CHAPTER IV

ARMED NEUTRALITY AND THE ESCORT OF CONVOYS


The period from the Summer of 1941 until the end of the year can perhaps best be likened to a multi-ringed circus with several acts in most of the rings' and more acts coming in all the time. The result is increasing activity in an atmosphere of apparent confusion. Out of escort operations and the further development of advanced bases grew problems which brought about many changes and modifications in existing plans. Admiral King, as manager of this show, and Admiral Bristol as ring master, playing before a crowd of rapidly shifting events both had plenty to keep them busy.

Throughout the Spring from the beginning of the Support Force, and undoubtedly before this, Admiral Bristol had been concerned with the problems he knew would arise in connection with convoy escort duty. He anticipated many of these problems and experienced them vicariously through talks with British Naval Officers. Writing Admiral Stark, Bristol said,

On March 20, 1941 Captain A. K. Scott-Moncrieff, R.N., and Lieutenant Commander A. G. Poe, R.N., joined the staff of ComSupFor at his request to serve in an advisory capacity. These Officers have contributed greatly in assisting this Force to develop its training with the view of incorporating the latest methods used overseas. The state of training of the Support Force now is such that the services of the above officers are no longer needed. It is agreeable, therefore, with Commander Support Force that these officers be detached from their present duties. If and when the

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international situation changes, and, in the event this Force should operate in the Northwest Approaches, it is probable that Commander Support Force will again ask for the services of these officers to act in a liaison capacity for a short period of time.1

On 20 August there were eleven escort groups under the Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Force (CCNF) with slow convoys sailing from Sydney every six days and fast convoys sailing from Halifax every six days. These groups, consisting of mixed British and Canadian destroyers and corvettes, were based at St. John's and usually consisted of four ships. Organization and sailing of convoys was carried out by the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast (COAC) whose headquarters were at Halifax. The ocean escort A.M.C. was allocated by the Rear Admiral of the Third Battle Squadron.

On this same date, 20 August, Admiral Bristol, on board the PRAIRIE in Portland, Maine, wrote a very long analysis of the escort situation. He noted that change No. 2 to WPL-52 lumped the approximate strength of the Ocean Escort as 6 battleships, 5 heavy cruisers, 27 destroyers, 23 old destroyers, and 48 patrol bombers. Atlantic Fleet Operation Plan 6-41, plus King's secret letter serial 00129 places strategic direction of surface light escorts under the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and charges Commander Task Group 1.3 (Bristol) with maintaining appropriate patrol plane escort operations from Iceland and Newfoundland

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in connection with the operations of Task Group 1. In this analysis the Admiral said,

The current Type Commander administration of surface craft of this Force through Squadron and Division Commanders should now be absorbed by the Force Commander; escort Groups will not be based on the Type Organization, and Squadron and Division Commanders will often be separated from their unit type commands for weeks at a time.

He made plans for escort control in the PRAIRIE at Boston, escorts being sent from Boston or Portland to Argentia. On returning they were not to escort west of 55° west unless submarines came in that close. The tenders MELVILLE at Argentia and VULCAN at Reykjavik would ensure necessary voyage repairs and services at intermediate points. Casco Bay was only to be used as a ready station and for such training as the season permitted. Three days later Bristol's Assistant C/S, Commander Carney, remarked in a memorandum that "Admiral King generally approved of Commander Support Force's foregoing memorandum on the escort of convoys."2 He stated that the project would probably be in effect by 11 September with sailings every six days; that the Commander in Chief was working out the details on the basis of five ships per escort.

August 31st Commander Task Unit 1.1.3, Captain J. L. Kauffman, escorted or was supposed to escort the Iceland

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flag ship SS LAGERFOSS to Reykjavik but never contacted this ship until six hours out of the destination. The merchant ship failed to follow the prescribed course, thereby causing much confusion. As a result of this Captain Kauffman recommended that there be a thorough understanding on the part of merchant captains with regard to prescribed routes and that a severe penalty be inflicted for failure to comply. Returning from Iceland, Kauffman' s Task Unit was to escort the SS SELFOSS back to the States. The latter ship went slowly and carried a small cargo, thus making the escort a more desirable target than the convoy, and the convoy not worth the risk of escort. In view of the impracticability of this type of escort duty, Captain Kauffman suggested that small ships like the SELFOSS be restricted to inter-island commerce, and let larger, faster ships handle the trips to the States.3

The 3rd of September the Chief of Naval Operations sent out a letter which said that the Naval Operating Base, Argentia, and such district craft and naval local defense forces assigned to this base are hereby assigned as a task group of the United States Atlantic Fleet, as was done in the case of the Naval Operating Base, Bermuda, in WPL-46. This task force was to operate under the immediate command

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of the Commandant Naval Operating Base, Argentia, under the orders of Admiral King. The administration of all matters concerning the naval reservations and naval activities in Newfoundland, and affecting the internal organization and administration of the naval district were to continue to be under the control of Commandant of the First Naval District. (Changes in WPL-46, and General Order 142 were accordingly prepared.)4

