover airborne planes. Destroyer McGowan, which took over fighter control, instructed them to land on one of the escort carriers near Iwo, until "Sara" had jettisoned her burning aircraft.

At 1846, just as things were beginning to look up, there came a sinister glare of parachute flares, and five more kamikazes attacked. Four were shot down clear of the carrier; the fifth came in unobserved, dropping a bomb which exploded on or just over the flight

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deck, blowing a 25-foot hole in that deck as the plane bounced overboard. Even in the predicament there was something to laugh at. A confused pilot from a CVE landed his plane on Saratoga's deck, remarking as he alighted "Gee, I'm glad I'm not on that old Sara. All hell's broken out there!" A deckhand replied "Take a good look around, brother. This is hell!"

But old "Sara" was not yet dead. Although wounded in seven places, by 2015 she was able to recover planes on the after part of her flight deck. On Admiral Spruance's order she steamed under her own power to Eniwetok, en route to a West Coast yard for repairs. She lost 36 planes by burning and jettisoning, and six by water landings, and sustained heavy casualties -- 123 killed and missing, 192 wounded.8

The loss of Saratoga's services for over three months, and the discouraging results of this battle, coupled with the distaste of carrier-plane pilots for night work,9 but a stopper on further development of special dusk-to-dawn carriers and planes. Admiral Mitscher was not favorably impressed by their performance. In the next operation, the one covering the Ryukyus, there was but one night-flying carrier, Enterprise. But, as we shall see, her performance in that operation caused the Admiral to change his mind about night fighters and bombers.

"Sara" was not the only flattop to catch it during the night of 21-22 February. At 1845, during twilight, escort carrier Bismarck Sea, operating with Admiral Durgin's group (to which Saratoga

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and Enterprise were temporarily attached) about 45 miles east of Iwo Jima, became a total loss to kamikaze attack. One Japanese plane attacking on her port bow was taken under fire but a second, coming in very low on the starboard side, was not seen until 1000 yards away. It was shot at until the guns could depress no more; already blazing, it crashed the ship abreast the after elevator, which dropped onto the hangar deck. About two minutes later a heavy explosion occurred. This started gasoline fires in planes on the hangar deck, the after end of which was blown out by a second explosion. The after part of the ship was a shambles and at 1905 Captain J.L. Pratt ordered Abandon Ship. Bismarck Sea burned and exploded for three hours, then rolled over and sank. Three destroyers and three destroyer escorts spent all night and until 1000 on the 22nd picking up survivors. Of her crew of 943 officers and men, 218 were lost.

Simultaneously with this fatal attack several Japanese torpedo bombers came in on the starboard side of escort carrier Lunga Point. The first, taken under fire at 1500 yards, launched a torpedo, then was caught by a shellburst and splashed only 200 yards away. The torpedo passed ahead. A second plane, closely following the first, dropped a torpedo which also crossed the carrier's bow safely; the plane then disappeared without being brought under fire. A third, close behind the second, after launching a torpedo which missed astern, hit the after part of the island with its wing, skidded across the flight deck with propeller chewing up the planking, then plunged into the sea over the port side. And a fourth plane was shot down. The fires in Lunga Point were soon quenched, the damage was slight, and nobody was killed.

Net cargo ship Keokuk 10 was cruising in formation with a group of LSTs and net tenders about 50 miles SE of Iwo Jima at 1720 February 21 when a Jill dived out of the clouds dead ahead, hit her on the starboard side just abaft the bridge, and slithered aft, wiping out all but one 20-mm gun of the starboard battery. All fires

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were out by 1850, but Keokuk had 17 killed or missing and 44 wounded. LST-477 was also hit by a kamikaze which apparently bounced overboard without doing much damage to this beaching craft or her embarked tanks.

