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79TH Congress                    SENATE                       DOCUMENT
 2d Session                                                    No. 244
 

INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

REPORT

OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

PURSUANT TO S. Con. Res. 27 A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR. KEEFE TOGETHER WITH MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. FERGUSON AND MR. BREWSTER JULY 20 (legislative day July 5), 1946-Ordered to be printed with illustrations UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1946
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin COUNSEL (Through January 14, 1946) WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel GERHARD A. GESELL, Chief Assistant Counsel JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel (After January 14, 1946) SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel Page iv LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL UNITED STATES SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C., July 16, 1946 Hon. Kenneth McKellar, President pro tempore of the Senate. Hon. Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives. Dear Mr. President and Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 27 (as extended), Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack has completed its work with a view to a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941. The committee has endeavored faithfully to discharge the duties assigned and respectfully submits herewith its report. Sincerely yours, ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Chairman. JERE COOPER, Vice Chairman. Page iv [Blank] Page v C O N T E N T S ................................................................... Page Foreword ........................................................... xi Introductory statement ............................................ xiii Part I. Diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack .......... 1 Japanese record of deceit and aggression ........................ 1 Fundamental differences between American and Japanese policies .. 4 Steps taken by the United States to meet the threat of Axis aggression...................................................... 10 Initial United States-Japanese negotiations: 1941 ................ 13 Japanese proposal of May 12 ...................................... 14 Japanese reaction to German invasion of Russia ................... 15 Temporary cessation of negotiations .............................. 16 Freezing of assets ............................................... 18 Resumption of negotiations and proposed meeting of President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye ................................... 19 Japanese proposals of September 6 and 27 ......................... 26 Advent of the Tojo Cabinet ....................................... 28 Arrival of Saburo Kurusu ......................................... 30 Negotiations versus deadlines .................................... 32 Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and the modus vivendi .......... 32 United States memorandum of November 26 .......................... 38 Fraudulent nature of Japanese diplomacy_November 28 to December 7 ..................................................... 42 Diplomatic and military liaison in Washington .................... 43 Conclusions ...................................................... 47 Part II. The Japanese attack and its aftermath ..................... 53 Formulation of the plan and date for execution ................... 53 Nature of the plan ............................................... 54 Departure for the attack ......................................... 56 Execution of the attack .......................................... 57 Air phase ..................................................... 57 Submarine phase ............................................... 62 Withdrawal of the striking force ................................. 63 Damage to United States naval forces and installations as a result of the attack .................................................. 64 Damage to United States Army forces and installations as a result of the attack .................................................. 65 Japanese losses .................................................. 65 Summary comparison of losses ..................................... 65 State of readiness to meet the attack ............................ 66 Attack a surprise .............................................. 66 Personnel ...................................................... 66 Antiaircraft ................................................... 67 Aircraft ....................................................... 68 Action taken following the attack ................................ 68 Defensive forces and facilities of the Navy at Hawaii ............ 69 Defensive forces and facilities of the Army at Hawaii ............ 70 Comparison of strength and losses: Japanese attacking force and Hawaiian defensive forces ...................................... 70 Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii ............................... 75 Consciousness of danger from air attack .......................... 75 Admiral Kimmel's awareness of danger from air attack ........... 75 General Short's awareness of danger from air attack ............ 79 Plans for the defense of Hawaiian coastal frontier ............. 81 Concept of the war in the Pacific .............................. 87 Conclusions with respect to consciousness of danger from air attack ....................................................... 88 VI C O N T E N T S Part III. Responsibilities in Hawaii-Continued Page Information supplied Admiral Kimmel by Washington indicating the imminence of war .............................................. 