OPERATIONS FOR 1943 - JANUARY

Submarine contacts for January numbered five. Two were kills, while the fate of the other three U-Boats could not be determined with certainty. he sinkings both occurred in a single day, the 6th of the month, and were the work of planes of Patrol Squadron 83.

The first kill was registered in Latitude 03° S, Longitude 31° 50' W, not far from Fernando de Noronha. The second took place much farther west, in Latitude 02° S, 39° 24' W, rather close to Forteleza. Twelve days later, two survivors of one of these subs, probably the second, were landed at São Luiz by Brazilian authorities. The later requested interrogators, but the U. S. Navy Department asked that they be brought to Washington for special questioning. This made it necessary for the Naval Attache in Rio to request the Brazilian Government to release them to the United States. Brazil granted this without hesitation, and the prisoners soon left under guard for Washington.

Again on the 13th, a VP-83 plane made a slight contact at 01° 38' S, 39° 52' W. The Plane made its attack just three seconds after the sub's conning tower submerged. All that could be seen thereafter was a small amount of oil slick. Though the sub probably went undamaged, the attack may have forestalled serious developments, as the enemy lay directly in the path of a convoy 20 miles distant.

The Goff and the Kearney made the other submarine encounters. The former made hers on the 11th; a good sound contact at a point bearing 127°, distant 42 miles, from Base Jig (San Juan). After the first attack a strong odor of diesel oil could be noted. But the visibility was poor and no other evidence of destruction appeared. At this time the Goff,

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With the Surprise and the PCs 577 and 609, was escorting convoy TB1 southward.

The Kearney's experience occurred five days later, as the ship proceeded toward Base Fox alone. At Latitude 00° 40' S, Longitude 27° 30' W, early in the afternoon, she obtained a good contact and made three depth charge attacks. No apparent results followed, so it must be concluded that the enemy got off undamaged.

January saw other substantial additions made to the strength of Solantfor. PC 574 reported for duty on the 2nd of the month. A few days later, after the two U-Boat sinkings by VP-83 planes, the Admiral informed the Ministerio da Marinha at Rio that he wished two Brazilian Mineiros (Minelayers) from the South to report to Captain Dutra. They would be needed until a change came in the submarine and convoy situation in the North. On the 14th, the Gunboat Courage reported, while on the same day a third squadron of planes, consisting of PBYs and designated VP-94, also made known to the Admiral its early availability for duty. The Squadron was then in Jacksonville, but intended to depart for Brazil at once. One plane had to be delayed, but the rest were in Natal in time for the Presidential inspection on the 28th.

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OPERATIONS FOR 1943 - FEBRUARY

Apparently no submarines were destroyed during February, though many an encounter took place, followed in several cases by attacks. A brief review of the month's record will show the increasing importance of the Brazilian Navy and Air Force in the Battle of the South Atlantic.

On February 5, the Carioca attacked a hostile submarine, at Latitude 09° 03' S, Longitude 34° 45' W, with results that appeared negative. Four days later, a surface escort of a Bahia-Trinidad Convoy made a second attack at Equator, 45° 08' W, with no apparent success. On the 10th, the CS-1, also Brazilian, left Bahia to investigate a submarine reported sighted by the FAB at 13° 20' S, 38° 40' W. The ship made a good sound contact and dropped five depth charges, again with no evidence of results.

February 14 saw three contacts made. The first two, which may have involved the same submarine, were sighted by an American and a Brazilian plane respectively. The first pilot, belonging to VP-83, saw his submarine at 08° 25' S, 34° 35' W, but did not attack. About two hours later, the FAB pilot delivered an attack on a U-Boat very near the position of the first sighting. Still later, the Cariocatangled with a submarine somewhat farther to the south, with no visible success.

The day following, still in the same vicinity, PC-489, forming part of a Bahia-Trinidad convoy, heard a torpedo and then a submarine. The sound contact was good; three attacks were delivered, with results again estimated as negative. The proximity of this to the previous day's events suggests that the sub was one of those then involved and that it was definitely after the convoy.

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On the 17th, HMS Wastewater, a ship not belonging to the South Atlantic Force, attacked a stationary sound contact at 07° 07' S, 34° 15' W. Again there was no evidence of results. A few hours later, a U. S. Army B-24 plane, flying at an altitude of 9,500 feet, was fired on by a submarine. This encounter took place well east of the Wastewater's attack; hence he assailant must have been a different sub. The plane escaped without injury, but, having no equipment for attack, merely flew on and reported the incident.

Next day a submarine sank the Brazilian merchant vessel Brasiloide at 12° 47' S, 37° 33' W. Some hours afterward, a Confor plane sighted a U-Boat in a position that could have made it the Brasiloide's attacker. The Destroyer Kearney was at once ordered out of Base Baker (Bahia) to hunt and destroy the submarine. Aircraft from VP-83 and VP-94, several planes from the Santee and one from the Memphis helped track the enemy. The FAB, on request, also supplied some assistance. In spite of the exceptional effort made, all searchers came back empty handed.

In one day, the 24th, the Carioca reported two contacts, which she followed up with a fruitless attack at 09° 58' S, 35° 39' W.

Some hours earlier, a plane of VP-83 reported seeing a submerged submarine attack a ship at 04° 46' S, 31° 55' W. The plane made straight for the enemy, which surfaced immediately after its attack on the vessel. The pilot dropped four depth charges, which fell short, inflicting no apparent damage. The U-Boat resubmerged, but not until it had fired at the plane, and a little later surfaced again about six miles away. While all this went on, the attacked vessel sank, being later identified as the Spanish ship Monte Iguialdo.

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The Humboldt and Kearney, then in Recife, were both ordered out to hunt the sub. They failed to locate it, but in the meantime a VP-83 plane sighted the Spanish freighter El Saturno, a ship strongly suspected of unneutral practice and of carrying contraband. The Humboldt and Kearney, being nearby while engaged in their sub hunt, were directed to order El Saturno into Recife for search, provided such action did not interfere with their primary mission. Apparently it did, since it was a plane that ordered the Spanish ship to reverse its course and proceed under surveillance to Recife. In the meantime the two warships went on with their fruitless search.

As El Saturno neared the Brazilian port the Commander South Atlantic Force learned from the Ministro de Marinha that the United States could not search her inside the continental limits of Brazil. Consequently, a searching party was sent out in the Linnet to board El Saturno, which meanwhile had anchored about three miles off Recife. The searchers went through the ship's papers, examined the crew, and looked through quarters. No evidence of unneutral service appeared, so they released the vessel.

The Spanish captain immediately proceeded into Recife for coal. Within a few days he insisted that the U. S. Navy should reimburse him for the fuel he had consumed as a result of being diverted. Before the Spanish Consul could proffer a formal request, the American Naval Authorities asked the Vice Chief of Naval Operations for instructions in the matter. The reply from Washington said that no such reimbursement would be made, but did state that El Saturno should be aided in obtaining any necessary fuel and supplies.

Earlier in the month, to illustrate the amount of trouble Spanish merchant vessels often gave, an order went out to ocean patrols to seize

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the ship Monte Naranco (Spanish), should she be encountered. Then, should search indicate unneutral service as anticipated, the patrol should bring her to the nearest neutral port for adjudication. The Monte Naranco was not encountered, nor were all Spanish ships engaged in unneutral service. However, the chances that they might be up to something were for a long time considered good grounds for treating any ship under the flag of Spain as an object of suspicion.

During February, two important forthcoming developments were announced, though they did not materialize until a little later.

On the 11th, NOB Rio was requested by despatch to inform the appropriate Brazilian government officials and the U. S. Embassy of a contemplated expansion of Navy personnel and facilities at Natal. Within a short time Fleet Air Wing Sixteen would be installed in Brazil, and at that time Natal seemed the logical place for headquarters.

Then, on February 20, news arrived of an impending change that many believed to be somewhat overdue. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, sent word that the South Atlantic Force would become the Fourth Fleet. Its new status should date from the 15th of March. The despatch from Cominch furthermore said that from that time the entire U. S. Fleet would comprise numbered Fleets. Within these units Task Force organizations were to conform to numbers at that time being allocated. Those assigned to the Task Forces of the Fourth Fleet should run from forty to forty nine.

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THE FOURTH FLEET

On March 15, in accordance with the Commander-in-Chief's despatch, the South Atlantic Force became the Fourth Fleet. At the time this change in designation came the Admiral was aboard the Memphis, returning from a long ocean sweep. His itinerary had included a four day stopover in Montevideo for the purpose of attending the inauguration of the Uruguayan President, which occurred early in March.

The Fleet at the time of its inception included both United States and Brazilian Units. The former numbered the Cincinnati, Marblehead, Memphis, Milwaukee, and Omaha, Cruisers; the Davis, Moffett, Winslow, Barry, Borie, Goff, Jouett, and Somers, Destroyers; the Carnelian, a District Craft Yacht; the Patrol Vessels Courage, Saucy, Siren, Surprise, and Tenacity; the Minesweepers Flicker and Linnet; the Seaplane Tender Humboldt; the Auxiliary Oiler Patoka; the Supply Ship Melville; 15 PCs; one Floating Drydock. still in Mobile; two Motor Mine Sweepers; a Yard Oiler; and a Harbor Tug. There were the floating units. To them must be added the three plane squadrons based at Natal, and the two remaining Provisional Marine Companies; the 18th at Natal and the 19th at Recife.

Brazilian units available at this time included 15 ships, plus the Força Aerez Brasileira.

However, the composition of the Fleet at a given time often had little permanence. Throughout its history ships came and departed with great frequency. It has not been deemed best to enumerate the changes fully here, since to itemize them all would be both tedious and without general interest.

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A matter worth noting for March is the preliminary step taken toward the establishment of Navy Lighter-than-Air craft in Brazil. The Admiral broached the subject on the first of the month, when he recommended to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations that Blimp Bases be extended southward from Dutch Guiana to include sites at Salinas, São Luiz, Natal, and Fernando de Noronha. At the end of the month, a committee detailed by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations arrived in Recife to start on its tour of inspection for recommending Lighter-than-Air sites. At the end of the first week in April, the members submitted their report, to be forwarded by the Commander Fourth Fleet to higher authorities. In summary, they recommended a main base at Maceio, with mast facilities for Amapá, Igarape Assu, São Luiz, Fortaleza, Recife, Fernando de Noronha, and Bahia. They also favored facilities at Trinidad in addition to those already under construction there, because the Belem area lacked any suitable location. They made the additional suggestion that partial facilities be provided for each base at the earliest possible date.

Before many months blimps had moved into Brazil, although arrangements made finally as to bases departed somewhat from the original recommendations.

Also by March preparation had begun for combating the subs in a scientific way. It will be recalled that during the previous December the Admiral had requested the sending of an Attack Teacher, Sangamo Type, from the United States, and a little later had learned that this would arrive aboard the Melville. On the 5th of February the Melville docked at Recife. Accompanying the Sound Gear were Ensign N. T. Margolis and a Soundman 2/c. They soon set up, in the Administration Building,

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the Submarine Signal Attack Teacher Unit. The purpose of this was to teach anti-submarine warfare to all escort craft, through the use of underwater sound gear.

Officers and selected members of ships crews, when in port, visited the unit and became familiar with the new gear. Within a month of his arrival Ensign Margolis had extended his teaching to Brazilian officers and men. The instruction here had to be very rudimentary and was complicated by the language difficulty. To rectify this, Segundo Tenente Carlos Neiva, son of Admiral Neiva, was added to the staff. He had a fluent knowledge of English and acted as Liaison Officer. He also rapidly learned the use of the Attack Teacher, and gradually became a co-worker and instructor.

Ultimately, the Anti-Submarine Warfare Unit was built up to a large organization, numbering six officers and a considerable staff of enlisted men. The tendency, as time passed, was gradually to shift emphasis from the instruction of American to that of Brazilian Navy personnel. But for the time being the Attack Teacher served mostly to prepare American ships for immediate contacts with German subs.

March was a busy month, with most of the successes being scored by the U-Boats. The Germans took a heavy toll of the Merchant Ships plying the South Atlantic.

On the first of the month, the steamer Fits John Porter, which was part of a Bahia-Trinidad Convoy escorted by three Brazilian warships, was torpedoed at 12° 20' S, 37° 01' W. None of the escorts obtained sound contacts, so no attack could be delivered.

March 3 saw the Brazilian Merchant Ship Marajo nearly hit. She sighted the torpedo and one of her escorts, the Brazilian Rio Grande do Sul,

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made a sound contact, which, however, was too indefinite to permit the Rio Grande to attack. This occurred in position 13° 25' S, 38° 32' W.

Two days later, on March 5, reports came of three sinkings by enemy underwater craft, though the incidents had been spread rather widely apart in time.

The Roger B. Taney, an American ship, had been sunk on February 7, by two torpedoes fired from a submerged submarine. The survivors, who included one officer and 12 men of the Armed Guard crew, spent 21 days in a lifeboat before the British Penrith Castle picked them up and landed them in Bahia, all uninjured. The Sinking took place at Latitude 22° 00' S, Longitude 07° 00 W, much closer to Africa than to Brazil, which accounts for the failure of the South Atlantic Force to learn earlier of the loss.

On the morning of March 3, the Brazilian Merchant Vessel Affonso Pena was torpedoed at 18° 20' S, 37° 30' W, not far from Porto Seguro. Again there were survivors and these landed at Porto Seguro on the 5th, the incident being reported immediately to the Bahia Naval Observer, Lieutenant Commander Saben, by the Brazilian authorities.

The third victim was the SS Staghound, torpedoed ad sunk on the morning of March 4, at 16° 10' S, 37° 20' W. Survivors picked up by the Argentine Rio Colorado reached Bahia safely within two days.

The early morning hours of March 9 witnessed the heaviest losses that had yet been suffered at any one time. The Bahia-Trinidad Convoy designated BT-6 was then at no great distance from its destination. The Fitz-John Forter, lost the first day of the month, had also been a member of this convoy. Following the original loss the merchant vessels put in at Recife, where the USS Borie, Ericsson, and Courage, with PCs 488, 575, 577, 592, 593, and 610, plus the Siren and Tenacity and the Motor Mine

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Sweepers 60 and 76, took over the escort.

At 0215 on the 9th, the Borie reported a submarine attack, and six hours later the same ship sent word that an offensive anti-submarine search had been conducted with negative results. The Borie's recommendation was that air coverage and salvage vessels be provided at once.

The submarines had indeed made a killing. The Kalvinbeck, British, and the James Smith and James K. Polk, both American, had gone down. Other American ships, the Joseph R. Drake, Thomas Ruffin, Mark Hanna, and George Meade, were damaged but afloat. The PC-592 was then standing by in the vicinity with 130 survivors on board.

NOB Trinidad took most of the salvage measures necessary, since the destruction had occurred in its vicinity. HMS Milford, with tugs Zwarte Zee and Frisky, proceeded at once from Trinidad to the position of PC-592. Three Corvettes followed a little later. From Paramaribo, Dutch Guinana, the Army Tug Jessop left to remove the survivors. A Salvage Tug from Moengo also went to the scene for the purpose of retrieving the damaged ships. By these prompt measures the disaster was prevented from assuming the fullest proportions.

The one real success of the month occurred the following day, though even this involved some loss.

The German blockade runner Kota Nopan has been mentioned earlier in connection with the Anneliese Essberger. When the latter was scuttled in November, 1942, the Kota Nopan was also believed to be in the South Atlantic. On March 10, she did put in an appearance, even though a brief one.

At that time Admiral Read was at sea, commanding Task Units 23.1.6

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and 23.1.7, which together made up Task 23.1. The Kota Kopan was sighted by a plane from the Santee, whereupon the Savannah and Eberle proceeded to intercept her. The contact took place at 07° S, 21° W. The crew of the runner abandoned ship on being discovered, but before doing so took time to initiate incendiaries and demolitions. In the face of grave danger, an Eberle boarding party searched the ship, in the hope of salvage and of obtaining valuable information. Explosions took place while the searchers were on board; one man was killed, seven were missing, and two seriously injured. One of the latter succumbed to his wounds while undergoing treatment in the Savannah.

The blockade runner sank soon after the explosions. Prisoners, numbering 70 and including some German Navy personnel, were brought to port in the Savannah, along with effects and captured material.

