Editor's Preface

It ha been explained in the preface to other volumes of this history that the work has been planned in accordance with a Government directive 'to provide a broad survey of events from an inter-Service point of view'. Throughout this book the work 'military' is used to cover the activities of all three fighting Services.

This volume is the fifth of a series of six on Grand Strategy, or the central direction of the war. The series is intended to supplement and provide the background for the volumes devoted to the several campaigns and special aspects of the war, such as the War at Sea, the Defence of the United Kingdom and the Strategic Air Offensive, just as from another point of view those volumes supply the background for the present series.

Grand strategy is concerned with both purely military strategy and politics; some overlapping into both these fields has been unavoidable, but the intention has been to leave the story of operations and local strategy to the volumes assigned to them, and not to trespass further either in this direction or in that of political and diplomatic history than is necessary to explain how the war was conducted from the centre at the highest level.

The present volume opens with the Anglo-American Conference at Quebec in August 1943, at which the Allied offensive for the winning of the war was planned. It closes with the check sustained by this offensive a year later, and will shortly be followed by the final volume, Volume VI, which continues the story to the surrenders of Germany and Japan.

Apologies are due to the reader for the appearance of the last volumes of a series before the first, but it seems more sensible to publish at once the volumes now ready than to keep them in storage pending the completion of those which precede them in time. It may perhaps be pleaded that Volume V begins at a recognizable starting-point to a new, and largely self-contained, period of the war.

The breach of chronological order results form the decision, which may itself require apology, to entrust the volumes on Grand Strategy to a number of different hands. The excuse must be that any other plan would have entailed still longer delay.

Our narratives are based mainly on official sources, to which we have been allowed full access: particularly on the voluminous telegrams, memoranda and minutes preserved in the Cabinet Office and other Departments. Among these Sir Winston Churchill's papers are of outstanding importance. Besides archives in official custody we have

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been allowed to use a wealth of private diaries and correspondence, as well as to consult orally many of the principal actors. To all who have helped in this way, and to their representatives, we express our thanks.

Apart form these primary sources, we have drawn largely on the work, published and as yet unpublished, of our colleagues of both the military and civil histories, and on the narratives, monographs and summaries prepared by the Service historical sections, under Rear Admiral R.M. Bellairs, Brigadier H.B. Latham and Mr. J.C. Nerney. We have also benefited greatly by the arrangements made with the official historians of the United States and of Commonwealth countries for an exchange of information and of draft histories.

For help in the presentation and interpretation of enemy documents we wish to thank Mr. B.M. Melland and Colonel G.T. Wards and their staffs. The maps have been prepared under the experienced direction of Colonel T.M. Penney.

As has been stated with respect to earlier volumes, the historians have not normally included references to documents not open to public inspection; since our references could not be checked, one of the main reasons for doing so was absent; full references, are, however, printed in a confidential edition which should be available to students whenever the archives are opened. This policy has raised the question whether we should include references to published sources in these volumes. To do so is open to the objection that, where both unpublished and published sources have been used, the reader may be misled into thinking that the text relies solely on the published authorities referred to. Nevertheless we have thought it better to depart as little as possible from the usual practice, and have accordingly included references to important published sources; the reader should understand however that the sources mentioned are not necessarily the only ones we have used. Further, while not specifically referring to sources not open to the public, we have indicated the nature of the authority for statements of fact and opinion when there seemed special reason for doing so.

In accordance with the recognized British constitutional principle, the historians have not held themselves free to reveal individual differences of opinion within the War Cabinet nor to lift the veil of Civil Service anonymity. We have felt bound, also, to respect the requirements of military 'security'.

The Editor would like ot acknowledge his personal obligations to the members of his Advisory Panel, Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Blake, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, Air Chief Marshal Sir Guy Garrod and Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Jacob, and to Mr. A.B. Acheson of the Cabinet Office.

J.R.M.B.

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Introduction

The last two volumes of this series on grand strategy, written by one author, are concerned with one main theme. For the period which they cover, from August, 1943 to August 1945, was the period of the Allied strategic offensive--of the final offensive in Europe and of the first (and as it proved, final) phase of the combined offensive in Asia iand the Pacific. The volumes thus deal with two separate wars, in both of which, however, large Allied forces were engaged continuously in operations whose respective places within the grand design had to be carefully considered, and constantly adjusted, in the light of the available resources and of the developments themselves.

The plans for the strategic offensive were designed at the first Quebec Conference in August, 1943; and the results, at least for Europe, followed their intentions with remarkable accuracy for almost a year, and never departed significantly form the pattern they had established. But this was not brought about without constant modification of detail, and occasionally of principle, natural enough when events were moving rapidly and on a majestic scale. It is the purpose of the two volumes to follow the development of the plans in relation to the events.

