11 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #762 |
"Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736** is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time." See doc. |
11 November 1941 |
From: Panama (Akiyama) To: Tokyo #273 |
"Ships passed through Panama on 11th and 12th." See doc. |
11 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #763 |
"With regard to our representations to the United States in this matter, we have received two representations from the Germans since then." See doc. |
11 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #764 |
"The British Government is not aware of the details of the conversations being conducted in Washington. Since its success would be of interest to Britain and Japan, it is fervently hoping for the success thereof." See doc. |
11 November 1941 |
From: Washington To: Tokyo #1074 |
"After my conversation with the President, I told Hull that as the situation is urgent, I would like to meet him the same evening or this morning and go on with concrete discussion." See doc. |
12 November 1941 |
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo #1087 |
"On the 12th at 3 p. m. WAKASUGI went with me to talk with Secretary HULL. BALLANTINE sat in and we conversed for about an hour. I asked if they had any answer to our proposal and HULL gave me the oral statements contained in my #1083 [a] and #1084 [b]." See doc. |
12 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Vichy #528 |
"In the face of the ever-straining international situation, the army is endeavoring to perfect as quickly as possible military facilities in French Indo-China. As a result, they now face a great need of making certain preparations in North Indo-China which would be in violation of the NISIHARA-MARUTAN agreement, especially the clause which forbids occupation by the army of the area south of the river Auju [a]." See doc. |
12 November 1941 |
From: Panama (Akiyama) To: Tokyo #282 |
"On the night of the 11th, a British light cruiser went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic." See doc. |
12 November 1941 |
From: Manila (Nihro) To: Tokyo #753 |
"On the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port." See doc. |
12 November 1941 |
From: Manila (Nihro) To: Tokyo #754 |
"According: to a report handed on to me by a Japanese who has lived in the Province of Ilocos Norte for some fourteen or fifteen years? the following has been ascertained." See doc. |
12 November 1941 |
From: Manila (Nihro) To: Tokyo #755 |
"A report given me by a Japanese who resides in Camarines Norte [a] is follows:" See doc. |
13 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #766 |
"According to this record, the Secretary asked you, point blank, in connection with the so-called self-defense rights, for a "concrete statement of Japan's relations with the Axis powers." See doc. |
13 November 1941 |
From: Washington To: Tokyo #1089 |
"On this, the 13th, Wakasugi called on Ballantine." See doc. |
13 November 1941 |
From: Panama (Akiyama) To: Tokyo #285 |
"Panama shipping report:" See doc. |
14 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #772 |
"The time of presentation of Proposal B will be according to my instructions of today." See doc. |
14 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington |
"Points 1, 2, 3, and 4 are given in my #727 [a]." See doc. |
14 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Hongkong Cir. #2319 |
"Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:" See doc. |
14 November 1941 |
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo #1090 |
"As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare." See doc. |
15 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #774 |
"Please be aware of the fact that the "B" suggestion was taken up because we thought it might be a short cut to settlement." See doc. |
15 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #775 |
"Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736* is an absolutely immovable one." See doc. |
15 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #781 |
"Please explain to Ambassador Nomura the conditions which exist here, and at the same time describe our determinations in detail to him." See doc. |
15 November 1941 |
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo #1095 |
"The United States handed us an explanation of their stand on the "non-discriminatory treatment in commerce" matter, which I am forwarding to you as separate wire "A", numbered my message #1096*, separate wire "B", numbered my message #1097**, contains the text of their proposal involving this matter." See doc. |
15 November 1941 |
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo #1098 |
"Let us suppose that the Japanese-U. S. negotiations for the adjustment of relations between the two countries which are being conducted at present, unfortunately break down, and that, as a consequence, we pursue an unrestricted course. The following is my guess as to what would be the relationship between the United States and Japan under such circumstances." See doc. |
15 November 1941 |
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo #1106 |
"The following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 15th, the gist of which I reported to you in my message #1095*:" See doc. |
15 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington Circular #2330 |