At the time of her interception the Kota Nopan flew the Dutch flag, and when challenged she gave the call for the Netherlands ship Kota Tjandi. As a matter of fact she was originally Dutch, her previous name having been Kota Penang. At the time of her interception, she was bound for the Japanese held Dutch East Indies, and had a cargo of crude rubber.

March events continued to come thick and fast.

On the 15th, the crew of a Pan-Air Clipper sighted a submarine, fully surfaced, in position 05° 04' S, 33° 40' W, on course 065° T., traveling at an estimated speed of 12 knots. The plane was bound for Natal at the time, but sent the report on the sighting ahead. Immediately on landing, the pilot was interviewed by an Aviation Intelligence Officer, whereupon one VP-83 and two VP-74 planes departed to investigate. The first mentioned aircraft sighted a conning tower so close to the location

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given by the Pan-Air pilot that there could be no question as to the identity. He at once made a run on the sub, which submerged so quickly that he had no chance to drop his bombs. Due to the distance, it had not been possible to observe any identity marks on the enemy.

Other planes from the two squadrons soon came to relieve the original ones. To hold down the sub, they instituted a patrol of an area fifty miles square. Many hours later a VP plane sighted a wake in the moonlight, and then a fully surfaced submarine, no doubt still the same one. A flare was released but failed to light. The plane quickly dropped to an altitude of less than a hundred feet and released four 650 pound depth bombs, spaced thirty feet by the intervalometer. One bomb appeared to detonate on or just below the surface, shaking the plane. Others seemed to be within 25 feet of the sub. Even so, no results could be observed, though it was reasonable to suppose some damage had been committed. This caused a surface vessel, the Somers to be sent to the scene. She had been helping escort a convoy not far away, and was spared temporarily for this new duty. But all her efforts, plus those of additional planes which swept the area for hours, could not contact the sub. One of the planes sighted it briefly, but it was too far away to attack. Not until the morning of the 17th did they give up the hunt.

In the meantime, a plane from the Santee had located another submarine not far away, and attacked it on the surface. With the Eberle, which came to join in the hunt, the Santee scoured the area. The planes found the sub and attacked again, with doubtful results, although a large, fresh oil slick did appear. Nothing justified claiming a kill.

Within a few days submarine war on merchant ships had been resumed. The Dutch steamer Mariso was the next victim, being torpedoed and sunk

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On March 20 at 13° 20' S, 37° 25' W. The survivors definitely identified their assailant as German. Three members of the crew were lost, the first mate and the wireless officer were imprisoned on board the sub, 28 men in a lifeboat remained unheard from, and the rest reached Bahia safely.

The Saucy, while acting as part of the escort of Convoy TB-8, encountered a submarine on March 22. After a sound contact and an attack, the ship had five torpedoes fired at her, but escaped being hit. In all, the Saucy made eleven depth charge attacks and finally lost contact. This occurred in position 00° 20' N, 46° 48' W.

On the 25th, the Swedish merchant vessel Industria, of neutral status was attacked and sunk by a German submarine in 11° 40' S, 35° 55' W. The Industria at the time was proceeding from Philadelphia to Rio. The sub removed the Captain, the Chief Officer, and the Chief Engineer, from a lifeboat and took them aboard. Shortly after this, the St. Cergue, of Swiss registry, picked up 22 survivors and landed them at Bahia.

The final sinking of the month came on the 29th, when an unidentified ship, using call sign GW4XN, was torpedoed at 04° 08' N, 17° 33' W.

For this month which saw the fleet attain its new dignity, the story had been unfortunate. In spite of all the merchant ships destroyed and the number of attacks made on subs, there was not an instance where a kill could be claimed with certainty.

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OPERATIONS - APRIL, 1943

Operational activities in April proved to be lighter than those during March, yet even so the subs fared somewhat worse.

On the 6th the Commander of the Second Brazilian Air Zone reported that one of his planes had attacked a U-Boat in 11° 25' S, 36° 27' W, and had destroyed the enemy. This at once led to a verification search by Planes of VP-74, now based at Bahia. After reconnoitering the area they ended by reporting the discovery of a small oil slick and nothing more. The only conclusion to be drawn was that the inexperienced Brazilians had been overly-optimistic in their observation.

More reliable, certainly, was the report which came direct from VP-83 on April 15. A plane of that squadron had encountered a submarine in 03° 23' S, 30° 28' W, close to Fernando de Noronha. The first attack delivered injured the enemy, which was later sunk by another plane of the same squadron. The sub put up a fight before succumbing and damaged its second assailant with gunfire. Between 30 and 50 survivors were observed in the water, and the planes dropped life rafts to them.

This was the only authenticated kill scored in the course of the month. A subsequent event gave reason to think that the victim here was Italian, not German. Almost two months later, a petty officer survivor of the Italian submarine Marquimiduim arrived at Belem aboard a Brazilian gunboat that had picked him up. General appearances made it seem possible that his ship was the one destroyed on the 15th by the two planes.

The day previous to this kill, PC-494, a member of the escort of Trinidad-Bahia Convoy number Ten, had attacked a good sound contact in

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00° 50' S, 42° 32' W. The attacks provided no visible evidence of damage, and after two hours the search was abandoned.

On the 29th of the month, the Jouett and an Army plane both made good contacts.

The Destroyer encountered her submarine in 08° 24' S, 31° 15' W, while on the way back to Recife from patrol. She remained in he vicinity most of the night, hunting the U-Boat. In the small hours of the following morning, the Jouett, having failed to arouse anything, abandoned the search.

The plane, for its part, sighted what appeared to be a submarine 60 miles off Recife. After releasing two depth charges, following a quick submergence by the enemy, it hovered about the vicinity. Twenty minutes later the personnel noticed a large black spot on the surface. Since nothing else came to view, the logical conclusion was that the Germans had escaped damage and had tried one of the conventional and time-honored shams.

The score against the submarines for the month was one kill.

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OPERATIONS - MAY, 1943

For May, the first noteworthy event was a fire. This occurred the second of the month aboard the Livingston Roe, a War Shipping Board operated Tanker, then tied up in the harbor of Recife. A dockside locomotive passed close to the ship, and a spark from its stack came accidentally into contact with loose gasoline, which had leaked from a broken fueling hose. From the Livingston Roe flames spread rapidly to Armazem number 2, in which various U. S. Army stores had accumulated. Ships tied close to the fire had to stand out of the harbor. These were the Humboldt and the Milwaukee, both of which temporarily proceeded to sea. The Livingston Roe finally had to be towed from her berth and beached at the north end of the harbor. Fire fighters extinguished the conflagration at the Armazem late in the afternoon, and put out the ship's fire in the early hours of the next morning.

Personnel from U. S. and British vessels in the harbor, from both Army and Navy shore establishments, and from Brazilian military and civil organizations, all worked on the fire, which in spite of its seriousness never got out of hand. Since the Livingston Roe was loaded with 100 octane gasoline, and the neighboring warehouses contained both ammunition and dynamite, a major catastrophe had been narrowly averted, thanks to effort and cooperation and some good fortune. A little more and all neighboring shore establishments would have been blazing.

The submarine war grew bitterer during the course of May, and "Alerts" twice had to be established on the Brazilian coast; once

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from Recife to Vitoria, and later from Natal to São Luiz. Subs were constantly in the South Atlantic during the month and the Fleet kept hotly after them.

On the 8th, the Moffett and Winslow, later joined by the Barry, stood out of Recife to hunt a sub that had attacked unsuccessfully a member of a Trinidad-Bahia Convoy. Planes of Fleet Air Wing Sixteen and the FAB gave assistance. When contact was made, a Brazilian plane delivered an attack on the U-Boat. No results could be observed other than air bubbles on the surface. This search nevertheless continued the entire day and into the night. The following morning a Navy plane discovered a submarine, possibly a different one, somewhat farther north. The ships, one by one, were ordered to abandon the region of their original search and shift to this new scent. It is disappointing to relate that no attacks resulted, since no contacts could be made with the enemy.

However, a little over a week later, the Fleet did "kill" a sub. This one was reported on the 16th, when in the early afternoon, a VP-74 plane sighted a U-Boat conning tower and wake at 10° 58' S, 35° 59' W. It released a stick of mark 44 depth charges, 65 seconds after the conning tower disappeared. Three of the charges appeared to be duds, and no signs of damage to the sub appeared. The Moffett and Jouett were ordered to the scene of the attack, and in the meantime VP-74 carried out standard "hold-down" procedure.

The night passed, and at 0915 in the morning a seaplane found the marauder surfaced and immediately attacked. The damage inflicted proved sufficient to keep it from submerging. The Moffett and Jouett then moved

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in and finished the submarine with their guns. The position by this time was 11° 08' S, 35° 38' W. Forty -seven survivors were picked up by the two ships, and four dead Germans received burial at sea. The Moffett and Jouett thereupon proceeded to Recife with the prisoners.

Some other good contacts resulted during the month, but in no case did a sub sinking follow.

On May 20, a transient plane received some damage by anti-aircraft fire form a submarine at 06° 20' S, 12° 40' W. Ascension Island sent out an Army bomber which located the sub, dropped depth charges, and saw it submerge. Oil slick was later reported in the vicinity; also three lifeboats with sails. But according to the rule generally followed, this did not justify claiming a kill.

The day following, the Siren, escorting a Bahia-Trinidad convoy, made a contact and attacked without results, in position 00° 35' S, 47° 20' W.

Meanwhile, the submarines continued to take their toll. They sank the steamer Samuel Jordan Kirkwood off Ascension Island, and a few days later, in the same vicinity, destroyed he Dutch Merchant Vessel Benekat. On the 28th they scored off a Bahia-Trinidad Convoy, in 03° 56' S, 36° 43' W. Three merchant ships received damage. One had to be towed and beached off Fortaleza. The other two were able to proceed with the rest of the convoy, at a slightly reduced speed. Three Brazilian warships came to the aid of the convoy, to assist both in towing operations and in anti-submarine sweeps in the area. All efforts to locate the submarine failed, there being no further sightings.

The only other damage was accidental, and occurred to two Cruisers of the Fleet. On the last day of the month, the Milwaukee and Omaha

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Sideswiped while proceeding from Montevideo to Recife and Rio respectively. The Omaha got the worst of the exchange and received some minor injury to her bow plating and stern. Arrangements had to be made for her to drydock in Rio, where these parts were worked over. No major damage resulted, however, and operation plans did not need to be altered as a result of the accident.

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OPERATIONS - JUNE, 1943

On June 1, 1943, the Admiral issued a new Operations Plan, Number 1-43, to the Fleet. It superseded all previous ones, which were ordered forthwith destroyed.

The new plan was long and comprehensive. It divided the entire command into nine Task Forces, numbered 41 to 49 inclusive.

First came some general observations concerning the mutual support to be rendered by United States, British and Brazilian Naval Forces, operating in adjacent areas. There was reaffirmation of the rule that, when forces of different nationalities operated together, the Senior Officer Present should be coordinator.

Then followed directions for the Fleet as a whole, which should:

  1. Guard traffic in focal areas;
  2. Destroy or capture enemy forces and shipping;
  3. Destroy or capture vessels trading with the enemy;
  4. Escort Bahia-Trinidad, Trinidad-Bahia Convoys and furnish air coverage within the areas assigned to the Fleet;
  5. Patrol the sea area with surface forces and aircraft, with the specific purpose of accomplishing the above items;
  6. Patrol the sea areas along the Brazilian coast, using air and surface craft for anti-submarine operations and convoy protection;
  7. Destroy or capture enemy expeditionary forces, and support the Army and Caribbean Sea Frontier in preventing the extension of enemy military power in the Western Atlantic Area.

Next came designation of Task Forces and their purposes.

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Task Force Forty-one, commanded by Rear Admiral O. M. Read, consisted of all the Cruisers, with the Omaha as Flagship. This force existed for ocean patrol and should cruise the mid-Atlantic area to capture enemy blockade runners or raiders. Normally this should base at Recife and Bahia, but as the occasion required it might use San Juan, Trinidad, Montevideo, the Falkland Islands and Rio.

Next came the Destroyers, which, under the orders of Commander H. C. Robinson, made up Task Force Forty-two. The purpose would be to escort. But in addition to protecting the Trinidad-Bahia, Bahia-Trinidad Convoys, the Force would provide Destroyer Leaders and Destroyers to escort and screen mid-ocean patrols, and to be ready to furnish components for killer groups.

The first two Task Forces comprised the larger ships of the Fleet. Smaller vessels, including all the PCs, formed a pool from which they could be assigned to various Groups as the situation required.

Next came Task Force Forty-three, the Carrier Group, but this had no organization at the time, there being no Carriers attached to the Fourth Fleet. In time its duties would consist of patrolling the mid=ocean line with the Cruisers, cooperating with surface vessels in attacking raiders and surface vessels, and scouting areas as directed.

The Air Arm, commanded by Captain R. D. Lyon, formed Task Force Forty-four. It included Fleet Air Wing Sixteen, all patrol squadrons, and would take in the Lighter-than-Air craft when they reported. Also in this Force were the Naval Air shore facilities in Brazil, and the Aircraft Tenders. Its function was to patrol as directed, provide intensive

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anti-submarine operations, cooperate with surface vessels, and provide air components for killer groups.

Task Force Forty-five, labeled "Killer Groups" had no set organization, since it would be assembled when necessary and consist of units from other Forces. Its function, when in existence, was to conduct hunting and killing operations against enemy submarines.

Brazilian Naval Forces of the Northeast, commanded by Rear Admiral Soares Dutra, comprised Task Force Forty-six. Normally the latter's function would be to handle the Bahia-Recife part of the Bahia-Trinidad convoy runs. In the case of the southbound convoys it would operate in the reverse direction, covering the same area. But it should also provide shuttle escorts from Belem for these convoys, when required, and other escorts when needed.

Task Force Forty-seven was classed as miscellaneous. The ships placed in this were mainly for the purpose of classifying them somewhere, since there was no likelihood of the units ever operating together. It consisted of the Fleet Flagships, the Harbor craft at Recife, Bahia, and Natal, the supply ship Melville, and the Patoka. This was not a combat Force, nor was it intended to be. Its chief duties were those of furnishing tender and supply service, assisting the shore establishments, and providing for the security of the ports.

The shore facilities, meaning all land establishments maintained by the Navy in Brazil, made up Task Force Forty-eight. Included here were such miscellaneous non-combat activities at the Medical Dispensary at Boa Viagem and the Destroyer Repair Units at Recife and Bahia.

Number Forty-nine consisted of the Brazilian Air Forces of the First, Second, and Third Zones, commanded respectively by Coronel Apel Neto,

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Brigadeiro Eduardo Gomes, and Brigadeiro Heitor Varady. Its instructions were very similar to those of Task Force Forty-four, except that there was stress on Anti-Submarine Warfare Training, ad no provision for furnishing components to killer groups.

All units involved began operating under the new plan the day of its promulgation.

No submarine kills took place in June, though frequent contacts showed the continued presence of enemy U-Boats in South Atlantic waters.

On June 3, three torpedoes sank the Greek steamer Boris in 07° 14' S, 18° 41' W. There were 37 survivors, who put to sea in two boats. The British Cable Ship Cambria picked up one party, numbering 16, and brought it into Recife on June 14. Though it seemed that the second boat, containing the Boris' Captain and the rest of the survivors, should be heard from soon, much time went by and it did not put in an appearance.

The Swedish merchant vessel Venezia received two torpedoes on June 21, at 25° 50' S, 38° 38' W., and sank. As the position shows, this took place in the Rio area. Due to earlier reports of a submarine operating there, it had already been planned to move planes of Fleet Air Wing Sixteen into that vicinity. Brazilian authorities in the meantime had been apprised of the intention, to permit them to take appropriate action. On the basis of the Venezia sinking, the number of planes sent to Rio was increased. These, of course, supplemented the FAB aircraft already operating there.

Likewise, a Submarine Alert was established from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro, and Captain Lyon soon got orders to move more U. S. planes into the Rio area. For the remaining few days of the month, that vicinity received the main attention.

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Another torpedoing, though not a fatal one, occurred on June 25, the day of proclaiming the alert. The SS Eagle, the victim, was damaged by a U-Boat in the 22° 10' S, 40° 45' W, off Cape Frio. The same day, a Brazilian Focke-Wolf plane, sighting a surfaced sub at 23° 20' S, 41° 53' W, dropped a bomb on it with uncertain results. Three days later, on June 28, the Charles W. Peale, U. S. Flag, narrowly escaped sinking just before entering Rio Harbor. Early that morning, a submarine attacked the Peale in the 23° 40' S, 42° 50' W. Though the ship had no escort it managed to evade the torpedoes and enter port undamaged.