8 September, 1941: Under this date Admiral Bristol as Commander Task Force 4 sent out Op Plan 13-41, which set up his convoy task organization and doctrine.5 (Although he sent this out as CTF 4, there had been no word to the effect that he was no longer CTG 1.3. All force, group, and unit designators begin with four.) His flag ship, USS PRAIRIE, was then at Boston. In this plan Admiral Bristol neglected to include Rear Admiral Reichmuth, who was supposedly to serve under him. For this he received a reprimand from Admiral King6 and the following day Admiral Bristol wrote Admiral Reichmuth assigning him to Task Force 4, and in his next Operation Plan the latter was in command of the Home

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Base Group. This letter to Admiral Reichmuth also stated (in compliance with CinClant secret Operation Plan 7-41) that the escort-of-convoy Control Station would be at Argentia and that initially CTF 4 in the PRAIRIE would be at Argentia; that the USS DENEBOLA was assigned to destroyer flotillas of Task Force 4, but also had certain duties with respect to services for ships of Task Force 1.7

Largely through the efforts of Commander E. H. Smith the Northeast Greenland Sledge Patrol came into being about the middle of 1941. The purpose of this patrol consisted of periodic reconnaissance expeditions in the Northeast Greenland area to determine the presence of enemy agents and to collect military intelligence data to further the protection of Greenland. Less than two months after its establishment, on 11 September, 1941, two members of the patrol were hunting musk-ox near the entrance of Young Sound when they sighted an unknown two masted schooner, flying no colors, about five miles off the coast. This information was reported to Commander Smith aboard NORTHLAND and the dragnet was out. A search by units of the Greenland Patrol was started and on the following day, 12 September, 1941, Commander Greenland Patrol in the NORTHLAND caught up to

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and chased this ship into McKenzie Bay, where she was captured at Myggbugta. The ship, a Norwegian sealer named the BUSKOE, "allegedly engaged in subversive activity, was taken into custody." Aboard were nine Norwegian men, a woman, and a German Gestapo agent by the name of Jacob R. Bradley. BUSKOE was towed back to the States along with her prisoners by the USS BEAR. The capture of the BUSKOE expedition by Commander Smith marks the first blow struck by the United States Navy against Germany, and as such was the first violation of the United States Neutrality policy.

On 10 September Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, had sent out the following confidential dispatch:

The actual escort of convoys will begin September 16th, otherwise my Op Plan 7-41 as modified by my 092350 is effective at noon September 10th. Addressed to holders my Op Plan 7-41.8

Admiral King's personal letter to Commodore Murray, RCN, (CCNF) of 13 September said that his (King's) instructions concerning escort of convoys in the Western Atlantic were in WPL-51 and the appendix thereto. King said he didn't consider it appropriate to include Murray's force in his Operation Plan nor to send him a formal letter of instructions concerning the escort of convoys, but he enclosed the draft of such a letter as an appendix to his personal letter which

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he hoped Murray would find useful in effecting the necessary cooperation between the two forces. This letter stated,

Your forces will, in general, escort slow eastbound (SC) convoys (which may be accompanied by Iceland flag ships) which leave Sydney at six-day intervals commencing September 17, 1941 from the vicinity of the 55 meridian west to mid-ocean meeting points.

Escort units shall consist of at least five ships, preferably six or more.

After escort units for eastbound convoys have been relieved at designated mid-ocean meeting points (MOMP) such units shall then proceed to Iceland with any Iceland flag that may be in convoy.

Westbound convoys will be met at designated mid-ocean meeting points by similar escort units from Iceland, the unit in each case (regardless of nationality) to be that one which has been the longest time in Iceland.

The responsibility of the escort unit with respect to the convoy holds whether U.S. or Iceland flag snips part company for any reason or do not join.

In an emergency, convoys may be diverted by escort unit commanders from prescribed routes without prior approval of CinClant, but only to the minimum extent necessary to avoid immediate danger. Report of any such emergency division will be made to CinClant as soon as circumstances permit. Resumption of prescribed track and arrival at the assigned mid-ocean meeting point on schedule will continue to be essential.

The coverage of U.S. and Canadian escort of convoy operations by U.S. patrol planes will be conducted from Argentia and Iceland with particular attention to the times and locations of mid-ocean meeting points for both fast and slow convoys.9

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The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, further stated that fuel from United States naval tankers would be available in Iceland for the Canadian escort units and that he would furnish information regarding convoys as necessary. On the 16th, in compliance with Admiral King's dispatch, Commander Task Force 4 began officially to conduct escort operations.

The question of plane operations in Iceland and Argentia came up several days later, and Admiral Bristol felt that during the winter months, icing conditions, short daylight hours, radio ineffectiveness, crowded conditions of planes operating in Iceland (plane and tender moorings in anchorages) created a serious problem. As a partial solution to this problem, Commander Task Force 4 requested Admiral King that PBMs and PBYs in these locations be replaced by PBY-5As to beat the possibility of plane loss due to icing conditions. The Amphibians would be more feasible to handle.10

About the end of the month Bristol, who had now moved with the PRAIRIE to Argentia, wrote Commander Patrol Wing 7 concerning the serial escort of convoys. He pointed out to Captain Mullinnix that these operations were no longer training exercises, and that all hands operating in the Western

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Atlantic were "playing for keeps". Although he assumed that records were being kept of these flights, the Admiral said in the future he wanted certain specific data written up.11 From this Bristol wanted a weekly report from each advanced base arranged so as to give continuity of operations in respect to each convoy.

