I

 

THE FATEFUL DECADE

 

THE FATEFUL decade, 1931-1941, began and ended with acts of violence by Japan. It was marked by the ruthless development of a determined policy of world domination on the part of Japan, Germany, and Italy.

In 1931 Japan seized Manchuria. Two years later Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and began rearming. In 1934 Japan gave notice of termination of the Washington Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament.

In 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia. In 1936 Hitler tore up the Treaty of Locarno and fortified the demilitarized Rhineland Zone. In 1937 Japan again attacked China. In 1938 Hitler occupied Austria and dismembered Czechoslovakia. During the first half of 1939 Hitler completed the destruction of Czechoslovakia and seized Memel, while Italy invaded Albania.

In September 1939 Hitler struck at Poland, and during the two years that followed almost all of the countries of Europe were plunged or dragged into war. In 1940 Japan with threats of force entered French Indochina. Finally, on December 7, 1941, Japan launched an armed attack on the United States, followed immediately by declarations of war against the United States on the part of Japan, of Germany, of Italy, and of their satellites.

In the face of these multiplying instances of treaty-breaking, of violence, and of open warfare, the United States followed a policy the successive stages of which are summed up here.

During the years preceding the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, the Government of the United States directed much of its energies toward an improvement of international relations and thus toward prevention of a breakdown of world peace. In his inaugural address of March 4, 1933 President Roosevelt dedicated the United States to the Policy of the Good Neighbor-"the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others-the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors". The Government of the United States advocated and applied the Good Neighbor Policy in the Western Hemisphere and everywhere in the world.

After the strain and confusion of the depression years, that policy bore its first fruit at the Seventh International Conference of American States, held in December 1933 at Montevideo, which ushered in a new era of inter-American friendship and solidarity, and through

 

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PEACE AND WAR

 

the adoption by this country, in June 1934, of the reciprocal-trade-agreements program. During the ensuing years the Government of the United States strove, by word and by deed, to make its contribution toward staying the rapidly proceeding deterioration of international political relations and toward building an economic foundation of enduring world peace.

After September 1939, when the forces of aggression and conquest burst all bounds, this Government sought in every practicable way to prevent the spread of conflict, while at the same time intensifying its efforts to carry out George Washington's admonition to place the country "on a respectable defensive posture". With the collapse of France in June 1940, with the appearance of Nazi legions on the shores of Western Europe, with Hitler's "blitz" attack on Britain and his openly proclaimed bid for control of the Atlantic, which paralleled Japan's drive for mastery of the western Pacific area, the United States took measures of self-defense by giving aid to nations resisting aggression and by greatly accelerating this nation's military, naval, and air rearmament program.

The documents, and the comments which here follow, set forth various acts and measures taken by the Government of the United States in the presence of mounting dangers to our national security. They should be read in the light of certain basic factors which necessarily affect the conduct of this country's foreign relations.

The conduct of the foreign relations of the United States is a function of the President, acting usually through the Secretary of State. The powers of the Executive in this field are very broad and sweeping. Yet the President and the Secretary of-State have by no means entire freedom in matters of foreign policy. Their powers may be defined or circumscribed by legislation-or by lack thereof. They must closely approximate the prevailing views of the country. In the conduct of foreign relations they must interpret and implement not a particular point of view in the country but the point of view of the nation as a whole.

Another factual limitation is that our foreign policy, like the foreign policy of any other country, must at all times take into consideration the policies, circumstances, and reactions of other governments and peoples. Action deemed desirable by the United States may be wholly impracticable if it does not harmonize with policies of other governments whose cooperation is necessary, or if such action would excite substantial enmity or effective opposition on the part of other nations or would isolate this country at a time when close cooperation with other governments is essential.

 

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931-1941

 

In the history of our country situations have arisen in which the Executive, with wide access to many sources of information from abroad, has known of or foreseen developments in foreign relations of which the public had not yet become aware. In such cases the President and the Secretary of State have exercised such executive powers as they possess and have endeavored to explain to the public the forces at work and the probable course of events and to outline the policies which need be pursued in the best interest of the United States. In such cases, if and as legislation has been needed, the executive branch of the Government has as soon as practicable asked of the Congress legislation to make possible the pursuit of the proposed policies.

During a large part of the period with which this volume deals, much of public opinion in this country did not accept the thesis that a European war could vitally affect the security of the United States or that an attack on the United States by any of the Axis powers was possible. In this respect it differed from the President and the Secretary of State, who early became convinced that the aggressive policies of the Axis powers were directed toward an ultimate attack on the United States and that, therefore, our foreign relations should be so conducted as to give all possible support to the nations endeavoring to check the march of Axis aggression.

Our foreign policy during the decade under consideration necessarily had to move within the framework of a gradual evolution of public opinion in the United States away from the idea of isolation expressed in "neutrality" legislation and toward realization that the Axis design was a plan of world conquest in which the United States was intended to be a certain, though perhaps ultimate, victim, and that our primary policy therefore must be defense against actual and mounting danger. This was an important factor influencing the conduct of our foreign relations. Of determining importance also was another factor, namely, that in many nations outside the United States a similar complacency of view had originally prevailed and likewise was undergoing a gradual modification.

The pages which follow show the slow march of the United States from an attitude of illusory aloofness toward world-wide forces endangering America to a position in the forefront of the United Nations that are making common cause against an attempt at world conquest unparalleled alike in boldness of conception and in brutality of operation.

 

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II

 

JAPANESE CONQUEST OF MANCHURIA 1931-1932

 

Attack of September 18, 1931

 

ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1931 Japan launched an attack on Manchuria.  Within a few days Japanese armed forces had occupied several  strategic points in South Manchuria.

The United States Minister to China reported to Secretary of State  Stimson, in a telegram dated September 22, his opinion that this was  "an aggressive act by Japan", apparently long-planned, and carefully and systematically put into effect. Minister Johnson found no evidence that it was the result of accident or the act of minor and irresponsible officials. He was convinced that the Japanese military operation in Manchuria "must fall within any definition of war" and that this act of aggression had been deliberately accomplished in  "utter and cynical disregard" of Japan's obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928 for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. (1)[1]

On September 22 Secretary Stimson informed Japanese Ambassador Debuchi at Washington that the responsibility for determining the course of events with regard to liquidating the situation in Manchuria rested largely upon Japan, "for the simple reason that Japanese armed forces have seized and are exercising de-facto control in South Manchuria". (2)

Meanwhile, the League of Nations was deliberating on the Manchuria situation. Secretary Stimson instructed the United States Consul at Geneva to inform the Secretary General of the League of Nations, in a communication dated October 5, 1931, that it was most desirable that the League in no way relax its vigilance and in no way fail to assert all its pressure and authority toward regulating the action of China and Japan. Secretary Stimson stated further that this Government, acting independently, would "endeavor to reinforce what the League does" and would make clear its keen interest in the matter and its awareness of the obligations of the disputants in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty, "should a time arise when it would seem advisable to bring forward these obligations". (3)

The United States Government, in identic notes of October 20, 1931 to China and Japan, called attention to their obligations under

 

[1] The numbers within parentheses refer to the numbers of the supporting documents, 1 to 271, beginning with p. 155.