Thus, for June as for various other months in the past, no direct score could be chalked up against the Germans. Yet in a less spectacular way the result had been good. Loss on the whole was small, convoys kept moving, and this, it should never be forgotten, was the main reason for the Fleet's existence. Moreover, in sub sinkings, the forthcoming month of July would tell an entirely different story.

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JULY, 1943 - THE ANTI-SUBMARINE BLITZ

During July, at least 15 submarines operated along the Atlantic Coast of South America. Never before had so many appeared at once, the average for the immediately preceding months having been scarcely a sixth of this number.

The Fourth Fleet accepted the challenge, and when the month had ended the score with reference to the submarines read "Sunk, six - probably sunk, two". These kills ranged all the way from the waters near Trinidad to the vicinity of Florianopolis, well south of Rio.

To darken the picture somewhat, the large submarine influx inevitably meant more merchant sinkings. For July the total shipping loss in the Fourth Fleet Area was 14; a loss that, when broken down by nationality, numbered 1 Norwegian, a Brazilian, 3 British, and 7 American ships. The tonnage sent to the bottom totalled 89,967.

Yet the record could be accounted good. During the first half of 1943, in all areas, United Nations Forces sank three submarines for every ten the latter destroyed. Regardless of whether we accept the figure six or eight as the Fourth Fleet's total for the month, in either case it is well above the average.

The question of why so many submarines appeared off the coast of South America in July is best answered by reference to other areas. Convoys in the North Atlantic were by now so well protected, particularly in the eastern part, that the enemy had to pay a heavy price for the ships he sank. In the Western and Southern Atlantic fewer escorts were available,

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and more ships had to be routed independently. The Germans would therefore logically reason that here should be easier pickings, with resulting smaller losses to themselves.

The last part of June had foreshadowed increased submarine activity. Several attacks on ships in the Rio area had necessitated the alert between Bahia and Rio, and had occasioned sending additional U. S. Planes to the Brazilian Capital. Furthermore, the convoy terminus had just been changed from Bahia to Rio. Convoys formerly designated BT-TB, now became JT-TJ, as Jig was the letter indicating Rio de Janeiro. These required additional protection, as did a considerable volume of local shipping between Rio and various southern ports, both in Brazil and along the Rio de la Plata. It meant that local convoys often had to be added to the main ones for short parts of the run, as, for instance, ships bound from Rio to Santos of Florianopolis.

NOB Rio faced the task of combining and coordinating Brazilian - U. S. Navy operations for the coastal areas between Carvellas and Florianopolis, a distance of 900 miles. This was the busiest and most important period in the Rio base's history.

Two other areas were especially concerned with the submarine menace. One was the bulge of Brazil, meaning roughly the coast lying between Forteleza and Bahia. Finally, the stretch from the Guianas to the Amazon saw several sub actions, three kills, and the sinking of three merchant ships.

To give the story chronologically, the submarines drew the first blood when one of them torpedoed the Brazilian Tutola off Santos, just

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before midnight on the last day of June. Seventeen survivors, picked up by a fishing vessel, came ashore the following morning.

The next victim was the Elihu B. Washburne, U. S. flag, which a U-Boat sank on July 3, also very close to Santos. In the course of the day Brazilian and American planes twice sighted a sub, very likely the Washburne's attacker, but were unable to do it any damage.

On July 4, the Bury, a small Brazilian merchant vessel, experienced a gunfire attack from a submarine in 23° 2' S, 44° 37' W. This location would put the occurrence very near the Bay of Guanabara (Rio). The Bury, being armed, fired on the sub, and a U. S. plane which observed the shooting gave chase to the enemy. It could make out no sign of the U-Boat; however, Brazilian aircraft and a U. S. Catalina went from Rio to the contact area for a thorough but fruitless submarine hunt.

Some time during the previous night, the Navy had suffered the loss of a PBM plane of VP-74. From causes unknown it had crashed in the sea, having no trace save floating wreckage. The accident took place near Rio, all personnel being lost.

The same day, the 4th, in the early afternoon, the Germans scored again, when one of their subs attacked and sank the Pelotasloide, a Brazilian merchant ship. This was far from the Rio area, taking place just below the Equator just off Salinas, near Belem. The Pelotasloide, then bound from Trinidad to Belem, had as her escorts two 110 foot patrol craft, manned by Brazilian crews. She sank in eleven fathoms of water, meaning possibly that a mine and not a torpedo had accounted for her. The two escorts did as much life saving as possible, and turned survivors over to a ship which stood out from Belem to receive them.

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Now that the enemy had struck at the northern as well as the southern end of the line, the Commander Fourth Fleet established a Submarine Alert from Belem to Natal. Since one had existed between Bahia and Rio since June 25, and the Brazilian Ministry of Marine had recently declared another from Rio to Santos, this virtually closed the coast of Brazil to independent shipping, except between Natal and Bahia.

Next day the Fourth Fleet learned of another casualty. Two whaleboats arrived at Cabadello in Parahyba, not far north of Recife, with 52 survivors of the British Vernon City, torpedoed on June 28 in 04° 20' S, 27° 20' W. News of this loss brought the number of known attacks on merchant ships in the area to eight, and the number of verified sinkings since June to five.

By the end of the first week in July the Fourth Fleet's position looked unenviable. Recent submarine attacks, all the way from French Guiana to Santos, had taxed its anti-submarine units. Convoys formerly terminating at Bahia now had to continue to Rio, adding to the burden. Due to some detachments the previous month, the Fleet was short of Destroyers, only the Somers being available for regular escort work. Six U. S. Navy planes had been transferred through necessity to Rio in support of Brazilian Forces. On paper the Commander of Fleet Air Wing Sixteen had five squadrons available. But mechanical difficulties, routine overhauls, and training periods actually reduced effective strength to about half the normal figure. Meanwhile the submarine crisis grew daily more acute.

The next events seemed to confirm the idea of the Fleet's numerical inadequacy. Very early on the morning of the 7th, a northbound convoy

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was twice attacked, just above the hump of Brazil. The submarines got three ships, the Sinnekson, Robertson, and Thompson, all U. S. flag. The Hunt, also in the convoy, received a torpedo, but arrived in Trinidad under her own power. The Alcoa Banner and Goiazaloide accidentally rammed the torpedoed vessels and received damage, but continued with the convoy.

Salvage and repair ships from Natal, Recife, and even Trinidad, came to help with the rescue and to augment the escort. The Fleet Material Officer traveled to the scene in a PC. For several days the search for damaged ships from he convoy went on, until finally the three already named were given up as lost.

Two submarine sightings were reported in the course of the 7th, but neither led to an attack.

July 8 brought further bad tidings. A Trinidad-Rio Convoy encountered a sub, and probably more than one, just north of the Amazon' mouth. The B. P. Newton, a Norwegian tanker took fire and went down at once. The Eldena, U. S. flag, received damage which a second torpedo turned into a sinking. This convoy, designated TJ-1, was escorted by the Somers Group, which gained sound contact on two subs, though it was believed that one had done all the firing. The contacts led to attacks, which brought no evidence of any damage to the U-Boats. Following this, the vessels put into Belem.

On July 9 came the first kill of the series, and probably involved one of the submarines that had attacked the convoy the previous day. First a Catalina, belonging to VP-94, sighted a fully surfaced sub in 03° 54' N, 48° 43' W. Lieutenant Hare, the pilot, closed and dropped all his bombs, which fell short. In return came vigorous anti-aircraft fire

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from the U-Boat which wounded the pilot in the throat so badly that he died a little later. Within five minutes the same plane, with a second pilot at the controls, sighted the wake o another submarine. Being out of bombs it had nothing with which to attack. However, there was another VP-94 Catalina in the neighborhood. This quickly swung into action and destroyed the still surfaced submarine, which left 5 survivors in the water as it sank. The plane dropped them a life raft.

For some time thereafter, planes and surface craft sighted or attacked submarines daily. They did not score another success immediately, however, and in the meantime the U-Boats sank the African Star on the 12th, and the following morning, just after midnight, damaged a Navy B-24 plane. This aircraft, on contacting the enemy, delivered its attack by the use of landing lights, and the effect of its bombs could not be learned. The sub, however, instead of submerging, shot it out with the assailant, which had to return to base on three engines. The position of this action was 05° 22' S, 33° 35' W, not far east of Natal.

Then, for a few days, came a lull. On the 17th, the Admiral lifted the submarine alerts from Belem to Natal and from Bahia to Rio. The reason for this action was not any fancied end of the danger, which nevertheless did seem to have diminished, but the necessity for clearing the harbors of small, coastwise ships which could not be included in convoys.

Things came to life with a vengeance on the 19th. Three encounters between aircraft and subs took place; one resulting in a kill.

In the other two cases he submarines more than defended themselves.

One damaged an Army B-18, covering a TJ convoy. Two attempts at attack by the pane were driven off by intense anti-aircraft fire. After

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the U-Boat submerged, depth bombs failed to produce any visible results. This occurred in 04° 40' N, 49° 10' W, not far from the scene of the kill on the 9th.

Close by, but earlier in the day, a Caribbean Sea Frontier plane had attacked a surfaced submarine. Four depth charges seemed to accomplish nothing. The U-Boat remained n the surface and engaged the plane in a machine gun fight, scoring hits on propellers and the tail assembly. The latter had to withdraw, leaving the submarine the mistress of the field.

The kill took pace off Florianopolis, far to the south. A VP-74 Mariner, operating from the Tender Barnegat, attacked a surfaced sub. The U-Boat gave back considerable AA fire, but the pilot used effective evasive tactics and straddled the enemy with his bombs. This ended the sub, which sank, leaving a number of survivors in the water. The Barnegat came up as fast as possible and picked up the Germans, including their Captain, Fritz Guggenberger, believed to be the officer who sank the British Carrier Ark Royal.

On July 19, it became known that Convoy TJ-2 was being followed by a submarine. On the 20th, a plane of VP-94 sighted and attacked another 50 miles ahead of the convoy, at 03° 53' N, 48° 45' W. The sub remained on the surface and opened fire immediately. A gun battle went on for approximately an hour. When the plane started away to lead escort surface vessels to the scene, the submarine submerged with apparent difficulty. This was certainly no kill, yet the enemy showed signs of being damaged.

The same sub was very likely the one attacked by another VP-94 plane the following day. The U-Boat sent up anti-aircraft and machine gun fire,

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but the pilot went straight to his target and made the attack. No doubt could exist regarding his success. The submarine sank immediately, nose up, going down in 03° 56' N, 45° 46' W.

Also on the 21st came the report that the Richard Caswell, U. S. flag, had been sunk near Florianopolis on July 16, while proceeding independently from Buenos Aires to Rio. This raised to ten the merchant ship casualty list for the month, if we count the Tutoia, sunk a little before midnight, June 30, and the British Harmonic, which went down on July 15, even though its loss was not yet known.

For the 23rd of July a sure kill and a "probable" can be listed.

The certainty occurred earliest in the day, not far from Fernando de Noronha. The morning before, two planes on training sweeps made sightings and an attack, which may have damaged the sub. Others from the same squadron (VB-107) continued with the hold down. A little after daylight on the 23rd, a B-24 sighted and attacked the U-Boat, and apparently crippled it enough to make submergence impossible. Two other planes, on search nearby, flew to the contact, and sank the submarine. The first of these, after straddling the sub with its bombs, plunged into the ocean and was lost with all hands. The U. S. S. Seneca hurried to the scene and picked up two survivors from the U-Boat.

The probable sinking listed for the same day came following a contact made in 07° 10' N, 51° 36' W. The submarine lay fully surfaced when sighted by a VP-94 plane, which flew through stiff anti-aircraft fire to make the attack. The U-Boat nosed up to 30 degrees, rolled to starboard, and disappeared. Some damage, though slight, was sustained by the pane. This took place during dark and rainy weather which made the detection of any

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possible survivors impossible. However, the main thing that cast doubt on the sub's destruction was an attack delivered slightly later in almost the same spot, by an Army plane operating under the Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier.

For July 24, the only report to come in was that 46 survivors of the British Harmonic had arrived in Bahia. They reported their ship as having been sunk on the 15th by two torpedoes from a German submarine in 23° 00' S, 33° 00' W.

Also, on this same day, though the fact was unknown until August, the British Fort Chilcotin, received a torpedo and sank in 15° 03' S, 32° 35' W. Survivors arrived in Rio on the 3rd.

Four days then went by without reports of U-Boat activities. But on the 28th survivors of the Hendeza reached Montevideo. This ship had been destroyed, as usual by a submarine, on the 24th, not far from Santos.

The 29th passed without events of any special importance. Then, on the 30th and 31st, came the events that wound up the month in triumphant fashion.

On the first day, not far from Recife, two enemy submarines were attacked, one being certainly, and both probably, accounted for.

The first exploit belonged to a Ventura, one of the lately arrived VP-127 Squadron. The coverage mission for Convoy TJ-2 sighted the sub, fully surfaced, about 25 miles from the convoy rendezvous off Recife. The Ventura arrived in a hurry, on summons, and its bombs straddled the enemy, which sank in four minutes. Numerous survivors were rescued by the Saucy, which hastened to the scene and brought them into Recife.

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Less than two hours later, another Ventura encountered a submarine about three degrees farther to the south. The plane made its attack, following which there was a reported explosion. The enemy went down, leaving no survivors on the surface. Perhaps no very good reason existed for calling this anything but a sure kill. The caution, however, which the Navy always employs in these cases led to a verdict of "probable".

The last one took place on the 31st, close to Rio, and was a certainty. A Mariner of VP-94 earned the initial credit here by attacking the surfaced sub which fired vigorously on the plane. The Mariner persisted, crippled the enemy, and then remained in the vicinity to draw its AA fire, while a Brazilian Air Force Catalina swooped in to make the actual kill. Therefore, the U. S. Navy and the FAB shared the honors for the final submarine of the month. The fact that on the same day the Brazilian ship Bagé went down north of Bahia, as the result of a torpedo, made the climax a little disappointing.

Nevertheless, what had started as an apparent field day for the subs had turned out to be the banner month of the South Atlantic Campaign.

In the course of this July activity, several changes in submarine tactics could be noted. Frequently the enemy U-Boats, when sighted, elected not to dive but to remain surfaced and fight the attackers with their guns, particularly if they lacked time to submerge to a safe depth. A surfaced sub, though dangerous, naturally presented the planes with a better chance to score a kill, and those of Fleet Air Wing Sixteen capitalized on their opportunities. Of the eight U-Boats probably destroyed

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in July, six were surfaced and firing at the time, while the other two appear to have been surprised before they could submerge. On the whole, the crews of the plane squadrons liked the new tactics and expressed the hope that the subs would continue them.

U-Boats appear to have been fitted with heavier anti-aircraft batteries. They placed their chief reliance in these, and did little firing from their large deck guns. In some cases, the latter seemed to have been removed altogether.

In most cases the submarine maneuvered to present its beam to the attackers, for the purpose, apparently, of bringing all its guns most advantageously to bear.

While i former months only one submarine customarily patrolled a given area, there were four instances, this time, that seemed to show them working in pairs.

Submarine intelligence regarding convoys seemed all too good. Several of the sinkings occurred at times and places which showed the enemy to be lurking in wait for a merchant ship group.

Also, on the average, sighted subs were closer inshore than had bee true of their predecessors.

Of the fourteen merchant ships destroyed during the month, six belonged to convoys, while eight proceeded independently. This was in line with old submarine policy in the Fourth Fleet Area; namely to specialize in attacks on unprotected, independently routed ships. The month's activity likewise showed the enemy moving progressively southward, since six of the merchant vessels and two of the subs were destroyed below the parallel of Rio.

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A few events of interest, other than operational, occurred during the month.

ON the 7th, the Commander Fourth Fleet and the Commanding General U. S. Army Forces (USAFSA) appointed a joint committee consisting of the Chief-of-Staff Fourth Fleet, the Chief-of-Staff USAFSA, and the Chief-of-Staff Army Transport Command (ATC). This committee received executive power to transfer any facilities in the area from one service to the other for use, depending on the shifting needs and the changing situation. There already existed a larger Joint Logistical Committee, which met every two weeks for discussion purposes but which lacked executive authority. The new joint commission of three supplied the power hitherto lacking.

