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79TH Congress SENATE DOCUMENT
2d Session No. 244
INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR
ATTACK
REPORT
OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
AND
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. KEEFE
TOGETHER WITH
MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. FERGUSON AND MR. BREWSTER
JULY 20 (legislative day July 5), 1946-Ordered to be
printed with illustrations
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina
JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania
BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California
FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel
GERHARD A. GESELL, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
UNITED STATES SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C., July 16, 1946
Hon. Kenneth McKellar,
President pro tempore of the Senate.
Hon. Sam Rayburn,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Dear Mr. President and Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to Senate Concurrent
Resolution No. 27 (as extended), Seventy-ninth Congress, first session,
the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl
Harbor Attack has completed its work with a view to a full and complete
investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances
leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon
Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.
The committee has endeavored faithfully to discharge the duties assigned
and respectfully submits herewith its report.
Sincerely yours,
ALBEN W. BARKLEY,
Chairman.
JERE COOPER,
Vice Chairman.
Page iv
[Blank]
Page v C O N T E N T S
................................................................... Page
Foreword ........................................................... xi
Introductory statement ............................................ xiii
Part I. Diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack .......... 1
Japanese record of deceit and aggression ........................ 1
Fundamental differences between American and Japanese policies .. 4
Steps taken by the United States to meet the threat of Axis
aggression...................................................... 10
Initial United States-Japanese negotiations: 1941 ................ 13
Japanese proposal of May 12 ...................................... 14
Japanese reaction to German invasion of Russia ................... 15
Temporary cessation of negotiations .............................. 16
Freezing of assets ............................................... 18
Resumption of negotiations and proposed meeting of President
Roosevelt and Premier Konoye ................................... 19
Japanese proposals of September 6 and 27 ......................... 26
Advent of the Tojo Cabinet ....................................... 28
Arrival of Saburo Kurusu ......................................... 30
Negotiations versus deadlines .................................... 32
Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and the modus vivendi .......... 32
United States memorandum of November 26 .......................... 38
Fraudulent nature of Japanese diplomacy_November 28 to
December 7 ..................................................... 42
Diplomatic and military liaison in Washington .................... 43
Conclusions ...................................................... 47
Part II. The Japanese attack and its aftermath ..................... 53
Formulation of the plan and date for execution ................... 53
Nature of the plan ............................................... 54
Departure for the attack ......................................... 56
Execution of the attack .......................................... 57
Air phase ..................................................... 57
Submarine phase ............................................... 62
Withdrawal of the striking force ................................. 63
Damage to United States naval forces and installations as a result
of the attack .................................................. 64
Damage to United States Army forces and installations as a result
of the attack .................................................. 65
Japanese losses .................................................. 65
Summary comparison of losses ..................................... 65
State of readiness to meet the attack ............................ 66
Attack a surprise .............................................. 66
Personnel ...................................................... 66
Antiaircraft ................................................... 67
Aircraft ....................................................... 68
Action taken following the attack ................................ 68
Defensive forces and facilities of the Navy at Hawaii ............ 69
Defensive forces and facilities of the Army at Hawaii ............ 70
Comparison of strength and losses: Japanese attacking force and
Hawaiian defensive forces ...................................... 70
Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii ............................... 75
Consciousness of danger from air attack .......................... 75
Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack ........... 75
General Short's awareness of danger from air attack ............ 79
Plans for the defense of Hawaiian coastal frontier ............. 81
Concept of the war in the Pacific .............................. 87
Conclusions with respect to consciousness of danger from air
attack ....................................................... 88
VI C O N T E N T S
Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii-Continued Page
Information supplied Admiral Kimmel by Washington indicating the
imminence of war .............................................. 89
Information supplied General Short by Washington indicating the
imminence of war .............................................. 100
Action taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to warnings and orders
from Washington ............................................... 103
Dispatch of October 16 from-Chief of Naval Operations ....... 103
Dispatch of November 24 from Chief of Naval Operations ...... 104
The "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ................... 104
Evaluation of the "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ......... 107
On where the attack might come .............................. 107
Other dispatches received on November 27 .................... 108
"Psychological handicaps" indicated by Admiral Kimmel ....... 109
The "War warning" and training .............................. 110