 

4


the Kellogg-Briand Pact. This Government expressed the hope that nations would refrain from measures which might lead to that they would agree upon a peaceful method for resolving their dispute "in accordance with their promises and in keeping with expectations of public opinion throughout the world".

 

“Non-Recognition Policy”

 

The Japanese Government professed a desire to continue friendly relations with China and denied that it had territorial designs in Manchuria. However, Japanese military operations continued. By the end of 1931 Japan had destroyed the last remaining administrative authority of the Government of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18 of that year. The United States Government notified the Chinese and Japanese Governments on January 7, 1932 that it could not admit the legality of any situation de facto nor did it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between these Governments which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China; that it did not intend to recognize "any situation, treaty, or agreement" which might be brought about by means contrary to the obligations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In pursuance of this policy the puppet government established by Japanese arms in Manchuria a few weeks later has not been recognized by the United States. (5)

After the hostilities between Japan and China had spread to the Shanghai area early in l932 the Japanese Government asked that the United States extend its good offices for stopping hostilities.  Thereupon, the United States made a proposal on February 2 containing the following points: cessation of all acts of violence on both sides; no further preparation for hostilities; withdrawal of both Chinese and Japanese combatants in the Shanghai area; protection of the International Settlement at Shanghai by the establishment of neutral ones; and upon acceptance of the foregoing, prompt negotiations to settle all outstanding controversies between Japan and China with the aid of neutral observers or participants.  The same proposal was made to Japan and China by the British, French and Italian Governments.  The Chinese Government promptly accepted the proposal; the Japanese Government, while accepting some of the points, rejected flatly the second and fifth points, and consequently the proposal came to no avail. (6)

In February 1932 Secretary of State Stimson proposed to the British Government that the United States and British Governments

 

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PEACE AND WAR

 

issue a joint statement invoking the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact in the Far Eastern controversy, making clear that the two Governments considered these treaties as fully binding  and declaring that they would not recognize as valid any situation created in violation of these treaties. (8)

 In a letter of February 23, 1932 to Senator Borah, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Secretary Stimson said that the situation which had developed in China could not be reconciled with the obligations set forth in the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. He referred to the statement of the United States Government of January 7 and said that if a similar policy were followed by the other governments of the world, an effective bar would be placed on the legality of any title or right sought to be obtained by pressure or treaty violation and that eventually such action would lead to restoration to China of the rights and titles of which China had been deprived. (9)

The British Government did not adopt the specific suggestion made by Secretary Stimson. Later it introduced in the Assembly of the League of Nations a resolution which was unanimously adopted; this resolution of March 11, 1932 stated in part: "it is incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris."

 

Ambassador Grew's Report on Japanese Military Spirit

 

The United States Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, reported to Secretary Stimson on August 13, 1932 the growing dangers in the existing situation. Ambassador Grew said that in Japan the deliberate building up of public animosity against foreign nations in general and the United States in particular was doubtless for the purpose of strengthening the hand of the military in its Manchuria venture in the face of foreign opposition. He stated that the Japanese military machine had been "built for war", felt prepared for war, and would "welcome war"; that it had never yet been beaten and possessed unlimited self-confidence. (10)

After consolidating their position in Manchuria the Japanese military forces proceeded, early in January 1933, to extend the boundaries of the new puppet state by the occupation of the province of Jehol in North China. The Japanese Ambassador, in a conversation of January 5 with Secretary Stimson, stated that Japan-had no territorial ambition south of the Great Wall. The Secretary reminded

 

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931 - 1941

 

the Ambassador that a year previously the latter had said that Japan had no territorial ambitions in Manchuria. The Ambassador replied that no Japanese Cabinet which advocated a compromise on the Manchuria question could survive in Japan and that the Manchuria incident must be regarded as closed. Secretary Stimson said that this Government had come to the conclusion that another war such as the World War might destroy our civilization; therefore, we were "determined to support the peace machinery which would render such a recurrence impossible". (11)

 

 Condemnation of Japanese Aggression

 

Meanwhile, the League of Nations had been considering the report of the Lytton Commission which had been appointed by the League to make an investigation of the situation in Manchuria. The Commission reported that the military operations of the Japanese in Manchuria could not be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defense; that the regime which the Japanese had set up there disregarded the wishes of the people of Manchuria and was not compatible with the fundamental principles of existing international obligations. The League Assembly adopted this report on February 24, 1933, and the Japanese delegation thereupon walked out of the Assembly. In a letter of February 25 to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, Secretary Stimson stated that the United States was in substantial accord with the findings and conclusions of the League. (12)

On March 27, 1933 Japan gave notice of its intention to withdraw from the League.

In the spring of 1933, in connection with proposed legislation to authorize the President under certain conditions to apply embargoes on the export of arms from the United States, consideration was given to the possibility of an arms embargo against Japan. In a statement made on behalf of Secretary of State Hull to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 17, 1933, it was emphasized that the United States Government concurred "in general in the findings of the Lytton Commission which place the major responsibility upon Japan for the international conflict now proceeding in China". In this statement concerning the proposed legislation, Secretary Hull said that it was not the intention of this Government to use the authority as a means of restoring peace between China and Japan. He aid that an arms embargo would not be an effective means of restoring peace in this instance; that Japan was an important producer of arms

 

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PEACE AND WAR

 

with industries sufficiently developed to supply its own needs; that China was dependent upon her importation of these commodities; that an arms embargo applied to both China and Japan would, therefore, militate against China and in favor of Japan; that an embargo directed against Japan alone would probably result in the seizure by the Japanese of arms intended for China, thus ultimately decreasing China's supply of arms and increasing Japan's supply. The Secretary stated that this Government would not be disposed to take any action which would favor the military operations of the Japanese. Further, he said that we would not under any circumstances agree to participate in an international embargo of this kind unless we had secured substantial guaranties from the Governments of all the great powers which would insure against the effects of any retaliatory measures which the Japanese might undertake. (16)

The proposed arms-embargo legislation was not enacted. (See pp. 23-24.)

 

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III

 

DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS 1932-1934

 

Statement of February 1932

 

THE FIRST General Conference for the Limitation and Reduction of Armaments assembled at Geneva in February 1932.

At the Washington Conference of 1922 the principle of limitation had been established by treaty for capital ships of the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan; at the London Naval Conference of 1930 this principle was extended to other types of warships of the United States, Great Britain, and Japan. Prior to the opening of the General Disarmament Conference in 1932, these were the principal steps taken by the nations of the world to lighten the burden of large armies and navies.