July 25 brought word from the U. S. Naval Attache in Montevideo that the Uruguayan Government had verbally granted the United States permission to use its territory for sea and land plane operations. This, however, would only be in the event that submarine activity developed off Rio de la Plata. Uruguay's consent formed a reply to a request of this nature, formulated considerably earlier by the Commander Fourth Fleet through the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

On July 12, the Commander Fleet Air Wing Sixteen shifted his administrative command to the Naval Administration Building in Recife. This had previously been located at Natal.

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THE REMAINDER OF 1943 - OPERATIONS

The month of August started busily, as a continuation of the strenuous events of July; then slackened considerably.

On the first day, a despatch arrived from Cominch, in reference to anti-submarine activities just completed by the Fleet. It read, "Well done to the Fighting Fourth and Brazilian Associates".

From appearances, there were still several submarines in the Fourth Fleet Area during the early days of August. Contacts occurred with regularity; one resulting in a probable kill. This sub was attacked and evidently severely damaged by a VB-107 plane on the 3rd. The position of the attack was 09° 33' S, 30° 37' W. The plane dropped six bombs, causing a violent explosion, following which the U-Boat had disappeared. Ten hours later another plane from VB-107 sighted a sub so near the first position, that it could well have been the same. Once more bombs were dropped, but the anti-aircraft fire was so intense that it damaged the starboard wing and the number two propellor of the plane. The Moffett, meanwhile, received orders and steamed to the area, arriving shortly after midnight. As it approached, a Navy plane that had taken over the patrol made a radar contact on the Destroyer. Darkness prevented proper identification. The plane believed the Moffett to be at another location and, mistaking the contact for the U-Boat, opened fire and wounded eight men. As soon as the identification had been made, both ship and plane turned attention to the sub. The Moffett attacked it with her guns as soon as it was daylight, and the plane, hovering overhead, observed hits on the submarine. The enemy disappeared, but whether due to voluntary submergence or to sinking could not be determined.

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Assuming, with good reason, that this was the same U-Boat attacked the previous day by the VB-107 plane, and that damage had been inflicted both times, there seemed every reason for scoring the action as a probable kill.

By the 10th, submarine contacts south of he Equator had ceased. Those made by the ships of the Fourth Fleet were now all as much as five degrees north, strongly indicating that, for the time being at least, the enemy was retiring.

During September, few subs put in an appearance. In fact until the latter part of the month no contacts were made and no merchant sinkings occurred. On the 26th a Spanish vessel picked up survivors from the St. Usk, British flag, which had gone down in 16° 30' S, 29° 00' W; torpedoed by a submarine apparently German. Later the same day the Ipitage, Brazilian, was torpedoed at approximately 10° 00' S, 35°, 50' W.

The fleet made its first September contact on the 27th, when a VP-74 plane attacked a sub in 12° 30' S, 35° 30' W. It made two runs, dropping six bombs in the first and two during the second, whereupon the U-Boat submerged. Both attacks had been delivered through intensive anti-aircraft fire, which wounded two members of the crew. Next day the Davis attacked a very doubtful contact in a position close by, but if the sub existed it certainly received no damage.

At the end of the month, two more despatches came of merchant vessels destroyed. The S. S. Mello, Portuguese flag, was reported afire, after being torpedoed at 02° 50' S, 31° 54' W. At the same time a whaler arrived on the Brazilian coast, near Bahia, with twelve survivors of the British ship Lady, torpedoed as far back as September 19. From the sparse data furnished by the rescued men, the exact location of the sinking could not be determined.

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October likewise produced little in the line of action. Two merchant vessels were lost, the Brazilian Campos and the Norwegian Seranger, on the 23rd and 24th, respectively. The former went down in the Latitude of Rio; the latter close to the equator. No contacts were made, if we except a possible sighting by a VB-107 plane out of Ascension on the 27th. The only excitement this caused came from the possibility that the submarine involved might be Japanese, but apparently nothing more was heard on the matter.

November proved more eventful; the total for the month being three contacts and one kill.

The latter took place on the 5th, and the sub was destroyed only after a five and a half hour battle, participated in by several planes, all based on Ascension Island. A Navy B-24 saw a surfaced submarine in 10° 09' S, 18° 00' W, and attacked, the first time without results. The second attack damaged the U-Boat so badly that it was unable to submerge. The plane pilot, with his ammunition exhausted, called for help by radio and stood by to pin the victim until others could come into action. Meanwhile, two additional Navy B-24s and two Army B-25s, the latter carrying demolition bombs, had been called to assist in the operation. In all, they expended 33 depth bombs and 12 demolition bombs. The plane finally making the kill participated in the first stages of the battle until it ran out of ammunition and almost out of gas. It flew back to the base, rearmed and refueled, changed pilots, and returned to the scene. On the tenth attack the submarine blew up, and survivors could be seen struggling in the water. The plane crews threw life rafts to them, and a

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merchant vessel in the area, the Fort Cumberland, was requested to pick them up and bring them to Ascension for questioning.

The record for December reveals only one submarine sighting. This was by an Army Mitchell Bomber, en route from Natal to Ascension, in position 06° 20' S, 29° 40' W. Two Venturas from Natal went out to investigate, but their search revealed nothing. So the year 1943 came to an end. The submarines, for all practical purposes, had been driven out of the South Atlantic.

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THE BLIMPS ARRIVE

Earlier in this narrative there has been mention of preparations for the introduction of Lighter-than-Air Squadrons into Brazil.

Blimps have several advantages for patrol purposes. They can stay in the air longer than planes; sometimes up to 22 hours. The slow speed they are able to maintain permits them to hover over an object, in order to observe it fully. Visibility from a blimp is excellent, for no part of the ship stands in the observer's way. The radar platform is good.

Since the composition of an airship crew is less generally known than that of a plane, some details are worth mentioning here. Three officers normally fly with a blimp, though sometimes the number is four. Six enlisted men round out the regular complement. Together these form a CAC (Combat Air Crew), and it is desirable to keep them together as a unit. The officers are designated Command Pilot, Co-Pilot, and Navigator. Every blimp flyer has the designation "Naval Aviator - Airship". Three CACs should be available for each ship. This does not mean that they are assigned to a given craft, but three to one is considered the proper ratio of crews to ships.

Lighter-than-Air units in the Fourth Fleet operated from the time of their arrival in Brazil under Captain Lyon, Commander Fleet Air Wing Sixteen and head of all air activities. The direct command, however, was held by Captain W. E. Zimmerman. In August 1943, Captain Zommerman began setting up his organization in Brazil. A month later the ships started moving south. During the remainder of the year and the early part of the next,

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two Squadrons came and were installed. Squadron 41 (Northern) eventually took care of the entire Brazilian area from Amapa to Fortaleza. Squadron 42 (Southern) patrolled from Fortaleza to Santa Cruz, a little beyond Rio. Each had its own Commander, with a Hedron Squadron based at Recife, the center.

The first airship of the United States Navy to reach Brazil was the K-84, flown from Lakehurst, New Jersey. As an item of interest it might be added that this was the first K Type (non-rigid) Airship to cross the Equator. She arrived in Fortaleza, on September 27, after a flight of 1430 nautical miles and 98 hours spent in the air. Captain Zimmerman, already in Brazil, met the ship and took part in the later stages of the flight.

This first arrival, which belonged to Squadron 41, was based at Fortaleza, as was the second (K-38), which got there on October 13. Fortaleza then became for a time the headquarters of Squadron 41. In the latter part of November, 1943, Squadron 42 moved in and set up at Fortaleza, while its predecessor temporarily vacated and established headquarters farther north. Then, in May, 1943, as a result of new bases being opened in southern Brazil, at Caravelas, Vitoria, and Santa Cruz, Squadron 42 had to spread its ships through the south. Squadron 41 moved back to Fortaleza, but now maintained headquarters at São Luiz, while 42 centered at Maceio.

After both squadrons had become permanently established, the blimp bases in Brazil, in geographical order, were Amapá, Igarape, Assú, Sã'o Luiz, Fortaleza, Fernando de Noronha, Ibura, Maceio, Ipitanga, Caravelas, Vitoria, and Santa Cruz. Three of these; Fortaleza, Ibura, and Vitoria,

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were more theoretical than real; meaning that some facilities for blimps existed at these places but that no ship was ever based at them. From time to time blimps flew to Fernando de Noronha for temporary operations. Ibura had been originally scheduled as a refueling base, and at one time had a mast and mooring circle, but no ship ever landed there. Vitoria became a fueling base solely, and it was never planned to use it for anything else.

The first blimp to visit southern Brazil was the K-84, which went to Santa Cruz for an interim overhauling as early as November, 1943. While there she did some flying over Rio, for publicity purposes and to provide a little show for the populace. She was photographed many times and attracted widespread interest.

The first operational mission in Brazil undertaken by blimps was the escort of a Trinidad-Rio Convoy, southbound, on October 2, 1943. Fro then until the end of the following May, lighter-than-air ships escorted 4862 surface vessels and 2223 surface escorts. The unbelievable size of these figures is due to the fact that each ship is a convoy or escort was counted several times. For instance, a given convoy might be covered by four airships, successively, during its coasting of Brazil. Yet each blimp counted as a separate mission, hence the total number of vessels in the convoy and escort would be added in again whenever a new airship took over.

The lighter-than-air ships could be, and were, put to uses other than covering convoys. Rescue work in the cases of plane crews forced down in North Brazilian jungles revealed the blimps at their best. No other type of craft would have been adequate.

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Just before Christmas of 1943, an Army Transport Plane had to land a few miles from Amapá, in the jungle. The K-106, piloted by Lieutenant R. A. Powers, went to the rescue. The Army personnel saw the blimp hovering overhead an hour before midnight. It dropped them some food and promised to return at dawn. When the K-106 came back, it made four separate landings, removing 2100 pounds of mail and baggage, plus the plane crew and most members of the landing party, who had hiked in to lend assistance.

Another case occurred on February 4. K-114, at Igarape Assú, received word to proceed to the scene of a plane crash 100 miles to the west. Joined by the K-90, also at Igarape Assú, the blimp started. They found the plane buried in a swamp, but no survivors. They learned that the officers from the wrecked plane had set out for the coast. K-114 continued the search and finally located one of them, Flight Officer J. G. Doherty of the Royal Canadian Air Force. The blimp selected a fairly open field, where cows were observed grazing and slogging about in the swamps. The pilot landed and picked up Doherty, and a little later found his companion, Flight Officer F. B. Clarue, also RCAF. They directed him to the same field ad there descended and took him aboard. No plane could possibly have landed on this spot.

The most spectacular blimp rescue occurred on February 11, when two Army planes came down i a dense jungle clearing. They called K-106, from Amapá, to their aid by use of a life raft radio. This time Lieutenant Powers skillfully maneuvered his ship to the small clearing, and Bos'n J. F. Desmond dropped to the ground and organized a landing party, which chopped away shrubbery and growth with machetes. Lieutenant Powers

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again brought the ship around. Though he cut some foliage with the propellors, he managed a successful landing. He loaded as many passengers as possible and took off. Meanwhile, the K-11, piloted by Ensign W. T. Raleigh, reached the clearing. Another successful landing was made, more Army personnel loaded, and some Navy men were left behind to lighten weight of takeoff. To conclude this episode, K-106 returned and brought these men away.

Usually a blimp landing at a prepared field is made with a party of some 50 men working below on a good runway. When this is considered, the spectacular achievement in the case of these rescues becomes evident.

Another example of the usefulness of airships is that of a PBY, compelled to land on a beach north of Natal. A slow moving blimp dropped gasoline in tanks, which the pilot used to refuel his ship and take off.

The number of airships ultimately based in Brazil was 16; each squadron having eight. These were broken down into detachments, consisting of two blimps apiece.

Commander C. L. Merts remained constantly in charge of Squadron 42. The Northern Squadron had two skippers; first Lieutenant Commander D. M. Entler, Jr., and later Lieutenant Commander J. J. McLendon. The Hedron Squadron was headed originally by Commander G. D. Zermuehlen, and then by Lieutenant Commander W. H. Spaulding.

Captain Zimmerman remained Commander of the Wing throughout the entire period.

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SHORE ACTIVITY FOR 1943

This year saw expansion on land carried beyond any limits that would have been deemed possible a short time before. In January, all shore facilities had been small. Twelve months later several of them had grown to substantial proportions, and others had sprung from virtually nothing into sizeable activities. The transfer of all Naval Observers to the Commander South Atlantic Force included the one at Recife. The establishments there now became a Naval Facility, with Captain Hodgman in charge as Commandant.

At the beginning of the year in Recife, the Admiral, his staff, the Naval Observer's office, and attendant activities, moved into the new Administration Building in the business heart of the city. To accommodate increasing sore personnel, which had to be maintained near the dock, work soon started on what became known as Camp Ingram.

Plans for Camp Ingram had been laid in October, 1942, and originally called for one BOQ, three enlisted men's barracks, and the necessary galley facilities. It soon became evident, however, that the camp must be built on a much larger scale. Plans accordingly were changed, and what had been originally designed for about 500 men ultimately housed over 1000. The ground was procured from the local dock company, and lay in the waterfront area of Recife Island, just across the road from Armazens 5 and 6. Since the land had originally been used as a garbage dump by the Brazilians, the first step had to be filling in, a work which began in January, 1943. By the middle of May the Construction program had been substantially completed, but the last building was not

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finished until mid-October. The completed camp consisted of 12 barracks, including one for the Chief Petty Officers and another for the Fourth Fleet Band. The buildings were all constructed according to a standard architectural type of brick and tile, designed especially for tropical housing. Perhaps the central feature of the camp was the Recreation Hall, which had facilities for a pool, ping pong, and other indoor games; a library, a bar, a ship's service store, and a theater, which could be quickly transformed into a chapel for religious services. The Recreation Hall also furnished offices for the Chaplains, and contained a barber shop employing Brazilian barbers, and an athletic gear locker.

Outdoor recreational facilities consisted of a boxing ring; courts for basketball, volleyball, and tennis; horseshoe pits; and a softball diamond located outside the camp, but within a short distance.

Camp Ingram was placed in charge of Lieutenant R. B. Stocking, who reported in Recife early in February. Lieutenant Stocking's civilian background as a hotel executive fitted him for this type of responsibility. His executive officer was first Ensign D. Frost, and, upon the latter's detachment, Lieutenant (jg), later Lieutenant, S. J. Wornom. Lieutenant R. M. Greenberg became Camp Medical Officer.

In addition to housing a small Ship's Company, Camp Ingram provided quarters for the band, the men from nearby DesRep 12, the crews of the Admiral's Yachts Perseverance and Big Pebble, and the Yeoman and Storekeepers who worked in the Administration Building.

During Camp Ingram's early days the BOQ was full. However, in July, the officers were placed on subsistence, and therefore the BOQ was taken

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over by various training activities, only a few beds for transient officers being kept. At the end of the year this feature was abolished. Sleeping quarters thereafter existed only for various duty officers. New officers, upon reporting in Recife, had to shift for themselves from the day of arrival. Many of the permanent ones lived at the various hotels, others clubbed together and rented houses, either in the city or at the Boa Viagem and Olinda beaches.

Much care was taken at Camp Ingram to give the grounds an attractive aspect. Grass, plants, and flowers were cultivated by hired Brazilian gardeners, and little by little the place was "dressed up". Enlisted men with a flair for art took pride and pleasure in beautifying the Recreation Hall, galley and library.

The regular use of the theater as a moving picture hall proved a godsend, and soon two feature pictures were being shown nightly, interspersed with an occasional USO traveling unit, and now and then shows produced by the men themselves.

By the end of the year, Camp Ingram had two Chaplains, a Catholic and a Protestant, who spread their activities and covered other nearby activities as well. It also had a Recreation and Welfare Officer, who took care of amusements and athletics, arranged parties and dances, and managed one boxing show a month. The welfare type of activity received much help from the generous contributions of the American colony in Brazil.

Hand in hand with the development of Camp Ingram went that of DesRep 12, the Destroyer Repair Unit, located close by. In March Lieutenant (jg) G. H. Boyd reported as Officer-in-Charge of this activity. It was a land based organization. opposite dock gate number 6. Lieutenant Boyd's

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assignment was to establish DesRep 12, for the purpose of making voyage repairs to merchant vessels, and keeping in condition the escort ships operating in he area. Within a short time enlisted personnel, numbering 26, comprising various ratings, reported from the Patoka.