The term "Defensive deployment" and failure to institute
distant reconnaissance .................................... 110
Action which was not taken upon receipt of the "War warning" .... 117
Estimate and action taken by General Short with respect to the
warning dispatch of November 27 ............................... 119
No warning of attack on Hawaii .............................. 120
Dispatches indicating threat of sabotage .................... 121
"Do-Don't" character of the November 27 dispatch and
"Avoidance of war" ........................................ 123
Commanding general's reliance on the Navy .................... 125
Interference with training ................................... 125
The order to undertake reconnaissance ........................... 126
The Short reply ................................................. 128
Action which was not taken upon receipt of the November 27
dispatch ...................................................... 129
The "Code destruction" intelligence ............................. 130
General Short's knowledge of destruction of confidential matter
by Japanese consulate ......................................... 131
The "Lost" Japanese carriers-Radio intelligence at Hawaii ....... 133
The "Mori" call ................................................. 137
Detection of Japanese submarine on morning of December 7 ........ 138
Radar detection of Japanese raiding force ....................... 140
Other intelligence received by Army and Navy in Hawaii .......... 142
Channels of intelligence ..................................... 142
The "Manila message" ......................................... 142
The Honolulu press ........................................... 142
The role of espionage in the attack ............................. 145
Liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short ................ 150
Estimate of the situation ....................................... 153
Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington ........................... 159
Basing the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii .............................. 159
Defensive facilities available in Hawaii ........................ 163
Transfer of Pacific Fleet units to the Atlantic ................. 167
"ABCD" understanding? ........................................... 168
Avoidance of war ................................................ 172
Intelligence available in Washington ............................ 179
The "Magic" .................................................. 179
Policy with respect to dissemination of magic ................ 180
"Ships in harbor" reports ....................................... 181
Nature of consular espionage ................................. 181
Conclusions with respect to "Ships in harbor" reports ........ 189
The "Winds code" ................................................ 191
"Hidden word" code .............................................. 192
The "Deadline messages" ......................................... 193
Dispatches indicating fraudulent nature of negotiations after
November 28, 1941 ............................................. 195
Status of diplomatic negotiations and the Army dispatch of
November 27 ................................................... 198
Failure to follow-up on the Short reply of November 28 .......... 201
The "Berlin message" ............................................ 204
Code destruction intelligence ................................... 205
The McCollum dispatch ........................................... 206
VII C O N T E N T S
Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington-Continued Page
Events of December 6 and 7, 1941 ................................ 209
The "Pilot message" ........................................... 210
The fourteen part memorandum .................................. 211
First thirteen parts ........................................ 211
Analysis and significance of first thirteen parts proper .... 212
Military significance of "Pilot" and "13-part" messages
apart from messages proper ................................ 219
The fourteenth part ....................................... 221
"One o'clock" and final code destruction messages ............... 222
Events attending transmittal of the December 7 dispatch ...... 224
Choice of facilities ......................................... 225
Significance of the "One o'clock" and code destruction
messages ................................................... 226
Significant messages translated after the attack ................ 228
Intelligence concerning Hawaiian defenses ..................... 228
Considerations responsible for delays in translations ......... 230
Conclusions with respect to intelligence available in
Washington which was not supplied Hawaii ...................... 232
Estimate of the situation in Washington ......................... 234
Nature of responsibilities ...................................... 237
Duties in Hawaii ............................................. 237
Duties in Washington ......................................... 238
Unity of command ................................................ 240
General observations ............................................ 245
The "Wyman Matter" ........................................... 245
The Philippine Attack ........................................ 246
Prior inquiries concerning the Pearl Harbor attack ........... 246
Part V. Conclusions and recommendations ........................... 251
Conclusions with respect to responsibilities .................... 251
Recommendations ................................................. 252
Supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies in
our military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl
Harbor investigation .......................................... 253
Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of
authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility ...... 254
Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for
granted in the alerting of subordinates ................... 254
Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information
should always be resolved in favor of supplying the
information ............................................... 255
The delegation of authority or the issuance of order's
entails the duty of inspection to determine that the
official mandate is properly exercised .................... 255
The implementation of official orders must be followed with
closest supervision ....................................... 256
The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be
insured through repetition ................................ 256
Complacency and procrastination are out of place where