Admiral Mitscher now ordered Enterprise to take Saratoga's place in close night support. Early 22 February she launched eight planes to search for "Sara's" missing pilots, Unfortunately two of these planes broke through a low, 500-foot cloud ceiling right over some of the fire support ships during an air alert, were mistaken for enemy and shot down. One crew of three was lost; the other, piloted by Ensign Henry G. Hinrichs USNR, was picked up by a PC which also mistook the men for Japanese and had the rail lined with armed bluejackets, in view of the enemy's propensity to toss hand grenades at would-be rescuers. Fortunately the "loud, continuous and explosive use of strong American invectives convinced them otherwise"; so much so that the patrol craft's skipper jumped over the side to aid the rescue.11

Enterprise had two main tasks off Iwo: to fly dawn and dusk C.A.P. over the escort carriers whose planes supported the troops by day, and to interdict the enemy airfield on Chichi Jima. On the evening of 23 February, her night fighter squadron, with the aid of five planes transferred from Saratoga, began hanging up a new record. Night and day for 174 consecutive hours, until midnight 2 March, this squadron kept planes airborne. Its pilots flew night, dawn, dusk and day air patrols, sweeps, and intruder missions on Chichi Jima. But the "jeep" carriers almost equaled this record of "Big E". Admiral Durgin's task group, during the 22 days that it furnished air support for Iwo (with only one day out for fueling), at one time kept planes airborne for 172 consecutive hours.12 Enterprise remained off Iwo, under operational control of Rear Admiral Durgin, until 10 March. From her association with the escort carriers she acquired to new nicknames, "Enterprise Bay"

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and "Queen of the Jeeps". She entered Ulithi lagoon on 12 March for two days' upkeep before departing with TF 58 on the next operation to cover Okinawa.

Admiral Clark's TG 58.1 and Admiral Radford's TG 58.4 had been busy on D-day fueling and replenishing from the logistics group and filling up what would otherwise have been restful hours with antiaircraft practice. On 20 February "Jocko" Clark, who hated to see and idle plane on board, sliced off six whole deckloads to support the troops on Iwo Jima, and a few more next day.

During 23 February Task Force 58 fueled from Rear Admiral Beary's Servron 6 east of Iwo Jima and at 1850 shaped a northerly course for a high-speed run toward Tokyo. Next day the destroyers were topped off from the heavy ships, although hampered by high seas and strong winds. At about noon, destroyers were sent ahead to deal with Japanese pickets and give early warning of air attack. Weather forced a reduction of speed to 16 knots but the sea was so rough that Moale, hastening from TG 58.4 to take her picket station, smashed her bow and forecastle and flooded several forward compartments.

The first sweeps were sent off at 0715 February 25 when the task force was about 190 miles SE of Tokyo. The weather was so bad that most of the strikes hit secondary targets or those of opportunity. As the weather worsened rapidly during the forenoon, Admiral Mitscher at 1215 ordered all further operations canceled. This second strike on Tokyo was even less effective than the first.

Early in the afternoon, with unfavorable reports of weather over Tokyo for the next day, Admiral Mitscher decided to strike Nagoya on the 26th and shaped a course accordingly. En route, destroyers Hazelwood and Murray sank three Japanese small craft that were too tiny to be mentioned in postwar assessments. But a 100-foot-long Japanese picket boat, which refused to be disposed of easily, put up a spunky fight. She was picked up at 0030 February 26 by Porterfield, which opened fire with 5-inch and automatic weapons. The picket boat returned small-caliber shell fire, scoring hits which did considerable damage to instruments and radio sets

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around the destroyer's bridge structure, killed one man and wounded twelve. Porterfield, reporting that she had left the picket in a sinking condition, passed on; but the Japanese vessel drifted into the inner screen of TG 58.3, where she almost collided with Pasadena and had the nerve to open fire on her at point-blank range, making 13 hits and wounding two men. The cruiser replied with 40-mm fire and passed on. Destroyer Stockham at about 0130 was ordered to destroy the enemy picket. She closed and opened fire with 5-inch and 40-mm guns. The boat still had considerable bite left, returned fire and hit Stockham several times with small bullets. By 0300 Stockham had silenced and dismasted the boat, leaving at awash in a sinking condition.