As in other parts of this series, operations are accordingly treated in outline; and since these volumes precede the relevant parts of the histories of the campaigns, I cannot pretend that such detail or such conclusions as appear should be taken as finally authoritative. Both are subject in due course to correction by those qualified to provide it. Nor does the account seek to describe, in due proportion, the contributions of the different Services. It would indeed be otiose, if not impossible, in a brief outline of conjunct operations, to follow the parts played respectively by land, sea and air forces; and since those operations mostly service campaigns, by land, the emphasis has fallen mainly on the movements of the armies, which of course depended in varying degrees on support form the sea and air.

But there is a more fundamental disproportion in these volumes between the space devoted to the great conjunct operations on the one hand and to operations at sea and in the air on the other. This is dictated by the stage which the war had reached. The British and American strategic offensive rested directly on the basis of maritime power, and included great bombing campaigns against Germany and later against Japan. But essential as both these factors were to final success, neither in this period occupied the foreground of British

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strategic thought as did the campaigns by land. Maritime superiority, gained by the combined efforts of sea and air forces, was by now a fact in the West--challenged on occasions, never to be taken for granted, and at times emerging as an immediate issue, but in general forming the background to the plans for the offensive; while the bombing of Germany, which formed an important element of those plans, was also by now pursuing its own course largely in the background of strategy, and emerged as a strategic issue at different times as that course affected, or was affected by, the conjunct operations. The progress and significance of the air campaign in Europe, highly important as it was, can therefore best be examined on such occasions, and the detail of the operations, which occupied the central planners only from time to time, need seldom occupy us.

A similar result for British strategy occurred, for different reasons, in the Far East. For most of this period, British operations against Japan were confined to Burma; and although there was much speculation in London on the nature of the effort to be put into the Pacific, it remained speculation until a late stage, and the American's great operations by sea and air in that theatre, which decided the fate of Japan, need not be followed at any length. In both East and West, therefore, British strategic thought was concerned more with campaigns involving the three Services in combination than with independent operations by sea and air; and this narrative must follow the same pattern.

But the space devoted to the campaigns themselves must in turn vary considerably on different occasions. For while an account of grand strategy can aim at describing them only in outline, the relation of operations to plans in this period demands a more detailed description of the former on some occasions than on others. It is sometimes impossible, for instance, to explain the precise interaction of the strategy for the Mediterranean with that for north-west Europe, without following closely the course of the battles in Italy; or to understand the British strategy for the Far East without a detailed knowledge of the topography of, and operations in, Burma. The space devoted to local events therefore varies with their significance in the larger pattern.

It is perhaps surprising at first sight that the greater space should be devoted to the smaller campaigns. Plans for, and operations in, north-west Europe, which set the pace and provided the climax for the Allied strategy in 1944, can normally be followed only so far as is necessary to know what is going on, and to appreciate their effects. It is the Mediterranean and south-east Asia which, throughout that year, claim most attention. But this is not so surprising when the nature of planning in general, and of the current conditions in particular, is considered. For by the later stages of a successful war, strategic thought may well concentrate chiefly on the marginal campaigns. The main stroke, which decides the pattern, has been designed, and is being prepared or

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executed. The function of planning is now to see that it is supported, or is not endangered, by necessary operations elsewhere. This applies the more strongly if there is no great preponderance of force. In 1943, it was thought that the main stroke, in north-west France, could be undertaken provided that opposition was kept within specific limits. The burden of strategic thought therefore fell on those measures, principally in the Mediterranean and in the air, which alone could achieve that end; and the limitations of force and of material which demanded such a strategy, naturally provided the obstacles to its success. Similarly, the necessary offensive in south-east Asia, and--as far as a British history can determine--the campaigns in the Pacific, were limited by the prior demands of Europe. In these circumstances, the lesser undertakings often attracted, and must now receive, the greater attention.

The story that emerges is intricate and sometimes complex, and it must be followed at some length. The shifts and changes or argument, as events distort and restore the pattern, are too frequent for a series of selected occasions either to illuminate the intervals or to account satisfactorily for the length of the discussion on some of the plans. Planning is in any case likely to be more complex in a period of offense than in a period of defence or of preparation. But an important reason for tracing its detail closely in this instance, arises from the fact that the fluctuations were often caused by a shortage of critical material, which forms the connexion between the two wars against Germany and against Japan, and whose consequences, involving comparatively small forces and quantities whose significance however was considerable, can be appreciated only by close examination. In both East and West we can therefore appreciate the course of the debates only by seeing each step against the background of resources, within whose iron limits the actors moved. In the West, in addition, we must cover a wider field, for the course of operations on the Continent, from France ot the Balkans, raised diplomatic problems which reacted upon strategy, and whose course must therefore be followed, in proportion to their effect, with that of the campaigns.