sudden and decisive action are of the essence ............. 257
The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in
times of stress must be insured by continuity of service
and centralization of responsibility in competent
officials ................................................. 257
The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is
fatal: There should never be any hesitancy in asking for
clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on
matters that are in doubt ................................. 258
There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness
on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials ..... 259
Communications must be characterized by clarity,
forthrightness, and appropriateness ....................... 259
There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information
received and every effort should be made to insure that
the paraphrased material reflects the true meaning of the
original .................................................. 260
Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the
exigencies of unusual situations .......................... 261
Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum
number of officials, while often necessary, should not be
carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the
organization .............................................. 261
There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident .. 262
Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit
of significant information ................................ 262
VIII C O N T E N T S
Part V. Conclusions and recommendation-Continued Page
Supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies in
our military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl
Harbor investigation-Continued
An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail
with his organization should forfeit his responsibility ... 263
Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation
for any eventuality ....................................... 263
Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an
official instruction ...................................... 263
Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization ... 264
Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted
in lieu of liaison or confused therewith where the latter
is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more
agencies .................................................. 264
No considerations should be permitted as excuse for failure
to perform a fundamental task ............................. 265
Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates
adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should
keep their superiors informed ............................. 285
The administrative organization of any establishment must be
designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility .. 265
In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of
responsibility and authority .............................. 266
Committee members signing the report ............................ 266
Additional views of Mr. Keefe ................................... 266
Appendix A. Prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor
attack .......................................................... 269
The Roberts Commission .......................................... 269
The Hart Inquiry ................................................ 269
The Army Pearl Harbor Board ..................................... 269
The Navy Court of Inquiry ....................................... 270
The Clarke Inquiry .............................................. 270
The Clausen Investigation ....................................... 270
The Hewitt Inquiry .............................................. 271
Appendix B. Names and positions of principal Army and Navy
officials in Washington and at Hawaii at the time of the attack
along with the leading witnesses in the various proceedings ..... 275
Organization and personnel of War Department .................. 275
Army Air Forces ............................................. 275
Organization and personnel of Navy Department ................. 276
Organization and personnel of Hawaiian Department ............. 276
Hawaiian Air Force .......................................... 277
Staff of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and United
States Pacific Fleet ........................................ 277
Organization and personnel of Fourteenth Naval District .... 278
List of witnesses appearing before the Joint Committee and
their assignments as of December 7, 1941 .................... 278
List of leading witnesses in prior proceedings who did not
testify before the Joint Committee and their assignments as
of December 7, 1941 ......................................... 279
Appendix C. Communications from the President of the United States
relating to the Pearl Harbor investigation ...................... 285
Appendix D. Review of the diplomatic conversations between the
United States and Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic
Conference in August 1941 through December 8, 1941 .............. 291
Introductory statement ........................................ 291
Brief resume of the Japanese-American conversations prior to
the Atlantic Conference ..................................... 293
The Atlantic Conference (August 10-14, 1941) .................. 300
President Roosevelt warns Japan against further aggression and
at the same time offers to resume the Japanese-American
conversations (August 17, 1941) ............................. 302
Japan protests United States shipments of oil to Russia
(August 27, 1941) ........................................... 305
Premier Konoye sends a personal message to President Roosevelt
urging the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August 28, 1941) .... 306
IX C O N T E N T S
Appendix D-Continued Page
Germany suspects treachery (August 29-30, 1941) ................. 307
President Roosevelt replies to Premier Konoye's message
(September 3, 1941) ........................................... 310
Japan presents new proposals in a new form (September 6, 1941) .. 311
Ambassador Grew supports the proposed "Leaders Conference"
(August-September, 1941) ....................................... 314
Japan determines its minimum demands and its maximum concessions
in the negotiations with the United States
(September 6, 1941) ........................................... 316
The United States asks Japan to clarify its new proposals
(October 2, 1941) ............................................. 319
Germany demands that Japan warn the United States that war