At first the only existing building was the machine shop, and this had not been completed. Machinery and materials came in fast, and had to be stored on another building, which after reconditioning became the carpenter shop. When heavy machinery arrived, the first building was in shape to permit its installation.

During April and May, 1943, other DesRep officers and enlisted personnel arrived. The new officers then took over the divisional duties which previously Mr. Boyd had supervised alone. Other shops were set up in the machine building, and construction of an ordnance shop began. Due to lack of facilities at first, after muster the men reported daily on board the Melville to carry on their work, until their own installations were ready.

In the course of June, 745 enlisted men reported, filling the allotted complement. During the month, since most of the needed machinery had now arrived, the real work of DesRep 12 began. The rest of the story is of steady work and continued expansion. By the beginning of 1944 the physical facilities consisted of adequate machines to perform major and minor repairs on all types of vessels in the Fourth Fleet, merchant vessels arriving in port which did not require dry-docking, and also repairs to the equipment of the various shore activities.

Lieutenant Boyd was later succeeded as Officer-in-Charge of DesRep 12 by Lieutenant Commander Silva, who in turn was relieved by Lieutenant, later Lieutenant Commander J. M. Flaherty.

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In February, 1943, Recife got its second permanent Shore Patrol Office, the first having existed for awhile the previous year, then the 19th Provisional Company of Marines acted in this capacity. In March, Lieutenant Otto Dougher, with long experience as a police executive in the United States, reported to become Senior Shore Patrol Officer. In the course of the year, his staff expanded from 4 men to about 25. Occasionally ship's details would be added to the force, but there existed a nucleus of seamen, permanently assigned to this duty.

The motor transportation rapidly expanded during 1943. Demands for transport grew with the increasing need for travel between the Administration Building and Camp Ingram, Knox Dispensary, Ibura Field, and the establishment presently started at Tejipió. At the end of the year the Recife Facility had 122 vehicles at its disposal, including 15 station wagons, 17 jeeps, 12 military cars, 10 sedans, 54 trucks, 3 buses, 3 water trucks, 3 bomb loaders, 2 ambulances, and 2 crash trucks for fires. One hundred and sixty-five Brazilian chauffeurs had been hired, organized into day and night shifts. The Navy maintained a garage, formerly the Garagem Central of the Auto Club of Pernambuco, which it rented. Navy personnel worked there for the purpose of making machinery repairs, and Brazilian employees performed routine maintenance.

Further development of the Jiquiá Magazines went on. In March, Lieutenant H. J. Schafer reported as Ordnance Officer. The buildings at this time constructed or under way at Jiquiá consisted of several subsurface magazines, both 20 x 50' and 20 x 20', located on 69 acres of ground. By the end of the year the designation "Naval Magazine, Recife" had been awarded. Further construction had taken place and the

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Recife Facility became the central issuing point for the South American Area.

The Admiral wished also to create a rest and rehabilitation center for sailors who had had long and arduous duty at sea. A conference with Senhor Magalhaus, the Interventor, secured the use of an unfinished Brazilian Hospital at Tejipio, a suburb of Recife. Plans were immediately made, and the Admiral placed Captain W. G. Roper, USN, Retired, in charge of the project. The Captain worked tirelessly at this task and succeeded in instilling the same energy into his subordinates. By October, the Tejipio establishment was ready for occupancy, and received its first draft of men. It also presently became the Receiving Station for the South Atlantic Area, a function hitherto performed by Ibura.

Of all the developments taking place around Recife, the one perhaps destined to have the most lasting effect was the experimental farm installed by he Admiral. The idea came from a farm previously established near Natal by three agriculturists from the Food Supply Division of the Office of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. The "Fazenda Nelson Rockefeller", organized by Dr. Kadow, Dr. Griffing, and Mr. Johnson at Natal, furnished food for the Parnamarim Air Base, which often had large numbers of American Soldiers to feed.

Both Admiral Ingram and General Walsh became interested in the agricultural experiment, and the former suggested that the three experts extend their activities to the Recife area. The purpose in large measure was to ease the burden on the often sparse Brazilian food supply, overtaxed by the influx of American personnel.

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In August the Admiral asked the Federal Interventor for some property to be used as a farm. Senhor Magalhaes granted 125 acres, located about midway between Tejipió and Varezea, adjoining the Brazilian experimental agricultural station. The land at that time was a wilderness, covered with trees and undergrowth, but it did contain a small lake. At the Admiral's request, Mr. Johnson looked over the site proposed. It would be good, he said, for raising pigs and chickens and fair for vegetables. On being told to go ahead, Johnson started clearing the land, using 14 Navy men with tractors, and numerous Brazilian workers. Later, when the farm had gone into production, he cut the seamen down to four and employed a select Brazilian crew.

About sixty acres went into cultivation. In November the farm began producing vegetables for Know dispensary; principally lettuce, peppers, and sweet corn. The first hogs maintained were "feeders", bought from the best stock in the Brazilian interior, fattened on Camp Ingram and Ibura garbage, and hardened on corn. Soon the farm began its own breeding program, with selected boars and sows, and ultimately became independent of outside recruitment. From November, 1943, to the end of September, 1944, the farm slaughtered between 50 and 60 tons of pork.

Chickens came next to hogs in importance. A good breeding stock of layers was brought from the minister of Agriculture's farm. From that batch pullets were raised, and from various sources the farm secured other hens to build up the laying stock to 1500. They supplied, all told, perhaps 100,000 eggs during the first year.

In addition to pork and eggs, the farm produced tons of sweet corn and

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potatoes for the hospital and the general mess. These, with lettuce, peppers, carrots, and beets, made up the main crops. Tomatoes, though raised, did not thrive so well. Later crops planted included peanuts and soybeans.

Another subsequent idea of Mr. Johnson's, who was commissioned Ensign in the Navy in 1943, was that of broiler chickens. He raised them in batches, maintaining about 7500 on the farm at any given time, ready to be killed at intervals.

Finally, the farm produced flowers for the Dispensary and for church services.

The buildings consisted of nine broiler houses, three houses (capacity of 500 hens each) for egg layers, and eleven farrowing pens. Though Northern Brazil has heavy rainfall it is seasonal, and irrigation became necessary for some crops. The lake supplied water, and the farm built two irrigation tanks.

In addition to proving a great boon in the matter of food supply, the farm created wide interest among Brazilians. They were quick to see the obvious difference between its products ad those ordinarily raised in the vicinity. On Sundays and holidays local families visited it in droves, and students of agriculture came, even from outside the State of Pernambuco, to observe and study. There always existed the understanding that when the Fleet should have no further need for the farm it would be turned over to the Government of Pernambuco.

The name of the establishment in English was "Fourth Fleet Farm"; in Portuguese "Fazenda Cruzeiro do Sul".

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Admiral Ingram's statement at the inception of this agricultural experiment is worth quoting:

"I am grateful to all agencies concerned for the splendid support being given this experiment. It is something new in warfare for the Boys in Blue in a foreign land. I have always believed that God is favorable to those who show the effort to look out for themselves wherever they may be."

The above quotation is taken from the South Atlantic News, a weekly newspaper published in Recife for the Fleet. The journal itself began as a mimeographed sheet, issued twice a week. In August, 1943, considerably enlarged, it became a printed publication, appearing every Friday. Through a contract with a local newspaper, the Jornal do Comerico, the use of a printing press was obtained. A staff of competent newsmen, all recruited from the shore facility, assisted Lieutenant (jg) W. S. Ricker, an experienced journalist, in getting out the paper. In time the South Atlantic News came to have quite a professional appearance, with editorials, feature stories, illustrations, and locally drawn cartoons. Naval personnel looked forward eagerly to its appearance, and each edition made its way over the entire area.

There can be no doubt that Brazilian journalism was affected by the South Atlantic News. Those in charge of the latter's format and makeup say that changes in style ultimately became apparent in the Portuguese language newspapers; changes that could be accounted for only on the basis of conscious imitation. Brazilian libraries far and wide sent requests for copies, and some were observed for sale in the newsstands of Rio for the price of 5 milreis (25¢).

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Among the features of the paper that may be longest remembered by its readers are the anonymous contributions of one who wrote Solantics under the nom de plume "Joe Glutz S2/c" and the cartoon adventures of "Salty", a Recife based sailor, drawn by the facile pen of "Wee Wilie Walton". Glutz, in a Ring Lardner style of grammar and spelling, philosophized and soliloquized about local happenings and conditions. "Salty", in an exaggerated form, had the normal adventures of a Recife seaman, talked extremely bad Portuguese, and either triumphed brilliantly or came to disaster in each episode.

A more modest paper, though a daily, was the Radio Press News, composed and mimeographed each night and circulated early in the morning. It consisted chiefly of slightly edited news stories of world events, particularly war news received from Communications, with a limited review of stateside happenings and a few items of purely local interest. The Press News began its career during the long stay of the Melville at Recife, and was first prepared on board. Following the ship's departure the paper became a Recife project. Two Yeomen, plus a mimeographer, did practically all the work. For over a year, with never a break, they continued to supply the Recife Facility, and as many other places as their production reached, with a digest of world events. Among the outstanding achievements of this paper was the furnishing of full coverage on the 1944 World Series. Several different officers-in-charge wielded control during this time, but the Yeomen really produced the paper.

Recife and its adjacent activities, had two distinguished visitors toward the close of the year.

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In October, Secretary of the Navy Knox made a brief inspection, while on his way back to the United States from Italy, where he had watched the Allied operations at Salerno from the deck of a warship. At the places visited by the Secretary reviews were held, following which the Admiral introduced him to the personnel, whom he addressed briefly, discussing the progress of the war in Europe with considerable frankness.

Admiral King made an inspection in December, being received with honors due his rank.

The numerical growth of the Bahia Facility began about the same time as that of Recife. Lieutenant Commander Saben, the original Bahia Naval Observer, was placed under the Commander South Atlantic Force late in 1942. It was then that preliminary steps were taken toward establishing a base. The three dockside armazens, numbered 8, 9, and 10, were rented from the Brazilians, together with adjoining land for the construction of barracks, which eventually became known as Base Baker. This very closely resembled Camp Ingram in appearance and general plan, except that the barracks were fewer and more widely scattered. Also, adequate BOQ accommodations existed for all officers.

During the building time, which lasted until February, 1944, personnel increased greatly, as did equipment. The base had been put into use long before the completion of the last of the structures.

Headquarters continued to be the business building at Rua da Polonia and Avenida da França, where Commander Saben, who was promoted again in May of 1943, occupied offices with his staff.

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Personnel, however, began to flow in long before barracks had been completed for occupancy. Various makeshifts were adopted, such as putting officers on subsistence, and temporarily quartering enlisted men in an apartment house. But by June of 1943, the camp was ready, and the greater part of the personnel, numbering about 500, moved into it.

Bahia development included the establishment of DesRep 13, a land base Destroyer Repair Unit similar to the one at Recife, though a smaller scale affair.

During this construction the Brazilian officials proved helpful and cooperative. There was never any real trouble between U. S. Naval personnel and the local populace. One reason for the popularity of the American establishment, was the large amount of employment given to native labor. The floating drydock installed early in 1944, alone utilized about 80 workers. The camp itself used many more, and others were employed at the lonely Supplementary Radio Station, located across the bay.

Bahia got its first Medical Officer, Lieutenant P. H. Hanley, in February, 1943. Although he had no staff and little equipment to start with, these conditions gradually mended. Shortly after the middle of the year, the Doctor moved into a well equipped Dispensary, located in Base Baker, which was then provided with a staff of Corpsmen. Outlying activities, such as Caravelas, Aratú, Ipitanga, and Radio Supplementary Station, sent patients there for emergency surgical treatment. The more difficult cases, however, went whenever possible to Knox Dispensary at Boa Viagem, where the staff was larger and the equipment more adequate.

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During the first half of 1943, all BT Convoys assembled at Bahia. These ran regularly until June, when the convoy assembly point changed to Rio de Janeiro. At times, as much as 250,000 tons of shipping might be in the port at once. There existed no adequate protection for the merchant ships at such times, yet no attack by submarine ever came. Authorities at Bahia rather expected trouble sooner or later, and never could quite understand why the Axis refrained.

During 1943, Bahia acquired a Chaplain (Protestant), and a Recreation Officer. Since Base Baker is located in a sparsely settled section of town, space existed for abundant athletic facilities. Four softball diamonds were built, and areas for boxing, volleyball, and basketball laid out. Indoor recreational facilities consisted of pool, ping pong, and tables for cards. Visiting ship crews made abundant use of these opportunities.

Natal also expanded its activities during 1943. The first half of the year brought an increase in the handling of matters pertaining to transportation. Four of the ten officers attached worked entirely at this duty. The activities of the assistant petroleum Officer also broadened considerably with respect to Natal. In April, an officer reported to handle NATS operations exclusively, thus relieving the Postal Officer of that burden and releasing him for full time post office activities, which more than doubled between January and July.

There was organized a Joint Intelligence Committee, composed of representatives from the U. S. Army, the State Department, the Legal Advisor to the Vice Consul, the Provost Marshall, and the various Naval activities in Natal.

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During the first half of the year, the outstanding news event was the combined visit of the President of the United States and President Vargas of Brazil on January 28. This has already been discussed in another connection.

Relations between American and Brazilian Officials of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps were very cordial. Complete cooperation existed, particularly with the Brazilian General and the Federal Interventor.

During this period the Natal activity received its new designation, that of Naval Operating Facility, Navy 119.

For the second half of the year the only changes of note were the addition of an Intelligence Officer, who took over duties previously performed by others, and who also handled Intelligence for Forteleza; and the establishment of a Fourth Fleet Material Unit.

Many survivors of merchant ship attacks received care and transportation at Natal, and numerous vessels were escorted from the port. Lieutenant Commander A. D. Cook remained Naval observer and Commandant NOF during the entire year.

Belem, in 1943, went through a period of continuous operational activity.

Early in the year the Naval Observer was designated Commanding Officer, U. S. Naval Operating Facility, Belem.

From this Facility the steps were taken to establish both heavier and lighter-than-air bases at Amapá, Igarape Assú, São Luiz, and Belem itself. This resulted in considerable growth for the personnel of NOF Belem, in connection with liaison work, disbursing, post office work, and especially supply.

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In the latter part of April, construction of Naval Buildings began at the Val de Cans airfield, hitherto used by the Army. By June the first of these was completed.

A Fleet Air Wing Sixteen Hedron Detachment, consisting of 4 officers and 100 men, arrived in June, followed by Squadron VP-94, with approximately 50 officers and 125 men. During July, heavier-than-air planes began operating out of Amapá, and São Luiz.

With the increased need for supplies, and with dependent activities in the area requiring provisioning, the Belem Supply Department expanded rapidly. A Supply Corps Officer reported for duty in April. The acquisition of large stocks led to the renting of a warehouse near the docks. Poor transportation facilities handicapped distribution, though this was remedied later in the year.

The Belem facility began participation in coastal convoys. The increase of shipping multiplied the activity of the Convoy ad Routing Section, and frequently required he aid of the Assistant Area Petroleum Officer.

In April a Communications Officer arrived with a staff of enlisted men. This took the strain off other office personnel and released them to devote full time to their proper activities.

By August increase in the activity and staff had necessitated a change in location for the administrative office. The latter moved from the Costa Leite Building to a structure adjacent to the U. S. Consulate, which in turn was located next to the offices of the Brazilian Commandant of the First Air Zone. The new quarters afforded twice as much office space, while still providing an advantageous location.

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In September, the Fourth Fleet Material Repair Unit, the USS YR-35, reported to the NOF Commandant. Necessary repairs, of the type this craft could perform, proved of great assistance. Port facilities at Belem are extremely limited, and the YR-35 increased the efficiency of vessels in the area.

Distinguished visitors to Belem in 1943 included Secretary of the Navy Knox, Vice Admiral Ingram, Vice Admiral Glassford, Vice Admiral Young, French Vice Admiral Fenard, Rear Admiral Stevenson, Rear Admiral Beauregard, Rear Admiral Sheldon, Lieutenant General Spaatz, and Assistant Secretary for Air Gates.