"The following is the order and method of destroying the code machines in the event of an emergency." See doc. |
15 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo (Togo) To: Honolulu (Riyoji)#111 | " As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy." See doc. |
15 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Manila #368 Re your #746*. |
"Please ascertain by what route the large bombers went to the Philippines, and also please make investigations again as to their number." See doc. |
15 November 1941 |
From: Manila (Nihro) To: Tokyo #767 |
"1. It has been ascertained that the ship of my #757*, paragraph 2, was a British transport, the AWATEA which entered port at the same time under convoy, (12000 or 13000 tons, 700 or 800 soldiers on board)." See doc. |
15 November 1941 |
From: Manila To: Tokyo #767 |
"The following is from a report of a Japanese resident in Cebu." See doc. |
16 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington # ---- |
"I have read your #1090 [a], and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before." See doc. |
16 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #782 |
"Naturally, therefore, should the negotiations end in a failure, these points would not be binding on Japan alone. We wish to have this clearly understood." See doc. |
16 November 1941 |
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo #1107 |
"ARMSTRONG then informed TERASAKI that during the last two days something happened, apparently, to make the President strongly desire the maintenance of peace between Japan and the United States." See doc. |
17 November 1941 |
From: Washington (Nomura). To: Tokyo #1113 |
"However, I stated that the intentions of the Japanese Government were peaceful, however as we see it the situation is very acute. To this the President replied that America also desired to preserve the peace of the Pacific." See doc. |
17 November 1941 |
From: Washington To: Tokyo #1114 |
"According to him, Williamson, the stumbling points in the Japanese U. S. negotiations are the Tripartite Pact and the matters pertaining to the China incident. A solution in so far as it involves the actual points is apparently quite possible from both the United States and Japanese viewpoints." See doc. |
17 November 1941 |
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo #1118 |
"There are at present three problems causing a deadlock between Japan and the United States: They are: Equality in commerce, the Tri-partite Agreement, and evacuation." See doc. |
17 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #783 |
"We have no objections to have it apply to the entire Pacific area. Therefore, we shall not object to your deleting the word"southwesternfrom Article 6 of our prop" osal of 25 September. " See doc. |
17 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #784 |
"By "in the event that the principle of non-discriminatory treatment is applied to the entire world", we mean that the Imperial Government desires that said principle would be applied uniformly throughout the world. Upon the realization of this hope, we anticipate that the principle will be applied on China as well." See doc. |
17 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #785 |
"In view of the fact that "materials necessary for one's own country's safety and for self-defense" shall be an exception, there is a danger that even after the agreement is entered into, they will put some restrictions on the exporting of petroleum." See doc. |
17 November 1941 |
From: Washington To: Tokyo. #1127 |
"The most emphasis in the talks between Hull, I, and Ambassador Kurusu on the 18th, (lasting about three hours), was placed on matters pertaining to the Triple Alliance." See doc. |
17 November 1941 |
From: Manila (Nihro) To: Tokyo #769 |
"On the morning of the 17th the ... left port." See doc. |
17 November 1941 |
From: Honkong (Yano) To: Ottawa Unnumbered Hongkong to Tokyo #542 |
"There have been rumors to the effect that the Canada army troops would soon be sent to the Orient." See doc. |
18 November 1941 |
From: Washington To: Tokyo #1129 |
"During my talks with Hull on the 18th it became evident that he is thinking about readjusting the economic situation of the world after the conclusion of this war and that he has only a passing interest in the various problems of China." See doc. |
18 November 1941 |
From: Washington To: Tokyo #1131 |
"On the 18th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull at 10:30 in the morning and we conversed for two hours and forty-five minutes." See doc. |
18 November 1941 |
From: Washington To: Tokyo #1133 |
"According to Ambassador Nomura's and my own observations, the President is maintaining a very self-composed attitude outwardly, but he seems also to be very much in earnest in regard to effecting an understanding between Japan and the United States." See doc. |
18 November 1941 |
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo #1134 |
"In our conversations of today, as a practical means of alleviating the ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful situation, as well as, to bring about a return to the situation existing before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested the evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China." See doc. |
18 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #788 |