between Germany and Italy and the United States would lead to
war between Japan and the United States pursuant to the
Tripartite Pact (October 1941) ................................ 325
The Konoye Cabinet falls, and Ambassador Nomura asks permission
to return to Japan (October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5,
1941) ......................................................... 326
The Tojo Cabinet formulates its "Absolutely final proposal"
(November 5, 1941) ............................................ 331
Ambassador Grew warns that war with Japan may come with
"Dramatic and dangerous suddenness" (November 3, 1941) ........ 335
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appeals to Great Britain and the
United States for aid (October 28-November 4, 1941) ........... 337
Japan delivers its next-to-last proposal to the United States
(November 10, 1941) ........................................... 344
The Tojo Cabinet refuses to consider any suggestion less
favorable to Japan than its" Absolutely final proposal"
(November 18-19, 1941) ........................................ 355
Japan delivers its "Absolutely final proposal" to the United
States and demands an agreement on that basis
(November 20, 1941) ........................................... 360
The United States replies (November 26, 1941) ................... 363
The Tojo Cabinet makes a pretense of continuing the Japanese-
American conversations and at the same time moves additional
Japanese troops into southern Indochina
(November 27-December 7, 1941) ................................ 387
The invasion of Thailand by Japanese forces from French Indochina
appears imminent (December 1-7, 1941) ......................... 405
Germany tells Japan the time is ripe to strike at the United
States, and promises to join with Japan in war against the
United States (November 29, 1941) ............................. 409
President Roosevelt returns to Washington as the far eastern
situation moves rapidly toward a climax (December 1, 1941) .... 411
President Roosevelt asks the Japanese Government to explain its
purpose in moving additional troops into southern Indochina
(December 2, 1941) ............................................. 415
The Japanese Government claims its troop movements in French
Indochina are for the purpose of defense against an attack by
the Chinese (December 5, 1941) ................................ 421
The last hours (December 6-8, 1941) ............................. 424
Appendix E. The "Winds Code" ...................................... 469
Establishment and nature of the "Winds Code" .................... 469
Efforts to monitor .............................................. 471
Considerations bearing on the possibility of a message in
execution of the "Winds Code" having been received prior to
December 7, 1941 .............................................. 471
Considerations militating against likelihood of "Winds Code"
execute message having been received prior to
December 7, 1941 .............................................. 475
Appendix F. Geographical considerations and Navy and Army
installations ................................................... 489
Geographical considerations ................................... 489
Navy and Army installations ................................... 490
Navy ........................................................ 490
Army ........................................................ 491
Illustrations ................................................. 499
CONTENTS OF THE MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT
Duty of the committee ............................................. 495
Fundamental questions before the joint committee .................. 496
Difficulties facing the joint committee and incompleteness of the
record .......................................................... 497
Form of this report ............................................... 502
Conclusions of fact and responsibility ............................ 503
Conclusions restated with supporting evidence [1] ................. 506
No. 1-(Growing tension with Japan) .............................. 506
No. 2-(Washington's tactics pending Japanese attack) ............ 510
No. 3-(Likelihood of attack by December 1, 1941) ................ 511
No. 4-(Washington's tactics of waiting for the firing of "the
first shot' by the Japanese) .............................. 512
No. 5-(Failure to employ Washington organization and facilities to
warn Hawaiian commanders) ................................. 513
No. 6-(Intercepted information respecting Japanese war plans) ... 514
No. 7-(Distribution of intercepted information to high authorities
in Washington) ............................................ 520
No. 8-(Expectation of a surprise attack by the Japanese on the
United States) ........................................... 521
No. 9-(Probability of an attack on Hawaii) ...................... 521
No. 10-(Obligation of Washington authorities to alert outpost
commanders for war) ...................................... 524
No. 11-(Responsibility of Washington authorities in view of the
decision to await Japanese attack) ....................... 530
No. 12-(Obligation of Washington to send clear instructions to
the Hawaiian commanders .................................. 530
No. 13-(Conflicting messages to Hawaiian commanders) ............ 532
No. 14-(Failure of Washington authorities to emphasize
probability, of a Pearl Harbor attack) ................... 537
No. 15-(Delays, confusion, and ,negligence of officers in
Washington) .............................................. 538
No. 16-(President Roosevelt's failure to enforce cooperation
between high military authorities in Washington) ......... 540
No. 17-(Failure of Washington to allocate adequate material to
the Hawaiian commanders) ................................. 543
No. 18-(Washington's responsibility for the competence of
subordinate officers) .................................... 553
No. 19-(Interdependent responsibilities of Washington and Hawaii) 553
No. 20-(Failure of the President to take instant Executive
action on December 6 and 7) .............................. 565
No. 21-(American people not to blame for Pearl Harbor) .......... 570
Conclusion ...................................................... 572
Summary of responsibilities ....................................... 572
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK XI
FOREWORD
On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, the United States and Japan were at
peace. Japanese ambassadors were in Washington in conversation with our
diplomatic officials looking to a general settlement of differences in
the Pacific.
