Footnotes

Chapter I:

1. See the earlier booklet, The Canadians in Britain, 1939-1944.

2. See From Pachino to Ortona, an earlier booklet in this series.

3. During the interim between General McNaughton's departure and General Crerar's arrival, Lieutenant-General K. Stuart, Chief of Staff at C.M.H.Q., commanded in an acting capacity.

Chapter II:

1. Assault Vehicles, Royal Engineers: adapted Churchill tanks fitted with "petards" firing "dustbins"--heavy charges for smashing concrete defences.

2. All casualties are reported in due course, but there are normally some cases where the date is unknown and some where it is inaccurate. The conditions of an assault landing naturally make casualty accounting especially difficult.

3. Interrogation of enemy generals revealed a difference of opinion on the reasons for the failure of their armour to develop further counter-attacks. Meyer, a regimental commander who succeeded to the command of the 12th S.S. on 13 June, blamed shortage of petrol; Feuchtinger of the 21st Panzer blamed the excellence of our anti-tank defence.

Chapter III:

1. This directive explained the plan of future operations as follows: "to hold the maximum number of enemy divisions on our eastern flank between Caen and Villers Bocage, and to swing the western or right flank of the Army Group southwards and eastwards in a wide sweep so as to threaten the line of withdrawal of such enemy divisions to the south of Paris". This was precisely the manner in which events developed nearly a month later.

2. These various special assault vehicles ("Funnies") were provided in this, as in all other operations, by the 79th British Armoured Division (commanded by Major-General Sir Percy Hobart)--a formation to which the Canadians owe much.

3. General Dempsey's one Army Headquarters was now "fighting" five full Corps: a most unusual situation.

4. Field Marshal von Rundstedt, who held the German command in the west when the invasion began, was removed by Hitler early in July, apparently because he had advised a withdrawal from North-Western France while there was still time to avoid a major disaster there. Rommel, field commander under Rundstedt in the beginning, was seriously wounded in an attack by our aircraft on 17 July. Later, it appears, he chose death by poison in preference to standing trial for allged complicity in the Generals' plot againt Hitler.

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Chapter IV:

1. These columns formed part of Lieutenant-General George S. Patton's Third U.S. Army, which had now assumed responsibility for the American right sector. On 1 August, General Bradley handed over the First U.S. Army to Lieutenant-General Courtney H. Hodges, and himself assumed command of the 12th Army Group.

2. On 8 August 1918, Canadian, British and Australian troops crashed through the German defences facing Amiens to a depth of eight miles. This was the beginning of offensive operations which ended only with the Armistice. Ludendorff later called it "the black day of the German Army."

3. Subsequent examination of the battlefield indicated that this estimate was too high; but there seems no doubt that the combined moral and material effects of the attacks played an important part in checking this offensive.

4. During this fighting in the Laison valley, a new and formidable weapon, the "Wasp" carrier-mounted flame-thrower, which was in part of product of Canadian development, was used for the first time by Canadians (the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders). The effect on the enemy was reported as "totally demoralizing".

5. 84 Group was the Tactical Group assigned to the support of the First Canadian Army. It was commanded at this time by Air Vice-Marshal L.O. Brown, and later by Air Vice-Marshal E.C. Hudleston. Its Headquarters moved with Army Headquarters throughout the campaign. 83 Group was assigned to the Second Army. This Group contained many Canadian squadrons.

Chapter V:

1. It is estimated that they left south of the Seine, on the battlefields and on their line of retreat, more than 12,000 motor vehicles out of perhaps 30,000 they had in Normandy. They thus saved a very considerable proportion of their transport, much of it apparently getting across the Seine by a single pontoon bridge; but they lost, it appears, two-thirds or more of their tanks and self-propelled guns. These estimates are subject to revision.

2. Alan Wood, The Falaise Road (London, W.H. Allen and Co., 1944, Hurricane book. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited).



Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Patrick Clancey, HyperWar Foundation