89 Information supplied General Short by Washington indicating the imminence of war .............................................. 100 Action taken by Admiral Kimmel pursuant to warnings and orders from Washington ............................................... 103 Dispatch of October 16 from-Chief of Naval Operations ....... 103 Dispatch of November 24 from Chief of Naval Operations ...... 104 The "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ................... 104 Evaluation of the "War warning" dispatch of November 27 ......... 107 On where the attack might come .............................. 107 Other dispatches received on November 27 .................... 108 "Psychological handicaps" indicated by Admiral Kimmel ....... 109 The "War warning" and training .............................. 110 The term "Defensive deployment" and failure to institute distant reconnaissance .................................... 110 Action which was not taken upon receipt of the "War warning" .... 117 Estimate and action taken by General Short with respect to the warning dispatch of November 27 ............................... 119 No warning of attack on Hawaii .............................. 120 Dispatches indicating threat of sabotage .................... 121 "Do-Don't" character of the November 27 dispatch and "Avoidance of war" ........................................ 123 Commanding general's reliance on the Navy .................... 125 Interference with training ................................... 125 The order to undertake reconnaissance ........................... 126 The Short reply ................................................. 128 Action which was not taken upon receipt of the November 27 dispatch ...................................................... 129 The "Code destruction" intelligence ............................. 130 General Short's knowledge of destruction of confidential matter by Japanese consulate ......................................... 131 The "Lost" Japanese carriers-Radio intelligence at Hawaii ....... 133 The "Mori" call ................................................. 137 Detection of Japanese submarine on morning of December 7 ........ 138 Radar detection of Japanese raiding force ....................... 140 Other intelligence received by Army and Navy in Hawaii .......... 142 Channels of intelligence ..................................... 142 The "Manila message" ......................................... 142 The Honolulu press ........................................... 142 The role of espionage in the attack ............................. 145 Liaison between Admiral Kimmel and General Short ................ 150 Estimate of the situation ....................................... 153 Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington ........................... 159 Basing the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii .............................. 159 Defensive facilities available in Hawaii ........................ 163 Transfer of Pacific Fleet units to the Atlantic ................. 167 "ABCD" understanding? ........................................... 168 Avoidance of war ................................................ 172 Intelligence available in Washington ............................ 179 The "Magic" .................................................. 179 Policy with respect to dissemination of magic ................ 180 "Ships in harbor" reports ....................................... 181 Nature of consular espionage ................................. 181 Conclusions with respect to "Ships in harbor" reports ........ 189 The "Winds code" ................................................ 191 "Hidden word" code .............................................. 192 The "Deadline messages" ......................................... 193 Dispatches indicating fraudulent nature of negotiations after November 28, 1941 ............................................. 195 Status of diplomatic negotiations and the Army dispatch of November 27 ................................................... 198 Failure to follow-up on the Short reply of November 28 .......... 201 The "Berlin message" ............................................ 204 Code destruction intelligence ................................... 205 The McCollum dispatch ........................................... 206 VII C O N T E N T S Part IV. Responsibilities in Washington-Continued Page Events of December 6 and 7, 1941 ................................ 209 The "Pilot message" ........................................... 210 The fourteen part memorandum .................................. 211 First thirteen parts ........................................ 211 Analysis and significance of first thirteen parts proper .... 212 Military significance of "Pilot" and "13-part" messages apart from messages proper ................................ 219 The fourteenth part ....................................... 221 "One o'clock" and final code destruction messages ............... 222 Events attending transmittal of the December 7 dispatch ...... 224 Choice of facilities ......................................... 225 Significance of the "One o'clock" and code destruction messages ................................................... 226 Significant messages translated after the attack ................ 228 Intelligence concerning Hawaiian defenses ..................... 228 Considerations responsible for delays in translations ......... 230 Conclusions with respect to intelligence available in Washington which was not supplied Hawaii ...................... 232 Estimate of the situation in Washington ......................... 234 Nature of responsibilities ...................................... 237 Duties in Hawaii ............................................. 237 Duties in Washington ......................................... 238 Unity of command ................................................ 