The 5th of October Admiral Bristol received a letter commenting on operations of the Iceland Air Detachment. Among other things, he was informed that,

According to information furnished me by Air Commander Primrose, RAF, flying boats are not suitable for winter operations in Iceland, and that it was planned to withdraw and replace them with landplanes about the second of October . . . While it is realized that this unit was operating under adverse conditions, with prevailing bad weather and unsuitable equipment, it is not believed they are accomplishing their major missions of patrolling and escorting convoys . . . The Air Commodore stated that it was difficult, if not impossible for planes to make contact with convoy unless equipped with Radar. He proposed one British and one American plane operate

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together until our planes were suitably equipped. No commitments were made.12

Admiral King again wrote to Commodore Murray on 9 October discussing the Canadian escort situation. King said he had directed that priority be given to assignment of Canadian Escort Units in Iceland to westbound convoys, regardless of whether slow or fast. It was expected that this would tend to equalize the convoy cycles between United States and Canadian Escort Units, (to the benefit of the latter) and at the same time maintain the ON convoy schedule without interruption. He anticipated that irregularities concerning the routing of Iceland flag shipping would shortly be squared away with the Navy Department, and in the meantime those ships knew that escorts were available for such convoys as their speed permitted them to join. In an effort to avoid confusion Admiral King requested that the Commodore take up any urgent matters concerning Canadian Escorts with SOPA, Iceland, rather than the Senior British Naval officer there. 13

The following day Admiral Bristol received a memorandum from Captain F. W. Pennoyer, Jr., USN, relative to a joint meeting on board the HMS KING GEORGE V in Hvalfjordur, Iceland. At this meeting were Admiral Tovey, RN (CinC

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British Home Fleets); Admiral Percy Noble (CinCWA) and quite a few other United States and British Naval Officers concerned with North Atlantic operations. This memorandum is of especial interest because it exposed a glaring weakness in the joint communications setup. The then existing procedure for communicating danger warnings to United States Navy escort commanders is quoted.

  1. CinCWA in Liverpool develops the presence of an emergency from his plot.
  2. He transmits it to the Admiralty, London.
  3. The Admiralty decides upon further transmission and, if so decided, enciphers and sends message to OpNav, Washington.
  4. OpNav deciphers it and decides upon further transmission.
  5. If decided to re-transmit, it is again enciphered in U.S. Navy code, and broadcast on the next Fox schedule.14

Instances were cited wherein 17 hours or more elapsed between the recognition of an imminent danger and receipt by the United States Navy escort units concerned. The setup adopted to rectify this discrepancy was: "When the British authority sees an immediate danger, a preliminary signal should be sent in the British and American Joint Cipher which can be received by the United States escort, either through Washington or on a direct broadcast."15

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Also on 10 October Admiral Bristol received a very important letter from Admiral King to the effect that,

Escort of convoy arrangement and procedure have now become so far stabilized that it is practicable to give full effect to your part in the current Op Plan 7-41 and the corresponding letter of instructions to you (my serial 00204).

There is hereby delegated to you all appropriate authority to control and supervise the conduct of trans-Atlantic escort of convoy operations within the N.W. Atlantic area, which are duly assigned to my direction in paragraph 502e of WPL-52.

The said authority embraces not only direct control of U.S. escort units but also coordinating supervision of the operations of Canadian escort units, which later will be effected through and with the Commodore Commanding Newfoundland (now Commodore L. W. Murray, RCN) who will have entire charge of the availability of Canadian escort unit. The same coordinating supervision will be effected through and with the Commanding Officer, Atlantic Coast (headquarters at Halifax) when appropriate.

Continue the arrangements whereby one of your destroyer squadron commanders is always in Iceland where (under SOPA Iceland) he will see to the servicing and other readiness of both U. S. and Canadian escort units.

Increase the number of ships in U. S. escort units from 5 to 6 as soon as practicable, having due regard for the long-range view which must include not only the number of ships, but also their availability for operational requirements.

This directive will be made effective by despatch.16

This directive did away with Bristol's status as Commander Task Group 1.3 and from now on he is again both

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Commander Support Force and Commander Task Force 4, but as time went on the latter designator became the more common.

Commander Task Force 4 informed Captain Deyo (CTU 4.2.6) on 14 October that CinClant had directed him to continue the arrangements whereby one of his destroyer squadron commanders was a1ways in Iceland. Under the general supervision of SOPA Iceland, he would see to the servicing and other readiness of both United States and Canadian escort units, their appropriate departure and routing and other related matters.

Also on the 14th, SOPA Iceland reported that Rear Admiral Hamilton, RN, had turned over to him for Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, control of all escort units under his command operating westward of MOMP. This was in accordance with Admiral King's directive, and as of 1200 GCT, 15 October, SOPA Iceland said he would turn over control of a11 escort units in that area to CTU 4.2.6.