At 7:55 a. m. (Hawaiian time) over 300 Japanese planes launched from 6
aircraft carriers attacked the island of Oahu and the American Pacific
Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii. Within a period of
less than 2 hours our military and naval forces suffered a total of
3,435 casualties in personnel and the loss of or severe damage to: 188
planes of all types, 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, and 4
miscellaneous vessels.
The attack was well planned and skillfully executed. The Japanese
raiders withdrew from the attack and were recovered by the carriers
without the latter being detected, having suffered losses of less than
100 in personnel, 29 planes, and 5 midget submarines which had been
dispatched from mother craft that coordinated their attack with that of
the planes.
One hour after Japanese air and naval forces had struck the Territory of
Hawaii the emissaries of Japan delivered to the Secretary of State a
reply to a recent American note, a reply containing no suggestion of
attack by Japan upon the United States. With the benefit of information
now available it is known that the Japanese military had planned for
many weeks the unprovoked and ambitious act of December 7.
The Pyrrhic victory of having executed the attack with surprise,
cunning, and deceit belongs to the war lords of Japan whose dreams of
conquest were buried in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. History
will properly place responsibility for Pearl Harbor upon the military
clique dominating the people of Japan at the time. Indeed, this
responsibility Premier Tojo himself has already assumed.
We come today, over 4 years after the event, not to detract from this
responsibility but to record for posterity the facts of the disaster. In
another sense we seek to find lessons to avoid pitfalls in the future to
evolve constructive suggestions for the protection of our national
security, and to determine whether there were failures in our own
military and naval establishments which in any measure may have
contributed to the extent and intensity of the disaster.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK XII
[Blank]
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK XIII
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
On November 15, 1945 the Joint Congressional Committee on the
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack held its first public hearings
pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 27, Seventy-Ninth Congress,
first session, as follows: [1]
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
September 6, 1945
Mr. BARKLEY submitted the follow concurrent resolution, which was
considered, modified, and agreed to
SEPTEMBER 11, 1945
House concurs
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That
there is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of
the Pearl Harbor attack, to be composed of five Members of the Senate
(not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to
be appointed by the President pro tempore, and five Members of the House
of Representatives (not more than three of whom shall be members of the
majority party), to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. Vacancies
in the membership of the committee shall not affect the power of the
remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall
be filled in the same manner as in the ease of the original selection.
The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its
members.
SEC. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of
the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or
following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in
the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the
Senate and the House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946,
the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as
it may deem advisable.
SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact
that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided
for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held
against him in examining his military status for credits in the service
to which he belongs.
SEC. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof,
is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the
sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-Ninth Congress
(prior to January 3, 1946), to require by subpoena or otherwise the
attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers,
and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to
procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it
deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such
hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.
(b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of
such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as
it deems necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the
compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as
amended, for comparable duties.
(c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,000, shall
be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half
from the con-
[1] The authority of the committee is to be found in S. Con. Res. No.