240 General observations ............................................ 245 The "Wyman Matter" ........................................... 245 The Philippine Attack ........................................ 246 Prior inquiries concerning the Pearl Harbor attack ........... 246 Part V. Conclusions and recommendations ........................... 251 Conclusions with respect to responsibilities .................... 251 Recommendations ................................................. 252 Supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies in our military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl Harbor investigation .......................................... 253 Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility ...... 254 Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the alerting of subordinates ................... 254 Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should always be resolved in favor of supplying the information ............................................... 255 The delegation of authority or the issuance of order's entails the duty of inspection to determine that the official mandate is properly exercised .................... 255 The implementation of official orders must be followed with closest supervision ....................................... 256 The maintenance of alertness to responsibility must be insured through repetition ................................ 256 Complacency and procrastination are out of place where sudden and decisive action are of the essence ............. 257 The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in times of stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials ................................................. 257 The unapproachable or superior attitude of officials is fatal: There should never be any hesitancy in asking for clarification of instructions or in seeking advice on matters that are in doubt ................................. 258 There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials ..... 259 Communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness, and appropriateness ....................... 259 There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information received and every effort should be made to insure that the paraphrased material reflects the true meaning of the original .................................................. 260 Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of unusual situations .......................... 261 Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the organization .............................................. 261 There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident .. 262 Officials should at all times give subordinates the benefit of significant information ................................ 262 VIII C O N T E N T S Part V. Conclusions and recommendation-Continued Page Supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies in our military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl Harbor investigation-Continued An official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his organization should forfeit his responsibility ... 263 Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any eventuality ....................................... 263 Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an official instruction ...................................... 263 Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization ... 264 Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu of liaison or confused therewith where the latter is necessary to the proper functioning of two or more agencies .................................................. 264 No considerations should be permitted as excuse for failure to perform a fundamental task ............................. 265 Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors informed ............................. 285 The administrative organization of any establishment must be designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility .. 265 In a well-balanced organization there is close correlation of responsibility and authority .............................. 266 Committee members signing the report ............................ 266 Additional views of Mr. Keefe ................................... 266 Appendix A. Prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor attack .......................................................... 269 The Roberts Commission .......................................... 269 The Hart Inquiry ................................................ 269 The Army Pearl Harbor Board ..................................... 269 The Navy Court of Inquiry ....................................... 270 The Clarke Inquiry .............................................. 270 The Clausen Investigation ....................................... 270 The Hewitt Inquiry .............................................. 271 Appendix B. Names and positions of principal Army and Navy officials in Washington and at Hawaii at the time of the attack along with the leading witnesses in the various proceedings ..... 275 Organization and personnel of War Department .................. 275 Army Air Forces ............................................. 275 Organization and personnel of Navy Department ................. 276 Organization and personnel of Hawaiian Department ............. 276 Hawaiian Air Force .......................................... 277 Staff of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and United States Pacific Fleet ........................................ 277 Organization and personnel of Fourteenth Naval District .... 278 List of witnesses appearing before the Joint Committee and their assignments as of December 7, 1941 .................... 278 List of leading witnesses in prior proceedings who did not testify before the Joint Committee and their assignments as of December 7, 1941 ......................................... 