Commander Task Force 4's first escort order also came out on 14 October although United States naval vessels had been escorting United States and Icelandic flag shipping previous to this time.17 Commander Macklin (CTU 4.1.7)

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with five destroyers,18 was to escort convoy HX-155 leaving Halifax 16 October, 1941. After escorting the convoy to the MOMP via a prescribed route he was to be relieved by the British Ocean Escort and then proceed to base Cast (Reykjavik) as escort of any Iceland bound ships of the convoy. Further, while he was within 200 miles of base Roger (Argentia), he was to guard that harbor's frequency.

The following day, CTF 4 received a report from CTU 4.1.1 saying that he had missed a rendezvous with the British escorts of Convoy ON-22 on 7 October.19 This was because the British had been unable to obtain navigational fixes for the previous three days. It was subsequently determined by D.F. fix that they had passed 15 miles to the North of the MOMP. No patrol planes were there to assist in search operations. In view of the uncertainty of weather in latitudes of eastern MOMPS it was recommended that escort units proceed unhampered by the convoy from bases in Iceland to the MOMP in order to permit a more extended scouting line to offset cases of navigational error of rendezvous. Also that every attempt be made to provide patrol plane coverage in the vicinity of the MOMP even though weather conditions may not be too desirable.

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In a letter to Admiral Bristol also written on the 15th of October Captain Deyo says:

CinClant's letter of instructions on Op Plan 7-41 . . . states that U.S. and Canadian escort Units will consist of five or more destroyers or a mixed force of DDs and escort vessels totaling 6 to 9. Yesterdays [convoy code unreadable in source file] went out with 6 corvettes and no DDs. Graham told me that they had sometimes been down as low as 4 corvettes and no DDs. That seems pretty thin.20

However, Captain Deyo thought it would be a mistake to mix Canadian and United States escorts and try and run the escort-of-convoy system from Iceland. Besides other reasons, inadequate repair facilities for ships coming into Iceland presented too much of a problem. He thought the greatest present danger to convoys was that they didn't receive the information from Naval Operations concerning routing changes, etc. He suggested that action addressees be more plainly identified in messages concerning convoy routing.

Communications seemed to be one of the major problems in convoy work. Three letters to Admiral Bristol from Commander W. K. Phillips (CTU 4.1.5), Captain Deyo, and SOPA Iceland on the 10th, 15th, and 17th of October point this up. Commander Phillips was Escort Commander of convoy ON-152 which got well out of position and it was necessary to make a 120° turn. In order to make the rendezvous with the British the convoy Commodore decided to make a series of six 20° turns

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which would bring them back into position in the necessary time. Radio Silence had to be maintained as submarines were known to be in the vicinity, one of the ships in the convoy having already been torpedoed. To make matters worse, it was late in the afternoon, and the visibility was very poor. The signal of two red lights was hoisted for the first turn, and at the same time visibility became further reduced so that the ships who saw the Signal turned, but the rest of them did not. The result was that in a short while the convoy was completely broken up. The blame for this fiasco was put on poor communications facilities and doctrine. If they had been able to receive earlier messages from Naval Operations they might not have been out of position. Communications had been Commander Phillip's major worry, and even squadron communication personnel in the USS MAYO were unable to copy many of the messages on the Fox schedule due to interference by a German station (DNB) and frequently bad atmospheric conditions. Captain Deyo suggested placing a symbol (letter) in the heading of the message to signify that it had to do with the "routing of convoy", and in the body of the text a serial number, representing the total number of despatches sent out by Naval Operations. The former indicated action for Escort Groups even though the address is garbled and the latter gives information whether a previous despatch has or has not been lost. SOPA Iceland,

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(Admiral R. C. Giffen) concurred with this idea.

Earlier, in September the USS GREER had been enroute from Argentia to Reykjavik with mail when she had a submarine sound contact. After trailing the submarine for a while the sub closed and fired a torpedo at the GREER; the GREER countered by dropping depth charges. Evidences of oil on the surface later indicated that the sub had been sunk. This was one of the earlier violations of neutrality. Later, on 20 October, the USS KEARNEY, while escorting a British convoy, was torpedoed, but despite considerable loss of personnel, she managed to limp into Reykjavik. This almost precipitated an international crisis, but evidently the United States decided to bide its time until the country was more completely prepared to go to war. The one good thing about this situation was that it proved conclusively to both officers and men something that they had always strongly suspected: namely, that ships of the United States Navy could "take it."

As a solution to the communication problem the Chief of Naval Operations devised the "Convoy Telegram." Commander Task Force 4 sent out a letter relative to it to his escort units in which he showed the type form.21

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When information was not available at the time the "convoy telegram" was disseminated, the word "nil" was substituted in the paragraph concerned, and as the information became available it was forwarded by despatch referring to the "convoy telegram".22

The 21st of October the Chief of Naval Operations wrote the Army Chief of Staff stating that work on construction of facilities for an Army plane squadron at the Naval Air Station, Argentia had not yet been undertaken, since no orders had bean given. He approximated that it would take about six months to build barracks. Naval barracks then approaching completion would be required for Naval personnel. The seaplane hanger, the only hanger available, was needed for aircraft actively engaged in patrol and escort operations. "While in the construction stage", said Admiral

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Stark,

Argentia is serving as an operating base not only for naval aircraft, but also for important units of the Atlantic Fleet. It is essential that nothing be done which will unnecessarily handicap the naval use of such facilities as are completed.23

Captain Deyo, Bristol's Destroyer Squadron Commander in Iceland, again wrote the Admiral concerning convoy problems on 23 October.