At the beginning of this conference Ambassador Hugh Gibson, speaking for the United States delegation, said that civilization was, threatened by the burden and dangers of the gigantic machinery of warfare then being maintained. He recalled that practically all the nations of the world had pledged themselves not to wage aggressive war. Therefore, he said, the conference should devote itself to the abolition of weapons devoted primarily to aggressive war. Among the points advocated by Ambassador Gibson were the following: Special restrictions for tanks and heavy mobile guns, which were considered to be arms peculiarly for offensive operations; computation of the number of armed forces on the basis of the effectives necessary for the maintenance of internal order plus some suitable contingent for defense; abolition of lethal gases and bacteriological warfare; effective measures to protect civilian populations against aerial bombing; abolition of submarines; prolonging the existing naval agreements concluded at Washington and London; proportional reduction from the figures laid down in the Washington and London agreements. (7)

 

Proposal of May 16, 1933

 

For more than a year the Conference at Geneva struggled with the tremendous problems involved-without making substantial progress. President Roosevelt made an effort in May 1933 to inject new life into the Conference. In a message of May 16 to the heads of 54 governments he stated that if all nations would agree to eliminate entirely from possession and use the weapons which make possible a successful attack, defenses automatically would become

 

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PEACE AND WAR

 

impregnable and the frontiers and independence of every nation would become secure. Therefore, he said, the ultimate objective of the Conference must be "complete elimination of all offensive weapons". His specific proposals were: Through a series of steps the weapons of offensive warfare should be eliminated; the first definite step should be taken at once; while these steps were being taken no nation should increase existing armaments over and above the limitations of treaty obligations; subject to existing treaty rights no nation should send any armed force of whatsoever nature across its own borders. (15)

Ten days before this message was sent, President Roosevelt had made clear to Dr. Schacht of Germany, President of the Reichsbank, who was in Washington as a special representative of the German Government, that the United States would insist that Germany remain in status quo in armament and that we would support every possible effort to have the offensive armament of every other nation brought down to the German level. The President intimated as strongly as possible that we regarded Germany as the "only possible obstacle" to a disarmament treaty; that he hoped Dr. Schacht would give this point of view to Hitler. (14)

 

Statement of May 22, 1933

 

One of the complications arising from the Disarmament Conference was that France felt that it could not agree to reduce armaments unless the United States and Great Britain would join with France and other nations in a system of collective security to enforce compliance on the part of Germany of provisions for arms limitation and reduction. It was argued that if League states took measures against an aggressor nation, there was no assurance that the United States would not interfere with these measures. In an effort to meet this objection and difficulty, Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the United States delegation at Geneva, stated to the Conference in an address of May 22, 1933 that the United States was ready not only to do its part toward the substantive reduction of armaments but that if this were effected by general international agreement, the United States was prepared to contribute in other ways to the organization of peace. In particular we were willing to consult other states in case of a threat to peace, with the view to averting conflict. Furthermore, in the event that the states, in conference, determined that a state had been guilty of a breach of the peace in violation of its international obligations and took measures against the violator,

 

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931-1941

 

then the United States, if it concurred in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party, would refrain from any action tending to defeat this collective effort for a restoration of peace. (17)

A few days later the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations rejected a proposal, urged by the Secretary of State, which would have permitted this Government to join with other governments in an arms embargo against an aggressor nation. (See p. 24.)

During a conversation on October 9, 1933 Secretary of State Hull discussed with the German Ambassador at Washington, Hans Luther the question of disarmament. The Secretary said that the purpose of the United States was the promotion of general disarmament; that the theory of this Government was that we should "wage a steady contest for the disarmament of the heavily armed nations rather than become parties to a plan for others to proceed to rearm". (19)

A plan was considered by the Disarmament Conference for certain immediate steps of disarmament and for progressive limitation and reduction of armaments. France proposed that instead of agreeing to steps being taken immediately and progressively there should be a period of trial in which to test German good faith. Germany refused to accept this proposal. On October 14, 1933 Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and on the same day gave notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations.

Consul General Messersmith at Berlin reported to the Department of State a month later that Germany would "fight shy of all conferences" on disarmament but would make constant professions of a will for peace and a desire to cooperate. He said that in the meantime Germany would go on rearming, as this was what Germany wanted to do and would do; that while all sorts of protestations might be made with regard to the reduction of armaments by other countries, what Germany was interested in was not so much the other countries' cutting down their armaments as having on its part a free hand, or rather time, to go ahead and rearm. (21)

The Conference continued at Geneva, without substantial progress Twenty-seven months after its opening, Chairman Norman H. Davis of the United States delegation made an address to the Conference surveying the disarmament situation. In this address of May 29 1934 Mr. Davis summarized as follows the attitude and policy of the United States: "We are prepared to cooperate in every practicable way in efforts to secure a general disarmament agreement and thus to help promote the general peace and progress of the world. We are furthermore willing, in connection with a general disarma-

 

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PEACE AND WAR

 

ment convention, to negotiate a universal pact of non-aggression and to join with other nations in conferring on international problems growing out of any treaties to which we are a party. The United States will not, however, participate in European political negotiations and settlements and will not make any commitment whatever to use its armed forces for the settlement of any dispute anywhere. In effect, the policy of the United States is to keep out of war, but to help in every possible way to discourage war." (34)

 

Japanese Denunciation of Naval Treaty of 1922

 

At the end of 1934 the Japanese Government gave notice of intention to terminate the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. In a statement made on December 29, 1934 Secretary Hull said that this notice was a source of genuine regret, as he believed that the existing treaties had safeguarded the rights and promoted the collective interests of all the signatories. (39)

 

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IV

 

WARNINGS OF DANGER 1933-1935

 

Secretary Hull's Conversation With the German Ambassador

 

ON NOVEMBER 2, 1933, in a conversation between Secretary of State Hull and German Ambassador Luther on the related questions of disarmament and world peace, the Secretary said that "the outlook in Europe at this distance for disarmament or for peace" did not appear very encouraging; that "a general war during the next two to ten years seemed more probable than peace"; that this country "had exerted itself in every way possible in support of the latter [peace] and against the possible recurrence of the former [war]", but that frankly he felt discouraged.

The German Ambassador quoted Hitler's statement to the effect that Germany would not seek the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, and that in his opinion this should quiet French apprehension. He added that the Saar question was an entirely separate one. (20)

 

Consul General Messersmith's Report From Berlin

 

The United States Consul General at Berlin, George S. Messersmith, who had been at that post since 1930, reported frequently to the Department of State during this period on the menace inherent in the Nazi regime. Mr. Messersmith expressed the view, in a letter of June 26, 1933 to Under Secretary of State Phillips, that the United States must be exceedingly careful in its dealings with Germany as long as the existing Government was in power, as that Government had no spokesmen who could really be depended upon and those who held the highest positions were "capable of actions which really outlaw them from ordinary intercourse". He reported that some of the men who were running the German Government were "psychopathic cases"; that others were in a state of exaltation and in a frame of mind that knew no reason; and that those men in the party and in responsible positions who were really worthwhile were powerless because they had to follow the orders of superiors who were suffering from the "abnormal psychology" prevailing in Germany. "There is a real revolution here and a dangerous situation", he said.

