21-30 November 1941

21 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#810
"Formal note" See doc.
21 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#811
"In case you use Proposal "B"*for an agreement, as an introductory paragraph please tentatively incorporatethe following draft: "See doc.
21 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
#969
"For this reason, we would like to avoid the rise of any violence at this time. At the same time, we would like to break up the policy of British-U. S.-U. S. S. R. joint action." See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#812
"There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you-twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date." See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#815
"The Anti-Comintern Agreement runs out on the 24th, and for some time we have been conferring with the signatories. It has been decided that this agreement shall be in effect for five more years and that on the 25th in Berlin, Japan, Germany, Italy, Manchukuo, Hungary,and Spain will all six sign the protocol." See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#816.
"Well, if they will accept our proposal "B", we will have no objection to letting President ROOSEVELT be our introducer."See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#817
"I take it that the "B" plan which you proposed on the 20th included the second clause of (5) relative to moving troops from southern to northern French Indo-China, and left out (6) concerning non-discrimination in commerce and (7) the Tri-Partite Treaty. AmI right?" See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Panama
(Akiyama)
To: Tokyo
#321
"I suppose you are already acquainted with these facts but the manner of defending the canal is now as follows:" See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#785
"A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier #7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown." See doc.
22 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1158
"Insofar as the latter part of that message is concerned, on the occasion of the interview outlined in my #1147,[b] no reference was made to this matter. However, after they have studied the matter, they will doubtless present some opinions concerning it." See doc.
23 November 1941
From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1159
"However, they said, we are not sure of Japan's real intentions as yet, for while on the one hand she apparently indicates her desire for peace by dispatching a special envoy, the tone of the politicians and press of Japan seems to be in direct opposition." See doc.
23 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1160
"Secretary Hull and I conferred for about a half an hour on the 21st to arrange our talks for the 22nd. At that time Hull said that he thought my idea of attaching so much importance to the agreement that it would outshine the Tripartite Pact, as expressed by me during our talks on the 18th, was wholeheartedly in favor of peace on the Pacific through joint action of the United States and Japan, and through this accomplishment, to contribute to the peace of the world." See doc.
23 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1161
"Trade between Japan and the United States could gradually be resumed if Japan were willing to take a peaceful attitude, representatives of foreign powers that are friendly with the United States met in conference yesterday." See doc.
24 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#821
"It seems that the United States as well as England, Australia, and the Netherlands is not satisfied with evacuation merely from the Southern part of French Indo-China. We have gone out of our way to venture this proposal in order to break the deadlock. We absolutely cannot make any further concessions." See doc.
24 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#822.
"The movement of Japanese troops from southern French Indo-China to the north is very important from a military standpoint. The occupation of northern French Indo-China is related to the basic settlement of the China incident, whereas the occupation of the southern portion was related to the freezing of funds by England and America." See doc.
24 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#823
"For both Ambassadors. The time limit setin my message #812 [a] is in Tokyo time." See doc.
24 November 1941 From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
#234
Re your #114
"According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns." See doc.
24 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#789
"Putting together various reports, it appears that a large amount of military stores was removed from the "port area" during the "blackout" on the night of the 21st." See doc.
25 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Nanking
#499
"We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while." See doc.
25 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1177
"Hence the Japanese correspondents here are transmitting various trends of the negotiations copied from newspaper articles here that are based on pure conjecture. Among these correspondents are those who recognize that the articles are valueless but who are being pressed by the head office for news." See doc.
25 November 1941 From: Hanoi
To: Tokyo
#118
"We are advised by the military that we are to have a reply from the United States on the 25th. If this is true, no doubt the Cabinet will make a decision between peace and war within the nextday or two." See doc.
25 November 1941 From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
#849
"In the event of the Empire's taking decisive action in a southward advance, it will of course be necessary in th eexercise of a belligerent's rights to make clear the relations of sovereign and subjects. On the one hand it will be absolutely necessary to bring Thai into our camp."See doc.
25 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#790
" Onthe 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Holland* (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port." See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Washington
#830
"It seems that the American newspapers think that there is a connection between the question of withdrawing our army from French Indo-China and that of the freezing of assets" See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#833
"When you reach a settlement in accordance with our new proposal, it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods in connection with clauses 2 and 3 of that proposal. Of these goods, the acquisition of petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent requirements of the Empire." See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#836
"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long." See doc.
26 November 1941 (1745 EST)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
(Telephone code)*
"Call me by telephone again upon completion of today's meeting."See doc.