During that night both wind and sea made up and speed had to be reduced to 12 knots to avoid damage to the destroyers. Admiral Mitscher, realizing by 0514 February 26 that he could not reach a launching position off Nagoya in time, canceled the strikes and turned toward his fueling area, around lat. 23 degrees 30 minutes N., long. 141 degrees E., where the task force fueled on the 27th. Admiral Radford's TG 58.4 was then detached to Ulithi, while the other three steamed westward to make their third call on Okinawa.

Early in the morning of 1 March they reached a position 60 to 70 miles SW of the "Great Loochoo". Even in that hornets' nest of enemy air activity tactical surprise was obtained and no airborne opposition developed. Naha, the flimsy capital of Okinawa, was well bombed. Carrier planes roamed at will over the future scene of battle, bombing and strafing every likely target. Very important for future operations were the photographic missions. It was a fair day for once, and the photo planes obtained almost perfect coverage of Okinawa, Kerama Retto, Minami Daito and Amami O Shima, obtaining data for charts which were made and distributed before the end of the month.

Retirement commenced as soon as planes were recovered that evening, except that Rear Admiral F.E.M. Whiting's cruisers (Vincennes, Miami and San Diego) with Desron 61 were detached to bombard Okino Daito (also known as Borodino Island), an islet

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195 east of Okinawa where the enemy was reported to have a radar station. Three firing runs were made there in the early hours of 2 March. Task Force 58 continued southeasterly and entered Ulithi lagoon on 4 March 1945 to prepare for the next operation, the capture of Okinawa.

During this two weeks' cruise, 16 February to 1 March, TF 58 claimed to have shot down 393 enemy planes in the air, and believed that it destroyed over 250 on the ground. It is now impossible to check these claims from Japanese sources. Plane and pilot losses were heavy -- 84 planes with 60 pilots and 21 crewmen in combat, 59 planes with eight pilots and six crewmen operationally.

Escort carrier planes were the winged worhorses of the Iwo Jima campaign. Anzio's planes destroyed two Japanese submarines;13 and while Task Force 58 raided Tokyo and Okinawa, Admiral Durgin's "jeeps", almost within sight of Mount Suribachi, were feeding out call-bombing and rocketing missions, and providing C.A.P. and antisubmarine patrol, from D-day minus 3 to D-day plus 18. "The daily task of providing air support," observed Admiral Durgin, "is not broken even for replenishing and refueling. It is a continual grind from dawn to dark each day."

3. The Land Battle, 22 February-16 March

On 22 February, worst day yet for weather, with a cold, drizzling rain, General Schmidt decided to give his front lines a rest, and the weather was so foul that afternoon air strikes had to be canceled. On the 23rd, after a preliminary bombardment, the Marines jumped off, with main effort directed towards No. 2 airfield. The 4th Division fought in misery in terrain honeycombed with mines, booby traps, buttressed pillboxes, caves and blockhouses, all mutually supporting. Gains of 200 to 300 yards were made on the right, but there was little change in the center or on the left.

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Map: Iwo Jima, Progress of Battle, 19 February-24March 1945
Iwo Jima: Progress of Battle, 19 February-24March 1945