Consul General Messersmith reported further that a martial spirit was being developed in Germany; that everywhere people were seen

 

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PEACE AND WAR

 

drilling, including children from the age of five or six to persons well into middle age; that a psychology was being developed that the whole world was against Germany, which was defenseless before the world; that people were being trained against gas and airplane attacks; and that the idea of war from neighboring countries was constantly harped upon. He emphasized that Germany was headed in directions which could only carry ruin to it and create a situation "dangerous to world peace". He said we must recognize that while Germany at that time wanted peace, it was by no means a peaceful country or one looking forward to a long period of peace; that the German Government and its adherents desired peace ardently for the time being because they needed peace to carry through the changes in Germany which they wanted to bring about. What they wanted to do was to make Germany "the most capable instrument of war that there has ever existed". (18)

Consul General Messersmith reported from Berlin five months later, in a letter of November 23, 1933 to Under Secretary Phillips, that the military spirit in Germany was constantly growing and that innumerable measures were being taken to develop the German people into a hardy, sturdy race which would "be able to meet all comers". He said that the leaders of Germany had no desire for peace unless it was a peace in complete compliance with German ambitions; that Hitler and his associates really wanted peace for the moment, but only to have a chance to prepare for the use of force if it were found essential; and that they were preparing their way so carefully that the German people would be with them when they wanted to use force and when they felt that they had the "necessary means to carry through their objects". (21)

 

President Roosevelt's Address of December 28, 1933

 

In an address delivered at Washington on December 28, 1933 President Roosevelt stated that the blame for the danger to peace was not in the world population but in the political leaders of that population. He said that probably 90 percent of the people in the world were content with the territorial limits of their respective nations and were willing further to reduce their armed forces if every other nation would agree to do the same thing. He said that back of the threat to world peace were the fear and possibility that the other 10 percent might go along with a leadership seeking territorial expansion at the expense of neighbors and unwilling to reduce armament or stop rearmament even if everybody else agreed to non-aggression

 

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931-1941

 

and to arms reduction. He believed that if the 10 percent could be persuaded "to do their own thinking and not be led", we would have permanent peace throughout the world. (24)

 

Acting Commercial Attaché Miller's Report on the Nazis

 

Consul General Messersmith transmitted to the Department of State on April 21, 1934 a report by Acting Commercial Attaché Douglas Miller on the situation in Germany. The Consul General noted that the conclusions of the Attaché had been arrived at independently and that they accorded entirely with his own appraisal of the situation.

Mr. Miller stated that the fundamental purpose of the Nazis "is to secure a greater share of the world's future for the Germans, the expansion of German territory and growth of the German race until it constitutes the largest and most powerful nation in the world, and ultimately, according to some Nazi leaders, until it dominates the entire globe". He expressed the view that the German people were suffering from a traditional inferiority complex, smarting from their defeat in the war and the indignities of the post-war period, disillusioned in their hopes of a speedy return to prosperity along traditional lines, and inflamed by irresponsible demagogic slogans and flattered by the statement that their German racial inheritance gave them inherent superior rights over other peoples. As a result the German people, who were "politically inept and unusually docile", had to a large measure adopted the Nazi point of view for the time being.

The most important objective of the Nazis, according to Mr. Miller's analysis, was to retain absolute control of the German people This control, he said, had been gained by making irresponsible and extravagant promises; by the studied use of the press, the radio, public meetings, parades, flags, uniforms; and finally by the use of force. He said that the Nazis were at heart belligerent and aggressive; that although they desired a period of peace for several years in which to rearm and discipline their people, the more completely their experiments succeeded "the more certain is a large-scale war in Europe some day".

Mr. Miller warned that we must not place too much reliance on Nazi public statements designed for consumption abroad, which breathed the spirit of good-will and peace and asserted the intention of the Government to promote the welfare of the German people and good relations with their neighbors. The real emotional drive behind

 

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PEACE AND WAR

 

the Nazi program, he said, was not so much love of their own country as dislike of other countries. The Nazis would never be content in merely promoting the welfare of the German people; they desired to be feared and envied by foreigners and "to wipe out the memory of 1918 by inflicting humiliations in particular upon the French, the Poles, the Czechs and anybody else they can get their hands on". Hitler and the other Nazi leaders had capitalized on the wounded inferiority complex of the German people and had magnified their own bitter feelings "into a cult of dislike against the foreign world which is past the bounds of ordinary good sense and reason". Mr. Miller emphasized that the Nazis were building a tremendous military machine, physically very poorly armed, but morally aggressive and belligerent. The control of this machine was in the hands of "narrow, ignorant and unscrupulous adventurers who have been slightly touched with madness from brooding over Germany's real or imagined wrongs". Mr. Miller stated that the Nazis were determined to secure more power and more territory in Europe; that they would certainly use force if these were not given to them by peaceful means. (27)

 

Reported German-Japanese Entente

 

Throughout this period indications were received by this Government from various sources that Germany and Japan were drawing together in closer relations. The two countries were in similar situations in that each had left the League of Nations and each was already engaged in preparing militarily and otherwise a program of national expansion. In May 1934 the United States Military Attaché in Berlin, Lieutenant Colonel Wuest, reported that evidence was accumulating which tended "to show the existence of unusually close and friendly relations between Germany and Japan even to the extent of a possible secret alliance". This report stated further that these friendly relations between the two countries were dependent entirely upon self-interest; that the Germans usually expressed themselves to the effect that "we are encouraging close and friendly relations with Japan because it is to our advantage to do so but we must never forget that we are white people and they are not". (32)

Shortly thereafter, United States Consul Geist at Berlin reported to the Department of State that the German Government was bent on recovering Germany's military prestige and then seeing what could be obtained from the rest of the world. He said that German rearmament was concentrated upon power in the air and motorization of attacking forces; that the young Nazis were enthusiastic with regard

 

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931-1941

 

to military prospects; that they spoke of gas war, bacteriological war, and the use of death-dealing rays; that they boasted that airplanes would not pass the German frontiers; and that they had fantastic ideas about Germany's invincibility in "the next war".

Mr. Geist emphasized that the youth of Germany were being inculcated with an unprecedented, conscious, and deliberate love of militarism; that one of the amazing things of modern history was that the government of a great power should definitely teach children to cherish ideas of valor, heroism, and self-sacrifice, "unrelieved by any of the virtues which modern civilization has come to place above brute force". The Consul said that war might not be imminent but it was difficult to foresee how the bellicose spirit here can be restrained and directed into permanent channels of peace towards the end of this present decade". (36)

 

Addresses by Secretary Hull

 

In an address at Washington, May 5, 1934, Secretary of State Hull warned of the dangers in the international situation. He said that dictatorships had sprung up suddenly in place of democracies; that nations everywhere were narrowing their vision, their policies, and their programs; that each was undertaking more and more to visualize only itself and to live by itself; that numerous nations were "feverishly arming", taxing their citizens beyond the limit of ability to pay, and in many ways were developing a military spirit which might lead to war. He warned that it "would be both a blunder and a crime for civilized peoples to fail much longer to take notice of present dangerous tendencies".