26 November 1941
(1946 to 1953 EST)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
(Telephone Code)**
"I have made all efforts, but they will not yield.quot; See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1180
"As we have wired you several times,there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so." See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1189.
"At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:" See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1190
"Judging from the progress of present Japanese-American relations, with which you are well acquainted through successive telegrams, the American proposal on the 26th (message #1189 [b]) showed agreat disparity between the demands of both parties. Unfortunately, there are no hopes of acceptance of our demands within the time limit you set." See doc.
26 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1191
"On the 26th at the request of Secretary HULL, KURUSU and I visited him. First of all, we read over cursorily the documents he handed us, which we sent you in separate messages #1192 [a],1193 [b] and 1194 [c], and then engaged in an argument." See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#841
"Please make the following corrections throughout the entire English text of the B Proposal:" See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Washington
#842
"In the middle of your message #1280*, there is the part which mentions that the United States might make a protective occupation of the Dutch East Indies. Now this is a very important matter, and a point which we would like know more about." See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
Circular #2409
"With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of despatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully." See doc.
27 November 1941
(2327-2334 EST)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
(Telephone Code)
"(Conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief, Yamamoto.)" See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1204
"The United States has been conferring with the Netherlands on subjects pertaining to U. S. claims and because we asked them to do so. In the midst of these talks, the White House suddenly came forth with the announcement on the 24th, that the United States is occupying Dutch Guiana, with the agreement of the government of the Netherlands, for the purpose of protecting it." See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1206
"Your recent proposal will no doubt be the cause of painful disappointment to the Japanese Government." See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Washington
To: Tokyo
#1206
"There are other factors other than those pointed out by the President. Japan has sent vast numbers of troops to French Indo-China with which to keep the military powers of other countries checked. With this advantage on her side, Japan carries in one hand, the Tripartite Pact, and in the other, the Anti-Communism Pact. Armed with these, she demands of the United States that petroleum be made available to her." See doc.
27 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#797
"The Portland, BUKKU*, 2 destroyers, 10 submarines, left port on the 26th (?). Destination unknown." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1214
"The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principals, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#844
"Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Honolulu
#118
"Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication being severed when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Hanoi
#93
"Even though the worst possible situation developed, and it will in all likelihood, the Imperial Government has made no decisions with regard to changing the position of the French Indo-Chinese Government." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Rio
To: Santiago
Circular #326
"There is nothing to do but break off negotiations, and our relations with England and the United States within the next few days will assuredly take a critical turn." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1209
"What the Imperial Government must, of course, consider is what Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and China, egged on by the United States, will do in case the Imperial forces invade Thailand." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1214
"The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Hsinking
To: Tokyo
#781
"In view of the situation, after conferring with the competent authorities, the following measures having to do with the treatment of British and American nationals in Manchukuo in the event that war breaks out with England and the United States are as outlined below." See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Tokyo
(Togo)
To: Honolulu
#119
Re your #243.
"Intelligences of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner:" See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Honolulu
To: Tokyo
#238
"Military report:" See doc.
28 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#799
"Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high-level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning." See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
#872
"WANITTO and SIN are keeping in touch with us through Yoshioka in regard to subsequent developments within the government, and we are giving them appropriate guidance under cover. The main points of the same are as follows: (Yoshioka's mediation in this puts him in a "delicate" position in relation to the army attaché, so this should be kept absolutely confidential within the department)." See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
#1393
"Ribbentrop: "It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan." See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Washington
(Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1216
"In the Washington special intelligence dated the 28th concerning the White House interview, President Roosevelt is the person meant where reference is made to "authoritatively stated" and to an "administration spokesman". We understand that Roosevelt particularly requested that the source be kept unclear." See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Washington
#857
"We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:" See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
#122
"We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements." See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Manila
(Nibro)
To: Tokyo
#805
"Ships in port on the 29th." See doc.
29 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: San Francisco
Circular #2431
" Make full report beginning December 1st on the following:" See doc.
30 November 1941 From: Tokyo To: Berlin #986 "Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy." See doc.
30 November 1941 From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
#985
"Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." See doc.
30 November 1941
(2230 to 2238 EST)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
Telephone Code
"Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night." See doc.
30 November 1941 From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
#1222
"Premier TOJO's speech was published here on the 30th in the newspapers under conspicuous headlines." See doc.
30 November 1941 From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
#809
"Due to the straining of international relations, we have destroyed in readiness for emergency out of the codes kept at this office the Yokohama Special Bank code, the TU code, MATU Chinese Character List (it was, of course, reported in my #806 (?)) on the 29th." See doc.