279 Appendix C. Communications from the President of the United States relating to the Pearl Harbor investigation ...................... 285 Appendix D. Review of the diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic Conference in August 1941 through December 8, 1941 .............. 291 Introductory statement ........................................ 291 Brief resume of the Japanese-American conversations prior to the Atlantic Conference ..................................... 293 The Atlantic Conference (August 10-14, 1941) .................. 300 President Roosevelt warns Japan against further aggression and at the same time offers to resume the Japanese-American conversations (August 17, 1941) ............................. 302 Japan protests United States shipments of oil to Russia (August 27, 1941) ........................................... 305 Premier Konoye sends a personal message to President Roosevelt urging the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August 28, 1941) .... 306 IX C O N T E N T S Appendix D-Continued Page Germany suspects treachery (August 29-30, 1941) ................. 307 President Roosevelt replies to Premier Konoye's message (September 3, 1941) ........................................... 310 Japan presents new proposals in a new form (September 6, 1941) .. 311 Ambassador Grew supports the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August-September, 1941) ....................................... 314 Japan determines its minimum demands and its maximum concessions in the negotiations with the United States (September 6, 1941) ........................................... 316 The United States asks Japan to clarify its new proposals (October 2, 1941) ............................................. 319 Germany demands that Japan warn the United States that war between Germany and Italy and the United States would lead to war between Japan and the United States pursuant to the Tripartite Pact (October 1941) ................................ 325 The Konoye Cabinet falls, and Ambassador Nomura asks permission to return to Japan (October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5, 1941) ......................................................... 326 The Tojo Cabinet formulates its "Absolutely final proposal" (November 5, 1941) ............................................ 331 Ambassador Grew warns that war with Japan may come with "Dramatic and dangerous suddenness" (November 3, 1941) ........ 335 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appeals to Great Britain and the United States for aid (October 28-November 4, 1941) ........... 337 Japan delivers its next-to-last proposal to the United States (November 10, 1941) ........................................... 344 The Tojo Cabinet refuses to consider any suggestion less favorable to Japan than its" Absolutely final proposal" (November 18-19, 1941) ........................................ 355 Japan delivers its "Absolutely final proposal" to the United States and demands an agreement on that basis (November 20, 1941) ........................................... 360 The United States replies (November 26, 1941) ................... 363 The Tojo Cabinet makes a pretense of continuing the Japanese- American conversations and at the same time moves additional Japanese troops into southern Indochina (November 27-December 7, 1941) ................................ 387 The invasion of Thailand by Japanese forces from French Indochina appears imminent (December 1-7, 1941) ......................... 405 Germany tells Japan the time is ripe to strike at the United States, and promises to join with Japan in war against the United States (November 29, 1941) ............................. 409 President Roosevelt returns to Washington as the far eastern situation moves rapidly toward a climax (December 1, 1941) .... 411 President Roosevelt asks the Japanese Government to explain its purpose in moving additional troops into southern Indochina (December 2, 1941) ............................................. 415 The Japanese Government claims its troop movements in French Indochina are for the purpose of defense against an attack by the Chinese (December 5, 1941) ................................ 421 The last hours (December 6-8, 1941) ............................. 424 Appendix E. The "Winds Code" ...................................... 469 Establishment and nature of the "Winds Code" .................... 469 Efforts to monitor .............................................. 471 Considerations bearing on the possibility of a message in execution of the "Winds Code" having been received prior to December 7, 1941 .............................................. 471 Considerations militating against likelihood of "Winds Code" execute message having been received prior to December 7, 1941 .............................................. 475 Appendix F. Geographical considerations and Navy and Army installations ................................................... 489 Geographical considerations ................................... 489 Navy and Army installations ................................... 490 Navy ........................................................ 490 Army ........................................................ 491 Illustrations ................................................. 499 CONTENTS OF THE MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT Duty of the committee ............................................. 495 Fundamental questions before the joint committee .................. 496 Difficulties facing the joint committee and incompleteness of the record .......................................................... 497 Form of this report ............................................... 502 Conclusions of fact and responsibility ............................ 503 Conclusions restated with supporting evidence [1] ................. 