Secretary Hull stated that international cooperation to promote understanding, friendship, and reciprocal benefits and conditions of peace was indispensable to the progress of civilization; that these international relationships had been practically abandoned; and that the entire political, economic, social, and moral affairs of most parts of the world were in a chaotic condition. The Secretary said that every Christian nation had an obligation to itself and to humanity to promote understanding, friendship, and peace. The civilization of the time was amply capable of meeting the unprecedented challenge which existing conditions offered and which must be met successfully unless the world was to be threatened with "another period of long night-such as the Dark Ages". He appealed to every individual to awaken and come to a realization of the prob-

 

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PEACE AND WAR

 

lems and difficulties facing all and of the necessity for real sacrifice of time and service. (30)

In another address of June 11, 1934 at Williamsburg, Virginia, Secretary Hull again warned of international dangers. He said that abroad there was reason "for the gravest apprehension"; that armaments were being increased; that the theory seemed to be abandoned that nations like individuals should live as neighbors and friends. He stated that the Government of the United States was striving to the utmost to make its fullest contribution to the maintenance of peace and civilization. (35)

 

Relations With Japan-1934

 

The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Koki Hirota, in a message delivered to Secretary Hull on February 21, 1934, stated that no question existed between the United States and Japan which was fundamentally incapable of amicable solution and emphasized that Japan had no intention whatsoever of making trouble with any other power. (25)

Secretary Hull replied on March 3, 1934 that it was the fixed intention of the United States to rely in the prosecution of its national policies upon pacific processes; that if there should arise any controversy between the United States and Japan, this Government would be prepared to examine the position of Japan in a spirit of amity and of desire for peaceful and just settlement. He expressed the hope that it might be possible for all countries interested in the Far East to approach every question arising between or among them in such spirit and manner that these questions might be regulated or resolved with injury to none and with definite and lasting advantage to all. (26)

Despite this encouraging exchange of views, there occurred almost immediately thereafter significant indications of an attitude inconsistent therewith on the part of the Japanese Government with regard to the rights and interests in China of other countries. These indications included a statement by Mr. Amau, spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office. On April 29, 1934, in accordance with instructions from Washington, Ambassador Grew presented to the Japanese Foreign Minister a note stating that the relations of the United States with China, with Japan, and with other countries were governed by the generally accepted principles of international law and the provisions of treaties to which the United States was a party; that treaties could

 

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931-1941

 

lawfully be modified or terminated only by processes prescribed recognized or agreed upon by the parties to them; that no nation could, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where there were involved the rights, the obligations, and the legitimate interests of other sovereign states; that the United States sought to be duly considerate of the rights, obligations, and legitimate interests of other countries, and it expected on the part of other governments due consideration rights, obligations, and legitimate interests of the United States.

In a conversation four days earlier the Japanese Foreign Minister had assured Ambassador Grew that Japan had no intention whatever of seeking special privileges in China, of encroaching on the territorial and administrative integrity of China, or of creating difficulties for the bona-fide trade of other countries with China; and that Japan would take no action in China purposely provocative to other countries. In reply, Ambassador Grew had said to the Foreign Minister that the Government and people of the United States would be less impressed by statements of policy than by more concrete evidence. (28)

On May 16, 1934 Secretary Hull had a general conversation with Japanese Ambassador Saito, one of many conversations in which the Secretary endeavored to convince the Japanese that their best interests lay in following policies of peace. Citing the commercial and military possibilities brought about by the remarkable advance in aviation, he said that twenty years ago no human being could have visualized the amazing changes that were taking place in every part of the world; that amidst these amazing changes the more highly civilized nations had correspondingly greater responsibilities and duties, from the standpoint both of their own progress and well-being and of that of the world. He expressed the belief that no highly civilized nation could let the people of other countries undergo a steady state of decline and even collapse without that civilized nation itself being drawn down in the vortex. He said that this meant that Japan and the United States, for their own self-preservation and for their world responsibility, should exhibit the utmost breadth of view and the most profound statesmanship. (31)

Three days later the Secretary talked again with the Japanese Ambassador. During the conversation the Ambassador repeated the formula which his Government had been putting forward publicly for some weeks to the effect that Japan had a superior and special function in connection with the preservation of peace in eastern Asia. The Secretary felt it desirable to bring to the Japanese Ambassador's

 

19


PEACE AND WAR

 

attention the clear implications contained in the Japanese formula of the intention on the part of Japan to exercise an overlordship over neighboring nations and territories. Accordingly, he inquired why the Ambassador's Government "singled out" the formula of Japan's claim to superior and special interests in "eastern Asia" and of her superior rights and duties in connection with the preservation of peace there; whether this formula had ulterior or ultimate implications partaking of the nature of an "overlordship of the Orient". The Ambassador protested that this was not the meaning intended.

The Secretary said to the Ambassador that there was universal talk about armaments on a steadily increasing scale, and that Japan and Germany were the two countries considered chiefly responsible for this talk. He said that if the world understood the absence of any Japanese intentions of overlordship or other unwarranted interference by the Ambassador's Government, Japan "would not be the occasion for armament discussion in so many parts of the world". (33)

A comprehensive appraisal of the situation in Japan was sent to the Secretary of State by Ambassador Grew in a despatch of December 27, 1934. The Ambassador reported that things were being constantly said and written in Japan to the effect that Japan's destiny was to subjugate and rule the world. He said that the aim of certain elements in the Army and Navy, the patriotic societies, and the intense nationalists throughout the country was "to obtain trade control and eventually predominant political influence in China, the Philippines, the Straits Settlements, Siam and the Dutch East Indies, the Maritime Provinces and Vladivostok, one step at a time, as in Korea and Manchuria, pausing intermittently to consolidate and then continuing as soon as the intervening obstacles can be overcome by diplomacy or force". With such dreams of empire cherished in Japan, and with a Japanese Army and Navy capable of "taking the bit in their own teeth and running away with it", we would be "reprehensibly somnolent", Ambassador Grew warned, if we were to trust to the security of treaty restraints or international comity to safeguard our own interests.

Continuing, the Ambassador said that there was a "swashbuckling temper" in the country, largely developed by military propaganda, which could lead Japan during the next few years to any extreme unless the saner minds in the Government were able to cope with it and to restrain the country from national suicide. He referred to the extreme sensitiveness of the Japanese people which, he said, arose out of a marked inferiority complex manifested "in the garb

 

20


UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931-1941

 

of an equally marked superiority complex, with all its attendant bluster, chauvinism, xenophobia and organized national propaganda". He characterized as "thoroughly mistaken" the idea that a great body of liberal thought lying just beneath the surface since 1931 would be sufficiently strong to emerge and, with a little foreign encouragement, assume control. The liberal thought was there, he stated, but it was inarticulate and largely impotent and probably would remain so for some time to come.

The Ambassador said that unless we were prepared to subscribe to the "Pax Japonica" in the Far East, we should rapidly build up our Navy to treaty strength, and when the Washington Naval Treaty expired we should continue "regardless of cost" to maintain the existing naval ratios with Japan; that Japan's naval policy had been formulated on a premise that the United States would never build up to treaty strength. He reported that almost half of the Japanese national budget for 1935-36 was for the Army and Navy.

Finally, the Ambassador declared, it would be "criminally shortsighted" to discard from calculations the possibility of eventual war with Japan; the best possible way to avoid it would be adequate preparation, as "preparedness is a cold fact which even the chauvinists, the military, the patriots and the ultra-nationalists in Japan, for all their bluster concerning 'provocative measures' in the United States, can grasp and understand". (38)

 

Defeat of Proposed Adherence to World Court

 

On January 16, 1935 President Roosevelt sent a message to the Senate, asking that the latter advise and consent to membership of the United States in the World Court. In his message the President said that such action would in no way diminish or jeopardize the sovereignty of the United States. He declared further that at this juncture, when every act was of moment to the future of world peace, the United States had an opportunity "once more to throw its weight into the scale in favor of peace". On January 29, 1935 the resolution of adherence was voted on by the Senate but failed of passage. (40)

 

Warnings February-June 1935

 

Secretary Hull, in an address on February 16, 1935 at New York, said that the enormous speeding up of trade and communications made futile any endeavor to induce the United States again to withdraw into "splendid isolation". Our policies must of necessity be

 

21


PEACE AND WAR

 

those of a great power; we could not, even if we would, "fail profoundly to affect international relations". The Secretary said that there had been a time when the ocean meant, or could mean, a certain degree of isolation; but that modern communication had ended this forever.