It has accordingly proved necessary to devote two volumes to this phase of the war: the first covering the period from August, 1943 to September, 1944, the second from October, 1944 to August, 1945. Although not greatly unequal in chronology, the two parts are unequal in length. For the first is concerned with the settlement of the strategy which endured throughout the second, and with its execution in the period of greatest complexity. The dividing line, however, is clear, at least for the British. For a distinction must be drawn at this point between the position of the British and that of the Allies. The last two years of the war have generally been seen as the period of inevitable victory, in which the long period of preparation and increasing

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production, made possible by a maritime strategy, reaped its due reward. Neither Germany nor Japan, in that order, could hope to withstand the pressure of the Allies' superiority in men and material. But such a view disregards one important factor, which modifies the perspective. If victory was inevitable, for the British it must also be reasonably swift. The limits of their war effort were by now compelling, and its tempo could not be sustained indefinitely. If they were to maintain their full contribution and to keep their place within the Alliance, the war in Europe must therefore end in 1944. In the summer of 1943, as Sir Winston Churchill has remarked, 'the danger which faced the United Nations was no longer Defeat but Stalemate.'1 A year later, the danger to the British was not Stalemate but Delay.

This theme gives a unity to the period covered by this volume--a period whose limits are marked by the two Allied conferences at Quebec. In August 1943, the first Quebec Conference settled the strategy for the defeat of Germany. In September 1944, that strategy had been so far successful that the second Quebec Conference opened in the immediate hope of a German surrender. Three weeks later, when it had closed, that hope hd disappeared. Thereafter, the war in Europe proceeded to its inevitable but protracted end, postponing further the full offensive against Japan which had necessarily been curtailed in 1944. The delay did not affect the capacity of the Allies to achieve final victory; but it affected the capacity of the British to maintain their effort any longer at its peak.

This difference in background fostered a certain difference in outlook that already existed between the two great Western Allies. And since these volumes are concerned largely with the relations between them, they are concerned largely with this difference. There has been no attempt to conceal the resulting disagreements; but I hope they have not been exaggerated. For there is perhaps always a danger that disagreement, which may breed discussion, will bulk larger than agreement in an account of this sort; and where the disagreements, as sometimes here, were profound, the danger is disproportionately greater. It is therefore as well to remember that the area of consent remained larger than the area of dispute, and that even when the partners differed they remained close partners. For the Anglo-American Alliance, in the last resort, must be accounted a remarkable success. The very frankness of the discussions, perhaps without parallel between allies, argues a close association that was also unparalleled. On no occasion, moreover, did the deadlock remain unbroken. One or other of the allies always gave way, or both reached a compromise favourable to one, before it was too late. Such an association may be contrasted with the periods of silence, punctuated by sudden demands

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or complaints or as sudden concessions, which the Western Allies experienced in their dealings with the Russians.

Place names in this volume follow official practice. I have referred to individuals by the styles they held at the time--e.g., Mr. Churchill, General Eisenhower, Mr. Eden--and, where I have omitted prefixes, have tried to combine courtesy with convenience. Promotions in rank where relevant, are given in an appendix.

I wish to thank all those who, by research, information, or comment on the test, have helped in the production of the book: the wartime Ministers, Chiefs of Staff and commanders, staff officers, and officials; the historians and staff of the United Kingdom Official Histories, Military and Civil; the members of the Advisory Panel of the Official Military Histories; the staffs of the Records and Historical Sections of the Cabinet Office, and of vaRious Departments; and the historians in Commonwealth and Allied countries. It is, I think worthy of record that, despite the novel nature of these volumes on grand strategy in the writing of official history, no Department or individual has asked me to censor or to alter anything of substance; nor has there been any obstacle to quoting the documents form which I have wished to quote. Her Majesty The Queen has graciously given permission for certain documents to be reproduced; and Ministers, the Secretary of the Cabinet, Departments, and the United States Government have given similar permission where required. Certain cypher telegrams have been paraphrased for security, but without affecting their substance or sense. Otherwise, quotations have been shortened, as shown in the text, only when I have considered a passage irrelevant or redundant. Where I reproduce substantial extracts fro Sir Winston Churchill's unpublished Minutes and telegrams, as distinct form the full text, the full relevant text is given in an appendix: where the quotation is of one of his Minutes or telegrams already published, in whole or in part, in his memoirs, I refer for comparison to the volume concerned. Otherwise, I have cited publications where they contain statements or quotations not already available in the documents I have used.

I owe two special words of thanks: to my editor, Professor J.R.M. Butler, who ha borne the ultimate responsibility for the work throughout; and to my principal Research Assistant, Miss Jean Dawson, who not only provided much information on detail, but also wrote several of the long studies on which sections of the book are based. I have been fortunate in being able to call, over a period of some years, on her industry, scholarship and judgment.

November, 1955

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Contents
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Footnotes

1. Closing the Ring (1952), preface.


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