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The great event of 23 February was the successful scaling of HOTROCKS, the code name for Mount Suribachi. General Kuribayashi ordered his troops there to hold out to the last. But things got so hot on HOTROCKS -- whose every slope could be reached by naval gunfire, air bombing and rocketing -- that the local commander became desperate, and sent a message to headquarters requesting permission to make a banzai charge, rather than sit tight and be smothered. Whether or not the General deigned to reply is not known; but in any event, Colonel Harry ("the Horse") Liversedge USMC gave neither commander any time to make up his mind. Early on the 23rd a 40-man detachment from Liversedge's 28th Marines, commanded by 1st Lieutenant H.G. Schreier USMC, scaled the volcano. As they scrambled over the rim of the crater they were challenged by a small defense force on the opposite edge and a hot little fight developed. Before it ended, one of the Marines picked up a length of iron pipe, lashed to it a small American flag that he had brought up in his pocket, and raised it at 1020. The flag was too small to be seen through the fog of battle, but fortunately a bigger one was coming up. A Marine had thoughtfully borrowed a big battle ensign eight feet long from LST-779, which had beached near the base. He carried it up the mountain, and Joe Rosenthal, Associated Press photographer, arrived in time to take the picture of the second flag-raising, at 1037, which became the most famous photograph of the Pacific War. It inspired the bronze monument to the Marine Corps by Felix de Welden that has been erected near Arlington National Cemetery, overlooking the Potomac.14

Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal was coming ashore with General Smith from Eldorado during the preliminaries. Symbolically, the touched Beach Green just as the second Stars and Stripes was flung to the strong north wind. "It was one of the proudest moments of my life," said General Smith; and the Secretary, turning to him, said gravely, "Holland, the raising of that flag

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on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next 500 years."15 Old Glory, visible all over the island and far off shore, lifted the spirits of all hands.

But the end was not yet near. Even the 28th Regiment could not leave Suribachi and join the rest of the 5th Division on its way north, because the volcano slopes were a rabbit warren of caves and tunnels. Although some 600 Japanese had been killed in the assault, at least 1000 more were still there, holed up like mites in an overripe cheese.

Unloading conditions continued bad, even after a shift was made to the western beaches to avoid the cluttered wrecks of landing craft on the eastern side. Wind seemed to go around in circles at Iwo Jima making first one side of the island and then the other a lee shore. Beach gradients everywhere were so steep that pontoon causeways broached, so the rest of the LSTs equipped with pontoons used them as lighters. Ordinary landing craft could not be used, as the backwash of each wave flooded them through the ramps, and all beaching craft had to keep motors running and use breastfasts in addition to two stern anchors.16

February 24 was a day of very heavy fighting in which significant gains were made. Idaho and Pensacola delivered an hour's naval bombardment of the heavily fortified area just north of No. 2 airfield; planes from the escort carriers then bombed it for a quarter of an hour and the Marines jumped off at 0915. During the day some of their tanks managed to reach the airfield by a rough road which first had to be cleared of mines. A foothold was secured near the middle of No. 2 airfield and gains of up to 800 yards were made on the left flank.

A feature of gunfire support rendered during the first week on Iwo Jima was the work of the LCI mortar unit under Lieutenant

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Commander Stanley J. Kelley USNR. Thirty LCI(M)s were assigned, but owing to breakdowns not all were available at the same time. They provided direct support on call, and harassing fire to break up enemy counterattacks. With their shallow draft they could work close inshore on the flanks and often were in a position to shoot up gullies against enemy targets that were not visible to the Marines. Much of their fire was delivered at night. So impressed were the Marines with the performance of Kelley's craft that on 22 February the landing force commander sent them a special message: "Ships of mortar support groups have been doing a splendid job. Believe your fire has had great effect in preventing large scale counterattacks."17 Ammunition shortages curtailed their support at times, but when they retired to Saipan on 26 February they had expended over 32,000 mortar projectiles. Although frequently taken under fire by enemy batteries the only one damaged was LCI(M)-760, by a near miss.


Beaching Craft Unloading Under Mount Suribachi, 24 February
The farthest LST is carrying a pontoon causeway, and the next one, an LCT. The nearest craft is an LSM; the wreck in the foreground is Japanese.

Beginning 25 February the Marines ashore made slow but steady progress, gradually pushing Japanese defenders into the northern part of the island. The 3rd Division having completed landing on 24 February, the final drive was made by three divisions abreast, 4th on the right 3rd in the center, and 5th, proud of having taken Suribachi, on the left flank.18 By 1 March, No. 2 airfield and the village of Motoyama were in their hands. The naval gunfire support plan continued as on D-day, with destroyers assigned to battalions and heavier ships to divisions, or engaged in area bombardment. This continued until 9 March, when the enemy was contained in a narrow strip along the north and northeast coasts of the island. With fewer targets to take under fire, fewer ships were assigned.