In this address Secretary Hull listed four pillars of a sound peace, structure: first, the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy; second, a promise of non-aggression; third, consultation in the event of a threat to peace; and fourth, non-interference on our part with measures of constraint brought against a deliberate violator of peace. In mentioning these peace pillars the Secretary emphasized that they might "readily crumble were they to be built on the shifting foundations of unrestricted and competitive armaments". Therefore, he said, the United States insisted that a real limitation and reduction of armament must be an essential concomitant of a peace program. (43)

Mr. Messersmith, who had been appointed Minister to Austria in 1934, continued to send to the Department of State reports on the situation in Germany. In February 1935 he reported that the Nazis had their eyes on Memel, Alsace-Lorraine, and the eastern frontier; that they nourished just as strongly the hope to get the Ukraine for the surplus German population; that Austria was a definite objective; and that absorption or hegemony over the whole of southeastern Europe was a definite policy. A few weeks later he reported a conversation with William E. Dodd, United States Ambassador to Germany, in which they had agreed that no faith whatsoever could be placed in the Nazi regime and its promises, that what the Nazis were after was "unlimited territorial expansion", and that there was probably in existence a German-Japanese understanding, if not an alliance. (41, 44)

During a conversation with German Ambassador Luther on March 28, 1935, Secretary Hull questioned the Ambassador regarding the reported objectives of Germany with respect to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Memel, and the Polish Corridor. The Ambassador denied each reported objective and insisted that his Government favored peace. The Secretary said that the German Government then had the greatest opportunity in two generations to make a remarkable showing of leadership with a program that would gradually bring Western Europe to normal political, social, and peace relations. He said that nations could either take this course or could continue more or less aloof from each other with misunderstanding of each other's motives, purposes, and objectives; the result

 

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931-1941

 

of the latter would be that each country would go forward and "arm to the teeth" so that at some stage a local incident might ignite the spark that would start a conflagration disastrous in ultimate effect to western civilization. (45)

In an address on June 12, 1935 Secretary Hull warned that there were ominous tendencies in the world. He referred to the reckless, competitive building up of armaments which if unchecked would result in national bankruptcies and consequent inevitable inflation together with the utter destruction of such national stability as had thus far been achieved. He said that the world could not extricate itself from this relentless circle if it did not stop its extravagant military expenditures; that the continuation of the armament race would "again plunge the world into disaster." (46)

In an address of a few days later the Secretary said that any clash abroad would dislocate the progress of recovery in the United States and that this country could not, in the long run, avoid the disastrous effects of such a clash. He could not, therefore, assure the people of the United States that they were immune from the effects of a possible conflict by being far removed from its locus or that they could "look without concern on the darkening clouds around the magic circle of the United States". (47)

 

Proposed Arms Embargo

 

In a letter of April 5, 1933 to the appropriate committees of Congress, Secretary of State Hull asked that Congress enact legislation authorizing the application of arms embargoes under certain conditions. A similar proposal had been strongly urged upon Congress early in 1933 by President Hoover and Secretary of State Stimson.

The terms of the legislation advocated by Secretary Hull were that whenever the President found that the shipment of arms or munitions of war might promote or encourage the employment of force in a dispute or conflict between nations and, after securing the cooperation of such governments as the President deemed necessary and after making proclamation thereof, it should be unlawful to export any arms or munitions of war from the United States to any country designated by the President. This proposal would have authorized cooperation by the United States in an arms embargo against an aggressor nation.

In supporting the proposed legislation Secretary Hull said that it would be exercised by any President "to the sole end of maintaining the peace of the world and with a due and prudent regard for our national policies and national interests". He said that the special

 

 

23


PEACE AND WAR

 

circumstances of each particular case which might arise would dictate what action, if any, would be taken, but the authority to act on terms of equality with other governments should be left to the discretion of the Executive. The Secretary said further that this Government should no longer be left in the position of being unable to join with other governments in preventing the supply of arms for use in an international conflict when it was exercising its diplomacy and the whole weight of our national influence and prestige to prevent or put an end to that conflict. Finally, he said that the enactment of the proposed legislation "would strengthen the position of this Government in its international relations and would enable us to cooperate more efficiently in efforts to maintain the peace of the world". (13)

In a statement made on behalf of Secretary Hull to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 17, 1933, it was declared that in certain cases this Government might concur in the opinion of the rest of the world in fixing the responsibility for a conflict upon an aggressor nation; that in such cases an international embargo on the shipment of arms to one party to the conflict might be deemed an equitable and effective method of restoring peace; that this method, nevertheless, "would certainly not be adopted by this Government without such effective guarantees of international cooperation as would safeguard us against the danger of this country's being involved in the conflict as a result of such action". (16)

Late in May the arms-embargo resolution, which had already been passed by the House of Representatives, was reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to the Senate with an amendment that any embargo established under it be applied impartially to all belligerents. Secretary Hull stated on May 29 that such an amendment was not in accord with the views of the President and of himself. The amended resolution was subsequently passed by the Senate but was not enacted.

 

Neutrality Legislation

 

In 1935 there developed considerable public support in the United States for an embargo on the export of arms to belligerents as a means of keeping the United States out of war. This support was based on the fallacious concept that the entrance of the United States into the World Wear in 1917 had been brought about by the sale of arms to belligerents. Under the influence of this concept and with the shadow of a new European war on the horizon the Congress

 

24


UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931-1941

 

passed a joint resolution in August 1935 providing that upon the outbreak or during the progress of war between or among two or more foreign states "the President shall proclaim such fact, and it shall thereafter be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war" from the United States to any belligerent country. This legislation also contained provisions for the licensing of arms exports, the prohibition of the carriage by United States vessels of arms to belligerent states, and the restriction of travel by United States citizens on vessels of belligerent states. This joint resolution, known as the Neutrality Act, was signed by President Roosevelt on August 31, 1935. In signing it the President said he had done so "because it was intended as an expression of the fixed desire of the Government and the people of the United States to avoid any action which might involve us in war". However, he said that the "inflexible" arms-embargo provisions "might drag us into war instead of keeping us out"; that no Congress and no Executive could foresee all possible future situations. (49, 50)

A few months later Secretary Hull, in referring to the Neutrality Act, warned that to assume that by placing an embargo on arms we were making ourselves secure from dangers of conflict with belligerent countries was "to close our eyes to manifold dangers in other directions". He said further that every war presented different circumstances and conditions which might have to be dealt with differently; that, therefore, there were apparent difficulties inherent in any effort to lay down by legislative enactment "inelastic rules or regulations to be applied to every situation that may arise"; that the Executive should not be unduly or unreasonably handicapped; that discretion could wisely be given the President. (57)

 

Montevideo Conference

 

The Seventh International Conference of American States assembled in December 1933 at Montevideo, Uruguay. There the Good Neighbor Policy set forth by President Roosevelt on March 4, 1933 was given concrete expression. In an address before the Conference on December 15, 1933 Secretary Hull expressed confidence that each of the American nations wholeheartedly supported the Good Neighbor Policy-that each earnestly favored "the absolute independence, the unimpaired sovereignty, the perfect equality, and the political integrity of each nation, large or small, as they similarly oppose aggression in every sense of the word".