Belem underwent two command changes in 1943. On February 12, Lieutenant Commander Phelan relieved Acting U. S. Naval Observer Lieutenant J. W. Meehan, and in turn was relieved by Lieutenant Commander A. D. Condon on June 22.

The census of the smaller Brazilian activities can be more briefly handled. Several new ones had been established in the course of the year, generally for the purpose of providing air coverage for cargoes.

Amapá was the most northerly. It had facilities for land planes and lighter-than-air craft. Being an outpost in the airport chain and not an essential nucleus, Amapá had a small personnel. Construction still went on there at the end of 1943. The landing field was being completed and mooring circles and a take-off mat for the blimps were still unfinished.

Next came Igarpe Assú, entirely a Blimp Base. Though its construction had not quite been completed, one K Type ship was already operating from there.

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Both of these northern spots, though isolated and located in what might be considered unhealthy spots, had excellent sanitary facilities and almost no sickness among their personnel.

São Luiz, with facilities for land planes and Lighter-than-Air ships, had completed its housing program by the end of the year and was in full operation.

Between São Luiz and Fortaleza, there existed a seaplane facility at Camoçim, with ramp, fueling facilities and storehouses, but no shops or barracks. The Navy, however, did not use Camoçim, which was under the custody of PanAir.

Fortaleza was set up and going, with a fairly sizeable personnel. It was the Headquarters of Blimp Squadron Forty Two at the end of the year, even tough heavier-than-air equipment had not all arrived, some details remained to be adjusted. A new airfield for planes was under construction by the Army, for the purpose of ferrying 4-engine bombers to Africa, thus relieving congestion at Natal.

Fernando de Noronha, an island of some ten square miles, approximately 250 miles northeast of Natal, fitted excellently into the chain of airports operating along the Brazilian coast. An old runway there, formerly owned and operated by Air France, had been superseded by a new one. A Hedron, consisting of two U. S. Naval Officers and 120 enlisted men, was maintained on the island, in addition to a good sized Army personnel. Facilities existed there for Lighter-than-Air, but the blimps made slight use of these.

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Ibura Field, the airport for Recife, had come a long way during 1943. Landplanes used it extensively, though it also had facilities for blimps in case of emergencies. The field acted as a main Hedron repair and storage base for all squadrons operating on the Brazilian coast. It had a nose hangar and complete accessory shops, and also afforded 30,000 square feet of storage space for supplies and spare parts for aircraft. Facilities likewise existed for taking care of the entire plane complement of one auxiliary carrier. Ibura had seen much building during the year, and by the end of it had adequate housing facilities for all its personnel, Army, Navy, and Marine. Not far from the American quarters there was camped a unit of Brazilian soldiers, waiting to move into new barracks then under construction.

Maceio operated land and sea planes, and was beginning to operate blimps. The planes, however, were few in number, and Lighter-than-Air had not fully moved in. Maceio, therefore, remained as before, a small Facility.

Bahia's two air bases Aratu, and Ipitanga, had undergone most of their development during 1943.

Aratú, the seaplane base, had a full operating squadron, with a personnel numbering 550. Another squadron was soon to be added. The heaviest handicap of Aratú was its inaccessibility; there being no good road connecting it with Bahia, 34 miles away. Building the base had involved terrific labor, since every piece of material that went into the housing had to be hauled in by mules or oxen. Among the details of construction was that of knocking down half a hill to provide more

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room. There being no local drinking water available, Aratú supply had to be brought from Bahia by truck, later replaced by a barge. In general, life at Aratú was inconvenient, as the place lacked many items of comfort and had no recreational facilities.

Ipitanga was in better shape, though such had not been the case at first. Originally the only communication it had with Bahia was over a very poor road along the beach, which at times was impassible. Though various private airlines and the FAB had previously used Ipitanga Field, no commercial transportation to it had ever existed. To remedy this situation ADP built a road between the field and the city, which, it is safe to say, is the best in that part of Brazil. January, 1944, saw it in operation.

Enlargement of the Ipitanga airfield involved draining much land and the enlargement and deepening of the Ipitanga River. Both the new runways built for the Navy were laid on swampland and a clay hill had to be moved to fill it up. Before the arrival of bulldozers, oxen spans of 10 each worked on the runways. Due to the nature of the land, barracks for the Navy men had to be located two miles from the field where they worked.

Ipiyanga Field, as a regular Navy establishment, started operations in September, and in December the first blimp arrived. Thereafter both types of flying craft were based on the field.

Caravelas and Vitoria, next in order down the coast, were both being prepared to receive seaplanes, but as yet none had been based in either place.

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Galeão and Santa Cruz, the two air bases near Rio, were both to some extent going concerns. The former was utilized by seaplanes, while the latter, pending some construction already underway, was being prepared for land planes and blimps.

Still farther south, at Florianopolis and Rio Grande do Sul, the Navy had small establishments, but neither of these ever attained much importance.

It will be apparent that many of the shore facilities in Brazil were lonely and isolated. Men stationed at these places found life dull and monotonous. Construction of necessities naturally had to take precedence over recreation and entertainment, but as fast as possible the latter received attention.

The USO had moved into Brazil during the year and had established headquarters in Recife. In the course of time it set up branches at all facilities large enough to warrant them. Nine USO community recreation centers ultimately flourished in seven major Brazilian cities. Though all branches of the service availed themselves of these, the Navy, because of its numerical preponderance in Brazil, naturally furnished the largest attendance.

In June, 1943, Lieutenant Commander C. A. Paul, reported to the Flag at Recife as Fourth Fleet Welfare and Recreation Officer. He at once set up an organization, and during the following months assigned Officer Specialists to Facilities whenever practical. At those places where the complement was too small to make the sending of an Officer Specialist feasible, some officer permanently stationed there received the recreation assignment as collateral duty.

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Lieutenant Commander Paul organized an Area Supply Depot with Headquarters in Recife, and through this all shore based activities were allotted athletic gear, library books, magazines, and 35 mm motion picture equipment. The construction of athletic and recreation facilities throughout Brazil was undertaken in conjunction with the Fleet Civil Engineer's Office. Ultimately there came to exist in the area 14 recreation buildings of various sizes, 22 libraries containing popular books and magazines, 24 softball fields, 5 boxing rings, and 17 motion picture theaters. Presiding over these, directly or indirectly, were 14 Officer Specialists, aided by 23 Chief Athletic Specialists.

The Welfare and Recreation department maintained liaison with representatives of the USC, American Red Cross, and the United States of America War Emergency Committee of Brazil. Many Brazilian social clubs made their facilities available to American Officers, and in some cases to enlisted personnel.

The War Emergency Committee of Brazil consisted of American citizens living i Brazil, the majority of them long time residents and well-to-do. They banded together and raised money for the purchase of recreation equipment for the uses of the Armed Forces. Particularly in the early days, before recreation gear became available in large quantities from the United States, they were able to furnish items which otherwise could not have been procured without long delay. Though most of these Americans lived in Southern Brazil, and hence saw little of the personnel they so liberally served, they asked no more than that their contributions be put to good use.

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Shore facilities were not over-emphasized at the expense of the ships. All incoming vessels were visited by Welfare Officers of their representatives, for the purpose of arranging and conducting activities as might be desired. Libraries were put aboard all ships possible, and arrangements made to keep the books circulating by means of exchanges. Participation in all activities available to men on shore was available to all seagoing personnel. This, of course, included the Armed Guard crews of merchant ships.

Somewhat later, Lieutenant Commander A. M. McCoy, formerly a football coach at Harvard, reported as Fleet Athletic Officer. He began the organization of a physical fitness program for the shore based personnel of the Fourth Fleet, against the time when they might be transferred to more active combat zones. Particularly stressed was the Tunney physical program, and Lieutenant Commander McCoy accompanied Commander Tunney when the latter made a tour of the Brazilian bases in June 1944.

In the first half of 1944, Lieutenant E. R. Moore, who had previously been attached to the Recife Facility, returned to report to the Flag as Educational Services Officer. His program stressed the off-duty educational needs of servicemen, both from the standpoint of a future civilian career and the possibility of a return to high school or college after release from the Navy.

The religious needs of the men of the South Atlantic Area had not been neglected, although some time had to elapse before the supply of Chaplains could be made adequate to the demand. The first Chaplain to work in the area was Lieutenant Commander C. Nelson, attached to the supply ship Melville. She tied up in Recife on February 5, 1943 and

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remained until September. Chaplain Nelson conducted Episcopal Services wherever possible, until the Camp Ingram Recreation Hall became available. Thereafter he utilized this space, which had the convenience of being located scarcely a stone's throw from his ship. A portable altar and communion rail had been constructed, and with minor adjustments these served equally well for Catholic and Episcopal services. Chaplain Nelson left with the Melville in September.

Next to report was Lieutenant T. J. Conroy, Catholic, who arrived on April 2, 1943, and served as NOF Chaplain for Recife. Chaplain Conroy conducted Catholic Services at Camp Ingram, Knox Dispensary, Tejipio, the Pina Radio Station, and occasionally aboard ships.

There are several evangelical Protestant Churches in Recife, with American and English, as well as Brazilian Ministers. Some of the latter, moreover, were able to deliver sermons in the English language. Seldom, therefore, did any difficulty exist in securing the services of one of these for a Sunday. Then too, Protestant Churches of the city, Brazilian and American, welcomed sailors from the Fleet and Shore Facility. Jewish sailors cold attend the local Synagogue, and always had special liberty on their holidays.

In June, 1943, Lieutenant H. Payne reported at Bahia, as Protestant Chaplain for the Facility. He also covered the Air Field at Ipitanga, and the Seaplane Base at Aratu.

A month later, in July, Lieutenant M. DePagter, also Protestant, arrived at Belem. In addition to caring for the Facility, his duties included services at the Air Field.

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During the year, Fleet Air Wing Sixteen had grown and established its bases up and down the coast. Consequently when Lieutenant H. Carpenter, Protestant, reported in November, he received an assignment as Wing Chaplain. This made it necessary for him to travel widely, since he had services to conduct at Maceio, Fernando de Noronha, and the ramp at Natal, in addition to Ibura Field, the headquarters of the Squadron.

Also in November, Lieutenant (jg), later Lieutenant P. Bloomquist, Protestant, reported to NOF, Recife. He filled the gap caused by the departure of Chaplain Nelson, and though his headquarters were at Camp Ingram he conducted Protestant Worship at Tejipió, Pina Radio Station, and the Dispensary.

By the end of the year, Lighter-than-Air had established several bases in Brazil. In December, Lieutenant G. Barger, Protestant, arrived for duty at Santa Cruz, one of the LTA Detachments. The small Naval personnel and abundance of churches in Rio, made it unnecessary for Chaplain Berger to hold services there, but he did make a journey once a week to Galeão, the Seaplane Base on the island in Guanabara Bay.

So, at the conclusion of 1943, the Naval Chaplains in Brazil numbered six; one Catholic and five Protestants. The supply still proved inadequate and the need for more and their suggested locations had been placed before the Chief of the Division.

In January, 1944, Chaplain Conroy, the senior, received additional duty as Fleet Chaplain. Thereafter, in addition to covering his regular activities, he made occasional visits to isolated spots to hold services.

Two more Chaplains, both Catholic, arrived in May. Lieutenant J. N. Thompson reported at Fortaleza, but began his tour with a short term of

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temporary duty in Recife, during the absence of Father Conroy in the United States on leave. Lieutenant E. M. Jarrett became Catholic Chaplain at Belem, and in addition covered Amapá, Igarape Assú, and São Luiz.

Finally in June, Lieutenant A. J. Clemens, Protestant, reported at Natal, to become the first Chaplain that Facility had ever had.

The total census of Naval Chaplains in Brazil at the middle of 1944 was nine; three Catholics, two Lutherans, and four Methodists.

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COMMUNICATIONS

This story really begins with Task Force Twenty Three, with the Memphis as flagship and Lieutenant Commander Porter Lewis as Force Communications Officer aboard the Memphis.

When Brazil declared war on Germany in August, 1942, the sip happened to be close to Recife. It at once moved into the harbor, and within a short time the Flag was transferred to the Patoka. Thereafter, for a time, all shore based communications were conducted from this ship, which had the only radio equipment then possessed by the Force. This had to be used, eked out by the aid of local Brazilian telegraph companies. The only radio circuit available was direct to Washington.

The Naval Mission in Rio also had a circuit set up between the Brazilian Capital and Washington, which was made available to the Admiral for relaying messages.

General Walsh, the Army Ferry Commander, had some radio equipment in excess of his needs. In November 1942, he agreed to turn this over to the Navy. The equipment was at Ibura Field, to which a special cable was run for controlling it from the Patoka.

In November, ten Communications Officers reported from the United States for duty with the South Atlantic Force. From that time until January, 1943, the Patoka arrangement was used. This now provided direct communications with all ships of the Force at sea, whereas it previously had all had to go through Washington.

Next came the question of communications with the Air Base at Natal. For reception there, a plane was kept on the ground every day

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to serve as a makeshift radio station. Later on a transmitter was installed in a tent.

Direct communication now existed with Rio de Janeiro, Natal, Washington, and ships of the Force at sea.

Around the first of the year 1943, Headquarters moved from the Patoka to the new Recife Administration Building, and Communications also made the change soon after.

About this time, as a result of the Admiral's visit to Washington in December, 1942, Commander, later Captain, P. R. Kinney, arrived in Recife as Force Communications Officer. Captain Kinney who remained until January, 1944, was a man of both vision and determination. He did much planning for the future and carried out a number of valuable enterprises. Seeing the great need for more facile communications in the South Atlantic, he realized the necessity of installing an extensive network of radio stations.

The next immediate steps were the installation of direct communications with Ipitanga and Belem, as the result of Fleet Air Wing Sixteen's expansion.

Lieutenant J. McKinney, became Radio Material Officer. He made a trip to Washington, and while there succeeded in getting enough equipment for the installation of 13 air stations in Brazil. From March to August, 1943, Lieutenant McKinney put in radio equipment at all the Naval Air Bases.

The Admiral needed an Administrative Radio Station. The result was Station MKM, set up at Jiquiá, with Lieutenant G. P. McGinnis as Officer-in-Charge.

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By the second half of 1943, then, the stations and the network had been established throughout Brazil. In the meantime, also, better local communications had come to exist. A good example of progress was the great improvement of the telephone service in the Administration Building, and among the various activities in and around Recife, including lines extended to the ships docked in the harbor.

Toward the end of the year Operations determined to run a continuous sweep of planes from Natal to Ascension. That meant the installation of a separate radio station at Natal with separate circuits set up to contact Ascension. The planes flew over at all daylight hours. There were enough of them, at sufficiently narrow intervals, to see any ship afloat, and when necessary they informed the ships of the Force. The Destroyer or Cruiser, as the case might be, could then arrive in time to intercept the intruder.

In January, 1944, Captain Kinney went to Washington and while there was transferred to other duty. Lieutenant Commander J. A. Loyall, who had been Assistant Communications Officer since the previous September, succeeded him. Lieutenant J. M. Joyner became the new Assistant.

Toward the end of 1943, NATS decided to expand in South America, which meant that it had to be provided with a separate communications system. New equipment was ordered and the program got under way. Lieutenant McGinnins went to Washington to work on the matter; to get the necessary information and equipment to help out NATS. This however, came almost under the head of post war planning.

By mid-1944, the Admiral's Administrative Radio Station, MKM, had a circuit to Ascension and Freetown; a high speed one to Washington; another linking Trinidad, Belem, Recife, and Rio; communications with

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each Naval Air Facility in South America and with every ship in the South Atlantic working out of Recife; as well as with all aircraft in the South Atlantic. Furthermore, through Brazilian coastal radio stations, it had a circuit linking every merchant ship in the South Atlantic.

For Communications administrative purposes the theater had to be split into three sections; a northern, managed from Belem, a central, from Recife, and a southern, from Rio.

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THE SOLANT TRIPLE PLAY

The first days of 1944 were truly spectacular. Three German surface blockade runners invaded the area, and the Fourth Fleet took care of them in a thoroughly businesslike manner.

January 1 and 2 brought nothing more exciting than the news that on Fernando de Noronha the mooring mast for blimps had been made ready. But the third day of the month saw he fireworks start to explode, and for the next three days the Fleet had plenty of activity.