Routine fire support duties were varied by many alarums and excursions. Few ships, however, had such a lively experience as destroyer Terry (Lieutenant Commander William B. Moore) on

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1 March. In a screening station northwest of the island, she was ordered at 0215 to search for a submarine contact which had been lost by another destroyer. At 0245 a low-flying Japanese plane coming from the direction of Kita Jima closed and dropped a torpedo at about 1000 yards' range. The plane had been picked up by radar and tracked; the recognition officer saw it drop the torpedo and sang out "Torpedo Away--". The skipper put rudder hard over and rang up flank speed, which enabled Terry to escape, the torpedo passing about 50 yards astern.

At 0720, en route to her next assignment, a screening station north of Iwo Jima, Terry was passing Kitano Point at the north end of the island and about 5200 yards off shore, when salvos from a Japanese coastal battery began straddling her. Lieutenant Commander Moore rang up flank speed and began counterbattery fire with his after guns. The destroyer received a 6-inch hit on the starboard side of her main deck over the forward engine room, losing eleven men killed and 19 wounded and suffering extensive damage. The Japanese battery fired continuously until about 0730, when Nevada and Pensacola silenced it.

On the same day, Colhoun, anchored off the northeastern coast of the island to repair damage received in a collision, absorbed a three-gun salvo from an 80-mm dual-purpose battery. It wrecked No. 2 torpedo tube, exploded the air flask of a torpedo, caused extensive damage, killed one man and wounded 16.

The same shore battery that bopped Terry almost got the number of ammunition ship Columbia Victory, anchored off the beach close to V Amphibious Corps headquarters. A salvo fell near enough to her fantail to wound a man. The skipper promptly slipped his cable and got under way, pursued by enemy salvos. Generals Smith and Schmidt watched this performance with hearts in their mouths, as one hit on the ammunition ship would have sent them as well as her to kingdom come.19

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Beach and unloading conditions improved after 25 February. New beach exits were constructed, a lateral road leading inland was covered with Marston matting, good progress was made cleaning up wrecked landing craft and vehicles, But weather and surf conditions still prevented anything smaller than LST, LSM and LCT from unloading. Late on 2 March landing operations were shifted to the western group of beaches, and thereafter both sets of beaches were used whenever wind and surf permitted.

Escort carrier planes and B-24s from the Marianas continued to provide air support. Base development work on No. 1 airfield was pressed by Seabees. On the 27th (D-day plus 8) the first light Piper Cub observation plane, designated OY-1, was launched successfully from LST-776, which had been equipped with a special gear of booms and cables (the so-called "Brodie") for launching and recovering these small aircraft.

PBMs began to arrive that day to operate searches from their floating bases, tenders Hamlin, Williamson and Chincoteague, and the first searches went out on the 28th. But the sea off Iwo proved to be too rough and too full of flotsam to operate PBMs profitably, and they began to withdraw to Saipan 6 March when A.A.F. fighters arrived to take over covering duties. Thereafter searches were flown by PB4Ys, using the Iwo No. 1 airfield, which had received its first twin-engine plane, a C-47, on 3 March. Next day the island received its first call from a B-29, returning low on gas from Japan. The CVEs began to pull out on 9 March. Last of the heavy bombardment ships departed 12 March, leaving only destroyers and LCI(G)s for fire support.

Vice Admiral Kelly Turner, the "devil man" who the Japanese vowed would never return home alive, departed in Eldorado 4 March, after appointing Rear Admiral Harry Hill S.O.P.A., Iwo Jima. Transdiv 33 left the same day, taking to Guam one regiment of the 3rd Marine Division, which had suffered severely in the fighting. The other two regiments were ordered to remain until relieved by the 147th Infantry U.S. Army. Major General James E. Chaney

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USA, commander of the future Army garrison, arrived with his headquarters on 27 February and the bulk of his troops began disembarking 21 March.20 This overlapping of Marines and Army was a good thing, as it gave the GIs an opportunity to learn the peculiar methods that had been developed to meet the enemy tactics before becoming responsible for the final dig-out and mopping-up.