The Secretary stated that peace and economic rehabilitation must

 

25


PEACE AND WAR

 

be "our objective" and avoidance of war "our supreme purpose"; that he believed profoundly that the American nations during the coming years would "write a chapter of achievement in the advancement of peace that will stand out in world history". He said that "while older nations totter under the burden of outworn ideas, cling to the decayed and cruel institution of war, and use precious resources to feed cannon rather than hungry mouths, we stand ready to carry on in the spirit of that application of the Golden Rule by which we mean the true good-will of the true good neighbor".

The Secretary asked that this be made the beginning of a new era, "a great renaissance in American cooperative effort to promote our entire material, moral, and spiritual affairs and to erect an edifice of peace that will forever endure"; that suspicion, misunderstanding, and prejudice be banished from every mind and genuine friendship for and trust in each other be substituted; that actions rather than mere words be the acid test of the conduct and motives of each nation; and that each country demonstrate by its every act and practice the sincerity of its purpose and the unselfishness of its relationship as a neighbor.

Finally, the Secretary said it was in this spirit that the Government and people of the United States expressed their "recognition of the common interests and common aspirations of the American nations" and joined with them "in a renewed spirit of broad cooperation for the promotion of liberty under law, of peace, of justice, and of righteousness". (22)

At Montevideo the 21 American republics agreed upon principles for peaceful international relations, in a convention on the rights and duties of states. This convention, of December 26, 1933, contained provisions that: No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another; the primary interest of states is the conservation of peace; differences of any nature which arise between states should be settled by recognized pacific methods; and territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained by force or other measures of coercion should not be recognized. Ratification of this convention was approved by the United States Senate on June 15, 1934; the convention was proclaimed by the President on January 18, 1935. (23)

Acting in the spirit and on the basis of the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy, the Montevideo Conference attempted to bring to an end the conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay which had broken out in 1932 as a result of a long-standing boundary dispute. Through the efforts of the Conference and a League of Nations commission a

 

26


UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931-1941

 

temporary armistice was brought about in December 1933. However, hostilities were soon resumed. The American nations continued persistent efforts to end the war, and in June 1935 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, and the United States succeeded in bringing about a termination of hostilities. As a result of an arbitral award delivered by representatives of these six countries, final settlement of the dispute was reached in 1938.

 

National Defense

 

In 1933 the enlisted strength of the United States Army was 115,000 men. As a result of reductions in governmental expenditures the War Department appropriation act of March 4, 1933 provided only $270,000,000 for the military activities of the Army-a sharp reduction from the amount made available for similar purposes during the previous year. General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, stated in his annual report of 1933 that successive reductions in appropriations had seriously injured the equipment and training of the Army. He said that the strength of the Army in personnel and equipment and its readiness for employment were "below the danger line".

In 1934 General MacArthur recommended a program of expansion for the Army; the accomplishment of this program, he said, would still leave us far behind all other major powers but would at least offer the United States "a justified assurance in freedom from attack or, at the worst, from extreme consequences in the event of attack".

The War Department appropriation act of April 1936 authorized an increase of the Army to 165,000 enlisted men. In his report of 1935 General MacArthur said that measures had been undertaken to procure additional airplanes, motorized vehicles, tanks, and artillery, in most of which the Army's supplies had become obsolete or inadequate.

By 1933 the United States Navy, in up-to-date ships, had fallen far below the tonnage allowed by treaty. In that year President Roosevelt allocated funds from the National Industrial Recovery Act for the purpose of constructing and equipping 32 naval vessels. The Secretary of the Navy reported in 1933 that no such building program had been undertaken by this country since 1916; that of the signatories to the naval treaties we alone had not undertaken an orderly building program designed to bring the Navy up to treaty strength. He recommended an orderly annual naval building and

 

27


PEACE AND WAR

 

replacement program which would "shortly give this country a treaty navy". He stated that the United States continued to strive for a reduction of armament by agreement but that the time had come when we could no longer afford to lead in disarmament by example. Other powers had not followed such a policy, he said, with the result that the United States found its relative naval strength seriously impaired. He said that our weakened position jeopardized the cause of peace, "because balanced armament fortifies diplomacy and is an important element in preserving peace and justice, whereas undue weakness invites aggressive, war-breeding violation of one's rights".

During 1934 the Vinson Naval Bill was enacted, authorizing the construction of ships up to the limits of the Washington and London Naval Treaties.

 

28


V

 

ITALIAN CONQUEST OF ETHIOPIA 1935-1936

 

Italian Preparations for War

 

ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1934 the United States Ambassador at Rome, Breckinridge Long, reported to the Secretary of State that rumors were current that Italy contemplated war against Ethiopia and was making extensive preparations to this end. Ambassador Long said he was convinced that preparations of an unusual sort were under way; he considered it quite possible that these preparations related to Ethiopia. A few months later, February 14, 1935, he reported to the Secretary of State that there were indications of general preparation for an extensive campaign in Ethiopia. The Ambassador reported that factories for the manufacture of trucks, tanks, and artillery at and around Milan were working day and night; that supplies and military forces were moving clandestinely; that concerted effort was being made to prevent any information getting out as to the size or general nature of shipments; that troop movements were at night; that embarkation was proceeding from several cities; that he had received reports that 30,000 troops had left Naples, and that the movement under way contemplated the use in Ethiopia of 200,000 or 300,000 troops; and that all of these movements were being camouflaged by the use of the regular merchant marine without using war vessels. (37, 42)

Italian preparations continued in the spring and summer and the danger of war became acute. Secretary Hull called in Italian Ambassador Rosso on July 10, 1935 to discuss the situation. He informed the Ambassador that the United States was deeply interested in the preservation of peace in all parts of the world. He emphasized the increasing concern of this Government in the situation arising cut of Italy's dispute with Ethiopia and expressed the earnest hope that a peaceful means might be found to arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution of the problem. (52)

On August 18, 1935 President Roosevelt sent a personal message to Premier Mussolini of Italy, stating that the Government and people of the United States felt that failure to arrive at a peaceful settlement of this dispute and a subsequent outbreak of hostilities would be a world calamity the consequences of which would adversely affect the interests of all nations. (48)

Ambassador Long cabled the Secretary of State on September 10, 1935 that there remained no vestige of doubt that Italy was irrevo-

 