506 No. 1-(Growing tension with Japan) .............................. 506 No. 2-(Washington's tactics pending Japanese attack) ............ 510 No. 3-(Likelihood of attack by December 1, 1941) ................ 511 No. 4-(Washington's tactics of waiting for the firing of "the first shot' by the Japanese) .............................. 512 No. 5-(Failure to employ Washington organization and facilities to warn Hawaiian commanders) ................................. 513 No. 6-(Intercepted information respecting Japanese war plans) ... 514 No. 7-(Distribution of intercepted information to high authorities in Washington) ............................................ 520 No. 8-(Expectation of a surprise attack by the Japanese on the United States) ........................................... 521 No. 9-(Probability of an attack on Hawaii) ...................... 521 No. 10-(Obligation of Washington authorities to alert outpost commanders for war) ...................................... 524 No. 11-(Responsibility of Washington authorities in view of the decision to await Japanese attack) ....................... 530 No. 12-(Obligation of Washington to send clear instructions to the Hawaiian commanders .................................. 530 No. 13-(Conflicting messages to Hawaiian commanders) ............ 532 No. 14-(Failure of Washington authorities to emphasize probability, of a Pearl Harbor attack) ................... 537 No. 15-(Delays, confusion, and ,negligence of officers in Washington) .............................................. 538 No. 16-(President Roosevelt's failure to enforce cooperation between high military authorities in Washington) ......... 540 No. 17-(Failure of Washington to allocate adequate material to the Hawaiian commanders) ................................. 543 No. 18-(Washington's responsibility for the competence of subordinate officers) .................................... 553 No. 19-(Interdependent responsibilities of Washington and Hawaii) 553 No. 20-(Failure of the President to take instant Executive action on December 6 and 7) .............................. 565 No. 21-(American people not to blame for Pearl Harbor) .......... 570 Conclusion ...................................................... 572 Summary of responsibilities ....................................... 572 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK XI FOREWORD On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, the United States and Japan were at peace. Japanese ambassadors were in Washington in conversation with our diplomatic officials looking to a general settlement of differences in the Pacific. At 7:55 a. m. (Hawaiian time) over 300 Japanese planes launched from 6 aircraft carriers attacked the island of Oahu and the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii. Within a period of less than 2 hours our military and naval forces suffered a total of 3,435 casualties in personnel and the loss of or severe damage to: 188 planes of all types, 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, and 4 miscellaneous vessels. The attack was well planned and skillfully executed. The Japanese raiders withdrew from the attack and were recovered by the carriers without the latter being detected, having suffered losses of less than 100 in personnel, 29 planes, and 5 midget submarines which had been dispatched from mother craft that coordinated their attack with that of the planes. One hour after Japanese air and naval forces had struck the Territory of Hawaii the emissaries of Japan delivered to the Secretary of State a reply to a recent American note, a reply containing no suggestion of attack by Japan upon the United States. With the benefit of information now available it is known that the Japanese military had planned for many weeks the unprovoked and ambitious act of December 7. The Pyrrhic victory of having executed the attack with surprise, cunning, and deceit belongs to the war lords of Japan whose dreams of conquest were buried in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. History will properly place responsibility for Pearl Harbor upon the military clique dominating the people of Japan at the time. Indeed, this responsibility Premier Tojo himself has already assumed. We come today, over 4 years after the event, not to detract from this responsibility but to record for posterity the facts of the disaster. In another sense we seek to find lessons to avoid pitfalls in the future to evolve constructive suggestions for the protection of our national security, and to determine whether there were failures in our own military and naval establishments which in any measure may have contributed to the extent and intensity of the disaster. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK XII [Blank] PEARL HARBOR ATTACK XIII INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT On November 15, 1945 the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack held its first public hearings pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 27, Seventy-Ninth Congress, first session, as follows: [1] IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES September 6, 1945 Mr. BARKLEY submitted the follow concurrent resolution, which was considered, modified, and agreed to SEPTEMBER 11, 1945 House concurs CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there is hereby established a joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, to be composed of five Members of the Senate (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the President pro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more than three of whom shall be members of the majority party), to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. Vacancies in the membership of the committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the ease of the original selection. The committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members. SEC. 