27, 79th Cong. 1st sess., passed by the Senate on September 6, 1945, and
concurred in by the House of Representatives on September 11, 1945, and
as extended by both Houses under S. Con. Res. No. 49. 79th Cong., 1st
sess., and by S. Con. Res. No. 54. 79th Cong., 2d sess.
XIV INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
tingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by
the chairman.
Passed the Senate September 6, 1945.
Attest: LESLIE L. BIFFLE,
Secretary.
Passed the House of Representatives September 11, 1945.
Attest: SOUTH TRIMBLE,
Clerk.
On 70 days subsequent to November 15 and prior to and including May 31,
1945, open hearings were conducted in the course of which some 15,000
pages of testimony were taken and a total of 183 exhibits received
incident to an examination of 43 witnesses.
Of assistance to the committee and its work were the testimony and
exhibits of seven prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor
attack, including inquiries conducted by the Roberts Commission. [2]
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, [3] the Army Pearl Harbor Board, [4] the Navy
Court of Inquiry, [5] Col. Carter W. Clarke, [6] Maj. Henry C. Clausen,
[7] and Admiral H. Kent Hewitt. [8] For purposes of convenient reference
there has been set forth in appendix A to this report a statement
concerning the scope and character of each of these prior proceedings,
the records of which total 9,754 printed pages of testimony from 318
witnesses and the attendant 469 exhibits. The records of these
proceedings have been incorporated as exhibits to the record of the
committee which encompasses approximately 10,000,000 words.
All witnesses appeared under oath and were afforded the fullest
opportunity to offer any and all information which was regarded as
having any relationship whatever to the disaster. In the course of
examination by committee counsel and the committee members themselves,
an effort was made to elicit all facts having an immediate or remote
bearing on the tragedy of December 7, 1941. It is believed the committee
has succeeded through its record in preserving for posterity the
material facts concerning the disaster.
The figures and witnesses in the drama of Pearl Harbor ran the gamut of
officials of the executive branch of the Government. The principal
personalities in the picture were the President of the United States,
Franklin D. Roosevelt; the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull; the
Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson; the Secretary of Navy Frank Knox;
the Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall; the Chief of Naval Operations.
Harold R. Stark; the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet Husband E.
Kimmel; and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, Walter C.
Short. In appendix B to this report there are set forth the names and
positions of the ranking Army and Navy officials in Washington and at
Hawaii at the time of the attack along with the principal witnesses in
the various proceedings.
The committee's investigation has extended to the files of all pertinent
branches of the Government. Instructions in this regard from the
President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, to various departments
will be found in appendix C to this report. The committee through its
counsel requested Miss Grace Tully, custodian of the files of the late
President Roosevelt, to furnish the committee all
[1] For proceedings of the Roberts Commission, see committee exhibit No.
143.
[2] For proceedings of the Hart Inquiry, see committee exhibit No. 144.
[3] For proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, see committee
exhibit No. 145.
[4] For proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, see committee exhibit
No. 146.
[5] For proceedings of the Clarke investigation, see committee exhibit
No. 147.
[6] For report of investigation conducted by Major Clausen, see
committee exhibit No. 148.
[7] For proceedings of the Hewitt inquiry, see committee exhibit No.
149.
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT XV
papers in these files for the year 1941 relating to Japan, the imminence
of war in the Pacific, and the general Far Eastern developments. She
furnished such papers in response to this request as she considered
might be involved and stood ready to testify before the committee at any
time.
All parties in interest have attested to the fact that they have been
afforded a full, fair, and impartial public hearing before the
committee. All witnesses who retained counsel-Admiral Stark, Admiral
Kimmel, and General Short-were given the opportunity to be examined by
their counsel if they so desired, and to submit questions to committee
counsel to be asked other witnesses.
The following action was not taken by the committee for the reasons
indicated:
(1) Former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was not called before the
committee as a witness for the reason that his health would not permit.