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PEACE AND WAR

 

cably determined to proceed in Africa. The Ambassador reported that the entire population, both military and civilian, was in complete accord with Mussolini's policies; that the press in every issue gave expression of the national determination to proceed to war and not to tolerate interference from any source. There was every indication of a carefully prepared, well-calculated, "hard, cold, and cruel" prosecution of preconceived plans by the use of an army and navy which were almost fanatic in their idolatry of and devotion to one man and which were worked up to an emotional pitch unique in modern times. Ambassador Long expressed the view that the situation was fraught with dangers for the future as well as for the present. (51)

A few days later he pointed out in a despatch to the Secretary of State that the long period of friendly cooperation between Italy and Great Britain had come to an end; he feared that it would be generations before the situation could be cured. The Ambassador said that any estimate of future possibilities must be based on one of two alternatives: first, that sufficient force would be applied to stop Italy's adventure and to impose upon it a definite defeat by arms or, second, that Italy would be successful in attaining its objectives in Ethiopia. In the latter case, he said, there would be nothing but trouble in the future; for if the venture were successful, Italy would be emboldened to proceed to others. Ambassador Long declared that Italy must either be defeated "now" and prevented from realizing its ambitions in East Africa, "or the trouble will continue on through for a generation as an additional irritation to European politics and an additional menace to world peace". (53)

On September 12, 1935 Secretary Hull made a public statement of the attitude of this Government. He said that the United States desired peace; that we believed international controversies could and should be settled by peaceful means; that a threat of hostilities anywhere would be a threat to the political, economic, and social interests of all nations; and that armed conflict in any part of the world would have adverse effects in every part of the world. He stated that all nations had the right to ask that any and all issues between nations be resolved by pacific means; that every nation had the right to ask that no other nation subject it to the hazards and uncertainties that must inevitably accrue to all from resort to arms by any two. In conclusion, the Secretary said that this Government asked the parties in dispute to "weigh most solicitously" the pledge given in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which was made by the signatories for the

 

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931-1941

 

purpose of safeguarding peace and sparing the world the incalculable losses and human suffering that inevitably follow in the wake of war. (52)

 

Outbreak of War

 

During this period of threatening hostilities the League of Nations was endeavoring to prevent the outbreak of war. The Italian Government, however, refused to be deterred from carrying out its plan for conquest. On October 3, 1935 Italian armed forces invaded Ethiopia.

With the outbreak of war between Italy and Ethiopia President  Roosevelt, in accordance with provisions of the Neutrality Act, issued  proclamations putting into effect an embargo on the export of arms,  ammunition, and implements of war to the two belligerent nations and restrictions on travel by United States citizens on vessels of the  belligerents. Upon issuing these proclamations on October 5, 1935, the President stated that "any of our people who voluntarily engage in transactions of any character with either of the belligerents do so at their own risk". (54)

The League of Nations, after deciding that Italy had violated its obligations under the Covenant, recommended to its members a number of commercial and financial sanctions against Italy. While sanctions were under consideration, it was reported that the League might ask non-League countries to participate. Thereupon the Secretary of State instructed the United States representatives at Geneva, on October 9, 1935, that he considered it advisable for the League to understand that definite measures had already been taken by the United States in accordance with our own limitations and policies; that these measures included the restriction of commercial and financial transactions with the belligerents; and that we desired to follow our course independently, in the light of developing circumstances. A week later the Secretary again sent instructions explaining the attitude of the United States toward cooperation with other governments or with the League of Nations in relation to the Italian-Ethiopian conflict. He declared that the United States was acting on its own initiative with respect to the war and that its actions had preceded those of other governments. He said that the major policy of the United States was to keep from becoming involved in war that, however, this Government was "keeping thoroughly alive its definite conviction" that it had an obligation to contribute to the cause of peace in every practical way consistent with this policy. (55, 56)

 

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PEACE AND WAR

 

Secretary Hull, in a radio address on November 6, 1935, stated the position of the United States on the general subject of peace. He conceived it to be our duty and in the interests of our country and of humanity not only to remain aloof from disputes and conflicts with which we had no direct concern, but also to use our influence in any appropriate way to bring about the peaceful settlement of international differences. He said that our own interests and our duty as a great power forbade that we sit idly by and watch the development of hostilities with a feeling of self-sufficiency and complacency when by the use of our influence, short of becoming involved in the dispute, we might "prevent or lessen the scourge of war". (57)

During this period there was an increase in the export from the United States to Italy of war materials which did not come within the category of "arms, ammunition, and implements of war". There was no statutory authority for stopping these exports. In a statement of November 15, 1935 Secretary Hull said that the people of the United States were entitled to know that considerably increasing amounts of oil, copper, trucks, tractors, scrap iron, and scrap steel, which were essential war materials, were being exported for war purposes. He said that this class of trade was directly contrary to the policy of the Government of the United States. (60)

 

Secretary Hull's Conversation With the Italian Ambassador

 

Under instructions from his Government, Italian Ambassador Rosso called on the Secretary of State on November 22, 1935. The Ambassador referred to the various statements of the United States Government on the war between Italy and Ethiopia, especially the Secretary's statement of November 15, and said that although these statements applied formally and theoretically to both contending parties, it was well known that their practical result would be actually to impair the freedom of trade only with respect to Italy. The Ambassador said further that the statement of November 15 was contrary to the letter and spirit of the treaty of 1871 between the United States and Italy which accorded freedom of commerce and navigation to each contracting party; that the limitation on freedom of commerce envisaged by the statement of November 15 would constitute an "unfriendly act".

The Secretary replied emphatically that these trading incidents complained of by the Italian Government were trivial compared with the real problems and deep concern which the war caused the United States; that the Ambassador must realize the resulting awful reper-

 

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931-1941

 

cussions that made their immediate appearance in remote parts of the world, and which would give the United States and other nations unimaginable troubles for a generation. The Secretary said that this Government was immensely concerned with the possible spread of war to other countries at almost any time with serious consequences. He said that it was deplorable to see Italy moving forward with a war which it must realize threatened to create terrific problems and conditions so far-reaching that the imagination could not grasp their possibilities. He inquired why these considerations were not in the mind of the Italian Government before it went to war. He reiterated his surprise that Italy was upbraiding this Government because we showed our deep concern and were striving in every possible way to keep entirely out of the war.

The Secretary took up the Italian complaint that the United States had violated the treaty of 1871 and said that, with both Italy and the United States signatory to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, it was not possible to understand how Italy could go to war and announce to the United States that regardless of this pact we must supply Italy with materials of war or be guilty of an unfriendly act. The Secretary said that the people of the United States were convinced that Italy was under most solemn obligation to keep the peace, and it was incomprehensible to them to find Italy contending that to be neutral the United States must furnish war supplies.

In this long conversation the Secretary endeavored to impress upon the Ambassador that the United States and other peace-loving nations were greatly pained to see their traditional friends, the Italian people, involved in this war in spite of numerous peace treaties and despite the awful menace to the peace of the world. (61)

Italy continued the conquest of Ethiopia. By the spring of 1936 Italian military forces had overrun most of Ethiopia and on May 5 Addis Ababa, the capital, fell to the invader. Shortly thereafter, on June 20, the United States terminated the application of the Neutrality Act to the conflicting parties.

The United States never recognized Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia.

 

33


VI

 

DEVELOPING DANGERS 1936-1937

 

Warnings by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull

 

THROUGHOUT 1935 the world peace structure had continued to deteriorat