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Footnotes

1. All sources mentioned in Chap. III, Note 1, especially Vice Adm. Turner's Action Report; Sgt. Bill Miller USMC "Hot Rock, the Fight for Mt. Suribachi" and Capt. F.A. Scott USMC "Ten Days on Iwo Jima" Leatherneck XXVIII, No. 5 (May 1945) 15-19.

2. On to Westward p. 180.

3. Isely & Crowl p. 501.

4. Maj. Tokasuka Horie "Explanation of Japanese Defense Plan and Battle of Iwo Jima" 25 Jan. 1946. Horie, one of Kuribayashi's staff officers, was detached before the landings and sent to Chichi Jima, where he survived the war.

5. Bartley Iwo Jima p. 197. The Royal Navy liaison officer with the attack force remarked to this writer, about two months later, "On the beach was an extraordinary character, almost as wide as he was tall, wearing the insignia of a Navy captain, but delivering his commands in amazingly blasphemous language, with a strong Scandinavian accent. But he managed to get things done." That was "Squeaky" Anderson. Weasels were tracked vehicles, 15 ft. 9 in. long.

6. Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service Bulletin 22 Feb. 1945.

7. CTF 58 (Vice Adm. Mitscher) Action Report for 10 Feb.-4 Mar., 13 Mar. 1945, CTG 52.2 (Rear Adm. Durgin) Action Report for Iwo Jima, 21 Apr. 1945.

8. Saratoga Action Report 7 Mar. 1945.

9. Discussed in letter from Cdr. William I. Martin (C.O. Air Group 90 in Enterprise) to Cominch 14 Apr. 1945. The reasons for this distaste were not so much the hazards of night flying as failure to receive target information from daytime fliers, dissatisfaction over not seeing targets, and irregular meals and hours. CTG 58.5 (Rear Adm. M.B. Gardner), in his Action Report of 12 March, stated that the effectiveness of a night carrier group was not properly tested during this operation. The losses of TG 58.5, 10-22 February, exclusive of Saratoga's in the 21 February attack, were eight planes (one over Yokosuka, one by "friendly" fire off Iwo, rest operational), five pilots and four other men, plus ten more planes jettisoned as a result of deck crashes. Admiral Spruance, in his endorsement to this report, observed that a special night carrier group was not a good solution because its requirements for daytime C.A.P. put too much load on the other groups. Night fighters were frequently called upon for emergency day missions; 71 per cent of their sorties in this operation were by day.

10. Designated AKN, an old train ferry converted to carry harbor nets and supplies for the net tenders.

11. "History of Night Torpedo Squadron 90" p. 35, included in History Night Carrier Air Group 90.

12. CTG 52.2 Action Report 21 Apr. 1945.

13. See end of Chap. I.

14. Bartley pp. 73-78; Coral and Brass pp. 259-262.

15. Walter Millis ed. The Forrestal Diaries (1951) pp. 29-30.

16. Notes from Commo. Robert C. Johnson USNR of the Seabees at Iwo Jima 21 Apr. 1945. From same source, 160 landing craft were damaged beyond repair the first two days.

17. CTG 52.6 (Com. Mortar Support Group) Action Report 2 Mar. 1945.

18. This advance is well described in Robert Sherrod On to Westward pp. 207-215.

19. Rear Adm. Hill Action Report p. III 9; Coral and Brass pp. 217-218.

20. Rear Adm. Hill Action Report pp. III 8, 14, XII 6. They arrived in cargo ships Zaurak, Alkaid, Alderamin and Celeno, escorted by DEs John L. Williamson and French.



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