"We will at this sailing have the families of our various diplomatic officials as well as members of their staffs who must return to Japan, without an exception, board the ship. However, we do not intend to warn any save those of our residents who must of a certainty return to sail." See doc. |
18 November 1941 |
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo #1135 |
"The President is very desirous of an understanding between Japan and the United States. In his latest speech he showed that he entertained no ill will towards Japan." See doc. |
18 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo (Togo) To: Honolulu #113 |
"Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein:See doc. |
18 November 1941 |
From: Panama (Akiyama) To: Tokyo #300 |
"On the 18th, one British ship and one Netherlands vessel of approximately 17,000 tons went through the Canal in the direction of the Pacific." See doc. |
18 November 1941 |
From: Manila To: Tokyo #757 |
"The CA heavy cruiser of my #753* was the Portland." See doc. |
18 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo (Togo) To: Singapore #353 |
"----- ----- that a squadron consisting of eight ships of the 15,000 ton class and ten other boats set out from port on November 4th with about 10,000British troops, including many aviators heading for the Malay States.See doc. |
19 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington Circular #2353 |
"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast." See doc. |
19 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington Circular #2354 |
"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:" See doc. |
19 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #798 |
"On the other hand, the internal situation in our country is such that it would be difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-China, merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored." See doc. |
19 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #799 |
"Now that matters have progressed this far, we think the only way to reach a full solution is to conclude an agreement now on a few absolutely essential items in order to prevent matters from going from bad to worse by long-view political adjustments, thus first of all avoiding the danger of an outbreak of war." See doc. |
19 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #800 |
"All the main items shall be considered and settled by the two governments before signatures are affixed to this agreement." See doc. |
19 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #801 |
"The government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present agreement." See doc. |
19 November 1941 |
From: Washington To: Tokyo #1136 |
"I know that it is beyond our powers to imagine the anxiety felt by the Cabinet leaders who bear the heavy responsibility of saving the nation and succoring the people at this time when relations between Japan and the United States have now at last reached the point of cruciality. There are now three ways which the Empire might take" See doc. |
19 November 1941 |
From: Washington To: Tokyo #1140 |
"We assume that the date, 25 November, mentioned in your message #736**, is an absolutely unalterable one. We are making all our arrangements with that as the basis." See doc. |
19 November 1941 |
From: Honolulu (Kita) To: Tokyo #222 |
"The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219 [a] on that day." See doc. |
20 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo To: Washington #806 |
"We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock except for you to push negotiations immediately along the lines of the latter part of our #798." See doc. |
20 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo (Togo) To: Ankara Circular #2364 |
"In the light of the trend of past negotiations there is considerable doubt as to whether a settlement of the negotiations will be reached." See doc. |
20 November 1941 |
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo #1144 |
"On everything else HULL expressed no noteworthy differences of opinion, however, when we came to the part about the United States doing nothing to obstruct our efforts for a comprehensive peace with China, he showed that he was terribly aroused." See doc. |
20 November 1941 |
To: Tokyo From: Washington #1147 |
"Our conversation with HULL on the 20th may be summarized as follows:" See doc. |
20 November 1941 |
From: Washington (Nomura) To: Tokyo #1148 |
"Secretary of State HULL, in the conversations I detailed in my #1144 [a], expressed his satisfaction that in the last two or three days Japanese newspaper editorial comment on the United States had become calm." See doc. |
20 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo (Togo) To: Honolulu #111 |
"Please investigate comprehensively the fleet - - - - - bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation." See doc. |
20 November 1941 |
From: Panama (Akiyama) To: Tokyo #310 |
"1. On the 19th and 20th, four American cargo ships, one British cargo ship and one tanker, and one French - - - - -, passed across to the Pacific." See doc. |
20 November 1941 |
From: Manila (Nihro) To: Tokyo #693 |
"The Houston, the Marblehead, eight destroyers, ten submarines (of the 170 and 190 class) and one mine layer left port on the morning of the 20th." See doc. |
20 November 1941 |
From: Tokyo (Togo) To: Manila #372 |
"Please advise immediately the results of your investigations as to the type of drift ----- presumed to be in the waters adjacent to Subic Bay [a]." See doc. |