On the subject of Canadian Escorts my understanding is that they are to continue with the odd numbered ON convoys, keeping their present cycles. As I understand it, they want to make a quick turn around at this end in order to get more time in home ports. Having only six units, their cycle is 30 days with convoy intervals of 6 days. This gives them 10 to 14 days at home. The pinch comes at this end where they have a maximum of 2 days which is often reduced to 36 hours or less and they are feeling the strain. The voyage out often takes them 11 days. They arrive here tired out and the DDs just barely making it . . . With winter coming on their problem will be more difficult. They are going to have break downs and ships running out of oil at sea.24

Admiral Bristol was evidently thinking along similar lines, for on the following day he sent a memo to Admiral King outlining his escort situation. He said that he had 42 destroyers and 2 CGs available, excluding KEARNEY; that ST. AUGUSTINE and ZIRCON were not suited for North Atlantic escort duty. He advocated an operational cycle of seven

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6-ship units to make runs with fast East and West convoys from Argentia to Iceland and back to Argentia in 28 days, slow convoys making the same run in 3O days. Round trip to Boston from Argentia, 4-5 days, Argentia time for replenishment and instruction, 2 days. The total cycle available under this organization was 42 days which allowed 5 (slow) or 8 (fast) days for upkeep, training, and liberty.25

Commander Task Force A's Operation Plan 14-41 came out on the 29th of October (USS PRAIRIE at Argentia) and in many respects it was very similar to his previous one.26

On 8 November Bristol sent King a long, detailed discussion on escort-of-convoy operations. In it he discussed such aspects as routing, diversions, and the strength and composition of escort units, arriving at the following conclusions:

  1. The northern routes via Iceland are more advantageous during summer; i.e. better air coverage, more daylight hours, and the short legged DDs can be used, thereby giving maximum protection from limited escort strength. The southern routes are better in winter; better weather, and more daylight. Short legged DDs are no good for out-and-back or trans-oceanic operations, but are best utilized in conjunction with mid-ocean fueling bases on both northern and southern routes.

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  1. Diversions are effective and should be continued within the radius limitations of the escorts employed. Note: there appears to have been at times a certain over-enthusiasm in the matter of diversions with consequent serious fuel shortage for some of the escorts.
  2. 56-72 DDs (or CGs) are needed to furnish 7-9 ship escort units for the present system or for the trans-oceanic system. A minimum of 63 (mixed DDs and corvettes) would be required by the Canadians for the trans-oceanic system . . . Escort control stations, similar to that now established in Iceland, should be established in the United Kingdom and Azores if they figure in the escort-of-convoy operations of U.S. and Canadian units. (Note: facilities already established for the Northwest Escort Force (SupFor) at Londonderry are available.) . . . If U.S. and Canadian forces operate in the United Kingdom or Azores, U.S. naval air operations will be inaugurated in those areas. (Note: facilities prepared for the Northwest Escort Force are now available at base "A" (Loch Erne).27

On the same day that Commander Task Force 4 sent Admiral King this discussion, 8 November, the Secretary of the Navy announced the establishment of Naval Operating Base, Iceland, under Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet. Rear Admiral J. L. Kauffman, USN, was named as Commandant of the base.

On 10 November Commander E. H. Smith, promulgated his Operation Plan No. 1-41 for the South Greenland Patrol. This plan is based upon and implements "Basic Joint Army and Navy Plan for the Defense of Greenland", short title "Noah" of 13 June, 1941 and as amended 30 September, 1941. The

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Northeast Greenland Patrol and South Greenland Patrol had pretty well dropped out of the Operation Plan picture for awhile, but now come back in as a combined force called the South Greenland Patrol under the Command of Commander Smith. The South Greenland Patrol is listed on this date with no designators.28 This force operated directly under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations.

Admiral Bristol finally indicated on 13 November that he was going to get the PBY-5A planes that were felt necessary for winter operations. Scheduled delivery was supposed to be the first week in December, and in order to maintain the Iceland and Argentia Air Detachments at effective strength a gradual transfer of old types for the new was to be effected. Bristol suggested transporting the new PBY-5As by ship, and replacing the planes in Iceland before those at Argentia. After submitting his plan to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, he stood by for approval; in the meantime, patrol and escort operations continued as scheduled.