Mr. Stimson did, however, submit a statement under oath for the
committee's consideration and the answers supplied by him to
interrogatories propounded were considered by the committee. He supplied
the portions of his personal diary requested by committee counsel and
informed the committee that the portions of his diary now in evidence
are the only portions thereof having any relationship to the Pearl
Harbor investigation.
(2) Former Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew appeared before the committee
as a witness and testified to material appearing in his personal diary
having a relationship to the events and circumstances of the Pearl
Harbor attack. On the basis of his personal representation that no
additional material pertinent to the subject of the committee's inquiry
appeared in his diary beyond that to which he had testified, the
committee did not formally request or otherwise seek to require the
production of Mr. Grew's complete diary.
(3) A request by one member of the committee for the appearance of the
former Prime Minister of England, Mr. Winston Churchill, was disapproved
by a majority of the committee. At the time Mr. Churchill was a guest in
the United States and it was not felt that he should with propriety be
requested to appear as a witness.
(4) A request by one member of the committee for production by the State
Department of all papers relating to the so-called Tyler Kent case was
disapproved by a majority of the committee. The State Department had
advised that these papers were in no way pertinent to the subject of the
committee's inquiry, and, additionally, members of the committee had
discussed the question with Mr. Kent who advised that he possessed no
facts that would in any way have relationship to the Pearl Harbor
attack.
Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull appeared before the committee but
was forced to retire by reason of failing health before completion of
the examination by all members of the committee. Mr. Hull subsequently
responded to interrogatories propounded by the committee.
The committee has conceived its duty to be not only that of indicating
the nature and scope of responsibility for the disaster but also of
recording the pertinent considerations relating to the greatest defeat
in our military and naval history. Only through a reasonable amount of
detail is it possible to place events and responsibilities in their
proper perspective and give to the Nation a genuine appreciation of the
salient facts concerning Pearl Harbor. For this reason our report is
XVI INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
of somewhat greater length than was initially believed necessary. It is
to be recalled in this connection, however that the over-all record of
the committee comprehends some ten million words. It was felt therefore
that the story of the antecedent, contemporaneous, and succeeding events
attending the disaster could not be properly encompassed within a report
any more concise than that herewith submitted.
We believe there is much to be learned of a constructive character as a
result of the Japanese attack from the standpoint of legislation and,
additionally, for guidance in avoiding the possibility of another
military disaster such as Pearl Harbor. Accordingly, in the section
devoted to recommendations there are set forth, in addition to the
recommendations proper, a series of principles, based on errors revealed
by the investigation, which are being commended to our military and
naval services for their consideration and possible assistance.
Our report does not purport to set forth or refer to all of the enormous
volume of testimony and evidence adduced in the course of the Pearl
Harbor investigation. It is believed, however that the material facts
relevant to the disaster have been outlined in the report. The
committee's record and the records of all prior investigations have been
printed and are available for review and study. It is to be borne in
mind that the findings and conclusions are based on the facts presently
in our record after an exhaustive investigation.
We desire to acknowledge particular gratitude to those who have acted as
counsel to the committee for their excellent work during the course of
the investigation and for their magnificent assistance in compiling the
facts for the committee in order that we might draw our conclusions,
which are necessarily those of the committee only.
In the following pages an effort has been made to present a review of
the diplomatic and historical setting of the Pearl Harbor attack
followed by a picture of the Japanese attack itself. Set forth
thereafter are separate treatments of responsibilities in Hawaii on the
one hand and responsibilities in Washington on the other. Situations
existing in our Army and Navy establishments having a proximate or
causative relationship to the disaster have been distinguished from
those which, while not to be condoned, are regarded as having no direct
or reasonable bearing on the conditions prevailing at Hawaii, preceding
and in the wake of the Japanese attack on Sunday morning December 7,
1941. To assist in following and better appreciating the story of the
attack there has been outlined in appendix F the geographical
considerations and military installations playing a role in and relating
to the disaster.
Throughout the report italics have been freely employed to facilitate
reading and to bring out more clearly matters regarded as of particular
importance.
[In the ASCII version, italics will be indicated by asterisks at the
beginning and ending of each italicized section. LWJ]
Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/5/96 Updated: 12/8/96