2. The committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946, the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable. SEC. 3. The testimony of any person in the armed services, and the fact that such person testified before the joint committee herein provided for, shall not be used against him in any court proceeding, or held against him in examining his military status for credits in the service to which he belongs. SEC. 4. (a) The committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Seventy-Ninth Congress (prior to January 3, 1946), to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding, and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words. (b) The committee is empowered to appoint and fix the compensation of such experts, consultants, and clerical and stenographic assistants as it deems necessary, but the compensation so fixed shall not exceed the compensation prescribed under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, for comparable duties. (c) The expenses of the committee, which shall not exceed $25,000, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the con- [1] The authority of the committee is to be found in S. Con. Res. No. 27, 79th Cong. 1st sess., passed by the Senate on September 6, 1945, and concurred in by the House of Representatives on September 11, 1945, and as extended by both Houses under S. Con. Res. No. 49. 79th Cong., 1st sess., and by S. Con. Res. No. 54. 79th Cong., 2d sess. XIV INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT tingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by the chairman. Passed the Senate September 6, 1945. Attest: LESLIE L. BIFFLE, Secretary. Passed the House of Representatives September 11, 1945. Attest: SOUTH TRIMBLE, Clerk. On 70 days subsequent to November 15 and prior to and including May 31, 1945, open hearings were conducted in the course of which some 15,000 pages of testimony were taken and a total of 183 exhibits received incident to an examination of 43 witnesses. Of assistance to the committee and its work were the testimony and exhibits of seven prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor attack, including inquiries conducted by the Roberts Commission. [2] Admiral Thomas C. Hart, [3] the Army Pearl Harbor Board, [4] the Navy Court of Inquiry, [5] Col. Carter W. Clarke, [6] Maj. Henry C. Clausen, [7] and Admiral H. Kent Hewitt. [8] For purposes of convenient reference there has been set forth in appendix A to this report a statement concerning the scope and character of each of these prior proceedings, the records of which total 9,754 printed pages of testimony from 318 witnesses and the attendant 469 exhibits. The records of these proceedings have been incorporated as exhibits to the record of the committee which encompasses approximately 10,000,000 words. All witnesses appeared under oath and were afforded the fullest opportunity to offer any and all information which was regarded as having any relationship whatever to the disaster. In the course of examination by committee counsel and the committee members themselves, an effort was made to elicit all facts having an immediate or remote bearing on the tragedy of December 7, 1941. It is believed the committee has succeeded through its record in preserving for posterity the material facts concerning the disaster. The figures and witnesses in the drama of Pearl Harbor ran the gamut of officials of the executive branch of the Government. The principal personalities in the picture were the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt; the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull; the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson; the Secretary of Navy Frank Knox; the Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall; the Chief of Naval Operations. Harold R. Stark; the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet Husband E. Kimmel; and the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, Walter C. Short. In appendix B to this report there are set forth the names and positions of the ranking Army and Navy officials in Washington and at Hawaii at the time of the attack along with the principal witnesses in the various proceedings. The committee's investigation has extended to the files of all pertinent branches of the Government. Instructions in this regard from the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, to various departments will be found in appendix C to this report. The committee through its counsel requested Miss Grace Tully, custodian of the files of the late President Roosevelt, to furnish the committee all [1] For proceedings of the Roberts Commission, see committee exhibit No. 143. [2] For proceedings of the Hart Inquiry, see committee exhibit No. 144. [3] For proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, see committee exhibit No. 145. [4] For proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, see committee exhibit No. 146. [5] For proceedings of the Clarke investigation, see committee exhibit No. 147. [6] For report of investigation conducted by Major Clausen, see committee exhibit No. 148. [7] For proceedings of the Hewitt inquiry, see committee exhibit No. 149. