Re: Gramcord notes on the article

From: Paul S. Dixon (dixonps@juno.com)
Date: Tue Jan 06 1998 - 12:57:54 EST


On Mon, 05 Jan 1998 21:00:56 -0500 Jonathan Robie <jonathan@texcel.no>
writes:
>At 07:47 PM 1/5/98 EST, Paul S. Dixon wrote:
>>On Fri, 02 Jan 1998 14:11:59 -0500 Jonathan Robie wrote:
>>>At 01:48 PM 1/2/98 EST, Paul S. Dixon wrote:
>
>>>>Let me try to state the rule (call it Dixon's rule, if you like and
for
>>>>simplicity): a predicate nominative will be definite if and only if
it
>>>>can be interchanged with the subject without losing any meaning.
Boy,
>>>>am I going out on a limb on this one, or what? Saw away.
>>>
>>>I'm not ready to saw yet, since the burden of proof rests on the
>>>affirmative. Give me some proof, then we'll start sawing ;->
>>
>>Well, there are plenty of examples affirming it. I could go through
the
>>Gospel of John and demonstrate it, I believe. Take 1:1c and 1:14 for
>>starters. Or, take one of the examples given by the Gramcord Institute
>>I challenged, Heb 1:10, ERGA TWN CEIRWN SOU EISIN hOI OURANOI.
>>The Institute notes argue for definiteness. If we turn it around, does
>>it work? "The works of your hands are the heavens"? I don't think so,
not
>>unless we want to conclude that the heavens are the complete works of
>>God's hands. What about the earth? It seems to be the anarthrous
>>construction is important here and that it probably indicates
>>qualitativeness, even though we might still translate it with a "the."
>
>This is circular reasoning - you are using the test you propose to
evaluate
>whether this example invalidates the test you propose. In the
linguistics
>literature I've read recently, linguistic tests are usually defined in
the
>domain of the language that is being studied, not in terms of the truth
>value of transformations of logical propositions which are stated in the
>language. I'm fairly convinced by Paul Grice's arguments that that
natural
>language logic and formal language logic can be quite different, and I
also
>suspect that the manner in which they differ may vary somewhat from
>language to language.

Yes, even as I was writing it I had this eerie merry-go-round sensation.
It was fun, though. Seriously, I think I was more illustrating than
proving. My proof, is that's what one seeks, is more deductive than
inductive. It was based, as you recall, upon the interchangeableness
(sic) of the articular predicate nominative and the definite subject and
the equally definite anarthrous definite predicate nominative being
substituted for it.

I know deduction is not really in vogue in grammatical analysis, but
maybe it should be. This, of course, takes us to the discussion of logic
in grammar. Is logic divine? The LOGOS is, and I tend to agree with
Gordon Clark (that logic is divine, and by implication language is a
reflection of such), but this is bordering on the limitations here, or is
it?
 
>Incidentally, if you assume, with Robertson, that the absence of the
>article has no fixed meaning, then an indefinite reading seems to make
>sense here:
>
>"The heavens are works of your hands"
>
>Since you argue for the qualitative interpretation, and Dale for the
>definite, I thought I'd fill in the third possibility ;->

Yes, I have not necessary problem with indefiniteness here.
Definiteness, however, does seem to have problems. I still have not
found an exception to my hypothesis. If none surfaces ...

Paul Dixon



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