The first of the German ships was the Weserland. Her coming was no particular surprise to the Fleet, since advance information had already been received to the effect that blockade runners would shortly have to be dealt with. This news had led to the establishment of an air blockade barrier. The barrier operations were designed to close to enemy ships practically the whole extent of the South Atlantic narrows between Africa and Brazil. The barrier proved effective. No unplotted northbound vessel passed through the Western South Atlantic during the time it was in effect.

On January 1, eleven FB4-Y-1 airplanes and approximately fifteen crews were assigned to this patrol. Six planes and nine crews operated from Ascension, while five planes and six crews worked out of Natal. The unit had its sole mission the maintenance of a barrier patrol to intercept enemy blockade runners known to be traveling northward through the South Atlantic.

The first of January brought the original sighting of the first doomed ship, by a plane based on Ascension. At that time the Weserland,

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As she ultimately proved to be, was in 09° 35' S, 23° 45' W, traveling on course 060° (T), at a 10 knot speed. The pilot at once realized that here was a ship not on the friendly plot for the day. He circled to investigate, challenging by blinker. The surface vessel hoisted a four letter call, then immediately hauled it down, before the plane crew could read it. The plane next closed in and made out the name Glenbank on a small bridge nameplate. Following this, the pilot challenged several times more, and the ship failed to hoist either a call or an authenticator. The plane opened fire and the ship replied, getting rather the better of the exchange. It scored three hits on the aircraft, disabling one engine and wounding a crew member engaged in taking photographs.

On this, the plane broke off the engagement and retired to base at Ascension. Another plane came out to watch the ship, of whose enemy character there now remained no doubt. Meanwhile, the call went out to nearby supporting surface units to close and board the stranger. The Destroyer Somers had the assignment of running down the intruder, but due to communications difficulties the message delayed in getting to her. Before the Destroyer reached the scene, during the early hours of January 3, the plane patrol had changed several times. Contact, however, had never been lost, and the planes were able to guide the Somers unerringly to the spot. When she reached it her guns went into action. The first report, issued shortly after midnight on January 3, read "Attacked and badly damaged enemy ship". About three hours later came the word "Ship now sunk. Identified as Weserland. 134 survivors in German Naval uniform were rescued.

The following had happened. By the time of closing, the Somers knew the target to be an enemy, it already having fired on two planes. If a

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blockade runner, its armament would probably be light; if a raider, it might carry guns up to 5.9, torpedo tubes and motor torpedo boats; possibly radar. Since both planes fired on had been hit, the German crew must be well trained. The planes, moreover, had dropped flares, which would certainly let the enemy know that a surface vessel was in the vicinity and would probably put him on the alert.

These factors taken together strongly indicated the need for caution. It being night, the Destroyer decided to use its superior speed to maneuver so as to place the target down moon, then close to hitting gun range and open fire, attempting surprise. Should the enemy appear armed and return fire, a torpedo attack would be pressed home. If not, the target would be sunk by gunfire.

Accordingly, the Somers, moving at a 25 knot speed narrowed the range to 7000 yards. At 0223 the order was given to "commence firing", using a modified down ladder; first salvo to hit, second up 500 yards, third down 1000 yards. Survivors from the Weserland later said that the first salvo scored, one shell killing four men on the bridge. At that moment the order was given aboard the blockade runner to abandon ship. Meanwhile, the Somers closed the range to 6000 yards, where its gunnery proved highly effective. The Destroyer continued firing until 50 flashes from hits and two explosions in the center of the ship had been observed. Then the order was given to cease, but since no flames were visible, and the ship did not appear to be sinking, firing resumed at 5000 yards. Every salvo struck, and produced what appeared to be from five to six explosive flashes. The target sank at 0300, in Latitude 14° 55' S, Longitude 21° 39' W.

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Having destroyed the enemy craft, the Somers immediately set about picking up survivors. After one boat had been rescued, it seemed wisest to move off for a time and return after daylight to take up the rest. This course was followed, and, beginning at dawn, a total of 7 lifeboats, and one life raft, containing 17 officers and 116 men, was collected by the Somers, which landed the prisoners in Recife on January 6.

Personal papers and belongings taken from the survivors established the sunken ship's identity as the German Merchantman Weserland, en route from Japan to Germany. No one had any chance to observe the cargo, but survivors stated that it consisted of rubber, tin, and wolfram.

Next day came the turn of the Rio Grande. Her interception and destruction go principally to the credit of Task Group 41.1, consisting of the Omaha and Jouett, with Rear Admiral Read in command.

The group received orders to depart Recife on January 2, on ocean patrol. The primary mission was the support of the barrier sweep between Natal and Ascension. By the 4th, the two ships were operating in the vicinity of 06° 11' S, 25° 57' W, conducting air search with the Omaha's planes. Flying operations for the day extended 60 miles on either side of base course 153° (T), the length of the search being 175 miles.

At 1025, while in Latitude 06° 28' S, Longitude 25° 51' W, the Omaha sighted a ship bearing 150° (T), about 20 miles distant, and at almost the same time the planes saw the stranger. Thereupon the Omaha directed one plane to investigate the contact and the other to go ahead with routine patrol.

Thirteen minutes later the Omaha and Jouett, on signal, proceeded to intercept the runner at a 20 knot speed. While the two ships were increasing

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speed and reducing the range, the stranger started to send a message. Very little of this could be made out, because the Omaha killed it by jamming on 500 kcs., in accordance with Force doctrine.

Meanwhile, the blockade runner had not shown her colors, nor had she hoisted her call; in fact she had offered no identification, though the Task Group had challenged.

By 1107, with range cut down to about 20,000 yards, the watches could see smoke aft on the ship. Whether this came from an explosion, a screen, or from fire could not be learned at the moment, but a little later the Omaha aircraft reported that explosions had occurred aft and midships and that the crew had abandoned ship in lifeboats. Just prior to this the Task group had opened fire, at first for the purpose of forcing the boats back to the ship, but later starting fire to the target itself. At 1114, the Omaha and Jouett ceased firing on orders from Admiral Read. A moment later, when it was seen that the lifeboats had no intention of returning to the ship, they reopened at a 7,600 yard range and continued until the target sank, partly from gunfire and partly from demolition charges set by the crew before abandoning ship.

The Task Group proceeded to clear the area at high speed, and, as it did so, passed four well equipped lifeboats containing the runner's crew, the estimated number being 50. In one boat there appeared to be officers in white uniforms. The group made no attempt to recover the survivors.

Shortly after the action, following decoding, it was found that the call sent out by the unidentified ship just before being attacked was that of the SS James Lykes, American. However, the characteristics of the

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sunken runner did not check with those of the Lykes. Moreover, the strangers conduct had been utterly incompatible with that of an American ship.

The following day, January 5, the Task Group passed again close to the area of the sinking and went through a large oil slick, presumably from the runner. It had a distinct odor of vegetable oil. The Jouett was ordered to collect various samples of cargo still afloat and did so. The most important item was crude rubber in bales of 245 kilograms, with French Indo China markings.

On the day of the sinking, from observations of the vessel's characteristics, it had been estimated that she could be the Rio Grande, if northbound, or the Elsa Essberger, if southbound. After the investigation of the wreckage on the 5th, the nature of the cargo definitely established the ship as northbound and from the Orient. This definitely placed her as the German Rio Grande. She had not been detected prior to being spotted by the Omaha, but she had still to pass through the barrier, where planes beyond a doubt would have picked her up.

Task Group 41.1 also had accounted for the Burgenland, third of the German runners. On January 5, a few hours after investigating the floating cargo of the Rio Grande, the Group was still engaged in its primary mission of supporting the barrier sweep and intercepting blockade runners. The Omaha and Jouett, at 1419, while in Latitude 06° 31' S, Longitude 25° 50' W, intercepted a message from plane number 5 of Patrol Squadron 203, addressed to the Senior Naval Aviator, Natal. The message announced that the pilot was investigating a ship. Decoded further, the report stated the vessel to be the U. S. Freighter Floridian, in Latitude 08° 38' S, Longitude 25° 43' W, on course 085°, speed 12 knots. The ship

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concluded the message, would hoist no call.

Admiral Read consulted his plot for the day and ascertained that the Floridian did not belong in the position given. This made the contact definitely suspicious, and at high speed the Group changed course to intercept the ship. A message went to plane number 5, instructing the pilot to keep the Admiral informed of the vessel's direction and speed. Presently there came a reply, showing a new course on the part of the contact.

At 1626, Admiral Read sent a message to the Commander Fourth Fleet and the Senior Aviators at Ascension and Natal, requestion them to take immediate steps to keep the ship under vigilance.

A little later, plane number 5 informed Natal that it had reached its limit of endurance, and that it could remain on the scene no longer; giving a previously stated position as the last available for the suspicious ship.

A relief plane, somewhat delayed, departed from Natal, and the Omaha and Jouett took separate courses to broaden their search and to cover the possibility of the ship's altering course again.

At 1853 the Omaha made a radar contact bearing 230° (T) and changed course to close. At 1901 the mast of the ship was sighted, and 20 minutes later the Omaha challenged, receiving no reply. When the Cruiser had closed the range to 22,000 yards it fired a shot across the stranger's bow. Four minutes later smoke was observed coming from the amidships part, following which the deck house burst into flame. Data as to characteristics which the Omaha possessed, made identification as the Burgenland possible without delay.

At 1933, on Admiral Read's orders, the Omaha with the Jouett, which

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had meanwhile come within range, both commenced firing and continued for ten minutes. During this time the target was heavily hit.

At 1952, a weak explosion took place on board the runner, as well as explosions from small caliber ammunition. Five minutes later she was seen to be settling rapidly, and within a moment or two the Burgenland sank, in Latitude 07° 29' S, Longitude 25° 37' W. Four boatloads of survivors had abandoned ship, but Task Group 41.1 had not the time to attempt rescue. Admiral Read quickly cleared the area of sinking, retiring to the eastward.

Survivors of the Rio Grande and Burgenland were collected and brought ashore in installments. The Davis picked up 21 of the latter's men on January 7, and the next day the Winslow rescued 35 more. Seventy-two men from the Rio Grande were recovered by the Marblehead, also on January 8. On the 11th, 22 more survivors from the Rio Grande reached Fortaleza in a whaleboat, to be taken into custody by the 10th Brazilian Military Region Commander. Finally, on the 13th, the Brazilian Minelayer Camocim, while escorting a Rio-Trinidad convoy, picked up a whaleboat with 25 Germans and 9 Italians. This accounts for all the survivors of the three sinkings.

Without exaggeration, it can be said that the German war effort suffered as a result of these loses. Cargo consisting largely of raw rubber would float and was too precious to be allowed to drift idly in the South Atlantic. Two Sea Going Tugs, the Seneca and Carib, spent a week collecting the scattered bales, and in that time salvaged rubber enough to make tires for 5000 bombers. The rubber floated only two or three inches out of the water, and of course lay widely scattered. It had to be located and handled bale by bale. The poorest hunting netted 22 bales for one ship in a day; the best brought 226 onto the deck. Crews of the Tugs who

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worked at this had to use hooks and tongs. The rubber was very soft and difficult to hook fast. Whaleboats plied from the Tugs and the crews competed among themselves for discovering and hooking the largest number of bales. The Whaleboat record stood at 50 for the best catch. All told, the salvage came to 1996 bales of rubber, including 4 rescued by the Somers, and 4 barrels of tallow. The Seneca won its competition with the Carib by a narrow margin.

The prisoners taken in the Weserland, Rio Grande, and Burgenland operations all subsequently went to the United States for interrogation.

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OPERATIONS - THE LATER EVENTS

Following the successful conclusion of the "Solant Triple Play" operational activities in the South Atlantic reverted to routine., unbroken save for occasional intervals. They can be reconstructed with relative brevity.

For the remainder of January, which was taken up largely with the aftermath of the blockade runners episode, little occurred beyond the ordinary. On the 9th, the Carib boarded the Spanish merchant ship Monte Anniboto outside Bahia, and took off a German stowaway, allegedly an internee in Argentina from the Graf Spee, the pocket battleship sunk off Montevideo by the British late in 1939. The purpose of this removal was interrogation. On the 17th, the K-36 (Blimp) stationed in Rio, crashed in a fog off Cabo Frio, not far from the Brazilian Capital. The crew consisted of nine officers and men, of whom two received slight injuries. Otherwise, convoys moved on schedule with no excitement or unusual features.

On the 6th of February, and Ascension based Liberator of Bombing Squadron 107 attacked and sank a submarine in position 10° 35' S, 23° 12' W, after sighting it at a distance of two miles. The co-pilot made out the enemy craft, whereupon the plane approached it at about a mile altitude and suddenly dropped through the clouds at a steep decline. The released bombs enveloped the German sub, which commenced firing as the Liberator swept over the conning tower. The plane's rudder was lost and the nose dropped badly, but Lieutenant Dawkins, the pilot, slowly pulled his ship up to 800 feet.

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A large oil slick appeared around the sub, whose crew by this time were all on deck. Suddenly the U-Boat exploded, some parts flying 200 feet into the air. Two days later, the Commander Task Force 41.1, in the Omaha recovered 14 survivors, consisting of two officers, two petty officers, and ten seamen. They told of being from the submarine in question, which they reported as sunk, and the Captain dead. Since no other known circumstances accounted for their presence and condition, there seemed no reason to doubt the story.

The only other item for February was the forcing down of a PBY at sea on the 29th. This was not the result of enemy action, mechanical difficulties alone being responsible. A Brazilian escort from a convoy found the plane and towed it to Rio, the nearest important harbor. The PBY received no damage and the crew escaped unhurt.

In March, Admiral O. M. Read was detached as Commander Cruiser Division II, to assume duty as Commandant NOB Trinidad.

April saw the 19th Provisional Marine Company detached from theFourth Fleet and returned to the United States. The Marines had been stationed first at Recife and then Ibura since the end of December 1941, a little after Pearl Harbor. Their silent departure was in singular contrast to their much heralded coming, which, it will be remembered, had occasioned almost a diplomatic crises between the United States and Brazil.

One submarine was sunk in April. This kill took place on the 10th when an Ascension based Liberator attacked and destroyed the enemy craft in position 15° 37' S, 17° 00' W. The U-Boats also scored. Late in the month they torpedoed the British SS Nebraska, survivors of which were picked up near the mouth of the Sergipe River by the Brazilian Turuena. Another boatload arrived safely in Recife.

During May a submarine accounted for one steamer, the Janeta, sunk

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on the 12th in position 14° 12' S, 20° 00' W. Ten survivors were later picked up by the USS Alger. Also during the month, the PC 1234 was transferred to the Uruguayan flag.

On the 15th of June there was encountered probably the toughest submarine that the Fourth Fleet had dealt with as yet. In March, the Carrier Solomons had entered the area and had come under the temporary operation control of the Admiral. She was, on June 15, patrolling a little south of the Latitude of Rio and well to the east, somewhat below St. Helena.

The affair began when Ensign G. E. Edwards took off from the Carrier in the morning on a regular anti-submarine patrol. At 1021 he reported a contact, bearing 070° (T), distant 50 miles from the Solomons. There was no further communication from him. Survivors from the submarine subsequently stated that he had attacked and made four runs in the face of concentrated anti-aircraft fire. On the last run his plane was hit and crashed into the sea. From later evidence it would seem that Ensign Edwards had not taken time to ascertain the position accurately.

Lieutenant Commander H. M. Avery next took off, to conduct a normal square gambit over the reported contact and to look for Ensign Edwards and the U-Boat. Not long before sunset, while at an altitude of 1500 feet, he sighted what seemed to be a wake, bearing 030° (T), distance 10 to 12 miles. He closed and ascertained this to be the wake of a fully surfaced submarine. This was about 50 miles from the position previously given by Ensign Edwards. As Lieutenant Commander Avery's plane approached, the enemy instead of submerging began to maneuver, running in circles of about 1000 feet in diameter, and keeping the aircraft on his stern. From the sub came intensive anti-aircraft fire at the plane, whose pilot circled while awaiting assistance.

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Somewhat earlier in the afternoon, Ensigns T. J. Wadsworth, R. E. McMahon, and M. J. Spear had taken off from the Carrier to investigate the contact reported by Ensign Edwards. Failing to find anything at that specified position, they had been on the point of landing on the Solomons at 1720, when they were suddenly sent to the scene of the new contact. They arrived over the target at 1743.

The entire attack on the submarine was delivered in three phases, commencing at 1746, eight minutes after sunset, and ending at 1753.

