[Secret]
To: Tokyo
From: Washington
November 20, 1941
Purple (Very Urgent)
#1147. Departmental secret
To
be handled in Government Code.
(Part
1 of 2)
Our
conversation with HULL on the 20th may be summarized as follows: (That day is
America's biggest holiday. They call it "Thanksgiving." In spite of
that, however, Mr. HULL not only agreed to talk with, but seemed glad to see
both me and Ambassador KURUSU when we went to call on him.)
First,
we explained the various items mentioned in the instructions in your #798 [a].
HULL had only one or two questions about the other parts and expressed hardly
any opinions but, when we came to the part where we state that we do not want
the United States to do anything to hinder us in bringing about a complete
peace over China, he seemed extremely reluctant to consider it. He went on to
reiterate what he has always said about the Tri-Partite Alliance. He said that
so long as fears emanating from that treaty existed in the heads of the
Americans, the United States would find it well-nigh impossible to cease aiding
CHIANG KAI-SHEK and that, as we knew, the United States is now opposing the
German policy of military expansion which knows no bounds; that on the one hand
she is helping Great Britain and on the other hand CHIANG KAI-SHEK; that therefore
until we Japanese made it perfectly clear that our policy is to be one of
peace, it will be impossible to cease aiding China, just like it will be impossible
to stop aiding England. He continued that, leading up to the state of affairs
we find today, American interests in Japan, including Manchukuo, had undergone
terrible embarrassment.
Army 25179 Trans. 11-24-41 (S)
[a] S.I.S. #25040 which tells Ambassador NOMURA to present Proposal "B" to the U. S. Government and says that no further concessions will be made.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 20, 1941
Purple
#1147 (Part 2 of 2) (Departmental Secret)
(To
be handled in Government Code.)
KURUSU
said, "When I had an interview with the President the other day, he talked
as if he would like to act as an introducer. Now if he wants to take the
trouble to do this introducing in order to bring about peace, I cannot
reconcile it with continued assistance to CHIANG KAI-SHEK, which actually
hinders peace. In other words, it seems quite reasonable to us to ask the
President to stop aiding CHIANG if he is going to act as an introducer."
HULL replied, "Well, what the President meant when he said that was that he
was pre-supposing that you Japanese would first make it apparent that your
fundamental policy was peaceful. Heretofore, influential Japanese statesmen
have expressed opinions favorable to HITLER's military expansion policy, and
the American people find it very difficult to believe that Japan is turning
peaceful." I said, "Well, the plan which I proposed today makes no
progress whatever on two or three points. However, since the situation is so
tense, if the tension between Japan and the United States can be relaxed, be it
ever so little, particularly in the southwestern Pacific, and quickly clear the
atmosphere, then I think we could go on and settle everything else." HULL
said, "Yes, I understand what you mean thoroughly, but that would be very
hard to do. In any case, you and I have on our shoulders a heavy responsibility
toward both the Japanese and American people. I might say toward the whole
human race." Mr. HULL's face assumed a sadly compassionate expression, and
he said, "I want to think over this proposal you have brought me fully and
sympathetically, and then I want to talk to you again.
Army 25180 Trans. 11/22/41 (2)
(EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE , EXHIBIT NO. 1 INTERCEPTED DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES SENT BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN JULY l AND DECEMBER 8, 1941)