On 19 November Admiral Bristol informed Admiral King that he had conferred with the Air Officer Commanding Eastern Air Command, and with Major General Brant, USAAF, Commanding the Newfoundland Base Command concerning combined

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air operations in Newfoundland. Responsibility was allocated for air coverage by United States Naval air units in Newfoundland, to a distance of about 500 miles from Argentia in a sector bounded on the north by 48° North, on the west by 55° West and for offensive sweeps as might be appropriate. Royal Canadian Air Force units based in Newfoundland were to cover to the east and north of Newfoundland, north of the 48th parallel to 500 miles from the Newfoundland Air Port (Gander) . . . this, plus appropriate shipping. Communications with the Royal Canadian Air Force were to be handled through the facilities of the Royal Canadian Navy with the assistance of the Task Force 4 liaison officer in St. John's. As soon as WPL-52 was issued, Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command, conferred with Commander Task Force 4 in order to draft a Joint Plan for the Defense of Newfoundland. Admiral Bristol said that one had been prepared on the principle of paramount interest.29

In connection with patrol plane duties Commander Task Force 4 told Commander Patrol Wing 7 (Captain Mullinnix) that commencing 25 November, until further orders, he would conduct offensive serial sweeps to cover a specified area off the coast of Newfoundland.30 He was to assign one plane

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to cover the area fifty miles to seaward from St. John's and Conception Bay; further, to maintain continual patrol of Placentia Bay. The Admiralty had said on the 25th that a U-Boat at Habana Bay was probably paying particular attention to the entrance to Conception Bay, and to patrol the sector between west and northwest of St. Francis.

With Axis subs operating in the waters surrounding the coast of Newfoundland, there was devised a plan to combat the Germans with their own weapon. This was called the Placentia Project which planned on using submarines operating out of Placentia Bay in anti-submarine warfare against the Axis U-Boats. During the latter part of November this project got under way, and on the 30th Admiral Bristol received a letter from Admiral King on the subject. King stated that there was a necessity for a definite procedure with regard to routing convoys to clear United States submarines, and it would be necessary to set up an operating area. He also commented on the method of destroyer and submarine training being conducted at Argentia.31

The "Joint Army-Navy Newfoundland Defense Plan 1" was sent to Admiral King by Admiral Bristol on 28 November, and Bristol said that prior to the receipt of King's directive on this subject, the Army representative in Newfoundland had stated that a War Department directive had stipulated that

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such a plan would be required. The proposed plan's assumptions weigh profitable enemy objects. St. John's, Torbay airport, Naval Air Station, Argentia, airport at Stephensville, ships in Argentia, shipping in Conception Bay, and other anchorages in Newfoundland, and the Newfoundland Railroad. The plan outlined the responsibilities of the two forces but despite this there seems to have been some friction as to who was to have the overall responsibility.

On 3 December 1941 Admiral Stark wrote the Commandant of the Coast Guard with reference to stationing weather ships in the North Atlantic. He requested that snips of the HAMILTON and MODOC classes be released to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet for this purpose. The Navy had several merchant ships that they were converting for this purpose, but they would not be ready until late in December, January, and February of l942. Also Stark stated that action would be taken by the Navy Department to increase the amount of weather information furnished by naval aircraft returning from offshore flights, and by ships which were compelled to break radio silence for other reasons.32 The Chief of Naval Operations was also concerned about patrol seaplanes operating from Argentia in winter conditions. He felt that they should be replaced by amphibians as soon as the latter were available and he stated that the Naval Air Station, Argentia should make preparations to receive one squadron of PBY-5As

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not later than January, 1942, and another squadron shortly thereafter.

Commander Task Force 4 was also worried about this problem, for he remarked in a letter to Admiral King 2 December that below-freezing temperatures and formation of ice on the planes at buoys, and while taking off during the past five days indicated that it would not be practicable to operate patrol planes with any degree of regularity from Argentia until spring. He stated that he was reducing the strength of the Argentia air detachment to 12 planes at the first opportunity with further reduction to eight - the number that could be accommodated in a temporary parking area. Complete cessation of operations would shortly become necessary until the arrival of the amphibians. King, by despatch, approved of this idea. On the following day Commander Task Unit 4.3.10 reported that since 24 November, winds of gale force had been passing that base at intervals of 8 to 48 hours; their intensity varying from 30 to 60 knots, with gusts to 75 knots. Operations during the past three weeks had therefore been greatly reduced and he felt that operations could not continue and afford proper security to material due to the rapidity with which the gales came. He strongly recommended Securing PBYs on ramps and PBMs at buoys in a non-operational status. The Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, answered on the same day that his mission (Commander Task Force 4's) was to have planes available to

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meet an emergency wherever conditions made operations possible; that maintenance and security of material were secondary to operating availability. King wanted to have as many planes in operational status as conditions warranted.

Also about this time there was a lot of correspondence on the subject of Argentia harbor defenses. At that point there were no mines or nets for its protection, and it was feared that some enterprising Axis U-Boat Commander might wake up to the fact that it would not be too difficult to sneak up on the practically unprotected harbor and take a few "pot shots" at the ships located there. Harbor Defense Plan 3 (Hypo-Dog-Prep-3) provided for harbor entrance patrol craft on continuous duty, but this was felt to be inadequate. This plan was in effect only one day at a time. It was recommended that an anti-torpedo net with net tenders be placed all the way across the harbor entrance, and this was eventually carried out.