Lieutenant Commander Avery took charge and ordered Wadsworth and McMahon to begin strafing attacks on the starboard and port quarters respectively, while Spear and the Lieutenant Commander coordinated a rocket attack.

Wadsworth made his strafing attack from the starboard quarter, and pulled out at less than 100 feet directly over the conning tower, amid many bursts of anti-aircraft fire. He expended 400 rounds of ammunition. McMahon, meanwhile had commenced his strafing run in a steep dive from 3000 feet, due to the sub's incessant maneuvering. He peppered the deck and conning tower with 200 rounds and then pulled out to clear the target for the first rocket attack.

Spear came in next, on the U-Boat's starboard beam, and on reaching 800 yards slant range he launched 8 rockets in pairs. Six of these hit a lethal area slightly ahead of the conning tower; the other two missed. On firing the last rocket, he pulled to the left and gave his gunner a chance to strafe.

Almost simultaneously, Lieutenant Commander Avery had made his attack from the port beam, and planted six projectiles in a lethal area 20 feet ahead of the conning tower.

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These actions constituted phase one of the attack. All four planes had passed over the enemy within 10 seconds. The submarine had straightened out on course 180° (T) at a slowing speed, trailing oil and smoking around the conning tower, but still directing anti-aircraft fire in bursts toward the planes.

Ensign Wadsworth had been ordered back to the Carrier, having suffered a damaged wing tank he could not jettison, but Lieutenants (jg) W. F. Chamberlain and D. E. Weigle had meanwhile taken off from the Solomons and arrived almost simultaneously on the scene.

Phase two began with McMahon making another successful strafing run, during which he expended the rest of his ammunition, followed by a rocket attack by Weigle. The latter fired 8 more, 6 of which hit the lethal area in front of the conning tower.

At the conclusion of this phase, the sub continued on course 180° (T) but with speed now reduced to 3 knots. Large quantities of greenish yellow oil showed on the surface.

To start phase three, Chamberlain was ordered to begin a depth charge run from the port quarter. He paid no heed to the burst of AA fire but released two charges at an altitude of less than 50 feet, directly over the conning tower. They caused a violent explosion which engulfed his plane, of which he maintained control just long enough to make a 180° turn and land in the water about 500 yards ahead of the U-Boat. Chamberlain, with his gunner and radio man, could not be rescued.

Lieutenant Commander Avery had gone in just ahead of the depth charge run to strafe, after which he pulled up into a chandelle (climbing turn) to the right enabling his gunner to get several bursts on the conning tower.

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Before the three VTBs still over the target could get into position to make the final killing attack, the U-Boat had gone down, bow first, leaving 30 to 40 survivors struggling in the water.

By estimate, this submarine was of the 1200 ton operational type. Her length was between 200 and 300 feet, and she had 4 to 6 AA guns in the bandstand aft of the conning tower. The gunners aboard the sub had good armor protection, because despite the strafing attacks they continued to fire until they went down. Photographs taken from the planes during the action turned out blank, since the attack occurred after sundown.

Toward midnight the USS Straub picked up 21 survivors from the sub, including the Captain and Executive Officer.

During July and August, the action continued light, yet there was just enough to show that the campaign had not ended.

Submarines continued at intervals to sink or damage surface vessels. The Vital de Oliveira, Brazilian, went down in 22° 30' S, 41° 00' W, on July 20, leaving 70 survivors to be rescued by the Tavari. Next day the Brazilian Navy suffered a loss when one of its Corvettes, the Camaqua, capsized and sank in 08° 10' S, 34° 20' W, and occurrence not due to enemy action.

Evidence of another sinking came on the 24th, when a PBK of Patrol Squadron 203 sighted three lifeboats with survivors, in a southerly Latitude. The USS Matagorda received orders to go to the rescue and the next day took on board what proved to be the entire crew of the SS William Gaston. Without having sighted her assailant, the merchant vessel had been attacked twice with torpedoes on July 24 in position 26° 42' S, 46° 12' W.

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On the 26th the Brazilian Destroyer Greenhalgh reported being attacked by torpedo, without apparently having made a sound contact or any attempt at retaliation.

August was the month of patrols and convoys. No submarine contacts occurred, and the only loss was that of a PBY and a Ventura, both of which were forced down near Natal at the end of the month. Survivors from both planes were rescued, and enemy action did not account for the loss.

A final sub kill, not necessarily the last in the Fourth Fleet's history, but the last that can be included in this narrative, came on September 29. At 0702 on that date, a Navy heavy bomber, piloted by Lieutenant J. T. Burton, sighted, attacked and seriously damaged an enemy sub at 10° 45' S, 25° 30' W. After injuring the U-Boat, Lieutenant Burton homed another plane piloted by Lieutenant E. A. Krug, Jr., to the scene. Subsequently they made three additional co-ordinated attacks, in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire. At 0722, twenty minutes after the first contact, they destroyed the submarine by co-ordinated attacks, the bombs of Lieutenant Krug's plane finally making the kill.

Life rafts were dropped to many survivors swimming in the water, and at 0748 both planes departed for base, having reached their prudent limit of endurance. The pilots received recommendations for the Distinguished Flying Cross, and the other personnel involved were named for Air Medals.

With this last successful episode we must bring to an end the action side of the South Atlantic's story.

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HIGHLIGHTS OF 1944

By the beginning of 1944 the Fourth Fleet establishments in Brazil had reached the stage of stabilization. Personnel had attained its maximum size and most of the construction was over. Some further enlargement of the Lighter-than-Air branch took place, involving additional building, chiefly in Southern Brazil. Much improvement of prior construction also went on. But the period of growth had ended. Moreover, the Brazilians had now reached a point of proficiency, both on sea and in the air, which enabled them to do a great deal of the convoy and patrol work formerly performed by Americans.

With the capture of the blockade runners in January, every reasonable indication existed that the battle of the South Atlantic had been won. From then on, although U-Boats appeared at intervals, the intervals became rarer. Finally, the Allied invasion of Continental Europe, commencing in June, soon wrested from the Nazis the western French ports on which so many of their subs had been based. As 1944 swung into its last quarter, the Mediterranean, France, Belgium, and part of Holland, had been liberated. It thus became almost a certainty that Germany, no matter how long she might postpone her day of collapse, could no longer send submarines to a theater as distant as the South Atlantic.

On the other hand, the uncertain actions of Argentina, with her well known Axis leanings, acted as a deterrent to any too-hasty withdrawal of the Fourth Fleet.

Since operations have been covered for 1944, in the previous chapter, the present one will be devoted to an enumeration of events of outstanding

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interest that took place during the year.

In March several of the Brazilian Facilities received a visit from Mrs. Roosevelt. The First Lady began her excursion with a flight through the Caribbean, where she stopped at several Army and Navy stations. Her first Brazilian stop was at Pelem, where she was met by Rear Admiral Read, representing the Commander Fourth Fleet, and General Walsh, Commanding General USAFSA. During her busy tour Mrs. Roosevelt attended several social functions given for her by high-ranking officers, but she described her chief purpose as that of seeing as many enlisted men as possible and telling them that their work was important.

At Natal the First Lady presented awards to 30 officers and men of the Navy Bombing Squadron stationed there, for excellent work in combating enemy submarines and blockade runners. At Recife she visited all the activities in the vicinity, and at each one spoke briefly to the assembled officers and men. She brought a message direct from the President, expressing appreciation for the excellent work done by the Fleet in the South Atlantic.

Mrs. Roosevelt did not proceed south of Recife, but returned immediately to the United States via the West Indies.

Early in the following month, the Admiral's Chief-of-Staff, Captain Braine, learned of his advancement to the rank of Commodore dating from March 31. On that day the Chiefs-of-Staff of several Navy fleets and shore commands were awarded the one star. The rank of Commodore, though once dropped by the U. S. Navy for officers of the active list, had been reestablished during 1943. Commodore Braine was the first of his rank to be seen in the South Atlantic, though a few weeks later Captain Dodd, head of the Naval Mission at Rio, received the same promotion.

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Earlier in the month of April, Vice Admiral Ingram received from Secretary Knox the "Distinguished Service Medal" for his contributions to the Allied cause. This award incidentally, was one of the last acts of the Secretary of the Navy's career, as he died a few days later. Presentation of the medal took place on April 27, at a staff conference, with Commodore Braine acting temporarily as the representative of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet, and making the bestowal.

"All of you share this honor," said the Admiral to those about him as he received the medal. He went on to state that the award was the result of the combined efforts of all the personnel of the Fleet.

Because many of the achievements for which the Admiral won the DSM were still of confidential nature the citation read by Commodore Braine was the "non-classified" one; the permanent citation being held for the time being in the Navy Department in Washington. The award made the Admiral the holder of the three highest Navy decorations, he already having won the Congressional Medal of Honor, for conspicuous action at Vera Cruz in 1914, and the Navy Cross. During his stay in South America, he acquired two high Brazilian decorations; those of Grand Commander of the Southern Cross, and the Ordem do Merito Naval. Commodore Braine also received the Brazilian Southern Cross decoration in June.

Commander Gene Tunney visited the South Atlantic area in the latter part of June. The Commander, who held the world's heavyweight boxing championship from 1926 to 1928, came to the Fourth Fleet Area to inspect the physical training program and facilities. As director of physical training for the entire Navy, Commander Tunney made this tour with a view of getting the men of the Fleet into shape for arduous duties they might

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later be called upon to perform in other areas. In visiting Recife, the Commander arrived just in time for a boxing smoker. He acted as referee for some of the bouts and made a speech to the assembled spectators, the theme of which was "keep fit and above all learn to swim." Commander Tunney, accompanied by Lieutenant Commander McCoy, Fleet Athletic Officer, was the recommendation that more athletic specialists be assigned to the area to assist in the sports program.

On the first day of August, the Brazilian Navy received two Destroyer Escort ships from the Fourth Fleet. The USS Pennewill and the USS Herzog became the Brazilian Naval vessels Bertioga and Beberibe. The transfer was the occasion for a presentation ceremony at Natal, where the exchange took place, attended by U. S. and Brazilian officials.

Admiral Ingram made a speech presenting the ships and Rear Admiral Parreiras, Director of the Natal Naval Base, accepted on behalf of his government. Both speakers stressed the idea of Brazilian-American solidarity, and Admiral Parreiras gave assurance that the Brazilian sailors about to man the vessels would endeavor to become worthy of their predecessors.

The program was enlivened by music of the Fourth Fleet Band. As the ceremony began, both ships were tied on opposite sides of a pier, with the stars and stripes still flying and an honor guard aboard. Each American commanding officer read the orders decommissioning his ship, and the American flags came down. At this point the two Admirals made their speeches of presentation and reception. The Brazilian Flag Secretary then read orders to commission the ships in his country's Navy. The Fourth Fleet Band

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broke into the Brazilian Navy March and the new crews marched aboard the Bertioga and Beberibe.

The new officers, on taking over, found awaiting them two engraved silver plates, as departing gifts from their predecessors.

All sailors from the ex Pennwill and Herzog returned to the United States, for leave and to await further assignment.

Much the same ceremony was gone through two weeks later when the Destroyer Escorts McAnn and Reybold became the Brazilian Bauru and Bracui. Again, the principal speakers were Admirals Ingram and Parreiras.

The speech of the American Admiral is worth quoting in part. After referring to this as an epochal ceremony in the relations between the Navies of Brazil and the United States, he added:

"I say 'epochal' because 15 days ago two U. S. DEs were turned over to and maned by the Brazilian Navy. These same ships steamed out of here four days later and today are in active operation with the South Atlantic Forces. Today we turn over the Reybold and the McAnn. This makes a homogeneous division of ships that will act as a Brazilian Convoy Escort to carry the big Allied convoys from a Northern point to the deep South Atlantic. It will be the first time that a unified combat escort unit will enter the great naval base . . . . . under the Brazilian flag and under the command of an officer of the Brazilian Navy . . . . .

The final test is the ability of you officers and men of the Brazilian Navy to carry on and operate these ships in an efficient manner. I have the utmost faith in your ability to do so. It is you who are going to set the standards for the operations of the new and modern Brazilian Navy. Make them high . . . . .

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"My friends, speaking for and in the name of President Roosevelt, I officially turn over to the Brazilian government the Reybold and McAnn.

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CONCLUSION

The history of modern warfare certainly has no very close analogies to the South Atlantic Campaign. Militarily, of course, the story is one of ships and land based planes hunting submarines and safeguarding convoys. There is, admittedly, nothing particularly unique about this, even though these tasks were extremely well performed. But when we examine the origins of the American establishment in Brazil the facts might cause honest skepticism were they not authenticated.

An Admiral in the Navy of a neutral nation enters the port of another neutral nation in command of two ships. His reception, though officially correct, is by no means cordial. The local officials and leaders wish to know why he is there, and he, being the representative of a country at peace, can not easily explain his purpose in terms that will be clear to them. Yet only a little over a year later that Admiral is in operational control of the Navy and Air Force of the country in question. The maneuvering and diplomacy by which the first situation developed into the second is a very important part of the story. Unfortunately it has not been possible to relate it in as much detail as could be given to the military events, since diplomacy is intangible and does not meet the eye as readily as does the exploding hulk of a damaged submarine. Nevertheless, the story of the Fourth Fleet is as much diplomatic as military.

There can be no doubt that the keystone of he Admiral's diplomatic success was the interview with President Vargas in April, 1942. By that

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time the United States had become a belligerent; Brazil had not, nor was it certain that she that she would become one. Considerable success had been attained in dealing with the Generals, Admirals, and Interventors of North-eastern Brazil. Yet, due to the centralized government of the country, this could all have come to nothing had the President not decided to "play ball." When the situation had once been explained to him he grasped it fully, saw the actions necessary, and took them. This proved to be the solution of the fundamental problem, for it dispelled any doubts or hesitations the lesser lights may have felt.

The diplomacy required by the situation could not always be orthodox. The Admiral did not come to Brazil as a typical U. S. Government agent. He was the commander of a seagoing force, charged at first with a reconnaissance mission, later with the protection of shipping, and finally with the prosecution of relentless warfare against the enemy. It involved the rather complicated dual role of being first friendly, open, and honest; and secondly somewhat removed, aloof, and tactful. Brazil and the United States differ widely; there could not be the remotest suggestion of interference in local domestic politics. Yet, during the long period of Brazilian indecision there had to be constant pressure maintained, directed toward moving the country in the right direction. The record shows that all this was complicated.

The task demanded to some degree the cooperation of every officer and enlisted man involved. he men were carefully instructed as to their share in cultivating the desired relationship. In general they performed their part well. If some slips occurred, as they did at intervals, the

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shore patrol was always available to wield the final argument. In general, however, the men proved ambassadors of good will rather than the reverse.

There is no doubt that the presence and mission of the Fourth Fleet left a deep impression in Brazil. The country, despite the existence of a small, cosmopolitan aristocracy, had lived an isolated existence for centuries, touched lightly by the affairs of the northern hemisphere. Suddenly the isolation was broken, and the change was reflected in countless ways, too numerous to be fully described. The removal of the Fleet has not taken place at the present date of writing, though it is expected soon. When it does come, Brazil will not be exactly the same as before, and can never be again. Its military power has expanded enormously, and still more important, the Brazilians have gained a better idea of the things that give a nation power and influence he world. They are far from being a stupid people; the lesson will not be lost on them.

Regardless of its local influence, however, the Fourth Fleet's primary purpose was to aid in winning World War II. It performed the military part of its task. Long before the events of Europe had deprived the Axis of vital submarine bases, the South Atlantic had become relatively secure. The accomplishment of this had required teamwork; between the various branches of the American services, and between Americans and Brazilians. The word "teamwork" could very well be the title of the Fourth Fleet's theme song.

World War II will have many historians, and its memory will certainly live as long as the American Nation endures. The historians will in general concentrate their efforts on the more spectacular theaters of combat, which

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seemed to be more vital. Yet the future historian with a true mastery of global strategy will feel the importance of the South Atlantic during a certain critical period. He will realize that the officers and men who gave their best efforts there were in all respects the colleagues of those who defended Stalingrad, won El Alamein, took Guadalcanal, and crossed the British Channel.

The South Atlantic campaign helped win the war. The men who waged it, living and dead, are satisfied with that statement. They do not ask that any more be said.

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Table of Contents
Part 1 ** Chronology



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