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT XV papers in these files for the year 1941 relating to Japan, the imminence of war in the Pacific, and the general Far Eastern developments. She furnished such papers in response to this request as she considered might be involved and stood ready to testify before the committee at any time. All parties in interest have attested to the fact that they have been afforded a full, fair, and impartial public hearing before the committee. All witnesses who retained counsel-Admiral Stark, Admiral Kimmel, and General Short-were given the opportunity to be examined by their counsel if they so desired, and to submit questions to committee counsel to be asked other witnesses. The following action was not taken by the committee for the reasons indicated: (1) Former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was not called before the committee as a witness for the reason that his health would not permit. Mr. Stimson did, however, submit a statement under oath for the committee's consideration and the answers supplied by him to interrogatories propounded were considered by the committee. He supplied the portions of his personal diary requested by committee counsel and informed the committee that the portions of his diary now in evidence are the only portions thereof having any relationship to the Pearl Harbor investigation. (2) Former Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew appeared before the committee as a witness and testified to material appearing in his personal diary having a relationship to the events and circumstances of the Pearl Harbor attack. On the basis of his personal representation that no additional material pertinent to the subject of the committee's inquiry appeared in his diary beyond that to which he had testified, the committee did not formally request or otherwise seek to require the production of Mr. Grew's complete diary. (3) A request by one member of the committee for the appearance of the former Prime Minister of England, Mr. Winston Churchill, was disapproved by a majority of the committee. At the time Mr. Churchill was a guest in the United States and it was not felt that he should with propriety be requested to appear as a witness. (4) A request by one member of the committee for production by the State Department of all papers relating to the so-called Tyler Kent case was disapproved by a majority of the committee. The State Department had advised that these papers were in no way pertinent to the subject of the committee's inquiry, and, additionally, members of the committee had discussed the question with Mr. Kent who advised that he possessed no facts that would in any way have relationship to the Pearl Harbor attack. Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull appeared before the committee but was forced to retire by reason of failing health before completion of the examination by all members of the committee. Mr. Hull subsequently responded to interrogatories propounded by the committee. The committee has conceived its duty to be not only that of indicating the nature and scope of responsibility for the disaster but also of recording the pertinent considerations relating to the greatest defeat in our military and naval history. Only through a reasonable amount of detail is it possible to place events and responsibilities in their proper perspective and give to the Nation a genuine appreciation of the salient facts concerning Pearl Harbor. For this reason our report is XVI INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT of somewhat greater length than was initially believed necessary. It is to be recalled in this connection, however that the over-all record of the committee comprehends some ten million words. It was felt therefore that the story of the antecedent, contemporaneous, and succeeding events attending the disaster could not be properly encompassed within a report any more concise than that herewith submitted. We believe there is much to be learned of a constructive character as a result of the Japanese attack from the standpoint of legislation and, additionally, for guidance in avoiding the possibility of another military disaster such as Pearl Harbor. Accordingly, in the section devoted to recommendations there are set forth, in addition to the recommendations proper, a series of principles, based on errors revealed by the investigation, which are being commended to our military and naval services for their consideration and possible assistance. Our report does not purport to set forth or refer to all of the enormous volume of testimony and evidence adduced in the course of the Pearl Harbor investigation. It is believed, however that the material facts relevant to the disaster have been outlined in the report. The committee's record and the records of all prior investigations have been printed and are available for review and study. It is to be borne in mind that the findings and conclusions are based on the facts presently in our record after an exhaustive investigation. We desire to acknowledge particular gratitude to those who have acted as counsel to the committee for their excellent work during the course of the investigation and for their magnificent assistance in compiling the facts for the committee in order that we might draw our conclusions, which are necessarily those of the committee only. In the following pages an effort has been made to present a review of the diplomatic and historical setting of the Pearl Harbor attack followed by a picture of the Japanese attack itself. Set forth thereafter are separate treatments of responsibilities in Hawaii on the one hand and responsibilities in Washington on the other. Situations existing in our Army and Navy establishments having a proximate or causative relationship to the disaster have been distinguished from those which, while not to be condoned, are regarded as having no direct or reasonable bearing on the conditions prevailing at Hawaii, preceding and in the wake of the Japanese attack on Sunday morning December 7, 1941. To assist in following and better appreciating the story of the attack there has been outlined in appendix F the geographical considerations and military installations playing a role in and relating to the disaster. Throughout the report italics have been freely employed to facilitate reading and to bring out more clearly matters regarded as of particular importance. [In the ASCII version, italics will be indicated by asterisks at the beginning and ending of each italicized section. LWJ]

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