Between 16 September 1941 and 7 December 1941, Task Force 4 operating from various bases in New England, Newfoundland, and Iceland, protected and escorted United States and certain friendly foreign flag shipping in the Northern Atlantic against Axis efforts to interfere with our announced national policy of Defense Aid of munitions and supplies to friendly nations. Between the above dates escort ships and aircraft of Task Force 4 provided the entire protection for British operated HX and ON convoys and certain other shipping in the Western Atlantic. During this period Commander Task

-- 99 --

Force 4 exercised coordinating supervision over all trade convoys in the North Atlantic, including operations of belligerent Canadian escort ships engaged in protecting trans-Atlantic shipping in the Western Atlantic. On numerous occasions ships and planes of Task Force 4 detected and attacked Axis submarines. The attack on GREER and the torpedoing of KEARNEY, RUBEN JAMES, and some of the merchant ships escorted by units of Task Force Four, all testify to the proximity of hostile forces, and to the hazards involved. Although the United States was not at war in the legal sense, Task Force Four and the Axis forces had been mutually engaged in belligerent operations in every practical sense.

After the events occurring between September and December 1941 it now becomes absolutely clear that Admiral Bristol's gig operational responsibility had come; not as he had expected, in the British Isles, but in the so-called Western Atlantic Area. His force had never become the Northwest Escort Force for which it ostensibly had been trained; neither had it become, nor was it ever to become the support force in the planned sense of the word. What it really had become might perhaps best be called a Western Atlantic Escort Force, and it was to continue in much the same status throughout the war.

The effect of 7 December 1941 on Commander Task Force 4 and advanced bases connected with his command was marked

-- 100 --

in several ways. The most immediate came on the following day, when Commander Task Force 8 (Commander Atlantic Fleet Air Wings) ordered Commander Task Group 4.3 (Captain Mullinnix) to transfer Patrol Squadrons 72 and 71 to the Pacific Fleet immediately. These planes from Patrol Wing 7 were to proceed to San Diego by squadrons or divisions via the southwest United States. He also ordered Patrol Wing 5 to transfer immediately Patrol Squadron 51 to the Pacific Fleet via the same route.

On 11 December Captain W. A. Corn, then in Washington in Naval Operations wrote a memorandum to Captain Denfeld, stating,

The frightful occurrence of last Sunday has driven all thoughts of smaller routine matters from most of our thoughts. As you already know, it has caused considerable shift of forces, and the effect on our particular task as previously conceived, has been tremendous. I haven't seen the revised pan, but I am certain that I am justified in saying that the possibility of occupying the overseas bases within the next six months practically doesn't exist. Captain Mullinnix is here and will bring you a picture of the plane situation much better than any I could write.

It may become necessary to divert quantities of base materials from Quonset in order to establish a base in the Pacific. This is not at all definite, but it may be expected at any time.

Incident to the diversion of patrol squadrons from our forces, I authorized the diversion with them of the standard spares which had been packed and crated for overseas shipment, Replacements are at Norfolk now, and within three weeks will again be packed and crated.

It now appears that we will not operate planes from Iceland this winter. In view of this Captain Mullinnix spoke this morning of sending the ALBERMARLE on to Iceland via Quonset immediately because the 5As will be able

-- 101 --

to get to Argentia on their own power. Slattery and his men will go along and continue the base development ready for occupation next spring.33

On the 16th Captain Corn said that although there was even less possibility of the advanced bases being occupied any time in the near future, he considered it a good idea to push their development as long as it did not interfere with current and immediate projects.34 However, Lt. Commander Slattery had different ideas about the advanced base set-up. He had previously been ordered to form a nucleus detachment for the Fleet Air Base, Iceland, which he had done and assembled them at Quonset for transportation to Iceland. He was also to be executive officer of the base at Iceland and prospective executive officer at Advanced Aviation Base "B". Since he did not think he would ever be used at Base "B", and felt a Lieutenant could take care of the Iceland base, he requested to be released from the Support Force, and become Commander Patrol Squadron 91, operating in the Pacific. However, he was refused. Captain Corn wrote Denfeld again on 19 December, and with reference to the shifting of forces said,

Insofar as Task Force Four is concerned, I expect that not more than one division of destroyers may be involved as a maximum. The outcome of the negotiations with Martinique (which appear to have been successful) may have a considerable bearing on what ships may be diverted . . .

Iceland detachment --- still all set in Quonset, and should get off in the ALBERMARLE, Lt. Comdr.

-- 102 --

Slattery left yesterday to join them. He has done an excellent job in preparing this unit, and has worked in close conjunction with Admiral Kauffman and the Bureaus . . . .

Members of our regular units have already sailed for Hawaii. It is my guess that they will be fully occupied from four to six months. During this period we will be in the same position with regard to occupation of an advance Destroyer Base as we were in April. The only answer of course, is that the PRAIRIE accompany the first wave, and either remain at Belfast acting as a tender, or land her entire repair department personnel at the base, and then, in the interest of safety to the ship, return to the U.S. for reorganization of the repair crew. Under either condition a relief repair ship would necessarily take her place at Argentia.35

These excerpts from Captain Corn's letters foreshadow fairly well the problems which lay ahead of Task Force Four for the coming year of 1942. The escort-of-convoy duties were to continue, but at a stepped up pace in view of the fact that the United States was now actively and openly engaged in fighting a war against the Axis. Also with the increased need for escorts and at the same time destroyers would be vitally needed in the Pacific for defensive actions. With this situation existing there was bound to be an excessive strain on both ships and crews on the United States Navy operating in the Atlantic. Besides this, the availability of patrol planes of all types would necessarily by curtailed to a certain extent. Just how much would remain to be seen. And finally, both personnel and material for advanced bases would be cut down and limited because they were needed more urgently elsewhere. Commander Task Force Four's prospect

-- 103 --

for the coming year of 1942 was certainly not a rosy one.

--104--

FOOTNOTES

1. ComSupFor sec. ltr. ser. 0072 of 4 August, 1941, to CNO.
2. Assist. C/S Carney memo (no serial) of 23 August, 1941, for C/S Denfeld.
3. CTU 1.1.3 sec. ltr. ser. 007 of 31 August, 1941, to CinClant.
4. CNO's sec. ltr. ser. 099212 of 3 September, 1941.
5. CTF 4 Op Plan 13-41 sec. ser. 0091 of 8 September 1941. See Appendix "A" for Task Organization and most important parts of this Op Plan.
6. CinClant sec. ltr. ser. 00177 of 11 September, 1941, to CTF 4.
7. CTF 4 sec. ltr. ser. 0097 of 11 September, 1941, to Rear Admiral R. L. Reichmuth.
8. Paraphrase of CinClant conf. dispatch of 10 September 1941.
9. CinClant personal ltr. of 13 September, 1941 to Commodore Murray, RCN.
10. Personal ltr. of 18 September, 1941, from Admiral Bristol to Admiral King.
11. CTF 4 conf. ltr. ser. 0440 to ComPatWing 7, 30 September 1941.
  1. Time and position convoy was met.
  2. Time and position convoy was left.
  3. Visibility, wind and state of sea.
  4. Composition and disposition of the convoy, as for example: 45 ships, 8 columns.
  5. Whether the convoy was in good order or whether straggling.
  6. Distance at which convoy could be sighted, and whether smoking.
  7. If at night time, whether the convoy was effectively darkened.
  8. Hostile craft contacted and record of action taken.
12. ComBatDiv 3 conf. ltr. ser. 0449 of 5 October, 1941 to CTF 4.
13. CinClant personal ltr. of 9 October, 1941, to Commodore Murray, RCN.
14. Captain F. W. Pennoyer, Jr., sec. ltr. ser. 0165 of 10 October, 1941, to ComSupFor.
15. Ibid.
16. CinClant sec. ltr. ser. 00228(A4-3(4)) of 10 October 1941, to ComSupFor.
17. See page 84.
18. TU 4.1.7 MOFFETT (F), STURTEVANT, OVERTON, BAINBRIDGE, and TRUXTON.
19. CTU 4.1.1 sec. ltr. ser. 0174 of 15 Oct., 1941 to CTF 4.
20. Captain Deyo's personal ltr. of 15 Oct., 1941, to Bristol.
21.

CTF 4 sec. ltr. ser. 00114 of 20 Oct., 1941, to CTUs 4.1.1 -- 4.1.8.

"Convoy Telegram"
Convoy number repeated.

Paragraph 1 - Approved ocean route.
Paragraph 2. - Position of MOMP, time (if known) and date of arrival.
Paragraph 3. - Speed of advance and time passing through lettered position.
Paragraph 4. - Secret position.
Paragraph 5. - Senior Officer's ship and total of escort.
Paragraph 6. - Name of Commodore's ship and total number of ships in convoy.
Paragraph 7. - Safe route to Reykjavik.
Paragraph 8. - Number of ships for Reykjavik.

22. CTF 4 sec. ltr. ser. 00114 of 20 Oct., 1941 to CTUs 4.1.1 --- 4.1.8.
23. CNO sec. ltr. ser. 0119512 of 21 October, 1941 to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.
24. Captain Deyo's personal letter of 23 October, 1941, to Admiral Bristol.
25. CTF 4 sec. ser. memo 0119 of 24 October, 1941 to CinClant.
26. CTF Op Plan 14-41 sec. ser. 00123 of 29 October, 1941, (For Task organization and pertinent parts of this plan, see appendix "B").
27. CTF 4 sec. ltr. ser. 00136 of 8 November, 1941, to CinClant.
28. NORTH STAR (F), NORTHLAND, MODOC, ALGONQUIN, COMANCHE, BEAR, BOWDOIN, and RARITAN.
29. CTF 4 sec. ltr. ser. 00148 of 19 November 1941 to CinClant.
30. The area to be patrolled was from Newfoundland along 48° North to 46° West, thence south to 45° North, thence to a point 42° North, 52° West, thence west to 56° West, thence north to Newfoundland.
31. Admiral King sec. ltr. serial 00101 of 30 November 1941 to Admiral Bristol.
32. CNO conf. ltr. serial 0139312 of 3 December 1941 to Commandant USCG.
33. Captain W. A. Corn sec. memo. Op-12D-WC/mr serial 01321 of 11 December 1941 to Captain L. E. Denfeld.
34. Captain W. A. Corn sec. memo. (no serial) of 16 December 1941 for Capt. Denfeld.
35. Captain W. A. Corn sec. memo. (no serial) of 19 December 1941 for Captain L. E. Denfeld.

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